republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-21049 December 22, 1923

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ISAAC PEREZ, defendant-appellant.

Mario Guariña for appellant.

Attorney-General Villa Real for appellee.

MALCOLM, J.:

Isaac Perez, the municipal secretary of Pilar, Sorsogon, and Fortunato Lodovice, a citizen of
that municipality, happening to meet on the morning of April 1, 1992, in the presidencia of Pilar,
they became engaged in a discussion regarding the administration of Governor-General Wood,
which resulted in Perez shouting a number of times: "The Filipinos, like myself, must use bolos
for cutting off Wood's head for having recommended a bad thing for the Filipinos, for he has
killed our independence." Charged in the Court of First Instance of Sorsogon with a violation of
article 256 of the Penal Code having to do with contempt of ministers of the Crown or other
persons in authority, and convicted thereof, Perez has appealed the case to this court. The
question presented for decision is, What crime, if any, did the accused commit?

A logical point of departure is the information presented in this case. It reads in translation as
follows:

That on or about April 1, 1922, in the municipality of Pilar, Province of Sorsogon, Philippine
Islands, the said accused, Isaac Perez, while holding a discussion with several persons on
political matters, did criminally, unlawfully and wilfully and with knowledge that Honorable
Leonard Wood was the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands and in the discharge of his
functions as such authority, insult by word, without his presence, said Governor-General,
uttering in a loud voice and in the presence of many persons, and in a public place, the following
phrases: "Asin an mangña filipinos na caparejo co, maninigong gumamit nin sundang asin
haleon an payo ni Wood huli can saiyang recomendacion sa pag raot con Filipinas," which in
English, is as follows: "And the Filipinos, like myself, must use bolos for cutting off Wood's head
for having recommended a bad thing for the Philippines.

Contrary to article 256 of the Penal Code.

At the trial of the case, two witnesses were called on behalf of the prosecution and three
witnesses on behalf of the defense. According to the first witness for the Government, Juan
Lumbao, the municipal president of Pilar, what Perez said on the occasion in question was this:

"The Filipinos, like myself, should get a bolo and cut off the head of Governor-General Wood,
because he has recommended a bad administration in these Islands and has not made a good
recommendation; on the contrary, he has assassinated the independence of the Philippines and
for this reason, we have not obtained independence and the head of that Governor-General
must be cut off." Higinio J. Angustia, justice of the peace of Pilar, in a written statement, and
Gregorio Cresencio, another witness for the prosecution, corroborated the testimony of the first
witness. Cresencio understood that Perez invited the Filipinos including himself to get their
bolos and cut off the head of Governor-General Wood and throw it into the sea.

The witnesses for the defense did not deny that an altercation took place on the morning of April
1, 1922, in which the accused participated. But they endeavored to explain that the discussion
was between Perez and one Severo Madrid, the latter maintaining that the fault was due to the
Nacionalista Party, while Perez argued that the Governor-General was to blame. The accused
testified that the discussion was held in a peaceful manner, and that what he wished to say was
that the Governor-General should be removed and substituted by another. On the witness
stand, he stated that his words were the following: "We are but blaming the Nacionalista Party
which is in power but do not take into account that above the representatives there is Governor-
General Wood who controls everything, and I told him that the day on which the Democrats may
kill that Governor-General, then we, the Filipinos will install the government we like whether you
Democratas want to pay or not to pay taxes."

The trial judge found as a fact, and we think with abundant reason, that it had been proved
beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused made use of the language stated in the beginning
of this decision and set out in the information. The question of fact thus settled, the question of
law recurs as to the crime of which the accused should be convicted.

It should be recalled that the fiscal named, in the information, article 256 of the Penal Code as
having been infringed and the trial judge so found in his decision. The first error assigned by
counsel for the appellant is addressed to this conclusion of the lower court and is to the effect
that article 256 of the Penal Code is no longer in force.

In the case of United States vs. Helbig ([1920], R. G. No. 14705 1), the accused was charged
with having uttered the following language: "To hell with the President of the United States and
his proclamation!" Mr. Helbig was prosecuted under article 256, and though the case was
eventually sent back to the court of origin for a new trial, the appellate court by majority vote
held as a question of law that article 256 is still in force.

