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TURKEY AND
QATAR IN THE TANGLED

GEOPOLITICS OF THE
MIDDLE EAST
Birol Başkan
Turkey and Qatar in the Tangled Geopolitics
of the Middle East
Birol Başkan
Turkey and Qatar

in the Tangled
Geopolitics of the
Middle East
Birol Başkan
School of Foreign Service in Qatar
Georgetown University
Doha, Qatar
ISBN 978-1-137-51770-8 ISBN 978-1-137-51771-5 (eBook)

DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-51771-5
Library of Congress Control Number: 2016936669
© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2016

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To my late father, Şefik ‘Baytar’ Başkan
PREFACE
This book examines the foreign policies of Turkey and Qatar in the post-
9/11 period. More specifically, it examines how Turkey and Qatar have
swum through the tidal waves unleashed successively by the US invasion
of Iraq, the intensification of the geopolitical rivalry between Saudi Arabia
and Iran, and the promises and fallouts of the Arab Spring. The book con-
textualizes the experiences, successes, and failures of Turkey and Qatar in
international politics within a broader discussion of the geopolitics of the
region, as the latter has been shaped by the intensifying rivalry between
Saudi Arabia and Iran in the same period. With the onset of the Arab
Spring, this rivalry exploded into bloody conflicts that are still raging in
Syria and Yemen.
I wished to write this book in order to fill a gap. That gap is ever
growing, as scholarly treatments of Turkey’s and Qatar’s foreign policies
before and after the Arab Spring by and large ignore one another. The few
attempts addressing Turkey–Qatar relations are either Turkey- or Qatar-
centric, and rarely contextualize the relationships between the two coun-
tries within the broader geopolitics of the Middle East.1 This is what I aim
to do in this book.
The challenge I have faced in writing the book is that the period under
consideration has not yet passed into history. There are many unknowns
and few archival sources. What follows is therefore mostly a structural
analysis. This means the following. I assume that states/regimes pursue
their self-interests, as they perceive them, at all times. In other words,
they seek to maximize their security and power; yet, they do so in a fluid
and often rapidly changing regional and international environment. In
vii
viii PREFACE
order to explain state/regime behavior—or more specifically the behavior

of Turkey and Qatar—one must thus look at the changing regional and
international environment within which this behavior takes place.
Fortunately, Turkey’s foreign policy makers speak often, and do so pub-
licly. I have benefited from this and have incorporated and analyzed their
perspectives in this book as much as possible. Unfortunately, however,
as is typical of all Arab Gulf rulers,2 Qatar’s foreign policy makers do not
often speak publicly; officials, be they in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or
in other ministries, avoid discussing their country’s foreign policy choices,
and if they do, they do so very defensively. As a result, this book necessarily
discusses Turkish foreign policy in greater length and draws on a richer set
of available material.
I am indebted to many friends and colleagues, especially from Turkey,
Qatar, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Saudi Arabia, with whom I
have conversed and exchanged views regarding regional and international
developments. Without their input, I would not see the full picture in the
way that I demonstrate in this book. I cannot name all of these people,
they are simply too many, but I am most grateful to, in alphabetical order,
Abdullah al Shammary, Afyare Elmi, Amira Sonbol, Ebtesam al Katbi, Emre
İşeri, Fatih Okumuş, Gökhan Bacık, Husam Muhammed, Ibrahim Sharqieh,
Mark Farha, Mazhar Al Zoby, Muhammed al Zayani, and Özgür Pala. I
thank them all. I also thank Muhittin Ataman, editor of Insight Turkey,
and Çınar Özen, editor of Turkish Yearbook of International Relations, for
giving me permission to use some of the materials I previously published
in their journals: “Turkey-GCC Relations: Is there a future?” and “Ankara
Torn Apart: Arab Spring Turns into Turkey’s Autumn,” respectively.
I must also thank the anonymous reviewer from Palgrave Macmillan
and of course Sara Doskow, my editor at Palgrave Macmillan, who not
only put great trust in this project but also made excellent suggestions
about the organization of the material.
Finally, I thank Feyza, herself an ardent follower of Gulf politics, for all
the friendship, companionship, love, and of course color and joy, that she
has brought to my life.
While writing this book, I lost my father, Şefik, from whom I have taken
the best moral lessons of my life. I will always be grateful. I dedicate this
book to his memory.
Birol Başkan
Washington DC USA
PREFACE ix
NOTES
1. To my knowledge, the most detailed treatment of Turkey–Qatar relations is
an unpublished master’s thesis submitted by Özgür Pala to Qatar University’s
Gulf Studies Program. I was an external reader of Özgür’s thesis.
2. The sea that separates the Arabian Peninsula and Iran is alternatively called
the Persian Gulf or the Arabian Gulf or the Basra Gulf. I simply call it the
Gulf. The Arab Gulf states or the Gulf states refer to six Arab states located
on the Arabian Peninsula, which are Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia,
Oman, and the UAE. The Arab Gulf rulers or the Gulf rulers refer to the
rulers of these six states.
CONTENTS
1 Introduction 1
Part I 9/11 and the Changing Regional Landscape 5
2 The Earthquake: The 9/11 Attacks and the US Response 7
3 Unsettling the Middle East: The Implications of the US

Rhetoric and Action 15
Part II The Rise of Turkey and Qatar 33
4 Enter Turkey and Qatar 35
Part III The Arab Spring: The Rise and Fall

of the Brotherhood Crescent 81
5 The Arab Spring Erupts, Turkey and Qatar Respond 83
xi
xii CONTENTS
6 The Coup and Its Aftermath 123
7 The Future Place of Turkey in the Middle East 139
Index 143
CHAPTER 1
Introduction
Abstract The question this book seeks to shed light on is, how and why
have Turkey and Qatar developed quite a special relationship in the last
three years? The chapter elaborates on the question and claims that Turkey
and Qatar were in fact unlikely countries to form such a special relation-
ship. However, as the chapter notes, driven by their own interests, the
two countries had already aligned their foreign policies on many critical
and controversial issues by summer of 2013. What pushed them further
together was their isolation in the region for the support they seemed to
be extending to the Muslim Brotherhood movement.
Keywords Turkey-Qatar Relations • post-9/11 Middle East • the Arab

Spring • the Muslim Brotherhood • the Gulf Security
By the time of the military coup in Egypt in the summer of 2013, Turkey
and Qatar had already aligned their policies on many critical and contro-
versial issues: for example, both fully supported the anti-regime oppo-
sition in Syria, developed working and even cordial relations with Iran,
recognized and treated Hamas as the legitimate representative of the
Palestinian people, and supported Egypt financially and diplomatically
during the presidency of the Muslim Brotherhood (henceforth, the MB
or the Brotherhood)-backed Muhammed Mursi.1
The coup in Egypt and its aftermath pushed the two countries even
closer. They exchanged numerous high-level visits. Qatar’s ruler, Sheikh
© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2016 1

B. Başkan, Turkey and Qatar in the Tangled Geopolitics of the
Middle East, DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-51771-5_1
2 B. BAŞKAN
Tamim bin Hamad al Thani, was the highest-ranking statesman from the
Arab World to attend Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s inau-
guration dinner in August 2014. Erdoğan soon reciprocated with a high-
level visit to Qatar the next month. This was Erdoğan’s first visit to the
Middle East after being elected president. At the end of the visit, Sheikh
Tamim drove President Erdoğan to the airport in his own car. Turkey and
Qatar declared 2015 the “Year of Culture.” More critically, the two have
recently signed an agreement to not only increase cooperation in military
training and defense but also deploy Turkish troops to Qatar.
If it is not blocked by new domestic, regional, or international develop-
ments, there is a potentially powerful Turkey–Qatar axis forming in the
Middle East. In the 1990s and even in the 2000s, no one would have
anticipated this. The two countries were then worlds apart and in many
ways they still are. Turkey is an electoral democracy while Qatar is a mon-
archy. Turkey is among the largest countries in the Middle East, both in
territory and population, while Qatar is among the smallest. Turkey calls
itself secular while Qatar does not.
Although Qatar is an energy-rich country, and Turkey an energy-
dependent country, they had not developed strong economic relations
prior to the 2000s. In 1996, for example, the total trade volume between
Turkey and Qatar was a meager $13 million2 and only 674 tourists from
Qatar visited Turkey. To see how much relations have improved since then,
in 2014, the total trade volume between the two countries was around
$739 million, having increased more than 50 times from 1996 to 2014,
and 29,743 tourists visited Turkey from Qatar.3
What happened in between? This book addresses this question. In a
nutshell, it argues that Turkey and Qatar had pursued similar foreign poli-
cies throughout the 2000s and during the Arab Spring, realigning inde-
pendently their positions on major issues, and eventually forged a special
relationship in the aftermath of the military coup in Egypt in 2013 in
order to break the state of regional isolation each found itself in. This iso-
lation was the outcome of the efforts of both actors to remain bipartisan
throughout the 2000s, in a Middle East increasingly marked by bipolarity
between Saudi Arabia and Iran, and to form an alternative pole to balance
these two countries with the onset of the Arab Spring.
Bipolarity in the Middle East is not something new. Throughout his-
tory, it has repeatedly emerged in the form of geopolitical rivalries between
states/empires (the Romans vs. the Sasanids, the Ottomans vs. the Safavids,
to cite a few examples). In 1979, the Middle East witnessed the emergence
of a new bipolar regional environment in the form of a rivalry between Iran
INTRODUCTION 3
and Saudi Arabia. In the 1990s, this rivalry waned, in large part thanks to the
coming to power in Iran of a more pragmatist leadership. The rivalry inten-
sified again, however, in the aftermath of the 11 September 2001 attacks.
In a post-9/11 regional context, Turkey and Qatar have become active
international players, both expanding their economic relationships with
the rest of the world and engaging in high-profile mediation efforts. In
the years preceding the Arab Spring, however, both countries were also
careful not to commit to either side of the Saudi–Iran rivalry. The Arab
Spring changed the regional context once again, as it brought to power
MB-affiliated political parties and leaders, who assumed new roles in major
Arab countries, especially Egypt and Tunisia.
Unlike other Middle Eastern states, such as Saudi Arabia, the UAE,
and Jordan, Turkey and Qatar saw little threat in the rise of the MB, as
both had developed cordial relations with the movement throughout the
2000s. Rather, they saw it as an opportunity to turn this new regional con-
text to their own advantage. To this end, for example, Turkey and Qatar
became the major financial and diplomatic supporters of Egypt under the
presidency of the Brotherhood-backed Muhammed Mursi.
In April 2013, King Abdullah of Jordan remarked, “I see a Muslim
Brotherhood crescent developing in Egypt and Turkey.”4 Yet, the July
2013 military coup in Egypt cut short this development. In the post-coup
regional environment, Turkey and Qatar became increasingly isolated, and
as a result turned to each other and strengthened their mutual ties.
This book is about Turkey’s and Qatar’s foreign policies, but it is also
to a certain extent about the security of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Kuwait,
and Bahrain. The security of these Gulf states is important for understand-
ing Turkey’s and Qatar’s foreign policies, simply because it is a, if not
the only, significant factor that molds the geopolitical space within which
Turkey and Qatar act and pursue their foreign policies.
These Gulf states are wealthy, thanks to their oil and natural gas. But,
they are not populous: some 36 million people live in them with a good
number of them being non-citizens. More importantly, they are situated in
the midst of a heavily populated and extremely poor region. This stark dis-
parity in wealth constitutes the essence of the security problem of these Gulf
states.5 A myriad of domestic, regional, and international developments can
and often does unexpectedly aggravate this problem, often catching the
Gulf rulers unprepared. Arab Gulf security is highly fragile, to say the least.
The 9/11 attacks and the aftermath brought new challenges for the Arab
Gulf states. More specifically, three actors came to pose security challenges
to the Arab Gulf states, successively. These were the USA, Iran, and the
4 B. BAŞKAN
transnational MB movement. I will say more about these actors later in the
book as discussion necessitates, but here I would like to note briefly that this
book narrates how these three actors have come to pose different security
challenges for the Arab Gulf states in the post-9/11 period and thereby
molded the space within which Turkey and Qatar have pursued their foreign
policies.
In the midst of all these developments, Turkey came to the region with
a renewed interest and a new outlook. In doing so, it became relevant to
Gulf security. When the USA and Iran began to pose security challenges to
the Arab Gulf states in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, Turkey became a
welcome actor in the region. Having their own agendas, Turkey and Qatar
skillfully turned this new context to their own advantage, and became
highly active actors in the region. When Turkey and Qatar became pro-
MB, however, during the Arab Spring, they became part of the security
challenge that the MB posed for Arab Gulf security. The two countries
therefore faced a regional backlash and became isolated, which in turn led
them to strengthen their relationship with each other.
Covering the post-9/11 period, this book is divided into three main
parts. The first part looks at how the US response to the 9/11 attacks
changed the regional geopolitics in the Middle East. The second part
examines how Turkey and Qatar benefited from this new regional envi-
ronment and aligned their policies. The third part discusses the impact of
the Arab Spring and the subsequent military coup in Egypt on regional
geopolitics as they have affected Turkey and Qatar. The book ends by
assessing the future of Turkey’s place in the Middle East and, by implica-
tion, the place of Turkey–Qatar relations.
NOTES
1. As will be discussed in Chap. 5, Turkey and Qatar pursued similar foreign
policies in the 2000s. For a short review, see Özgür Pala and Bülent Aras,
“Practical Geopolitical Reasoning in the Turkish and Qatari Foreign Policy
on the Arab Spring,” Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies, 17(3),
pp.286–302.
2. Otherwise stated, all $ signs refer to US dollars.
3. These figures are from Turkish Statistical Institute, http://www.tuik.gov.tr
4. Jeffrey Goldberg, “The Modern King in the Arab Spring,” The Atlantic,
April 2013. Available at http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/
archive/2013/04/monarch-in-the-middle/309270/
5. See the very enlightening book on the topic, Kristian Coates-Ulrichsen,
Insecure Gulf: The End of Certainty and the Transition to the Post Oil Era,
Hurst/Columbia University Press, 2011.
PART I
9/11 and the Changing

Regional Landscape
CHAPTER 2
The Earthquake: The 9/11 Attacks

and the US Response
Abstract Turkey and Qatar have begun to align their foreign policies in
the post-9/11 regional context, a context that had been deeply shaken by
the USA. To see how the USA had shaken the Middle East, this chapter
discusses how the USA responded to the 9/11 attacks. The chapter argues
that the USA in fact pursued two-pronged strategy: on the one hand, it
sought ways to punish the regimes in Afghanistan and Iraq it held respon-
sible for the 9/11 attacks; on the other hand, it promoted democracy in
the Middle East.
Keywords the 9/11 attacks • the US Invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq

• US Promotion of Democracy
On 11 September 2001, al Qaeda, an international terrorist organization

based in Afghanistan, undertook four deadly attacks in New York City and
Washington, DC. Thousands, mostly civilians, were killed and wounded.
It was not the first time al Qaeda had attacked US targets: the organiza-
tion had been at war, self-proclaimed to be holy, with the USA for at
least half a decade by then, but none of its previous attacks had been of
this magnitude. The numbers of dead and injured were shockingly high,
but there were also other features that made the attacks unprecedented.
The most important was perhaps that all previous al Qaeda attacks had
involved US targets abroad; for the first time, they hit the very soil that
had long been thought of by Americans as safe.

B. Başkan, Turkey and Qatar in the Tangled Geopolitics of the
Middle East, DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-51771-5_2
8 B. BAŞKAN
The comments of the US president, George W. Bush, made on the same

day perhaps best describe the general public mood in America regarding
the attacks: “The pictures of airplanes flying into buildings, fires burning,
huge structures collapsing, have filled us with disbelief, terrible sadness
and a quiet, unyielding anger.” Bush assured the Americans that the USA
would bring to justice the perpetrators of the attacks and, while doing so,
Bush warned, the USA “will make no distinction between those who com-
mitted these acts and those who harbor them.”1
Nine days later, George W. Bush addressed a joint session of Congress
and declared “war on terror,” which would begin with al Qaeda, but would
not end with it. Bush declared a war that would last “until every terrorist
group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated.” In the same
address, Bush also issued what amounted basically to an ultimatum to the
Taliban regime in Afghanistan, who were accused of harboring al Qaeda.
Bush asked the Taliban to “deliver to the United States authorities all the
leaders of al Qaeda.” Otherwise, the Taliban would share al Qaeda’s fate.
Bush was not bluffing. Less than a month after the attacks, in October
2001, the USA attacked Afghanistan and toppled the Taliban govern-
ment, which refused to hand Osama bin Laden, the prime suspect in the
11 September attacks, and other al Qaeda leaders to the USA. In the same
speech that Bush issued an ultimatum to the Taliban, he also warned other
countries, and did so quite explicitly. Bush said, “Every nation, in every
region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us or you are with
the terrorists.” He somewhat softened his warning in the next sentence,
“From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support
terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime.”2 But
his message was clear: the USA was basically demanding unconditional
support for its war on terrorism.
Many countries in the Middle East had long suffered from terrorism,
and would normally have welcomed such a strong US commitment to
combating international terrorism, but there was a problem in the way
the US president framed the whole issue. Right from the very beginning,
Bush claimed that al Qaeda targeted not just the security of the American
people, but also their freedom. In his very first speech on 11 September
2001, Bush said, “Today, our fellow citizens, our way of life, our very free-
dom came under attack in a series of deliberate and deadly terrorist acts.”
Bush also claimed that the terrorists picked the USA as a target because
Americans were “the brightest beacon for freedom and opportunity in the
world.”3
THE EARTHQUAKE: THE 9/11 ATTACKS AND THE US RESPONSE 9
In his address to the joint session of US Congress nine days later, Bush
reiterated the same argument. He said, “On September the 11th, enemies
of freedom committed an act of war against our country.” In giving his
own answer to the question, “why do they hate us?” he further elabo-
rated: they hate Americans because, Bush claimed, the USA was ruled by
“a democratically elected government.” The leaders of al Qaeda were not
such a government, but instead “self-appointed.” Bush finally claimed that
terrorists hated the freedoms Americans enjoyed: “They hate our free-
doms—our freedom of religion, our freedom of speech, our freedom to
vote and assemble and disagree with each other.”
For the Middle East rulers, a more worrisome implication of the speech
was that George W. Bush had possibly found an almost transhistorical
mission for the USA, in the war on terror, a mission to advance human
freedom. In the words of Bush, “Great harm has been done to us. We have
suffered great loss. And in our grief and anger we have found our mission
and our moment. Freedom and fear are at war. The advance of human
freedom—the great achievement of our time and the great hope of every
time—now depends on us.”4
In the early stages, this mission was still expressed in such abstract
terms, but as time passed, it acquired a more definite meaning: the war
on terror was transforming into the active promotion of democracy. Bush
sent strong signals in that direction in early 2002. For example, in his
2002 State of the Union address, the first after the 11 September attacks,
Bush said that there were some non-negotiable demands for human dig-
nity such as “the rule of law, limits on the power of the state, respect for
women, private property, free speech, equal justice, and religious toler-
ance,” and he announced that “America will always stand firm for” these
demands. More critically, Bush named the Islamic World as a potential
target and promised to support advocates of democracy in the region. In
his own words, “America will take the side of brave men and women who
advocate these values around the world, including the Islamic world.”5
Bush made similar points in his West Point Speech in June 2002.
“When it comes to the common rights and needs of men and women,”
Bush said, “there is no clash of civilizations. The requirements of freedom
apply fully to Africa and Latin America and the entire Islamic world.” He
added, “The peoples of the Islamic nations want and deserve the same
freedoms and opportunities as people in every nation. And their govern-
ments should listen to their hopes.”6
10 B. BAŞKAN
Six months later, in December 2002, the USA took a more concrete
step in promoting democracy in the Middle East by establishing the Middle
East Partnership Initiative (MEPI). In explaining the US objectives for
this initiative, Colin Powell, the US Secretary of State, was explicit.7 In his
initiation speech, Powell observed that the Middle East had largely missed
out on the prosperity and welfare generated by “the spread of democracy
and free markets elsewhere.” This is a problem, Powell suggested, because
when a lack of economic opportunities and rigid political systems meet, it
becomes “a dangerous brew.” What the people of the Middle East needed
was just the opposite: “freer economies” and “a stronger political voice.”
With this initiative, the USA was declaring its readiness to help the region
to develop economically, politically, and educationally. In a similar vein,
the USA would spearhead another initiative in June 2004, called the
Broader Middle East and North Africa Partnership Initiative (BMENA).
With this second initiative, the USA aimed to include other G8 countries
in the promotion of democracy in the region.
Soon after the announcement of MEPI, in February 2003, George
W. Bush made a more explicit reference to democracy as an antidote to
terrorism. In his speech at the American Enterprise Institute,8 Bush said,
“The world has a clear interest in the spread of democratic values, because
stable and free nations do not breed ideologies of murder. They encourage
the peaceful pursuit of a better life. And there are hopeful signs of a desire
for freedom in the Middle East.”
This declaration came at a time when the Bush administration was
struggling to make a strong case for regime change in Iraq. The USA
was accusing Saddam Hussein, the Iraqi leader, of supporting terrorism
and developing weapons of mass destruction. A regime change in Iraq
would not only eliminate such immediate threats to security, but also,
Bush believed, serve a broader objective. As Bush saw it, from intellectuals
to leaders, the whole region was calling for a change in the same direc-
tion the Bush administration was preaching: greater political participa-
tion, economic openness, and free trade. “And from Morocco to Bahrain
and beyond, nations are taking genuine steps toward politics reform.”
Therefore, Bush claimed, “A new regime in Iraq would serve as a dramatic
and inspiring example of freedom for other nations in the region.”
The USA could not secure the broad international support it wished
to muster, but this did not stop the Bush administration. In March 2013,
the USA invaded Iraq and toppled the Saddam regime for its alleged ties
to al Qaeda, and the development of weapons of mass destruction. Soon
after the invasion, it turned out that Iraq had already stopped its program
of developing weapons of mass destruction. It was, a report submitted
to the US president concluded, an intelligence failure. “The Intelligence
Community,” the report noted, “was dead wrong in almost all of its pre-
war judgments about Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction.”9
Having failed to prove its prime justification for the war against Iraq,
the Bush administration began to emphasize the potential benefits for
the region of establishing a functioning democracy in Iraq.10 Fortunately,
this did not really constitute a radical break in the Bush administration’s
evolving narrative. The Bush administration had already been suggesting,
implicitly and explicitly, the benefits of democracy in the region. After the
invasion, the administration simply became more explicit. Five months
after the invasion of Iraq, Condoleezza Rice, National Security Advisor in
the Bush administration, for example, wrote in the Washington Post that
a democratic Iraq would serve as a key element in the new Middle East,
where “the ideologies of hate will not flourish” anymore, pretty much in
the same way “a democratic Germany became a linchpin of a new Europe
that is today whole, free, and at peace.”11
As discussed above, George W. Bush had already made the same point.
He repeated it in a speech delivered at the National Endowment for
Democracy in November 2003. This time Bush prophesized that “Iraqi
democracy will succeed—and that success will send forth the news, from
Damascus to Teheran—that freedom can be the future of every nation.” He
also claimed, “The establishment of a free Iraq at the heart of the Middle
East will be a watershed event in the global democratic revolution.”12
The USA has not invaded another country or toppled another authori-
tarian regime in the Middle East, but it adopted a threatening posture
toward Iran. As early as January 2002, Iran was George W. Bush’s target.
In his State of the Union address, Bush named Iran among the three
countries in the so-called axis of evil. The two other countries were Iraq
and North Korea. These states, Bush claimed, “constitute an axis of
evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world. By seeking weapons of
mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger. They
could provide these arms to terrorists, giving them the means to match
their hatred. They could attack our allies or attempt to blackmail the
United States. In any of these cases, the price of indifference would be
catastrophic.”13
Fortunately for Iran, the USA picked Iraq as its first target in the
Middle East and did not attack Iran, at least militarily, but Iran remained
12 B. BAŞKAN
under pressure. In his State of the Union address in February 2005, Bush
called Iran “the world’s primary state sponsor of terrorism” and accused
it of “pursuing nuclear weapons while depriving its people of the free-
dom they seek and deserve.” Bush then called on Iranians: “as you stand
for your own liberty, America stands with you.”14 The USA had already
been on alert about Iran’s nuclear program. It finally succeeded in leading
the United Nations (UN) in 2006 to impose heavier economic sanctions
against Iran over its nuclear program.
What came emerged from the Bush administration’s achievements in
realizing its Freedom Agenda in the Middle East does not seem to be
impressive.15 It is highly debatable whether the Middle East or Afghanistan
has become noticeably more democratic, or if they are better places for
women and youth as a result. Neither al Qaeda nor the Taliban has been
exterminated once and for all, and Iran could not be stopped from devel-
oping its nuclear program. This is not to suggest that the US response to
the 9/11 attacks did not bring change to the Middle East, however, it
did. By promoting democracy in the region, invading Iraq and adopting
a threatening posture toward Iran, the USA shook the strategic landscape
in the region.
NOTES
1. “Text of Bush’s address,” CNN, Sept. 11, 2001. Available at http://edi-
tion.cnn.com/2001/US/09/11/bush.speech.text/
2. See “Text of George Bush’s Speech,” The Guardian, Sept. 21, 2001.
Available at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/sep/21/sep-
tember11.usa13
3. “Text of Bush’s address,” CNN, Sept. 11, 2001. Available at http://edi-
tion.cnn.com/2001/US/09/11/bush.speech.text/
4. See “Text of George Bush’s Speech,” The Guardian, Sept. 21, 2001.
Available at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/sep/21/sep-
tember11.usa13
5. “Text of President Bush’s 2002 State of the Union Address,” The
Washington Post, Jan. 29, 2002. Available at http://www.washingtonpost.
com/wp-srv/onpolitics/transcripts/sou012902.htm
6. “Text of Bush’s Speech at West Point,” International New York Times,
June 1, 2002. Available at http://www.nytimes.com/2002/06/01/
international/02PTEX-WEB.html?pagewanted=1
7. The quotes are taken from “The U.S.-Middle East Partnership Initiative:
Building Hope for the Years Ahead,” US Department of State,
December 12, 2002. Available at http://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/

former/powell/remarks/2002/15920.htm
8. The following quotes are from “President George W. Bush Speaks at AEI’s
Annual Dinner,” American Enterprise Institute, February 28, 2003.
Available at http://www.aei.org/publication/president-george-w-bush-
speaks-at-aeis-annual-dinner
9. The report can be accessed at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/wmd/
about.html
10. See the discussion in F. Gregory Gause III, The International Relations of
the Persian Gulf, New York: Cambridge University Press. 2010,
pp.228–233.
11. Condoleezza Rice, “Transforming the Middle East,” The Washington Post,
August 7, 2003.
12. “Remarks by President George W. Bush at the 20th Anniversary of the
National Endowment for Democracy,” the National Endowment for
Democracy, November 6, 2003. Available at http://www.ned.org/
george-w- bush/remarks-by-president-george-w-bush-at-the-20th-
anniversary
13. “Text of President Bush’s 2002 State of the Union Address.”
14. “Text of President Bush’s 2005 State of Union Address,” The Washington
Post, Feb. 2, 2002. Available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
srv/politics/transcripts/bushtext_020205.html
15. See Katerina Dalacoura, “US democracy promotion in the Arab Middle
East since 11 September 2001: a critique,” International Affairs, 81(5)
(October 2005), pp.963–979; Bruce Gilley, “Did Bush Democratize the
Middle East? The Effects of External-Internal Linkages,” Political Science
Quarterly, 128(4) (Winter 2013), pp.653–685.
CHAPTER 3
Unsettling the Middle East:

The Implications of the US Rhetoric
and Action
Abstract This chapter discusses how the US response to the 9/11 attacks
has shaken the regional context in the Middle East. By overthrowing the
regime in Iraq, the USA destroyed a Sunni Arab bulwark regime that bal-
anced Iran in the region. As the Shia groups came to political prominence
in Iraq, Iraq has become, or is perceived to be, an ally of Iran. The US
efforts to isolate Iran further aggravated the problem as Iran began to
speed up its nuclear program. It was in this context that the traditional
leaders of the Middle East, Saudi Arabia and Egypt, were in retreat, open-
ing more space for new actors to expand their activism and dynamism.
Keywords Post-9/11 Middle East • Saudi-Iran Rivalry • the Arabs’

Leadership Crisis • US Promotion of Democracy • Iran’s Nuclear Program
The USA responded to the 9/11 attacks by overthrowing the regimes in

Afghanistan and Iraq, seeking ways to punish Iran and promoting democ-
racy in the Middle East. The US response had serious implications for the
Middle East.
THE RISE OF IRAN AS A REGIONAL HEGEMON

The USA’s most consequential action concerning the Middle East was
its invasion of Iraq in 2003. By invading Iraq, the USA in fact destroyed
the so-called Eastern Flank of the Arab World against Iran. Saddam’s Iraq

B. Başkan, Turkey and Qatar in the Tangled Geopolitics of the Middle
East, DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-51771-5_3
16 B. BAŞKAN
could not overwhelm them, but at the very least, it militarily balanced
Iran, and as such was pivotal in sustaining the balance of power, especially
in the Gulf. By invading Iraq, the USA destroyed that pivot.
Iran turned out to be the chief beneficiary of this invasion. In the words
of an expert on Iran, by toppling not only Saddam Hussein’s regime in
Iraq, but also the Taliban’s regime in Afghanistan, the USA basically
demolished “two of Iran’s most difficult enemies.” In the ensuing “geo-
political vacuum,” Iran emerged as the regional hegemon.1 Iran actively
sought ways to turn the chaos in Iraq and Afghanistan, which ensued from
the US invasions, to its own advantage by reactivating its already existing
ties, and cultivating new ones, among the Shias in both countries.2
Especially the prospect of Iraq falling under Iran’s spell alarmed the
Arab states. The earliest warning came from King Abdullah of Jordan.
In late 2004, the King accused Iran of interfering in the upcoming Iraqi
elections, which were scheduled in January 2005. “I’m sure,” the King
said, “there’s a lot of people, a lot of Iranians in there that will be used as
part of the polls to influence the outcome.” Iran had an interest in influ-
encing the elections because it wanted to “to have an Islamic republic of
Iraq … to achieve a government that is very pro-Iran.” If this happened,
the King prophesized, a new Shia “crescent” would be formed, which
would stretch from Iran into Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon. The King warned
that this new crescent could undermine the political stability of the Arab
Gulf countries. “Even Saudi Arabia,” the King claimed, “is not immune
from this.”3 The president of Egypt, Hosni Mubarak, and Saudi Arabia’s
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Saud al Faisal, expressed their own concerns
regarding Iran’s role in Iraq.4 The former, for example, explicitly blamed
the Shias for being “loyal to Iran and not the countries where they live.”5
The extent of Iran’s, so to speak, political reach in Iraq is difficult to
assess. It might be simply a problem of perception,6 but one could cer-
tainly speak of a rising Shia political activism in the region. As Vali Nasr
put it, “The U.S. invasion of Iraq unleashed a process of Shi’ite empow-
erment,” which Nasr warned prophetically “won’t be confined to that
country: From Lebanon to the Persian Gulf, through peaceful elections
and bloody conflicts, the Shi’ites are making their presence felt.”7
Countries with sizable Shia populations such as Saudi Arabia, Bahrain,
and Kuwait thus had good reasons to be worried. Not only could their
restive Shia populations be emboldened by such a development, as had
happened in the past after the 1979 Iranian revolution, but Iran could
UNSETTLING THE MIDDLE EAST: THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE US 17
turn this to its own advantage and create further problems for the Arab
Gulf states. Coincidentally, an armed Shia rebellion, known as the Houthi
rebellion, erupted in Yemen in 2004 and had grown so dangerously by
2009 that Saudi Arabia, already worried about the developments in the
region, launched a military offensive against the rebels in 2009.
There was another worrying possibility, that the USA would welcome
and even support a Shia-dominated Middle East. In fact, Vali Nasr, the
Iranian-born, influential American academic and public intellectual quoted
above, who also served as an advisor to the US Department of State, was
among those who were pushing this very same idea: that the balance of
power had shifted toward the Shias thanks to the USA, and it was better
that the USA lived with that fait accompli.8
The emerging Shia revival, Nasr suggested, “presents Washington
with new opportunities to pursue its interests in the region. Building
bridges with the region’s Shias could become the one clear achievement
of Washington’s tortured involvement in Iraq.” The USA had to do more
to finalize this achievement, however. It had to engage Iran, “the country
with the world’s largest Shia population and a growing regional power,
which has a vast and intricate network of influence among the Shias across
the Middle East, most notably in Iraq.”9 This could be achieved, Nasr
claimed, for “Iran’s long-term interests in Iraq are not inherently at odds
with those of the United States.”10
The USA was having a great trouble in Iraq, as the sectarian civil war
was tearing the country apart and the Bush administration was under
heavy pressure about what seemed to be a failure. The Bush administra-
tion could remember Iran’s cooperation in Afghanistan when the USA
invaded the country: Iran could also be of help to the USA in Iraq, but
the Bush administration was not eager to cooperate with Iran. Iran was
itself a target, named as one of the three countries in the axis of evil.
With hindsight, the USA’s threatening posture toward Iran provoked
the latter into a new defensive/aggressive attitude toward the region.
IRAN’S DEFENSIVE/AGGRESSIVE ATTITUDE

Having closely watched what happened to Iraq, the second country in
the “axis of evil,” Iran had every reason to worry about its own security.
The world’s sole superpower, boosted by its seemingly swift success first
in Afghanistan and then in Iraq, was both hostile and non-compromising
18 B. BAŞKAN
toward Iran, and as such posed an imminent security threat. Mehran

