Knowledge for What?

The Camelot Legacy: The Dangers of Sponsored Research in the Social

Sciences
The Rise and Fall of Project Camelot: Studies in the Relationship between Social Sciences and
Practical Politics by I. L. Horowitz
Review by: A. L. Madian and A. N. Oppenheim
The British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 20, No. 3 (Sep., 1969), pp. 326-336
Published by: Wiley on behalf of The London School of Economics and Political Science
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BOOK REVIEWS

Knowledge for what? the Camelot legacy

The dangersof sponsoredresearchin the social sciences*
Review Article

[INTRODUCTION: Project Camelot brought into focus general issues

of principle and practice of the greatest importance. The two dis-
cussions which appear below treat these issues from distinct points
of view: the first locates Camelot historically and points to its sig-
nificance for 'the relationship between social science and practical
politics' in the United States; the second attempts to illumine the
situation in Britain giving us, in Oppenheim's words, 'an opportunity
to learn from the American experience'-Review Editor.]

America's leading academic scientists became intimately involved

with governmental institutions during the second world war. The
honeymoon was disrupted by the use of nuclear weapons against the
Japanese. A somewhat less easy relationship based on mutual depen-
dence resulted; financial support for research was exchanged for a
variety of professional services. Compared to the physical scientists
the social scientists have long felt neglected; during the second world
war their principal function was as intelligence specialists. After the
war they were generally ignored, except by the C.I.A. and other
departments requiring the services of economists.
With the exception of psychological studies in the 'fifties and
economic studies from Roosevelt's 'New Deal' little use had been
made of social science by Government, prior to the War against
Poverty.2 If the War against Poverty marked the honeymoon period
for sociological and political studies, Project Camelot can be seen
as the equivalent of the earlier nuclear disruption in the relation
between government and the physical sciences. The disruption is less
easy to understand since, unlike the atom bomb, the project was
cancelled at a very early stage.
Project Camelot was an Army-sponsored project which was con-
* I. L. Horowitz (ed.), The Rise and Fall of Project Camelot: Studies in the
Relationship between Social Sciencesand Practical Politics, M.I.T. Press, 1967,
viii+385 pp. 96s.'
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ducted under the Special Operations Research Office of American

University in Washington D.C. for some months in 1965 prior to its
abrupt cancellation.
The Project had a number of purposes; at its most theoretical level
the project was concerned:
. . to determine the feasibility of developing a general social
systems model which would make it possible to predict and
influence politically significant aspects of social change in the
developing countries. Somewhat more specifically its objectives are:
First, to devise procedures for assessing the potential for internal
war within national societies;
Second, to identify with increased degrees of confidence those
actions which a government might take to relieve conditions which
are assessed as giving rise to a potential for internal war and:
Finally, to assess the feasibility of prescribing the characteristics of
a system for obtaining and using the essential information needed
for doing the above two things."

If successful the model was expected to yield perspectives and in-

formation which would aid the Army in its counter-insurgency
missions. The project was to be supported by a six million dollar
contract over a three to four year period. A substantial proportion
of these funds were to be expended in primary data collection in
foreign countries. The geographic focus was to be toward Latin
American countries. The project might charitably be viewed as a
wedding of social science and intelligence activities; less charitably
it might be viewed as an intelligence operation designed to be carried
out in the guise of academic research.
It seems highly likely that the potential contribution of social
science was taken over-seriouslyby the Army; in any case outstanding
specialists were procured. Among those who served on the project
during its initial stages were Professors James S. Coleman, Lewis
Coser, William Kornhauser, Neil Smelser, S. N. Eisenstadt, Gino
Germani, W. J. Goode, Jessie Bernard, Harry Eckstein, Thomas
Schelling, Gordon Tullock, William Riker, and Theodore Draper.'
Major responsibility for the design was undertaken by Professors
Nehnevasja, Coleman, Bernard and Robert Hefner.
Camelot was exposed through the actions of Hugo Nutini, an
assistant professor of anthropology at the University of Pittsburg, who
attempted to recruit staff for the project in Chile without indicating
the source of financial support as the Army. Some of the Chilean
social scientists had received an accurate picture of the project from
Johan Galtung,5 a Norwegian sociologist working as a Unesco Pro-
fessor in Chile who had been invited to serve as a consultant. Nutini
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was confronted with the Galtung revelations. The local repercussions

