The Two Cities in Augustine's Political Philosophy (Rex Martin)

The Two Cities in Augustine's Political Philosophy
Author(s): Rex Martin

Source: Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 33, No. 2 (Apr. - Jun., 1972), pp. 195-216
Published by: University of Pennsylvania Press
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THE TWO CITIES IN
AUGUSTINE'S POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY
BY REX MARTIN
There has been a surprisingly wide divergence of interpretations

Augustine's conception of the state, especially with respect to the
litical bearing of his concept of the Two Cities and to his position
the nature and role of justice in the governance of states. In this es
I wish to develop a single, coherent reading of Augustine's theory
of the themes and passages that are generally regarded as the matr
of his conception of the state and, then, to confirm and extend t
reading by directing it against some of the major alternative interp
tations of his theory.
What are these themes and passages which provide the agre
upon field of interpretation and reinterpretation? There is, first,
concept of the Two Cities and the political interpretation given it
Then, second, there is the well-known passage in the City of God (
4, pp. 112-13) where Augustine draws an analogy between a kingd
(regnum) and a robber band. Finally, we have Augustine's refl
tions on, and apparent reworking of, Cicero's definition of a comm
wealth (res publica).' These themes and passages are all of a pie
The political interpretation placed on the idea of the Two Cities w
affect the reading one gives to the "robber band" and "commo
wealth" passages. The conception that one develops of the state
these passages will be a feature of the way that the idea of the T
Cities is construed. Most commentators appear to regard Augustin
basic position as a consistent one. Differences have come, however
in determining exactly what this position is.
I think the simplest approach to Augustine's position is by way
the Two Cities. According to Augustine, the twofold division of t
universe into the "City of God" and the "City of Earth" originated
the prideful revolt of the (now fallen) angels in heaven. As it had b
in heaven so it was on earth. Men had primevally lived on earth i
peace and comity (joined with one another in natural, familial
fection) until the Fall, which brought sin into the world. The two citie
'References to and citations of the text of Augustine's City of God will generally
cur in the body of the paper and will follow a single style-e.g., IV.4, pp.112-13, w
the numbers denote, respectively, the book (IV), the chapter (4), and the page numb
of the passage in question. The page references are to the Modern Library edition of
City of God, trans. by Marcus Dods and others (New York, 1950). For Augustine's
cussion of Cicero's definition see, in particular, II.21, pp.60-63 and XIX.21, 23, 24,
699-701,706.
195
196 REX MARTIN
on earth had their germ in C

the first earthly city, "but A
p. 479). Thus, Augustine can sa
Accordingly, two cities have been f
of self, even to the contempt of G
the contempt of self. ... In the
are ruled by the love of ruling.... B
dom, but only godliness, which off
for its reward in the society of th
"that God may be all in all" (XIV
One model for interpreting

the Earthly City with the sta
tional church. Assuming for t
fundamentally sound, we can
tion of political life would f
state as such, when taken on i
pear to be a radical devaluatio
considerable measure of pessi
man's political condition. On t
-at least in the Christian di
of God on earth.
What political implication this would have, however, is not alto-
gether clear. It would seem, though, that if the state could be Chris-
tianized through some special relationship with the institutional
church, then a fundamentally different evaluation of such a state
would be warranted. The basic point here would be to distinguish the
state per se, on its own principles, from the state as Christianized
through some organic relationship with the institutional church.2 The
function of the identification model would be to validate this distinc-
tion, to justify this way of looking at politics, and to legitimate the no-
tion of a Christianized state.
The twofold identification which I have described, of the state with
the City of Earth and of the church militant with the City of God,
could lead to a "clericalist" doctrine of the state. This seems to have
happened in the Middle Ages, when there was a strong curren
2A variety of possible arrangements could be suggested as suitably satisfying the

ganic relationship" in question. Among the alternatives are: (a) some sort of theocr
(b) Caesaro-papism of the Byzantine sort, (c) a cooperative relationship between chu
and state within a single polity, as in Charlemagne's conception of the Holy Roman
pire, or (d) a cooperative relationship between two types of authority within a
Christian society, as in the "formula" of Pope Gelasius. It has even been said tha
mere establishment of the Christian church or simply the official toleration of Ch
tianity would be sufficient. See J. N. Figgis, The Political Aspects of St. Augus
"City of God" (Gloucester, 1963; originally published in 1921), 60-61.
AUGUSTINE'S TWO CITIES 197
"clericalist" rhetoric in which the identif