Kamrava well captures Iran’s trouble:
Threat perceptions in Tehran grew exponentially in the aftermath of the

post 9/11 US posture, and especially after the fall of Baghdad and Iraq’s
occupation by American forces. Overnight, Iran, now branded a member
of an ‘axis of evil’ by the US president, found itself at the center of a storm
brewing in its own immediate neighborhood, and the many initiatives it
undertook to improve its image and to help the US in its fight against the
Taliban –including pledging hundreds of millions of dollars toward the
postwar reconstruction of Afghanistan and an offer to help rescue American
servicemen stranded near its border in Afghanistan –did little to allay fears
that it might be the next target of President Bush’s War on Terror.11
More importantly, the USA completely encircled Iran. Pro-US gov-

ernments were in power in almost all countries in the immediate vicin-
ity of Iran, from Pakistan to Turkey. Even more threatening, the USA
had massive military presence in most of these countries, especially in
Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Arab Gulf states. It is highly likely that this
new threatening regional environment in which Iran found itself greatly
weakened the reformist position and strengthened that of the hard-
liners. As such the Bush administration’s hostile and provocative atti-
tude toward Iran, directly or indirectly, contributed to the election of
a hard-liner, Mahmoud Ahmedinejad, in the first presidential elections
in 2005.12
Mahmoud Ahmedinejad’s presidency further complicated the security
situation for the Arab Gulf states. Ahmedinejad certainly sought to develop
better relations with the Arab Gulf states, attending, for example, the Gulf
Cooperation Council (GCC) annual meeting as a visitor in 2005, touring
four Arab Gulf states, Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman, and the UAE, in 2007 and
Saudi Arabia in 2007, but his fiery and provocative rhetoric against the
USA and Israel resonated in the Arab streets, as these two states generally
appeared in the public opinion surveys as the greatest threat to the security
in the region. More critically, perhaps, Ahmedinejad’s rhetoric made the
Arab leaders appear too impotent and submissive in the face of a hostile and
threatening USA, and thus had the potential to undermine their legitimacy
in the eyes of their own people. How effective this was can be debated,
but that was Ahmedinejad’s so-called “Arab Street” strategy, “speaking
directly over the heads of Arab rulers to their publics, undermining the
rulers’ legitimacy by portraying them as sclerotic lackeys of Washington.”13
Ahmedinejad’s staunch position on the Palestine–Israel conflict, and

more critically Iran’s support for Hamas, must have greatly improved his
image and that of Iran. This could not have come at a worse time, for the
Palestine issue was at the time the soft underbelly of most of the Arab
states, with the exception of Syria. In the post-9/11 atmosphere, Saudi
Arabia, for example, adopted a radical new policy toward the Palestine–
Israel conflict. It led the adoption in the Arab Summit in 2002 of a peace
initiative, “calling for full Israeli withdrawal from all the Arab territories
occupied since June 1967 … and the land-for-peace principle, and Israel’s
acceptance of an independent Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its
capital, in return for the establishment of normal relations in the context of a
comprehensive peace with Israel.”14 This proposal understandably put such
Palestinian groups as Hamas, who rejected any compromise with Israel, in
an awkward position. More crucially, perhaps, Saudi Arabia began to act
more carefully in its support for Hamas. In June 2004, an Israeli military
official and a General Counsel of the US Department of Treasury even
claimed that funds from Saudi Arabia had substantially decreased.15 This
change in Saudi policy inescapably pushed Hamas further toward Iran,
which had been financially supporting them since the early 1990s.
Iran also improved its image thanks to its continued support of Hizbullah.
Hizbullah’s defiance of Israel in the latter’s attack in the summer of 2006
and that of Iran particularly created an unprecedented sympathy for Iran
and its leader in the Middle East. A poll, conducted by Zogby International
and the University of Maryland, found that Hasan Nasrallah, the leader
of the Shia Hizbullah, was the most admired world leader according to
respondents from Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, and
the UAE. In the poll, Nasrallah was followed by Jacques Chirac and then,
possibly to the great dismay of many Arab leaders, Mahmoud Ahmedinejad.
Fortunately for the Arab rulers, sympathy for Ahmedinejad and Iran
fluctuated over the years. For example, the hanging of Saddam Hussein
in December 2006 greatly reversed the pro-Iran and pro-Ahmedinejad
sentiments in the Arab World.16 Ahmedinejad recovered, however, find-
ing himself a place among the most admired world leaders in 2008, 2010,
and 2011. In 2010 and 2011, he was even in the top three most admired
leaders in the Arab World.17
That was not, however, the only trouble Ahmedinejad created for the
Arab Gulf states. More importantly, he expedited Iran’s nuclear program,
which had already made progress by the time Ahmedinejad was elected.
Negotiations between Iran and such European countries as Britain, France,
20 B. BAŞKAN
and Germany were ongoing. Ahmedinejad’s election was a big blow to

the negotiations. Iran reopened a uranium conversion plant in August
2005. In February 2006, Iran’s case was referred to the UN Security
Council. The council did not impose economic sanctions, but urged Iran
to stop uranium enrichment. In reaction, Ahmedinejad declared that Iran
had successfully enriched uranium, albeit at low levels. Ahmedinejad also
declared uranium enrichment as Iran’s inalienable right.18
Iran was fortunate because the USA was bogged down in a heavy sec-
tarian war in Iraq and had therefore exhausted its enthusiasm and will to
confront Iran militarily. It thus opted for diplomacy, working to bring
together a broad international coalition of states against Iran. The USA
sought to include the Arab Gulf states in this coalition. In an initiative
known as the Gulf Security Dialogue, the USA also sought to establish
a common defense system for the Gulf under its own leadership.19 The
Gulf states rejected the said initiative and even publicly distanced them-
selves from the US policy toward Iran,20 but it was not because they were
unconcerned about Iran becoming a nuclear power; rather, the Arab Gulf
states had their own issues with the Bush administration and made their
decisions under totally different domestic and regional constraints.
It was obvious that Iran’s success in its nuclear program was going to
change the balance of power in the Gulf, turn Iran into a regional hege-
mon, and increase the vulnerability of the Arab Gulf states. As Abdullah
Bishara, former secretary-general of the GCC, put it, Iran’s nuclear pro-
gram “totally turns over the balance of power, and makes Iran the master
of the region and the influential instrument in its decisions.”21 The Saudis
in particular were very critical and vocal. For example, the Saudi Minister
of Foreign Affairs, Saud al Faisal, described Iran’s nuclear program as “a
disaster for the region” and urged Iran “to accept the position that we have
taken to make the Gulf, as part of the Middle East, nuclear free and free of
weapons of mass destruction.”22 The Saudi ambassador to the USA, Turki
al Faisal, voiced the same concern, arguing that Iran’s nuclear program
worsened tension in the region: “it escalates the tensions, and brings about
competition which is unneeded and unnecessary and uncalled for.”23
THE ARABS’ OWN PREDICAMENT: LEADERSHIP CRISIS

Beyond its military, the USA has other means to influence Middle East
politics. It can particularly influence the behaviors of those regimes that
receive massive US support. By withholding its financial and military
support, the USA can seriously cripple an authoritarian regime’s willing-

ness and capacity to inflict violence on the opposition.24 Even by merely
becoming more vocal and critical about authoritarianism and human
rights abuses, the USA can drastically change the calculus of opposi-
tion. The USA, in other words, can greatly help an opposition regain its
vibrancy and in this way undermine the political stability of incumbent
regimes.
In the past, the USA used its influence only once, but lost its major ally
in the region, Iran, as a result. Understandably, therefore, the USA had
become more reluctant to pressure its allies in the Middle East to respect
human rights and adopt political reforms. As discussed above, after 9/11
everything changed. The USA not only changed its rhetoric, becoming
more vocal about the need for political reform in the region, but extended
its financial and diplomatic aid to the opposition. As a result, the opposi-
tion became more energized and spirited, strongly voicing their demands
for political reform. Under the watchful eyes of the USA, the authoritarian
regimes in the Middle East could not violently crack down on the opposi-
tion, which further emboldened the opposition, and even had to agree to
political opportunities, however limited they might be.25
In concluding his analysis of the impact of the US promotion of
democracy in the Middle East, Bruce Gilley says that, not in all, but in
some countries, “The Bush Freedom Agenda weakened authoritarian
regimes and strengthened their opponents, helping to create conditions
for democratic openings.”26 Katerina Dalacoura’s conclusion is similar:
“Democracy promotion policies in the Arab Middle East since 2001 have
had mixed results. Achievements include bringing more attention to the
lack of democracy in the region; initiating a debate about reform; embold-
ening opposition movements; and making the need for change a given,
accepted by both publics and governments.”27
The US promotion of democracy in the Middle East and its invasion of
Iraq had critical implications for the strategic landscape in the Middle East.
In the first place, the region plunged into a leadership vacuum as the tra-
ditional powerbrokers and powerhouses became more occupied with their
own domestic problems, exacerbated by the mounting US pressure for
political reform. Iraq, for example, fell into an utter shambles as the USA
destroyed the country’s infrastructure and disbanded its armed forces. In
the ensuing years, the country turned into a hotbed for al Qaeda, which
found a receptive audience among the estranged Sunni populations. The
country then underwent a sectarian civil war, which claimed thousands
22 B. BAŞKAN
of lives and sowed the seeds of hatred and suspicion among the Shia and
Sunni populations of the country.28
In order to avoid the fate met by Iraq at the hands of the USA, Libya
renounced its support for terrorism, accepted its responsibility in the
bombing of Pan Am flight 103, and agreed to pay generous compensation
to families of the victims. Libya also stopped its weapons development
programs and even opened them for inspection. It cooperated with the
USA in the latter’s combat against terrorism. These goodwill efforts paid
off: not only did the USA turn its attention away from Libya, but took
it off the list of states sponsoring terrorism.29 In the ensuing years, Libya
turned its attention even more to Africa, a shift that had already been
underway in 2001. Moammer Qaddafi, the president of Libya, became
a staunch proponent of a stronger African Union and even served as the
chair of the African Union, an international union of 54 African states.
Syria was in bigger trouble. The regime was not only in the midst of a
transition of power from father, Hafez al Assad, to son, Bashar al Assad,
but also had to face a hostile and determined USA. In 2003, the US
Congress even passed what was known as the Syrian Accountability and
Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act, and granted the president authority
to impose a broad range of economic sanctions on Syria. The act described
its goal as “to halt Syrian support for terrorism, end its occupation of
Lebanon, and stop its development of weapons of mass destruction, and
by doing so hold Syria accountable for the serious international security
problems it has caused in the Middle East.”30 Even though Congress
passed the act in January 2003, the president signed it in December 2003.
As noted by Fouad Ajami, the Bush administration was reluctant at first
to implement the act, but that reluctance was gone when George W. Bush
embraced it in his State of the Union speech in 2005. Bush explicitly
called on the Syrian regime in that speech, “to end all support for terror
and open the door to freedom.”31 The regime had every reason to worry
about this. “American power was nearby on Syria’s eastern border, Iraq.
A Baathist tyranny in Baghdad had been demolished and there were ‘neo-
cons’ –a veritable obsession of the Syrian regime –in Washington speak-
ing of ‘long-hanging fruit’ and of retribution against regimes that harbor
terror.”32
Egypt was particularly exposed to US pressure. After Israel, it had been
the largest recipient of US aid, both military and economic, until 2004.
Amounting to close to $2 billion a year, this precious US aid was at risk
after 11 September as many, from members of Congress to Middle East
experts, in Washington, DC, began to question whether Egypt deserved

the aid. In 2004, a Congressman, Tom Lantos, who was a member of
the House International Relations Committee and the founding chair of
the House Caucus on Human Rights, proposed an amendment, which, if
passed, meant that around half a billion dollars of the military aid given to
Egypt would be diverted to economic assistance and democratic reform.33
Fortunately for Egypt, the amendment was defeated, but 131 members
voted for it. Similar efforts continued through the rest of the decade,
which showed that, in the words of Steven Cook, “the Egyptians had few,
if any champions left in official Washington.”34
The Egyptian regime had another and even more serious problem to
be worried about. Anti-Americanism was on the rise in Egypt, as it was
in other countries in the region. The US invasion of Iraq gave it a new
momentum. On 20 March 2003, the same day the USA began the inva-
sion, massive anti-US demonstrations and protests erupted in Cairo. More
worryingly, the protesters targeted not only the USA and Israel, but also
the regime, as they chanted anti-regime and anti-Mubarak slogans. The
protests lasted for days.35 Even though the protests dissipated eventually,
the problem continued to haunt the regime. As it did elsewhere in the
region, US pressure for political reform and promotion of democracy
in the region emboldened the opposition, which was also critical of the
regime for its links to the USA and Israel. In other words, the Egyptian
regime was truly caught in a paradoxical situation. It had to appease the
USA. It did so, by, for example, inviting political parties to a national
dialogue for political reform and also agreeing to hold competitive and
transparent presidential and parliamentary elections, but this appeasement
came at a cost of opening the political space for the opposition.36 As the
USA bogged down in Iraq, however, and George W. Bush’s second term
came to an end, Egypt was relieved of such pressure and could go back to
business as usual.
THE PARADOX OF THE ARAB GULF STATES

Even though the Arab Gulf states do not receive any financial or military
aid from the USA, they are susceptible to US pressure, even more so than
Libya and Syria—even Egypt, but for an entirely different reason: their
security almost exclusively and heavily depends on the willingness of the
USA to keep a strong military presence in the region and wage, if neces-
sary, costly wars against aggressors.
24 B. BAŞKAN
Beginning in the mid-twentieth century, six Arab Gulf states came to

control significantly the world’s largest oil reserves. With their oil- and
later natural gas–derived wealth, these states have improved the living con-
ditions for their citizens well above the regional and world standards. This
has been possible in part because these states have sparse populations, a
legacy of the desert climate. Now around 36 million people live in these
countries, a good percentage of which are foreigners. On the other hand,
some 300 million people, if you add India even more, live in their immedi-
ate geographical vicinity and do so in conditions below world standards.
The presence of a small but wealthy population in the midst of a heav-
ily populated and extremely poor geography constitutes the essence of
the Arab Gulf state security problem. In such an environment, the more
populous neighboring states may develop strong predatory incentives, as
the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 made painfully clear, or seek to design
the regional security structure according to their own wishes as Iran has
been trying to do, or continue to be a playground for non-state actors that
might pose serious security risks as have Yemen and Somalia.37
What complicates the situation is that the Arab Gulf states are different
sizes, territorially, demographically, and, as a result, militarily. In terms of
size, the Arab Gulf states can be divided into three groups. The first group
consists of small countries such as Bahrain, Qatar, and Kuwait. As of 2006,
Bahrain, Qatar, and Kuwait had 11,200, 12,400, and 15,500 troops in
their military forces, respectively. The second group, which consists of
countries such as Oman and the UAE, are medium sized. As of 2006,
Oman and the UAE had 41,700 and 50,500 troops, respectively. The
third group consists of Saudi Arabia only and is large in size. As of 2006,
Saudi Arabia had 199,500 troops in its military forces.
There is thus an imbalance of military power among the Gulf states,
which prevents or hinders the development of stronger political and mili-
tary unity due to the smaller states’ fear of being dominated by Saudi
Arabia. Despite being the largest country in the Arab Gulf region in ter-
ritorial and demographic size, even Saudi Arabia cannot sustain a military
force as large as that of, for example, Iran, Iraq, Turkey, Syria, or Egypt.38
Due to this demographic imbalance, the Arab Gulf states, except Saudi
Arabia, cannot sustain even a deterrent military force against the bigger
states surrounding them in the region. Saudi Arabia has compensated for
its relative demographic imbalance by overspending on its defense com-
pared to rivals in the region and in this way sought to retain the balance
of military power. In the period 1991–1999, for example, Saudi Arabia’s
average annual military spending was around $22.9 billion while that of
Iran and Iraq were $5.2 billion and $1.9 billion.39
We should not be deceived, however, by this high level of defense spend-
ing in Saudi Arabia. The Kingdom began to invest in its military forces much
later than Iran. Furthermore, its military had also been paralyzed by the
ruling family’s constant effort to make sure that the military would not pose
a threat. Other factors, such as personal rivalries, tribalism, nepotism, cor-
ruption, and dependence on foreigners, have had their own negative impacts
on the development of a credibly deterrent military force in Saudi Arabia.40
As a result, the Arab Gulf states, Saudi Arabia no exception, rely on a
combination of appeasement, diplomacy, and, more importantly, the pro-
tection of a superpower in order to solve their security problem. After
Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990, they became almost exclusively and heavily
dependent on the willingness of the USA to provide a military service.41
Throughout the 1990s, they continued to develop stronger military rela-
tions with the USA. With the exception of Saudi Arabia, for example, they
all signed bilateral security treaties with the USA. Saudi Arabia, on the
other hand, continued to host the US Combat Air Operations Centre in
its territories.
This dependence on the USA comes at a cost, however. The USA is
a particularly troubling ally for the Arab Gulf states. Such a high level of
dependence on the USA can cause a crisis of legitimacy for the Gulf rul-
ers at any time, but especially when anti-Americanism rises in the region.
Too close a relationship with the USA can thus fuel domestic opposition.
Saudi Arabia learned this lesson well as it witnessed the rise of a religious
opposition in reaction to the US deployment of troops in the Kingdom in
the 1990s. More importantly, however, because they became too heavily
dependent on the USA, the Arab Gulf states also became too exposed to
US pressure. This became particularly troubling in the 2000s when the
USA began to promote democracy in the region.
Saudi Arabia was the most exposed. In addition to its non-democratic
credentials, Saudi Arabia had other vices for which it was targeted by its
critics. Fifteen of the nineteen militants who undertook the 11 September
attacks were from Saudi Arabia. Osama bin Laden, the leader of al Qaeda,
was an ex-Saudi citizen and had extensive ties inside the country. The USA
also found many Saudis in Afghanistan and Iraq, who had joined the fight
against the US forces.42
Even though Saudi Arabia had itself been attacked by al Qaeda, it still
had to face widespread criticisms raised by influential statesmen, politicians,
26 B. BAŞKAN
and think tanks in Washington, DC, and in other world capitals.43 The
criticisms were numerous and often harsh. For example, a RAND briefing,
given to a top Pentagon Advisory Board, described Saudi Arabia as “the
kernel of evil, the prime mover, the most dangerous opponent in the Middle
East.” The briefing claimed that Saudi Arabia was a major supporter of ter-
rorism and as such an enemy of the USA. According to the briefing, “the
Saudis are active at every level of the terror chain, from planners to finan-
ciers, from cadre to foot soldier, from ideologist to cheerleader.”44 Even
the reputable Council on Foreign Relations joined the chorus, a task force
of the council concluding, “[F]or years, individuals and charities based in
Saudi Arabia have been the most important source of funds for Al-Qaeda.
And for years, Saudi officials have turned a blind eye to this problem.”45
The problem was that this flurry of criticism came at a time when the
USA was promoting democracy and political reform in the Middle East.
Saudi Arabia weathered the storm, however, by making some cosmetic
political reforms and spending on publicity in the Western media. Once
the storm was over, Saudi Arabia was ready under the new King, Abdullah,
to start confronting the newly rising Iran.
THE SAUDI–IRAN RIVALRY REVIVED

The Saudi–Iran rivalry began in the aftermath of the 1979 Iranian revolu-
tion. Prior to that, Iran’s potential to create a security risk in the Arab Gulf
was limited at least since the beginning of the nineteenth century. In the
1970s, Iran had even been a source of stability as the USA relied on, and
groomed, Iran and Saudi Arabia as two pillars of stability and security in
the Gulf.
The Iranian revolution changed all this. It not only installed an
extremely anti-US and radical regime in Iran, but also generated a new
political activism among their Shia populations, especially in three coun-
tries where they were sizable: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Bahrain. When
Iraq attacked Iran in 1980, especially Saudi Arabia saw this as an oppor-
tunity to deal with the challenge that revolutionary Iran posed. As soon
as the war started, Saudi Arabia declared its support for Iraq and contin-
ued financially and logistically to help in its war against Iran. Kuwait also
joined Saudi Arabia and extended financial and logistical help to Iran. But,
this only deepened the rift.
A series of developments prevented the further deepening of the rift
between Iran and the Arab Gulf states: the end of the war between Iran
and Iraq in 1988; the death of Iran’s religious leader, Ruhollah Khomeini
in 1989, and the coming to power in Iran of such pragmatists as Ali
Khamenei, who became the religious leader, and Hashemi Rafsanjani,
who became the president; and, finally, Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990.
The relations even improved in the 1990s. In March 1991, for exam-
ple, Iran and Saudi Arabia re-established diplomatic relations. One month
later, the Iranian Foreign Minister visited Saudi Arabia and met the King.
The election of a much more moderate figure, Muhammed Khatami, as
the president of Iran in 1997 gave a further boost to Iran’s developing
relations with the GCC. The relationship developed to the extent that in
2001, the sides even signed a limited security treaty, in which Iran and
Saudi Arabia agreed to cooperate on issues related to border security,
money laundering, and combating drug trafficking and terrorism.
Despite the considerable progress in relations, some thorny issues
remained unresolved. For example, Iran continued to occupy three islands
that belonged to the UAE and proved to be extremely uncompromising
on the issue. More critically, the USA continued its military presence in
the Arab Gulf states, even after Iraq was ousted from Kuwait. As these
thorny issues remained unresolved, Iran’s relations with the GCC were
doomed not to make much progress. The tension was to be renewed in
the aftermath of the US invasion of Iraq.
Its own troubles immediately after 9/11 delayed it. But, eventually,
Saudi Arabia began to confront Iran in the second half of the 2000s. This
was facilitated by a huge jump in oil prices: spot crude prices averaged
$24.41 per barrel in 2001, jumped to an average of $90 in the end of
2007, and in the summer of 2008 briefly touched $140.46 As a result,
Saudi Arabia’s oil revenues jumped from $742.5 billion in 1997–2001 to
$2284.1 billion in 2002–2008.47
The options available to Saudi Arabia for confronting Iran were limited,
however, for it did not have the necessary demographic, industrial, and
military power. The rise in oil prices in the 2000s was therefore timely,
because Saudi Arabia could flex its financial muscle and step up its dip-
lomatic efforts to reverse what it saw as a shift in the balance of power
toward Iran.
To this end, Saudi Arabia pursued a multilateral and complex foreign
policy that turned the Kingdom into an active diplomatic player in the
region.48 This policy included, for example, reactivating former ties or
cultivating new ties with, and extending financial and diplomatic aid to
groups in countries such as Iraq and Lebanon, who could compete with
28 B. BAŞKAN
Iran-backed groups. Due to the US presence there, Saudi Arabia’s involve-

ment in Iraq remained limited, at least officially, but in Lebanon, Saudi
Arabia poured hundreds of millions of dollars into the country, devoting
some of them to the Shia communities, to increase its own influence and
balance that of Iran.
Saudi Arabia’s most ambitious attempt, an attempt that received US
support, was its efforts to bring together a broad coalition of states, which
shared with Saudi Arabia similar concerns about the rise of Iran. Among
them were, first and foremost, Egypt and Jordan. In a similar vein, Saudi
Arabia also tried a rapprochement with Israel, which had its own concerns
about Iran, which were no less grave than those of Saudi Arabia, Egypt,
or Jordan.
To make further gains in Lebanon, Saudi Arabia worked to undermine
the influence of Syria, Iran’s longtime ally in the region, in Lebanon. Once
Saudi Arabia realized that this strategy was failing, however, it tried a rap-
prochement with Syria, hoping to weaken its ties with Iran. To this end, King
Abdullah made a historic visit to Damascus in October 2009, which was
reciprocated by Bashar al Assad, the Syrian president, in January 2010. Saudi
Arabia would change its policy toward Syria again during the Arab Spring.
To what extent Saudi Arabia’s overall strategy of balancing Iran was
successful is difficult to assess. It is fair to say that it could not undo much
of Iran’s gains in the region by the end of the decade. Neither Hamas nor
Hizbullah nor the Assad regime in Syria distanced itself from Iran. The
Houthis in Yemen were not defeated, which was viewed by Saudi Arabia
as another advance by Iran. A pro-Iran government, led by Nouri Maliki,
was firmly in power in Iraq. The USA became even more disinterested in
halting Iran’s military and political rise in the region, especially under the
new president, Barack Obama.
NOTES
1. Ali M. Ansari, Confronting Iran, New York: Basic Books, 2006, p.209.
2. Ofira Seliktar, Navigating Iran: From Carter to Obama, New York:
Palgrave MacMillan, 2012, chapter 7.
3. Robin Wright and Peter Baker, “Iraq, Jordan See Threat to Election from
Iran,” The Washington Post, Dec. 8, 2004. Available at http://www.wash-
ingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A43980-2004Dec7.html
4. See Kayhan Barzegar, “Iran and the Shiite Crescent: Myths and Realities,”
Brown Journal of World Affairs, 15(1) (Fall/Winter 2008), pp.87–99.
5. Quoted in Rannie Amiri, “The Shia Crescent Revisited,” CounterPunch,

Feb. 19–21, 2010. http://www.counterpunch.org/2010/02/19/the-shia-
crescent-revisited/
6. See the discussion in Anoushiravan Ehteshami, “Iran-Iraq Relations after
Saddam,” The Washington Quarterly, 26(4) (Autumn 2003), pp.115–129.
7. Vali Nasr, “Behind the Rise of the Shi’ites,” Time, Dec. 19, 2006. Available
at http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1571368,00.
html. Also see his “When the Shiites rise,” Foreign Affairs, 85(4) (July/
August 2006), pp.58–74.
8. Vali Nasr, The Shia Revival: How Conflicts within Islam Will Shape the
Future, New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2007.
9. Vali Nasr, “When the Shiites rise,” Foreign Affairs, 85(4) (July/August
2006), p.60.
10. Nasr, “When the Shiites rise,” p.70.
11. Mehran Kamrava, “Iranian Foreign and Security Policies in the Persian
Gulf,” in Mehran Kamrava, ed. International Politics of the Persian Gulf,
New York: Syracuse University Press, 2011, pp.191–192.
12. Ahmedinejad’s election cannot be fully explained of course by this factor.
It is fair to say that the US attitude gained Ahmedinejad some votes as it
might have triggered nationalist feelings among the Iranians. Nikkie
Keddie, Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution, New Haven: Yale
University Press, 2006, p.329.
13. Frederic Wehrey et al., Saudi-Iranian Relations Since the Fall of Saddam:
Rivalry, Cooperation and Implications for U.S. policy, Pittsburg: RAND
Cooperation, 2009, p.3.
14. Emphasis is mine. This is an excerpt from the official translation of the
plan. “The Arab Peace Initiative, 2002.” Available at http://www.al-bab.
com/arab/docs/league/peace02.htm
15. Cited in Christopher M. Blanchard and Alfred B. Prados, Saudi Arabia:
Terrorist Financing Issues, Congressional Research Service, Report for
Congress, September 2007, pp.16–17. Available at http://fas.org/sgp/
crs/mideast/RL32499.pdf
16. See the discussion in Frederic Wehrey et al., Dangerous But Not Omnipotent:
Exploring the Reach and Limitation of Iranian Power in the Middle East,
Pittsburg: RAND Corporation, 2009, pp.133–135.
17. Shibley Telhami et al., 2011 Annual Arab Public Opinion Survey, 2011.
Available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/
2011/11/21%20arab%20public%20opinion%20telhami/1121_arab_
public_opinion.pdf
18. See Michael Slackman, “Iran Boasts of Capacity to Make Bomb Fuel,” The
New York Times, Feb. 11, 2010. Available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2010/02/12/world/middleeast/12iran.html
30 B. BAŞKAN
19. See Christopher M. Blanchard and Richard F. Grimmet, “The Gulf
Security Dialogue and Related Arms Sale Proposals,” Congressional
Research Service, Oct. 8, 2008. Available at https://www.fas.org/sgp/
crs/weapons/RL34322.pdf
20. See Joseph Kostiner, “GCC Perceptions of Collective Security in the Post-
Saddam Era,” in Mehran Kamrava, International Politics of the Persian
Gulf, Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2011.
21. Quoted in Jumana Al Tamimi, “Region ‘could be first victim of Iran’s
nuke program,’” Gulf News, Apr. 3, 2006. Available at http://gulfnews.
com/news/region/iran/region-could-be-first-victim-of-iran-s-nuke-
programme-1.231501
22. See Hasan M. Fattah, “Gulf States Join Call for Tougher Action Toward
Tehran,” The New York Times, Feb. 1, 2006. Available at http://www.
nytimes.com/2006/02/01/international/middleeast/01arab.
html?pagewanted=print&_r=0
23. “Saudi Prince slams Iran’s nuclear program,” The Daily Star Lebanon, Feb.
10, 2006. Available at http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Middle-
East/2006/Feb-10/68285-saudi-prince-slams-irans-nuclear-program.
ashx#sthash.5CgW2c9N.dpuf
24. See Eva Bellin, “The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East:
Exceptionalism in Comparative Politics,” Comparative Politics, 36(2) (Jan.
2004), p.144.
25. For details, see Dalacoura, “US democracy promotion in the Arab Middle
East since 11 September 2001: a critique”; Gilley, “Did Bush Democratize
the Middle East? The Effects of External-Internal Linkages.”
26. Gilley, “Did Bush Democratize the Middle East? The Effects of External-
Internal Linkages,” p.683.
27. Dalacoura, “US democracy promotion in the Arab Middle East since 11
September 2001: a critique,” p.978.
28. See Bobby Ghosh, “Why They Hate Each Other: Sunni-Shi’ite Divide,”
Time, 5 March 2007. Available at http://time.com/2899942/
iraq-why-they-hate-each-other-behind-the-sunni-shiite-divide/
29. See Jon B. Alterman, “Libya and the U.S.: The Unique Libyan Case,”
Middle East Quarterly, 13(1) (Winter 2006), pp.21–29.
30. The text of the Act can be found at https://www.govtrack.us/congress/
bills/108/hr1828/text
31. Bush’s speech can be found at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/
politics/transcripts/bushtext_020205.html
32. Fouad Ajami, The Syrian Rebellion, Stanford: Hoover Institution Press,
2012, p.52.
33. “Lantos Foundation reacts to events in Egypt,” Jan. 28, 2011. Available at
http://www.lantosfoundation.org/Lantos_News_Template.asp?id=3
34. See the discussion in Steven Cook, The Struggle for Egypt from Nasser to
Tahrir Square, New York: Oxford University Press, 2011, p.221.
35. See Paul Schemm, “Egypt Struggles to Control Anti-War Protests,”
Middle East Report, March 31, 2003. Available at http://www.merip.
org/mero/mero033103
36. See Erin A. Snider and David M. Faris, “The Arab Spring: U.S. Democracy
Promotion in Egypt,” Middle East Policy, 18(3) (Fall 2011), pp.49–62.
37. See Kristian Coates-Ulrichsen, Insecure Gulf: The End of Certainty and the
Transition to the Post Oil Era, New York: Columbia University Press, 2011.
38. Anthony H. Cordesman and Khalid R. Al-Rodhan, The Changing
Dynamics of Energy in the Middle East, v.1, London: Praeger Security
International, 2006, p.71.
39. Anthony H. Cordesman, The Military Balance in the Middle East, London:
Praeger, 2004, p.315.
40. I found the following article useful. Norvell B. De Atkine, “Why Arabs
Lose Wars,” Middle East Quarterly, 6(4) (December 1999). Available at
http://www.meforum.org/441/why-arabs-lose-wars. See also Anthony
H. Cordesman and Khalid R. Al Rodhan, The Gulf Military Forces in an
Era of Asymmetric War: Saudi Arabia, Washington: Center for Strategic
and International Studies, 2006. Available at http://csis.org/files/media/
csis/pubs/060728_gulf_saudi.pdf
41. See F. Gregory Gause, III, The International Relations of the Persian Gulf,
New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010, chapter 4.
42. See the numbers in J.E. Peterson, “Saudi-American Relations After 11
September 2001,” Asian Affairs, 33(1) (Feb. 2002), p.11.
43. See J.E. Peterson, “Saudi-American Relations After 11 September 2001”;
Gawdat Bahgat, “Saudi Arabia and the War on Terrorism,” Arab Studies
Quarterly, 26(1) (Winter 2004), pp.51–63; David Ottaway, “The Kind
and Us: U.S.-Saudi Relations in the Wake of 9/11,” Foreign Affairs, 88(3)
(May/June 2009), pp.121–131.
44. Thomas E. Ricks, “Briefing Depicted Saudis as Enemies: Ultimatum
Urged to Pentagon Board,” The Washington Post, August 6, 2002.
Available at https://www.library.cornell.edu/colldev/mideast/murawiec.
htm
45. Cited in Gause III, The International Relations of the Persian Gulf, p.145.
46. Cited in Gause III, The International Relations of the Persian Gulf,
pp.181–182.
47. Mohammed A. Ramady, The Saudi Arabian Economy, 2nd ed., New York:
Springer, 2010, p.45.
48. In the forthcoming discussion, I benefited greatly from Wehrey et al.,
Saudi-Iranian Relations Since the Fall of Saddam, chapter 4.
PART II
The Rise of Turkey and Qatar

CHAPTER 4
Enter Turkey and Qatar
Abstract This chapter discusses how the post-9/11 regional context

paved the way for Turkey and Qatar to play more active roles. The chap-
ter details how Turkey and Qatar pursued similar policies and employed
similar tools in the 2000s and expanded their influences in the region.
The chapter also discusses how Turkey and Qatar had developed stronger
relations with the Muslim Brotherhood movement and its offshoot in the
Palestine, Hamas, during the same period. The chapter shows that by the
time the Arab Spring erupted, Turkey and Qatar had become the most
active regional players in the Middle East.
Keywords Turkey’s Foreign Policy • Qatar’s Foreign Policy

• the post 9/11 Middle East • the Muslim Brotherhood • Hamas
It was in this regional environment that Turkey and Qatar began to pursue
a pro-active foreign policy in the region. It was a propitious environment
for both countries. In the first place, the US rhetoric and action brought
no harm to those in power in both countries. In the case of Turkey, the US
rhetoric and action even helped them consolidate their power. Moreover,
the post-9/11 strategic landscape in the Middle East was favorable to both
Turkey and Qatar. Their friendship was sought after by Saudi Arabia to
counter the rise of Iran and by Iran to break its international isolation.
By remaining bipartisan, Turkey and Qatar turned this competition to
their own advantage, pursuing policies with unprecedented similarities:
East, DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-51771-5_4
36 B. BAŞKAN
expanding their economic and political relations with the rest of the world,
mediating in high-profile international conflicts, and strengthening their
ties with the MB and Hamas.
ACQUIRING IMMUNITY TO US PRESSURE: THE 1990S