In the case of People vs. Perfecto ([1922], 43 Phil., 887), the accused was charged with having
published an article reflecting on the Philippine Senate and its members in violation of article
256 of the Penal Code. In this court, Mr. Perfecto was acquitted by unanimous vote, with three
members of the court holding that article 256 was abrogated completely by the change from
Spanish to American sovereignty over the Philippines, and with six members holding that the
Libel Law had the effect of repealing so much of article 256 as relates to written defamation,
abuse, or insult, and that under the information and the facts, the defendant was neither guilty of
a violation of article 256 of the Penal Code nor of the libel Law. In the course of the main opinion
in the Perfecto case, is found this significant sentence: "Act No. 292 of the Philippine
Commission, the Treason and Sedition Law, may also have affected article 256, but as to this
point, it is not necessary to make a pronouncement."

It may therefore be taken as settled doctrine, to which those of us who retain a contrary opinion
must bow with as good grace as we can muster, that until otherwise decided by higher authority,
so much of article 256 of the Penal Code as does not relate to ministers of the Crown or to
writings coming under the Libel Law, exist and must be enforced. To which proposition, can
properly be appended a corollary, namely: Seditious words, speeches, or libels, constitute a
violation of Act No. 292, the Treason and Sedition Law, and to this extent, both the Penal Code
and the Libel Law are modified.

Accepting the above statements relative to the continuance and status of article 256 of the
Penal Code, it is our opinion that the law infringed in this instance is not this article but rather a
portion of the Treason and Sedition Law. In other words, as will later appear, we think that the
words of the accused did not so much tend to defame, abuse, or insult, a person in authority, as
they did to raise a disturbance in the community.

In criminal law, there are a variety of offenses which are not directed primarily against
individuals, but rather against the existence of the State, the authority of the Government, or the
general public peace. The offenses created and defined in Act No. 292 are distinctly of this
character. Among them is sedition, which is the raising of commotions or disturbances in the
State. It is a revolt against legitimate authority. Though the ultimate object of sedition is a
violation of the public peace or at least such a course of measures as evidently engenders it, yet
it does not aim at direct and open violence against the laws, or the subversion of the
Constitution. (2 Bouvier's Law Dictionary, 974; U.S. vs. Abad [1902], 1 Phil., 437; People vs.
Cabrera [1922], 43 Phil., 64.)

It is of course fundamentally true that the provisions of Act No. 292 must not be interpreted so
as to abridge the freedom of speech and the right of the people peaceably to assemble and
petition the Government for redress of grievances. Criticism is permitted to penetrate even to
the foundations of Government. Criticism, no matter how severe, on the Executive, the
Legislature, and the Judiciary, is within the range of liberty of speech, unless the intention and
effect be seditious. But when the intention and effect of the act is seditious, the constitutional
guaranties of freedom of speech and press and of assembly and petition must yield to punitive
measures designed to maintain the prestige of constituted authority, the supremacy of the
constitution and the laws, and the existence of the State. (III Wharton's Criminal Law, pp. 2127
et seq.; U.S. vs. Apurado [1907], 7 Phil., 422; People vs. Perfecto, supra.)
Here, the person maligned by the accused is the Chief Executive of the Philippine Islands. His
official position, like the Presidency of the United States and other high offices, under a
democratic form of government, instead, of affording immunity from promiscuous comment,
seems rather to invite abusive attacks. But in this instance, the attack on the Governor-General
passes the furthest bounds of free speech was intended. There is a seditious tendency in the
words used, which could easily produce disaffection among the people and a state of feeling
incompatible with a disposition to remain loyal to the Government and obedient to the laws.

The Governor-General is an executive official appointed by the President of the United States
by and with the advice and consent of the Senate of the United States, and holds in his office at
the pleasure of the President. The Organic Act vests supreme executive power in the Governor-
General to be exercised in accordance with law. The Governor-General is the representative of
executive civil authority in the Philippines and of the sovereign power. A seditious attack on the
Governor-General is an attack on the rights of the Filipino people and on American sovereignty.
(Concepcion vs. Paredes [1921], 42 Phil., 599; U.S. vs. Dorr [1903], 2 Phil., 332.)