or at least presupposed.3 That we should
litical rhetoric as an interpretation of Au
may well be that the medieval analysis
rather than about Augustine and, hence, n
pretation of the political doctrine of th
times, however, scholarly interpretation
lend weight to taking the clericalist doct
model, as a substantially correct account o
As Figgis says, "Their views are stronger
tine meant, than is the constant use that w
thinkers. The medieval habit of taking tag
the general purpose of the writer, discou
Besides this there was an immediate polem
Although the identification model wou
validity, or at least great historical intere
stantially correct account of Augustine's
support of Augustine's text, as it bears
Cities and his analysis of the state. It i
identification model is altogether too simp
Augustine's own rendering of the Two C
clear in what follows.
Let me begin by elaborating the contention that Augustine had
an essentially tripartite conception of the city of God. The first concep-
tion is that the city of God is an "eternal city"; as such it is composed
of the Trinity, the unfallen or loyal angels, and the eternally pre-
destined-to-grace portion of the human race. The eternal citizenship
of the human portion, which is potentially eternal "in time" and ac-
tually eternal "at the end of time" (i.e., in the Heaven of Book XXII),
is referred to by Augustine in phrases such as "the eternal life of the
saints" (XII.19, p. 402) and "a future eternal priesthood" (XVII.6,
p. 583).
The second conception of the city of God is that it is an associa-
3The term "clericalist" is Figgis's (64). A number of medieval thinkers can plausibly
be cited as holding the clericalist doctrine on grounds of the identification model: Hilde-
brand (see Figgis 88-89 for discussion and citation); Engelbert of Admont (Figgis, 85,
97-98); James of Viterbo (C. H. McIlwain, The Growth of Political Thought in the West
[New York, 1932], 159; McIlwain also cited Hildebrand, 160); the anonymous
source cited in the anti-papalist tract Rex pacificus (H. A. Deane, The Political and So-
cial Ideas of St. Augustine [New York, 1963], 232-33); and Giles of Rome (Deane,
232, 332, n. 25; Giles is also cited by McIlwain, 159n).
4Figgis, 77. Ritschl, for example, appears to identify the state with the City of
Earth (Figgis, 55, 128, n.6 for discussion and citation). Gierke holds a theocratic inter-
pretation of the state based, again, on identifying the City of God with the church (Fig-
gis, 77, 131, n.9). Similar views are held by Dorner and Ritschl (Figgis, 131, nn.8, 10).
198 REX MARTIN
tion (a collective only "in co

of individual persons who lo
themselves and the things of
Augustine divided all manki
"the flesh" and those who
Members within each group
culiar characters of the "lo
These individuals are not cor
institution or set of institut
forming two "cities." Accord
vidualistic" conception of th
viduals and their love.
The third conception of the city of God is that it is a visible and in-
stitutional entity. Before Christ, this entity was the Hebrew nation
(not state). Christ "took away the kingdom" from Israel, because
Israel had become his "enemy" (XVII.7, p. 585), and put it under
his own headship in his church, the catholic church. It is especially
noteworthy that Augustine used this terminology to describe what he
believed to have been an historical occurrence, the transfer of God's
institutional "kingdom" on earth from the Hebrew nation to the
Christian church.
Too many roadblocks stand in the way of any literal and complete
identification of the city of God with the church. The term
"church" should properly refer only to the New Testament "King-
dom" of Christ. Thus, all the individual persons who lived before
Christ can never be included within the church. Furthermore, the God-
head and the angels who compose part of the "eternal" city can in no
sense be called part of the church (although Christ is called "head" of
the church). These two exceptions will hold true no matter how broadly
one chooses to interpret the term "church" (providing, of course, that
the term is strictly confined to the New Testament or Christian
dispensation).
If one prefers to limit "church" to the "institutional" or "visible"
church, then one must be prepared to admit that the "individualis-
tic" church can never be fully comprehended in it. There will always
be some predestined individuals (i.e., members of the "eternal"
city) who at any given time are not members of the "visible" church
and even individuals who love God but, for one reason or another,
have not affiliated themselves with the "visible" church (e.g., martyrs
who die for Christ but outside the church and who are admitted to
his kingdom by the "baptism of blood" rather than to his church
the "baptism of water"). Finally, there are always members of th
"visible" church who do not belong to the "eternal" or "individua
tic" cities; their presence within the "institutional" city or chur
thus makes it impossible to "identify" that c

two cities.
Sometimes texts in the book which expl
God with the church are seized upon as pr
identification. (See, for examples, VIII.2
424; XVII.4, p. 573; XVIII.29, p. 634.) H
textual straws is futile, if it is admitted
"city of God" nor "church" is used une
pushed back to examining the specifics, an
variably show that no wholesale identific
this is not to dismiss the claim that there is an "institutional" sense of
the term "city of God." And it is clearly true that the institutional
church, for Augustine, is to be regarded as exemplifying this sense in
the Christian era.5 His point was that the city of God on earth should
not be identified exclusively with either of the two Christian "socie-
ties"; rather, it was that the institutional view of the church must
be set over against and integrated with that of the "individualistic"
church of the true saints.
The individuals who compose the "individualistic" church are
members of that city of God by virtue of their love; they are also-for
the most part-members of the institutional church. The institutional
5The problem here is to establish unmistakably that Augustine did refer with one
sense of the term "city of God on earth" to the institutional church. Our locus classicus
is Augustine's exegetical discussion of Noah's ark (XV.26, 27, pp. 516-20). He said about
the ark: "This is certainly a figure of the city of God sojourning in this world; that is to
say, of the church, which is rescued by the wood on which hung the Mediator of God and
men, the man Christ Jesus" (516). The condition of the church's "sojourning" is the con-
dition of the animals in the ark (i.e., "the clean and unclean together," 519). This inclu-
sion of both "clean" and "unclean" in the ark (i.e., saved and unsaved in the church) is
an image appropriate to the visible or institutional church but hardly to the church con-
ceived as an association of individuals bound together solely by their love of God.
Hence, the image of the ark provides not only the looked-for proof text but also the prin-
ciple of differentiating the individualistic from the institutional sense of the term "city
of God on earth." Augustine's clearest statement of his twofold conception of the church
under the single heading of "Kingdom of heaven" (or City of God) is found in XX.9,
which deals with the millennial reign of Christ; see esp. pp. 725-27. This chapter pro-
vides another discussion of the church/city of God along the same lines as in the Noah's
ark sections. On the theme of the institutional church as itself a mixed community, see
Augustine's discussion of heretics in the church (XVIII.49, p. 660 and, esp. 51, pp.
661-63). The notion of the city of God as a sacramental body seems, also, to point to the
institutional church. At two points this is unmistakable, where Augustine conjoins the
themes of the church as a mixed community and as a sacramental body. (See the Noah's
ark chapters, especially the analogy of the door of the ark with the wounded side of
Christ [p. 516], and 1.35, p. 38.) Finally, there is his idea that the city of God in
the Christian era is prefigured by the Hebrew nation. Augustine several times treated of
this foreshadowing with special reference to public, corporate worship. (See especially
X.1, p. 305; VII.32, p. 238; X.32, p. 343.) The presence of the concept of public worship
here definitely points to an institutional church.
200 REX MARTIN
church conceived as a divin