can be seen most clearly in Boletim 10.488.6 The local reaction in-
cluded protests to the State Department by the U.S. Ambassador,
Ralph Dungan, and the project was cancelled. Subsequently a presi-
dential order was issued giving the state department responsibility
to authorize government sponsored research abroad. The Army's
sponsorship of Camelot caused considerable unease in the Senate and
State Department as well as in the Universities.
The easy assumptions of compatibility of social science and policy
research were opened to question.' Individual scholars and profes-
sional societies are raising two types of questions concerning foreign
area research. The first set of questions arises out of professional self
interest; it concerns the extent to which social science activities are
likely to be jeopardized in foreign areas if the government, particu-
larly the military, sponsors research which has a clear intelligence
value. The second set of questions concerns the ethics of using
professional skills and access in the service of government policies;
policies which are seen by some to be imperialistic and therefore
illegitimate. Kalman Silvert8 deals with both sets of problems with
characteristic candour.
The present unease among American students of the third world
in regard to policy oriented research doubtless owes more to the Viet-
nam war than to the combination of the Camelot revelations and the
Ramparts revelations of C.I.A. infiltration of foreign area research
projects, foundations, and private organizations working abroad.
The collaboration of academic institutions with government, in
support of policies which are unpopular with the vast majority of
students and younger staff in the social sciences, had led to a large
proportion of the increasing unrest on the campuses of America's
leading universities. In many cases leading American universities
(such as M.I.T., Johns Hopkins and the University of California,
Berkeley) receive a large proportion of their funds from administer-
ing government contracts which are defence-related. It is not unusual
for contract research conducted by such universities to equal or
exceed their total teaching budget; as a result their administrations
often become more adept at serving the government than at serving
teaching staff and students. When the government, or its policies, is
unpopular such relations almost inevitably lead to conflict.
It seems likely that many of the professional associations will move
in the next few years to prohibit their members from doing certain
types of government sponsored policy research abroad whether under
university or other auspices. Moves in this direction have already
been made by the anthropologists. Research prohibitions may well
be imposed by universities as well. Research prohibitions will be
seen by some as an infringement of academic freedom and by others
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as a means of maintaining professional or academic integrity, or

campus peace, or both.
It is ironic that this move to divorce academia from government
is the principal legacy of Camelot. The name Camelot was borrowed
directly from the Lerner and Lowe musical to characterize the 'en-
lightened pragmatism' and 'grace' of the Kennedy administration,
which was seen by social scientists as their own. The promise of
Kennedy's Camelot has entered tragically into history and myth along
with its legendary predecessor. The Army's Camelot, both in terms
of scientific conception and execution, was closer to farce than to
tragedy. But the Army's Camelot also supported a political concep-
tion promoting America as policeman to the world which is likely to
have extremely serious consequences both for American and inter-
national politics. The reassessment of the U.S. role was provoked
by the failure of the U.S. Vietnam war effort and the success of
the McCarthy campaign, supplemented by the extent and intensity
of other opposition to the war. Project Camelot demonstrates the
degree to which Vietnam is simply an extreme manifestation of a
more general policy, which is being fiercely contested. If the exposure
of Camelot provides leverage for those who wish to reorient the more
general policy it may prove to have been invaluable to both govern-
ment and the 'socialscience community'. If the attempt at reorientation
fails, Camelot may be seen as a prototype of the activities of one
branch of what will become an increasingly polarized social science
community.9 In either case Project Camelot holds lessons for the
future.
A. L. Madian
Lecturer in Political Science, London School of Economics

Notes
1. See also, Boletim Num. 10.488
Caimarade Diputados de Chile, In-
forme de la Comision Especial . . .
Para Investigar... 'Plan Camelot'...,
302 pp., I.G.M., 1966.
U.S. House of Representatives,89th
Congress, Second Session, House Re-
port No. 1224. 'Behavioral Sciences
and the National Security',Report No.
4, togetherwith Part IX of the hearings
of 'Winning the Cold War: The U.S.
Ideological Offensive'by the Sub-com-
mittee on International Organizations
and Movementsof the Committee on
Foreign Affairs,House of Representa-
tives, etc., 203 pp. Government Print-
ing Office.
329
House of Representatives, 9oth Con-
gress, First Session. The Use of Social
Research in Federal Domestic Pro-
grams, 4 vols., April 1967. Staff study
for the Research and Technical Pro-
grams Subcommittee of the Committee
on Government Operations.
Part I: Federally Financed Social
Research - Expenditures,
Status, and Objectives,
379 PP-
Part II: The Adequacy and Useful-
ness of Federally Financed
Research on Major National
Social Problems, 635 pp.
Part III: The Relation of Private
Social Scientists to Federal