Section 8 of Act No. 292 of the Philippine Commission, as amended by Act No. 1692, appears
to have been placed on the statute books exactly to meet such a situation. This section reads as
follows:

Every person who shall utter seditious words or speeches, or who shall write, publish or
circulate scurrilous libels against the Government of the United States or against the
Government of the Philippine Islands, or who shall print, write, publish utter or make any
statement, or speech, or do any act which tends to disturb or obstruct any lawful officer in
executing his office or in performing his duty, or which tends to instigate others to cabal or meet
together for unlawful purposes, or which suggests or incites rebellious conspiracies or which
tends to stir up the people against the lawful authorities, or which tends to disturb the peace of
the community or the safety or order of the Government, or who shall knowingly conceal such
evil practices from the constituted authorities, shall be punished by a fine not exceeding two
thousand dollars United States currency or by imprisonment not exceeding two years, or both,
in the discretion of the court.

In the words of the law, Perez has uttered seditious words. He has made a statement and done
an act which tended to instigate others to cabal or meet together for unlawful purposes. He has
made a statement and done an act which suggested and incited rebellious conspiracies. He has
made a statement and done an act which tended to stir up the people against the lawful
authorities. He has made a statement and done an act which tended to disturb the peace of the
community and the safety or order of the Government. All of these various tendencies can be
ascribed to the action of Perez and may be characterized as penalized by section 8 of Act No.
292 as amended.

A judgment and sentence convicting the accused of a violation of section 8 of Act No. 292 as
amended, is, in effect, responsive to, and based upon, the offense with which the defendant is
charged. The designation of the crime by the fiscal is not conclusive. The crime of which the
defendant stands charged is that described by the facts stated in the information. In accordance
with our settled rule, an accused may be found guilty and convicted of a graver offense than that
designated in the information, if such graver offense is included or described in the body of the
information, and is afterwards justified by the proof presented during the trial. (Guevarra's Code
of Criminal Procedure, p. 9; De Joya's Code of Criminal Procedure, p. 9.)

The penalty meted out by the trial court falls within the limits provided by the Treason and
Sedition Law, and will, we think, sufficiently punish the accused.

That we have given more attention to this case than it deserves, may be possible. Our course is
justified when it is recalled that only last year, Mr. Chief Justice Taft of the United States
Supreme Court, in speaking of an outrageous libel on the Governor of the Porto Rico, observed:
"A reading of the two articles removes the slightest doubt that they go far beyond the "exuberant
expressions of meridional speech," to use the expression of this court in a similar case in
Gandia vs. Pettingill (222 U.S. , 452, 456). Indeed they are so excessive and outrageous in their
character that they suggest the query whether their superlative vilification has not overleapt
itself and become unconsciously humorous." (Balzac vs. Porto Rico [1922], 258 U.S., 298.)
While our own sense of humor is not entirely blunted, we nevertheless entertain the conviction
that the courts should be the first to stamp out the embers of insurrection. The fugitive flame of
disloyalty, lighted by an irresponsible individual, must be dealt with firmly before it endangers
the general public peace.

The result is to agree with the trial Judge in his findings of fact, and on these facts to convict the
accused of a violation of section 8 of Act No. 292 as amended. With the modification thus
indicated, judgment is affirmed, it being understood that, in accordance with the sentence of the
lower court, the defendant and appellant shall suffer 2 months and 1 day's imprisonment and
pay the costs. So ordered.

Street, Ostrand, Johns and Romualdez, JJ., concur.

