Time and Eternity in Proclus

Author(s): W. O'Neill
Source: Phronesis, Vol. 7, No. 2 (1962), pp. 161-165
Published by: BRILL
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 Time and Eternityin Proclus
W.O'NEILL

The nature of eternity and time and their interrelation were briefly
outlined by Plato in the Timaeus 37d-38c.' This outline was the basis
for various attempts at definition, of which Aristotle's aimed at the
plain meaning of the terms. Time was: 'a reckoning of movement with
regard to antecedent and subsequent'2; eternity: 'the sum of existence
of the whole heaven, the sum which includes all time even to infinity'.3
Plotinus tries to arrive at an understanding of the more ultimate
nature of eternity and time, in the course of which he is strongly critical
of Aristotle.4 For Plotinus both eternity and time are kinds of life.
Eternity is life boundless, complete, unchanging and ever present:
'If someone should thus denominate eternity, calling it life which is
now infinite, because it is all, and nothing of which is consumed, because
nothing pertaining to it is either past or future, ... he would be near
to defining it.'s Eternity in Plotinus is the life of 'Nous', but the soul,
since it does not intuit its object but must use discursive reasoning, is
thereby necessarily involved in time, which is a sign of movement away
from unity to multiplicity: 'It would be sense to say that time is the
life of the soul in a movement of passage from one way of life to another' .6
Proclus seems to evolve notions of time and eternity that differ
considerably from the views of his predecessors.7 In the Alcibiades
commentary he mentions time and eternity principally in two passages8
and adopts a simple division: eternity, first and second time correspond
to 'Nous', Soul and 'principles divided in association with bodies'.
In Elements of Theology,9 Proclus goes somewhat deeper and posits
I cf. A. E. Taylor's Commentary pp. i86-19i and Appendix IV 'The Concept of Time
in the Timaeus'.
2 cf. Physics 2I9gb2.

3 cf. De Caelo 27ga26 Loeb trans.

4 cf. Enneads III 7.
5 cf. Enneads III 7 s tr. Taylor who compares Boethius' definition: 'Interminabilis vitae
tota simul et perfecta possessio' - De Consolatione c. j.
6 Enneads IllI7 i tr. Armstrong.
7 cf. 'Four views of Time in Ancient Philosophy' by John F. Callahan (Plato, Aristotle,

Plotinus, Augustine). Le temps et l'eternit6 chez Plotin' par Jean Guitton. 'The theory
of Time in Plotinus' by Gordon H. Clark in Phil. Rev. 53 pp. 337-58.
8 cf. in Alc. p. 4, 5-18; p. 237, 1-14.
9 cf. props. S2-S trans. & comment. by E. R. Dodds.

I 6I
an eternity before all things eternal, a time prior to all things temporal.
Eternity is cause of things existing and acting as simultaneous wholes.
Time is either the perpetual duration of things that ever come-to-be
or the limited duration of things that come-to-be only for a while.
E. R. Dodds notes, that Proclus was indebted for his concept of eternity
to the Chaldaean Oracles, which describe it as the 'Father-begotten
light' that irradiates all beings with the intelligence and love of the
supreme principle.2 The Orphics, perhaps influenced by Iranian ideas,
had regarded Time as a primary principle in cosmogony, and had identi-
fied the god Kronos with Time (Chronos).3 Both these sources were
regarded by Proclus as divinely inspired, and the effort to adapt their
views to Neoplatonism results in considerable intricacy in his thought
when he discusses time and eternity in the Timaeus commentary.
Proclus4 himself is well aware of the difficulties involved in explaining
his views: 'But to understand and explain convincingly the nature of
eternity and of time that imitates it in mobile fashion, is a matter of the
greatest difficulty'.5
To begin with eternity: the later Neoplatonists had introduced
various divisions within the second principle 'Nous', forming a triad
from its closely related aspects of Being-Life-Intellect.6 Proclus is
anxious to locate eternity precisely; in the process of emanation it is the
last form of the principle Being and immediately precedes the Living
Creature that is the supreme model of the universe. Eternity itself is
immediately preceded by the One-that-Is: 'It seems to have the Monad
of Being and the One-that-Is prior to it, and to abide in this One.'7 This
is because 'the One-that-Is' is cause of existence to beings, but eternity
is cause of their existence as constant simultaneous wholes. Eternity
coordinates and unites the intelligible henads:8 'So what else would
eternity be but the one embracing principle of the intelligible henads
and of the summit of their multitude (by henads I mean the fornmsof
the intelligible creatures and the classes of all these intelligible forms);
Icf. ibid. P. 228.
2 cf. in Tim. IIIp. 14, 2-13.
3 cf. The Pre-Socraticsby Kirk & Raven pp. 39-42, S6-7; Kern, Orph. Frag. 68.
4 For the influence of the ChaldaeanOracles upon Proclus cf. Hans Lewy: 'Chaldaean
Oracles& Theurgy' pp. 99-Ios, I40-4I, & esp. 40o-9; also 'New Light on the Chal-
daeanOracles'by E. R. Dodds in Harv.Theol. Rev. Oct. i 96 1.
5 !n Tim. 11 p. 8, 22-4.
6 cf. Jean Pepin: L'Intelligenceet L'Intelligible,Rev. PhilosophiqueXg56.
7 In Tim. III p. I5, 13-15.