In the Middle East, Turkey and Qatar were the countries least affected
by the US response to the 9/11 attacks. They were, so to speak, immune
to the aftermath shocks of the 9/11. They had acquired this immunity
throughout the 1990s.
Turkey faced two formidable challenges in the 1990s, both of which
had their origins in the late Ottoman period: political Islam and Kurdish
separatism.1 The Republican period, which started in 1923,2 dealt with
both movements harshly, weakening and marginalizing political Islam
and brutally suppressing Kurdish separationism in the 1920s. By the late
1930s, the Republic seemed to have resolved both problems. In the early
1970s, however, the issues arose again.
Necmettin Erbakan, a university professor of mechanical engineering,
led the revival of political Islam by founding the National Order Party
in 1970, which was soon shut down by the military. In its place Erbakan
founded the National Salvation Party in 1971. Although Erbakan man-
aged to enter the cabinet a few times, his party remained a minor party in
parliament throughout the 1970s and was eventually shut down again in
1980 by the military. For most of the 1980s, he was banned from politics.
He was back in politics in 1988 and from then on managed to increase
the vote share of his new party, the Welfare Party, in both municipal and
parliamentary elections. In the 1994 municipal elections, the Welfare Party
scored a great victory by winning the metropolitan mayorships of Istanbul
and Ankara. In the 1995 national elections, the party scored even a big-
ger victory, emerging as the first party in the elections for the first time in
Erbakan’s political life. The party did not have the necessary majority to
form a government, however. Erbakan agreed to form a coalition govern-
ment with a right-wing party and became the Prime Minister of Turkey in
1996 for the first time in his life.
This proved to be a short-lived success. Alarmed by this success,
the Turkish Armed Forces once again intervened and engineered what
amounted to a military coup. Erbakan was forced to resign and later
banned from politics by the Constitutional Court, which also closed down
ENTER TURKEY AND QATAR 37
his party. Without occupying any political post since, he passed away in
2011 at the age of 84.
In the late 1990s, Turkey’s political Islam movement underwent a split.
A dissident group parted their ways with Necmettin Erbakan and founded
the Justice and Development Party (JDP) in 2001. The separation was
not simply organizational, but also ideological—at least this was what
Erbakan’s dissident students claimed. The JDP called itself a “conservative
democrat” party and declared “the unity and the integrity of the Republic
of Turkey, the secular, democratic, social State of law, and the processes of
civilianization, democratization, freedom of belief and equality of oppor-
tunity”3 essential.
Abdullah Öcalan, a low-ranking public servant and a leftist student, led
the revival of Kurdish separatism by founding the PKK, an acronym for
the Partiya Karkeren Kurdistane, or Kurdistan Workers’ Party, in 1978,
to establish an independent state for the Kurds.4 Soon thereafter Öcalan
first moved to Lebanon and then settled in Syria, from where he began
to direct his party. The PKK undertook its first attack on Turkey’s Armed
Forces in 1984 and escalated its attacks in the ensuing years.
The First Gulf War turned out to be a blessing for the PKK as the
US-imposed no-fly zone turned northern Iraq into a safe haven for the
PKK. From northern Iraq, the PKK could better wage attacks on and ter-
rorize the whole southeast Turkey. Turkey began to accuse two countries,
Iran and Syria, of turning a blind eye and even providing logistics to the
PKK. In the early 1990s, Turkey desperately tried to secure their coopera-
tion against the PKK, but in vein, both Iran and Syria ignored Turkish
pleas and instead attempted to use the PKK as a wild card against Turkey.
At the very least, this was what Turkey believed to be the case.
While combating the PKK, Turkey also failed to receive the support of
the USA and the European Union (EU), who even refused to sell them
the high-tech weapons systems Turkey needed and demanded to fight
the PKK. Germany even requested that Turkey not to use the German-
made Leopard tanks against the PKK.5 Conditions could not have been
more conducive for a rapprochement with Israel. The Turkish military
had long been impressed by the Israeli military’s technological edge, and
more importantly, Israel was willing to sell Turkey weapons that Turkey
desperately needed, without any conditions being imposed. Turkey would
also benefit from Israel’s strong ties in the USA, especially in mobilizing
the Jewish lobby against the Armenian lobby.
38 B. BAŞKAN
Relations between Turkey and Israel had in fact begun to warm up

earlier in the mid-1980s, culminating in Turkey’s decision to upgrade
its relations to embassy status in December 1991 after Israel and the
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) met for peace talks in Madrid in
October 1991. In addition to exchanging extensive high-level state visits,
both countries signed numerous agreements throughout the 1990s. In
1992, both countries agreed to cooperate on drug trafficking, terrorism,
and organized crime, and also agreed to improve military cooperation
between the Israeli and Turkish defense industries. In 1993, Turkey and
Israel signed a memorandum of understanding by which Turkey would
allow Israel to gather electronic intelligence on Syria and Iran through
Turkey and in return Israel would assist Turkey in equipping and training
Turkish forces in anti-terror warfare on her southern borders.
Particularly worrisome for the Arab World and Iran was the deep and
extensive military and security component of the relationship. Two impor-
tant agreements, which formed the basis of Turkey–Israel military coop-
eration, came in 1996: one was signed in February, the Military Training
and Cooperation Agreement, and the one in August, the Defense Industry
Cooperation Agreement. Both agreements prepared the stage for joint
military training, joint military maneuvers, joint weapons production proj-
ects, and Israel’s arms sale to Turkey. The agreements did not stay on
paper, but were put into practice. By the end of 1999, almost all Israeli
pilots, for example, had gained some experience by flying in Turkish air-
space. In 1998, the naval forces, and in 2000, the air forces, undertook
their first joint maneuvers, later to be joined by the US Air Force.6
As Turkey’s relations with Israel warmed up, its relations with Iran and
the Arab World cooled. Turkey and Syria came to the brink of war. Syria
avoided a war with Turkey only by asking the PKK leader, Abdullah Öcalan,
to leave the country. Turkey made three major military incursions into Iraq,
drawing strong criticisms from the Arab League and Iraq. Throughout the
1990s, Turkey and Iran exchanged verbal assaults: Iran criticized Turkey for
its ultra-secular policies, such as the ban on headscarves and good relations
with Israel; Turkey accused Iran of harboring the Kurdish PKK within its ter-
ritories and supporting anti-regime armed and non-armed religious groups.
In the mid-1990s, Turkey and Iran even expelled each other’s ambassadors.7
This security environment began to change in the late 1990s. The
rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan and Muhammed Khatami’s election to
presidency in Iran in 1997 led at least to a detente as the two countries
restored diplomatic relations by appointing new ambassadors in March
1998. Syria also changed its policy. After avoiding a war with Turkey in
1999, Syria set out to develop much more cordial relations with Turkey
and became more cooperative in helping Turkey fight the PKK. As Iran
and Syria cut their logistical support to the PKK, by the early 2000s, the
Turkish military had managed to minimize the PKK threat to Turkey. The
capture of the PKK leader, Abdullah Öcalan, in Kenya with the help of
the USA, further boosted the Turkish military and demoralized the PKK.
While Turkey had been tackling both political Islam and Kurdish sepa-
ratism, the economy had undergone successive crises in 1994, 1999, and
2001: the gross national product (GNP) shrank by 6.1% in both 1994
and 1999, and by 9.5% in 2001; the gross national product per capita
shrank even more, by 7.8% in 1994, 7.4% in 1999, and 11.1% in 2001;
unemployment rates fluctuated within a range of 6–9% throughout the
1990s, soared from 6.5% in 2000 to 8.4% in 2001 and 10.3% in 2002;
inflation rates also soared in the 1990s; consumer price index fluctuated
in the range of 60–70% in the early 1990s, peaked in 1994 at a record of
106%, and stabilized in the range of 80–89% in 1995–1998. The index fell
to 64.9% in 1999, 54.9% in 2000 and 54.4% in 2001.8
Weak coalition governments and petty fights among politicians did not
alleviate, but simply aggravated the economic decline in Turkey until a
coalition government led by Bülent Ecevit, a veteran politician, imple-
mented a painful economic program after the 2001 economic crisis, for
which his party and the other coalition partners paid a heavy price in the
next elections, held in November 2002.
As a matter of fact, all political parties in parliament paid a heavy price.
None of them could pass the national electoral threshold of 10%. Only
two political parties, which had not been in the parliament, could pass
it: the JDP and the Republican People’s Party. Controlling the majority
of the seats in parliament, the JDP formed a single-party government.
Turkey thus entered the twenty-first century.
In the 1990s, Qatar faced two daunting challenges. One was to craft
a foreign policy independent of Saudi Arabia, and the other was to over-
come its over-dependence on oil in generating welfare. In this decade,
Qatar also underwent a succession crisis, which was intimately related to
the question of how to tackle these two challenges.
Qatar is a small country, covering an area of approximately 11,000
square kilometers. Poor in underground water reserves and hence agri-
cultural land, the country had always had a sparse population, which was
around 25,000 in the mid-century. The country’s population increased to
40 B. BAŞKAN
109,000 in 1970 and then to 477,000 in 1990.9 From a small population,

Qatar could muster a small military force. In 1990, for example, the total
size of its armed forces was 7500, which jumped to around 12,000 in
2000.10 Such a tiny force could deter other smaller GCC states, such as
Kuwait, Bahrain, and the UAE, but it could not be effective in deterring
more populous neighbors, such as Saudi Arabia and Iran.
To compensate for this unfavorable imbalance in military power, espe-
cially vis-à-vis Saudi Arabia and Iran, Qatar had no option but to pursue
a policy mixture of appeasing, balancing, and relying on the protection
of a regional or international power. In the early twentieth century, to
protect its autonomy in the face of an encroaching Saudi state, Qatar not
only sought British protection, but also appeased the Saudis by embracing
Wahhabism. Qatar remained as a British protectorate from 1913 to 1971.
After the British left the Gulf, the USA was uninterested in filling the vac-
uum until the 1990s. During this period, Qatar had no option other than
to pursue a foreign policy that was highly dependent on Saudi Arabia.
The 1990s provided Qatar with an opportunity to distance itself from
Saudi Arabia and pursue a more independent policy. This was thanks to
the USA’s assumption of a more hegemonic role in the Gulf after the
First Gulf War.11 More importantly, perhaps, Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa
al Thani, who was by then the crown prince of Qatar, was willing to do
so. The year 1992 was a critical year. Qatar signed a Defense Cooperation
Agreement with the USA, according to which the USA would have com-
plete access to the military bases in Qatar and could pre-position its mil-
itary equipment in case it was needed. In the same year, Qatar signed
agreements with Iran to improve cooperation in a number of fields. In the
same year also, an unfortunate incident seriously harmed Qatar’s relations
with Saudi Arabia. Two Qataris were killed and a third taken prisoner in
a border clash with Saudi Arabia. In response, Qatar withdrew from the
ongoing military exercises held by the Gulf states.
In July 1993, Qatar’s deputy ruler visited Iran and agreed to form a
joint committee to expand cooperation in the oil and gas fields. In 1994,
Qatar and Iran held talks to curb drug trafficking in the Gulf. Qatar also
sought to develop relations with Israel. In January 1994, Qatar and Israel
held discussions about whether Qatar could supply natural gas to Israel.
In November of that year, Israel’s Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs paid
an official visit to Qatar.
As Qatar was seeking ways to develop its relations with Iran and Israel,
its relations with Saudi Arabia deteriorated further in the 1994. There
were five border skirmishes between Qatar and Saudi Arabia that year. In
reaction, Qatar refused to participate in the GCC summit conference in
November 1994.12
Sheikh Hamad staged a bloodless coup against his father, Sheikh
Khalifa bin Hamad al Thani, in 1995 and assumed full control over deci-
sion-making,13 but he was still in a precarious situation. Sheikh Khalifa
was unwilling to give up power and to this end sought regional support
to regain his throne. He settled in Abu Dhabi and visited Egypt and Syria.
Sheikh Hamad faced an attempted coup in early 1996, almost six months
after he overthrew his father. Fortunately, the coup attempt failed, but it
nevertheless added further tension to Qatar’s already strained relations
with its neighbors, because Qatar accused the others, especially Saudi
Arabia, Bahrain, and the UAE, of involvement in the coup attempt.
The coup and the reaction of the other Gulf states must have made
Sheikh Hamad even more determined. He continued to nurture better
relations with Iran and Israel. Muhammed Khatami’s historic Gulf tour in
1999 also included Qatar, during which Iran and Qatar signed a series of
agreements to improve cooperation in diverse fields such as sports, tour-
ism, and investment.14 Relations with Israel also improved. In October
1995, Qatar announced that it would develop economic relations with
Israel even if the peace talks between Israel and the Palestinians failed. A
month later, Israel agreed to buy liquefied natural gas from Qatar.15 More
surprisingly, in April 1996, Shimon Peres, the prime minister of Israel,
visited Qatar. One month later, Qatar opened a trade representation office
in Doha for Israel. Israel also participated in the Middle East and North
Africa Economic Conference held in Doha in 1997, despite protests from
several other Arab states, including Saudi Arabia.
Qatar’s relationship with Israel faced setbacks, especially in reaction
to the frequent deteriorations in Israel–Palestinian relations, but did not
collapse totally. Qatari and Israeli high-level officials continued to meet
at international conferences. For example, in September 2000, the Israeli
Prime Minister, Ehud Barak, met Sheikh Hamad at the UN Millennium
Summit. In defending this, Qatar’s foreign minister, Sheikh Hamad bin
Jassim al Thani said, “We do not ask permission to meet with anybody …
I do not think that anybody should be able to dictate to us who we should
meet and who we should not.”16
In the meantime, Qatar also improved its relations with Saudi Arabia,
despite the latter’s protest and withdrawal from the 1997 Economic
Conference. The sides agreed to settle the border issue and finally agreed
42 B. BAŞKAN
on a new boundary line in 2000. Qatar also agreed to solve its dispute with
Bahrain over the Hawar Islands and referred the case to the International
Court. The dispute was resolved in 2001, the islands being given to Bahrain.
What proved to be Qatar’s most valuable foreign policy initiative came
in 1996, one year after the coup. Sheikh Hamad established an interna-
tional news channel, Al Jazeera, recruiting its first staff from BBC Arabic
Television, which had been just closed by its major financier, Saudi Arabia.
In 1998, Sheikh Hamad took one step further and abolished the Ministry
of Information, which had served in Qatar and elsewhere in the Arab World
as a mechanism of censorship. Qatar thus provided Al Jazeera with not only
finance but also operative freedom. Al Jazeera turned into a popular public
platform for debate about almost all matters, sensitive or non-sensitive,
political or non-political, primarily concerning the Arab World. It gave an
unprecedented opportunity to Arabs and non-Arabs—be they journalists,
academics, public intellectuals, activists, opposition, and pro-government
figures, basically to all from all ideological stripes—to voice their views.
In the words of Muhammed Zayani, Al Jazeera basically turned into “a
heaven for free speech in the Arab World,” filling “not only a media void
but also a political void.” Being open to all, Zayani said, Al Jazeera served
“as a de facto pan-Arab opposition and a forum for resistance,” providing
“a voice for Arab opposing views and a high-profile platform for political
dissidents many of whom live abroad.”17
As millions in the Arab World turned to it, Al Jazeera increased Qatar’s
soft power, but it also brought trouble for the country. Some Arab states,
including Saudi Arabia, even withdrew their ambassadors from Doha in
protest of Al Jazeera’s coverage.18 Sheikh Hamad would later confess in an
interview, “I know Jazeera causes me a big problem too. In the past, many
Arab leaders didn’t even want to talk to me.”19 These troubles were not
without advantages for Qatar. Not only officials from other Arab coun-
tries, but also US officials, often turned to the Qatari leadership for favors
regarding Al Jazeera.20
Crafting an independent foreign policy was just one of the challenges
Qatar faced. Another was to overcome Qatar’s over-dependence on oil
for generating wealth. Oil was discovered in the mid-twentieth century
and generated unprecedented wealth in Qatar. With that wealth, the state
could build state institutions almost ex nihilo, and provide all public ser-
vices free of charge to its citizens.
The challenge was to sustain this model, which began to face problems
in the 1980s with the drastic decline in oil prices, as can be readily seen.
Qatar’s gross domestic product (GDP), in current prices, decreased from

$8.6 billion in 1981 to a record low of $5 billion in 1986 and fluctuated in
the range of $6–7.5 billion until 1994. The country surpassed its 1981 GDP
level in 1996. Qatar’s GDP per capita likewise fell from $34,000 in 1981 to
$12,600 in 1986, and then increased gradually to $17,600 in 1996.21
Such an economic downturn could be politically destabilizing. As a
matter of fact, Qatar witnessed the rise of an opposition in the early 1990s,
however limited it might have been. In 1992, 54 prominent citizens of
Qatar signed a petition and presented it to by then the ruler of Qatar,
Sheikh Khalifa. The petition complained about several issues such as “the
abuse of power,” “the stagnant state of the economy,” “lack of freedom
of speech, the inequitable health system and the stagnant education sys-
tem.”22 The petition then demanded “free parliamentary elections, a writ-
ten constitution and the expansion of personal and political freedoms.”23
Sheikh Khalifa not only ignored the petition but responded harshly. Some
signatories were jailed, some banned from traveling, and some threatened.
Sheikh Khalifa took a step to tackle the problem of over-dependence on
oil. Qatar was also endowed with another resource, natural gas, located in
an offshore field shared by Iran, which might help to explain Qatar’s over-
tures to Iran. In 1991, Qatar started the first phase of a massive project
to develop its natural gas field, known as the North Field, but this project
had to wait another six years to bear any fruit. Qatar was to make its first
export of natural gas, liquefied due to the lack of a pipeline, in 1997.
Natural gas would definitely diversify Qatar’s sources of revenues, but
it would not bring any qualitative change to Qatar’s economy. For that to
happen, a comprehensive educational reform was needed, which became
possible only after Sheikh Hamad overthrew his conservative father and
took full control of political power. In one of his first acts, Sheikh Hamad
established the Qatar Foundation for Education, Science and Community
Development to shoulder this educational reform, and endowed it richly.
The Qatar Foundation’s ultimate objective was to expand education in
English at all levels, but especially at the college level. As a part of what
was to become the massive Education City project, the Qatar Academy
was founded in 1998 to provide education from primary to high school
levels. In the same year, the Virginia Commonwealth University opened a
campus to offer degrees in art and design. In 2001, the Academic Bridge
Program was opened with the objective of advancing the English levels of
high school graduates from Qatar so that they could pursue higher educa-
tion in English not only in Qatar but elsewhere in the world.
44 B. BAŞKAN
Educational reform, led by the Qatar Foundation, slowly evolved, and

Sheikh Hamad took other steps in the meantime. These steps, as Gulf
specialists point out, were part of Sheikh Hamad’s “state branding” cam-
paign,24 which served to polish his own image as well as that of Qatar. As
such, as Mehran Kamrava noted, they compensated for Sheikh Hamad’s
initial “fragile base of support within the ruling al Thani family by appeal-
ing to a broader base of Qataris and also to the international community.”25
Some of Sheikh Hamad’s early initiatives seemed to be addressing
the petition submitted to the ruler in 1992. Sheikh Hamad, for exam-
ple, promised a written constitution and formed a committee in 1999 to
draft it. The draft constitution envisaged an Advisory Council with 45
members, 30 of whom were to be elected and the rest appointed by the
ruler. Sheikh Hamad also announced that elections would be held for
the Municipal Council. Later, he announced that women would also be
able to vote and run as candidates in the elections. In his announcement,
Sheikh Hamad said,
The formation of the Central Municipal Council through direct elections,

and granting women the right of membership and voting are a major step
toward boosting popular participation in both executive and legislative
activities and laying the foundations of democratic practice in our country
in a gradual manner until we ultimately reach the full democracy we dream
of achieving.26
Qatar indeed held elections, for the first time in its history, for the
Board of the Qatar Chamber of Commerce in April 1998. More impor-
tantly, it held the first municipal elections in 1999, specifically on 8 March,
International Women’s Day. Women voted in this election and six even ran
as candidates, although none won a seat.27 Qatar held its second municipal
elections in 2003, and this time one woman was elected to the council.
She won her seat on the council because no one contested her in the
electoral district. According to a Qatari official, the regime asked the male
candidates in that district to withdraw to make sure that she won the
elections.28
It was obvious that the regime was actively seeking ways to improve
women’s status in the country’s political and economic system. Sheikh
Hamad had signaled this effort in his earliest days in power. In 1995,
he founded and generously endowed the Qatar Foundation and put its
administration under his wife, Sheikha Moza bint Nasser. In later years,
Sheikha Moza assumed more public positions29 and began to appear in

public both at home and abroad, as a symbol of his country’s progressive
stance toward women’s rights.
Sheikha Moza was obviously the most famous case, but there were other
less known cases. In 1996, for example, Sheikha Ahmed Al Mahmoud was
appointed as the deputy assistant minister of education and higher educa-
tion. Sheikh Hamad’s sister, Sheikha Aisha became the chairperson of the
Preparatory Committee for municipal elections. This committee was also
charged with the task of “encouraging the participation of Qatari women
and, as voters and as candidates.”30 Sheikha al Mahmoud later became the
Minister of Education in 2003, in both cases being the first woman to
ever occupy those positions. In the same year, Sheikha Abdallah al Misnad
became the president of the national university, Qatar University, the first
woman ever to hold that position. Prior to this appointment, Sheikha Al
Misnad had served as the vice president of Qatar University for three years.
TURKEY AND QATAR FACING THE POST-9/11 REGION

The party that steered Turkey’s foreign policy in the post-9/11 regional
context was the newly founded JDP. As discussed above, this party had
roots in the political Islam tradition in Turkey, although its leadership
cadre had just renounced their ties to that tradition. That tradition had
been undergoing its own crisis in the late 1990s, after having been declared
the prime security threat to the state by the military.
From the very beginning, the JDP found itself under the close watchful
eyes of the military and the judiciary. The generals of the Turkish Armed
Forces used the opening and graduating ceremonies of high military
schools as occasions to teach the members of the government the central
Kemalist tenets of the Turkish state. University presidents used the open-
ing days of their universities in the same vein. The heads of high judiciary
used their ceremonies starting annual judicial years as occasions to warn
the government, and to deliver a lecture on secularism in the context of
Turkey.
The cold war between the JDP on the one hand and the military, the
judiciary, and the universities on the other had continued for years to come
and peaked in intensity in 2006 and 2007. In one of the last showdowns,
the JDP even faced a possible closure with the outcome of the party leader
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan being banned from politics.31 Fortunately, the
Constitutional Court decided not to close the party on 30 July 2008.32
46 B. BAŞKAN
But, the voting was very close. Six of the eleven members voted for the
closure of the party, lacking just one vote to do so. Only one member
voted against the closure of the party, and four others voted for state with-
drawal of full financial aid to the party.
Simply to survive this ordeal, the JDP governments pursued a multi-
pronged strategy, as a part of which, for example, it pursued EU member-
ship. Without any hindrance from parliament, the JDP introduced many
political reforms. The speed and dedication of the government in intro-
ducing and implementing the laws even impressed the EU, leading to the
historical decision, taken on 17 December 2004, to open negotiations
with Turkey for full membership.33
Boosted by this success on the European front, a perceptible economic
recovery in Turkey, inflation rates falling to single-digit levels and eco-
nomic growth rates averaging 6.9% between 2002 and 2005, simply added
to the JDP’s popularity. With an impressive 11% increase in the vote share,
the JDP emerged victorious in the July 2007 national elections, receiving
47.9% of the total vote. The Constitutional Court’s decision not to close
down the JDP simply confirmed that the JDP was secure in power.
The Bush administration’s promotion of democracy in the Middle East
came at the very time the JDP had been making its own fight for democracy
at home. The JDP sought to capitalize on this opportunity. Even though
the JDP-dominated parliament did not pass a resolution allowing US
troops to use Turkey as a base to invade Iraq, the JDP sought to develop
stronger ties with the USA. Shortly after the invasion, Erdoğan penned an
apologetic commentary published in the Wall Street Journal and titled it
“My Country Is Your Faithful Ally.” Erdoğan ended his piece as follows:
Turkey will strive for peace and durable stability in the region alongside
the U.S., her strategic partner and ally for more than half a century. We are
determined to maintain our close cooperation with the U.S. We further
hope and pray that the brave young men and women return home with
the lowest possible casualties, and that the suffering in Iraq ends as soon as
possible.34
The JDP was also eager to promote democracy in the Middle East,
alongside the USA. Erdoğan was, for example, present at the G8 meeting
where the US-led BMENA was announced. Before he left Turkey for the
meeting, Erdoğan explained to his party group, “We support openings,
democratization and welfare producing strategies in this geography and
will continue to support them.” Erdoğan believed that Turkey had always
been the guarantor of peace, security, and democracy in its region and
therefore would take its part in all international initiatives to this end.35
The USA also valued Turkey’s enthusiasm highly. It was looking for
partners in the region and Turkey appeared to be the perfect partner.
The deputy defense secretary Paul Wolfowitz expressed this in a speech he
delivered in Istanbul in July 2002.
“To win the war against terrorism, and, in so doing, help shape a more
peaceful world,” “we must reach out to the hundreds of millions of mod-
erate and tolerant people in the Muslim world. We must speak to those
people around the world who aspire to enjoy the blessings of freedom and
free enterprise. Turkey offers a compelling demonstration that these values
can be compatible with modern society—that religious beliefs need not be
sacrificed to build modern democratic institutions.”36
Almost two years later, George W. Bush pointed to Turkey as a model.

In a speech delivered at the NATO summit held in Istanbul, Bush said,
This land has always been important for its geography—here at the meeting
place of Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. Now Turkey has assumed even
greater historical importance, because of your character as a nation. Turkey
is a strong, secular democracy, a majority Muslim society, and a close ally of
free nations. Your country, with 150 years of democratic and social reform,
stands as a model to others, and as Europe’s bridge to the wider world.
Your success is vital to a future of progress and peace in Europe and in the
broader Middle East—and the Republic of Turkey can depend on the sup-
port and friendship of the United States of America.37
Erdoğan and Turkey thus represented a golden combination for the

USA and the EU: a secular, Muslim, democratic, pro-West, pro-Israel
state, a state, and more importantly, in the hands of former Islamists.
In addition to the political reforms initiated, Erdoğan and his party also
received the generous and almost free support of hundreds of liberal intel-
lectuals in Turkey in persuading the Western public opinion about its
“image of a post-Islamist, liberal, democratic and reformist party.”38 When
Erdoğan was fighting for his own political career against the military and
the judiciary in Turkey, he therefore had a strong support from the USA
and the EU, which greatly helped him in establishing civilian control over
the Turkish military and other state institutions.
48 B. BAŞKAN
At the time of the 11 September attacks, Qatar was politically and eco-
nomically in better shape than Turkey.39 The ruler of Qatar, Hamad bin
Khalifa al Thani, had been in power for six years and was firmly in power,
his own legitimacy at home being greatly boosted by his political reforms
and more importantly the ever-improving economic conditions. Not only
did oil prices begin to increase in the second half of the 1990s, but also,
and more importantly, Qatar began to export liquefied natural gas in 1995.
Starting modestly, Qatar rapidly expanded its share in the world market,
to become the largest exporter in 2006. The impact of this new source of
wealth began to be felt immediately. When Sheikh Hamad took power,
Qatar’s per capita GDP was, in current dollars, around $15,000. This
steadily increased in the second half of the 1990s and reached $30,000 in
2002, $35,000 in 2003, and $44,000 in 2004.40
Having pre-empted the US promotion of democracy in the Middle
East, Sheikh Hamad did not feel threatened by it. In fact, the Qatari lead-
ership had called for political reform in the region before the USA did so.
In an interview given to CBS News in May 2001, for example, by then
Qatar’s minister of foreign affairs, Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim al Thani,
bravely declared: “Democracy started. Either the leaders like or they don’t
like it. Either you open the door, or they break the door. It’s a matter of
time, in my opinion.”41
The 11 September attacks also provided Qatar a precious opportunity
to develop stronger military relations with the USA. Qatar had already
signed a security treaty with the USA in 1992 after the Iraqi invasion of
Kuwait, but it sought a US military base in the country, like Saudi Arabia,
Kuwait, and Bahrain. Apparently with that in mind, Sheikh Hamad estab-
lished two new military bases, al Udeid and Sayliyah, in Qatar. The pre-
cious opportunity Qatar was looking for appeared immediately after the
11 September attacks. The USA used al Udeid Air Base to conduct air
attacks against the Taliban in Afghanistan. More importantly, in 2003,
during the preparations for the war against Iraq, the USA began to move
its forward headquarters and facilities for the US Army and Air Force to
Qatar, and completed the move immediately after the war ended. It was
from Qatar, in the words of George W. Bush, that Americans “executed
one of the most innovative war plans in the history of armed conflict.”42
With this move, Qatar boosted its security against potential external
threats and became a critical ally of the USA in the region. Qatar also
sought other ways to boost its relations with the USA, one of which
was through expanding educational and academic activities between the
two countries. In this it had already made some progress. The Qatar
Foundation, headed by Sheikh Hamad’s wife, Sheikha Moza, was in
the process of inviting prestigious US universities to open branches in
Qatar. The Virginia Commonwealth University was the first such univer-
sity, which opened a campus in Qatar, starting its School of Arts pro-
gram in 1998. Cornell University began to run a medical program in
early 2001, Texas A&M University an engineering program in 2003, the
Carnegie Mellon a business and computer science program in 2004, and
Georgetown University its School of Foreign Service program in 2005.
Qatar also opened branches of two prestigious US think tank organiza-
tions, Brookings and RAND, cooperating with the latter in the reform of
the whole Qatari educational system.
FOREIGN POLICY ACTIVISM

The US promotion of democracy in the Middle East thus put neither
Qatar nor Turkey in an uncomfortable position. Turkey and Qatar could
even turn the post-9/11 regional landscape to their own advantage
by pursuing more active foreign policies. Both sought, for example, to
expand their economic and commercial relationships with as many dif-
ferent actors as possible. In the case of Qatar, it was almost an economic
necessity. After Russia and Iran, the country was the third richest country
in the world in natural gas reserves, but unlike the two, it could only
export natural gas as liquefied. This presented a problem of storage. The
most economically efficient means meant that once natural gas was lique-
fied, it had to be exported immediately to the buyers. Liquefied gas could
be sold immediately on the market, but at a much reduced price. To reap
the maximum profit, Qatar had to make long-term sales contracts. To
this end, Sheikh Hamad made dozens of trips to countries in different
continents, from Latin America to Far East and South Asia, from Europe
and North America to Africa. From April 2009 to March 2010 alone, the
Emir of Qatar, Sheikh Hamad, visited Brazil, Argentina, Venezuela, Costa
Rica, Turkey (twice), Iran, Saudi Arabia (twice), Italy, the USA, France,
Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore, the UK, Belarus, Bulgaria, Portugal,
and Croatia.
Not all these trips proved effective in securing long-term buyers for
Qatar’s gas. By 2010, the bulk of Qatar’s exports, around 75%, were
still made to five Far East and South Asian countries only: Japan, South
Korea, Singapore, India, and Thailand. Qatar’s success in diversifying its
50 B. BAŞKAN
export destinations was to be commended, however. In addition to other

Arab and Asian countries, Qatar was also exporting to North and Latin
America, Africa, European, and Oceanic countries as of 2010. The impact
of Qatar’s efforts on economy was phenomenal. From 2002 to 2010,
Qatar’s hydrocarbon exports increased from a mere $9.9 billion to $72.6
billion with a corresponding increase in governmental revenues from $8
billion to $42.7 billion in the same period. Thanks to the same efforts,
Qatar’s economy found itself among the fastest-growing economies in the
world. Qatar’s real GDP grew annually by 8.7% between 2000 and 2005,
26.2% in 2006, 18% in 2007, 12% in 2009, and 16.6% in 2010. From
2004 to 2010, GDP per capita jumped phenomenally from $44,000 to
$71,510.43
This sudden accumulation of capital not only helped the state of Qatar
finance its many projects in urban planning, education, and health, but
also turned into yet another effective tool of soft power. In 2005, the state
of Qatar established the Qatar Investment Authority (QIA) to manage
Qatar’s international investments. Except in rare instances where politics
seemed to influence investment decisions, economic logic has dictated
Qatar’s investment decisions. This does not suggest, however, that Qatar’s
investments had no political consequences. The QIA now seems to pursue
a strategy that has geographically diversified its investments as much as
possible,44 willing to invest even in politically risky countries. As a result,
Qatar has become a destination for political leaders from all over the world
who desire to attract Qatari investment to their countries. Qatar has also
made investments all over the world, possibly the bulk being made in
the EU countries. The overall impact of these investments should not
be missed. They embedded Qatar within an extensive web of economic
and commercial relationships with many different countries, which, as a
result, became invested in the stability and security of Qatar in one way
or another.45
There was also an economic logic behind Turkey’s foreign policy activ-
ism in the 2000s. The two were in fact so closely linked that a Turkish
scholar, Kemal Kirişçi, described Turkey’s foreign policy activism as “the
rise of the trading state.”46 Thanks to state-led industrialization in the first
seven decades of the century and economic liberalization in the last two
decades, Turkey came to have a thriving, export-oriented economy. In
very diverse sectors ranging from agriculture to manufacturing, from con-
struction to the service sector, tens of thousands of small-, middle-, and
large-scale family enterprises sought to enter new markets to further their
growth. With a lack of international experience, however, they needed a

political hand, and Erdoğan and the JDP were willing to give that hand.
Erdoğan called it “merchant politics.” As soon as the JDP came to power,
Erdoğan and other JDP leaders traveled with hundreds of businessmen
around the world to establish commercial links and obtain contracts for
them. The outcome was impressive. Erdoğan and his team helped Turkey’s
exports increase phenomenally, from $36 billion in 2002 to $113 billion
in 2010.
Erdoğan and the JDP also sought to expand Turkey’s economic and
commercial interests in the Middle East. This can be readily seen via sta-
tistics. Under Erdoğan’s governments, while Turkey’s export to EU coun-
tries increased by 2.58 times from $20 billion to $52 billion, Turkey’s
exports to the Middle East and North Africa increased by 6.45 times
from $4.7 billion in 2002 to $30 billion in 2010. Turkey’s exports to
the Middle East and North Africa also increased in relative terms from
13% in 2002 to 26% in 2010 while those to EU countries decreased from
56% in 2002 to 46% in 2010. Improving relations with Iran and the Arab
World also paid off in turning Turkey into a popular tourist destination:
the number of Iranian and Arab tourists to Turkey increased from around
950,000 in 2003 to around 2.8 million in 2010, giving a further boost to
the Turkish economy.
AVOIDING ENTRAPMENT IN THE SAUDI–IRAN RIVALRY