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Review Article

Programs on National Social 5. Galtung's account appears in

Problem, 605 pp.
Part IV: Current Issues in theAdmin-
istration of Federal Social
Research, 658 pp.
2. For an indication of the current
extent of government-sponsored social
research, see 'The Use of Social Re-
search', op. cit.
3. Excerpt from the official proposal
reprinted in Horowitz, op. cit., pp.
47-8.
4. A complete list of consultants is
available in H.R. 1224, op cit., p. 62,
indications of what some of them did
is available in Bernard's essay in
I. L. Horowitz, op. cit.
Horowitz, op. cit. Galtung's major
criticism of the project was the lack of
symmetry, resulting from focusing re-
search entirely on Latin America
rather than on both the U.S. and Latin
America, and defining the research in
terms of the 'needs' of the U.S.
6. Op.cit.
7. The assumed compatibility had
been formally buttressed by the 'policy
science' perspective of such scholars as
Harold Lasswell, Daniel Lerner and
I. de Sola Pool.
8. In Horowitz, op. cit.
9. Evidence for this view proliferates
in H.R. 1,24, op. cit.

Not all of us are sufficiently aware of the amount and type of research
in the social sciences which is, or has been, government-sponsored.
Project Camelot may have been the largest of its kind, but it is by no
means unique.
At M.I.T. (which receives more than two-thirds of its budget from
the Department of Defence) the Center for International Studies has
carried out a large number of sponsored studies dealing with Com-
munist China, the U.S.S.R., North Vietnam, guerilla warfare, etc.
Some Ph.D. students at M.I.T. work on classified material and can
only be supervised and examined by professors with the necessary
'clearance'. Members of the staff of the Harvard Center for Inter-
national Affairs advise the American Defence and State Departments
on foreign policy matters. There are Department of Defence sup-
ported studies at many American (and foreign) universities, includ-
ing the Security Studies Project at U.C,L.A. and the now discon-
tinued Project Michelson which started defence-sponsored research
in many academic institutions. The work of the Office of Naval
Research and the Rand Corporation is well-known, but that of the
Systems Development Corporation perhaps less so.
In Britain, this kind of research has not as yet developed to the
same extent, though, for example, psychological research sponsored
by the Department of Defence is being carried out at some of our
universities. There are signs, however, that various government
departments are showing a growing interest in the social sciences,
through the placement of research contracts, commissioning theoreti-
cal papers and the recruitment of advisers and consultants.
The physical sciences have long had to wrestle with these problems,
and with the ethical issues which they pose. (Leonardo da Vinci was,
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for a time, chief engineer to Cesare Borgia's army.) Various govern-

ment departments have also long supported research in education
and in the medical and biological sciences. There is likewise no great
novelty in finding, say, an academic economist being seconded to
government departments, or in having academics as members of
various departmental boards and committees, most of which are
policy-oriented. However, sociologists, social psychologists, social
anthropologists, political scientists and many others are relatively
new to these hazardsand opportunities, and have not yet worked out
their collective attitudes. We have an opportunity to learn from the
American experience.
What kinds of sponsors?
Basically, we are dealing here with a two-way traffic:
(a) from the governmental sponsors and the universities flow
money and facilities, prestige, and opportunities for access and
influence;
(b) in return, they receive advice, research results and technical
assistance.
Government departments are the sponsors that will primarily
concern us; in Britain these often feel that they have special claims
on assistance from academics, because the major source of university
finance is the Treasury, via the University Grants Committee. In the
United States, a good deal of research is sponsored by Health and
Education, and by Defence (less openly) and State (still less openly).
Project Camelot, which was sponsored by the U.S. Army without full
consultation with the State Department, came to grief partly because
it seemed to shade over into an intelligence operation.
To a lesser extent, international organizations sponsor social re-
search at universities, including N.A.T.O., the I.L.O., Unesco, and
others.
Independent foundations and trusts are another source of sponsor-
ship; it is often necessary to tailor research proposals to their known
policies and interests if an application is to be successful.
We must not neglect to mention sponsorship of research by indus-
trial and commercial firms. This is quite common in physical sciences
such as engineering or inorganic chemistry; in the social sciences the
work is more likely to involve some aspects of marketing, but quite
different problems, such as automobile safety, may also be supported.
In commercial and industrial commissioned studies we see perhaps
the closest relationship between research and the direct interests of
the sponsor.
We should draw particular attention to the existence of 'buffer'
institutions; by this we mean organizations such as the Social Science
Research Council, the National Science Foundation, the Medical Re-
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search Council and the Advanced Research Projects Agency. These

receive lump sums of money from the government, but they develop
their own sponsoring policies (within their terms of reference) and
may help to safeguard the academic from direct pressures by govern-
ment departments. It may well be that the more buffer institutions
of this kind will in future offer one type of solution to our prob-
lems.
It is perhaps worth pointing out that most universities have but
small funds for research, and must rely heavily on commissioned re-
search and grants from outside sources.

