Analysis of information released by DOE on Possible Use of “Reactor Grade”

Plutonium in Nuclear Weapons

Karanam. L. Ramakumar
(Email: karanam.ramakumar@gmail.com)

Abstract: Information released by Department of Energy (DOE) on Possible Use of “Reactor

Grade” Plutonium in Nuclear Weapons has been critically analysed. The analysis is based on
published scientific literature and the information released by the Government Agencies. The
primary aim of the analysis is to estimate the Pu-240 content in the plutonium used in the
devise exploded in 1962. From the available literature, it was possible to conclude that Pu
used in the 1962 device contained about less than 20% Pu-240 (in the range 15 to 18%).
Possibility of using non-weapons grade plutonium in the nuclear weapons is also explored.

Keywords: nuclear weapons; plutonium; reactor grade; fuel grade; Calder Hall nuclear
reactor; DOE database on nuclear explosions

Introduction
The US government had announced in 1994[1] that a nuclear weapons test using 'reactor
grade' plutonium was carried out at the Nevada Test Site in 1962. The information was
declassified in July 1977 but additional information was provided in 1994. The yield of the
blast was less than 20 kilotons. According to DOE, extensive nuclear test database and
predictive capabilities maintained by US and the low yield test revealed that weapons can be
constructed with reactor-grade plutonium. The plutonium was provided by the United
Kingdom under the 1958 United States/United Kingdom Mutual Defence Agreement. Various
documents on this subject are available from different sources on the Internet. Based on the
downloaded documents an analysis has been carried out to review the information released
by the DOE. It may be mentioned that the analysis is based on scientific publications and the
information released by Government Agencies. The primary aim of the analysis is to estimate
the Pu-240 content in the plutonium used in the devise exploded in 1962. Possibility of using
non-weapons grade plutonium in the nuclear weapons is also explored.

Analysis of information provided by DOE

Details of nuclear test with “reactor grade” plutonium: About 1149 nuclear tests/detonations
were carried out by the USA between 1945 and 1992[2]. Ninety-six of them were carried out
in 1962. Two of these 96 tests used plutonium supplied by UK. The details are given below:

Test Test Date Sponsor Location Hole

No. (mm/dd/yyyy)
215 Pampas Accidental release 03/01/1962 LANL/UK NTS U3al
of radioactivity detected
offsite
299 Tendrac 12/07/1962 LANL/UK NTS U3ba
 Test Time Latitude Longitude Surface Type Purpose Yield
No. (GMT) (degrees) (degrees) Elevation Range
(meters)
215 19:10:00.09 37.041 -116.030 1196 Shaft Joint US-UK 9.5 kt
299 19:00:00.10 37.052 -116.030 1202 Shaft Joint US-UK Low

The DOE Fact sheet[1] mentioned that the yield was low (< 20 kt). It is therefore surmised
that the test no. 299 could have used “reactor grade” plutonium.

Nomenclature on different plutonium grades

The DOE fact sheet merely mentioned that reactor grade Plutonium was used in 1962 test.
The exact isotopic composition of the plutonium remains classified. It may be noted that until
1976, DOE had designated three different grades of plutonium[3]. These are:
 Super weapons grade, less than 3% Pu-240
 Weapons grade, less than 7% Pu-240
 Reactor grade, 7% or more Pu-240

The DOE definition of reactor grade plutonium changed in 1976. The revised grades are:
 Super weapons grade, less than 3% Pu-240
 Weapons grade, less than 7% Pu-240
 Fuel grade, ≥ 7% and < 19% Pu-240
 Reactor grade, ≥ 19% Pu-240

The US nuclear weapons test in 1962

As the first de-classification on using reactor grade Pu in nuclear weapons testing by DOE was
in 1977, some lingering uncertainty with regard to “reactor grade” nomenclature existed.
Added to this, which definition or designation, that of the old or new scheme applies to the
1962 reactor grade plutonium weapon test, has not been officially disclosed.