In the post-9/11 regional landscape, Turkey and Qatar also benefited from
the escalating rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran, or what some called
the New Cold War in the Middle East. Qatar had been wary of the rise of
Iran, but also preferred not to fall into the orbit of Saudi Arabia. Despite
some mutual overtures, Qatar’s relations with Saudi Arabia had thus
ebbed and flowed throughout the 2000s. Saudi Arabia had been uneasy
over what it saw as Qatar’s overly independent foreign policy. Toward
Iran, however, Qatar had adopted a much more friendly attitude. During
the 2000s, Sheikh Hamad visited Iran at least five times, the first visit in
July 2000. In the most notable gesture to Iran, Sheikh Hamad extended
an invitation to the President of Iran, Mahmoud Ahmedinejad, to attend
the GCC summit held in Doha in December 2007. The relations between
Iran and Qatar developed to the point that the Iranian Parliament speaker,
Ali Larijani, described Qatar as a strategic partner during his visit to Qatar
in July 2009. During the same visit, Sheikh Hamad said, “Iran is always
52 B. BAŞKAN
standing behind Arabs and the people of Palestine, but some want to make
minds turn against the country while we have no problem with it. Iran is
always our friend and we won’t allow any ill-will person to create problems
between us.”47
During the 2000s, Turkey worked to keep its neutrality in the Saudi–
Iran rivalry and instead developed strong relations with both sides. The
post-9/11 regional landscape made this possible. As discussed before, Iran
was working to develop better diplomatic relations with the rest of the
world in order to break the US- and Saudi Arabia-led efforts to isolate Iran
in the region and the world. Turkey was one of the countries to which Iran
paid particular attention, and so was Qatar. The JDP desired to develop
stronger relations with Iran for at least three reasons. First, Iran had a
huge population and highly protected domestic market, and was there-
fore an attractive market for Turkey. Second, the JDP was hoping to turn
Turkey into a major transit road for energy and Iran was crucial for real-
izing this ambitious plan. 48 Finally, Turkey had its own energy problem
and was already importing oil and gas from Iran. As discussed above, for
Iran’s sake, Turkey put its strategic interests with the USA, the EU, and
Israel—and not to mention the Arab World—at great risk by engineer-
ing the Nuclear Fuel Swap Deal. One month after the deal, Turkey also
voted against further UN sanctions on Iran as a non-permanent member
of the Security Council. Turkey’s overtures to Iran paid off, trade volume
between the two countries increasing from $1.25 billion in 2003 to $16
billion in 2011.
Syria was in the same predicament as Iran. Throughout the 1990s,
Turkey’s relations with Iran and Syria were full of tension, as these
two states ignored Turkish pleas not to support the Kurdish separatist
PKK. Fortunately for the JDP, by the time it came to power, the PKK
problem had already subsided thanks to the heavy-handed measures taken
by the Turkish military throughout the 1990s. Syria had become more
cooperative and even expelled the PKK leader, who was later caught in
Kenya, to avert an imminent war with Turkey. In the 2000s, Turkey’s rela-
tions with Syria developed further. The two countries signed a free trade
agreement in 2006, canceled visa requirements for each other in 2009,
and even, to the ire of Israel, undertook joint military maneuvers in the
same year.49
In the 2000s, Turkey also developed strong relations with Saudi Arabia.
As discussed before, the Kingdom was working to form a broad coali-
tion of states against Iran and wanted to lure Turkey into that coalition.
For the first time in 40 years, a Saudi King visited Turkey, twice in fact.
The last time a Saudi King had visited Turkey was in 1966. In 2006,
King Abdullah visited Turkey and paid another visit in 2007. Turkey also
paid a visit to Saudi Arabia at the highest level. The President of Turkey,
Abdullah Gül, went to Saudi Arabia in 2009 on an official visit, 25 years
after the last presidential visit. Relations between the two countries devel-
oped both economically and politically. For example, the trade volume
between Turkey and Saudi Arabia increased from $1.3 billion in 2002 to
$3.46 billion in 2009. More importantly, Turkey and Saudi Arabia began
to pursue similar foreign policies on Iraq and Lebanon, both countries
supporting the same political figures, Iyad Allawi in Iraq and Saad Hariri
in Lebanon.
The relationship between Turkey and Saudi Arabia peaked in 2010. In
January of that year, Erdoğan was in Saudi Arabia and delivered a speech
in the Riyadh Chamber of Commerce. “Saudi Arabia’s joy,” Erdoğan said,
“is our joy. Its sorrow is our sorrow. In the same way, I know and whole-
heartedly believe, Turkey’s joy is Saudi Arabia’s joy and Turkey’s sorrow
is Saudi Arabia’s sorrow.”50 Two months later, Saudi Arabia awarded its
highly prestigious “King Faisal International Prize for Service to Islam” to
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, by then Turkey’s prime minister. The press release
announcing the prize claimed that Erdoğan “set an example of judicious
leadership in the Islamic world,” and thanks to his “unyielding position
on various Islamic and global issues,” gained “the respect of the entire
Islamic nation and the rest of the world.” Finally, Erdoğan was claimed to
have “rendered an outstanding service to Islam by fiercely defending the
rights and just causes of the Islamic nation, particularly the rights of the
Palestinian people.”51
Turkey’s economic and political relationships developed not only with
Saudi Arabia on its own, but also with the Arab Gulf states collectively. In
2004, Turkey was instrumental in launching a NATO initiative, known as
the Istanbul Initiative, which aimed to develop cooperation in the field of
security with the Middle East. The initiative initially invited six Arab Gulf
states to participate in the initiative, only four, Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait,
and the UAE, accepting the invitation.52 In May 2005, the relationship
took one more step. Turkey and the Gulf states signed a memorandum
of understanding in Manama, Bahrain, to support economic cooperation,
encourage exchange of technical expertise and information, improve eco-
nomic relations, and initiate negotiations to establish free trade zones.53
54 B. BAŞKAN
Truly a historical milestone in the relations, on 2 September 2008, the

GCC foreign ministers declared Turkey a strategic partner.54 The GCC also
signed another memorandum of understanding with Turkey, calling for
the establishment of a comprehensive and regular consultation mechanism
on political, economic, defense, security, and cultural matters. In this vein,
both sides agreed to hold a joint annual meeting of foreign ministers.55
The first joint ministerial meeting was held in Istanbul on 8 July 2009.
The sides decided to improve cooperation in “all economic, commercial
and technical fields,” seek new prospects of cooperation “in the field of
energy, including oil, gas, renewable energy and mineral resources,” coor-
dinate the activities of security authorities “in the fields of countering ter-
rorism, sources of terror funding, money laundering, drug trafficking, and
organized crime,” establish “mechanisms to increase cooperation among
institutions of research and higher education, national archives and cul-
tural institutions,” and “promote and facilitate educational and cultural
exchange programs as well as exchanges of young diplomats for language
and on-the-job training.”56
RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL
Turkey had not been content only to develop stronger economic and
political relations with the regimes in the Middle East. Starting in 2008,
it also wanted to improve its image and popularity on the Arab streets. To
this end, Erdoğan, in the footsteps of Mahmoud Ahmedinejad, began to
publicly criticize Israel. In the most publicized incident, Erdoğan stormed
off a panel at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, in reac-
tion to the panel moderator’s interruptions. What was memorable, how-
ever, was Erdoğan’s harsh criticism of Israel, while directly looking into
the eyes of another panelist—Shimon Peres, Israel’s president. The impact
of this and similar criticisms raised by Erdoğan against Israel paid off.
In 2009, he entered the list of most admired world leaders in the Arab
World. This was the first time Erdoğan found himself a place in the list.
In 2009, only 4% of the Arab respondents cited Erdoğan as the world
leader they admired the most. In 2010, Erdoğan was at the top of the list.
Erdoğan’s popularity also found echoes among Arab leaders. As already
mentioned, Saudi Arabia awarded him “the King Faisal International Prize
for Service to Islam” in March 2010. In the same year, Libya awarded him
the “Al Qaddafi International Prize for Human Rights.” In 2011, Kuwait
followed and awarded Erdoğan its “Outstanding Personality in the Islamic

World Award.”
Erdoğan’s popularity in the Arab World came at a cost, however.
Erdoğan had inherited a Turkey with good relations with Israel, and at
first he did not seem to have any intention to change this. In 2005, for
example, he paid a visit to Israel and declared anti-Semitism “a crime
against humanity” and expressed pride that Jews were not persecuted
in Turkey. In the same year, he accepted the Anti-Defamation League’s
“Courage to Care Award” on behalf of diplomats who saved Jews during
the Holocaust.” In the award ceremony, Erdoğan said, “Our consistent
policy towards anti-Semitic diatribes can be nothing short of zero toler-
ance” and expressed Turkey’s commitment to “maintaining strong ties
with the State of Israel.”57 In this period, the JDP governments also paid
around $65 million to lobby firms in the USA to polish Turkey’s image as
a pro-Western and pro-Israel country.58
As Turkey became more critical of Israel, its relationship with Israel
systematically deteriorated, and hit its lowest ebb after Israel’s deadly mili-
tary operation on the Turkish flotilla, Mavi Marmara, which was headed
to Gaza.59 Finally, when the UN report on the flotilla incident was leaked
to the media, Turkey downgraded its diplomatic relations to the second
secretary level60 and suspended all military agreements, worth billions of
dollars, with Israel.61 Despite this setback, however, Turkey’s trade with
Israel continued unharmed. It jumped from $1.4 billion in 2002 to $2.7
billion in 2007, and increased further to $4.4 billion in 2011.
Qatar’s relations with Israel also continued in the 2000s, but came to
an abrupt end in 2009. High-level meetings were held. For example, in
May 2003, foreign ministers of both countries met in Paris to talk about
Arab–Israeli peace. This “represented a return to Arab-Israeli diplomacy,
which was stalled by the outbreak of the Palestinian uprising in September
2000.”62 Qatar also sought Israel’s support for its bid for a seat in the
UN Security Council and thus became the first ever Arab state to do so.
Qatar invited Israel’s Foreign Minister, Tzipi Livni, to attend two interna-
tional conferences in Doha: one in October 2006 and the other in April
2008. In the latter conference, the Eighth Doha Forum on Democracy,
Development and Free Trade, Livni was invited as a keynote speaker. Livni
declined the first invitation, but accepted the second and delivered the
keynote speech.63 More importantly, however, Shimon Peres, by then
Israel’s Deputy Prime Minister, visited Qatar in March 2007. During the
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two-day visit, Peres took part in the Doha Debates, led by Tim Sebastian,
met with students from Georgetown University’s campus in Qatar, and
even toured a local market.64 The relations between Qatar and Israel were
low profile, but truly unusual within the Arab and Gulf context. They
faced great strain in December 2008 when Israel initiated a major attack
on Hamas in Gaza. Qatar not only closed Israel’s trade office, but also
harshly criticized Israel, Qatar’s Foreign Minister, calling the attack “fla-
grant savage aggression against the Palestinian people.”65
HIGH-PROFILE MEDIATION EFFORTS

Having developed relatively good relations with almost all important
regional states, and thus viewed generally as neutral, Turkey and Qatar
could engage in high-profile mediation efforts in some perennial intra-
state and inter-state conflicts in the region.66 This was also possible because
no one else could do so, as the US policies, as discussed above, had created
a leadership vacuum in the Middle East.67 Turkey and Qatar sought to fill
that vacuum through mediation efforts.
Both countries had relatively good relations with Israel, which had
started in the 1990s and continued to develop in the 2000s, and there-
fore both engaged in mediation efforts in conflicts that involved Israel.
In May 2003, for example, Qatar’s Foreign Minister met with Israel’s
Foreign Minister in Paris for talks on Arab–Israel peace. Qatar also tried,
but failed, to secure the release of an Israeli soldier held captive by Hamas
in mid-2006. Turkey sought to mediate between Israel and Syria, initi-
ating negotiations between the two and even hosting several rounds of
indirect peace talks in 2008. Turkey was also involved in the longstanding
Israel–Palestine conflict by helping the sides “increase resources for settle-
ment and capacity building.” In this vein, Turkey proposed to create an
industrial zone in Erez, a town nearby the Gaza Strip, and build pipelines
for energy, water, and power supplies, all of which would create “a con-
ducive environment for peace.”68 Turkey was also said to have played a
critical role in the negotiations between Israel and Hamas over the release
of a young Israeli soldier kidnapped by Hamas in 2011.
Turkey and Qatar were involved in other mediation efforts. Turkey,
for example, sought to mediate between Iraq and Syria in 2009 when the
relationship between the two became strained by Iraq implicating Syria
in two deadly bombings.69 Most ambitiously, Turkey sought to mediate
between Iran and the West on several issues. In 2007, for example, Turkey
helped in the release of 15 British sailors and a French teacher captured

by Iran. Turkey’s most ambitious attempt involved the nuclear question
though. Turkey showed its willingness to mediate on the issue as early as
2006. Turkey’s real breakthrough came in May 2010 when Iran accepted
a nuclear swap deal as a result of joint efforts of Turkey and Brazil.70
Qatar focused its mediation efforts more on intra-state conflicts. In
2007, for example, Qatar negotiated between two Palestinian factions,
Fatah and Hamas, and succeeded in the formation of a unity government.
In the same year, Qatar was also successful in securing a cease-fire between
the Shia rebels, also known as the Houthis, and the Yemen government.
In early 2008, Qatar persuaded the sides to sign a peace treaty in Doha.
Peace did not last for long, unfortunately, and Qatar continued its media-
tion efforts in 2010. Qatar was also involved in Lebanon, mediating in
the 18-month conflict between the Hezbollah and the Lebanese govern-
ment. Hosting the sides in Doha, Qatar successfully secured an agreement
between them, known as the Doha Agreement. The agreement formed a
unity government, but also gave Hezbollah de facto veto power.71
By benefiting from the leadership vacuum in the Arab World against a
rising Iran, but themselves avoiding entrapment in the Saudi–Iran rivalry
that revived and intensified in the second half of the 2000s, Turkey and
Qatar could emerge as pro-active players in the international politics of
the Middle East. Having good relations with almost all sides, Turkey and
Qatar engaged in mediation efforts in conflicts that raised the profile of
both countries. Turkey and Qatar could engage in mediation efforts in
conflicts that involved Israel in part because the two had cordial rela-
tions with Hamas and the broader MB movement. These relations were
in part historical, but partly fresh, and further improved throughout the
2000s.
RELATIONS WITH THE MB
The MB, possibly the most influential and widespread movement of all
Islamist movements, was born in Egypt, founded in 1928 by Hasan al
Banna. Thanks to its founder’s superb organizational skills, seemingly
endless energy, deep belief in his own righteousness, strong commitment,
and the simplicity of his message, the Brotherhood rapidly expanded and,
by the time he was assassinated in 1949, was an elaborate organization
with offices and a membership base spanning the whole country.
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Soon after its foundation, however, the Brotherhood began to imagine

itself as a transnational movement, which would not restrict itself only to
Egypt. Benefiting from Egypt’s status as the prime center of both religious
and modern education in the Arab World, the Brotherhood also expanded
to other Arab countries such as Palestine, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Tunisia,
Sudan, Yemen, and Jordan.72
The Brotherhood was soon to clash with the more secular regimes that
came to power in the Arab World. The clash was the harshest, and the
most violent, in Egypt, Iraq, and Syria. Many members of the movement
in these countries lost their lives in the regime gallows; many others wasted
their lives in regime prisons; and many others found refuge elsewhere.
Qatar was one of the countries that welcomed the Brotherhood. This
was not just based on generosity. Qatar discovered oil in the late 1930s
and made its first oil export in the late 1940s. With its new wealth, Qatar
embarked on building a modern education system, but it needed human
capital, because the country had no prior investment in modern educa-
tion. Like many other Arab countries, it had to import professionals of all
kinds from more developed Arab states, especially Egypt.
The Brotherhood members also came to Qatar, and indeed played a
critical role in shaping the educational system at all levels. Qatar’s first
director of education was a member of the MB from Egypt, for example,
and so was the person who had served in the same position for 15 years
from 1964 to 1979.73 Yusuf al Qaradawi,74 a prominent Brotherhood fig-
ure, served a critical role in the development of religious education in
Qatar, first as the director of the Religious Institute and then as the found-
ing Dean of College of Sharia and Islamic Affairs at Qatar University.
Qatar’s cordial relations with the MB continued unharmed since then,
even though Qatar began to introduce the kind of reforms that could
generate religious opposition in the mid-1990s. Usually described by Gulf
specialists as “state branding,”75 these reforms aimed to distinguish Qatar
from the rest of the Gulf and Arab states as a reformist, progressive state.
The Brotherhood in Qatar did not raise any vocal opposition to these
reforms. This was partly because this was the very time the Brotherhood
were facing setbacks across the region. By taking a stance against the regime
in Qatar, the Brotherhood would risk their historically good relations,
and this was the risk they did not take.76 As a gesture to the regime, the
Brotherhood in Qatar went even further and dissolved itself in 1999. As
justification for the dissolution, the leading Brotherhood figure in Qatar,
Jassim Sultan, said that the state was already performing its religious duties.77
The regime in Qatar had its own reason not to sour its relationship with
the Brotherhood. Quite the reverse, it had a good reason to keep relations
on good terms, at the very least to secure their non-opposition and even,
in the best case scenario, support for the reforms; otherwise the reforms,
especially those empowering women, could engender religious opposi-
tion, drawing criticisms from the conservatives not only in Qatar but also
in neighboring Saudi Arabia. Thus, the Brotherhood’s silence, or in the
best-case scenario, support for the reforms, would be most welcome by
the rulers in Qatar.
During Sheikh Hamad’s reign, therefore, the relations between the
state and the Brotherhood did not sour, and even improved as Qatar con-
tinued to provide opportunities for the Brotherhood figures. To a certain
extent, Yusuf Al Qaradawi owes his iconic status in the Arab World to the
opportunities the state of Qatar provided him during Sheikh Hamad’s
rule. Possibly the most important opportunity given to him was that he
became the regular guest on a weekly religious program, Al Shari’a wa al
Hayat [Shari’a and Life], on Al Jazeera, Qatar’s state-funded global satel-
lite channel. This program became a platform for al Qaradawi to express
his views and issue his religious opinions, fatwas, on a variety of matters,
including those that interested the Arab masses the most.78 Reaching out
to millions of Arabs through this program, within a decade, al Qaradawi
became a celebrity in the Arab World.79
Throughout the 2000s, Qatar had continued to provide new opportu-
nities to members of the Brotherhood, now not only those in Qatar, but
also elsewhere in the Arab World, and eventually turned into what Andrew
Hammond calls “a mini Ikhwanistan.”80 Even in the most controversial
education initiative, the Education City, where education was to be in
English and provided by Western universities, the Brothers were given
opportunities. The Brotherhood’s iconic figure, Yusuf al Qaradawi, for
example, was personally involved in the foundation of the Qatar Faculty of
Islamic Studies in 2007. It was he who in fact announced the foundation
of this school and served as the chair of the school’s advisory committee.
The advisory committee of the school also included another prominent
Brother, Izz al Din Ibrahim from the UAE. In 2008, this school estab-
lished within its body a research center and named it after al Qaradawi: the
al Qaradawi Center for Islamic Moderation and Renewal.81
Al Jazeera turned out to be Qatar’s most valuable gift to the
Brotherhood. As noted, Yusuf al Qaradawi really owed his popularity to
his regular appearance in the weekly program Al Shari’a wa al Hayat from
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the very beginning. It is unlikely that al Qaradawi was alone in the net-
work. In 2001, Fouad Ajami observed that most of Al Jazeera’s reporters
were “either pan-Arabists—nationalists of a leftist bent committed to the
idea of a single nation across the many frontiers of the Arab world—or
Islamists who draw their inspiration from the primacy of the Muslim faith
in political life.”82 The Brotherhood had probably become more dominant
in the network after Wadah Khanfar, who had not held back from express-
ing his sympathies for the Islamists, became the general manager in 2003.
Given the Brotherhood’s transnational and networkist character, it is likely
that they promoted their own members within the network and acquired
disproportionate influence, if not total dominance.83 It must be kept in
mind, however, this is almost impossible to quantify outside a survey of
Al Jazeera staff.
In addition to employment opportunities, Al Jazeera provided a valu-
able platform for the Brotherhood figures and other Islamists to express
their views to the whole Arab World and beyond. Many, from Rashid
Ghannoushi to Hasan al Turabi, found the opportunity, numerous times
in fact, to appear in different Al Jazeera programs. Even Turkey’s ruling
party, the JDP, had immensely benefited from Al Jazeera’s open-arms pol-
icy toward the Brotherhood and Islamists. The JDP-affiliated academics,
journalists, and intellectuals from Turkey were given plenty of opportuni-
ties to appear in Al Jazeera’s programs and invited to Al Jazeera’s annual
forum held in Doha. The network’s coverage of Turkey was generally
positive, especially under Wadah Khanfar’s84 tenure, to the point that a
pro-JDP columnist Hakan Albayrak described the network as “Turkey’s
official media apparatus.” Albayrak added: “Al Jazeera and especially
Wadah Khanfar have greatly contributed to the shining of Turkey as a
star.”85
Albayrak was not entirely mistaken. The network indeed contributed
significantly to the popularity of the JDP. It made a documentary, for
example, on the life of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, and translated Ahmet
Davutoğlu’s book, Stratejik Derinlik (Strategic Depth), into Arabic.
More importantly, Al Jazeera promoted the case of Turkey as a model, a
model that became possible under the JDP only.86 In fact, this was pre-
cisely Wadah Khanfar’s personal view of Turkey. As early as 2005, Khanfar
said in an interview with a Turkish daily newspaper, “Relations between
Turks and the Arab world have been historically problematic and plagued
with mistrust on both sides. But with its stable democracy, multi-party
political system and prosperous economy, Turkey is now … a model for
the Arab world and its will to keep good relations with Arab neighbors
while marching on its European course is a source of prestige.”87 Six years
later, in 2011, Khanfar repeated the same argument in a piece he wrote
for the Guardian. Khanfar described the JDP experience as “one of the
most influential experiences” that “have led to the maturation of political
Islam.” The JDP, Khanfar claimed, “has been a source of inspiration for
many Islamic movements. Although the AKP [JDP] does not describe
itself as Islamic, its 10 years of political experience have led to a model that
many Islamists regard as successful. The model has three important char-
acteristics: a general Islamic frame of reference; a multi-party democracy;
and significant economic growth.”88
Qatar was not the only country that kept and further developed its
relations with the Brotherhood movement. Turkey also developed a rela-
tionship with the group. It is difficult to imagine that a state like Turkey,
self-proclaimed as secular, would need to embrace the Brotherhood in
any period in the twentieth century. If it had done that, we simply do not
know. In the 2000s, however, there was a new party in power, the JDP,
which itself hailed from the political Islam tradition in Turkey, and this
tradition had prior ties with the Brotherhood.
The political Islam tradition in Turkey originated independently of the
Muslim Brotherhood movement. Even though its roots can be traced back
to Islamism of the nineteenth century, political Islam in Turkey crystallized
as a political party as discussed before in the early 1970s, under the leader-
ship of Necmettin Erbakan. This had long remained an important differ-
ence between the political Islam tradition in Turkey and the MB: the latter
had objected to the formation of a political party well until the 2010s.
Necmettin Erbakan was in fact a follower of an influential Naqshi
Sheikh, Mehmed Zahid Kotku. But, he eventually emerged as an Islamist
leader on his own in Turkey. While he sought to remain on good terms
with almost all religious leaders in Turkey, Erbakan also sought to develop
stronger ties with other religious movements elsewhere in the Muslim
World, such as the Jamaat e Islami in Pakistan and the MB in the Arab
World. Erbakan succeeded in this too, and distinguished himself as the
most prominent political Islamist from Turkey.
To achieve this end, Erbakan turned his party into a conduit through
which the works of prominent Islamists were distributed throughout
Turkey. Nureddin Şirin, himself an Islamist religious scholar claimed, for
example, that it was Erbakan’s party that received the works of Hasan Al
Banna, Abu’l Ala Mawdudi, and Muhammed Qutb from Kuwait-based
62 B. BAŞKAN
International Federation of Muslim Students Associations and distributed

them in Turkey.89 Erbakan had also regularly met with Islamist leaders
from other countries and participated in international and regional confer-
ences. In one highly publicized incidence, for example, he was part of a
delegation of Islamist leaders who sought to peacefully solve the crisis of
Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990. If solved, the leaders hoped to prevent
direct US military involvement in the crisis. Erbakan was in the delegation,
which also included such Brotherhood figures as Hasan al Turabi of Sudan,
Rashid Ghannoushi from Tunisia, Muhammed Abdal Rahman Khalifa
from Jordan, and Abdal Majid al Zindani from Yemen. The delegation
visited Saudi Arabia, Iran, and finally Iraq, and issued a statement, prais-
ing Saddam Hussein, Iraq’s leader for his “steadfastness” and condemning
foreign forces whose objective was to “destroy the Iraqi military forces in
order to serve the Zionist scheme and to enable Israel to absorb citizens
from the Soviet Union so it can strike against the intifada.”90 It is illustra-
tive that this was announced as the statement of the society of the MB.
Erbakan’s connections with the Brotherhood also became public when
some leading Brotherhood figures attended his party’s, the Welfare Party,
fourth congress in 1993. From the Egyptian Brotherhood, for example,
Mustafa Mashour, Mamoun Al Hudaibi, and Muhammed Mehdi Akef,
who successively served as the general guides of the Brotherhood from
1996 to 2010, attended the congress. Hasan al Turabi from Sudan and
Abdurrahman Khalifa from Jordan were also present.91 The fifth con-
gress of the Welfare Party, held in 1996, was also attended by leading
Brotherhood figures from Egypt, Sudan, and Yemen.92
The roads of Erbakan and the MB also crisscrossed in Europe. During
that period, when conditions were difficult in Egypt, Syria, and Iraq, some
Brotherhood figures found refuge in Europe. They found an environment
much freer than that at home, and founded the first Brotherhood orga-
nizations in Europe: mosques, student organizations, and clubs. These
organizations multiplied over time and expanded across Europe. The
Brotherhood later began to unify them under national organizations and
then under a continental umbrella organization, the Federation of Islamic
Organizations in Europe (FIOE). By the late 1990s, the Brotherhood
had come to control an extensive network of cultural, educational, and
religious organizations, and also became politically influential as the most
organized representatives of the Muslims.93
From the mid-1970s, Erbakan also sought to expand his party’s net-
work among the Turkish migrants in Europe. In the mid-1980s, the party
established a national organization centered in Germany, which formed

the core of what later became the Islamic Community Milli Görüş.
Erbakan’s efforts to organize Turkish migrants in Europe did not lead to
competition with the Brotherhood in Europe simply because the latter
had difficult access to Turkish migrants because of the language barrier.
The two organizations had thus expanded in tandem, and could even col-
laborate and join forces if necessary. The good relationship between the
two found its most concrete manifestation in a marriage: Erbakan’s niece,
Sabiha, was married to Ibrahim Zayat, who served as the leader of the
Brotherhood-inspired Islamic Society of Germany and would become the
future chairman of the FIOE. While Sabiha’s husband was moving up in
the Brotherhood network in Europe, her brother, Mehmet Sabri Erbakan,
was the leader of the Islamic Community Milli Görüş.94
The JDP hailed from Necmettin Erbakan’s movement. Even though
the JDP leaders declared their split with that tradition in the beginning,
it is probable that they inherited some of the ties that Necmettin Erbakan
had built with the Brotherhood. Building upon them, the JDP further
strengthened its ties with the Brotherhood starting in the mid-2000s. This
was a part of a larger campaign in which the party also sought to estab-
lish ties with all possible Muslim religious groups across the world. Yet,
this campaign seemed to be waged non-officially. Pro-JDP religious non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) undertook it.
These NGOs had already established an umbrella organization, called
the Foundation of Turkey Voluntary Organizations (TGTV) in 1994.
Among the founders of TGTV were several politicians who later served
as ministers under the JDP governments and journalists who later became
JDP pundits. Most, if not all, of the founding NGOs also later became
strongly pro-JDP. Starting as a group of 65 NGOs in 1995, TGTV
expanded and came to have 132 members as of 2015. It is illustrative of
TGTV’s links to the JDP that 39 of the original founding members and
122 of its total members later became part of the Platform of Common
Wisdom, Ortak Akıl Platformu, a platform of NGOs which repeatedly
issued statements in support of the JDP in 2014 and 2015.95
TGTV organized a conference in Istanbul in 2005, titled “the
International Conference of Non-Governmental Organizations of the
Islamic World: Searching for a New Vision in a Changing World.” More
than 300 NGOs from 40 different countries attended the conference. Not
to make it a one-time gathering only, the Union of NGOs of the Islamic
World (UNIW) was founded in December 2005 with headquarters in
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Turkey. The UNIW has now 272 members, 90 from Turkey and the rest
from other countries in the world. Its motto is telling: 6 Continent, 55
Countries, 272 Members: we are one nation.96 It is illustrative that 60 of
90 NGOs from Turkey later became part of the Platform of Common
Wisdom.
This initiative illustrated that the JDP desired to boost its ties with
other religious groups and movements across the world. For sure the JDP
declared no formal affiliation with the conference, but it is telling that
the conference was opened by speeches delivered by two high-ranking
JDP figures: Bülent Arınç, by then the speaker of the parliament, and
Abdullah Gül, by then Minister of Foreign Affairs. These two figures, like
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, were also members of the Welfare Party, but later
announced their split with Necmettin Erbakan’s Milli Görüş and founded
the JDP. The initiative, no doubt therefore, received the blessing of the
JDP.
To what extent the UNIW initiative has been a success is debat-
able, but there were other gestures the JDP had made directly to the
Brotherhood. In 2002, an NGO was founded in Istanbul, Hikmet Society
of Knowledge, Friendship and Cooperation, or in Turkish, Hikmet Bilim,
Dostluk ve Yardımlaşma Derneği (in short, Hikmet). Hikmet became
the only member from Turkey of the MB’s umbrella organization, the
FIOE. In 2005, Hikmet held the 15th meeting of European Council of
Fatwa and Research in Istanbul.97 The council was initiated by FIOE in
1997 and had been chaired by Yusuf al Qaradawi, a prominent MB fig-
ure. Hikmet also held the 16th meeting of the council in Istanbul in July
2006.98 In the same month, the TGTV, in partnership with other NGOs,
including UNIW, hosted another important meeting in Istanbul, the
Second General Assembly of the International Union of Muslim Scholars
(IUMS). Founded in 2004 and headquartered in Doha, Qatar, the IUMS
had also been chaired by Yusuf al Qaradawi. In the coming years, Turkey
continued to host international forums and conferences that were well
attended by prominent Brotherhood figures from all around the world,
and even Hamas leaders. In the words of Steven Merley, “Istanbul became
a center for Global Muslim Brotherhood political activity,” from 2006
until 2010, hosting “at least ten international conferences that involved
the Muslim Brotherhood.”99 The Turkish state had not been officially
involved in the organization of these activities, but several Turkish NGOs,
such as TGTV, UNIW, and IHH, which were very close to the ruling JDP,
were involved. Through these NGOs, the JDP had in fact boosted its ties
with the Brotherhood and the broader Islamic World.
The Mavi Marmara flotilla incident, in which Israeli commandos
killed ten citizens of Turkey, cost Turkey dearly, as its relations with Israel
totally collapsed, but it greatly improved Turkey’s image and that of Recep
Tayyip Erdoğan, especially among the Islamists of the Arab World. The
third general assembly of the IUMS in fact met in Istanbul with an atten-
dance of more than 500 religious scholars. The vice-chair of the IUMS,
Ali Al Qaradaghi, said in the opening session: “Finally the hearts and
minds of Muslims are coming together today. The Freedom Flotilla and
the proud stance of Turkish President Abdullah Gül and Prime Minister
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan against the Israeli attacks are the examples of this.”
IUMS’s chair, Yusuf al Qaradawi, would say rather emotionally: “We are
not guests here; we are among our own brothers and sisters.”100
A more powerful declaration of support came from 30 religious schol-
ars, who met in Istanbul. Among them were such prominent Brotherhood
figures as Yusuf al Qaradawi, Rashid al Ghannoushi, Tariq al Suwaidan,
and Issam al Bashir. Yusuf al Qaradawi said:
We must applaud the great Turkish people from all sectors and we wish
mercy for their righteous martyrs … we applaud the bravery of their prime
minister, the hero Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who stood like a high mountain
challenging Israel and those behind. He thus wrote a new page in the his-
tory of the Turkish people who were the first to raise the flag of jihad against
the crusaders.
Al Qaradawi continued:
If fear made the enemies of Turkey scheme against it and plot against its
leader Erdoğan, then it is upon the Islamic ummah to stand with Turkey,
applaud Erdoğan, pray for him a victory, strengthen and rely on his back.
Talking is not enough. They must be applied in actions. For this reason buy
Turkish products, prefer them over others, encourage travelling to Turkey
and in particular Istanbul, open the doors for projects of the Turkish gov-
ernment, companies and organizations.
Al Qaradawi ended the statement with a call: “We call upon our nation
… to support one another, cooperate with one another, attach to one
another so as to form a major bloc, [a bloc] having a weight and power
among the international blocs … to become a bloc for the victory of truth,
66 B. BAŞKAN
justice, human rights, [a bloc] against invasion upon people; we have

