G.R. No.
L-37453 May 25, 1979 PATUNAY NG MGA SAKSI
RIZALINA GABRIEL GONZALES, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE COURT
OF APPEALS and LUTGARDA SANTIAGO, respondents.
It appears that on June 24, 1961, herein private respondent
Lutgarda Santiago filed a petition with the Court of First Instance of
Rizal docketed as Special Proceedings No. 3617, for the probate of a
will alleged to have been executed by the deceased Isabel Gabriel
and designating therein petitioner as the principal beneficiary and
executrix.
There is no dispute in the records that the late Isabel Andres Gabriel
died as a widow and without issue in the municipality of Navotas,
province of Rizal her place of residence, on June 7, 1961 at the age
of eighty-five (85), having been born in 1876. It is likewise not
controverted that herein private respondent Lutgarda Santiago and
petitioner Rizalina Gabriel Gonzales are nieces of the deceased, and
that private respondent, with her husband and children, lived with
the deceased at the latters residence prior an- d up to the time of
her death.
The will submitted for probate, Exhibit "F", which is typewritten and
in Tagalog, appears to have been executed in Manila on the 15th
day of April, 1961, or barely two (2) months prior to the death of
Isabel Gabriel. It consists of five (5) pages, including the pages
whereon the attestation clause and the acknowledgment of the
notary public were written. The signatures of the deceased Isabel
Gabriel appear at the end of the will on page four and at the left
margin of all the pages. The attestation clause, which is found on
page four, reads as follows:
Kaming mga nakalagdang mga saksi o testigo na ang aming mga
tinitirahan ay nakasulat sa gawing kanan at kahilira ng aming mga
pangalan sa ibaba nito, ay pagpapatutuo na ipinakilala ipinaalam at
ipinahayag sa amin ni Isabel Gabriel na ang kasulatang ito na
binubuo ng Limang Dahon (Five Pages) pati na ang dahong ito, na
siya niyang TESTAMENTO AT HULING HABILIN, ngayong ika 15 ng
Abril, 1961, ay nilagdaan ng nasabing testadora na si Isabel Gabriel
ang nasabing testamento sa ibaba o ilalim ng kasulatan na nasa ika
apat na dahon (page four) at nasa itaas ng patunay naming ito, at sa
kaliwang panig ng lahat at bawat dahon (and on the left hand
margin of each and every page), sa harap ng lahat at bawat isa sa
amin, at kami namang mga saksi ay lumagda sa harap ng nasabing
testadora, at sa harap ng lahat at bawat isa sa amin, sa ilalim ng
patunay ng mga saksi at sa kaliwang panig ng lahat at bawa't dahon
ng testamentong ito.
At the bottom thereof, under the heading "Pangalan", are written
the signatures of Matilde D. Orobia, Celso D. Gimpaya and Maria R.
Gimpaya, and opposite the same, under the heading "Tirahan", are
their respective places of residence, 961 Highway 54, Philamlife, for
Miss Orobia, and 12 Dagala St., Navotas, Rizal, for the two
Gimpayas. Their signatures also appear on the left margin of all the
other pages. The WW is paged by typewritten words as follows:
"Unang Dahon" and underneath "(Page One)", "Ikalawang Dahon"
and underneath "(Page Two)", etc., appearing at the top of each
page.
The will itself provides that the testatrix desired to be buried in the
Catholic Cemetery of Navotas, Rizal in accordance with the rites of
the Roman Catholic Church, all expenses to be paid from her estate;
that all her obligations, if any, be paid; that legacies in specified
amounts be given to her sister, Praxides Gabriel Vda. de Santiago,
her brother Santiago Gabriel, and her nephews and nieces,
Benjamin, Salud, Rizalina (herein petitioner), Victoria, Ester, Andres,
all surnamed Gabriel, and Evangeline, Rudyardo Rosa, Andrea,
Marcial, Numancia, Verena an surnamed Santiago. To herein private
respondent Lutgarda Santiago, who was described in the will by the
testatrix as "aking mahal na pamangkin na aking pinalaki, inalagaan
at minahal na katulad ng isang tunay na anak" and named as
universal heir and executor, were bequeathed all properties and
estate, real or personal already acquired, or to be acquired, in her
testatrix name, after satisfying the expenses, debts and legacies as
aforementioned.
The petition was opposed by Rizalina Gabriel Gonzales, herein
petitioner, assailing the document purporting to be the will of the
deceased on the following grounds:
1. that the same is not genuine; and in the alternative
2. that the same was not executed and attested as required by
law;
3. that, at the time of the alleged execution of the purported
wilt the decedent lacked testamentary capacity due to old age and
sickness; and in the second alternative
4. That the purported WW was procured through undue and
improper pressure and influence on the part of the principal
beneficiary, and/or of some other person for her benefit.
Lutgarda Santiago filed her Answer to the Opposition on February 1,
1962. After trial, the court a quo rendered judgment, the summary
and dispositive portions of which read:
Passing in summary upon the grounds advanced by the oppositor,
this Court finds:
1. That there is no iota of evidence to support the contentio
that the purported will of the deceased was procured through
undue and improper pressure and influence on the part of the
petitioner, or of some other person for her benefit;
2. That there is insufficient evidence to sustain the contention
that at the time of the alleged execution of the purported will, the
deceased lacked testamentary capacity due to old age and sickness;
3. That sufficient and abundant evidence warrants
conclusively the fact that the purported will of the deceased was
not executed and attested as required by law;
4. That the evidence is likewise conclusive that the document
presented for probate, Exhibit 'F' is not the purported win allegedly
dictated by the deceased, executed and signed by her, and attested
by her three attesting witnesses on April 15, 1961.
WHEREFORE, Exhibit "F", the document presented for probate as
the last wig and testament of the deceased Isabel Gabriel is here by
DISALLOWED.
From this judgment of disallowance, Lutgarda Santiago appealed to
respondent Court, hence, the only issue decided on appeal was
whether or not the will in question was executed and attested as
required by law. The Court of Appeals, upon consideration of the
evidence adduced by both parties, rendered the decision now under
review, holding that the will in question was signed and executed by
the deceased Isabel Gabriel on April 15, 1961 in the presence of the
three attesting witnesses, Matilde Orobia, Celso Gimpaya and Maria
Gimpaya, signing and witnessing the document in the presence of
the deceased and of each other as required by law, hence allow ed
probate.
Oppositor Rizalina Gabriel Gonzales moved for reconsideration 3 of
the aforesaid decision and such motion was opposed 4 by
petitioner-appellant Lutgarda Santiago. Thereafter. parties
submitted their respective Memoranda, 5 and on August 28, 1973,
respondent Court, Former Special First Division, by Resolution 6
denied the motion for reconsideration stating that:
The oppositor-appellee contends that the preponderance of
evidence shows that the supposed last wig and testament of Isabel
Gabriel was not executed in accordance with law because the same
was signed on several occasions, that the testatrix did not sign the
will in the presence of all the instrumental witnesses did not sign
the will in the presence of each other.
The resolution of the factual issue raised in the motion for
reconsideration hinges on the appreciation of the evidence. We
have carefully re-examined the oral and documentary evidence of
record, There is no reason to alter the findings of fact in the decision
of this Court sought to be set aside.
In her petition before this Court, oppositor Rizalina Gabriel Gonzales
contends that respondent Court abused its discretion and/or acted
without or in excess of its jurisdiction in reverssing the findings of
fact and conclusions of the trial court. The Court, after deliberating
on the petition but without giving due course resolved, in the
Resolution dated Oct. 11, 1973 to require the respondents to
comment thereon, which comment was filed on Nov. 14, 1973.
Upon consideration of the allegations, the issues raised and the
arguments adduced in the petition, as well as the Comment 8 of
private respondent thereon, We denied the petition by Resolution
on November 26, 1973, 9 the question raised being factual and for
insufficient showing that the findings of fact by respondent Court
were unsupported by substantial evidence.
Subsequently, or on December 17, 1973, petitioner Rim Gabriel
Goes fried a Motion for Reconsideration 10 which private
respondent answered by way of her Comment or Opposition 11
filed on January 15, 1974. A Reply and Rejoinder to Reply followed.