Gonzales Vs. Comelec Case Digest

Gonzales Vs. Comelec
27 SCRA 835
G.R. L-27833
April 18, 1969

Facts: RA 4880 which took effect on June 17, 1967, prohibiting the too early nomination of
candidates and limiting the period of election campaign or partisan political activity was
challenged on constitutional grounds. More precisely, the basic liberties of free speech and free
press, freedom of assembly and freedom of association are invoked to nullify the act. Petitioner
Cabigao was, at the time of the filing the petition, an incumbent councilor in the 4th District of
Manila and the Nacionalista Party official candidate for Vice-Mayor of Manila to which he was
subsequently elected on November 11, 1967; petitioner Gonzales, on the other hand, is a
private individual, a registered voter in the City of Manila and a political leader of his co-
petitioner. There was the further allegation that the nomination of a candidate and the fixing of
period of election campaign are matters of political expediency and convenience which only
political parties can regulate or curtail by and among themselves through self-restraint or mutual
understanding or agreement and that the regulation and limitation of these political matters
invoking the police power, in the absence of clear and present danger to the state, would render
the constitutional rights of petitioners meaningless and without effect. Senator Lorenzo M.
Tañada was asked to appear as amicus curiae, and elucidated that Act No. 4880 could indeed
be looked upon as a limitation on the preferred rights of speech and press, of assembly and of
association. He did justify its enactment however under the clear and present danger doctrine,
there being the substantive evil of elections, whether for national or local officials, being
debased and degraded by unrestricted campaigning, excess of partisanship and undue
concentration in politics with the loss not only of efficiency in government but of lives as well.
The Philippine Bar Association, the Civil Liberties Union, the U.P. Law Center and the U.P.
Women Lawyers' Circle were requested to give their opinions. Respondents contend that the
act was based on the police power of the state.

Issue: Whether or Not RA 4880 unconstitutional.

Held: Yes. As held in Cabansag v. Fernandez there are two tests that may supply an acceptable
criterion for permissible restriction on freedom of speech. These are the “clear and present
danger” rule and the 'dangerous tendency' rule. The first, means that the evil consequence of
the comment or utterance must be extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely
high before the utterance can be punished. The danger to be guarded against is the
'substantive evil' sought to be prevented. It has the advantage of establishing according to the
above decision a definite rule in constitutional law. It provides the criterion as to what words may
be publicly established. The "dangerous tendency rule" is such that “If the words uttered create
a dangerous tendency which the state has a right to prevent, then such words are punishable.”
It is not necessary that some definite or immediate acts of force, violence, or unlawfulness be
advocated. It is sufficient that such acts be advocated in general terms. Nor is it necessary that
the language used be reasonably calculated to incite persons to acts of force, violence, or
unlawfulness. It is sufficient if the natural tendency and probable effect of the utterance be to
bring about the substantive evil which the legislative body seeks to prevent.

The challenged statute could have been more narrowly drawn and the practices prohibited more
precisely delineated to satisfy the constitutional requirements as to a valid limitation under the
clear and present danger doctrine. As the author Tañada clearly explained, such provisions
were deemed by the legislative body to be part and parcel of the necessary and appropriate
response not merely to a clear and present danger but to the actual existence of a grave and
substantive evil of excessive partisanship, dishonesty and corruption as well as violence that of
late has invariably marred election campaigns and partisan political activities in this country.

The very idea of a government, republican in form, implies a right on the part of its citizens to
meet peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs and to petition for redress of
grievances. As in the case of freedom of expression, this right is not to be limited, much less
denied, except on a showing of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that Congress
has a right to prevent.

The prohibition of any speeches, announcements or commentaries, or the holding of interviews

for or against the election of any party or candidate for public office and the prohibition of the
publication or distribution of campaign literature or materials, against the solicitation of votes
whether directly or indirectly, or the undertaking of any campaign literature or propaganda for or
against any candidate or party is repugnant to a constitutional command.

MANUEL LAGUNZAD, petitioner, vs.MARIA SOTO VDA. DE GONZALES and THE COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.G.R. No. L-32066 August 6, 1979

