Michelle S.

Alejandrino July 18, 2018

LLB-4 Atty. Genevieve Marie Dolores Brandares- Paulino

Case #1:
EDWIN N. TRIBIANA vs. LOURDES M. TRIBIANA
FACTS:

Edwin and Lourdes are husband and wife who have lived together since 1996 but
formalized their union only on 28 October 1997. On 30 April 1998, Lourdes filed a petition
for habeas corpus before the RTC claiming that Edwin left their conjugal home with their
daughter, Khriza Mae Tribiana (Khriza). Edwin has since deprived Lourdes of lawful custody
of Khriza who was then only one (1) year and four (4) months of age. Later, it turned out
that Khriza was being held by Edwins mother, Rosalina Tribiana (Rosalina). Edwin moved to
dismiss Lourdes petition on the ground that the petition failed to allege that earnest efforts
at a compromise were made before its filing as required by Article 151 of the Family Code.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the case should have been dismissed for failure to comply with the
condition precedent under Article 151 of the Family Code
HELD: NO.
Evidently, Lourdes has complied with the condition precedent under Article 151 of the
Family Code. A dismissal under Section 1(j) of Rule 16 is warranted only if there is a failure
to comply with a condition precedent. Given that the alleged defect is a mere failure to
allege compliance with a condition precedent, the proper solution is not an outright
dismissal of the action, but an amendment under Section 1 of Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure. It would have been a different matter if Edwin had asserted that no efforts
to arrive at a compromise have been made at all.
In addition, the failure of a party to comply with a condition precedent is not a
jurisdictional defect. Such defect does not place the controversy beyond the courts power to
resolve. If a party fails to raise such defect in a motion to dismiss, such defect is deemed
waived. Such defect is curable by amendment as a matter of right without leave of court, if
made before the filing of a responsive pleading. A motion to dismiss is not a responsive
pleading.

Case # 2:

SPOUSES ARACELI OLIVA-DE MESA and ERNESTO S. DE MESA vs. SPOUSES

CLAUDIO D. ACERO, JR. and MA. RUFINA D. ACERO, SHERIFF FELIXBERTO L.
SAMONTE and REGISTRAR ALFREDO SANTOS

FACTS:

This involves a parcel of land situated at No. 3 Forbes Street, Mount Carmel Homes
Subdivision, Iba, Meycauayan, Bulacan, which was formerly covered by Transfer Certificate
of Title (TCT) No. T-76.725 (M) issued by the Register of Deeds of Meycauayan, Bulacan
and registered under Araceli’s name. The petitioners jointly purchased the subject property
on April 17, 1984 while they were still merely cohabiting before their marriage. A house was
later constructed on the subject property, which the petitioners thereafter occupied as their
family home after they got married sometime in January 1987.

Sometime in September 1988, Araceli obtained a loan from Claudio D. Acero, Jr.
(Claudio) in the amount of ₱100,000.00, which was secured by a mortgage over the subject
property. As payment, Araceli issued a check drawn against China Banking Corporation
payable to Claudio. When the check was presented for payment, it was dishonored as the
account from which it was drawn had already been closed. The petitioners failed to heed
Claudio’s subsequent demand for payment. Thus, Claudio filed a complaint for violation of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (B.P. 22) against the petitioners. The petitioners were acquitted
but they were ordered to pay Claudio the amount of ₱100,000.00 with legal interest from
date of demand until fully paid.

On March 15, 1993, a writ of execution was issued and Sheriff Felixberto L. Samonte
(Sheriff Samonte) levied upon the subject property. On March 9, 1994, the subject property
was sold on public auction.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the subject property that was levied and sold is a family home
2. Whether or not the sheriff err in levying and selling the subject property

HELD:

1. YES. The subject property is a family home.

Under the Family Code, there is no need to constitute the family home judicially or
extrajudicially. All family homes constructed after the effectivity of the Family Code (August
3, 1988) are constituted as such by operation of law. All existing family residences as of
August 3, 1988 are considered family homes and are prospectively entitled to the
benefits accorded to a family home under the Family Code.

Here, the subject property became a family residence sometime in January 1987. There
was no showing, however, that the same was judicially or extrajudicially constituted as a
family home in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code. Still, when the Family Code
took effect on August 3, 1988, the subject property became a family home by operation of
law and was thus prospectively exempt from execution

2. NO. The sheriff did not err in levying and selling the subject property

While it is true that the family home is constituted on a house and lot from the time it is
occupied as a family residence and is exempt from execution or forced sale under Article
153 of the Family Code, such claim for exemption should be set up and proved to the
Sheriff before the sale of the property at public auction. Failure to do so would
estop the party from later claiming the exemption.

Having failed to set up and prove to the sheriff the supposed exemption of the subject
property before the sale thereof at public auction, the petitioners now are barred from
raising the same. Failure to do so estop them from later claiming the said exemption.

In this case, it is undisputed that the petitioners allowed a considerable time to lapse
before claiming that the subject property is a family home and its exemption from execution
and forced sale under the Family Code. The petitioners allowed the subject property to be
levied upon and the public sale to proceed. One (1) year lapsed from the time the subject
property was sold until a Final Deed of Sale was issued to Claudio and, later, Araceli’s
Torrens title was cancelled and a new one issued under Claudio’s name, still, the petitioner
remained silent. In fact, it was only after the respondents filed a complaint for unlawful
detainer, or approximately four (4) years from the time of the auction sale, that the
petitioners claimed that the subject property is a family home, thus, exempt from
execution.