can be said to act for and in the interest of the individualistic church.
It is the historical "deputy" of God and, as divine, "stands for" God
and his people (the "individualistic" church); the institutional church
has the mission of carrying the religion of Christ throughout the
Christian era and of guaranteeing the truth of this religion, with re-
spect to both cult and doctrine.
As long as the institutional church is divinely directed to do God's
work it is the city of God on earth in a most important and indispens-
able way. Regardless of the general character of its membership and
because it always contains the greater portion of the saints on
earth, the catholic church (in Augustine's opinion) goes on its pilgrim-
age, inheritor of the "kingdom" of God from the Hebrews, house of
worship, dispenser of the sacraments, and teacher of scripture. It is
the peculiar medium through which God's will is worked and is a
sharer in God's grace as truly as is the "individualistic" church. Each
church, admittedly in its own way and in a nonexclusive and limited
sense, is an aspect of the city of God on earth. The conclusion I draw
is that Augustine did not treat "City of God on earth" and "institu-
tional church" as identical in meaning. But I have argued that there is
a unique relationship here, between the City of God and the visible
church, which requires some term to describe it.
Figgis has suggested the notion of a "symbol."6 While Noah's Ark
may be a symbol of the church (by way of analogy), the institutional
church is not in that sense a "symbol" of the City of God. For some
features of the church are not simply analogous to traits of the City of
God but are, rather, actual historical functions of the City of God on
earth. Perhaps the word to describe the relationship is a stronger
one: the institutional church represents or is the agent of the divine
City in certain of the functions the church actually performs, i.e., in
worship, sacraments, scripture, and authoritative discipline. Rather
than a simple identity there is an identification at certain points and
for certain purposes. It is this claim which I would urge against both
Figgis and Deane.7 Although I endorse their contention that Augus-
tine does not identify the City of God on earth with the institutional
church, I claim that this fact alone does not require us to withdraw
the notion of a Christianized state, since there is still the relationship
of special representation.
6Figgis, 51, 68. Bluhm refers to the "identification," of the city of God with the
institutional church, as "only figurative": Theories of the Political System (Englewood
Cliffs, 1965), 163.
7Both Figgis (51-52, 121) and Deane (24, 34, 121) do, of course, deny the simple iden-
tification model. Figgis does it with the qualification "sans phrase"; Deane's denial is
unqualified: it is "absolutely impossible to identify the City of God . . . with the visible
Christian Church in this world" (24).
Deane, however, wants to deny the Chris

tion altogether. To accomplish this, he wa
simple identification model but also any no
tion. His claim here is quite uncompromisin
or association can ever claim to be a part o
City of God. . . . Even the visible Church,
the reprobate along with the elect, is not
City of God, although ... it is more closely
any earthly state or society can ever be."8
One might well agree with Deane, as I do
state is not an Augustinian notion. But I do
as his reason that there is no basic relationshi
representation, between the City of God an
in Augustine's eyes. It seems to me to run
ustine's text to say that the institutional chur
sion of the City of God" and to suggest th
earthly states or societies only in degree. R
is a special relationship-representation-and
rant, although an attenuated one, for retai
tianized state as a possible interpretation of
has managed to squeeze the whole Chri
through the needle's eye of the relation
has alleged, though noting that the City of
fied precisely" with "existing human in
church, that the Kingdom of Christ was "
and Christianized empire." This "conceptio
wealth" is, Sabine says, Augustine's "most
based on "a philosophy of history [i.e., t
which presents such a commonwealth as
spiritual development."9 I would agree w
the Christianized state idea must at least b
8Deane, 29 (see also 28). It is difficult to say her

Jesus' opinion or Augustine's. But he is clearly expo
says that the City of God "has no earthly representat
to refer exclusively to states I would agree, but if it is
tant as well (as it does on 121), I cannot agree.
9The passages cited are from G. H. Sabine, History
York, 1961), 190-91. It is interesting to note that Sabi
notion on Augustine, by reference to the Two Cities co
that the church "represents" the City of God "even th
fied with the ecclesiastical organization" (190). It is dif
was referring to with the phrase "Christian commo
ferred, at least in part, to the "Christianized empire"
do find Sabine endorsing the claim of James Bryce tha
Empire was built upon Augustine's City of God" an
Augustine's espousal of the notion of "a Christian stat
202 REX MARTIN
given the idea of a partial id

agent representation-of the cit
But what about the other ba
of Earth? Do we have any t
state and the City of Earth?
a priori move might prove he
velop a parallel between the i
City of God and the state in
a priori grounds, we could ru
cation. Moreover, Figgis' not
pear warranted-as the text,
(For example, Cain, who is
City of Earth, also founded t
Romulus, who founded Rom
XV.5, pp. 482-83.].) Finally,
sentation would, on a priori gr
The question is, How would
point(s) would the identity h
to the passage where August
loves, "the earthly by love of s
of concern for the things of
Augustine specifically menti
this is a notion relevant to po
such, through the love of ru
Earth? I do not think it was
mind, for he says, "In the on
are ruled by the love of ruling
It is not the state as such, i.
or all of them taken togethe
represents the City of Earth
Rome) plays a role toward th
by the institutional church t
lelism descends even to det
which we have already noted
in the succession of the grea
p.627).
It has been observed by Figgis (p.53) and Deane (p. 171), in particu-
lar, that Augustine was personally an anti-imperialist. (See, for
'0It is interesting to note that Figgis will allow only a "symbolic" representation
of the City of God by the church, and Deane not even this; but the relationship between
the City of Earth and the State is treated, in each case, in a non-parallel fashion. Deane,
for example, suggests that "states of this world are in some sense regarded as parts of
the earthly city" (31, italics added; see also Deane, 30, and Figgis, 51, and 58).
example, IV.15, p.123.)" However, the connec