Finally, on March 27, 1974, We resolved to give due course to the
petition.
We now proceed to consider petitioner's assignments of errors.
Petitioner, in her first assignment, contends that the respondent
Court of Appeals erred in holding that the document, Exhibit "F",
was executed and attested as required by law when there was
absolutely no proof that the three instrumental witnesses were
credible witnesses. She argues that the require. ment in Article 806,
Civil Code, that the witnesses must be credible is an absolute
requirement which must be complied with before an alleged last
will and testament may be admitted to probate and that to be a
credible witness, there must be evidence on record that the witness
has a good standing in his community, or that he is honest and
upright, or reputed to be trustworthy and reliable. According to
petitioner, unless the qualifications of the witness are first
established, his testimony may not be favorably considered.
Petitioner contends that the term "credible" is not synonymous
with "competent" for a witness may be competent under Article
820 and 821 of the Civil Code and still not be credible as required by
Article 805 of the same Code. It is further urged that the term
"credible" as used in the Civil Code should receive the same settled
and well- known meaning it has under the Naturalization Law, the
latter being a kindred legislation with the Civil Code provisions on
wigs with respect to the qualifications of witnesses.
We find no merit to petitioner's first assignment of error. Article 820
of the Civil Code provides the qualifications of a witness to the
execution of wills while Article 821 sets forth the disqualification
from being a witness to a win. These Articles state:
Art. 820. Any person of sound mind and of the age of
eighteen years or more, and not blind, deaf or dumb, and able to
read and write, may be a witness to the execution of a will
mentioned in article 806 of this Code. "Art. 821. The following are
disqualified from being witnesses to a will:
(1) Any person not domiciled in the Philippines,
(2) Those who have been convicted of falsification of a
document, perjury or false testimony.
Under the law, there is no mandatory requirement that the witness
testify initially or at any time during the trial as to his good standing
in the community, his reputation for trustworthythiness and
reliableness, his honesty and uprightness in order that his testimony
may be believed and accepted by the trial court. It is enough that
the qualifications enumerated in Article 820 of the Civil Code are
complied with, such that the soundness of his mind can be shown
by or deduced from his answers to the questions propounded to
him, that his age (18 years or more) is shown from his appearance,
testimony , or competently proved otherwise, as well as the fact
that he is not blind, deaf or dumb and that he is able to read and
write to the satisfaction of the Court, and that he has none of the
disqualifications under Article 821 of the Civil Code. We reject
petitioner's contention that it must first be established in the record
the good standing of the witness in the community, his reputation
for trustworthiness and reliableness, his honesty and uprightness,
because such attributes are presumed of the witness unless the
contrary is proved otherwise by the opposing party.
We also reject as without merit petitioner's contention that the
term "credible" as used in the Civil Code should be given the same
meaning it has under the Naturalization Law where the law is
mandatory that the petition for naturalization must be supported
by two character witnesses who must prove their good standing in
the community, reputation for trustworthiness and reliableness,
their honesty and uprightness. The two witnesses in a petition for
naturalization are character witnesses in that being citizens of the
Philippines, they personally know the petitioner to be a resident of
the Philippines for the period of time required by the Act and a
person of good repute and morally irreproachable and that said
petitioner has in their opinion all the qualifications necessary to
become a citizen of the Philippines and is not in any way disqualified
under the provisions of the Naturalization Law.
In probate proceedings, the instrumental witnesses are not
character witnesses for they merely attest the execution of a will or
testament and affirm the formalities attendant to said execution.
And We agree with the respondent that the rulings laid down in the
cases cited by petitioner concerning character witnesses in
naturalization proceedings are not applicable to instrumental
witnesses to wills executed under the Civil Code of the Philippines.
In the case at bar, the finding that each and everyone of the three
instrumental witnesses, namely, Matilde Orobia, Celso Gimpaya and
Maria Gimpaya, are competent and credible is satisfactorily
supported by the evidence as found by the respondent Court of
Appeals, which findings of fact this Tribunal is bound to accept and
rely upon. Moreover, petitioner has not pointed to any
disqualification of any of the said witnesses, much less has it been
shown that anyone of them is below 18 years of age, of unsound
mind, deaf or dumb, or cannot read or write.
It is true that under Article 805 of the New Civil Code, every will,
other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at the end thereof
by the testator himself or by the testator's name written by some
other person in his presence, and by his express direction, and
attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the
presence of the testator and of one another, While the petitioner
submits that Article 820 and 821 of the New Civil Code speak of the
competency of a witness due to his qualifications under the first
Article and none of the disqualifications under the second Article,
whereas Article 805 requires the attestation of three or more
credible witnesses, petitioner concludes that the term credible
requires something more than just being competent and, therefore,
a witness in addition to being competent under Articles 820 and 821
must also be a credible witness under Article 805.
Petitioner cites American authorities that competency and
credibility of a witness are not synonymous terms and one may be a
competent witness and yet not a credible one. She exacerbates that
there is no evidence on record to show that the instrumental
witnesses are credible in themselves, that is, that they are of good
standing in the community since one was a family driver by
profession and the second the wife of the driver, a housekeeper. It
is true that Celso Gimpaya was the driver of the testatrix and his
wife Maria Gimpaya, merely a housekeeper, and that Matilde
Orobia was a piano teacher to a grandchild of the testatrix But the
relation of employer and employee much less the humble or
financial position of a person do not disqualify him to be a
competent testamentary witness.
Private respondent maintains that the qualifications of the three or
more credible witnesses mentioned in Article 805 of the Civil Code
are those mentioned in Article 820 of the same Code, this being
obvious from that portion of Article 820 which says "may be Q
witness to the execution of a will mentioned in Article 805 of this
Code," and cites authorities that the word "credible" insofar as
witnesses to a will are concerned simply means " competent." Thus,
in the case of Suntay vs. Suntay, 95 Phil. 500, the Supreme Court
held that "Granting that a will was duly executed and that it was in
existence at the time of, and not revoked before, the death of the
testator, still the provisions of the lost wig must be clearly and
distinctly proved by at least two credible witnesses. 'Credible
witnesses' mean competent witnesses and not those who testify to
facts from or upon hearsay. " emphasis supplied).
In Molo Pekson and Perez Nable vs. Tanchuco, et al., 100 Phil. 344,
the Supreme Court held that "Section 620 of the same Code of Civil
Procedure provides that any person of sound mind, and of the age
of eighteen years or more, and not blind, deaf, or dumb and able to
read and write, may be a witness to the execution of a will. This
same provision is reproduced in our New Civil Code of 1950, under
Art. 820. The relation of employer and employee, or being a relative
to the beneficiary in a win, does not disqualify one to be a witness
to a will. The main qualification of a witness in the attestation of
wills, if other qualifications as to age, mental capacity and literacy
are present, is that said witness must be credible, that is to say, his
testimony may be entitled to credence. There is a long line of
authorities on this point, a few of which we may cite:
A 'credible witness is one who is not is not to testify by mental
incapacity, crime, or other cause.
As construed by the common law, a 'credible witness' to a will
means a 'competent witness.'
Expression 'credible witness' in relation to attestation of wins
means 'competent witness that is, one competent under the law to
testify to fact of execution of will.
The term 'credible', used in the statute of wills requiring that a will
shall be attested by two credible witnesses means competent;
witnesses who, at the time of attesting the will, are legally
competent to testify, in a court of justice, to the facts attested by
subscribing the will, the competency being determined as of the
date of the execution of the will and not of the time it is offered for
probate, Smith vs. Goodell 101 N.E. 255, 256, 258 111. 145. (Ibid.)
Credible witnesses as used in the statute relating to wills, means
competent witnesses — that is, such persons as are not legally
disqualified from testifying in courts of justice, by reason of mental
incapacity, interest, or the commission of crimes, or other cause
excluding them from testifying generally, or rendering them
incompetent in respect of the particular subject matter or in the
particular suit.