numerous power, economic power, cultural power, spiritual power.”101
By the end of the 2000s, Turkey and Qatar had stronger relations not
only with the MB movement but also with Hamas.
RELATIONS WITH HAMAS
Hamas had grown out of the MB in Palestine. As mentioned above, the
Brotherhood imagined itself as a transnational movement early in its his-
tory and sought ways to expand its network into other countries. Palestine
was the favorite place of Hasan al Banna, the founder, because it was
where the future Israel–Arab conflict was brewing. The Brotherhood’s
experience in Palestine has been inescapably shaped by this conflict, also
known as the Palestine–Israel conflict. This conflict had a prior history, but
exploded fully when the state of Israel was founded in 1948.
The Palestinians, who paid the heaviest price, resisted the foundation of
the Israeli state and formed many armed resistance groups. The Fatah, or
Harakat al Tahrir Al Watani al Falestini, was one of them, and eventually
became the most influential, since 1969 leading the Palestinian Liberation
Organization or the PLO, which was established in 1964 to unify the
Palestinian resistance.
The fortunes of the Fatah-controlled PLO ebbed and flowed in the
next two decades. By the end of the 1980s, the PLO was at the point of
“acknowledging the right of Israel to live in peace and security, confirm-
ing UN Security Council resolution 242 (which calls for the withdrawal of
Israel armed forces from territories occupied during the 1967 war) as the
basis for negotiation, and renouncing terrorism.”102
In October 1991, the PLO was at the same table with Israel in Madrid,
in a peace conference led by the USA. Two years after Madrid, in September
1993, Yasser Arafat and Yitzhak Rabin signed the Oslo Accords on the
lawn of the White House under the sponsorship of the US President, Bill
Clinton. Israel and the PLO thus recognized each other as legitimate.
Israel also agreed to leave the control of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank
to the Palestinians, thus creating the Palestinian National Authority. On 1
July 1994, Yasser Arafat, the chairman of the PLO, returned to the Gaza
Strip, ending his 27-year exile, and was elected as the president of the
Palestinian National Authority.
The Palestinian question had occupied the Arab states since the very
beginning: they resisted Israel’s foundation from the first day, but failed to
undo it. Especially after their defeat in the 1967 war, the Arab states must
have come to realize that Israel was not going anywhere. More impor-
tantly, perhaps, the status quo was becoming more costly. Egypt made
the first move and signed a historical peace treaty with Israel in 1979, but
illustrating the sensitivity of the Palestinian question, it proved to be a
costly step. Egypt’s move not only generated great domestic unrest, but
also cost Egypt its seat in the Arab League.
A peace process that would involve the Palestinians would have greatly
relieved those Arab states that wanted a change in their policies. If the
Palestinians themselves made peace with Israel, then the other Arab states
could discontinue their hostility toward Israel if they chose to do so. The
Arab Gulf states, in particular, needed this peace, perhaps more than the
others, for at that time they themselves faced a great security risk from
Iraq and desperately needed US help. Not surprisingly, the Saudis were
also involved in the peace process. Bandar bin Sultan, by then the Saudi
ambassador to the USA, even attended the Madrid Peace Conference as a
representative from the GCC.103
The euphoria around the Oslo Accords was soon to pass, however. This
was primarily because the Palestinian armed resistance did not stop. At
the very time the PLO was contemplating giving up arms, another actor
began taking them up: Harakat al Muqawamah al Islamiyah or Hamas.
Reportedly founded on 9 December 1987, the very same day the massive
street protests known as the First Intifada erupted in the Palestine, prior
to taking up arms against Israel, Hamas had been better known as the MB
Branch of Palestine, and been involved in primarily religious and chari-
table activities. It thus had a more extensive network than the PLO among
the Palestinians of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank who had really been
bearing the brunt of suffering at the hands of the Israelis. There was an
added problem: Israel did not seem to be committed to its promises. More
importantly, it unleashed uncontrolled violence on Hamas, which did not
stop them, but just improved its image in the Arab World.
The rise of Hamas as an uncompromising resistance movement put the
Arab states back into the same dilemma. If they supported Hamas, they
would risk their relations with the USA. If they did not, they would risk their
stance in the eyes of their own people. Egypt did not have many options.
It was the largest recipient of US aid after Israel and had its own growing
problem at home with the MB. It immediately distanced itself from Hamas.
Jordan was ambivalent. It made some gestures to Hamas in the begin-
ning: the leadership cadre, apart from those in Israel prisons, operated
68 B. BAŞKAN
out of Jordan, for example. King Hussein even helped with the release of
Hamas’s leader, Sheikh Ahmed Yasin, from an Israeli prison, but the coun-
try had been under heavy US pressure, to which it could resist no longer.
It first greatly limited Hamas’s activities and finally expelled the leadership
from its country. Unrestrained by any dependence on the USA, Syria wel-
comed Hamas when the latter was expelled from Jordan, and continued
to support it throughout the 2000s. Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states
were less restrained than Egypt and Jordan, but not as free as Syria. They
showed more sympathy toward Hamas and even extended financial sup-
port, albeit through private channels.
This certainly served to appease their public to a certain extent, but
there was also a geopolitical dimension. Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states
had to keep Hamas on their own side. The alternative was being on Iran’s
side. It must be noted that Hamas could not live without an external
patron, as the financial resources it could raise in the Gaza Strip and the
West Bank were limited. In order to survive as an organization, Hamas
had to raise funds elsewhere to finance its armed and non-armed activi-
ties. Any cut in financial aid to the organization would force them to
seek other patrons, and Iran, like Syria, had no constraints. It had already
been the major supporter of a similar group in the region, Hezbollah, and
would welcome Hamas. In fact, Iran was one of the three countries in the
early 1990s where Hamas officially existed. To prevent complete Iranian
control over Hamas, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Arab states therefore had
to keep their doors open to the group. Not surprisingly, Sheikh Ahmed
Yasin, was able to visit Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, and the UAE on a
fund-raising tour in 1998. The other countries Ahmed Yasin visited on
this tour were Yemen, Syria, Sudan, and Iran.
Prior to Ahmed Yasin’s visit, Qatar already had relations with Hamas.
According to a statement by Khaled Meshaal, a leading member of
Hamas, Hamas and Qatar developed relations in the early 1990s when
Sheikh Hamad was the crown prince. When Jordan closed the Hamas
office and expelled four Hamas leaders in 1999, Qatar offered to receive
them. Khaled Meshaal lived in Doha for two years before he moved to
Syria, but Doha continued to be a favorite destination for Hamas lead-
ers. In an interview given in 2003, Khaled Meshaal declared, “There are
regions more secure than others. I have limited my choices between Doha
and Damascus. I am settled in Doha and Damascus.”104
Throughout the 2000s, Qatar continued to receive various Hamas lead-
ers: Khaled Meshaal continued to shuttle between Doha and Damascus.
Qatar also invited Hamas leaders to international conferences held in

Qatar. In fact, Israel’s Foreign Minister, Livni, declined to attend one
international conference held in Doha in 2006 because Hamas representa-
tives would also attend the conference. In addition to private donations,105
Qatar also officially provided direct financial assistance to Hamas. It gave,
for example, $50 million to the Hamas-led Palestinian government in
January 2006, and $10 million to Hamas in August 2009.106 Qatar’s
ties to Hamas were frequently criticized in Washington, DC. In 2009,
for example, Senator John Kerry said in a speech delivered to Brookings
Institute, “Qatar … cannot continue to be an American ally on Monday
that sends money to Hamas on Tuesday.”107
Turkey established renewed ties with Hamas in the 2000s. Prior to
the coming to power of the JDP, Turkey did not have official relations
with Hamas. The JDP leaders, hailing from the political Islam tradition in
Turkey, had strong sympathies with Hamas and its struggle against Israel.
They were also, it must be remembered, former members of the Welfare
Party and disciples of Necmettin Erbakan, Turkey’s political Islamist
leader.
During his political career, Erbakan had also nurtured ties with Hamas.
Along with other Brotherhood figures, Hamas leaders were reported to
have attended the party congresses. Khaled Meshaal, for example, attended
the Welfare Party’s fourth congress in 1993 and Ibrahim Ghousheh the
fifth congress in 1996.108 This was understandable because from the very
beginning of his political career, Erbakan had been not only attentive to
and emotional about the Palestine issue, but also contributed a great deal
to the anti-Zionist, and to a certain extent anti-Semitic, rhetoric that devel-
oped among Turkey’s Islamists. For him, Zionism was the source of all evil
in the world. He once wrote, “Those who know Zionism compare it to
an octopus. This octopus has numberless arms. Communism is one arm,
capitalism another arm, freemasonry a side branch, racism another arm.
Those who become part of these currents without knowing, are serving
Zionism, are fighting for Zionism whatever they might say themselves.”109
Erbakan’s pro-Palestine and anti-Zionist/Israel stance was even
acknowledged and complimented by Khaled Meshaal. In an interview
given to a Turkish newspaper, Vakit, Khaled Meshaal likened Erbakan to
the Ottoman Sultan, Abdülhamid II (r.1876–1909), who was celebrated
by the Islamists for his refusal to cooperate with Theodore Herzl, the
founder of Zionism. Meshaal said, “All Islamic movements in Turkey are
very precious for us. Especially Professor Erbakan is very important for
70 B. BAŞKAN
us. He is the Abdal Hamid [Abdülhamid II] of our age, who explained
Zionism to the ummah. He is an eminent person. He is the one who most
supported the Palestine issue. The Muslims of the world learned Zionism
from him.”110
The JDP leaders were, however, reluctant in their first years in gov-
ernment, and did not make any public attempt to connect with Hamas.
Only after Hamas won the elections in 2006 and formed a government in
Palestine, could the JDP leaders make a move. Soon after the elections, in
late January 2006, Erdoğan said, “Hamas won the elections … we must
show respect to the choice of the Palestinian people.” Erdoğan also made
a call to Hamas, asking the organization to recognize Israel and expressed
Turkey’s desire to play the role of a mediator between the two sides.111
More importantly, Hamas leader, Khaled Meshaal, paid a visit to Ankara
in mid-February 2006 and met Turkey’s foreign minister, Abdullah Gül.
In reaction to the protests and criticisms, Erdoğan defended the visit, say-
ing, “We fulfilled what our humanitarian, historic, moral responsibility
necessitates. We will continue to do what our responsibilities necessitates
after this.”112
In hindsight, the JDP leaders were testing the waters with the Hamas
visit to Ankara. Not yet secure in power, they must have come to the
conclusion that the time had not come to be more frank about Hamas,
but they gave NGOs, especially humanitarian aid organizations, which
were close to them, free rein to continue and boost ties with Hamas.113
The Foundation of Human Rights and Freedoms (IHH) was particularly
active, for example, raising funds for Palestine, organizing demonstra-
tions and conferences in support of Palestine. In 2009, for example, IHH
donated $20 million to the Palestinians, half of which went to Gaza.114
In the same year, IHH organized a conference called the Symposium of
Masjid al Aqsa115 and invited Raed Saleh, the leader of the Islamic move-
ment in Israel linked to Hamas, to speak in the conference.116 IHH’s
leading members, including its president, had met Hamas leaders on
numerous occasions: in 2009, for example, IHH’s president led a delega-
tion and visited Khaled Meshaal in Damascus. More importantly, the IHH
was the main organizer of the Mavi Marmara flotilla in 2010, which led
to a severe crisis in Turkey–Israel relations. Two years before the flotilla
incident, Israel in fact banned IHH, claiming that IHH had been affiliated
with Hamas.117
IHH was one of the 36 charitable organizations Israel banned from
raising funds for Hamas. Israel accused these 36 organizations of being
members of the Union of Good, which was outlawed by Israel in 2002.

This umbrella organization was founded in 2000 and had been chaired by
the famous MB figure and resident of Qatar, Yusuf al Qaradawi.
NOTES
1. There is an extensive literature on Turkey’s Kurdish problem. For a concise
summary, see Dogu Ergil, “The Kurdish Question in Turkey,” Journal of
Democracy, 11(3) (July 2000), pp.122–135. See also Nimet Beriker-Atiyas,
“The Kurdish Conflict in Turkey: Issues, Parties and Prospects,” Security
Dialogues, 28(4) (December 1997), pp.439–452; Michael M. Gunter, “The
Kurdish Problem in Turkey,” Middle East Journal, 42(3) (Summer 1988),
pp.389–406; Michael M. Gunter, “The Continuing Kurdish Problem in
Turkey after Öcalan’s Capture,” Third World Quarterly, 21(5) (2000),
pp.849–869. For the Kurdish problem’s impact on Turkish foreign policy,
see Robert W. Olson, The Kurdish Question and Turkish-Iranian Relations:
From World War I to 1998, Costa Meza: Mazda Publishers, 1998.
2. Turkey abolished the sultanate in 1922 and declared itself Republic in 1923.
3. The full program is available at https://www.akparti.org.tr/english/
akparti/parti-programme (accessed on 20 April 2014).
4. Abdullah Öcalan was born in 1948 in a village of Şanlı Urfa. He first studied
in a vocational school and then at Faculty of Political Sciences at Ankara
University. He was working as a clerk in the state when he founded the PKK.
5. Germany lifted this condition only in 2009. Barkın Şık, “Leopard’lara
PKK’yı vurma izni,” Akşam, May 5, 2009.
6. For more on Turkey–Israel relations in the 1990s, see Ofra Bengio, The
Turkish-Israeli Relationship: Changing Ties of Middle Eastern Outsiders, 2nd
ed., New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009. See also Çevik Bir and Martin
Sherman, “Formula for Stability: Turkey plus Israel,” Middle East Quarterly,
9(4) (Fall 2002), pp.23–32. What makes this article particularly insightful is
that one of the authors, Çevik Bir, was the deputy chief of Staff of the
Turkish Armed Forces at the time of critical agreements between Turkey
and Israel were made, and is seen as the Turkish architect behind the exten-
sive relations.
7. For more on Turkey–Iran relations, see Robert Olson, Turkey-Iran
Relations, 1979–2004: Revolution, Ideology, War, Coups and Geopolitics,
Costa Mesa: Mazda Publishers, 2004.
8. Turkish Statistical Institute, Statistical Indicators 1923–2004, Ankara:
Turkish Statistical Institute, No Date. GNP-related figures are at page 642,
unemployment figures at page 153, interest rates figures are at page 554,
and inflation figures are at page 535.
72 B. BAŞKAN
9. United Nations, World Population Prospects: The 2012 Revision, Volume I:

Comprehensive Tables, New York: United Nations, 2013, p.112. Available at
http://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/Publications/Files/WPP2012_Volume-I_
Comprehensive-Tables.pdf
10. Anthony H. Cordesman and Khalid R. Al Rodhan, Gulf Military Forces in
an Era of Asymmetric War: Qatar, Washington, DC: Center for Strategic
and International Studies, 2006. Available at http://csis.org/files/media/
csis/pubs/060728_gulf_qatar.pdf
11. See F. Gregory Gause III, The International Politics of the Persian Gulf,
New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009.
12. Anthony H. Cordesman, Saudi Arabia Enters the Twenty-first Century, v.2,
Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing, 2003, 71–72.
13. For this section, in addition to the referenced works, I also depended on
Kamil Mahdy, “Qatar: History,” in Taylor & Francis Group, The Middle
East and North Africa 2004, London: Europa Publications, 2004.
14. “World: Middle East Khatami concludes historic Gulf tour,” BBC, May 20,
1999. Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/349033.stm
15. Mahdy, “Qatar: History.”
16. Cited in Uzi Rabi, “Qatar’s Relations with Israel: Challenging Arab and
Gulf Norms,” Middle East Journal, 63(3) (Summer 2009), p.451.
17. Muhammed Zayani, ed. The Al Jazeera Phenomenon: Critical Perspectives on
New Arab Media, London: Pluto Press, 2005, p.2
18. “60 Minutes: Inside Al Jazeera,” CBS News, October 2001. Available at
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/i60-minutes-i-inside-al-jazeera/ The broad-
cast was originally aired in May 2001.
19. “Interview transcript: Qatar’s Sheikh Hamad,” Financial Times, 24 October
2010. Available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/9163abca-df97-11df-
bed9-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3VruX6870
20. See the discussion in Kamrava, Qatar: Small State, Big Politics, pp.74–75.
21. The figures are from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators,
available at http://data.worldbank.org/products/wdi
22. Uzi Rabi, “Qatar,” in Ami Ayalon, ed., Middle East Contemporary Survey
1991, Boulder: Westview Press, p.611.
23. Youssef M. Ibrahim, “54 Qatar Citizens Petition Emir for Free Elections,”
The New York Times, 13 May 1992. Available at http://www.nytimes.
com/1992/05/13/world/54-qatar-citizens-petition-emir-for-free-
elections.html
24. Peter Van Ham observed that, pretty much like firms, states also develop brands.
See Peter Van Ham, “The Rise of the Brand State,” Foreign Affairs (September/
October 2001). It was J.E. Peterson who described Qatar’s multiple efforts as
“state branding.” See J.E. Peterson, “Qatar and the World: Branding for a
Micro-State,” Middle East Journal, 60(4) (Autumn 2006), pp.732–748.
25. Mehran Kamrava, “Royal Factionalism and Political Liberalization in

Qatar,” Middle East Journal, 63(3) (Summer 2009), p.401.
26. Cited in Jennifer Lambert, “Political Reform in Qatar: Participation,
Legitimacy and Security,” Middle East Policy Council, 18(1) (Spring 2011).
27. See Louay Bahry, “Elections in Qatar: A Window of Democracy Opens in
the Gulf,” Middle East Policy, 6(4) (June 1999), pp.118–127.
28. Lambert, “Political Reform in Qatar: Participation, Legitimacy and
Security.”
29. See UN Secretary General’s MDG Advocacy Group, HH Sheikha Moza
bint Nasser, http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/advocates/members/
hhs-sheikha-moza-bint-naser.shtml
30. Amy Hawthorne and Amal Winter, Qatar: Training for Women Candidates
1999 Central Municipal Council Elections, International Foundation for
Election Systems, December 1998. Available at https://www.ifes.org/
sites/default/files/r01810.pdf
31. “AKP’ye Kapatma Davası,” Milliyet, March 14, 2008.
32. “Kapatma Yok, Ciddi Ihtar Var,” Milliyet, July 31, 2008.
33. Kemal Kirişçi, “The December 2004 European Council Decision on Turkey:
Is it an Historic Turning Point?” The Middle East Review of International
Affairs, 8(4) (Dec., 2004).
34. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, “My Country Is Your Faithful Ally,” The Wall Street
Journal, 31 March 2003. Available at http://www.wsj.com/articles/
SB104907941058746300
35. “Erdoğan: ‘Türkiye ekonomisi için yeni bir sayfa açılmıştır,” Milliyet, June
8, 2004. http://www.milliyet.com.tr/2004/06/08/son/sonsiy09.html
36. Paul Wolfowitz, “Turkey and America: Partners at the Crossroads of
History,” Department of Defense, July 14, 2004. Available at http://www.
defense.gov/Speeches/Speech.aspx?SpeechID=268
37. “George Bush addresses the NATO summit in Turkey,” The Guardian,
29 June 2004. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/jun/29/eu.
nato1
38. Ariane Bonzon, “Did the Turkish liberal intellectuals act as the Islamists’
‘useful idiots’?” Jan. 4, 2014. Available at http://arianebonzon.fr/
did-the-liberal-intellectuals-act-as-the-islamists-useful-idiots/
39. For a more thorough discussion, see Mehran Kamrava, Qatar: Small State,
Big Politics, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2013, chapter.4.
40. The World Bank, World Development Indicators 2014. Available at http://
data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD
41.“60 Minutes: Inside Al Jazeera,” CBS News, October 2001. Available at http://
www.cbsnews.com/news/i60-minutes-i-inside-al-jazeera. The broadcast was
originally aired in May 2001.
74 B. BAŞKAN
42. George W. Bush, “Remarks to the Troops at Camp As Sayliyah, Qatar,”
June 5, 2005. Available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=64952
43. See Kamrava, Qatar: Small State, Big Politics, chapter.5.
44. See the discussion in Kamrava, Qatar: Small State, Big Politics, pp.96–102.
45. Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, Qatar and the Arab Spring, London: C. Hurst &
Co., 2014.
46. Kemal Kirişçi, “The Transformation of Turkish foreign policy: The rise of
the trading state,” New Perspectives on Turkey, 40 (2009), pp.29–57.
47. Cited in Ariel Farrar-Wellman, “Qatar-Iran Foreign Relations,” American
Enterprise Institute Iran Tracker, 23 February 2010. Available at http://
www.irantracker.org/foreign-relations/qatar-iran-foreign-relations
48. For more on Turkey’s energy policy, see Katinka Barysch, “Turkey’s role in
European Energy Security,” Center for European Reform Essays, 2007.
Available at http://www.cer.org.uk/pdf/essay_turkey_energy_12dec07.
pdf and Şaban Kardaş, “Turkish-Azerbaijani Energy Cooperation and
Nabucco: Testing the Limits of the New Turkish Foreign Policy Rhetoric,”
Turkish Studies, 12(1) (2001), pp.55–77.
49. Turkey also canceled visa requirements with Yemen, Jordan, and Lebanon.
50. Cited in Veysel Ayhan, “Geçmişten Geleceğe Türkiye-Suudi Arabistan
İlişkileri,” Ortadoğu Analiz, 2(23) (Nov., 2010), p.31.
51. The press release is available at http://kfip.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/
09/SI-2010-PR.pdf
52. See the information provided by NATO at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/
natohq/topics_58787.htm?
53. T.C. Başbakanlık Kanun Tasarısı, “Türkiye Cumhuriyeti ve Körfez Arap
Ülkeleri İşbirliği Konseyi Üyesi Ülkeler Arasında Ekonomik İşbirliğine ilişkin
Çerçeve Anlaşma,” Oct. 27, 2005. Available at http://www2.tbmm.gov.
tr/d23/1/1-0322.pdf
54. Mariam Al Hakeem, “GCC Names Turkey First Strategic Partner Outside
the Gulf,” Gulf News, Sept., 3, 2008. Available at http://gulfnews.com/
news/gulf/uae/general/gcc-names-turkey-first-strategic-partner-
outside-the-gulf-1.129631
55. Al Hakeem, “GCC Names Turkey First Strategic Partner Outside the Gulf.”
56. The full text of the joint statement can be found at the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of Turkey at http://www.mfa.gov.tr, Available at http://www.mfa.
gov.tr/joint-statement-of--the-joint-ministerial-meeting-of-the-gcc-turkey-
high-level-strategic-dialogue-istanbul-_-turkey_-8-July-2009.en.mfa
57. “Prime Minister Erdoğan tells ADL that “Anti-Semitism Has No Place in
Turkey,” ADL Press Release, June 10, 2005. Available at http://archive.
adl.org/presrele/asint_13/4730_13.html#.VZErJxOqpHw
58. Mustafa Gürlek and Elif Eşit, “CHP’li Erdoğdu: AKP, İsrail’in dostluğunu
kazanmak için lobilere 65 milyon aktardı,” Zaman, Feb. 17, 2015. Available
http://www.zaman.com.tr/politika_chpli-erdogdu-akp-israilin-
dostlugunu-kazanmak-icin-lobilere-65-milyon-dolar-aktardi_2278284.
html
59. On the changing relations between Turkey and Israel, see Hasan
Kösebalaban, “The Crisis in Turkish-Israeli Relations: What is Its Strategic
Significance,” Middle East Policy, 17(3) (Fall 2010), pp.36–50.
60. Diplomatic relations between Turkey and Israel were upgraded to the
ambassadorial level in 1991.
61. “İsrail’e 5 Yaptırım,” Anadolu News Agency, Sept. 2, 2011. Available at
http://www.aa.com.tr/tr/manset/91199-israile-5-maddelik-yaptirim
62. Uzi Rabi, “Qatar’s Relations with Israel: Challenging Arab and Gulf
Norms,” Middle East Journal, 63(3) (Summer 2009), p.452.
63. Rabi, “Qatar’s Relations with Israel: Challenging Arab and Gulf Norms.”
64. Avi Issacharoff, “Peres in Qatar meets with Emir and international stu-
dents,” Haaretz, Jan. 31, 2007. Available at http://www.haaretz.com/
print-edition/news/per es-in-qatar-meets-with-emir-and-
international-students-1.211560
65. Cited in Rabi, “Qatar’s Relations with Israel: Challenging Arab and Gulf
Norms,” p.458.
66. I should add that both Turkey and Qatar engaged in mediation efforts out-
side of the Middle East as well such as Afghanistan and the Philippines.
67. I should note that Gulf specialists note this factor to explain Qatar’s rise in
mediation.
68. Meliha Altunışık, “The Possibilities and Limits of Turkey’s Soft Power in
the Middle East,” Insight Turkey, 10(2) (2008), p.51
69. See Mesut Özcan, “Turkish Foreign Policy Towards Iraq in 2009,”
Perceptions, 15(3–4) (Autumn–Winter 2010), pp.113–132.
70. For more on Turkey’s mediation, see Aylin G. Gürzel and Eyüp Ersoy,
“Turkey and Iran’s Nuclear Program,” Middle East Policy Council, 19(1)
(Spring 2012). Available at http://www.mepc.org/journal/middle-east-
policy-archives/turkey-and-irans-nuclear-program?print
71. For more details on Qatar’s mediation efforts, see Sultan Barakat, “The
Qatari Spring: Qatar’s emerging role in peacemaking,” London: LSE
Kuwaiti Programme Working Paper No. 24, July 2012 and Mehran
Kamrava, “Mediation and Qatari Foreign Policy,” Middle East Journal,
65(4) (Autumn 2011), pp.539–556.
72. For the expansion of the Brotherhood into Syria, Lebanon, and the Palestine,
see Abdal Fattah Muhammad Al Awaisi, The Muslim Brothers and the
Palestine Question 1928–1947; for Sudan, see Abdalwahab el Affendi,
Turabi’s Revolution: Islam and Power in Sudan, London: Grey Seal, 1991;
for Iraq, see Basim al Azimi, “The Muslim Brotherhood: Genesis and
Development,” in Falah A. Jaber, Ayatollahs, Sufis and Ideologues: State,
Religion and Social Movements in Iraq, London: Saqi Books, 2002.
76 B. BAŞKAN
73. See David B. Roberts, “Qatar, the Ikhwan, and transnational relations in the
Gulf,” POMEPS, March 2014. Available at http://pomeps.org/2014/
03/18/qatar-the-ikhwan-and-transnational-relations-in-the-gulf/
74. Yusuf Al Qaradawi is originally from Egypt. Settled in Qatar in the early
1960s, he was naturalized and had been since then living in Qatar.
75. See Peterson, “Qatar and the World: Branding for a Micro-State.”
76. This reason is suggested by Abdelaziz al Mahmoud, a Qatari journalist and
novelist. See Amr al-Turabi and Tarek al Mubarak, “Qatar’s Introspective
Islamists,” Asharq al Al Awsat, June 18, 2013. Available at http://www.
aawsat.net/2013/06/article55306189/qatars-introspective-islamists
77. Cited in Ahmed Azem, “Qatar’s ties with the Muslim Brotherhood affect
entire region,” The National, May 18, 2012. Available at http://www.the-
national.ae/thenationalconversation/comment/qatars-ties-
with-the-muslim-brotherhood-affect-entire-region
78. The matters Al Qaradawi expresses his opinions may range from elections to
women. On the latter issue, see Naomi Sakr, “Women, Development and al
Jazeera: A Balance Sheet,” in Mohamed Zayani, ed. The Al Jazeera
Phenomenon: Critical Perspectives on New Arab Media, London: Pluto Press,
2005, pp.133–134.
79. See Anthony Shadid, “Al-Jazeera Star Mixes Tough Talk with Calls for
Tolerance,” The Washington Post, Feb. 14, 2003.
80. Andrew Hammond, “Arab awakening: Qatar’s controversial alliance with
Arab Islamists,” openDemocracy, April 25, 2013. Available at https://
w w w. o p e n d e m o c r a c y. n e t / a n d r e w - h a m m o n d / a r a b - a w a k e n i n g -
qatar%E2%80%99s-controversial-alliance-with-arab-islamists
81. See http://www.qfis.edu.qa/research-centres/alqaradawi-center
82. Fouad Ajami, “What the Muslim World Is Watching,” The New York Times,
Nov. 18, 2001. Available at http://www.nytimes.com/2001/11/18/
magazine/18ALJAZEERA.html?pagewanted=all
83. See Kristen Gillespie, “The New Face of Al Jazeera,” The Nation, 26
November 2007. Available at http://www.thenation.com/article/new-face-
al-jazeera?page=0,0
84. There are claims that Ahmet Davutoğlu and Wadah Khanfar were actually
friends. I heard this from a diplomat from Turkish Embassy in Doha. He
also added that Khanfar was very receptive to the embassy’s demands regard-
ing the coverage of Turkey. In one incidence, he told me, Al Jazeera gave
more coverage time to Abdullah Gül’s visit to Egypt than it would. Hüsnü
Mahalli, an Arab journalist, also notes that the two were friends. See Hüsnü
Mahalli, “BOP denilen büyük oyun!” Yurt, July 30, 2013. Available at
http://www.yurtgazetesi.com.tr/gundem/bop-denilen-buyuk-oyun-
h39441.html
85. Hakan Albayrak, “Vaddah Hanfer’e vefa,” Yenişafak, Sept 24, 2011. Available
at http://www.haksozhaber.net/vaddah-hanfere-vefa-22738yy.htm
86.Sam Cherribi notes that Al Jazeera used “Turkey as a model of democratic

Islamic possibility.” Unfortunately, he does not elaborate on this point. See
Sami Cherribi, “Al Jazeera Arabic, Transnational Identity and Influence,” in
Holli A. Semetko and Margaret Scammell, The SAGE Handbook of Political
Communication, London: SAGE Publications, 2012, p.481.
87. “Al Jazeera sees bridge role between Turkey, Arab world,” Hürriyet Daily
News, Feb 18, 2005. Available at http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/al-
jazeera-sees-bridge-role-between-turkey-arab-world.aspx?
pageID=438&n=al-jazeera-sees-bridge-role-between-turkey-arab-
world-2005-02-18
88. Wadah Khanfar, “Those who support democracy must welcome the rise of
political Islam,” The Guardian, 27 November 2011. Available at http://
www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2011/nov/27/islamist-
arab-spring-west-fears
89. Cited in Abdülhamit Birışık, “Mevdudi İslamcılığının Türkiye’ye Giriş
Biçimi ve Türkiye İslamcılığına Etkisi,” in İsmail Kara and Asım Öz, eds,
Türkiye’de İslamcılık Düşüncesi ve Hareketi, İstanbul: Zeytinburnu Belediyesi,
2013, p.397.
90. Cited in Alison Pargeter, The Muslim Brotherhood: The Burden of Tradition,
London: Saqi Books, 2010, p.121.
91. These names pass in Soner Yalçın, Erbakan, 3rd. ed, İstanbul: Kırmızı Kedi
Yayınevi, 2013. Yalçın is an investigative journalist, who usually does not pay
attention to his references. I could not confirm how he got these names.
92. Murat Kul, “Refah kongresinde ‘İhvan’ ağırlığı,” Milliyet, Oct 10, 1996.
93. On the Brotherhood presence in Europe and the USA, see Lorenzo Vidino,
The New Muslim Brotherhood in the West, New York: Columbia University
Press, 2010.
94. See Vidino, The New Muslim Brotherhood in the West, chapter.6
95. The names of TGTV members can be found in its website: http://www.
idsb.org/tr/. The members of the Platform of Common Wisdom can be
found at http://www.haber7.com/guncel/haber/1386489-203-stkdan-
ortak-milli-irade-bildirisi
96. See the website: http://www.idsb.org/tr/
97. “İstanbul’da Alimler Buluşması,” Vahdet Dergisi, 1 July 2006. Available at
http://www.vahdet.info.tr/isdunya/dosya6/1552.html
98. “Uyanın ey Müslümanlar,” Milli Gazete, 5 July 2006. Available at http://
www.milligazete.com.tr/haber/Uyanin_ey_Muslumanlar/28050#.
VZPaIxOqpHw
99. Steven G. Merley, Turkey, The Global Muslim Brotherhood and the Gaza
Flotilla, Jerusalem: Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, 2011, p.17.
78 B. BAŞKAN
100. “International Muslim intellectuals express thanks to Turkey,” Today’s