the notion that the imperial state "represent
not been sufficiently noted. At several poin
essential similarity of all imperial states in th
domination and their imposition of rule by w
the connection of this feature of imperial s
the City of Earth, a connection such that w
imperial states the exemplars and institution
City of Earth. The earthly city is the city of ea
the master lust is the lust of domination. Thi
it is the pride which apes God himself. This,
the imperial state in its role as the agent rep
Earth: "The earthly city,... though it be mis
itself ruled by its lust of rule" (I. preface, p.3; a
The notion of a basic parallelism within th
I think, substantially sound. Sabine puts the i
parallelism well: "Augustine did think of th
least represented by the pagan empires, thou
with them. He also thought of the church as
God, even though the latter cannot be identif
organization" (p. 190; italics added).
My analysis of Augustine's political phil
claim that he does not identify either of the
tions on earth. The two cities have a simple
identity only beyond the Final Judgment, i
respect to this world, the concept of the Two C
two types or classifications of men. However,
are earthly institutions that "represent" and
cities in human history: the imperial states a
the City of Earth and, after the advent of C
church is the unique and indispensable repre
God.
"Augustine had an ambivalent attitude toward the Romans' acquisition of empire.

He does not trace it simply to the love of ruling but, also, includes the provocations of
Rome's neighbors among the causes of empire. The empire accrued to Rome in part as
the result of fighting "just wars" (IV.15, p. 123; Augustine makes this same point at
III.10, p. 81). He also provides a special reason (or cause) for Rome's empire: God
"helped forward the Romans, who were good according to a certain standard of an
earthly state" (V.19, p. 173). At another point he says that by Rome "God was pleased
to conquer the whole world, and subdue it far and wide by bringing it into one fellowship
of government and laws" (XVIII.22, p. 628; also XIX.7, p. 683). It is, in the light of this,
understandable that Augustine would be reluctant to accept the "fall" of Rome (see
IV.7, p. 115). The hold of the Roman myth was powerful on its loyal subjects, Christian
and pagan.
204 REX MARTIN
This conception of the institu

tive of the City of God allow
notion of a Christianized st
might appropriate some sort
just as the Hebrew nation had
The issue remains open. On t
and not the state as such, tha
will allow us to dispense with a
state per se with the "earthly
Cities on its own, although it p
political doctrines, does not g
tine's political philosophy. In
us with sufficient informatio
nature and role of justice in th
was advocating the notion of
provide us even with August
essential link between the sta
broken.
Exception could well be taken to my claim. It has been pointed out,
for example, that Cain, the germ of the City of Earth, founded the first
town. But even if we allow that this first city is the first state, I would
ask what we might conclude about the nature of the state. For the cru-
cial question is, What is the nature of the state in Augustine's opinion?
The connoisseur of the City of God might here invite attention to one
of Augustine's most famous political passages, the one that begins:
"Justice being taken away, then [Remota itaque iustitia], what are
kingdoms but great robberies? For what are robberies themselves, but
little kingdoms?" and ends: "Indeed that was an apt and true reply
which was given to Alexander the Great by a pirate who had been
seized. For when that king had asked the man what he meant by keep-
ing hostile possession of the sea, he answered with bold pride, 'What
thou meanest by seizing the whole earth; but because I do it with a petty
ship, I am called a robber, whilst thou who dost it with a great fleet
art styled emperor' " (IV.4, pp. 112-13).
I would suggest, however, the importance of considering this pas-
'2Insofar as Augustine can be said to be concerned with the political state as such, I
think we can say that he saw the state qua state as belonging to the things of this world,
as distinct from the things of heaven. Certainly this much can be read into Augustine's
oft repeated observation that Cain founded the first city (XV.1, p. 479). This, together
with the fact that Augustine pointed Abel out as a shepherd, not as a ruler of men, indi-
cates that Augustine did not regard the rule of man over men as part of the economy of
Eden.
sage in its context, as many commenta

Carlyle, Mcllwain, d'Entreves). Its context
of imperial states and their imaging forth o
"lust for domination" which I have been d
extended treatment of the theme of the imp
IV of the City of God.) I suggest that the co
cial, that the systematic import of the passa
text is ignored, and that we obtain a very di
keep these points in mind. Let us read the
justice in Kingdoms, but about the nature
can be taken as saying: set the issue of jus
are not particularly just. They are really n
While robber bands and empires do have
with the conventionally more acceptable
have princes, pacts of confederation, bind
they have in common is how they do thei
principle there is no difference: if a robbe
of cities and subdue people, it would be an
an imperial state is not that the gang is ri
rather, that they have gotten too big to be
The force of this reading of IV.4, as bei
imperial state, is brought out not just from
from the explicit reference to empire on
and, finally, from a passage which comes
after. Here we find Augustine explicitly l
ultimately tying in both, as imperial state
concludes the chapter, speaking of the Ass
make war on your neighbors and thenc
through mere lust of dominion to crush a
no harm, what else is this to be called
p.114). It would seem that this passage
phrase "great robbery") to IV.4. But, m
connects IV.4 with the theme of the impe
and the essential tie-in of the imperial st
minion," to the City of Earth. (See also, f
linkage, IV.7, p. 114; XVI. 17, pp.541-42,
In saying all this I am not meaning to su
cussion of the "Kingdom" and the "remov
bearing beyond the imperial state theme
tion between an imperial state and a "dom
be true to say that Augustine's discussion
latter as well. But what that is exactly can
by relating it to Augustine's discussion o
206 REX MARTIN
"commonwealth" (res publica