In the strict sense, the competency of a person to be an
instrumental witness to a will is determined by the statute, that is
Art. 820 and 821, Civil Code, whereas his credibility depends On the
appreciation of his testimony and arises from the belief and
conclusion of the Court that said witness is telling the truth.
"Competency as a witness is one thing, and it is another to be a
credible witness, so credible that the Court must accept what he
says. Trial courts may allow a person to testify as a witness upon a
given matter because he is competent, but may thereafter decide
whether to believe or not to believe his testimony." In fine, We
state the rule that the instrumental witnesses in Order to be
competent must be shown to have the qualifications under Article
820 of the Civil Code and none of the disqualifications under Article
821 and for their testimony to be credible, that is worthy of belief
and entitled to credence, it is not mandatory that evidence be first
established on record that the witnesses have a good standing in
the community or that they are honest and upright or reputed to be
trustworthy and reliable, for a person is presumed to be such unless
the contrary is established otherwise. In other words, the
instrumental witnesses must be competent and their testimonies
must be credible before the court allows the probate of the will
they have attested. We, therefore, reject petitioner's position that it
was fatal for respondent not to have introduced prior and
independent proof of the fact that the witnesses were "credible
witnesses that is, that they have a good standing in the community
and reputed to be trustworthy and reliable.
Under the second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh and eighth
assignments of errors, petitioner disputes the findings of fact of the
respondent court in finding that the preparation and execution of
the will was expected and not coincidental, in finding that Atty.
Paraiso was not previously furnished with the names and residence
certificates of the witnesses as to enable him to type such data into
the document Exhibit "F", in holding that the fact that the three
typewritten lines under the typewritten words "pangalan" and
"tinitirahan" were left blank shows beyond cavil that the three
attesting witnesses were all present in the same occasion, in holding
credible that Isabel Gabriel could have dictated the will without
note or document to Atty. Paraiso, in holding that Matilde Orobia
was physically present when the will was signed on April 15, 1961
by the deceased Isabel Gabriel and the other witnesses Celso
Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya, in holding that the trial court gave
undue importance to the picture takings as proof that the will was
improperly executed, and in holding that the grave contradictions,
evasions and misrepresentations of the witnesses (subscribing and
notary) presented by the petitioner had been explained away.
Since the above errors are factual We must repeat what We have
previously laid down that the findings of fact of the appellate court
are binding and controlling which We cannot review, subject to
certain exceptions which We win consider and discuss hereinafter.
We are convinced that the appellate court's findings are sufficiently
justified and supported by the evidence on record. Thus, the alleged
unnaturalness characterizing the trip of the testatrix to the office of
Atty. Paraiso and bringing all the witnesses without previous
appointment for the preparation and execution of the win and that
it was coincidental that Atty. Paraiso was available at the moment
impugns the finding of the Court of Appeals that although Atty.
Paraiso admitted the visit of Isabel Gabriel and of her companions
to his office on April 15, 1961 was unexpected as there was no prior
appointment with him, but he explained that he was available for
any business transaction on that day and that Isabel Gabriel had
earlier requested him to help her prepare her will. The finding of the
appellate court is amply based on the testimony of Celso Gimpaya
that he was not only informed on the morning of the day that he
witnessed the will but that it was the third time when Isabel Gabriel
told him that he was going to witness the making of her will, as well
as the testimony of Maria Gimpaya that she was called by her
husband Celso Gimpaya to proceed to Isabel Gabriel's house which
was nearby and from said house, they left in a car to the lawyer's
office, which testimonies are recited in the respondent Court's
decision.
The respondent Court further found the following facts: that Celso
Gimpaya and his wife Maria Gimpaya obtained residence
certificates a few days before Exhibit "F" was executed. Celso
Gimpaya's residence certificate No. A-5114942 was issued at
Navotas, Rizal on April 13, 1961 while Maria Gimpaya's residence
certificate No. A-5114974 was issued also at Navotas, Rizal on April
14, 1961. The respondent Court correctly observed that there was
nothing surprising in these facts and that the securing of these
residence certificates two days and one day, respectively, before
the execution of the will on April 15, 1961, far from showing an
amazing coincidence, reveals that the spouses were earlier notified
that they would be witnesses to the execution of Isabel Gabriel's
will.
We also agree with the respondent Court's conclusion that the
excursion to the office of Atty. Paraiso was planned by the
deceased, which conclusion was correctly drawn from the
testimony of the Gimpaya spouses that they started from the
Navotas residence of the deceased with a photographer and Isabel
Gabriel herself, then they proceeded by car to Matilde Orobia's
house in Philamlife, Quezon City to fetch her and from there, all the
three witnesses (the Gimpayas and Orobia) passed by a place where
Isabel Gabriel stayed for about ten to fifteen minutes at the clinic of
Dr. Chikiamco before they proceeded to Atty. Cipriano Paraiso's
office.
It is also evident from the records, as testified to by Atty. Paraiso,
that previous to the day that. the will was executed on April 15,
1961, Isabel Gabriel had requested him to help her in the execution
of her will and that he told her that if she really wanted to execute
her will, she should bring with her at least the Mayor of Navotas,
Rizal and a Councilor to be her witnesses and that he (Atty. Paraiso)
wanted a medical certificate from a physician notwithstanding the
fact that he believed her to be of sound and disposition mind. From
this evidence, the appellate court rightly concluded, thus: "It is,
therefore, clear that the presence of Isabel Gabriel and her
witnesses Matilde Orobia, Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya
including the photographer in the law office of Atty. Paraiso was not
coincidental as their gathering was pre-arranged by Isabel Gabriel
herself."
As to the appellate court's finding that Atty. Paraiso was not
previously furnished with the names and residence certificates of
the witnesses as to enable him to type such data into the document
Exhibit ' L which the petitioner assails as contradictory and
irreconcilable with the statement of the Court that Atty. Paraiso was
handed a list (containing the names of the witnesses and their
respective residence certificates) immediately upon their arrival in
the law office by Isabel Gabriel and this was corroborated by Atty.
Paraiso himself who testified that it was only on said occasion that
he received such list from Isabel Gabriel, We cannot agree with
petitioner's contention. We find no contradiction for the,
respondent Court held that on the occasion of the will making on
April 15, 1961, the list was given immediately to Atty. Paraiso and
that no such list was given the lawyer in any previous occasion or
date prior to April 15, 1961.
But whether Atty. Paraiso was previously furnished with the names
and residence certificates of the witnesses on a prior occasion or on
the very occasion and date in April 15, 1961 when the will was
executed, is of no moment for such data appear in the notarial
acknowledgment of Notary Public Cipriano Paraiso, subscribed and
sworn to by the witnesses on April 15, 1961 following the
attestation clause duly executed and signed on the same occasion,
April 15, 1961. And since Exhibit "F" is a notarial will duly
acknowledged by the testatrix and the witnesses before a notary
public, the same is a public document executed and attested
through the intervention of the notary public and as such public
document is evidence of the facts in clear, unequivocal manner
therein expressed. It has in its favor the presumption of regularity.
To contradict all these, there must be evidence that is clear,
convincing and more than merely preponderant. (Yturalde vs.
Azurin, 28 SCRA 407). We find no such evidence pointed by
petitioner in the case at bar.