Zaman, 1 July 2010. Available at http://www.todayszaman.com/national_
international-muslim-intellectuals-express-thanks-to-turkey_214776.html
101. “Al Qaradawi yawjah nedaaen li tawheed al ummah al islamiyya,” Islam
Today, June 25, 2010. Available at http://www.islamtoday.net/albasheer/
artshow-12-135230.htm
102. Yezid Sayigh, “Struggle within, struggle without: the transformation of
PLO politics since 1982,” International Affairs, 65(2) (Spring 1989),
pp.247–271.
103. Rosemarie Said Zahlan, Palestine and the Gulf States: The Presence at the
Table, New York: Routledge, 2009, p.96.
104. Matthew Levitt, Hamas: Politics, Charity, and Terrorism in the Service of
Jihad, New Haven: Yale University Press, pp.198–199.
105. Matthew Levitt and Dennis Ross, Hamas: Politics, Charity, and Terrorism in
the Service of Jihad, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006, p.199.
106. Christopher M. Blanchard, Qatar: Background and U.S. Relations,
Congressional Research Service, 16 May 2011, p.4.
107. The text of the speech is available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/
Events/2009/3/04-leadership/0304_leadership.PDF
108. O. Kunter Öymen, “Hamas Skandalı,” Milliyet, Oct 15, 1996.
109. Cited in Rıfat N. Balı, “The Image of the Jew in the Rhetoric of Political
Islam in Turkey,” Cahiers d’Etudes sur la Mediterranee Orientale et le monde
Turco-Iranien, 28 (1999), pp.2–10.
110. Mustafa Uzun, “Erbakan çağımızın Abdülhamid’idir,” Vakit, Dec 20, 2008.
Available at http://www.haber7.com/siyaset/haber/366091-erbakan-
cagimizin-abdulhamididir
111. “Başbakan Erdoğan: Hamas, İsrail’i tanımalıdır,” Zaman, Jan 28, 2006.
Available at http://www.zaman.com.tr/gundem_basbakan-Erdoğan-hamas-
israili-tanimalidir_251249.html
112. “Erdoğan İsrail’e demokrasi dersi verdi,” Zaman, Feb 21, 2006. Available at
http://www.zaman.com.tr/gundem_Erdoğan-israile-demokrasi-dersi-
verdi_258156.html
113. See Zeynep Atalay, “Civil Society as Soft Power: Islamic NGOs and Turkish
Foreign Policy, in Riva Kastoryano, ed. Turkey between Nationalism and
Globalization, New York: Columbia University Press, 2012.
114. International Crisis Group, Türkiye’nin İsrail ve İran Krizleri, Kriz Grubu
Avrupa Raporu no.208, Sept 8, 2010, p.5. Available at http://www.crisis-
group.org/~/media/Files/europe/208_Israel_and_Iran_full_report_
TURKISH.pdf
115. A few other conferences on the Palestine were organized in 2009. See
“İstanbul’da Filistin Konferansları,” Vuslat Dergisi, July 2009. Available at
http://www.vahdet.info.tr/filistin/dosya7/1868.html
116. The conference participants can be found at http://www.ihh.org.tr/foto-

graf/yayinlar/dokumanlar/mescidi-aksa-sempozyumu.pdf
117. See “Defense Minister signs order banning Hamas-affiliated charitable orga-
nizations,” Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 7 July 2008. Available at
http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/pressroom/2008/pages/defense%20minis-
ter%20signs%20order%20banning%20hamas-affiliated%20charitable%20
organizations%207-jul-2008.aspx
PART III
The Arab Spring: The Rise and Fall

of the Brotherhood Crescent
CHAPTER 5
The Arab Spring Erupts, Turkey and Qatar

Respond
Abstract This chapter discusses how the Arab Spring threw the region
into another turmoil. It then details how Turkey and Qatar repositioned
themselves and reacted to the unfolding developments in the Arab World.
This chapter argues that by the time the Arab Spring erupted, Turkey and
Qatar had become too confident of their own achievements in the 2000s
and sought to expand their influence even further in the region. The fact
that the Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated political parties and figures rose to
prominence boosted their ambitions as both countries had extremely close
relations with the movement. Building upon these former ties, the chap-
ter discusses how Turkey and Qatar developed much stronger relations
with Egypt under the presidency of the Brotherhood-backed Muhammed
Mursi.
Keywords Arab Spring • regional turmoil • Muslim Brotherhood

Crescent • Saudi Arabia • the UAE
When it erupted in late December 2010, the Arab Spring found Turkey
and Qatar over-confident with what they had achieved during the 2000s
in both domestic and foreign politics. But, neither Turkey nor Qatar had
ever imagined what a regional earthquake the Arab Spring was in the mak-
ing. Prior to this, both countries had in fact been stepping up their efforts
to develop stronger economic and political relations with Arab Spring

East, DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-51771-5_5
84 B. BAŞKAN
countries such as Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Syria, which would be hit
hard by it.
For instance, just two weeks before the Arab Spring erupted, Turkey’s
minister of state for foreign trade was in Tunisia for a two-day official
visit in an attempt to improve economic and political relations between
Turkey and Tunisia. Two weeks after this visit, Qatar’s prime minister was
in Tunisia to attend the fourth session of the Qatar–Tunisia Joint Higher
Committee. The sides agreed to expand cooperation in diverse fields and
signed 14 agreements to this end.1
The Arab Spring shelved whatever plans Turkey and Qatar had to
improve their relations with the Arab Spring countries. Reluctant first,
both later took stronger stances.
TUNISIA
The Arab Spring started in Tunisia when Muhammed Bouazizi set himself
on fire on 17 December 2010 just two weeks after the Turkish minister left
the country and one day after the Qatar–Tunisia Joint Higher Committee
met. Neither Turkey nor Qatar foresaw what was coming, and their initial
reactions were extremely cautious. In the period from the self-immolation
of Bouazizi on 17 December 2010 to the resignation of Zein Al Abidine
bin Ali on 14 January 2011, Turkey’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued
not a single press release on the events in Tunisia, although in the same
period they issued statements on a wild range of topics such as the signing
of a treaty between Israel and (South) Cyprus, the parliamentary vote of
confidence on the new Iraqi government, terrorist attacks in Pakistan and
in Alexandria, Egypt, the visits of foreign dignitaries, Israel’s destruction
of the Shepherd Hotel in East Jerusalem, and German Prime Minister
Angela Merkel’s statements on (South) Cyprus.2
Turkey issued its first press release on 14 January 2011, almost one
month after the protests started and on the very day Bin Ali resigned.
It was still a short and cautious statement, expressing Turkey’s concerns
and sadness for the events that were costing many lives and injuries. The
statement then expressed Turkey’s wishes for the re-building of order and
peace.3 Two weeks later, on 28 January, Turkey finally declared its support
for the Tunisian people’s demands for more democratic and free society.4
Qatar was likewise cautious in the beginning, and did not make any state-
ment for almost a month after the protests began, but when the president
of Tunisia, Zein Al Abidine bin Ali, left the country, Qatar was the first
THE ARAB SPRING ERUPTS, TURKEY AND QATAR RESPOND 85
Arab Gulf state to express “its respect for the will and choice of the people
of Tunisia.”5
The official voice was not the only voice rising from Qatar. In fact, the
loudest voice favorably toward the Arab Spring was coming from Doha:
that of Al Jazeera. It was in fact this Doha-based and Qatar-financed
network that popularized and turned Bouazizi’s self-immolation into a
truly historical event by airing a video of it on the same day it happened. It
was not a one-time coverage. Al Jazeera repeatedly played and popularized
the video, connected to activists and journalists on the ground, and made
their voices heard across the Arab World.6 To what extent the Jasmine
revolution, as they call it, was also Al Jazeera’s revolution is debatable,7
but it is certain that Al Jazeera took a strong pro-revolutionary stand, and
sought to shape events. An Al Jazeera program producer, Aref Hijjawi, was
very frank about it: “Between faithfully reporting an event, and attempt-
ing to actively shape it … There is little doubt that it was Al-Jazeera’s clear
intention to affect.”8
EGYPT
When the protests spread to Egypt, Turkey did not remain cautious, but
declared its full support early on. It was Turkey’s strong man, by then
prime minister, Erdoğan, who declared that support. Just one week after
the massive street protests broke out in Cairo,9 Erdoğan gave a speech to
his party group in the parliament. First, he set out his party’s principles.
The JDP has always stood on the side of the right and freedom … the JDP
has always been on the side of advanced democracy. Since the day it was
founded the JDP has believed that people’s choices are above everything
and defended this in the strongest terms possible.
Then, Erdoğan spoke about Turkey and its foreign policy:
Turkey is playing roles that will move all the stones in the region and change
the stream of history … Turkey, which say stop to the tyrant, acts against the
familiar. Turkey, which calls the killer the Killer, is breaking taboos. Turkey,
which can say stop to those who subject people to privation and blockades,
is shouting out for the just and the truth on every occasion. Turkey is put-
ting forward a strong will so that not only peace, stability and tranquility,
but also democracy, universal law, and rights and freedoms will prevail in
the region.
86 B. BAŞKAN
Erdoğan then addressed Mubarak in his speech:
I want to make a very sincere advice, a very genuine warning Egypt’s

President Mr. Hosni Mubarak; we are human, we are mortal, we will not
stay. We will all die and will be questioned for what we leave behind. As
Muslims the place we will all go into is a two-meter-squared hole. We are
all temporary… What will remain is … to be remembered as respected and
spoken of with mercy. We exist for the people and we perform our duties for
our people … Therefore I say, listen, let us listen, to the people’s callings and
their most humane demands. Respond without any hesitation to the desire
of change coming from the people…. You take the first step for Egypt’s
peace, security and stability. Take steps that will satisfy the people. Freedoms
cannot be delayed and ignored in today’s world.10
The state of Qatar was again cautious about Egypt, waiting until the day
Hosni Mubarak stepped down to issue a statement. Qatar was again the
first Arab Gulf state to express “respect for the will of the Egyptian people
and their choices.” More remarkably, however, the state of Qatar also said,
“the transfer of power to the Supreme Council OF ARMED FORCES is a
significant positive step towards achieving the aspirations of the Egyptian
people for democracy, reform and a LIFE OF DIGNITY.”[emphasis in
original]11 With this statement, Qatar publicly declared that it embraced
the Arab Spring.
Qatar’s Al Jazeera figured even more prominently in the Egyptian revo-
lution, taking a very strong pro-revolution stand. The regime in Egypt
attempted to silence Al Jazeera by interrupting its broadcast on the NileSat
satellite, but Al Jazeera was undeterred and continued to cover the events
through other stations. Even the arrest of its reporters and closure of its
offices did not deter Al Jazeera, which secretly sent reporters to Egypt.12
Not only that, but Al Jazeera almost obsessively began a focus on Egypt.
About its English channel, for example, Scott Bridges said that Al Jazeera
“broadcast the developing crisis in Egypt to the exclusion of very nearly
everything else. For over two weeks, the schedule was cleared and the
regular day-to-day pattern of news bulletins and recorded programming
was suspended.” Al Jazeera English, Bridges added, “dedicated itself to
reporting events in Egypt and airing special in-depth current affairs pro-
grams, which meant that viewers knew they could tune into the channel at
any time for information on events in Egypt.”13
It must be noted that it is almost unthinkable that if the state of Qatar

had wanted to silence Al Jazeera, or curb its enthusiasm, it could not.
Certainly Al Jazeera had not represented the state of Qatar, but the state
of Qatar let it take a strong pro-revolution stand, and by doing so showed
that it had no qualms about the revolutionary change the Arab World was
undergoing. It must be added that Al Jazeera needed no encouragement
from the state of Qatar to wage a pro-revolution media campaign against
the regimes in Tunisia and Egypt. It was home to journalists from various
Arab countries, most of whom, if not all, were themselves critical of the
regimes in their home countries.14
LIBYA, YEMEN, AND BAHRAIN

Shortly after Mubarak stepped down, the street protests spread to other
Arab countries, breaking out in Libya, Yemen, and Bahrain. The foreign
policy makers in Ankara saw an opportunity in this new situation. To be
more specific, with its democracy, Turkey could shine as a model to be
emulated in Egypt, first, and then in the rest of the Arab world.15 Ahmet
Davutoğlu,16 Turkey’s minister of foreign affairs, was quite explicit in
expressing Turkey’s desire to be a model. Davutoğlu expressed this desire
on at least two occasions, the first on 26 March 2011 and the other on
24 May 2011. The first was a speech delivered in a symposium organized
by an NGO, called the Turkish Houses, to commemorate the centennial
anniversary of its foundation.17 The second was an interview made with
Davutoğlu, and aired on national television.
In the first speech, Davutoğlu spoke of the last century as the century
of the abnormalization of the Middle East, by which Davutoğlu meant
that the peoples of the Middle East had become aliens to one another.
Davutoğlu blamed colonial administrations and the divisive ideologies
adopted by post-colonial states for this alienation. Davutoğlu explained
the prime objective of Turkey’s foreign policy during his tenure as “the
normalization of the history and of this geography, re-settlement of this
history on its normal path.” In his view, the Arab Spring, or “the current
major upheavals in the Middle East,” was in fact the pain of this normal-
ization. Davutoğlu then confidently stated, “We as Turkey want to lead
this process of normalization. It is our desire that this wave of change does
not become an excuse for some to be used in the service of new colonial-
ism. It is our desire that the peoples of the Middle East are not separated
from each other under new authoritarian structures. It is our desire that in
88 B. BAŞKAN
the process of normalization of history every one respects these borders,

but these borders do not serve as walls any more, and transform into flex-
ible and penetrable borders.”18
It is worth mentioning that Davutoğlu seemed to believe that this nor-
malization was inescapable, and therefore prophesized that those rulers
who could not see this course of history and act accordingly would either
be swept away or have difficulties. “It is because he did not correctly read
this course of history, Mubarak is not in power right now. And those
countries whose rulers cannot read this course of history correctly are hav-
ing major difficulties.”
In the second speech, Davutoğlu once again described the Arab Spring
as “a return to normal” in the Middle East, the normality being broken,
according to Davutoğlu, during the colonial period and the Cold War.19
Davutoğlu seemed to believe that Turkey had spearheaded the normal-
ization the region was undergoing by becoming an inspiration for the
peoples of the Middle East. Turkey was also a democracy and it experi-
enced, Davutoğlu claimed, neither chaos nor radicalism. More significantly,
democracy did not make Turkey weak against Israel. Quite the opposite,
democracy helped Turkey defend the Palestinians even more strongly. For
Davutoğlu, therefore, the concerns of the Arab regimes about democracy
were unfounded. The success of Turkey, Davutoğlu claimed, was shatter-
ing those concerns. Therefore, Davutoğlu declared, “This was both Arab
Spring and Turkish Spring.” The Arabs were emulating Turkey.
It soon turned out, however, that these cases were disturbingly compli-
cated for both Turkey and Qatar. In these new cases, the leaders would not
easily succumb to the protestors, as in Tunisia or Egypt, and were willing
to resort to violence if necessary. The protestors were in turn willing to
accept foreign assistance to change the balance of power on the ground.
After making such a passionate and powerful declaration in support
of the protestors in Egypt, Turkey could not simply deny its support for
the protesters in these other countries. Turkey was unprepared for what
needed to be done when the leaders and the opposition resorted to vio-
lence, and therefore oscillated. In the beginning, it rejected violence. In
the case of Bahrain, for example, where the Gulf states intervened militar-
ily on behalf of the ruling al Khalifa dynasty, Turkey risked its relation-
ship with them and declared its support for the protestors. Even after the
military intervention, Turkey did not back down and called on all sides
to “refrain from violence,” urging the regime “to listen to the legitimate
expectations and demands on the path of reform and democracy.”20
Erdoğan was more to the point, sounding quite critical of the mili-
tary intervention in Bahrain. “My Shia brothers well know Karbala,” said
Erdoğan, and added “we also know it well.” As he viewed it, what was
happening in Bahrain was another Karbala.21 “We are communicating
with all sides,” stated Erdoğan, so that “no negative developments occur
after this act of military intervention.”22
In Libya too, Turkey vehemently opposed a Western-led direct mili-
tary intervention on the side of the rebels.23 Erdoğan expressed his strong
objection to the military operation on several occasions. On one such
occasion, for example, Erdoğan said, “Should NATO intervene in Libya?
Can there be nonsense like this? What business does NATO have in Libya?
… Look, as Turkey, we are against this. Something like this cannot be
spoken, something like this cannot be entertained.”24 On another occa-
sion, Erdoğan implicitly accused the Western countries leading the opera-
tion, France in particular, of eyeing Libyan oil. On the other hand, Turkey
was not: “Our relationship with Libya is not one of an oil relationship,
or a relationship based on interest.”25 Only when Turkey could not pre-
vent a military operation, did it change its position and decide to join the
NATO-led military operation on Libya, sending four frigates, a subma-
rine, and a support vessel.26
After Egypt, Qatar more or less acted together with other Gulf states.
It did not object, for example, to the deployment of the Saudi Arabia-
dominated GCC force in Bahrain and even contributed some troops to
the force. In Yemen too, Qatar acted together with other Gulf states and
took part in the GCC-led initiative to end the mounting crisis between the
protesters and the regime. The initiative was basically seeking a peaceful
transfer of power in return for immunity for the president, but in hind-
sight, Ali Abdullah Saleh, Yemen’s president, was trying to buy time. He
was thus angry when Qatar’s prime minister, Hamad bin Jassim, stated
publically in April 2011 that the GCC was trying to persuade President
Ali Abdullah Saleh to step down. In reaction, Saleh accused Qatar and
Al Jazeera of “funding chaos in Yemen, Egypt, Syria and throughout the
Arab world” and called back Yemen’s ambassador to Doha. One month
later, in May 2011, Qatar withdrew from the GCC initiative and at least
officially left the management of crisis in Yemen to other Gulf states.27
Although it took the back seat and left the leadership to Saudi Arabia
in handling the crisis in Bahrain and Yemen, Qatar took the leadership in
Libya. The fact that Qatar held the rotating presidency of the Arab League
in 2011 facilitated this role. Qatar not only recognized the National
90 B. BAŞKAN
Transitional Council, in fact the first Arab state to do so, but also rallied
the Arab states through the Arab League behind the idea of imposing a
no-fly zone over Libya and establishing safe areas to protect Libyans. The
Arab League’s decision was later used as an excuse for the passage of a UN
Security Council resolution on Libya. Qatar also provided logistical, finan-
cial, and even military aid to the rebels in Libya and actively participated
in the NATO operation, which really “saved the nascent rebellion from
annihilation and slowly turned the tide of war against” the regime.28
Al Jazeera’s stand with respect to other protests paralleled that of Qatar.
As many critics observed, Al Jazeera had shown little interest in covering
them, and conveniently ignored the protests in Bahrain,29 but in Yemen
and Libya, Al Jazeera was committed to the revolution, hence Ali Abdullah
Saleh’s accusation. In covering the protests Al Jazeera was accused either
of outright distorting the facts on the ground or of selective coverage, and
thus pursuing a political agenda.30 As a result, the network’s image as an
independent media outlet was greatly damaged and instead it began to
be viewed by many as Qatar’s diplomatic tool, one WikiLeaks document
referring to it as “one of Qatar’s most valuable political and diplomatic
tools.”31
SYRIA
Protests also erupted in Syria in mid-March 2011 and plunged the coun-
try into a civil war that still rages. Of all the cases Turkey faced, perhaps the
most difficult dilemma was that in Syria, with which Turkey had developed
quite cordial relations since 1999, to the extent that Turkey and Syria not
only held joint military exercises in April 2009,32 but also, shortly before
the protests broke out in Syria, agreed that the Turkish army would train
the Syrian army.33 Syria had also been the home for Hamas since the late
1990s and was supportive of its struggle against Israel.
Soon after the protests started, it became obvious that Syria would not
follow the path Tunisia, Egypt, or Yemen had followed earlier, that is,
a peaceful transition of power. The regime was determined to suppress
the protests, and by excessive use of violence if necessary. The opposition
has since then developed along two lines. Some protesters took arms and
organized a number of armed groups. Officers and soldiers who defected
the Syrian army formed the main fighting group, the Free Syrian Army
(FSA), in the summer of 2011 and had by the end of 2011 become the
main armed group confronting the regime.
It soon became clear that Syria would not follow the path Libya had
followed either. No regional or international military intervention would
change the balance of power in their favor. The regime in Syria had regional
and international backers, Iran and Russia, which made a military inter-
vention much riskier than it was in Libya. There was an additional compli-
cation in Syria. Al Qaeda was also seeking an outlet in Syria and began to
organize its own force, which became Jabhat al Nusra, in the summer of
2011.34 The presence of an al Qaeda-linked armed group in Syria deterred
the USA and the European countries from delivering weapons that could
change the military balance of power on the ground.
As the protests erupted and developed into armed opposition, Turkey
took pains not to make a definitive break with the regime. Turkey painstak-
ingly continued to keep channels of communication with the Syrian regime
open, encouraging it to stop the violent crackdown and to implement nec-
essary reforms. As late as the beginning of August 2011, Turkey had still
hope that Esad would listen to Turkey’s voice and implement reforms. In
what turned out to be Turkey’s last attempt, Ahmet Davutoğlu, Turkey’s
Minister of Foreign Affairs, made a much-publicized visit to Syria, which
also proved to be futile. On 15 August 2011, Davutoğlu said, “From now
on there is nothing left to talk about with Syria.”35
Nine months after the protests started, in November 2011, Erdoğan
called Bashar al Assad to step down for the first time. Speaking in his
party group in parliament, he said, “I renew my call to Bashar Asad
here: … without spilling more blood, without more cruelty, for the sake
of the well being of your people, your country and the region, resign
from that office.” Turkey was not ready to make a call for a military
action against the regime, however. “Criticising a dictator who persecutes
and turns his weapons on his own people is not interfering in internal
affairs,” said Erdoğan and added, “it is not a call to the world for a military
intervention.”36
It was evident that Turkey was puzzled about how to tackle the crisis in
Syria. While it kept channels of communication with the regime open, it
also supported the protesters. In the end, Turkey was trying to persuade the
Syrian regime to address the protestors’ demands. More importantly, Turkey
allowed both armed and non-armed opposition to organize in Turkey. The
former gave birth to the FSA, the latter to the Syrian National Council.37
Qatar also had a difficult time making a decisive move. Almost four
months passed after the protests started in Syria, and Qatar had taken
no action against the regime. Only after its embassy was attacked by pro-
regime protesters, did Qatar withdraw its ambassador and shut down its
embassy in Damascus in July 2011. By November 2011, Qatar must have
come to a decision. In that month, Qatar led the suspension of Syria’s
92 B. BAŞKAN
membership in the Arab league. The league also imposed a series of eco-
nomic sanctions on the regime. Neither the suspension nor the sanctions
nor the League’s peace plan, however, helped the crisis in Syria, which
became more and more violent. Losing all its hopes of a diplomatic solu-
tion, Qatar finally began to make calls to the other Arab states for military
action against the regime in January 2012.
As Turkey and Qatar made their definitive break with the Assad regime,
Hamas also made a choice, the last member of the Hamas office, Imad al
Alami, leaving Damascus in early February 2012.38 Hamas’s political leader,
Khaled Meshaal, moved to Doha, and its deputy leader, Moussa Abu
Marzouk, to Cairo. Ismail Haniyah, the head of Hamas government in Gaza,
declared support for the Syrian revolution: speaking in a mosque in Cairo, he
said, “I salute all people of the Arab Spring, or Islamic winter, and I salute the
heroic people of Syria who are striving for freedom, democracy and reform.”39
The issue remained to be solved: where was Hamas to be based? In
early January 2012, Ismail Haniyah visited Turkey and met Prime Minister
Erdoğan. In late January 2012, by then Crown Prince of Qatar, Sheikh
Tamim bin Hamad al Thani accompanied a Hamas delegation to meet
King Abdullah of Jordan, possibly to mend ties, but the efforts proved
fruitless. Hamas was left homeless beyond the Gaza Strip, although Turkey
and Qatar allowed the Hamas leaders to continue their activities in their
territories. In September 2012, Khaled Meshaal even gave a speech in the
JDP congress. In one part of his speech, he said, “My Brother, Erdoğan,
be thankful to God. He gave you many things. And you deserve this. Pray
so that your name will be more exalted. You are not a Turkish leader only,
you are also a leader in the Islamic world.”40
In its campaign against the Assad regime, Qatar received the backing of
other Gulf states. By the summer of 2011, Saudi Arabia appeared equally,
if not more, committed to supporting the opposition, both armed and
non-armed. In fact, the Saudi King was the first among the Arab lead-
ers to condemn the Assad regime. One month after Qatar made its call
for military action against the Assad regime, in February 2012, the other
Gulf states joined Qatar, recalled their ambassadors and expelled Syria’s
ambassadors in their countries. In their announcement, the Gulf states
also called other Arab states “to take every decisive measure faced with this
dangerous escalation against the Syrian people.”41
Saudi Arabia’s involvement is understandable. Saudi Arabia possibly
saw in the Syrian crisis an opportunity to undermine Iran’s influence in
the region. Rivalry through proxies had already been raging in Lebanon,
Yemen, and Iraq. Now Syria had turned into another specter of rivalry—
and it was an important one. Joshua Jacobs describes it well:
For years, Syria has been the conduit through which Iranian influence has
been peddled into the Levant, Iranian money, guns, and agents have flowed
from Damascus to Hizbullah and Hamas, not to mention Syria itself. Short
of toppling the regime in Tehran, toppling Assad and replacing his regime
with a more ideologically symmetric Sunni Islamist government would thus
be the greatest possible prize in Saudi Arabia’s struggle with its Persian foe.
Not only would it remove Iran’s greatest Arab ally, but it could potentially
sever Tehran’s connection to Hizbullah and Hamas.42
From February 2012, Saudi Arabia and Qatar took the lead in the cam-
paign against the Assad regime, in which Turkey soon joined. In March
2012, Turkey closed its embassy in Damascus and recalled its ambassador.
Two months later, in May 2012, Turkey expelled Syria’s diplomats as a
reaction to a massacre, which claimed the lives of more than 100 people in
the town of Houla. In June 2012, Syria shot down a Turkish fighter, kill-
ing its two pilots. In a speech to his party group, Erdoğan did not declare
war on Syria as some expected, but he sounded as if the shooting erased
any restraint he had been showing until then in supporting the armed
opposition in Syria.
Starting in the summer of 2012, therefore, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and
Turkey seemed to be on the same page on the Syrian case. They agreed
that Bashar al Assad must go. They frequently called for the opposition to
be armed, and occasionally made a case for international military action
against the Assad regime, but neither the USA nor the EU was interested
in either option. They thus set out to change the balance of power on
the ground themselves, and to this end provided logistical, financial, and
diplomatic support to the opposition. Numerous journalistic reports have
also claimed that these three countries provided military support to the
opposition, yet have not been clear about how, to who exactly, or when.
This support for the armed opposition had an impact. The regime def-
initely had a technologically superior military arsenal, better organized
and more disciplined armed forces, and received financial, diplomatic,
and military support from regional and international powers such as Iran,
and its ally, Hizbullah, and Russia. On the other hand, the opposition
was extremely fragmented, could not form a unified front, and did not
have very sophisticated weapons. Despite this great disparity, the armed
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opposition had made surprising territorial advances. In fact, in mid-

summer 2012, the FSA and the regime were battling over the capital city,
Damascus. The regime repelled the rebel forces from the city and re-cap-
tured the surrounding towns by mid-August.
Despite what could equally be seen as a temporary setback, Davutoğlu,
by then foreign minister of Turkey, prophesized on 24 August 2012 that
the collapse of the Assad regime was imminent. “I did not,” Davutoğlu
said, “set a date for when Assad is going to leave, but a regime that has
become alienated from its own people cannot stand.” Davutoğlu added,
“This painful process will not last for long.” The regime was to collapse
within “months or weeks.”43 By the summer of 2012, Turkey was there-
fore hopeful. The process was painful certainly, but also promising.
It was promising because Turkey was hopeful that it could further
expand its political influence in the region, and had an eye on developing
closer relations with post-revolutionary Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia, but it
was not alone and faced stiff competition from other regional and inter-
national powers. In late May 2011, the G8 countries, for example, met
in France and promised $20 billion in aid to Egypt and Tunisia, an aid
conditional on political and economic reforms.44 Around the same time,
the Arab Gulf states were also moving in. Saudi Arabia had announced
a $4 billion financial aid to Egypt a few days before the G8 meeting.45
Other Arab Gulf states soon joined Saudi Arabia. Qatar pledged to invest
in projects worth at least $10 billion and the UAE announced a $3 billion
aid to Egypt.46
Itself a recipient and in need of international capital, Turkey was not
in a position to compete in this game. What it could offer Egypt, at least
financially, was limited. Turkey’s moves therefore remained political.
Turkey’s president, Abdullah Gül, was possibly the first world leader who
visited Egypt after Mubarak stepped down. In September 2011, Turkey’s
prime minister, Erdoğan, paid a visit to both Egypt and Tunisia, sign-
ing with Tunisia the Friendship and Cooperation Treaty and with Egypt
a framework that was to become the High Level Strategic Cooperation
Council between the two countries.
Turkey aimed high and was especially thrilled about the potential with
Egypt. It had a good reason for this, because Erdoğan received a hero’s
welcome in both countries. Just a few days after Erdoğan’s visit to Egypt,
Turkey’s Foreign Minister Davutoğlu gave an interview to the New York
Times and expressed Turkey’s desire to form a partnership with Egypt,
or to be more specific, a new axis of power. “This is what we want,” said
Davutoğlu. He added, “This will not be an axis against any other country
–not Israel, not any other country, this will be an axis of democracy, real
democracy.” That would be an axis “of the two big nations in our region,
from the north to the south, from the Black Sea down to the Nile Valley
in Sudan.”47
THE RISE OF THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD

Turkey had reasons to be optimistic about the developments in the Arab
World, because soon after Davutoğlu gave his interview, political parties
ideologically akin to the ruling JDP in Turkey scored impressive electoral
victories in Tunisia and Egypt in their first parliamentary elections, Tunisia
in October 2011 and Egypt in November–December 2011 and January
201248: the Al Nahda movement in Tunisia and the Freedom and Justice
Party (FJP) in Egypt.
Both al Nahda in Tunisia and the FJP in Egypt were affiliated with the
MB. As already mentioned, the MB originated in Egypt, but spread to
other Arab countries. Rashid al Ghannoushi, a native Tunisian who studied
in Egypt, brought the movement’s ideology and organization to Tunisia
in the late 1960s. Throughout the 1970s and the 1980s, the movement
had grown and began to challenge the strictly secular regime. In 1989,
al Ghannoushi changed his organization name from the Movement of
the Islamic Tendency, the MIT, to al Nahda. In the same year, al Nahda
was accused of organizing a plot to overthrow the regime in Tunisia and
was banned from participating in the 1989 elections. In the same year,
Ghannoushi was forced to political exile, first to Algeria and then to
Britain. Two years later, the regime officially banned al Nahda and initi-
ated a sweeping crackdown on its members.
When the Arab Spring erupted and toppled Zein Al Abidine bin Ali in
January 2011, Rashid al Ghannoushi returned to Tunisia on 30 January
2011. Two months later, al Nahda became a legal party again. Despite
the decades-long strict surveillance, al Nahda was still able to score an
electoral victory in the October 2011 elections, winning 41% of the seats
in parliament.
By the time the Arab Spring erupted, the Brotherhood had a presence
in Egypt much stronger than it had in Tunisia, even though the movement
had to endure repeated cycles of violence unleashed by the regime. This
had started in the 1950s when Jamal Abdal Nasser, Egypt’s new leader,
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violently cracked down on the Brotherhood and dissolved it after an assas-

sination attempt in 1954.
Only after Abdal Nasser died in 1970, did the Brotherhood find a
much-needed respite from the regime’s violence.
Throughout the 1970s, the Brotherhood worked to recover its orga-
nizational strength, and expanded its social base, as a new generation
of Islamist student leaders joined the movement. The MB expanded its
network particularly among the professional classes, and also had wealthy
businessmen among its followers. By the end of the 1980s, the Muslim
Brotherhood was in control of major professional syndicates. The last
major syndicate, that of the lawyers, also fell into the movement’s control
in 1992.49
Alarmed by the rise of the Brotherhood, the Egyptian regime once
again turned against the movement in the mid-1990s and started a sweep-
ing crackdown, the like of which had not been seen since the 1950s. In
response to the regime crackdown, the Brotherhood more or less turned
inward, as it underwent a period of internal disputes, but, overall, it avoided
escalating the confrontation with the regime: to this end, the movement
adopted a policy of keeping “a low public profile” and refrained from
activities that might increase the regime’s wrath.50
The movement weathered the storm once again. In the 2000 parlia-
mentary elections, the Brotherhood fielded 70 candidates. When 17 of
them won against their rivals, the Brotherhood emerged as the largest
opposition bloc in the parliament. This was an impressive success given
that it came right after a period of regime pressure on the movement. In
February 2001, the Brotherhood scored another victory in the bar asso-
ciation elections, its list winning the elections to the board.51
The US invasion of Iraq and the promotion of democracy opened wide
the political space for the MB. Paradoxically, however, the movement took
active part in leading the protests against the USA in the days leading up
to the invasion. More daringly, it declared a reform agenda for Egypt in
March 2004. Announced by the movement’s supreme guide, the reform
agenda called for “revoking the emergency law, ridding the information
media of non-Islamic content, curtailing the sweeping powers of the presi-
dent, ensuring religious, speech and political freedoms, releasing political
detainees, and deepening the principle of rotation of power via elections
marked with integrity.”52
More worrying for the regime, the Brotherhood contested 120 of the
444 seats in parliament in the 2005 parliamentary elections, and won 88
of them, thus becoming the largest ever opposition bloc in the parliament.
The Brotherhood could have won more seats if it contested them, but
it did not. Khairat al-Shatir, the deputy guide of the Brotherhood,
explained why the Brotherhood did not seek more seats in parliament
in an opinion piece he published immediately after the first round of
elections: “We have contested only 120 of the 444 parliamentary seats,
knowing that standing for more might provoke the regime into fixing
the results.”
Published in the Guardian, and therefore speaking directly to the
Western audience, the piece aimed to gain sympathy for the Brotherhood
in the West. “We are not,” al Shatir said, “seeking more than a small piece
of the parliamentary cake.” The Brotherhood was after something bigger.
What we want to do instead is trigger a renaissance in Egypt, rooted in the

religious values upon which Egyptian culture and society is built; for we
believe these values can effectively deal with the obstacles that have hin-
dered reform and development. At present, political life in Egypt is plagued
by apathy; only a few parties with puny followings are officially allowed to
join the political process. The priority is therefore to revitalise political life
so that citizens can join a real debate about the solutions to Egypt’s chronic
problems and the sort of future we want for our country.53
As the USA had become increasingly bogged down in Iraq, however,

the Brotherhood began to face a backlash from the regime. Even before
this, the Mubarak regime had been harassing the Brotherhood, but not on
a massive scale. The strong showing of the Brotherhood in the 2005 elec-
tions marked the beginning of a new crackdown described by some mem-
bers and outsiders as “the most widespread campaign against the group
since the 1960s.”54 From March to June of 2006, the regime detained
over 850 members of the Brotherhood. In December of the same year,
the regime rounded up over 140 members of the Brotherhood, includ-
ing senior leaders such as Khairat al Shatir. In an attempt to defend the
regime’s crackdown, Mubarak declared the Brotherhood “a danger to the
security of Egypt” and warned that if it came to power, Egypt would be
isolated in the world.55 The crackdown did not deter the Brotherhood,
however, who participated in the upper house elections held in June 2007.
The movement won no seats even though it fielded 19 candidates.56 In
addition to harassment and other hindrances, the regime arrested another
several hundred members during the election. Another wave of arrests,
over 830 members, came during the municipal elections in April 2008.57
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In the midst of all this, the Brotherhood began to cast itself as a demo-
cratic force in Egypt. In Spring 2005, the movement staged a series of
demonstrations, 23 in total, bringing around 140,000 people to the
streets. This, Shadi Hamid claimed, “was the largest pro-democracy mobi-
lization Egypt had seen in decades.”58 Khairat al Shatir’s opinion piece,
mentioned above, was in fact an early attempt in the same vein. Al Shatir
ended his piece with a call to the world:
“The success of the Muslim Brotherhood should not frighten anybody: we

respect the rights of all religious and political groups. So much damage has
been inflicted on the country over the past century because of despotism
and corruption that it would be impossible to embark on wider political
reform and economic development without first repairing the damage to
our basic institutions. Free and fair democratic elections are the first step
along the path of reform toward a better future for Egypt and the entire
region. We simply have no choice today but to reform.”59
In January 2007 came an unprecedented move by the Brotherhood.