discussion of "commonweal
defects mentioned earlier in
philosophy by rounding out th
Cicero's famous "definition
given in his Republic through
Well, then, a commonwealth is

populi). But a people is not any
in any sort of way, but an assem
an agreement with respect to just
common good.
This definition can be effect

(1) law and justice and (2) the
definition at two points in the
In 11.21, pp.60-63, he begin
said that "even in his time
tirely extinct, and that the
all" (p.60). Now, the natural q
Augustine leads up to answe
ing that the concord (i.e., "c
classes") which is required
retained where justice has be
Augustine, Scipio asserts tha
the most absolute justice [s
who is following Cicero's ow
l3The term res publica is normally

logically related to it) or as "comm
tions and since "commonwealth" con
seems preferable. See A. P. d'Entre
35, esp. 33, and, 75, n. 2.
'4Cicero, De Republica, trans. by
emphasizes the primacy of justice in
nership in justice" (77). D'Entreves h
iuris consensu should be translated "
lators (including Keyes) have it, or
n.2). I have seen one translation th
English the difference in sense is st
appear to change, depending on w
Latin iuris, whether it is translate
right or rightness. Hence, even if w
force of "just law" or "law accord
point could be derived, philosophical
and ultimately in "right reason"
317, 345, 381, 385, and De Republic
meaning iustitia (justice); although his
of"rights" as well.
and 219), points out that Scipio later "re

his own brief definition of a republic" and
that a "republic, or 'weal of the people,' then
and justly governed, whether by a monarch,
whole people" (p.61). Augustine, then, para
Scipio (Cicero): a republic given over to in
ished . . . but by legitimate deduction from
gether ceases to be" (pp.61-62).
Augustine's point is ultimately a moral o
that Cicero (through his spokesman Scipio)
the community" as essential to a republic
common good part of its "definition"), and
day had lost this morality to the degree that
as no longer a republic. But at this poin
note. He suggests that, perhaps, Cicero a
antique Roman republic have failed to inqu
days of primitive men and morals, true justic
not perhaps even then, to use the casual ex
colored painting than the living reality"
immediately adds that he will "consider
briefly indicates what he will take up later on
He wants, first, to show that by Cicero's
never a republic "because true justice had
second, Augustine says that a "more feasibl
than Cicero's would allow us to say, as Cice
"there was a republic of a certain kind, an
administered by the more ancient Roma
representatives." Finally, Augustine wishes
has no existence save in that republic whose f
if at least any choose to call this a republic;
that it is the people's weal. But if perch
which has become familiar in other connec
our common parlance, we may at all events
justice; the city of which Holy Scripture
said of thee, O city of God' " (all passages:I
Augustine's new points, which he promis
taken up again in Book XIX. Before I turn to
it would be helpful to note certain things
in working our way into Augustine's own pos
that Augustine in 11.21 has not been talkin
rather about a more specialized notion,
particular reference to the Roman repub
"republic" is not a descriptive term but pr
denoting a principle, that of the "weal o
208 REX MARTIN
evaluative point that Augu

"true justice," as different
justice. What historic Rom
whose founder and ruler is
lic-and Augustine is reluc
called, he tells us, the City
for textual evidence whic
some sort of Christianized
govern our judgment here.
the Roman or any other, is
people of Christ . . . are
earthly republic, wicked an
themselves" a place among
of heaven" where "God's w
republic" is clearly this "re
which Augustine is reluct
"republic") since it is not eve
There is, I think, an obvio
here: between the "earthly
political and the celestial ci
the eternal-divine, between
as it were.
Finally, I think we can take Augustine as endorsing Cicero's dis-
tinction between the antique republic (existing before Christ and the
Roman emperors and coming to an end in Cicero's own day) and
Rome's "modern representatives," which include the Romans of the
imperial state, under the emperor, of Augustine's own day. Rather
than contrasting the Christianized State with the pagan state, Augus-
tine was indicating that he favored the antique Roman State, which
was pagan, over the "modern" Roman empire in which Christianity
was established! But we have no paradox here, if we allow that
Augustine's basic distinction was between the "republic of heaven"
and the "earthly republic."
It is important, in this context, to note that Augustine nowhere
makes an explicit distinction between heathen and Christian states (see
Deane, 123). This fact in itself and his obvious preference for the
antique Roman republic, which is repeated at XIX.24, p.706, make it
difficult to see how the Christianized State interpretation has come to
have the credibility that it has in recent scholarship.15 That Augustine
should prefer the earlier republic of Rome over the later empire is,
unlike the basic distinction between the "earthly republic" and the
'5Augustine's basic attitude towards politics, following the Pauline tradition, is

passive, negative, almost indifferent. It would seem that one could hardly advocate the
Christianized State on the one hand and say, on the other, "What does it matter under
heavenly, not grounded on theological co