Likewise, the conclusion of the Court of Appeals in holding that the
fact that the three typewritten lines under the typewritten words
"pangalan ' and "tinitirahan" were left blank shows beyond cavil
that the three attesting witnesses were all present in the same
occasion merits Our approval because tills conclusion is supported
and borne out by the evidence found by the appellate court, thus:
"On page 5 of Exhibit "F", beneath the typewritten words "names",
"Res. Tax Cert. date issued" and place issued the only name of Isabel
Gabriel with Residence Tax certificate No. A-5113274 issued on
February 24, 1961 at Navotas Rizal appears to be in typewritten
form while the names, residence tax certificate numbers, dates and
places of issuance of said certificates pertaining to the three (3)
witnesses were personally handwritten by Atty. Paraiso. Again, this
coincides with Atty. Paraiso's even the sale must be made to close
relatives; and the seventh was the appointment of the appellant
Santiago as executrix of the will without bond. The technical
description of the properties in paragraph 5 of Exhibit F was not
given and the numbers of the certificates of title were only supplied
by Atty. Paraiso. "
It is true that in one disposition, the numbers of the Torrens titles of
the properties disposed and the docket number of a special
proceeding are indicated which Atty. Paraiso candidly admitted
were supplied by him, whereupon petitioner contends that it was
incredible that Isabel Gabriel could have dictated the will Exhibit "F"
without any note or document to Atty. Paraiso, considering that
Isabel Gabriel was an old and sickly woman more than eighty-one
years old and had been suffering from a brain injury caused by two
severe blows at her head and died of terminal cancer a few weeks
after the execution of Exhibit "F". While we can rule that this is a
finding of fact which is within the competency of the respondent
appellate court in determining the testamentary capacity of the
testatrix and is, therefore, beyond Our power to revise and review,
We nevertheless hold that the conclusion reached by the Court of
Appeals that the testatrix dictated her will without any note or
memorandum appears to be fully supported by the following facts
or evidence appearing on record. Thus, Isabel Gabriel, despite her
age, was particularly active in her business affairs as she actively
managed the affairs of the movie business ISABELITA Theater,
paying the aparatistas herself until June 4, 1961, 3 days before her
death. She was the widow of the late Eligio Naval, former Governor
of Rizal Province and acted as coadministratrix in the Intestate
Estate of her deceased husband Eligio Naval. The text of the win
was in Tagalog, a dialect known and understood by her and in the
light of all the circumstances, We agree with the respondent Court
that the testatrix dictated her will without any note or
memorandum, a fact unanimously testified to by the three attesting
witnesses and the notary public himself.
Petitioner's sixth assignment of error is also bereft of merit. The
evidence, both testimonial and documentary is, according to the
respondent court, overwhelming that Matilde Orobia was physically
present when the will was signed on April 15, 1961 by the testatrix
and the other two witnesses, Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya.
Such factual finding of the appellate court is very clear, thus: "On
the contrary, the record is replete with proof that Matilde Orobia
was physically present when the will was signed by Isabel Gabriel on
April '15, 1961 along with her co-witnesses Celso Gimpaya and
Maria Gimpaya. The trial court's conclusion that Orobia's admission
that she gave piano lessons to the child of the appellant on
Wednesdays and Saturdays and that April 15, 1961 happened to be
a Saturday for which reason Orobia could not have been present to
witness the will on that — day is purely conjectural. Witness Orobia
did not admit having given piano lessons to the appellant's child
every Wednesday and Saturday without fail. It is highly probable
that even if April 15, 1961 were a Saturday, she gave no piano
lessons on that day for which reason she could have witnessed the
execution of the will. Orobia spoke of occasions when she missed
giving piano lessons and had to make up for the same. Anyway, her
presence at the law office of Atty. Paraiso was in the morning of
April 15, 1961 and there was nothing to preclude her from giving
piano lessons on the afternoon of the same day in Navotas, Rizal."
In addition to the testimony of Matilde Orobia, Celso Gimpaya and
Maria Gimpaya that Matilde was present on April 15, 1961 and that
she signed the attestation clause to the will and on the left-hand
margin of each of the pages of the will, the documentary evidence
which is the will itself, the attestation clause and the notarial
acknowledgment overwhelmingly and convincingly prove such fact
that Matilde Orobia was present on that day of April 15, 1961 and
that she witnessed the will by signing her name thereon and
acknowledged the same before the notary public, Atty. Cipriano P.
Paraiso. The attestation clause which Matilde Orobia signed is the
best evidence as to the date of signing because it preserves in
permanent form a recital of all the material facts attending the
execution of the will. This is the very purpose of the attestation
clause which is made for the purpose of preserving in permanent
form a record of the facts attending the execution of the will, so
that in case of failure in the memory of the subscribing witnesses, or
other casualty they may still be proved.
As to the seventh error assigned by petitioner faulting the Court of
Appeals in holding that the trial court gave undue importance to the
picture-takings as proof that the win was improperly executed, We
agree with the reasoning of the respondent court that: "Matilde
Orobia's Identification of the photographer as "Cesar Mendoza",
contrary to what the other two witnesses (Celso and Maria
Gimpaya) and Atty. Paraiso said that the photographer was
Benjamin Cifra, Jr., is at worst a minor mistake attributable to lapse
of time. The law does not require a photographer for the execution
and attestation of the will. The fact that Miss Orobia mistakenly
Identified the photographer as Cesar Mendoza scarcely detracts
from her testimony that she was present when the will was signed
because what matters here is not the photographer but the
photograph taken which clearly portrays Matilde Orobia herself, her
co-witnesses Celso Gimpaya. " Further, the respondent Court
correctly held: "The trial court gave undue importance to the
picture takings, jumping therefrom to the conclusion that the will
was improperly executed. The evidence however, heavily points to
only one occasion of the execution of the will on April 15, 1961
which was witnessed by Matilde Orobia, Celso Gimpaya and Maria
Gimpaya. These witnesses were quite emphatic and positive when
they spoke of this occasion. Hence, their Identification of some
photographs wherein they all appeared along with Isabel Gabriel
and Atty. Paraiso was superfluous."
Continuing, the respondent Court declared: "It is true that the
second picture-taking was disclosed at the cross examination of
Celso Gimpaya. But this was explained by Atty. Paraiso as a
reenactment of the first incident upon the insistence of Isabel
Gabriel. Such reenactment where Matilde Orobia was admittedly no
longer present was wholly unnecessary if not pointless. What was
important was that the will was duly executed and witnessed on the
first occasion on April 15, 1961 , " and We agree with the Court's
rationalization in conformity with logic, law and jurisprudence which
do not require picture-taking as one of the legal requisites for the
execution or probate of a will.
Petitioner points to alleged grave contradictions, evasions and
misrepresentations of witnesses in their respective testimonies
before the trial court. On the other hand, the respondent Court of
Appeals held that said contradictions, evasions and
misrepresentations had been explained away. Such discrepancies as
in the description of the typewriter used by Atty. Paraiso which he
described as "elite" which to him meant big letters which are of the
type in which the will was typewritten but which was Identified by
witness Jolly Bugarin of the N.B.I. as pica the mistake in mentioning
the name of the photographer by Matilde Orobia to be Cesar
Mendoza when actually it was Benjamin Cifra, Jr.— these are indeed
unimportant details which could have been affected by the lapse of
time and the treachery of human memory such that by themselves
would not alter the probative value of their testimonies on the true
execution of the will, (Pascual vs. dela Cruz, 28 SCRA 421, 424) for it
cannot be expected that the testimony of every person win be
Identical and coinciding with each other with regard to details of an
incident and that witnesses are not expected to remember all
details. Human experience teach us "that contradictions of
witnesses generally occur in the details of certain incidents, after a
long series of questionings, and far from being an evidence of
falsehood constitute a demonstration of good faith. In as much as
not all those who witness an incident are impressed in like manner,
it is but natural that in relating their impressions, they should not
agree in the minor details; hence the contradictions in their
testimony."
It is urged of Us by the petitioner that the findings of the trial court
should not have been disturbed by the respondent appellate court
because the trial court was in a better position to weigh and
evaluate the evidence presented in the course of the trial. As a
general rule, petitioner is correct but it is subject to well-established
exceptions. The right of the Court of Appeals to review, alter and
reverse the findings of the trial court where the appellate court, in
reviewing the evidence has found that facts and circumstances of
weight and influence have been ignored and overlooked and the
significance of which have been misinterpreted by the trial court,
cannot be disputed. Findings of facts made by trial courts
particularly when they are based on conflicting evidence whose
evaluation hinges on questions of credibility of contending
witnesses hes peculiarly within the province of trial courts and
generally, the appellate court should not interfere with the same. In
the instant case, however, the Court of Appeals found that the trial
court had overlooked and misinterpreted the facts and
circumstances established in the record. Whereas the appellate
court said that "Nothing in the record supports the trial court's
unbelief that Isabel Gabriel dictated her will without any note or
document to Atty. Paraiso;" that the trial court's conclusion that
Matilde Orobia could not have witnessed anybody signing the
alleged will or that she could not have witnessed Celso Gimpaya and
Maria Gimpaya sign the same or that she witnessed only the
deceased signing it, is a conclusion based not on facts but on
inferences; that the trial court gave undue importance to the
picture-takings, jumping therefrom to the conclusion that the will
was improperly executed and that there is nothing in the entire
record to support the conclusion of the court a quo that the will
signing occasion was a mere coincidence and that Isabel Gabriel
made an appointment only with Matilde Orobia to witness the
signing of her will, then it becomes the duty of the appellate court
to reverse findings of fact of the trial court in the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction over the lower courts.