The movement announced its intention to form a political party. This was
a serious break with the movement’s historical attachment to the view of
the founder, Hasan Al Banna, that political parties were foreign imports
and divided Muslims. The party’s draft program was announced in late
August 2007, which came as a disappointment to many as it was seri-
ously short of the program of a democracy-promoting political party.60
Even some leading Brotherhood figures publicly expressed dissatisfaction
with the program.61 In response to the negative reaction, the Brotherhood
decided to continue to work on the program before it was finalized, but
this effectively ended the movement’s initiative to form a political party.
The eruption of the Arab Spring must have changed the Brotherhood’s
calculations. Almost a week after Mubarak, Egypt’s president since 1981,
stepped down, the Brotherhood again announced its plan to establish a
political party. The party was officially established in late April 2011 under
the chairmanship of Muhammed Mursi, Egypt’s future president, and
entered the parliamentary elections, the first round of which started in
November 2011. The party scored an electoral victory and won 47% of
the seats in the lower house. The FJP scored another victory in elections
for Egypt’s upper house, the Shura Council, in January–February 2012.62
The FJP in Egypt received around 45% of the votes and won around 38%
of the seats.
The FJP scored an even more important victory in late May 2012:
in the first round of presidential elections, its candidate, Mursi, received
the highest number of votes, 25%, and was set to compete in the sec-
ond round against his closest rival, Ahmed Shafik, the last Prime Minister
of the Mubarak regime. Just two days before the second round, Egypt’s
supreme court dissolved the FJP-dominated parliament and thus dealt a
serious blow to the MB. This blow was soon to be forgotten, however, as
Mursi scored a victory in the second round of elections and was elected as
the first democratically elected president of Egypt. Turkey’s President Gül
and Prime Minister Erdoğan, were the first world leaders to congratulate
Mursi on his election.
The rise to power of the FJP in Egypt and al Nahda in Tunisia must
have boosted Turkey and Qatar. The ruling party in Turkey itself hailed
from the political Islam tradition of which the Brotherhood had been part,
and had strong historical and ideological ties to the movement. Qatar
had no Brotherhood problem at home and also had its own historical, if
not ideological, ties to the movement. More importantly, as discussed,
both Turkey and Qatar had been increasing their ties with the movement
throughout the 2000s.
Having possibly seen in Mursi’s presidency an opportunity to advance
their interests, Turkey and Qatar rushed to provide political and financial
aid to Egypt.
Qatar’s move came quite early. Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa, the ruler of
Qatar, paid a visit to Egypt at the head of a delegation in August 2012
and thus became the first Gulf leader to visit Egypt since Mursi’s elec-
tion to the presidency. It was during this visit that Qatar pledged $2 bil-
lion budget support to Egypt in four installments over the coming four
months.63 A few weeks later, Qatar’s Prime Minister and Minister of
Foreign Affairs Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim was back in Egypt. He handed
a letter from Qatar’s ruler to Egypt’s president, in which Sheikh Hamad
confirmed Qatar’s eagerness to cooperate with Egypt in various areas. On
his part, Hamad bin Jassem said, “There is no ceiling for cooperation or
investment in Egypt.” Prior to Mursi’s election to the presidency, Qatar
had already announced its intention to invest $10 billion in Egypt over a
period of five years. During this visit in September 2012, Qatar’s prime
minister announced that Qatar was going to invest $18 billion in tour-
ism and industry projects. The prime minister also announced that the
remaining $1.5 billion budget support would be paid in the coming three
months.64
100 B. BAŞKAN
Despite its financial weakness, Turkey also did its best. In mid-September
2012, Egypt’s vice president for external relations and international coop-
eration visited Turkey and signed a deal according to which Turkey was
to provide $2 billion aid to Egypt,65 $1 billion as a loan and $1 billion as
credit, to be used to finance imports from Turkey and implement projects
in Egypt in partnership with Turkey. Two weeks later, in late September
2012, Mursi visited Turkey.
Mursi received a wholehearted welcome in Turkey. In addition to offi-
cial meetings, Mursi also attended the party congress of the ruling party
in Turkey and even delivered a speech. In his speech, Mursi gratefully
informed the audience that the first person who visited him in office as the
president of Egypt was the foreign minister of Turkey and the first persons
who called to congratulate him were the prime minister and the president
of Turkey. For Mursi, “these are signs that show how strong the relations
between Egypt and Turkey are.”
“The Egyptian and Turkish people,” Mursi said, “have many common
goals, hopes and also a common history.” Mursi then enumerated some of
these goals: freedom, justice, peace, growth, and development. Among the
common goals Mursi cited were also “to ensure that people and nations
are the source of power” and “to support the nations that are fighting for
peace and want to get rid of their oppressive brutal dictators, the countries
that seek stability, peace, justice and development just like Palestine and
Syria” and to “stand against oppression, injustice and attempts to control
the people or governments by other people or governments.” Mursi also
added, “The history [between the Egyptian and Turkish people] that we
all know, we see a lot of goodness in it, we are proud of this history; in the
present time we can also see the common goals between us. This calls us
to cooperate and work together.”66
In another speech delivered to businessmen, Mursi called Turkey his
“second homeland” and advised them to improve relations. “Our trade
volume is very low. In cultural, technological and research fields, we could
establish the necessary network. It is a must that we build cultural bridges
as soon as possible … let us do whatever necessary to strengthen our ties
… We will be such an important example that other countries will envy us
when they see this.”67
Less than two months later, Erdoğan visited Egypt at the head of a huge
delegation, the delegation including 10 ministers and 350 businessmen.
During his visit to Egypt in November 2012, Turkey’s prime minister
co-chaired the second meeting of the High Level Strategic Cooperation
Council. The meeting resulted in some 20 treaties, almost all of them

seeking to expand cooperation between Turkey and Egypt in a number
of fields such as transportation, communication, agriculture, health ser-
vices, tourism, urban development, and culture.68 Another outcome of
Erdoğan’s visit was that Egypt agreed to buy ten ANKAs, unmanned aerial
vehicles produced by Turkey.69
Erdoğan also delivered a speech at Cairo University. “As it has always
been in history,” he said, “today and tomorrow, we will continue to be in
solidarity with Egypt, walk together with Egypt, and undertake all neces-
sities our brotherhood requires.” Erdoğan also prophesized that “Egypt
and Turkey, two powerful states of the region, will be the assurance of
peace, stability and tranquility of this geography.”
Erdoğan’s visit coincided with Israel’s next attack on Gaza. Erdoğan
thus did not eschew the Palestinian plight in his speech and made an emo-
tional appeal, an appeal that reflected his image of the Middle East.
“As Mecca, Medina, Cairo, Alexandria, Beirut, Damascus, Diyarbakır,

İstanbul, Ankara are sisters of each other, let the whole world know and
understand,Ramallah, Nablus, Eriha, Rafah, Gazza and Jerusalem are also sis-
ters of these cities as well … Any drop of blood shed in these cities is the same
blood in our veins. Any soul fallen on the ground in these cities is our soul.
Any drop of tears is our tear... Everyone should know that eventually, today or
tomorrow, the account of those innocent children massacred in non-human
methods in Gaza will be definitely settled [their revenge will be taken. BB]”.70
Symbolically, and significantly, while Erdoğan was in Egypt, Qatar’s

ruler, Sheikh Hamad, also happened to be in Egypt. Egypt’s President
Muhammed Mursi held talks with the two visiting leaders, Turkey’s
Erdoğan and Qatar’s Hamad bin Khalifa about the ongoing crisis in the
Gaza.71
Despite the important political and financial support Turkey and Qatar
provided to Egypt, it was possibly not enough for Mursi given the precari-
ous situation in which he found himself. With high levels of unemploy-
ment and inflation, depleted foreign reserves, decreased tourism revenues,
fleeing international capital, depreciating national currency, downgraded
rating status, and rising external debt, the economy was simply in sham-
bles. Mursi did not even cite foreign policy among the five issues he would
prioritize during the first 100 days of his presidency. They were rather
“providing citizens with bread, energy stability, security and cleanliness as
well as solving the problem of traffic jams.”72
102 B. BAŞKAN
Mursi could not, however, ignore foreign affairs, because interna-

tional support was critical in addressing these issues. He was not only
dealing with urgent economic problems, but also facing a restless youth
and a vocal opposition. He also had to cope with an obstructive judi-
ciary, placate Egypt’s powerful military, and appease his own support base,
the Brotherhood. International and regional allies could be of help and
empower his hand against his rivals.73 His first 100 days in office basically
passed on this quest.
Muhammed Mursi made his first foreign visit to neither Turkey nor
Qatar, but to Saudi Arabia, his choice reflecting the significance of this
country. The Kingdom already pledged to provide important financial
aid to Egypt and Mursi had to make sure that that aid was forthcoming.
In concluding his visit, Mursi was going to speak very highly of King
Abdullah. “Everything [King Abdullah] said was in the interest of the
future, of the region and of Egypt,” and the King spoke with “wisdom and
knowledge and love for the Egyptian people.”74
With intensive links to Egypt’s Armed Forces, the USA was more
important for Mursi. Aware of this, the Brotherhood sought to polish
its image with the USA and initiated what Nael Shama called a “charm
offensive” to assure Americans of their commitment, especially to peace
with Israel.75 Having been invited to the USA immediately after his elec-
tion, Mursi visited in September 2012 to attend the UN annual meeting.
He was also scheduled to meet the US president, Barack Obama, but the
meeting was canceled by the USA, possibly for electoral reasons. Mursi’s
moment to prove his worth to the USA came in November 2012 when
he negotiated a cease-fire between Israel and Hamas which lasted for two
weeks. According to his aides in the White House, Obama, who spoke
with Mursi on the phone several times during the crisis, was impressed by
his approach.76
Thomas Friedman’s view of Mursi captured well what Obama had in
mind.
Precisely because he represents the Muslim Brotherhood, the vanguard of

Arab Islam, and precisely because he was democratically elected, if Mursi
threw his weight behind an Israeli-Palestinian peace deal, it would be so
much more valuable to Israel than the cold peace that Sadat delivered and
Hosni Mubarak maintained. Sadat offered Israelis peace with the Egyptian
state. Mursi could offer Israel peace with the Egyptian people and, through
them, with the Muslim world beyond.77
Mursi must have been convinced that the financial and political sup-
port he gathered from Turkey, Qatar, and, more importantly, the USA
empowered his position at home, for immediately afterwards he made
his most ambitious bid to consolidate his power. He unilaterally granted
himself sweeping powers: he authorized himself “to take any measures he
sees fit in order to preserve the revolution, to preserve national unity or
to safeguard national security”; his “constitutional declarations, laws and
decrees” could not be “appealed or cancelled by any individual or political
or governmental body.”78 A week later, Islamist-dominated Constituent
Assembly rushed to pass a draft constitution. In mid-December 2012, the
constitution was approved in a referendum.
These moves simply galvanized the opposition, which had already been
on alert, and led to a fresh wave of street protests. In the succeeding
months, the protests continued to ebb and flow. Neither Mursi nor the
Brotherhood could take steps that would quell them. In late April 2013,
Tamarod, literally meaning “rebellion” in Arabic, was launched to “gather
signatures registering a withdrawal of confidence from” Mursi and “call for
early presidential elections.”79 Supported by different opposition groups,
the campaign grew and, by late June 2013, could claim to have gathered
more than 20 million signatures. In his first year review, made on 26 June
2012, Mursi said, “I have made mistakes on a number of issues” and
warned that the country was on the brink of a chaos. According to Mursi,
“the enemies of Egypt” were at work, “trying to sabotage the democratic
experience.”80 Four days after this speech, on 30 June 2013, the day that
marked the first anniversary of Mursi’s inauguration as Egypt’s president,
millions took to the streets in protest, calling for the resignation of Mursi.
According to a BBC report, “The last time such numbers were seen on
the square was during the revolution in 2011 which saw the removal of
President Hosni Mubarak from power.”81
During this difficult period, Turkey and Qatar continued to stand
behind Mursi. In response to a currency crisis set off by the street pro-
tests, Qatar announced that it was going to lend $2 billion and grant $500
million to Egypt. Qatar’s total aid to Egypt thus became $5 billion, $1
billion in grants and $4 billion in deposits.82 In late March 2013, Qatar’s
ruler, Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa, called other Arab states to support Egypt
during his opening address to the Arab League summit held in Doha.
“Nobody,” Sheikh Hamad said, “can forget the sacrifices Egypt has made
for all the Arabs.”83 Soon thereafter, Qatar announced another aid pack-
age to Egypt, worth of $3 billion, in April 2013. As its total aid to Egypt
104 B. BAŞKAN
thus rose to $8 billion, Qatar became the largest donor to Egypt during
Mursi’s presidency. It is worth noting that during this period, Egypt had
been holding talks with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for a loan
of $4.8 billion. Qatar’s prime minister, Hamad bin Jassim, also announced
that Qatar might “cover Egypt’s exports of gas” during the summer and
was willing to “participate in all projects tabled by the government of
Egypt.”84
Turkey did not have the deep pockets of Qatar, and therefore could
not help Egypt solve its dire financial crisis. It could, on the other hand,
continue to seek ways to develop cooperation with Egypt. In February
2013, for example, Turkey and Egypt signed a tourism partnership agree-
ment with the objective of boosting cooperation between the two coun-
tries in the field of tourism and “to promote Egypt and Turkey as key
tourist destinations in the region.”85 In April 2013, Turkey and Egypt
signed another agreement, this time seeking to expand cooperation in the
media.86 Finally, in June 2013, Turkey and Egypt signed three agreements
on railroad, maritime, and overland transportation which significantly
reduced red tape and bureaucratic fees.87
At the same time as it was receiving generous and enthusiastic finan-
cial and political support, Egypt was also aligning its foreign policies with
Turkey and Qatar, although not necessarily as quid pro quo. While assur-
ing Egypt’s old allies such as the USA and Saudi Arabia of Egypt’s friend-
ship and goodwill, Mursi also wanted to expand Egypt’s portfolio of allies,
and sought to develop stronger relations with other major world powers.
Mursi visited China in August 2012, his first visit to a non-Arab state,
Germany in January 2013, India in March 2013, and Russia in April 2013.
In all three cases, Mursi sought to promote bilateral economic relations.
More importantly, Mursi visited Iran in August 2012 to attend the
Non-Aligned Movement meeting. He thus became the first Egyptian
leader to visit Iran since the 1979 revolution. Egypt and Iran had already
made mutual gestures to repair bilateral relations immediately after
Mubarak stepped down.88 The relations did not improve much, however,
in large part because the architect, Nabil al Arabi, left the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs in June 2011. Mursi was also willing to change the nature
of Egypt–Iran relations. In his speech during the Organization of Islamic
Conference summit held in Mecca in August 2012, for example, Mursi
included Iran among the four regional countries, the others being Egypt,
Saudi Arabia, and Turkey, that must work together to solve the Syrian cri-
sis. Called the Islamic Quartet, the group held its first meeting at foreign
ministry level in Cairo in September 2012, with the notable absence of the
Saudi Minister.89
In the same month, September 2012, the Wall Street Journal reported
that Iran was holding talks to sell oil to Egypt. The initiative came from
Iran, but Egypt’s al Ahram newspaper reported that Egypt’s Minister
of Oil expressed no objection to “importing and refining Iranian oil.”90
Iran reciprocated Mursi’s visit in February 2013 when Iran’s President
Mahmoud Ahmedinejad visited Egypt and attended the Organization of
Islamic Conference meeting. This was the first visit ever made by an Iranian
president to Egypt since the 1979 revolution. Iran’s state news agency,
IRNA, reported that Ahmedinejad said, “I will try to pave the ground
for developing cooperation between Iran and Egypt.” He added that, “If
Tehran and Cairo see more eye to eye on regional and international issues,
many (issues) will change.”91 In a symbolic act, Ahmedinejad also met with
the Grand Sheikh of Al Azhar during his visit. In the same month, February
2013, Egypt and Iran signed an agreement to promote tourism between
the two countries. A month later, the two countries re-started direct flights
after 34 years.92 In May 2013, Egypt and Turkey agreed to Iran’s proposal
to form an Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)-type
petrochemical association. Abdolhossein Bayat, the Managing Director of
the National Iranian Petrochemical Organization, said that, with this, “the
core of a petrochemical OPEC has been formed.”93
While participating in rapprochement with Iran, Egypt also took a very
strong pro-opposition stance in the ongoing crisis in Syria during Mursi’s
presidency. Mursi expressed his support for the rebels in Syria soon after
he was elected. He called for an end to the rule of Syria’s President Bashar
Al Assad in August 2012 when he attended the Organization of Islamic
Conference meeting in Saudi Arabia. He also reiterated his support for the
rebels in Syria during his visit to Iran. In his speech, Mursi said, “Our soli-
darity with the struggle of the Syrian people against an oppressive regime
that has lost its legitimacy is an ethical duty as it is a political and strategic
necessity.” Mursi added, “We all have to announce our full solidarity with
the struggle of those seeking freedom and justice in Syria, and translate
this sympathy into a clear political vision that supports a peaceful transi-
tion to a democratic system of rule that reflects the demands of the Syrian
people for freedom.”94 In his address to the UN General Assembly, Mursi
renewed his call to Bashar al Assad to step down, and thus confirmed
Egypt’s anti-regime stance.95
106 B. BAŞKAN
Finally, Egypt’s relationship with Hamas also changed under Mursi.

As discussed, Hamas was the Brotherhood’s branch in Palestine and
therefore it enjoyed a historical and close relationship with the Egyptian
branch. Hailing from the same movement, Mursi could not be expected
to have a negative view of Hamas. In fact his victory was met with jubila-
tion in Gaza, where Hamas was in control. Ismail Haniyah, a senior figure
in Hamas, and by then the elected head of the government in Gaza, said,
“We will look to Egypt to play a big, leading role, a historic role, regarding
the Palestinian cause, in helping the Palestinian nation get freedom, return
home, and totally end the Gaza siege.”96
Mursi met the Hamas leaders in July 2012, a meeting that could not
even be imagined with Mubarak. Mursi spoke of “supplying Gaza with fuel
and electricity and easing the restrictions on the border crossing between
Gaza and Egypt.”97 Mursi would not be able to deliver much material
support to Hamas during his presidency.98 He could not even end Egypt’s
cooperation with Israel in the blockage of Gaza. On the contrary, he even
increased it. A senior Hamas leader, Mahmoud al Zahar, was reported to
have said, “The previous [Egyptian] regime was cruel, but it never allowed
Gaza to starve.”99
Mursi definitely held the belief that Hamas must be spoken to and
treated as the one, if not the only, representative of the Palestinians. Mursi
acted on that belief and met with Hamas leaders, several times in fact.
Under Mursi, Egypt had not kept its strictly pro-Fatah position, but rather
became more equidistant to both groups. This in turn greatly improved
Hamas’s legitimacy.
Egypt’s changing attitude toward Hamas could be seen during the con-
flict between Hamas and Israel in November 2012. Mursi called Israel’s
military operation an “unacceptable aggression,” recalled Egypt’s ambas-
sador to Israel, and sent his prime minister to Gaza as a show of sup-
port. Mursi’s stance toward Hamas, and the brotherly links between the
two branches of the Brotherhood, helped him broker a cease-fire between
Hamas and Israel. Mursi could thus prove his worth to the USA, as noted
above.
During Mursi’s presidency, in short, Egypt aligned its major foreign
policy positions with those of Turkey and Qatar. While it kept its old allies
such as the USA and Saudi Arabia, it also sought to develop stronger rela-
tions with other major powers such as China, Russia, and India. It also
sought to improve its relations with Iran, adopted a pro-opposition stance
in the ongoing Syrian crisis, and treated Hamas as a legitimate political
actor. These were almost the same positions Turkey and Qatar had already
taken well before Egypt under Mursi had taken. Turkey, Egypt, and
Qatar thus formed what King Abdullah of Jordan would call “the Muslim
Brotherhood Crescent.”
TROUBLED MONARCHIES
When King Abdullah called it the “Muslim Brotherhood Crescent,” he
was not merely making a descriptive statement. He was unusually critical.
King Abdullah was definitely concerned about his own country: in his
view, the Brotherhood in Jordan had become too confident of themselves
after the Arab Spring. The King believed that they refused to be part of the
national dialogue initiated after the Arab Spring, precisely for this reason:
“I think they thought the revolution was going to happen in Jordan, and
they didn’t need to be part of the national committee … They thought
they’d won. They had decided that they had won.”100
Jordan was not alone. Saudi Arabia and the UAE were equally dis-
concerted by the electoral successes of the Brotherhood-affiliated political
figures and parties. Until then both Saudi Arabi and the UAE had had an
ambivalent relationship with the Brotherhood, if not troubled.
Both countries were among those that wholeheartedly received the
Brotherhood in the 1950s. Like Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE had
also been building their educational institutions and needed human capi-
tal for it. Facing waves of suppression in countries such as Egypt, Syria,
and Iraq, the Brotherhood figures in fact found precious opportunities in
Saudi Arabia and the UAE.
The Brotherhood had provided another service to Saudi Arabia. From
the 1960s, the Kingdom was waging a Pan-Islamic unity campaign among
the Muslim countries to counter Nasser’s Egypt, which was waging its
own campaign of Pan-Arabism. For Saudi Arabia, Islam was to serve as
the counter ideology against pan-Arab socialism, be it the Nasserite or
Baathist version. To this end, Saudi Arabia founded the Muslim World
League in 1962 and the World Assembly of Muslim Youth in 1972. The
Brotherhood figures, themselves victims of the regimes, were useful in
undertaking this campaign effectively.
Without any hindrance, therefore, the Brotherhood figures spread
their ideology and organization in Saudi Arabia, and occupied important
positions in the newly expanding state institutions, and especially in the
educational system. This auspicious period was to end however. In Saudi
108 B. BAŞKAN
Arabia,101 the end began in the 1980s and came out fully into public after
Iraq invaded Kuwait and Saudi Arabia invited the USA to defend the
Kingdom and expel Iraq from Kuwait. The Saudi government secured a
fatwa from the highest religious authority in the Kingdom, justifying its
decision to invite the USA, but this did not quell the dissent. Some lead-
ing religious figures and intellectuals inspired by the Brotherhood ideol-
ogy, known as the Sahwis, openly criticized the decision and the fatwa.
More provocatively, they formed a forum in March 1991 that began to
issue its own fatwas to counter those of the official religious establish-
ment. The same individuals penned a petition to the King, described as a
letter of demands. Signed by more than 400 figures, among whom were
the two highest-ranking religious officials in the Kingdom, the letter was
delivered in April 1991 and distributed throughout the Kingdom. The
letter advised the King to undertake a series of reforms, one of which was
the formation of an advisory council “independent of the regime, made
up of ‘specialists in various areas.’”102 The letter was followed by a memo-
randum of advice, which specified what needed to be done to meet the
demands set out in the petition.
As the opposition gained more momentum, more groups, even those
who had been at odds with, and even opposed the Sahwis for various
reasons, joined the opposition. Among them was Osama bin Laden. Born
in 1957 in Saudi Arabia into a wealthy family from Yemen, bin Laden
climbed all the ladders of the Saudi educational system and began to make
frequent trips to Afghanistan in the early 1980s. The country was under
Soviet invasion, and the USA and Saudi Arabia were collaboratively sup-
porting and nurturing resistance groups against it. Bin Laden joined this
effort, or what was termed the “Afghan Jihad,” the “Holy War,” against
the Soviet Union, raising funds and recruiting fighters for it. The Soviet
Union withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989, and the jihad should have
been over, but it was not over for bin Laden. He was in search of a new
front to continue the jihad, and now he was more experienced and had
better logistics. One year before, in 1988, he had established an organiza-
tion and named it al Qaeda. He was also in command of a good number
of experienced Arab fighters under his command.
Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait presented an opportunity. He offered his
fighters to defend the Kingdom. When he was refused, bin Laden turned
against the Kingdom at the very time the Sahwi opposition was growing.
By the time Bin Laden declared his support for the Sahwi opposition, he
was no longer in Saudi Arabia. He spent some years in Sudan and then
moved to Afghanistan, where a fresh force, the Taliban, was unifying the
country. In Afghanistan, bin Laden would declare Holy War against the
USA; in one of his fatwas, issued in 1998, he announced that killing any
American, be they civilian or military, was an individual duty for every
Muslim “who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it.”103
In early 1993, the Saudi regime struck back by arresting some 40 indi-
viduals, but it fell short of stopping the opposition. In Stephane Lacroix’s
words “[T]he years 1993 and 1994 appear in retrospect as a kind of
golden age of Saudi Islamism.”104 Undeterred, the Saudi regime contin-
ued its efforts to dissipate the oppositional momentum and succeeded in
greatly containing it by the mid-1990s.
Despite this success, the whole episode had a deep impact on the Saudi
regime’s attitude toward the Brotherhood. This can be most vividly seen
in an interview with the then Minister of Interior, Prince Nayif bin Abdal
Aziz al Saud, gave to a Kuwaiti newspaper in November 2002. The prince
was asked whether the Saudi security forces used excessive violence against
citizens. Prince Nayef talked about the infamous Grand Mosque seizure
incident of 1979, where some 200 people were killed, and then claimed
that this incident was undertaken by the movements inspired by the
Brotherhood. The Prince continued:
I want to say without hesitation that all our problems … came from the
Muslim Brotherhood … when the situation became difficult for the Muslim
Brotherhood and their own states were executing them, they took refuge in
Saudi Arabia, and the Saudi government granted them the required safety.
And after they stayed for several years, they asked to get jobs, so we hired
them, and some of them worked in schools and even universities. However,
they did not forget their allegiance to the Brotherhood, and they started to
recruit people and create different movements. In their case they should not
have harmed the Kingdom, if they wanted to say something they could say
it but not in the country that was generous and kind to them.105
The regime’s attitude toward the Brotherhood in the UAE also under-
went a notable change. In the UAE, a native Brotherhood branch was
founded in the mid-1970s. Its members, both natives and migrants,
played important roles in the newly developing UAE state institutions
and especially the educational system at all levels. The years between 1977
and 1983 were golden years for the Brotherhood. From 1977 to 1979,
one member was in the cabinet as the minister of justice and awqaf. In
110 B. BAŞKAN
1979, another member entered the cabinet as the minister of education

and youth and, as the minister, also became the president of the only uni-
versity in the country, the UAE University. In 1977, an important position
in the ministry, the director of curriculums, also came to be occupied by a
another Brotherhood member.
The change in the UAE’s attitude toward the Brotherhood came in
1983. In that year, the three Brotherhood members were all removed
from their positions. With this act, the UAE state initiated a series of
reforms that was to “Americanize” the educational system and decrease
the significance of the Arab–Islamic element.106 The Brotherhood figures
were aware that they were losing their influence in the educational system.
From the very beginning, they had not refrained from raising their criti-
cisms of and objections to this re-orientation, and from the very begin-
ning, the UAE state had proved to be determined. In the earliest instance
of a confrontation, the UAE authorities stopped the publication of their
journal from October 1988 to April 1989.
A more radical move against the Brotherhood came in 1995. The UAE
authorities disbanded the administrative council of the official Brotherhood
organization in the UAE, the Islah Society, forbade all of its activities
abroad, and delegated the supervision of the branches to the Ministry of
Social Affairs. It was certainly a big blow against the Brotherhood, but
not a fatal one. Retrospectively, it was an attempt to tame them, not a
punishment. The UAE regime was ambivalent about the Brotherhood
and remained so in the coming decade. The relations between the UAE
state and the Brotherhood had not improved, but had not turned into
full-fledged confrontation either.107
The rise to power of the FJP in Egypt, and al Nahda in Tunisia, must
have been disconcerting for both the UAE and Saudi Arabia. The move-
ment’s branches in these two Gulf countries had, since the 1990s, evolved
and developed a different but still oppositional discourse against the
regimes.108 The Arab Spring and the coming to power of the Brotherhood,
especially in Egypt, greatly concerned the rulers. Now the local branches,
otherwise not commanding much public support, had powerful regional
support and were therefore troubling.
The UAE’s campaign against the Brotherhood started in early
December 2011, shortly after the first round of parliamentary elections
in Egypt. The UAE president evoked the citizenship of seven members of
the Islah Society. In the months to come, the UAE would ratchet up the
campaign. In January 2012, for example, Dhahi Khalfan, Dubai’s police
chief and the UAE’s most visible face against the Brotherhood, delivered a
speech on Gulf security in a conference held in Bahrain and listed the US
foreign policy in the Arab region at the top. In Khalfan’s view, the USA
was working to export the Arab revolutions, and after Tunisia, Egypt, and
Libya, the Gulf region was the next in line. More importantly, Khalfan
noted that the USA had found a local ally, the Muslim Brotherhood. In
his view, the Brotherhood was getting stronger and stronger and was
embraced by the USA, and therefore this was a security threat to the Gulf
states.109 Two months later, the UAE initiated a wave of arrests of leading
figures of the Brotherhood in the UAE. By January 2013, the UAE had
arrested a total of 94 figures and charged them of “seeking to oppose the
basic principles of the UAE system of governance and to seize power.”110
Saudi Arabia was not vocal, but was no less concerned than the
UAE. The Brotherhood and Saudi Arabia held completely opposite
views when it came to Muslim political agency. While the former held
that Muslims should be politically active and engaged, the latter pro-
moted the opposite. Saudi Arabia had no formal Brotherhood branch,
but it had Islamist groups, some of which owed great intellectual debt to
the Brotherhood, and the rise of the Brotherhood could embolden these
groups. More importantly, perhaps, the Brotherhood could steer Egypt,
its most valuable and longtime ally, away from Saudi Arabia.111 To have
a countervailing force against the Brotherhood in Egypt, Saudi Arabia
reportedly supported the Salafis in Egypt, which, despite their political
inexperience, emerged as the second largest bloc in parliament in the first
post-Mubarak elections in Egypt.
A NOTE ON QATAR
Qatar’s rulers can hardly be described as “Islamists.” In terms of religious
orientation, Qatar’s rulers are Wahhabis, and even proudly so, because al
Thanis and Wahhabism’s founder, Muhammed ibn Abdal Wahhab, descend
from a certain Omar bin Maadhed of Bani Tamim tribe.112 Symbolically,
and significantly, the largest state mosque constructed during the reign of
Sheikh Hamad was named after the founder of Wahhabism, Muhammed
bin AbdalWahhab.
Al Thanis in Qatar must be as much averse to a religious orientation
like that of the MB as are al Sauds in Saudi Arabia, the only other Wahhabi
country in the world, which makes its adherents politically active and
questioning. Bernard Haykel puts it succinctly:
112 B. BAŞKAN
The Brotherhood is a vanguard political movement with a popular mass

base of support, and its members seek to rule in the name of Islam, which
they describe as a comprehensive ideological and social system. By contrast,
Qatar officially subscribes to Wahhabism and adheres to the Hanbali school
of law, which insists on the political obedience of subjects to their ruler,
who is effectively a monarch. Put differently, the Muslim Brotherhood is an
activist and anti-Western political movement ultimately seeking to topple
secular nationalist regimes, and it is not particularly in favour of monarchi-
cal systems of rule, especially those that are in close economic and military
alliance with the West. Not only is Qatar allied closely to the U.S., but its
version of Islam does not tolerate political activism of any kind unless it is
controlled and sanctioned by the ruler.113
There is an important difference between Qatar and Saudi Arabia,