preference, and a regard for the grounds
where we are concerned with his political ph
It is important in analyzing Augustine'
XIX, of Cicero's definition of a commonw
ological from the political motif. Theolog
have two motives in undertaking his ref
true justice depends on the correct appreh
and (2) to suggest that no secular or polit
a true commonwealth because it could not
and ultimately would not serve the true com
The key to his political point is provide
alternative definition of the commonwealth:
A people is an assemblage of reasonable beings bound together by a common

agreement as to the objects of their love; then, in order to discover the char-
acter of any people, we have only to observe what they love. Yet whatever it
loves, if only it is an assemblage of reasonable beings and not of beasts, and
is bound together by an agreement as to the objects of love, it is reasonably
called a people; and it will be a superior people in proportion as it is bound to-
gether by higher interests, inferior in proportion as it is bound together by
lower. According to this definition of ours, the Roman people is a people, and
its weal is without doubt a commonwealth or republic (XIX.24, p.706).
This new definition is, presumably, the "more feasible" definition

which Augustine had promised in 11.21 and it is a definition which
whose government a dying man lives [and we are all dying men], if those who gov-
ern do not force him to impiety and iniquity?" (V.17, p. 166). This observation would
appear to be doubly telling against those who assert that Augustine wanted to turn the
whole body of true saints (the "individualistic" city of God) into a political state. See,
for example, Otto Butz, Of Man and Politics (New York, 1964), 60-62 and G. Combes,
quoted in Deane, 303, n.67. Indeed, to attempt to institutionalize the "individualistic"
city in any way on earth is what Gilbert Ryle would call a category mistake.
16Augustine's primary reasons for challenging Cicero's definition are theological,
not political. This interpretation can be confirmed by the text of Augustine's argument.
(a) As to justice he says: "There is no republic where there is no justice. Further, jus-
tice is that virtue which gives every one his due. Where, then, is the justice of man, when
he deserts the true God and yields himself to impure demons? Is this to give every one
his due? Or is he who keeps back a piece of ground from the purchaser, and gives it to a
man who has no right to it unjust, while he who keeps back himself from the God who
made him, and serves wicked spirits, is just?" (XIX.21, p. 699).
(b) Augustine repeats his charge at a later point: "For in general, the city of the un-
godly, which did not obey the command of God that it should offer no sacrifice save to
Him alone ... is void of true justice" (XIX.24, p. 706).
(c) As to the common good Augustine says: "And why need I speak of the advantage-
ousness, the common participation in which, according to the definition [of Cicero]
makes a people? . . . If you choose to regard the matter attentively, you will see that
there is nothing advantageous to those who live godlessly, as every one lives who does
not serve God but demons" (XIX.21, p. 700).
210 REX MARTIN
Augustine acknowledges as h
definition so radically differ
basically, to Cicero's definitio
Cicero's definition easily enou
and the "true weal" of men a
propriate only to the church
final analysis, the only "true r
tion, could ever exist is the
God; and this is not in huma
added that certain moral q
common well-being, qualities
"true justice" might still s
wealth."18 Why did Augustin
note it, as it were, to draw t
theological and a correct p
"justice," and "well-being"?
In answering this question I
from Cicero is more appare
tinguish a republic from a t
being justice. Why justice?
the cement that binds a stat
harmonious whole (see De Re
belongs to the definition of
res populi, i.e., partnership o
In short, without justice the
would be no social harmony
ation is that a concord of th
highest political good and he
17This definition is consistent with

gious context: "A civic community ..
gether by some associating tie" (XV
be found in Augustine's letters and o
"definition" in response to Cicero an
be applied generally: to every societ
basic sense of the definition ("reaso
ment as to the objects of love") could
'8One of the most important featur
made an explicit distinction betwe
(imago) of justice: Deane, 96-103, es
that "true justice" is not a political
"image of justice") did not belong in
Deane is the first one to insist on th
distinction. The failure of Carlyle, F
introduces a serious distortion into
did not seem sufficiently alert to the
necessary to social peace and harmony, be

any republic.
This is the way that justice gets into
republic. But here we are using "definitio
includes a definition in the strict sense: t
res populi or social partnership." And it i
element as well; the factual claim that the
sary for the existence of a harmony of th
worth noting that the content of this exten
at either descriptively (we can describe
harmony of the classes) or evaluatively (a
the highest political good).19
Augustine's new "definition" follows thi
closely. Augustine's basic distinction is dr
a "kingdom" of the robber band variety.
note constitutional entities but, rather, prin
organization. A republic is a matter of "c
recalls Cicero's harmony of social classes)
(regnum) is not organized on the principle of
the principle of imposition from above. An
of tyranny where social harmony was rep
one man over all or of one class over the oth
any apparent importance, and it is really
that Cicero's notion of popular concurren
social classes whereas that same notion
harmony of individual persons, without refe
Regimes or kingdoms are structured on
domination. They are in essence exactly l
is why the word "kingdom" (regnum) can
either to imperial states or to "domestic"
is that imperial states lord it over subjec
dependently organized politically while "
that rule over other men in a single state
it an imperial state or a regime ruling in a s
'1Cicero apparently thought that a harmony of t

publica) could best be achieved in a "mixed constitu
archial element with a consultative senate and a p
83, 105, 125, 151, 179. His analysis is somewhat h
uses terms designative of political institutions (like
times class terms (like "leading citizens" or "the mas
lary of classical political philosophy is ambiguous o
racy" and "democracy" have both an institutional
Cicero's intent seems clear enough, despite the amb
this question of the constitution is not an issue in
correlate in Augustine's political philosophy.
212 REX MARTIN
the people but of their mast