Still the petitioner insists that the case at bar is an exception to the
rule that the judgment of the Court of Appeals is conclusive as to
the facts and cannot be reviewed by the Supreme Court. Again We
agree with the petitioner that among the exceptions are: (1) when
the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculations,
surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference is manifestly
mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is a grave abuse of
discretion; (4) when the presence of each other as required by law.
" Specifically, We affirm that on April 15, 1961 the testatrix Isabel
Gabriel, together with Matilde Orobia, Celso Gimpaya and his wife
Maria Gimpaya, and a photographer proceeded in a car to the office
of Atty. Cipriano Paraiso at the Bank of P.I. Building, Manila in the
morning of that day; that on the way, Isabel Gabriel obtained a
medical certificate from one Dr. Chikiamko which she gave to Atty.
Paraiso upon arriving at the latter's office and told the lawyer that
she wanted her will to be made; that Atty. Paraiso asked Isabel
Gabriel to dictate what she wanted to be written in the will and the
attorney wrote down the dictation of Isabel Gabriel in Tagalog, a
language known to and spoken by her; that Atty. Paraiso read back
to her what he wrote as dictated and she affirmed their correctness;
the lawyer then typed the will and after finishing the document, he
read it to her and she told him that it was alright; that thereafter,
Isabel Gabriel signed her name at the end of the will in the presence
of the three witnesses Matilde Orobia, Celso Gimpaya and Maria
Gimpaya and also at the left-hand margin of each and every page of
the document in the presence also of the said three witnesses; that
thereafter Matilde Orobia attested the will by signing her name at
the end of the attestation clause and at the left-hand margin of
pages 1, 2, 3 and 5 of the document in the presence of Isabel
Gabriel and the other two witnesses, Celso Gimpaya and Maria
Gimpaya; then, Celso Gimpaya signed also the will at the bottom of
the attestation clause and at the left-hand margin of the other
pages of the document in the presence of Isabel Gabriel, Matilde
Orobia and Maria Gimpaya; that Maria Gimpaya followed suit,
signing her name at the foot of the attestation clause and at the
left-hand margin of every page in the presence of Isabel Gabriel,
Matilde Orobia and Celso Gimpaya; that thereafter, Atty. Paraiso
notarized the will as Page No. 94, Book No. IV, Series of 1961, in his
Notarial Register. On the occasion of the execution and attestation
of the will, a photographer took pictures, one Exhibit "G", depicting
Matilde Orobia, the testatrix Isabel Gabriel, Celso Gimpaya, Maria
Gimpaya and Atty. Paraiso, taken on said occasion of the signing of
the will, and another, Exhibit "H", showing Matilde Orobia signing
testimony that he had earlier advised Isabel Gabriel to bring with
her at least the Mayor and a Councilor of Navotas, Rizal to be her
witnesses for he did not know beforehand the Identities of the
three attesting witnesses until the latter showed up at his law office
with Isabel Gabriel on April 15, 1961. Atty. Paraiso's claim which was
not controverted that he wrote down in his own hand the date
appearing on page 5 of Exhibit "F" dissipates any lingering doubt
that he prepared and ratified the will on the date in question."
It is also a factual finding of the Court of Appeals in holding that it
was credible that Isabel Gabriel could have dictated the will, Exhibit
"F", without any note or document to Atty. Paraiso as against the
contention of petitioner that it was incredible. This ruling of the
respondent court is fully supported by the evidence on record as
stated in the decision under review, thus: "Nothing in the record
supports the trial court's unbelief that Isabel Gabriel dictated her
will without any note or document to Atty. Paraiso. On the contrary,
all the three attesting witnesses uniformly testified that Isabel
Gabriel dictated her will to Atty. Paraiso and that other than the
piece of paper that she handed to said lawyer she had no note or
document. This fact jibes with the evidence — which the trial court
itself believed was unshaken — that Isabel Gabriel was of sound
disposing memory when she executed her will.
Exhibit "F" reveals only seven (7) dispositions which are not
complicated but quite simple. The first was Isabel Gabriel's wish to
be interred according to Catholic rites the second was a general
directive to pay her debts if any; the third provided for P1,000.00
for her sister Praxides Gabriel Vda. de Santiago and P2,000.00 for
her brother Santiago Gabriel; the fourth was a listing of her 13
nephews and nieces including oppositor-appellee Rizalina Gabriel
and the amount for each legatee the fifth was the institution of the
petitioner-appellant, Lutgarda Santiago as the principal heir
mentioning in general terms seven (7) types of properties; the sixth
disposed of the remainder of her estate which she willed in favor of
appellant Lutgarda Santiago but prohibiting the sale of such
properties to anyone except in extreme situations in which
judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the
findings of fact are conflicting, (6) when the Court of Appeals, in
making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the
same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee.
Petitioner's insistence is without merit. We hold that the case at bar
does not fall within any of the exceptions enumerated above. We
likewise hold that the findings of fact of the respondent appellate
court are fully supported by the evidence on record. The
conclusions are fully sustained by substantial evidence. We find no
abuse of discretion and We discern no misapprehension of facts.
The respondent Court's findings of fact are not conflicting. Hence,
the well-established rule that the decision of the Court of Appeals
and its findings of fact are binding and conclusive and should not be
disturbed by this Tribunal and it must be applied in the case at bar
in its full force and effect, without qualification or reservation. The
above holding simply synthesize the resolutions we have heretofore
made in respect ' to petitioner's previous assignments of error and
to which We have disagreed and, therefore, rejected.
The last assignments of error of petitioner must necessarily be
rejected by Us as We find the respondent Court acted properly and
correctly and has not departed from the accepted and usual course
of judicial proceedings as to call for the exercise of the power of
supervision by the Supreme Court, and as We find that the Court of
Appeals did not err in reversing the decision of the trial court and
admitting to probate Exhibit "F", the last will and testament of the
deceased Isabel Gabriel.
We rule that the respondent Court's factual findings upon its
summation and evaluation of the evidence on record is unassailable
that: "From the welter of evidence presented, we are convinced
that the will in question was executed on April 15, 1961 in the
presence of Matilde Orobia, Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya
signing and witnessing the same in the the will on a table with Isabel
Gabriel, Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya sitting around the table.
Atty. Paraiso, after finishing the notarial act, then delivered the
original to Isabel Gabriel and retained the other copies for his file
and notarial register. A few days following the signing of the will,
Isabel Gabriel, Celso Gimpaya and another photographer arrived at
the office of Atty. Paraiso and told the lawyer that she wanted
another picture taken because the first picture did not turn out
good. The lawyer told her that this cannot be done because the will
was already signed but Isabel Gabriel insisted that a picture be
taken, so a simulated signing was performed during which incident
Matilde Orobia was not present.
Petitioner's exacerbation centers on the supposed incredibility of
the testimonies of the witnesses for the proponent of the will, their
alleged evasions, inconsistencies and contradictions. But in the case
at bar, the three instrumental witnesses who constitute the best
evidence of the will making have testified in favor of the probate of
the will. So has the lawyer who prepared it, one learned in the law
and long in the practice thereof, who thereafter notarized it. All of
them are disinterested witnesses who stand to receive no benefit
from the testament. The signatures of the witnesses and the
testatrix have been identified on the will and there is no claim
whatsoever and by anyone, much less the petitioner, that they were
not genuine. In the last and final analysis, the herein conflict is
factual and we go back to the rule that the Supreme Court cannot
review and revise the findings of facts of the respondent Court of
Appeals.