In what follows, we shall not concern ourselves with research labora-

tories and institutes wholly run by government departments. Many
would regard their work and their staff as non-academic, especially if
the research is of a secret nature and cannot be published. Scientists
working in such institutions may be regarded as having left the
'scientific community' and as no longer bound by its ethos of free,
international exchange of information. If they disagree with govern-
ment policy, or with the use to which their results may be put, then
it is open to them to resign.

The dangers of direct government sponsorship

Doubts, objections and criticisms have been expressed in many ways,

which can be summarized as follows:

(1) Violation of the ethos of free exchange of information

This refers to the lack of freedom to publish, to the need for a security
'clearance', the signing of the Official Secrets Act declaration, to
closed laboratories and locked sections of libraries, and to secret
Ph.D.s. To find these kinds of restrictions around a university is con-
sidered by many to be particularly offensive, and out of step with the
true functions of a university.

(2) Dangers to academic freedom

Arguments quoting dangers to academic freedom tend to be a little
vague, at times: freedom for what, or from whom? The very exist-
ence of secret research in any university is taken by some to con-
stitute a violation of academic freedom, presumably meaning the
freedom to publish or exchange information. Perhaps more signifi-
cant is the danger of pressures from sponsors, in particular political
pressure; it may curtail the academic's freedom to follow his research
to its conclusions, if these conclusions militate against existing
government policy. The 'disinterested pursuit of knowledge for its
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own sake' ceases to be disinterested-though some will no doubt

argue that it never was, and that we merely substitute one set of
interests for another, someone else's for our own.
Paradoxically, in some of the physical sciences we have heard the
argument that academic freedom is being violated if scientists are
not allowed to take part in secret research. It would seem that, in
some disciplines, the most advanced research and the best technical
facilities are to be found in secret government-sponsored laboratories
on various campuses; to be cut off from these is to be excluded from a
significant body of advanced work, and thus is said to be a curtail-
ment of academic freedom.
(3) Influence on the direction of research
Sponsorship can influence the direction in which research develops
at universities; it creates competition for grants, it can offer privileged
access and facilities, and distributes power and prestige. In some
cases, a significant part of senior staff members' pay consists of re-
search directors' salaries or emoluments. All these pressures create a
subtle trend towards trying to please potential sponsors, seeking to
have grants extended; it also invites the danger of sycophantic con-
clusions.
Altogether it gradually involves the academic in parts of the
governmental machine, and not all of us have long spoons. The
academic may allow his prestige and status to be 'used', he may be
tempted to support a given policy for political reasons although
scientific evidence in its favour is inconclusive. His integrity may be
eroded by powerful pressures, and he may find himself giving priority
to the needs of his sponsors rather than to the needs of his students
of the demands of 'pure' research.
(4) Splits in the academic community
It is certainly a feature of the aftermath of Project Camelot, and of
the current academic scene in the United States, that past or current
participation in government sponsored research is seen by some as a
dangerous form of contamination, or worse.
Now if a British sociologist has been asked by H.M.G. to go
to Aden and advise the local authorities on the best approach to
ensure peaceful withdrawal of British forces, would we approve? If
a social psychologist had been advising the Commonwealth Office on
how to deal with U.D.I. in Rhodesia, what would we have said?
Without wishing to argue these cases either way, let us note that
this kind of thing does cause considerable unease in universities, and
may cause major upheavals and a souring of the academic climate in
a way that links with government departments dealing with health
or economics hardly ever do.
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(5) Violation of supra-national ideology

Government-sponsored research or advisorships in the fields of
defence or foreign relations are likely to be nationalistic in aim-
which is one reason for secrecy. The work will, in principle, be aimed
either at strengthening our own forces (through greater efficiency,
better use of scientific knowledge, various protective measures, im-
proved forecasting, etc.) or at harming the other side, especially in
these times of trouble. This may be contrasted with the supra-
national ideal embraced by scientists and universities, whose search
for knowledge is supposed to be 'for the common good', or at least
not in order to cause harm or discomfort to anyone else.
Against this, appeals are made to the virtues of patriotism, or to
the need for self-preservation. If 'pure' knowledge is being 'mis-
used' then either it was never 'pure' or else the cause is 'just', or
anyway only 'temporary', or else the academic need not feel respon-
sible for what others may do with his findings concerning, say, the
causes of revolutions, the communication methods of guerillas, or the
most effective ways of getting enemy soldiers to defect. In a nation at
war, and with the sheer scale of governmental sponsorship, some find
the supra-national ideal hard to sustain; others may never have
believed in it anyway.
(6) Dangers to peace
This ties in with the preceding point. To what extent are the univer-
sities guardians of peace, and repositories of international good-will?
If so, is this because they can speak out with an independent voice?
Is this the true meaning of academic freedom.