8 For the intelligible henadscf. El. Theol. prop. i62 & notes by E. R. Dodds.

i62
also the one cause of the unchangeable duration of them all, not existing
on the level of the many intelligibles nor assembled therefrom, but
present to them transcendently, of itself arranging and as it were
shaping them, and effecting this by their simultaneous totality'., Proclus
summarises the position and function of eternity in the following passages
'It must precede the Living Creature, being an intelligible god, but not
yet a creature' - 'The rank of eternity in relation to the Living Creature
is therefore clear; it is superior and immediately superior, and is cause
to the intelligibles of unchanging permanency' - 'So there are three
things in succession: the One-that-Is as Monad of beings, eternity as
dyad, possessing the quality of everlastingness along with being, and
the eternal which participates both in being and in everlastingness,
but is not the primary ever-existent, as eternity is. The One-that-Is is
cause to all beings of any kind... of their being alone, whereas eternity
is cause of their duration in being' .2
When he considers time, Proclus disagrees with both Aristotle and
Plotinus: it is neither the measure of movement nor a product of the
soul. 'So if the demiurge had already ensouled the world and rendered
it a blessed god, and then set time over it, clearly time and life in
cycles determined according to time would be something superior to
soul and the life that is blessed on account of possession of soul. So time
would not be anything like the many say, but would possess a being
more divine than souls or the goods of thesoul'. 3
In giving this exalted position to time, Proclus was influenced by the
attributes of the Chaldaean, and perhaps Orphic, god Chronos. He
disagreed with Plotinus on two counts a) because whatever is given to
the world subsequent to its constitution must be superior to it, and time
is given to the world by the demiurge as its regulator b) if the soul
requires time, it cannot generate it, since in that case it would both
possess and lack a perfection at the same time. 4
Time is of the rank of 'Nous' and itself eternal: 'So this is a sort of
Nous that proceeds, established in eternity and on this account itself
said to be eternal'. 'Time is eternal not merely in its essence, but it is
also ever the same in its inner activity, and it is only in so far as it is
participated by things outside itself that it is movable. . . 'S It is produced

I In Tim. III p. 12, 12-2 2.

2 ibid. p. 1 3, 2 3 & 2 gff; p. I5, 2 8ff.
3 In Tim. III p. 3, 32 - p. 4, 6.
4 In Tim. III p. 22, I3-28.
s ibid. p. 27, 3-5 & 26-8.

i63
 by the demiurge after the pattern of eternity, with the purpose of
regulating and uniting the cycles of beings in motion: 'The efficient
cause of time is the demiurge, its pattern is eternity, and its end is the
turningabout towards the One of objects in motion by way of cycles'.'
Time bestows a certain perpetuity upon beings: 'Time arouses the
productsof the creator towardstheir own perfection and is the measure
of the universe and bestower of a certain perpetuity'.2 It is a measure
of movements, but not in the Aristoteliansense: 'So time is a measure
of movements, not as being that by which we measure (since this is
effected by reflection about time and not by time itself), but as pro-
ductive and definitive of the being of the life and every other kind of
movement of the things that are in time, and as measuringthe latter
accordingto their exemplarsandassimilatingthem thereto'.3
Proclus makes various divisions of time, not all of which it is easy
to fit into an harmoniousscheme. There is a primarydivision into supra-
and intra-mundane,with a further division of the intramundane:'Time
has proceeded among beings in twofold form, the one supramundane,
the other intramundane,the former both abiding and proceeding, the
latter carried about in motion. Participatedtime is also twofold, the
one by simple participation,the other in the cycles of the heavenlystars,
which brings about months and days and nights and years'.4 The di-
vision into invisible and visible time seems to correspond to supra-
and intramundanetime: 'Invisibletime, as a total, one and intelligent
number, preceded time that is participatedand proceeds according to
number'.5 Second time is equivalent to visible time: 'So that second
time, if it is visible to all, if it revealssupramundanetime, if it is divided,
hasnaturallyproceededfrom the reasonof the demiurge'.6
This second, visible and intramundanetime also has its divisions,,
first of which is that referring to the perfect cycle of the world-soul;
'Havingposited this whole series of time, refer it back to the one most
primary time, which defines the cycle of 'the divine creature',7 itself
being the genuine measure ... which is a measureof all the cycles in the
universe'.8 Next is the tim-e that refers ton the more nartial a'mects of the
I ibid. p. 28, 31-3-
2 ibid. p. 24, 1-2.
3 In Tim. IIIp. 20, i-6.
4 ibid. p. S3, 13-18.
s ibid. p. gS, 3-i.
6 ibid. p. S4, 10-13.
7 cf. Resp. s46b.
8 In Tim. IIIp. 89, 4-6; p. S4., i6-17.

i 64
cosmos: 'This time is definitive and preservativeof the limits in the
movementsof soulsor bodies'.'
In conclusion, then, one may say that for Proclus time is ultimately
on the level of 'Nous', eternal, invisible and divine, supramundaneand
unparticipated.From it proceeds time which is visible, intramundane
and participated: participated simply, totally and primarily by the
world-soul,Zsecondarily, partially and in a multiplied manner by the
stars, seven planets, individual souls and even beings without soul.3
Proclus is perhapsnearer to Plato than Plotinus in regardingtime as the
regulatorof the cosmos, and as that which turns it back to its ultimate
principle, the One.4

Universityof SouthernCalifornia

I ibid. p. S4., 24-5-

2 Cf. El. Theol. prop. 200 & notes by E. R. Dodds.
3 cf. in Tim. III p. 22, 29 - p. 23, 4.
4 cf. also Simplic. Coroll. de Temp. (Comment. Aristot. IX p. 773-800); Rene Roques:
l'Univers Dionysien p. I61-4; Aquinas in Div. Nom. Expos. Lect. III, cap. X de aevo
et tempore.

NOTE: The above article, in its original form, was an appendix to a thesis submitted
to Liverpool University for a Ph. D. degree, and as such received the benefit of revision
and correction from Profs. A. H. Armstrong & E. R. Dodds.

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