G.R. No. L-48840 December 29, 1943
ERNESTO M. GUEVARA, petitioner-appellant, vs. ROSARIO
GUEVARA and her husband PEDRO BUISON, respondent-appellees.
Ernesto M. Guevarra and Rosario Guevara, ligitimate son and
natural daughter, respectively, of the deceased Victorino L.
Guevara, are litigating here over their inheritance from the latter.
The action was commenced on November 12, 1937, by Rosario
Guevara to recover from Ernesto Guevara what she claims to be her
strict ligitime as an acknowledged natural daughter of the deceased
— to wit, a portion of 423,492 square meters of a large parcel of
land described in original certificate of title No. 51691 of the
province of Pangasinan, issued in the name of Ernesto M. Guervara
— and to order the latter to pay her P6,000 plus P2,000 a year as
damages for withholding such legitime from her. The defendant
answered the complaint contending that whatever right or rights
the plaintiff might have had, had been barred by the operation of
law.
It appears that on August 26, 1931, Victorino L. Guevara executed a
will (exhibit A), apparently with all the formalities of the law,
wherein he made the following bequests: To his stepdaughter
Candida Guevara, a pair of earrings worth P150 and a gold chain
worth P40; to his son Ernesto M. Guevara, a gold ring worth P180
and all the furniture, pictures, statues, and other religious objects
found in the residence of the testator in Poblacion Sur, Bayambang,
Pangasinan; "a mi hija Rosario Guevara," a pair of earrings worth
P120; to his stepson Piuo Guevara, a ring worth P120; and to his
wife by second marriage, Angustia Posadas, various pieces of
jewelry worth P1,020.
He also made the following devises: "A mis hijos Rosario Guevara y
Ernesto M. Guevara y a mis hijastros, Vivencio, Eduviges, Dionisia,
Candida y Pio, apellidados Guevara," a residential lot with its
improvements situate in the town of Bayambang, Pangasinan,
having an area of 960 square meters and assessed at P540; to his
wife Angustia Posadas he confirmed the donation propter nuptias
theretofore made by him to her of a portion of 25 hectares of the
large parcel of land of 259-odd hectares described in plan Psu-
66618. He also devised to her a portion of 5 hectares of the same
parcel of land by way of complete settlement of her usufructurary
right.1awphil.net
He set aside 100 hectares of the same parcel of land to be disposed
of either by him during his lifetime or by his attorney-in-fact Ernesto
M. Guevara in order to pay all his pending debts and to degray his
expenses and those of his family us to the time of his death.
The remainder of said parcel of land his disposed of in the following
manner:
(d). — Toda la porcion restante de mi terreno arriba descrito, de la
extension superficial aproximada de ciento veintinueve (129)
hectareas setenta (70) areas, y veiticinco (25) centiares, con todas
sus mejoras existentes en la misma, dejo y distribuyo, pro-indiviso, a
mis siguientes herederos como sigue:
A mi hijo legitimo, Ernesto M. Guevara, ciento ocho (108) hectareas,
ocho (8) areas y cincuenta y cuatro (54) centiareas, hacia la parte
que colinda al Oeste de las cien (100) hectareas referidas en el
inciso (a) de este parrafo del testamento, como su propiedad
absoluta y exclusiva, en la cual extension superficial estan incluidas
cuarenta y tres (43) hectareas, veintitres (23) areas y cuarenta y dos
(42) centiareas que le doy en concepto de mejora.
A mi hija natural reconocida, Rosario Guevara, veintiun (21)
hectareas, sesenta y un (61) areas y setenta y un (71) centiareas,
que es la parte restante.
Duodecimo. — Nombro por la presente como Albacea
Testamentario a mi hijo Ernesto M. Guevara, con relevacion de
fianza. Y una vez legalizado este testamento, y en cuanto sea
posible, es mi deseo, que los herederos y legatarios aqui nombrados
se repartan extrajudicialmente mis bienes de conformidad con mis
disposiciones arriba consignadas.
Subsequently, and on July 12, 1933, Victorino L. Guevarra executed
whereby he conveyed to him the southern half of the large parcel of
land of which he had theretofore disposed by the will above
mentioned, inconsideration of the sum of P1 and other valuable
considerations, among which were the payment of all his debts and
obligations amounting to not less than P16,500, his maintenance up
to his death, and the expenses of his last illness and funeral
expenses. As to the northern half of the same parcel of land, he
declared: "Hago constar tambien que reconozco a mi referido hijo
Ernesto M. guevara como dueño de la mitad norte de la totalidad y
conjunto de los referidos terrenos por haberlos comprado de su
propio peculio del Sr. Rafael T. Puzon a quien habia vendido con
anterioridad."
On September 27, 1933, final decree of registration was issued in
land registration case No. 15174 of the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan, and pursuant thereto original certificate of title No.
51691 of the same province was issued on October 12 of the same
year in favor of Ernesto M. Guevara over the whole parcel of land
described in the deed of sale above referred to. The registration
proceeding had been commenced on November 1, 1932, by
Victorino L. Guevara and Ernesto M. Guevara as applicants, with
Rosario, among others, as oppositor; but before the trial of the case
Victorino L. Guevara withdrew as applicant and Rosario Guevara
and her co-oppositors also withdrew their opposition, thereby
facilitating the issuance of the title in the name of Ernesto M.
Guevara alone.
On September 27, 1933, Victorino L. Guevarra died. His last will and
testament, however, was never presented to the court for probate,
nor has any administration proceeding ever been instituted for the
settlement of his estate. Whether the various legatees mentioned in
the will have received their respective legacies or have even been
given due notice of the execution of said will and of the dispositions
therein made in their favor, does not affirmatively appear from the
record of this case. Ever since the death of Victorino L. Guevara, his
only legitimate son Ernesto M. Guevara appears to have possessed
the land adjudicated to him in the registration proceeding and to
have disposed of various portions thereof for the purpose of paying
the debts left by his father.
In the meantime Rosario Guevara, who appears to have had her
father's last will and testament in her custody, did nothing judicially
to invoke the testamentary dispositions made therein in her favor,
whereby the testator acknowledged her as his natural daughter
and, aside from certain legacies and bequests, devised to her a
portion of 21.6171 hectares of the large parcel of land described in
the will. But a little over four years after the testor's demise, she
(assisted by her husband) commenced the present action against
Ernesto M. Guevara alone for the purpose hereinbefore indicated;
and it was only during the trial of this case that she presented the
will to the court, not for the purpose of having it probated but only
to prove that the deceased Victirino L. Guevara had acknowledged
her as his natural daughter. Upon that proof of acknowledgment
she claimed her share of the inheritance from him, but on the
theory or assumption that he died intestate, because the will had
not been probated, for which reason, she asserted, the betterment
therein made by the testator in favor of his legitimate son Ernesto
M. Guevara should be disregarded. Both the trial court and the
Court of appeals sustained that theory.
Two principal questions are before us for determination: (1) the
legality of the procedure adopted by the plaintiff (respondent
herein) Rosario Guevara; and (2) the efficacy of the deed of sale
exhibit 2 and the effect of the certificate of title issued to the
defendant (petitioner herein) Ernesto M. Guevara.
I
We cannot sanction the procedure adopted by the respondent
Rosario Guevara, it being in our opinion in violation of procedural
law and an attempt to circumvent and disregard the last will and
testament of the decedent. Procedure in probate of will in Rule 76
of the new Rules of Court, which took effect on July 1, 1940.
The proceeding for the probate of a will is one in rem, with notice
by publication to the whole world and with personal notice to each
of the known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator (section
630, C. c. P., and sections 3 and 4, Rule 77). Altho not contested
(section 5, Rule 77), the due execution of the will and the fact that
the testator at the time of its execution was of sound and disposing
mind and not acting under duress, menace, and undue influence or
fraud, must be proved to the satisfaction of the court, and only then
may the will be legalized and given effect by means of a certificate
of its allowance, signed by the judge and attested by the seal of the
court; and when the will devises real property, attested copies
thereof and of the certificate of allowance must be recorded in the
register of deeds of the province in which the land lies.