rests on two fundamental d
city of God and the "earth
republic," between a res pu
latter distinction requires fu
The distinction of regnum
p.156 where he puts civita
publicae on the other). McIl
way of drawing it is defec
distinction which Augustin
Augustine's distinction wa
all. Second, he treats the
states, not so much const
Christian).20 But I would as
of states but rather, polar
ganization. His distinction
grounds on which the prefer
If anything is clear, it is
on the principle of "comm
ganized on the principle o
reason that Augustine endo
ciple of organization in Aug
of subjection he condemne
robbery." I regard the cr
principles, i.e., the differ
as the ground of his basic
(for there is here no contr
political but, rather, only b
bad).21
It is also clear from other passages that Augustine took a negative
20Deane rejects McIlwain's distinction of regnum/res publica because he does not
see that Augustine uses his terms in the way McIlwain has indicated: Deane, 297,
n.28. Even more objectionable is the interpretation McIlwain puts on the distinction
once he has drawn it terminologically. He says that all pagan states are regna, since
they are, as pagan, deprived of justice but that republics would have the quality of jus-
tice; and he suggests, but does not say, that a Christianized State would be a republic.
Even so, I think the distinction of regnum/res publica, if interpreted along the lines I
am suggesting, can be used to point to a genuine principle of distinction in Augustine's
political thought.
2'D'Entreves construes Augustine as offering a value-neutral definition of the state
(23-27). This view is, I think, mistaken. The whole notion of a "republic" was intro-
duced and discussed in an evaluative way. In contrast to d'Entreves I would say that
Augustine was "defining" a "republic," where that term referred to a political value
which could be exemplified or not in any state. The very notion of a republic, as we find
it in XIX.21, for example, is itself an entirely favorably evaluated notion. (For addi-
tional discussion, see d'Entreves' chapter, "The State-A Neologism," 28-36.)
view, morally, of the whole principle of

He speaks of robbers who "invade the
ultimately would have a city or nation "subm
peace in a passage (XIX. 12, p.687), recallin
passage (in IV.4). He also speaks of "wick
maintain the peace of their own circle, an
men belonged to them, that all men and
head, and might, either through love o
peace with [them]! It is thus that pride i
It abhors equality with other men under
rule, it seeks to impose a rule of its ow
p.689).
We have then, in Augustine's theory, two basic kinds of political
values in the organization of states: the community principle, defined
by basic social agreement, and the regime principle, defined by an
imposed order. However, Augustine's evaluations do not end here, for
he recognizes that human freedom (in its political form, i.e., common
agreement as to desired political ends) can have a variety of objects.
And these objects will themselves vary in moral quality, "higher in-
terests" as opposed to "lower." What Augustine called "true justice"
can never be an interest or object of the state (at least, Augustine
never allowed that it could). Even strict Ciceronian justice might be
unattainable, for Augustine appears to believe that human justice, with
or without a proper relationship to God, would always be imperfect,
even when judged by internal or human standards, like those of Cicero
(XIX.23-27, pp. 705-08). But if a state were to dedicate itself to some
attainable "image of justice" (but not to the impossible goal of "true
justice") then presumably it would have chosen a "higher interest."
Or we might infer that, if a state were to undertake certain tasks in
the interest of the church, as, for example, the use of its coercive power
in the maintenance of the doctrines and discipline of the church, then
that would be a "higher interest." If we interpret the Christianized
State notion as meaning, not that a republic can only be a Christian
state or that political justice is ultimately a theological and ecclesi-
astical category, but simply that service to the church is a political
good (a "higher interest"), then Augustine might be said to hold this
notion.22
Whether the highest attainable political goal is service to the church
or an image of justice, I will not venture to say. But if a commonwealth
can have "lower" interests and still remain a commonwealth, then it
22Augustine came, rather reluctantly and rather late, to advocate state coercion of
heretics and the suppression of schism by political means. See his Correction of the
Donatists, in Works (trans. J. R. King; Edinburgh, 1872), III, esp. 485; also the very ex-
cellent chapter 6 on heresy by Deane, 172-220.
214 REX MARTIN
is clear that virtues like jus

to the church are not essent
such virtues may be essenti
"image of justice," althoug
for that very reason-necess
existence of the commonw
Niebuhr's phrase) "not to th
monwealth."
There may be, however, something other than justice that is es-
sential to the very existence of a commonwealth as defined, and,
hence, that belongs of necessity on its agenda. This is, of course, a
question of fact. Put in this way, it would seem that Augustine's con-
clusion is not difficult to fathom. What does belong to its basic agenda
according to him, is peace.
The earthly city, which does not live by faith, seeks an earthly peace, and the
end it proposes, in the well-ordered concord of civil obedience and rule, is the
combination of men's wills to attain the things which are helpful to this life
The heavenly city [on earth] makes use of this peace only because it must,
until this mortal condition which necessitates it shall pass away. . . . [The
heavenly city] makes no scruple to obey the laws of the earthly city, whereby
the things necessary for the maintenance of this mortal life are administered;
and thus, as this life is common to both cities, so there is a harmony between
them in regard to what belongs to [this mortal life] (XIX. 17, pp.695-96).
Augustine's notion of peace is complex, but if we take it just in

reference to the theme of commonwealth, I think it is clear that he
meant it to be more than simply "law and order," the policemen's
peace. It does, however, include the suppression of civil commotion
and riot; but if this were all, there would be no ultimate distinction
between a commonwealth and a regime. Rather what he points to is
a "well-ordered concord" in which obedience follows from a rational
conception of permanent and mutual interests and not from fear
repression. Augustine says, "The peace of all things is the tranquil
of order. Order is the distribution which allots things equal and
equal, each to its own place" (XIX. 13, p.690). At the basis of
Augustinian commonwealth is "order," which requires a rough, pr
matic, but effective "distribution." The Augustinian minimum polit
agenda is Pax, ordo, lex, societas.23 Under his new definition of co
monwealth, the necessary condition for one to exist is "the tranquillit
of order."
How different, really, is this "tranquillity of order" from
Ciceronian justice? Not very. What ultimately divides the two men,
23Ernest Barker, "Introduction" to J. Healey's translation of the City of God (Lon-