FACTS
Petitioner Manuel Lagunzad, a newspaperman, began the production of a movie entitled "The
Moises Padilla Story" portraying the life of Moises Padilla, a mayoralty candidate of the
Nacionalista Party for the Municipality of Magallon, Negros Occidental and for whose murder,
Governor Rafael Lacson, a member of the Liberal Party then in power and his men were tried
and convicted. The emphasis of the movie was on the public life of Moises Padilla, there were
portions which dealt with his private and family life including the portrayal in some scenes, of his
mother, Maria Soto, private respondent herein, and of one "Auring" as his girl friend. Padilla’s
half sister, for and in behalf of her mother, Vda.de Gonzales, objected to the "exploitation" of his
life and demanded in writing for certain changes, corrections and deletions in the movie. After
some bargaining as to the amount to be paid Lagunzad and Vda. de Gonzales, executed a
"Licensing Agreement" whereby the latter as LICENSOR granted Lagunzad authority and
permission to exploit, use, and develop the life story of Moises Padilla for purposes of producing
the picture for consideration of P20,000.00.Lagunzad paid Vda. de Gonzales the amount of
P5,000.00. Subsequently, the movie was shown indifferent theaters all over the country.
Because petitioner refused to pay any additional amounts pursuant to the Agreement, Vda. de
Gonzales instituted the present suit against him praying for judgment in her favor ordering
petitioner 1) to pay her the balance of P15,000.00, with legal interest from of the Complaint;
and 2) to render an accounting of the proceeds from the picture and to pay the corresponding 2-
1/2% royalty there from, among others. Petitioner contended in his Answer that the episodes in
life of Moises Padilla depicted in the movie were matters of public knowledge and occurred at or
about the same time that the deceased became and was a public figure; that private respondent
has no property right over those incidents; that the Licensing Agreement was without valid
cause or consideration and constitutes an infringement on the constitutional right of freedom of
speech and of the press; and that he paid private respondent the amount of P5,000.00 only
because of the coercion and threat employed upon him. As a counterclaim, petitioner sought for
the nullification of the Licensing Agreement, Both the trial court and the CA ruled in favor of Vda.
deGonzales.

ISSUES
 Whether or not the fictionalized representation of Moises Padilla is an intrusion upon his right to
privacy notwithstanding that he was a public figure.
Whether or not Vda. de Gonzales., the mother, has any property right over the life of Moises
Padilla considering that the latter was a public figure.
Whether or not the Licensing Agreement constitutes an infringement on the constitutional right
of freedom of speech and of the press.

HELD
YES, being a public figure ipso facto does not automatically destroy in toto a person's right to
privacy. The right to invade as person's privacy to disseminate public information does not
extend to a fictional or novelized representation of a person, no matter how public a figure he or
she may be. In the case at bar, while it is true that petitioner exerted efforts to present a true-to-
life story of Moises Padilla, petitioner admits that he included a little romance in the film because
without it, it would be a drab story of torture and brutality.
YES, Lagunzad cannot dispense with the need for prior consent and authority from the
deceased heirs to portray publicly episodes in said deceased's life and in that of his mother and
the members of his family. As held in Schuyler v. Curtis" a privilege may be given the surviving
relatives of a deceased person to protect his memory, but the privilege exists for the benefit of
the living, to protect their feelings and to prevent a violation of their own rights in the character
and memory of the deceased."
NO, Lagunzad claims that as a citizen and as a newspaperman, he had the right to express his
thoughts in film on the public life of Moises Padilla without prior restraint. The right of freedom of
expression, indeed, occupies a preferred position in the "hierarchy of civil liberties." It is not,
however, without limitations. One criterion for permissible limitation on freedom of speech and of
the press is the "balancing-of-interests test." The principle requires a court to take conscious
and detailed consideration of the interplay of interests observable in a given situation or type of
situation."
In the case at bar, the interest’s observable are the right to privacy asserted by respondent and
the right of -freedom of expression invoked by petitioner. Taking into account the interplay of
those interests, and considering the obligations assumed in the Licensing Agreement entered
into by petitioner, the validity of such agreement will have to be upheld particularly because the
limits of freedom of expression are reached when expression touches upon matters of
essentially private concern

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-39227 October 14, 1933

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
JUAN FELEO, defendant-appellant.

Ignacio Nabong for appellant.

Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for appellee.

STREET, J.:

This appeal has been brought to reverse a judgment of the Court of First Instance of the
Province of Bulacan, finding the appellant, Juan Feleo, guilty of the offense of inciting sedition in
violation of article 142 of the Revised Penal Code, and sentencing him to undergo imprisonment
for four years, nine months and eleven days, prision correccional, with the accessory penalties
prescribed by law, imposing upon him a fine of P500, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, and requiring him to pay the costs.

It appears that on September 29, 1932, the legislative committee on labor held a public meeting
in San Miguel, Bulacan, to hear the complaints and grievances of farmers. Many people were
present at said meeting, and after addresses had been delivered by the official speakers, Juan
Feleo made a talk in the course of which he used expressions in the Tagalog language
substantially to the following effect:

My brothers: Nobody violates the law but he who make it; and it is necessary that we should all
unite to over- throw that power. A soviet government is necessary here; Russia is the first
country where the laborers have had their emancipation from oppression, imperialism and
capitalism. It is necessary that all property should be delivered to the government for its
administration, and from this we will see the redemption of the Filipino people.