It will readily be seen from the above provisions of the law that the
presentation of a will to the court for probate is mandatory and its
allowance by the court is essential and indispensable to its efficacy.
To assure and compel the probate of will, the law punishes a person
who neglects his duty to present it to the court with a fine not
exceeding P2,000, and if he should persist in not presenting it, he
may be committed to prision and kept there until he delivers the
will.
The Court of Appeals took express notice of these requirements of
the law and held that a will, unless probated, is ineffective.
Nevertheless it sanctioned the procedure adopted by the
respondent for the following reasons:
The majority of the Court is of the opinion that if this case is
dismissed ordering the filing of testate proceedings, it would cause
injustice, incovenience, delay, and much expense to the parties, and
that therefore, it is preferable to leave them in the very status
which they themselves have chosen, and to decide their
controversy once and for all, since, in a similar case, the Supreme
Court applied that same criterion (Leaño vs. Leaño, supra), which is
now sanctioned by section 1 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court.
Besides, section 6 of Rule 124 provides that, if the procedure which
the court ought to follow in the exercise of its jurisdiction is not
specifically pointed out by the Rules of Court, any suitable process
or mode of procedure may be adopted which appears most
consistent to the spirit of the said Rules. Hence, we declare the
action instituted by the plaintiff to be in accordance with law.
Let us look into the validity of these considerations.
The implication is that by the omission of the word "intestate" and
the use of the word "legatees" in section 1 of Rule 74, a summary
extrajudicial settlement of a deceased person's estate, whether he
died testate or intestate, may be made under the conditions
specified. Even if we give retroactive effect to section 1 of Rule 74
and apply it here, as the Court of Appeals did, we do not believe it
sanctions the nonpresentation of a will for probate and much less
the nullification of such will thru the failure of its custodian to
present it to the court for probate; for such a result is precisely what
Rule 76 sedulously provides against. Section 1 of Rule 74 merely
authorizes the extrajudicial or judicial partition of the estate of a
decedent "without securing letter of administration." It does not say
that in case the decedent left a will the heirs and legatees may
divide the estate among themselves without the necessity of
presenting the will to the court for probate. The petition to probate
a will and the petition to issue letters of administration are two
different things, altho both may be made in the same case. the
allowance of a will precedes the issuance of letters testamentary or
of administration (section 4, Rule 78). One can have a will probated
without necessarily securing letters testamentary or of
administration. We hold that under section 1 of Rule 74, in relation
to Rule 76, if the decedent left a will and no debts and the heirs and
legatees desire to make an extrajudicial partition of the estate, they
must first present that will to the court for probate and divide the
estate in accordance with the will. They may not disregard the
provisions of the will unless those provisions are contrary to law.
Neither may they so away with the presentation of the will to the
court for probate, because such suppression of the will is contrary
to law and public policy. The law enjoins the probate of the will and
public policy requires it, because unless the will is probated and
notice thereof given to the whole world, the right of a person to
dispose of his property by will may be rendered nugatory, as is
attempted to be done in the instant case. Absent legatees and
devisees, or such of them as may have no knowledge of the will,
could be cheated of their inheritance thru the collusion of some of
the heirs who might agree to the partition of the estate among
themselves to the exclusion of others.
In the instant case there is no showing that the various legatees
other than the present litigants had received their respective
legacies or that they had knowledge of the existence and of the
provisions of the will. Their right under the will cannot be
disregarded, nor may those rights be obliterated on account of the
failure or refusal of the custodian of the will to present it to the
court for probate.
Even if the decedent left no debts and nobody raises any question
as to the authenticity and due execution of the will, none of the
heirs may sue for the partition of the estate in accordance with that
will without first securing its allowance or probate by the court,
first, because the law expressly provides that "no will shall pass
either real or personal estate unless it is proved and allowed in the
proper court"; and, second, because the probate of a will, which is a
proceeding in rem, cannot be dispensed with the substituted by any
other proceeding, judicial or extrajudicial, without offending against
public policy designed to effectuate the testator's right to dispose of
his property by will in accordance with law and to protect the rights
of the heirs and legatees under the will thru the means provided by
law, among which are the publication and the personal notices to
each and all of said heirs and legatees. Nor may the court approve
and allow the will presented in evidence in such an action for
partition, which is one in personam, any more than it could decree
the registration under the Torrens system of the land involved in an
ordinary action for reinvindicacion or partition.
We therefore believe and so hold that section 1 of Rule 74, relied
upon by the Court of Appeals, does not sanction the procedure
adopted by the respondent.
The case of Leaño vs. Leaño (25 Phil., 180), cited by the Court of
Appeals, like section 1 of Rule 74, sanctions the extrajudicial
partition by the heirs of the properties left by a decedent, but not
the nonpresentation of a will for probate. In that case one Paulina
Ver executed a will on October 11, 1902, and died on November 1,
1902. Her will was presented for probate on November 10, 1902,
and was approved and allowed by the Court on August 16, 1904. In
the meantime, and on November 10, 1902, the heirs went ahead
and divided the properties among themselves and some of them
subsequently sold and disposed of their shares to third persons. It
does not affirmatively appear in the decision in that case that the
partition made by the heirs was not in accordance with the will or
that they in any way disregarded the will. In closing the case by its
order dated September 1, 1911, the trial court validated the
partition, and one of the heirs, Cunegunda Leaño, appealed. In
deciding the appeal this Court said:
The principal assignment of error is that the lower court committed
an error in deciding that the heirs and legatees of the estate of Dña.
Paulina Ver had voluntarily divided the estate among themselves.
In resolving that question this Court said:
In view of the positive finding of the judge of the lower court that
there had been a voluntary partition of the estate among the heirs
and legatees, and in the absence of positive proof to the contrary,
we must conclude that the lower court had some evidence to
support its conclusion.
Thus it will be seen that as a matter of fact no question of law was
raised and decided in that case. That decision cannot be relied upon
as an authority for the unprecedented and unheard of procedure
adopted by the respondent whereby she seeks to prove her status
as an acknowledged natural child of the decedent by his will and
attempts to nullify and circumvent the testamentary dispositions
made by him by not presenting the will to the court for probate and
by claiming her legitime as an acknowledged natural child on the
basis of intestacy; and that in the face of express mandatory
provisions of the law requiring her to present the will to the court
for probate.
In the subsequent case of Riosa vs. Rocha (1926), 48 Phil. 737, this
Court departed from the procedure sanctioned by the trial court
and impliedly approved by this Court in the Leaño case, by holding
that an extrajudicial partition is not proper in testate succession. In
the Riosa case the Court, speaking thru Chief Justice Avanceña,
held:
1. EXTRAJUDICIAL PARTITION; NOT PROPER IN TESTATE
SUCCESSION. — Section 596 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
authorizing the heirs of a person who dies intestate to make
extrajudicial partition of the property of the deceased, without
going into any court of justice, makes express reference to intestate
succession, and therefore excludes testate succession.
2. ID.; EFFECTS OF; TESTATE SUCCESSION. — In the instant
case, which is a testate succession, the heirs made an extrajudicial
partition of the estate and at the same time instituted proceeding
for the probate of the will and the administration of the estate.
When the time came for making the partition, they submitted to the
court the extrajudicial partition previously made by them, which the
court approved. Held: That for the purposes of the reservation and
the rights and obligations created thereby, in connection with the
relatives benefited, the property must not be deemed transmitted
to the heirs from the time the extrajudicial partition was made, but
from the time said partition was approved by the court. (Syllabus.)
The Court of Appeals also cites section 6 of Rule 124, which provides
that if the procedure which the court ought to follow in the exercise
of its jurisdiction is not specifically pointed out by the Rules of
Court, any suitable process for mode of proceeding may be adopted
which appears most conformable to the spirit of the said Rules. That
provision is not applicable here for the simple reason that the
procedure which the court ought to follow in the exercise of its
jurisdiction is specifically pointed out and prescribed in detail by
Rules 74, 76, and 77 of the Rules of Court.