For all intents and purposes, the petitioners’ negligence or omission to assert their right
within a reasonable time gives rise to the presumption that they have abandoned, waived or
declined to assert it. Since the exemption under Article 153 of the Family Code is a personal
right, it is incumbent upon the petitioners to invoke and prove the same within the
prescribed period and it is not the sheriff’s duty to presume or raise the status of the
subject property as a family home.
Case # 3

EUGENIO SAN JUAN GERONIMO vs. KAREN SANTOS

FACTS:

Eugenio and Emiliano Geronimo, the defendants, executed a document declaring

themselves as the only heirs of spouses Rufino and Caridad Geronimo. Consequently, they
took possession and were able to transfer the tax declaration of the subject property to
their names.

Karen Santos, on the other hand, claims to be the only child of deceased Rufino and
Caridad Geronimo. She filed a complaint for the annulment of document and recovery of the
possession against the defendants, brothers of his father. She alleged that with the death of
her parents, the property belonging to her parents was passed on to her by the law of
intestacy.

The defendant denied the allegation that the plaintiff was the only child and sole heir
of their brother stating that the deceased Rufino and Caridad were childless and took in as
their ward Karen, the child of Caridad’s sister. To strengthen their defense, they claimed
that the birth certificate of the plaintiff was a simulated document. The birth certificate had
alterations as confirmed by an NSO representative.

They alleged that it is impossible for Rufino and Caridad to register the plaintiff in
Sta. Maria, Ilocos Sur because they never lived or sojourned in that place. Also, Caridad, an
elementary teacher in Bulacan, never filed a maternity leave during the period of her
service, as supported by a certification from the Schools Division Superintendent.

The RTC ruled that the respondent is a legitimate child of the putative parents. The
trial court found that respondent’s filiation was duly established by the certificate of live
birth which was presented in evidence. It dismissed the petitioners’ claim that the certificate
was tampered. It further stated that even granting arguendo that the birth certificate is
questionable, the filiation of respondent has already been sufficiently proven by evidence of
her open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child under Article 172 of
the Family Code.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals held that under Article 170, the action to impugn the
legitimacy of the child must be reckoned from either of these two dates: the date the child
was born to the mother during the marriage, or the date when the birth of such child was
recorded in the civil registry. The appellate court found no evidence or admission that
Caridad indeed gave birth to respondent on a specific date.

It further resolved that the birth certificate presented in this case does not qualify as
the valid registration of birth in the civil register because it was not signed by the physician
or midwife in attendance at the child’s birth or the parents of the newborn child, contrary to
what the law required. However, the CA ultimately ruled that the respondent was able to
prove her filiation via open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child as
supported by secondary evidence presented.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred when it ruled that petitioners have no
personality to impugn respondent’s legitimate filiation.

2. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in allowing the introduction of secondary
evidence and rendered judgement notwithstanding the existence of primary evidence
of birth certificate.

HELD:

1. YES. The Court of Appeals erred when it ruled that petitioners have no
personality to impugn respondent’s legitimate filiation.
 Only the husband can contest the legitimacy of a child born to his wife. He is the one
directly confronted with the scandal and ridicule which the infidelity of his wife produces;
and he should decide whether to conceal that infidelity or expose it, in view of the moral
and economic interest involved. It is only in exceptional cases that his heirs are allowed to
contest such legitimacy. Outside of these cases, none – even his heirs – can impugn
legitimacy; that would amount to an insult to his memory."20

What petitioner failed to recognize, however, is that this procedural rule is applicable
only to actions where the legitimacy – or illegitimacy – of a child is at issue. This situation
does not obtain in the case at bar.

In the instant case, the filiation of a child – herein respondent – is not at issue.
Petitioner does not claim that respondent is not the legitimate child of his deceased brother
Rufino and his wife Caridad. What petitioner alleges is that respondent is not the child of the
deceased spouses Rufino and Caridad at all. He proffers this allegation in his Amended
Answer before the trial court by way of defense that respondent is not an heir to his brother
Rufino. When petitioner alleged that respondent is not a child of the deceased spouses
Rufino and Caridad in the proceedings below, jurisprudence shows that the trial court was
correct in admitting and ruling on the secondary evidence of respondent – even if such
proof is similar to the evidence admissible under the second paragraph of Article 172 and
despite the instant case not being a direct action to prove one’s filiation. In the following
cases, the courts a quo and this Court did not bar the introduction of secondary evidence in
actions which involve allegations that the opposing party is not the child of a particular
couple – even if such evidence is similar to the kind of proof admissible under the second
paragraph of Article 172.

2. NO.

Secondary evidence may be admitted only in a direct action under Article 172
because the said provision of law is meant to be instituted as a separate action, and proof of
filiation cannot be raised as a collateral issue as in the instant case which is an action for
annulment of document and recovery of possession. However, this rule is applicable only to
actions where the legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child is at issue.

In the case at bar, filiation is not an issue. What petitioner alleges is that the
respondent is not a child of the deceased spouses at all. Thus, both the RTC and the Court
of Appeals correctly admitted secondary evidence similar to the proof admissible under Art.
172 of the Family Code.

However, the Supreme Court ruled that the lower court’s declaration that the
respondent is a legitimate child and sole heir of the deceased spouses is based on
misapprehension of facts. The irregularities consisting of the superimposed entries on the
date of birth and the name of the informant made the document questionable, as supported
by the corroborating testimony of the NSO representative. In addition, even the respondent
herself did not offer any evidence to explain such irregularities. These irregularities and the
totality of the circumstances surrounding the alleged birth of respondent are sufficient to
overthrow the presumption of regularity attached to the respondent’s birth.

With the declaration that the birth certificate is a nullity or falsity ruled then the
respondent is not the child of Rufino, and therefore not entitled to inherit from the estate.