The proof submitted by the prosecution fully sustains the allegation that the sentiments
contained in the foregoing paragraph were expressed by the speaker. A demurrer was
interposed to the information on the ground that no offense is charged, but said demurrer was
overruled. The actions are clearly directed to the end of inciting sedition, contrary to the
provisions of article 142 of the Revised Penal Code.

The crime of sedition, as now punishable in these Islands, is defined in article 139 of the said
Code. According to that article, one various forms of sedition consists in preventing the Insular
Government or any provincial or municipal government, or any public officer thereof, from freely
exercising its or his functions. The language imputed to the appellant incites the auditors to the
overthrowing of the lawmaking power; and as the greater includes the less, this language
necessarily involves preventing the Government and public officials from freely exercising their
functions.

It is claimed by the appellant that the language imputed to him was within the privilege secured
by constitutional guaranties, but we have more than once held that this contention, in
connection with speeches of the character of that now before us, is untenable. (People vs.
Feleo, 57 Phil., 451; People vs. Feleo, G.R. Nos. 36427 and 36428, 57 Phil., 990; People vs.
Nabong, 57 Phil., 455; People vs. Evangelista, 57 Phil., 354.)

It will be noted that on January 1, 1932, the Revised Penal Code came into effect, abrogating
section 8 of Act No. 292, as amended, relating to the offense of sedition. The provisions of the
earlier law, and there naturally result certain differences in the wording of the laws. But which
affects the law favorably to the appellant in this case.

The penalty imposed by the trial court is correct, and the judgment appealed from will be
affirmed. So ordered, with costs against the appellant.lawphi1.net

Avanceña, C.J., Malcolm, Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Hull, Vickers, Imperial, and Butte, JJ.,
concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-36277 October 26, 1932

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
CRISANTO EVANGELISTA and ABELARDO RAMOS, defendants-appellants.

Vicente Sotto for appellants.

Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.

OSTRAND, J.:

In case No. 41830 (No. 36277 in the Supreme Court) the herein accused, Crisanto Evangelista
and Abelardo Ramos, were charged in the Court of First Instance of Manila with a violation of
section 8 of Act No. 292, as amended. Upon trial the court below found the accused guilty and
sentenced each of them to six month's imprisonment and to pay a fine of P400 with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and each of the accused to pay one-half of the costs.
Thereupon the defendants appealed to this court.

The acts which gave rise to this accusation were as follows: On the first day of May, 1931, a
parade was to be held by the communists in the municipality of Caloocan within two and a half
miles of the city limits of Manila, but as the permit for the parade had been revoked, a
Constabulary officer appeared with his soldiers at the place to prevent the holding of the parade.
The appellant, Crisanto Evangelista, who apparently was the leader of the people therein
assembled to take part in the parade, held a conversation with the Constabulary officer about
the permit and its revocation, after which Evangelista was allowed by the Constabulary officer to
say a few words to the people for the purpose of informing them that the parade could not be
held and that they should retire. But instead of telling the people to retire, he raised his fist,
which the people approved by shouting "mabuhay", and then said: "Comrades or brethren, the
municipal president, Mr. Aquino, has allowed us to hold the parade, but for reason unknown to
me, the permit has been revoked. This shows that the big ones are persecuting and oppressing
us, who are small, which they have no right to do." Then shouts were heard from the audience
saying, "Let us fight them". The accused Abelardo Ramos, who was among the people, shouted
"Let us fight them until death". Evangelista proceeded saying, "My heart bleeds", but could not
continue because the officer stopped him and placed them both, Crisanto Evangelista and
Abelardo Ramos, under arrest. Thereupon the mass began to advance against the
Constabulary officer and soldiers, in an attempt to wrest Evangelista from the constabulary and
to continue the parade, but the soldiers made use of a water pump and dispersed them. There
were found on the body of Crisanto Evangelista the permit issued by the municipal president
and its revocation.