don, Everyman, 1947) I, xxvii.
after we make the true justice/image of

line. Augustine's "tranquillity of order" ca
and ready justice (i.e., imperfect even by h
require an "absolute justice," in Cicero's p
(strict fair dealing between men and betw
his own) is an "image" of the "true justic
(the "order" requisite to tranquillity) is a
degree to which Augustine has moved fr
proposition: the true test of any state is an
This marks a difference, a relative deva
favor of a lesser but more comprehensiv
not a rejection of justice as a political cat
think, or of the need for some sort of r
prudential appeal to the strictly necessary
ing existence of the "republican" political sty
Augustine's point here is simply a factu
they differ as to the facts. Cicero thought
quired for the existence of a people's st
believed that a less than strict or perfect
dards, was required as a matter of fact. T
replaces "absolute" justice on the basic ag
and this shift is reflected in the difference between Cicero's "defini-
tion" of a republic and Augustine's own "more feasible" one.25
Augustine's real break with Cicero came, not on the "definition"
of the commonwealth (for they agree that it is a matter of popular
concurrence in res populi) nor on the empirical determination of its
necessary conditions (for the difference here is only one of degree and
24Carlyle seemed to hold the view that Augustine, in effect, simply got rid of the
notion of justice as a political category: A. J. Carlyle, A History of Medieval Political
Theory in the West (New York, originally published in 1903) I, 170, 174. Carlyle re-
garded this as quite momentous, out of line with literally centuries of earlier and subse-
quent political thought (see 169, 221). At the same time Carlyle is bemused that "Aug-
ustine seems to take the matter lightly" (166). And he was even led to conclude in an-
other place that Augustine may not have "realized the enormous significance of what
he was saying," in F. J. C. Hearnshaw, ed., Social and Political Ideas of Some Great
Medieval Thinkers (London, 1923), 50. But I would suggest that all this represents too
simplistic a reading of Augustine's text.
25Figgis, of course, recognizes the important role peace plays in Augustine's politi-
cal thought but he does not see that what Augustine meant by peace (the "tranquillity of
order") is essentially continuous with Ciceronian justice (62-64). Deane, on the other
hand, tends to equate Augustinian peace with what Augustine called the "image" of
justice (125, 136). I do not think there is adequate textual warrant for Deane's treat-
ment; moreover, it makes the difference between Augustine's definition and that of
Cicero, admittedly more apparent than real, wholly inexplicable. I would suggest that
Augustine's "peace" and Cicero's "justice" do differ in name but that they point to the
same kind of thing; the only difference between them is one of degree.
216 REX MARTIN
of vocabulary), but on the

Cicero, like the great classi
tle, had idealized politics. P
good; the state was, in prin
realize their true end in p
phrase, man is a "political
absolute justice was symp
Augustine's devaluation of
tomatic of a different evaluation.
The point is that Augustine rejected the classical idealization of
the state; this is far more central than how he stood on Cicero's defini-
tion. There is a gulf of radical discontinuity between Augustine and
classical politics. In this sense, Augustine can be said to have written
an anti-politics. His program was to put the things of this world, even
the best of states, under the things of the next, to commit oneself
wholly only to what is absolute, to idealize nothing. Christian political
philosophy, like the Christian himself, is a stranger here below; it can
be in the world but not of it. The good state, the "republic" with
meritorious common interests, can be pointed out, but the state is
not a church and the church should not become a state. The church
must look beyond, to the heavenly republic. This is the basic trut
the Christian religion, as it must be the constant theme of Chris
political philosophy. This is, I think, the political theme of the Cit
God. It is the political meaning of the concept of the Two Cities.
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The Two Cities in Augustine's Political Philosophy

Author(s): Rex Martin

University of Pennsylvania Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and

There has been a surprisingly wide divergence of interpretations

on earth had their germ in C

One model for interpreting

2A variety of possible arrangements could be suggested as suitably satisfying the

"clericalist" rhetoric in which the identif

tion (a collective only "in co

thus makes it impossible to "identify" that c

church conceived as a divin

Deane, however, wants to deny the Chris

8Deane, 29 (see also 28). It is difficult to say her

given the idea of a partial id

example, IV.15, p.123.)" However, the connec

"Augustine had an ambivalent attitude toward the Romans' acquisition of empire.

This conception of the institu

sage in its context, as many commenta

"commonwealth" (res publica

Well, then, a commonwealth is

This definition can be effect

l3The term res publica is normally

and 219), points out that Scipio later "re

evaluative point that Augu

'5Augustine's basic attitude towards politics, following the Pauline tradition, is

heavenly, not grounded on theological co

A people is an assemblage of reasonable beings bound together by a common

This new definition is, presumably, the "more feasible" definition

17This definition is consistent with

necessary to social peace and harmony, be

'1Cicero apparently thought that a harmony of t

the people but of their mast

view, morally, of the whole principle of

is clear that virtues like jus

Augustine's notion of peace is complex, but if we take it just in

23Ernest Barker, "Introduction" to J. Healey's translation of the City of God (Lon-

after we make the true justice/image of

of vocabulary), but on the

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The Two Cities in Augustine's Political Philosophy (Rex Martin)

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