The Court of Appeals also said "that if this case is dismissed,
ordering the filing of testate proceedings, it would cause injustice,
inconvenience, delay, and much expense to the parties." We see no
injustice in requiring the plaintiff not to violate but to comply with
the law. On the contrary, an injustice might be committed against
the other heirs and legatees mentioned in the will if the attempt of
the plaintiff to nullify said will by not presenting it to the court for
probate should be sanctioned. As to the inconvenience, delay, and
expense, the plaintiff herself is to blame because she was the
custodian of the will and she violated the duty imposed upon her by
sections 2, 4, and 5 of Rule 76, which command her to deliver said
will to the court on pain of a fine not exceeding P2,000 and of
imprisonment for contempt of court. As for the defendant, he is not
complaining of inconvenience, delay, and expense, but on the
contrary he is insisting that the procedure prescribed by law be
followed by the plaintiff.
Our conclusion is that the Court of Appeals erred in declaring the
action instituted by the plaintiff to be in accordance with law. It also
erred in awarding relief to the plaintiff in this action on the basis of
intestacy of the decedent notwithstanding the proven existence of a
will left by him and solely because said will has not been probated
due to the failure of the plaintiff as custodian thereof to comply
with the duty imposed upon her by the law.
It is apparent that the defendant Ernesto M. Guevara, who was
named executor in said will, did not take any step to have it
presented to the court for probate and did not signify his
acceptance of the trust or refusal to accept it as required by section
3 of Rule 76 (formerly section 627 of the Code of Civil Procedure),
because his contention is that said will, insofar as the large parcel of
land in litigation is concerned, has been superseded by the deed of
sale exhibit 2 and by the subsequent issuance of the Torrens
certificate of title in his favor.
This brings us to the consideration of the second question, referring
to the efficacy of the deed of sale exhibit 2 and the effect of the
certificate of titled issued to the defendant Ernesto M. Guevara. So
that the parties may not have litigated here in vain insofar as that
question is concerned, we deem it proper to decide it now and
obviate the necessity of a new action.
The deed of sale exhibit 2 executed by and between Victorino L.
Guevara and Ernesto M. Guevara before a notary public on July 12,
1933, may be divided into two parts: (a) insofar as it disposes of and
conveys to Ernesto M. Guevara the southern half of Victorino L.
Guevara's hacienda of 259-odd hectares in consideration of P1 and
other valuable considerations therein mentioned; and (b) insofar as
it declares that Ernesto M. Guevara became the owner of the
northern half of the same hacienda by repurchasing it with his own
money from Rafael T. Puzon.
A. As to the conveyance of the southern half of the hacienda
to Ernesto M. Guevara in consideration of the latter's assumption of
the obligation to pay all the debts of the deceased, the Court of
Appeals found it to be valid and efficacious because: "(a) it has not
been proven that the charges imposed as a condition is [are] less
than the value of the property; and (b) neither has it been proven
that the defendant did not comply with the conditions imposed
upon him in the deed of transfer." As a matter of fact the Court of
Appeals found" "It appears that the defendant has been paying the
debts left by his father. To accomplish this, he had to alienate
considerable portions of the above-mentioned land. And we cannot
brand such alienation as anomalous unless it is proven that they
have exceeded the value of what he has acquired by virtue of the
deed of July 12, 1933, and that of his corresponding share in the
inheritance." The finding of the Court of Appeals on this aspect of
the case is final and conclusive upon the respondent, who did not
appeal therefrom.
B. With regard to the northern half of the hacienda, the
findings of fact and of law made by the Court of Appeals are as
follows:
The defendant has tried to prove that with his own money, he
bought from Rafael Puzon one-half of the land in question, but the
Court a quo, after considering the evidence, found it not proven; we
hold that such conclusion is well founded. The acknowledgment by
the deceased, Victorino L. Guevara, of the said transactions, which
was inserted incidentally in the document of July 12, 1933, is clearly
belied by the fact that the money paid to Rafael Puzon came from
Silvestre P. Coquia, to whom Victorino L. Guevara had sold a parcel
of land with the right of repurchase. The defendant, acting for his
father, received the money and delivered it to Rafael Puzon to
redeem the land in question, and instead of executing a deed of
redemption in favor of Victorino L. Guevara, the latter executed a
deed of sale in favor of the defendant.
The plaintiff avers that she withdrew her opposition to the
registration of the land in the name of the defendant, because of
the latter's promise that after paying all the debt of their father, he
would deliver to her and to the widow their corresponding shares.
As their father then was still alive, there was no reason to require
the delivery of her share and that was why she did not insist on her
opposition, trusting on the reliability and sincerity of her brother's
promise. The evidence shows that such promise was really made.
The registration of land under the Torrens system does not have the
effect of altering the laws of succession, or the rights of partition
between coparceners, joint tenants, and other cotenants nor does it
change or affect in any other way any other rights and liabilities
created by law and applicable to unregistered land (sec. 70, Land
Registration Law). The plaintiff is not, then, in estoppel, nor can the
doctrine of res judicata be invoked against her claim. Under these
circumstances, she has the right to compel the defendant to deliver
her corresponding share in the estate left by the deceased,
Victorino L. Guevara.
In his tenth to fourteenth assignments of error the petitioner assails
the foregoing findings of the Court of Appeals. But the findings of
fact made by said court are final and not reviewable by us on
certiorari. The Court of Appeals found that the money with which
the petitioner repurchased the northern half of the land in question
from Rafael Puzon was not his own but his father's, it being the
proceeds of the sale of a parcel of land made by the latter to
Silvestre P. Coquia. Said court also found that the respondent
withdrew her opposition to the registration of the land in the name
of the petitioner upon the latter's promise that after paying all the
debts of their father he would deliver to her and to the widow their
corresponding shares. From these facts, it results that the
interested parties consented to the registration of the land in
question in the name of Ernesto M. Guevara alone subject to the
implied trust on account of which he is under obligation to deliver
and convey to them their corresponding shares after all the debts of
the original owner of said land had been paid. Such finding does not
constitute a reversal of the decision and decree of registration,
which merely confirmed the petitioner's title; and in the absence of
any intervening innocent third party, the petitioner may be
compelled to fulfill the promise by virtue of which he acquired his
title. That is authorized by section 70 of the Land Registration Act,
cited by the Court of Appeals, and by the decision of this Court in
Severino vs. Severino, 44 Phil., 343, and the cases therein cited.
Upon this phase of the litigation, we affirm the finding of the Court
of Appeals that the northern half of the land described in the will
exhibit A and in original certificate of title No. 51691 still belongs to
the estate of the deceased Victorino L. Guevara. In the event the
petitioner Ernesto M. Guevara has alienated any portion thereof, he
is under obligation to compensate the estate with an equivalent
portion from the southern half of said land that has not yet been
sold. In other words, to the estate of Victorino L. Guevara still
belongs one half of the total area of the land described in said
original certificate of title, to be taken from such portions as have
not yet been sold by the petitioner, the other half having been
lawfully acquired by the latter in consideration of his assuming the
obligation to pay all the debts of the deceased.
Wherefore, that part of the decision of the Court of Appeals which
declares in effect that notwithstanding exhibit 2 and the issuance of
original certificate of title No. 51691 in the name of Ernesto M.
Guevara, one half of the land described in said certificate of title
belongs to the estate of Victorino L. Guevara and the other half to
Ernesto M. Guevara in consideration of the latter's assumption of
the obligation to pay all the debts of the deceased, is hereby
affirmed; but the judgment of said court insofar as it awards any
relief to the respondent Rosario Guevara in this action is hereby
reversed and set aside, and the parties herein are hereby ordered to
present the document exhibit A to the proper court for probate in
accordance with law, without prejudice to such action as the
provincial fiscal of Pangasinan may take against the responsible
party or parties under section 4 of Rule 76. After the said document
is approved and allowed by the court as the last will and testament
of the deceased Victorino L. Guevara, the heirs and legatees therein
named may take such action, judicial or extrajudicial, as may be
necessary to partition the estate of the testator, taking into
consideration the pronouncements made in part II of this opinion.
No finding as to costs in any of the three instances.