The appellants testified denying having said the words above quoted and attributed to them.
They further claimed that the people were peaceful, but the trial court found the facts as above
stated, and the appellant's brief does not point out any data or reason why the finding of the trial
court should not be upheld.1awphil.net

Under the circumstances of the case, the statements made by the accused on the occasion
above related are clearly seditious. It must be noted that the disorder took place on May 1,
1931, that is, several months after the inauguration of the Communist Party and after the
communists had already filled the minds of their followers with their revolting ideas in several
meetings. That the said utterances were really inciting the people to revolt, is shown by the fact
that the mass, not only shouted a protest against the officers of the law, but did actually
advance against them, and the latter had to use force in order to enforce the law. The defense
arguing upon the authority of United States vs. Apurado (7 Phil., 422), maintains that there is no
sedition here, because a mere disorder is not sedition, but the comparison is inadmissible. In
the Apurado case, the people assembled at the chamber of the municipal council to ask for the
removal of the municipal treasurer on account of religious differences. This court did not find
any disorder in that case. It was a petition for redress of grievances made in more or less
excited language, but the affair on the whole was peaceful and orderly; whereas in the instant
case, there was an inducement to fight, an actual though unexpected fight and resistance
against the authorities. It was simply the practical expression and repetition of the previous
instigations to overthrow the government, made by the communist leaders before.

For these reasons and those given in cases G. R. Nos. 36275 1 and 36276, 2 the judgment
appealed from will be affirmed with the costs against the appellants. So ordered.

Avanceña, C.J., Street, Malcolm, Villamor, Villa-Real, Hull, Vickers and Imperial, JJ., concur.
Espuelas vs People
G.R. No. L-2990
December 17, 1951

Facts:

On June 9 and June 24, 1947, both dates inclusive, in the town of Tagbilaran, Bohol, Oscar
Espuelas y Mendoza had his picture taken, making it to appear as if he were hanging lifeless at
the end of a piece of rope suspended form the limb of the tree, when in truth and in fact, he was
merely standing on a barrel. After securing copies of his photograph, Espuelas sent copies of
same to Free Press, the Evening News, the Bisayas, Lamdang of general circulation and other
local periodicals in the Province of Bohol but also throughout the Philippines and abroad, for
their publication with a suicide note or letter, wherein he made to appear that it was written by a
fictitious suicide, Alberto Reveniera and addressed to the latter's supposed wife translation of
which letter or note, stating his dismay and administration of President Roxas, pointing out the
situation in Central Luzon and Leyte, and directing his wife his dear wife to write to President
Truman and Churchill of US and tell them that in the Philippines the government is infested with
many Hitlers and Mussolinis.

Issue:

Whether the accused is liable of seditious libel under Art. 142 of the RPC against the
Government of the Philippines?

Held:

Yes. The accused must therefore be found guilty as charged. And there being no question as to
the legality of the penalty imposed on him, the decision will be affirmed with costs.

Analyzed for meaning and weighed in its consequences, the article written bybthe accused,
cannot fail to impress thinking persons that it seeks to sow the seeds of sedition and strife. The
infuriating language is not a sincere effort to persuade, what with the writer's simulated suicide
and false claim to martyrdom and what with is failure to particularize. When the use irritating
language centers not on persuading the readers but on creating disturbances, the rationable of
free speech cannot apply and the speaker or writer is removed from the protection of the
constitutional guaranty.

If it be argued that the article does not discredit the entire governmental structure but only
President Roxas and his men, the reply is that article 142 punishes not only all libels against the
Government but also "libels against any of the duly constituted authorities thereof." The "Roxas
people" in the Government obviously refer of least to the President, his Cabinet and the majority
of legislators to whom the adjectives dirty, Hitlers and Mussolinis were naturally directed. On
this score alone the conviction could be upheld.
Regarding the publication, it suggests or incites rebellious conspiracies or riots and tends to stir
up people against the constituted authorities, or to provoke violence from opposition who may
seek to silence the writer. Which is the sum and substance of the offense under consideration.

The essence of seditious libel may be said to its immediate tendency to stir up general
discontent to the pitch of illegal courses; that is to say to induce people to resort to illegal
methods other than those provided by the Constitution, in order to repress the evils which press
upon their minds.