There was, however, consensus that UK plutonium came from Calder Hall nuclear power
reactors during late 1960s as at that time only Calder hall and Chapelcross nuclear power
reactors were operating. Primary purpose of these reactors was for production of weapons
grade plutonium and intermittently for electricity generation. Brief particulars of Calder Hall
reactor[4] relevant to the present context are:

Table-1. Relevant data for Calder Hall reactor

Electrical output (gross) 46 MWe
Thermal output (gross) 182 MWt
Efficiency 23 %
Material Natural uranium
metal
Mass of uranium per reactor 120 tonnes

Different interpretations were put forward to identify the grade of plutonium used in the test.
As the production and isotopic composition of plutonium depends on burnup, it would be
interesting to deduce the burnup of the Calder Hall fuel during the period of interest. From
the available literature it is seen that in case of MAGNOX type reactors, the cross-over from
fuel-grade (Pu-240 ≤ 18%) to reactor-grade plutonium (Pu-240 > 18%) occurs at a burnup
of around 3500 MWd/t [5]. Thus, estimating burnup of the MAGNOX fuel which was
reprocessed for separating Pu for shipment to the USA is desirable to possibly identify the
quality of plutonium used in the 1962 nuclear weapon test.

Burnup of the fuel could be estimated from the data given in the Table-1. Assuming the
reactor was continuously operating for 300 days,

Burnup (MWD/T) = (182 (MWt) x 300 (days))/120 (tonnes) = 455 MWD/T

However, for electricity production the reactors need to be operated at higher burnups. This
would also result in increased Pu-240 content in the fuel. Hinton[6] mentions that at its peak,
the station generated 196 MW — four times as much power as it did when it opened. This is
very close to the figure given by McCrickard[7]. Then the thermal power is estimated to be
784 MWt and assuming that the reactors operated again continuously for 300 days, the burn
up would be 1950 MWD/T. For producing plutonium with > 18% Pu-240, at least some of
the fuel elements in these reactors should have been irradiated to more than 3500 MWD/T
burnup and the reactors continuously operated for extended periods of time. For this purpose,
literature [8-11] was studied. Following observations could be made:

(a) Due to some systematic faults in the fuel, Calder Hall and Chapelcross reactors operated
at somewhat lower burnups than 2000 MWD/t during initial periods of operation[8].
(b) Later, MAGNOX civil reactor fuel elements and also some Calder Hall and Chapelcross
test fuel elements fabricated with modified specifications to address the causes of failure
were subjected to test irradiation in Calder Hall and Chapelcross reactors and had
undergone higher irradiations (channel average burnup of more than 3000 MWD/t)
resulting in higher Pu-240 content (> 18%)[9].
(c) The IAEA publication [10] gives average and maximum core burnup of Calder Hall fuel
as 2700 and 3900 MWD/t respectively for the year 1962. As the test was carried out in
July 1962, it is reasonable to assume that the fuel might have been discharged during
January 1962 for reprocessing to separate plutonium for shipment to the USA. It is
therefore necessary to estimate the average and maximum core burnup at the time of
discharge in January 1962 for deducing Pu-240 content.
(d) Stewart in his publication[11] gives details of irradiation history of fuel elements in
Calder Hall reactors. Some of the fuel elements loaded in 1958 were still undergoing
irradiation trials as of August 1963 and these fuel elements did see burnup exceeding
3000 MWD/Te as of August 1963. Suppose some of these fuel elements were selectively
removed for reprocessing to separate plutonium for shipment to the US for the 1962
test. As the 1962 test was carried out in July 1962, it is reasonable to assume that about
six months was needed to complete the process of the discharge the fuel elements,
reprocessing followed by shipment of the separated plutonium to the US for assembling
the devise. It would of interest to deduce burnup of these elements as on January 1962.

What could be the Pu-240 content in the plutonium used in the 1962 device?
As mentioned earlier, the DOE fact sheet merely mentioned that reactor grade Plutonium was
used in 1962 test. At that time according to DOE, plutonium with more than 7% Pu-240 was
designated as reactor grade. Subsequently DOE modified its nomenclature and defined
plutonium with more than 19% Pu-240 as reactor grade. Plutonium with Pu-240 content in
the range between 7 and 19% was designated as fuel grade. It would be of interest to deduce
Pu-240 content in the plutonium used in 1962 test to know if it was fuel grade (Pu-240 content
< 19%) or reactor grade (Pu-240 content > 19%). One may not get the accurate figure but
a reasonable accurate band may be enough for discussion.
Isotopic composition of plutonium produced in a nuclear reactor, among other things depends
on the burnup. Very low burnups are needed to produce weapon-grade plutonium with Pu-
240 content less than 7%. Higher burnups result in more and more Pu-240 production. A
knowledge of burnup the fuel was irradiated to would be useful in this regard.
The IAEA publication [5] gives average and maximum core burnup of Calder Hall fuel as 2700
and 3900 MWD/t respectively for the year 1962. As the test was carried out in July 1962, it
is reasonable to assume that the fuel might have been discharged during January 1962 for
reprocessing to separate plutonium for shipment to the USA. It is therefore necessary to
estimate the average and maximum core burnup at the time of discharge in January 1962 for
deducing Pu-240 content. The maximum core burnup at the end of 1961 was shown to be
about 3000 MWD/te.
Further, It should be mentioned that average burnup of a channel and an individual fuel pin
within the channel could be much higher than the core values.
Papers published by Steward in 1963 and 1964 listed channel average and individual pin
burnup values. Some relevant 1963 values given in Table 5 of the publication are reproduced
in the Table below:

High irradiation experience with natural uranium MAGNOX fuel in Calder Hall (CR) reactors
Description of Reactor Date loaded Irradiation position at August 1963
fuel element Number of Irradiation MWD/te
channels Mean Peak fuel
channel element
Calder Hall Mk. CR.1 September 1958 8 3440 4500
1A fuel element CR.3 June 1958 205 2600 3400
with coarse- 16 4180 5150
grained cans 32 1900 2500

These values are as on August 1963. Thus, it is seen that channel average and individual pin
burnup values are indeed much higher than the core values.
As the test was carried out in July 1962, it is reasonable to assume that some of the pins
might have been discharged during January 1962 for reprocessing to separate plutonium for
shipment to the USA. It is therefore necessary to estimate the channel average burnup and
peak fuel element burnup at the time of discharge in January 1962. For deducing Pu-240
content.

Estimating channel average burnup and peak fuel element burnup in January 1962
Hardy and Lawton[12] listed the fuel rating values for the inner zone configuration for Calder
hall reactor core. Maximum fuel rating was 3.48 MW/te and the average value for the channel
when computed is 2.66 MW/te. At 3.48 MW/te fuel rating the burnup of the element for one
year irradiation is calculated as 1270 MWD/te. Calculating back the peak fuel element burnup
at the time of discharge in January 1962 comes to about 3000 MWD/te. At this value Pu-240
content in the plutonium may not be more than 18%.
It should also be mentioned that even though the maximum fuel rating of 3.48 MWD/te was
mentioned, it seems the fuel did not actually see this level of fuel rating. Otherwise the peak
fuel element burnup should have been more than 6000 MWD/te instead of 5150 MWD/te as
given in the Table 5 of Stewart. Noting that the fuel elements were loaded in June, 1958, the
peak fuel element burnup of 5150 MWD/te would reach after 5 years at 3.48 MWD/te fuel
rating for 300 days of operation every year or 2.8 MWD/te fuel rating for the whole year of
365 days. Either way, at the time of discharge in January 1962, the burnup could have been
about 3400 MWD/te.
On the other hand, if it is assumed that full channel was discharged for reprocessing in January
1962, then the channel average burnup in January 1962 would be about 2850 MWD/te.
Thus, we have three values of burnup at the beginning of 1962: 2850, 3000 and 3400
MWD/te. Pu-240 content in plutonium at these burnup values range between 15 and 18%.
Thus, it may be assumed that Pu-240 content in the plutonium used in the 1962 US nuclear
weapon test might be in the range between 15 and 18%.

Reactor- or fuel- grade plutonium in DOE test

Thus, it is seen from the published literature that the highest burnup of Calder hall fuel during
the period under consideration (1956–1962) ranged between 2850 MWD/t and 3400 MWD/t
with Pu-240 content between 15 and 18%. It was reactor grade plutonium as per pre-1976
definition or fuel grade Plutonium as per post-1976 definition of Plutonium grades. Clinching
proof to this estimate comes from none other than another US DOE Publication. The DOE’s
publication of 1996 [13] clearly mentions that “under the Mutual Defence Agreement with the
United Kingdom from 1959 to 1980, the United States acquired a total of 5.4 MT of plutonium
(5360 kilograms) in exchange for 6.7 kilograms of tritium and 7.5 MT of highly enriched
uranium”. The report further says that this plutonium was of “primarily fuel grade” plutonium.
That means Pu-240 content in the material used was between 7% and 19%. In all probability,
the 0.4T of plutonium received from other countries was reactor grade. One may refer to the
Table 7 on page 44 of the report. It would be very clear why it had to be reactor grade. The
quality of plutonium could be undoubtedly reactor grade and also the period of Pu receipt is
also way beyond 1962. Surprisingly there was no reference to this statement in the DOE
publication of 1996 by any analyst/interpreter.