SOME POSSIBLE REMEDIES

If the example of the physical sciences-who have long suffered from

these dilemmas, more especially since the advent of the atomic bomb
-is anything to go by, then an important prerequisite to any institu-
tionalized safeguards must be the heightened awareness of the issues,
and vigorous public discussion among social scientists. Such debates
will help to arouse watchfulness, and may lead to the development of
some commonly accepted norms or standards. In due course these
will make it easier for academics to refuse to do secret policy-oriented
research, if they are so minded; they will not have to go to the lengths
of making a self-righteous moral stand, but would be able to refer to
accepted norms and practices. Some universities might actually en-
force such rules-indeed some already do-but academics can easily
do this kind of work in their spare time, or set up a private company.
The wider acceptance of the principle of operating only through
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'buffer institutions' is probably the most helpful practical remedy,

more particularly in freeing the scientist from political pressures.
Unfortunately, buffer institutions can themselves become powerful,
especially when they have a virtual monopoly of sponsorship in a
given field; they may develop rigid policies and requirements, direct-
ing research towards or away from certain areas. Nevertheless, one
would think that buffer institutions are always preferable to direct
government sponsorship,at least in policy-oriented research in defence
and foreign relations.
The sponsoring department acquires much of its power to
influence from its financial might, and not infrequently from its
monopoly position in the field. To counteract both these effects we
would like to see more uncommitted research funds within univer-
sities, and greater diversity among the larger foundations. As the
social sciences become more technical and begin to tackle bigger
problems, they will require larger sums of money; it is important
that this should not drive them into the arms of government sponsors
alone.
The individual research worker will often be confronted with a
crisis of conscience, and he may cast about for a simple rule. He might
do worse than to apply the can-I-publish test, or, if publication is not
immediately possible, the can-I-publish-within-a-yeartest. (We ought
to bear in mind that applied research for industry or commerce is
often not published for fear of benefiting a competitor, but this seems
less sinister.) As an alternative, we may offer the whom-will-it-hurt/
whom-will-it-benefit test, especially in respect of research for the
armed forces; this test is more difficult to apply than the first, but it
might have prevented many social scientists from taking part in Pro-
ject Camelot. In other words, we cannot close our eyes to the likely
application of our findings, and by accepting sponsorship we accept
a measure of responsibility. A third test might be: am I required to
sign the Official Secrets Act? But, admittedly, access to some research
materials would become impossible without signing.
The individual's decision is even more difficult in the case of
secondments, advisorships, membership of governmental commis-
sions, etc. . . . It is difficult to remain indifferent to requests and
subtle blandishments of influence and prestige; later on, it is still
more difficult to retain one's scientific integrity when pressed to help
make decisions for which scientific evidence is lacking. The call of
patriotic duty is strong, and it may actually be true that these experien-
ces feed back in one's later academic teaching and research. What
should a social scientist do who is invited, say, to join a committee
designing new selection methods for submarine crews? Or to help
prune the foreign service? In the end, the decision may well depend
on one's own political conscience, and on one's attitudes to the
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policies of the government in power. And, incidentally, no-one should

make the mistake of thinking that he can outwit the mandarins of
Washington at their own game!
Having said all this, it remains to point out that the universities
and the social sciences do not exist in a vacuum; they and their mem-
bers are products of their times and cultures, with built-in biases and
distortive conventions. It is hardly fair to hold up the 'disinterested
pursuit of knowledge' as an ideal with which to brow-beat politicians
and civil servants-even within universities research often gets done
for the 'wrong' reasons, and problem choice reflects all kinds of
personal and social biases. Nor are we always as prompt in our pub-
lishing habits as we should be. Moreover, not everyone would agree
that the near-anarchy and free-enterprise entrepreneurial ideology
which prevails at the frontiers of research is necessarily better than a
planned, sponsored, directed assault on a series of problems; in the
past, and in other fields, both methods have paid off at times. Often
we do not know how to proceed, or where; because no-one knows
what will be of benefit in the long run.
A. N. Oppenheim
Reader in Social Psychology, London School of Economics

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