A note about using plutonium with more than 7% Pu-240 in nuclear weapons
Typically, nuclear weapons are designed so that a pulse of neutrons will start the nuclear
chain reaction at the optimum moment for maximum yield; background neutrons from
plutonium-240 can set off the reaction prematurely, and with reactor-grade plutonium the
probability of such "pre-initiation" is large. Pre-initiation [14] can substantially reduce the
explosive yield, since the weapon may blow itself apart and thereby cut short the chain
reaction that releases the energy. If pre-initiation occurs just at the moment when the
material first becomes compressed enough to sustain a chain reaction, the explosive yield
would be of the order of one or a few kilotons. Historically this yield is referred to as the "fizzle
yield". The term “Fizzle” had become synonymous to failure of a nuclear weapons test.
Treating neutron kinetics in a typical explosion device as purely deterministic in nature, it has
been shown[15] that the energy yield of a nuclear explosive decreases by one and two orders
of magnitude if the 240Pu content increases from 5 (nearly weapons-grade plutonium) to 15
and 25%, respectively. Thus in typical nuclear weapon with an expected yield of 20 kT with
5% Pu-240 device, the yield would reduce to 2 KT and 0.2 KT for 15% 240-Pu and 25% 240-
Pu devices respectively. These are “fizzle yields” according to conventional nomenclature but
are by no means fizzle. During 1958, the USA conducted series of nuclear weapons tests at
different locations at Pacific Proving Grounds [16]. In the nuclear test with code name Juniper,
it was indicated that a minimum threshold yield of 0.2 KT for a boosted primary is required
for a successful test. The test device had a diameter of ~37 cm, and a length of ~38 cm. It
weighed ~76 Kg and resulted in 65 kT yield. With optimum design configuration supported
by theoretical calculations, even with up to 25% Pu-240 containing plutonium device, it is
possible to realise this yield.
Observations on the information released by DOE
According to DOE
1. It was a successful test
2. The yield was less than 20 kilotons
3. The United States maintains an extensive nuclear test data base and predictive
capabilities. This information, combined with the results of this low yield test, reveals
that weapons can be constructed with reactor-grade plutonium.

The information released by the DOE is cryptic and many questions arise.
What were the criteria followed by the DOE to declare a test is successful or not?
Was the process of testing a success? Was the design of the weapon a success?
Was the DOE’s predictive capability a success?

The reason why the DOE did not give the yield figure is also very intriguing. There are many
instances where the DOE did publish the actual yield figures including very low values (less
than 10 kiloton). DOE had no hesitation to give these figures for weapons grade plutonium.
Bur for “reactor-grade” plutonium despite the fact that “Reactor-grade plutonium is
significantly more radioactive which complicates the design, manufacture and stockpiling of
weapons”, DOE felt otherwise. Another question that comes to mind is how low was this
figure? Finally, one is tempted to interpret the last point again in different ways. Did the DOE
indeed predict very low yield in this test? Or were the results of very low yield, formed the
basis for reassessing the predictive capabilities? Or did this test prompt the DOE to revisit the
classification terminology for plutonium grades to include fuel-grade in between weapons-
grade and reactor-grade? Could it be also the reason why the DOE declared that the plutonium
received from other countries including United Kingdom was primarily fuel-grade? One never
knows. But the analysis given above indicates that the plutonium used in the test could be
fuel-grade with Pu-240 content in the range 12 to 16%. One may give any name to the grade
of plutonium used in the 1962 test. It is immaterial whether it was reactor grade or fuel
grade. What is pertinent is the Pu-240 content. Treating neutron kinetics in a typical
explosion device as purely deterministic in nature, it has been shown [15] that the energy
yield of a nuclear explosive decreases by one and two orders of magnitude if the 240Pu content
increases from 5 (nearly weapons-grade plutonium) to 15 and 25%, respectively. Thus, in
typical nuclear weapon with an expected yield of 20 kT with a 5% Pu-240 device, the yield
would reduce to 2 KT and 0,2 KT for a 15% 240-Pu and 25% 240-Pu devices respectively.
These are “fizzle yields” according to conventional nomenclature but are by no means fizzle.
One should have no doubt about nuclear weapons built with reactor grade plutonium. 1962
test was the first test with RG plutonium and there is no way to say with confidence that the
Pu-240 content was between 20-23%. Safe statement could be Pu-240 was more than 12%
as at that time this plutonium was indeed reactor grade.
Sahin’s work shows how the yield of a weapon could change depending on the Pu-240 content.
This is where knowledge of actual yield value becomes important and crucial. On both the
counts the test would be deemed to be successful.

Conclusions
The purpose of this analysis in not intended to address the use of reactor- or fuel- grade
plutonium in nuclear weapons. In the current context of the spectre of nuclear terrorism and
the possibility of radiation dispersion devices, it is always safe to secure any plutonium
irrespective of its isotopic content. No purpose is served by proving or disproving of the use
of “reactor grade” or “fuel grade” plutonium in nuclear weapons. Plutonium being plutonium
it has to be treated with respect. The IAEA is absolutely right in declaring any plutonium
(except that with more than 80% Pu-238 content) to be brought under safeguards and
securing. It is also mandatory on the part of the countries having Plutonium containing more
than 80% Pu-238 to secure to prevent any malicious and terrorist activities.

References
1. DOE Fact Sheet:
https://www.osti.gov/opennet/forms.jsp?formurl=document/press/pc29.html#ZZ0
(US Department of Energy, 1994)
2. United States Nuclear Tests: July 1945 through September 1992, DOE/NV--209-REV
15, DOE (2000) and https://www.nnss.gov/docs/docs_LibraryPublications/DOE_NV-
209_Rev16.pdf
3. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reactor-grade_plutonium
4. Description of the Magnox Type of Gas Cooled Reactor (MAGNOX), S. E. Jensen and E.
Nonbol, Riso National Laboratory, Roskilde, Denmark NKS-2 (1998)
https://inis.iaea.org/collection/NCLCollectionStore/_Public/30/052/30052480.pdf
5. David Albright, Frans Berkhout and William Walker, Plutonium and Highly Enriched
Uranium 1996: World Inventories, Capabilities and Policies, Stockholm International
Peace Research Institute Oxford university press, New York (1997)
6. Lord Christopher Hinton, Calder Hall Nuclear Power Station, http://www.engineering-
timelines.com/scripts/engineeringItem.asp?id=778
7. J. McCrickard, The Development of Calder Hall and Chapelcross as Base Load Nuclear
Power Stations, in Proceedings of the Conference on Operating Experience With Power
Reactors, Vol. I, IAEA, Vienna, 4-8 June 1963 pp. 407-423
https://inis.iaea.org/collection/NCLCollectionStore/_Public/44/064/44064225.pdf
8. A Johnson, “Magnox Fuel Cycles,” Operating Experience with Power Reactors, Volume
II, International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna, 1963
9. The Development of Uranium-Magnox Fuel Elements for an Average Irradiation Life of
3000 MWD/te, H. K. Hardy et al., The Journal of the British Nuclear Energy Society,
Volume 2, 1963 (January 1963)
10. Operating experience with nuclear power stations in member states until end 1970
https://inis.iaea.org/collection/NCLCollectionStore/_Public/02/014/2014309.pdf.
11. J. C. C. Stewart, C.B.E., B.Sc., Development and Manufacture of Magnox Fuel, Proc.
Instn. Mech. Engrs., 1963-64 Vol 178 Pt I No 9 (227-240)
12. Hardy HK, Lawton H (1958) the assessment and testing of fuel elements, Second
United Nations international Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy,
a/conf.15/p/3o6 https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/4283557
13. Plutonium: The First 50 Years, DOE/DP-0137, DOE
(1996) http://fissilematerials.org/library/doe96.pdf
14. https://courses.physics.illinois.edu/phys280/sp2012/archive/Reactor-
Grade%20and%20Weapons-Grade%20Plutonium%20in%20Nuclear%20Explosives.pdf
15. Siimer Sahin, Reply to "Remarks on the Plutonium-240 Induced Pre-Ignition Problem
in a Nuclear Device", Nuclear Technology, 54, 431-432 (1981)
16. http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Usa/Tests/Hardtack1.html