however. Al Thanis have not historically faced a well-entrenched native
religious class in Qatar, whereas al Saudis have done so.114 Sheikh Hamad
could introduce otherwise controversial reforms starting in the mid-1990s
without facing an organized religious opposition. Qatar’s support for the
Islamists, including the Brotherhood figures, almost killed any such possi-
bility, because this support came with a condition, that the Islamists would
not engage in any kind of activity that would undermine the stability of
the regime in Qatar. Most being foreigners, the interests of those Islamists
supported by Qatar lay elsewhere, mostly in their home countries. Even
relations with Hamas, declared a terrorist organization by the USA, the
EU, and Israel, were not without advantages. Qatar’s relations with the
USA and Israel could be conveniently ignored and Qatar could serve as a
mediator in conflicts involving Hamas.
By opening the way to power for the MB-affiliated political parties
in Tunisia, Egypt, and Yemen, the Arab Spring in fact created unfore-
seen opportunities for Qatar. Qatar’s leadership was aware of this. In
November 2011, right after the first round of parliamentary elections
in Egypt, Qatar’s influential prime minister, Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim,
would prophesize that Islamists would be the next in line in assuming
political power in the Arab World. He also made a call: “We shouldn’t
fear them, let’s co-operate with them,” adding that moderate Islamists
could be helpful in fighting against the extremists. “We should not have a
problem with anyone who operates within the norms of international law,
comes to power and fights terrorism.”115
Hamad bin Jassim was also reported to have said that Qatar was a kind
of democracy, but “not fighting for democracy.”116 Indeed, unlike Turkey
and Egypt, Qatar was, and still is, a monarchy. Its rulers did not come
to power through elections like Muhammed Mursi in Egypt and Recep
Tayyip Erdoğan in Turkey. Even though they might have believed that
political legitimacy could be acquired through the ballot box, it was not
the only way to acquire it. Even in their most reformist period, Qatar’s
rulers did not seem to be interested in subjecting themselves to elections.
At the very best, they could imagine a parliament, partly elected, with
legislative powers.
Qatar’s constitution, approved in 2003, indeed vested legislative
authority in a Consultative Council. This council “shall consist of forty-
five Members,” but only “thirty of whom shall be elected by direct, gen-
eral secret ballot.” The rest would be appointed by the ruler himself.117
Even though the constitution prescribed such a council, Qatar’s rulers
were slow. The first elections for the council were scheduled to take place
in 2007, but they were postponed first to 2010, and then to 2013.
Instead of having the first parliamentary elections in 2013, Sheikh
Hamad made an unexpected move and abdicated on 25 June 2013 in
favor of his son, Sheikh Tamim. No elections were held that year and the
term of the existing, entirely appointed Council was extended to 2016. It
is yet to be seen whether Qatar will have its first parliamentary elections
in 2016, but as of now, the probability of Qatar making a transition to
democracy seems to be almost nil.118 Eight days after Sheikh Hamad’s
abdication, the Egyptian Armed Forces staged a coup and overthrew the
MB-backed Muhammed Mursi.
NOTES
1. “Qatar, Tunisia sign 14 agreements,” The Peninsula, Dec. 16, 2010.
Available http://thepeninsulaqatar.com/news/qatar/135958/qatar-tunisia-
sign-14-agreements
2. The press releases of the Minister of Foreign Affairs are available at http://
www.mfa.gov.tr/sub.tr.mfa?3fc6582e-a37b-40d1-847a-6914dc12fb60
(accessed on Sept., 3, 2011).
3. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Tunus’ta Meydana Gelen Olaylar Hk.,”
Press Release no. 14, Jan. 14, 2011. Available at http://www.mfa.gov.tr/
no_-14_-14-ocak-2011_-tunus_ta-meydana-gelen-olaylar-hk_.tr.mfa
114 B. BAŞKAN
4. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Tunus’ta Olaylar Hk.” Press Release no.
36, Jan. 28, 2011. Available at http://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_-36_-28-ocak-
2011_-tunus_taki-olaylar-hk_.tr.mfa
5. “World responds to Tunisia uprising,” Al Jazeera English, Jan. 14,
2011. Available http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2011/01/
2011114224727460658.html
6. See Merlyna Lim, “Framing Bouazizi: ‘White Lies’, hybrid network, and
collective/connective action in the 2010-11 Tunisian uprising,” Journalism,
14(7) (2013), pp.921–941.
7. Lawrence Pintak, “The Al Jazeera Revolution,” Foreign Policy, 2 Feb.
2011. Available at http://foreignpolicy.com/2011/02/02/the-al-jazeera-
revolution/
8. Aref Hijjawi, “The Role of Al-Jazeera (Arabic) in the Arab Revolts of 2011,”
Perspectives Middle East, 2 (May 2011) Special Issue, p.68.
9. Massive street protests began on 25 January 2011.
10. The full text of Erdoğan’s speech can be found at http://www.akparti.org.
tr/site/haberler/basbakan-erdoganin-ak-parti-grup-toplantisinda-yaptigi-
konusmanin-tam-metni/7006#1 Translation is mine.
11. “Emiri Diwan issues statement on developments in Egypt,” The Peninsula,
Feb. 11, 2011. Available at http://thepeninsulaqatar.com/news/qatar/
142233/emiri-diwan-issues-statement-on-developments-in-egypt
12. Hijjawi, “The Role of Al-Jazeera (Arabic) in the Arab Revolts of 2011.”
13. Scott Bridges, “How Al Jazeera Took on the (English-Speaking) World,”
Inside Story, Oct. 19, 2012. Available at http://insidestory.org.au/
how-al-jazeera-took-on-the-english-speaking-world
14. Hijjawi, “The Role of Al-Jazeera (Arabic) in the Arab Revolts of 2011.”
15. Turkey as a model in the Middle East was proposed by George W. Bush, for
example. It is highly likely that as advisor to him, Bernard Lewis was instru-
mental in crafting this proposal. See Steve M. Wright, The United States and
Persian Gulf Security, Reading: Ithaca Press, 2007. I thank Steve Wright for
pointing out the connection between Bush and Lewis. Recently, similar pro-
posals have been voiced. See, for example, Robert D. Kaplan, “Arab democ-
racy and the return of the Mediterranean World,” The Washington Post, Feb.
27, 2011. Conservative circles in Turkey also enthusiastically embraced the
idea of Turkey, Muslim, yet secular and democratic, as a model in the Islamic
World.
16. Ahmet Davutoğlu has been seen, for good reasons, as the main architect of
Turkey’s foreign policy under successive JDP governments. He was the chief
advisor to the prime minister of Turkey on foreign affairs from 2002 to
2009 and the minister of foreign affairs from 2009 to August 2014. After
Erdoğan became the president of the republic, Davutoğlu became the prime
minister of Turkey.
17. Otherwise states, the quotes below are taken from http://www.mfa.gov.tr/
disisleri-bakani-sayin-ahmet-Davutoğlu_nun-turk-ocaklari_nin-
kurulusunun- 100_-yilini-kutlama-etkinlikleri-kapsaminda-duzenlenen.
tr.mfa. Translations are mine.
18. Davutoğlu discusses in the rest of his talk some other objectives that seem
rather tools to achieve the prime objective he states in the beginning.
19. The interview was aired on 24 May 2011 in TRT Haber. Available at
http://www.frequency.com/video/dailymotion-trt/7546170
20. Minister of Foreign Affairs, “Bahreyn’de Meydana Gelen Olaylar Hk.,”
Statement No:72, Mar. 17, 2011. Available at http://www.mfa.gov.tr/
no_-72_-17-mart-2011_-bahreyn_de-meydana-gelen-olaylar-hk_.tr.mfa
21. Karbala refers to a battle between Hussein, who was accepted by the Shias
as the third imam, and Yazid, the Umayyad caliph, that took place in 680,
resulting in the massacre of Hussein and his predominantly unarmed
followers.
22. Erdal Şen, “Gazetecilik kisvesi alında kirli senaryolar uyguluyorlar,” Zaman,
Mar. 16, 2011.
23. For an insightful take on Turkey’s position on Libya, see Şaban Kardaş,
“Turkey’s ‘moral politics’ in Libya: Seduction by analogy?” Today’s Zaman,
Mar. 20, 2011, available at http://www.todayszaman.com/news-238664-
turkeys-moral-politics-in-libya-seduction-by-analogy-by-saban-kardas*--.
html (accessed on Sept. 3, 2011) and Şaban Kardaş, “Turkey Balances its
Ties with West and Islamic World in Libya Operation,” Eurasia Daily
Monitor, 8(62) (Mar. 30, 2011). Available at http://www.jamestown.org/
single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=37718 (accessed on Sept.
3, 2011).
24. “NATO’nun Libya’da ne işi var,” NTVMSNBC News, Feb. 28, 2011.
Available at http://www.ntv.com.tr/arsiv/id/25187334
25. “Erdoğan: Libya’ya silah doğrultmayacağız,” NTVMSNBC News, Mar. 22,
2011. Available at http://www.ntv.com.tr/arsiv/id/25194990/
26. “Turkish assembly backs joining NATO naval operation,” Reuters, Mar. 24,
2011. Available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/03/24/
us-libya-turkey-vote-idUSTRE72N51220110324
27. Tom Finn, “Yemen’s crisis mounts amid protests, killings,” The Wall Street
Journal, May 14, 2011. Available at http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100
01424052748703864204576321334194576812
28. Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, Qatar and the Arab Spring, p.123. Ulrichsen
provides a succinct overview of Qatar’s involvement in Libya.
29. See Andrew Hammond, “Gulf media find their red line in uprisings:
Bahrain,” Reuters, Apr. 14, 2011. Available at http://www.reuters.com/
article/2011/04/14/oukwd-uk-mideast-protests-media-
idAFTRE73D1HB20110414
116 B. BAŞKAN
30. This accusation can be directed to all media outlets in the Middle East,
including those in Turkey. With regard to Al Jazeera, see Ali Hashem, “The
Arab spring has shaken Arab TV’s credibility,” The Guardian, Apr. 3, 2012.
Available http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/apr/03/
arab-spring-arab-tv-credibility
31. Cited in Omar Chatriwala, “What Wikileaks Tells Us About Al Jazeera,”
Foreign Policy, Sept. 19, 2011. Available at http://foreignpolicy.
com/2011/09/19/what-wikileaks-tells-us-about-al-jazeera/
32. “Turkey and Syria to stage joint military exercise,” Anadolu News Agency,
Apr. 26, 2009. Available at http://www.todayszaman.com/newsDetail_
getNewsById.action?load=detay&link=173556 (accessed on Sept. 4, 2011).
33. “Turkish army to train Syrian army,” Anadolu News Agency, Jan. 31, 2011.
Available at http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=turkish-army-to-
train-syrian-army-2011-01-31 (accessed on Sept. 4, 2011).
34. Rania Abouzeid, “The Jihad Next Door: The Syrian roots of Iraq’s newest
civil war,” Politico Magazine, June 23, 2014. Available at http://www.
politico.com/magazine/story/2014/06/al-qaeda-iraq-syria-108214
35. Gürkan Zengin, Kavga: Arap Baharı’nda Türk Dış Politikası, Istanbul,
İnkılap, 2013, p.124.
36. “Kendi halkına karşı savaşmak korkaklıktır,” available at http://www.
akparti.org.tr/site/haberler/ak-parti-grup-toplantisinda-konustu/
16252#1
37. On the lives of 13 leading figures from the non-armed opposition, see Feyza
Gümüşlüoğlu, Suriye’de Muhalif Olmak, İstanbul: Mana Yayınları, 2013.
38. “Final member of Damascus-based Hamas politburo leaves Syria,” Haaretz,
Feb. 5, 2012. Available at http://www.haaretz.com/news/middle-east/
final-member-of-damascus-based-hamas-politburo-leaves-syria-1.411226
39. “Hamas political leaders leave Syria for Egypt and Qatar,” BBC News, Feb.
28, 2012. Available at http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-
17192278
40. “Meşal: Artık İslam aleminin de liderisin” NTV, Sept. 30, 2012. Available at
http://www.ntv.com.tr/turkiye/mesal-artik-islam-aleminin-de-liderisin,
pilA9TveYUKLfs6tQ3rqEQ
41. “Gulf states recalling ambassadors in Syria,” Reuters, Feb. 7, 2012. Available
http://www.r euters.com/ar ticle/2012/02/07/us-gulf-syria-
idUSTRE81618C20120207
42. Joshua Jacobs, “The danger that Saudi Arabia will turn Syria into an Islamist
hotbed,” The Christian Science Monitor, Apr. 12, 2012. Available at http://
w w w. c s m o n i t o r. c o m / C o m m e n t a r y / O p i n i o n / 2 0 1 2 / 0 4 1 2 /
The-danger-that-Saudi-Arabia-will-turn-Syria-into-an-Islamist-hotbed
43. “Davutoğlu Esad’a ömür biçti,” NTV, Aug. 24, 2012. http://www.ntv.
com.tr/arsiv/id/25376791
44. Liz Alderman, “Aid pledge by Group of 8 seeks to Bolster Arab Democracy,”
The New York Times, May 27, 2011. Available at http://www.nytimes.
com/2011/05/28/world/europe/28g8.html
45. Tom Arnold, “Saudi offers assistance to Egypt,” The National, May 23,
2011. Available at http://www.thenational.ae/business/economy/saudi-
offers-assistance-to-egypt
46. Eman el Shenawi, “Are Egypt’s ‘old chums’ coming soon?” Al Arabiya, July
12, 2011. Available http://english.alarabiya.net/articles/2011/07/12/
157283.html
47. Anthony Shadid, “Turkey Predicts Alliance with Egypt as Regional
Anchors,” International New York Times, Sept. 18, 2011. Available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/19/world/middleeast/turkey-
predicts-partnership-with-egypt-as-regional-anchors.html?_r=0
48. Egypt held the elections in three stages, each stage with a run-off. The elec-
tions lasted from 28 November to 11 January.
49. For the recovery of the Brotherhood in Egypt, see Carrie R. Wickham,
Mobilizing Islam: the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, New York: Columbia
University Press, 2003.
50. Carrie R. Wickham, Mobilizing Islam: the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt,
postscript.
51. Mona El-Ghobashy, “The Metamorphosis of the Egyptian Muslim
Brothers,” International Journal of Middle East Studies, 37(3) (August
2005), p.387.
52. Gamal Essam El-Din, “Brotherhood steps into the fray,” Al Ahram Weekly,
no: 681, March 11–17, 2004. Available at http://weekly.ahram.org.
eg/2004/681/eg3.htm. Also see the discussion in Marc Lynch, “The
Brotherhood’s Dilemma,” Brandeis University Crown Center for Middle
East Studies Middle East Brief, 25 (January 2008).
53. Khairat el-Shatir, “No need to be afraid of us,” The Guardian, Nov. 23,
2005. Available at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2005/nov/23/
comment.mainsection
54. International Crisis Group, “Egypt’s Muslim Brothers: Confrontation or
Integration?,” Middle East/North Africa Report, 76 (June 2008), p.9.
55. Roaee Nahmias, “Mubarak warns against religious state in Egypt,” ynet-
news, Jan. 11, 2007. Available at http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/
0,7340,L-3351377,00.html
56. See Marc Lynch, “The Brotherhood’s Dilemma.”
57. International Crisis Group, “Egypt’s Muslim Brothers: Confrontation
or Integration?,” Middle East/North Africa Report, 76 (June 2008),
pp.8–15.
58. Shadi Hamid, Temptations of Power: Islamists and Illiberal Democracy in a
New Middle East, New York: Oxford University Press, 2014, p.123.
118 B. BAŞKAN
59. El-Shatir, “No need to be afraid of us.”

60. Nathan J. Brown and Amr Hamzawy, “The Draft Party Platform of the
Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood: Foray into Political Integration or Retreat
Into Old Positions,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Middle
East Series, 89 (Jan. 2008). Available at http://carnegieendowment.org/
files/cp89_muslim_brothers_final.pdf
61. International Crisis Group, “Egypt’s Muslim Brothers: Confrontation or
Integration?,” pp.15–20. See also Lynch, “The Brotherhood’s Dilemma.”
62. Egypt held the elections in two stages, each stage with a run-off. The elec-
tions lasted from 29 January to 29 February 2012.
63. “Qatar pledges $2 bn for Egypt’s central bank,” Al Jazeera, Aug. 12, 2012.
Available at http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2012/08/
201281261018425841.html
64. “Qatar to invest $18bn in Egypt: PM,” The Peninsula, 7 Sept. 2012.
Available at http://thepeninsulaqatar.com/news/qatar/207270/qatar-to-
invest-18bn-in-egypt-pm
65. Matt Bradley, “Turkey to Provide Egypt $2 Billion in Aid,” The Wall Street
Journal, Sept. 15, 2012. Available at http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100
00872396390444517304577653852418813354
66. Muhammed Mursi’s speech is available at https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=2Xx9I8mLhPM
67. “Mursi: Suriye’deki vahşete son vermeliyiz,” Bugün, Oct. 1, 2010. Available
at http://www.bugun.com.tr/dunya/suriyede-gunun-gelismesi-haberi/
207099
68. “Türkiye ile Mısır arasında 27 anlaşma imzalandı,” Yeni Şafak, Nov. 17,
2012. Available at http://www.yenisafak.com.tr/politika/turkiye-ile-misir-
arasinda-27-anlasma-imzalandi-424492
69. “Egypt to be first country to buy Turkish UAVs,” Today’s Zaman, Nov. 20,
2012. Available at http://www.todayszaman.com/business_egypt-to-be-
first-country-to-buy-turkish-uavs_298764.html
70. “Erdoğan Mısır’dan çok sert çıktı,” CNNTürk, Nov. 17, 2012. Available at
http://www.cnnturk.com/2012/dunya/11/17/Erdoğan.misirdan.cok.
sert.cikti/685013.0/
71. “Israel should lift siege of Gaza: Emir,” The Peninsula, Nov. 19, 2012.
Available at http://thepeninsulaqatar.com/news/qatar/214725/israel-
should-lift-siege-of-gaza-emir. According to a Turkish newspaper, Khaled
Meshaal was also in Cairo and joined the talk. See “Israel will pay price for
Gazans’ tears, Erdoğan says in Cairo,” Today’s Zaman, Nov. 17, 2012.
Available at http://www.todayszaman.com/diplomacy_israel-will-pay-price-
for-gazans-tears-Erdoğan-says-in-cairo_298471.html
72. Nabil Faymy, “Egypt’s Mursi Gets Marks for Speed, Not Style in Foreign
Policy,” Al-Monitor, Oct. 13, 2012. Available at http://www.al-monitor.
com/pulse/politics/2012/10/Mursis-foreign-policy-grading-could-do-
better.html
73. See Nael Shama, Egyptian Foreign Policy from Mubarak to Mursi: Against
the National Interest, New York: Routledge, 2014, p.218.
74. “Egypt’s Mursi visits Saudi for security talks,” Al Jazeera, July 12,
2012. Available http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2012/07/
2012712911171733.html
75. See the discussion on Nael Shama, Egyptian Foreign Policy from Mubarak to
Mursi, pp.227–230.
76. See Peter Baker and David D. Kirkpatrick, “Egyptian President and Obama
Forge Link in Gaza Deal,” New York Times, Nov. 21, 2012. Available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/22/world/middleeast/egypt-leader-
and-obama-forge-link-in-gaza-deal.html?_r=0
77. Thomas Friedman, “Mursi’s Moment,” New York Times, Nov. 24, 2012.
Available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/25/opinion/sunday/
friedman-Mursis-moment.html?_r=0
78. “Egypt’s President Mursi assumes sweeping powers,” BBC News, Nov.
22, 2012. Available http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-
20451208
79. Hend Kortam, “Kefaya says Tamarod campaign is not under auspices of
Kefaya movement,” Daily News Egypt, Apr. 30, 2012. Available at http://
www.dailynewsegypt.com/2013/04/30/kefaya-says-tamar od-
campaign-is-not-under-auspices-of-kefaya-movement/
80. “Mursi: Divisions threaten to paralyse Egypt,” Al Jazeera, June 28, 2013.
201362620743699836.html
81. “Egypt crisis: Mass protests over Mursi grip cities,” BBC News, July 1, 2013.
Available at http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-23115821
82. “Qatar steps up aid to Egypt,” Gulf Times, Jan. 9, 2013. Available at http://
www.gulfinthemedia.com/index.php?m=politics&id=629607&lim=0&lan
g=en&tblpost=2013_01
83. “Qatar calls on Arabs to support Egypt economy,” Ahram Online, Mar. 26,
2013. Available at http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/3/12/
67775/Business/Economy/Qatar-calls-on-Arabs-to- support-Egypt-
economy.aspx
84. “Qatar in extra $3bn aid offer to Egypt,” Agence France-Presse, Apr. 11,
2013. Available at http://www.gulf-times.com/qatar/178/details/348725/
qatar-in-extra-$3bn-aid-offer-to-egypt
85. Dalia Farouk, “Egypt, Turkey sign tourism partnership agreement,”
Al-Ahram English, Feb. 13, 2013. Available at http://english.ahram.org.
eg/NewsContent/3/12/64571/Business/Economy/Egypt,-Turkey-
sign-tourism-partnership-agreement-.aspx
120 B. BAŞKAN
86. Basil El-Dabh, “Egypt and Turkey sign media agreement,” Daily News
Egypt, Apr. 21, 2013. Available at http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2013/
04/21/egypt-and-turkey-sign-media-agreement/
87. “Turkey, Egypt sign transportation agreements,” Anadolu News Agency,
June 11, 2013. Available at http://www.aa.com.tr/en/news/191985--
turkey-and-egypt-sign-transportation-agreements
88. See the discussion in Nael Shama, Egyptian Foreign Policy from Mubarak to
Mursi, chapter. 5.
89. “Seeking Syria peace, ‘Islamic Quartet” meets in Egypt for first time since
launch,” Associated Press, Sept. 18, 2012. Available at http://www.haaretz.
com/middle-east-news/seeking-syria-peace-islamic-quartet-
meets-in-egypt-for-first-time-since-launch-1.465414
90. Benoit Faucon and Summer Said, “Tehran Holds Talks With Cairo on Oil
Sales,” the Wall Street Journal, Sept. 10, 2012. Available at http://www.
wsj.com/articles/SB10000872396390444100404577643253122689204
91. “Iran’s Ahmedinejad makes historic visit to Cairo,” The Telegraph, Feb. 5,
2013. Available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/mid-
dleeast/iran/9849332/Irans-Ahmadinejad-makes-historic-visit-to-Cairo.
html
92. “Egypt, Iran resume direct flights after 34 years,”Associated Press, Mar. 30,
2013. Available at http://english.al-akhbar.com/node/15393
93. Sara Rajabova, “Turkey, Egypt agree to Iran’s proposal on OPEC-style pet-
rochemical body,” AzerNews, May 10, 2013. Available at http://www.
azernews.az/oil_and_gas/54076.html
94. “Mursi criticises Syria at Tehran meeting,” Al Jazeera, Aug. 30, 2012.
20128308579560767.html
95. Steven R. Hurst, “Muhammed Mursi, President of Egypt, Urges End to
Syria Civil War,” Huffington Post, Sept. 26, 2012. Available at http://www.
huffingtonpost.com/2012/09/26/egypt-syria-un-Mursi_n_1917934.
html
96. “Hamas: Mursi victory in Egypt will help Palestinian cause,” Reuters, June
24, 2012. Available at http://www.haaretz.com/news/middle-east/
hamas-Mursi-victory-in-egypt-will-help-palestinian-cause-1.443621
97. Cited in Hussein Ibish, “Hamas’s Desengano With Mursi,” The Daily Beast,
Mar. 11, 2013. Available at http://www.thedailybeast.com/arti-
cles/2013/03/11/hamas-s-desenga-o-with-Mursi.html
98. Benedetta Berti, “No blank cheques: Mursi and Hamas,” Fathom Journal
(Spring 2013). Available at http://fathomjournal.org/no-blank-cheques-
Mursi-and-hamas/
99. See Douglas Bloomfield, “Why is President Mursi helping Israel, not
Hamas?” Jerusalem Post, Mar. 20, 2013. Available at http://www.jpost.
com/Opinion/Columnists/Why-is-President-Mursi-helping-
Israel-not-Hamas-307157
100. See “Jordan’s King: Muslim Brotherhood Crescent Developing,” Wilson
Center, Mar. 21, 2013. Available at https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/
jordans-king-muslim-brotherhood-crescent-developing
101. The following discussion depends on Stephene Lacroix, Awakening Islam:
the Politics of Religious Dissent in Contemporary Saudi Arabia, Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 2011.
102. See the discussion Stephane Lacroix, Awakening Islam, p.181.
103. See “Al-Qaeda: Declarations & Acts of War,” The Heritage Foundation. No
Date. Available at http://www.heritage.org/research/projects/enemy-
detention/al-qaeda-declarations
104. Lacroix, Awakening Islam, p.199.
105. “Al Amir Nayef fi hadeeth l’il Siyasah al Kuwaitiyyah: La yakheefanaa al
Ista’daae ellezi naraah min al I’laam al Ameriki wa al Britaanii wa lakinnahu
Maz’aaj,” Riyadh Daily, Nov. 28, 2002.
106. Sally Findlow, “International networking in the United Arab Emirtes
higher-education system: global-local tensions,” Compare, 35(3) (Sept.
2005), pp.285–302.
107. See Mansour al Nuqaidan, “Al Ikhwan al Muslimuun Fi al Emirat al
Tamdeed wa al Inhesar,” in Al Ikhwan al Al Muslimuun fi al Khaleej, 7th
ed., Al Mesbar Studies and Research Center, 2012. A brief history of the
Brotherhood in the UAE is also available in Birol Baskan and Mazhar al
Zoby, “Discourse and oppositionality in the Arab Spring: The case of the
Muslim Brotherhood in the UAE,” International Sociology, Forthcoming.
108. For the main contours of this discourse in the case of the UAE, see Mazhar
al Zo’by and Birol Başkan, “Discourse and oppositionality in the Arab
Spring.”
109. Dhahi Khalfan’s speeech is available at http://www.thememriblog.org/
blog_personal/en/41653.htm
110. See Ola Salem, “94 Emiratis charged with compromising UAE security,”
The National, Jan. 28, 2013. Available at http://www.thenational.ae/
news/uae-news/politics/94-emiratis-charged-with-compromising-
uae-security
111. On Saudi Arabia’s position, see “Saudi Arabia and the Muslim Brotherhood:
Unexpected Adversaries,” Stratfor Global Intelligence, Mar. 5, 2012; Angus
McDowall, “Rise of Muslim Brotherhood frays Saudi-Egypt ties,” Reuters,
May 1, 2012; Giorgio Cafiero, “Saudi Arabia and Qatar: Dueling
Monarchies,” Foreign Policy in Focus, Sept 26, 2012; Alain Gresh, “Gulf
cools towards Muslim Brothers,” Le Monde Diplomatique –English Edition,
(Nov. 2012).
122 B. BAŞKAN
112. Hamad bin Khalifa is the 15th and Muhammed bin AbdalWahhab was the
7th great grandson of the same person: a certain Omar bin Maadheed:
Omar bin Maadheed … bin Muhammed bin Aluwi bin Waheeb … bin
Tamiim.
113. Bernard Haykel, “Qatar and Islamism,” The Norwegian Peacebuilding
Resource Center, Policy Brief, February 2013.
114. See Birol Başkan and Steven Wright, “Seeds of Change: Comparing State-
Religion Relations in Qatar and Saudi Arabia,” Arab Studies Quarterly,
33(2) (Spring 2011), pp.96–111.
115. Roula Khalaf and Heba Saleh, “West ‘should not fear Islamist movements’,”
Financial Times, Nov. 30, 2011. Available at http://www.ft.com/
cms/s/0/c2178ab8-1b71-11e1-8b11-00144feabdc0.html#
axzz3evfgRvpd
116. Roula Khalaf, “Qatar steps in to fill regional void,” Financial Times, Nov.
30, 2011. Available at http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/6490c2ae-1b64-
11e1-8b11-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3evfgRvpd
117. See Chapter 3, Article 77 of Qatar’s Constitution at https://portal.www.
gov.qa/wps/wcm/connect/5a5512804665e3afa54fb5fd2b4ab27a/
Constitution+of+Qatar+EN.pdf?MOD=AJPERES
118. In the words of Mehran Kamrava, “a decade after Qatar saw its first elections
and 13 years after Shaykh Hamad’s assumption of power, meaningful politi-
cal liberalization remains as elusive as ever before, and the prospects for the
political system becoming democratic do not seem even remotely possible.”
See Mehran Kamrava, “Royal Factionalism and Political Liberalization in
Qatar,” Middle East Journal, 63(3) (Summer 2009), p.402.
CHAPTER 6
The Coup and Its Aftermath
Abstract The military coup staged in Egypt in the summer of 2013 cut
short the life of the Muslim Brotherhood crescent. This chapter discusses
why the rise of the Brotherhood-affiliated political parties and figures
was a troublesome development for Saudi Arabia and the United Arab
Emirates. The chapter discusses how these two countries waged an anti-
Brotherhood campaign and supported the military coup in Egypt. The
chapter also discusses how and why Turkey and Qatar reacted to the coup
in Egypt differently. Yet, the impact of the coup for both countries has
been the same: Turkey and Qatar found themselves increasingly isolated
in the region. The chapter claims that to break this isolation, Turkey and
Qatar have developed even stronger relations.
Keywords Military Coup in Egypt • regional isolation of Turkey and

Qatar • Saudi Arabia • the UAE • anti-MB Campaign • Islamic State •
Houthis
Ahmet Davutoğlu, the chief architect of Turkey’s foreign policy under suc-
cessive JDP governments, gave a speech at Dicle University in Diyarbakir
on 15 March 2013.1 In this speech, Davutoğlu first expressed his belief
that humanity needed a major restoration because the world was undergo-
ing a major crisis and needed a major civilizational transformation. “The
International system is falling apart and has lost its ability to respond to
crises. Meanwhile, technological advances are in such magnitudes that they

East, DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-51771-5_6
124 B. BAŞKAN
can impact not only the biological, but also psychological-spiritual future
of humanity.” Reiterating his earlier views of the Arab Spring, Davutoğlu
argued that the Middle East region was also undergoing its own internal
restoration, a restoration Davutoğlu metaphorically described as “the clo-
sure of a 100-years old parenthesis.”
In those 100 years, Davutoğlu claimed, the region had been divided
by colonialism, cold war, artificial borders, and nation states, and was in
search of integration and an internal restoration. The region could suc-
ceed, Davutoğlu prophesized, in this search if the artificial borders dividing
it could be rendered meaningless, so that the whole region could become
one big common economic market. “We will respect the borders, but will
not allow any border around us to become a wall.” For Davutoğlu, the
Arab Spring provided an opportunity to realize this objective, which is
important, because it brought to power governments whose legitimacy
derived from the people. “We will render the borders meaningless in this
wind of changes [blowing] in the Middle East, [working] together with
the administrations that came to and will come to power.”
Turkey’s foreign policy, Davutoğlu explained, had sought to establish a
new regional order, an order closely connected to Asia, the Indian Ocean, and
Africa. “This is the pillar of our economic restoration. For this reason we can-
cel visa requirements; with high level meetings of strategic cooperation, we in
fact open the way for a major restoration, regional restoration.” The region,
Davutoğlu prophesized, had to make this restoration; otherwise, it would be
further divided into even smaller pieces. A change was needed, because “the
future cannot be built on newly born (nevzuhur) conceptions of the state.”
Davutoğlu stated that the existing states in the region emerged first on
Sykes–Picot maps, and then colonial administrations and then artificially
drawn maps, and were based on competition and nationalist ideologies.
He then confidently asserted, “We will break that template drawn for us
by Sykes-Picot.” For Davutoğlu, the closure of the 100-year-old parenthe-
sis was really meant to reintegrate the region, otherwise artificially divided
by the existing state system, and he asserted, “No one can prevent this
[from being realized].”2
The next month, King Abdullah of Jordan spoke to Jeffrey Goldberg
of the Atlantic magazine. What he saw happening in the Middle East
was totally different. “I see,” he remarked, “a Muslim Brotherhood cres-
cent developing in Egypt and Turkey,”3 a crescent “the Arab Spring high-
lighted.” The King was concerned. His allies, he thought, were naïve
about the Brotherhood. This was an organization, in his view, run by
THE COUP AND ITS AFTERMATH 125
“wolves in sheep’s clothing” and was to be prevented from coming to

power across the region. This was the fight he was accepting.
As discussed before, Jordan was not alone in the region. Saudi Arabia
and the UAE had not seen massive street protests inspired by the Arab
Spring, but had their own native Islamist groups and movements, including
branches of the Brotherhood. The rise and success of the MB elsewhere in
the Arab World could have emboldened these groups and therefore posed
a serious challenge to their survival as monarchies. More threatening was
the possibility that the local branches could receive the powerful backing of
the two most populous countries in the region, Turkey and Egypt, which
began to act as radical states questioning the status quo of borders and
state structures. If Iran’s own radical stance was added to the picture, the
strategic regional landscape looked dangerously dim for the monarchies.
Fortunately for the monarchies, the MB crescent had a short life. Four
months after the King made his remarks, the Egyptian military staged a coup
against Muhammed Mursi and took over the government in Egypt on 3 July
2013. The Brotherhood refused to acknowledge the legitimacy of the coup
and organized a series of protests in the ensuing months. The military reacted
violently, starting a brutal crackdown on the MB. No one could possibly know
the exact figures, but according to the Egyptian Center for Economic and
Social Rights, 2528 civilians were killed in protests and clashes in the period
from 3 July 2013 to 31 January 2014, more than 17,000 people wounded in
the period from 3 July 2013 to 28 February 2014, and 18,977 people arrested
from 3 July to 31 December 2013. Reporting these numbers, two observers
note that the numbers “exceed those seen even in Egypt’s darkest periods
since the 1952 military-led revolution that would bring Jamal Abdel Nasser to
power. They reflect a use of violence that is unprecedented in Egypt’s modern
political history.”4 Many in the Brotherhood leadership cadres were arrested
by the military. Of 18,977 arrested people, 2590 were political leaders primar-
ily from the MB. Some Brotherhood figures managed to escape the crack-
down in Egypt, leaving behind an organization in total disarray.
Jordan must have been relieved, but so must have been Saudi Arabia
and the UAE. These two Gulf states, joined by Kuwait, rushed to not only
recognize the presidency of Adly Mansour, the military-appointed interim
president of Egypt, but also extend generous financial aid to Egypt. Saudi
Arabia pledged $5 billion, the UAE $3 billion, and Kuwait $4 billion. This
aid came at a time the IMF had postponed negotiations with Egypt for an
IMF loan. The support of these three Gulf states was so critical to the suc-
cess of the military coup that Andrew Hammond even called it “[a] very
126 B. BAŞKAN
Gulf coup.”5 Saudi Arabia and the UAE continued to back Egypt in the
coming years. In a leaked recording, Abdal Fatah Al Sisi, the coup maker
and later president of Egypt, admitted to his office manager, Abbas Kamil,
that the aid from the Gulf states amounted to a total of $39.5 billion, $25
billion of which was in cash and the rest in petrol.6
Qatar was less enthusiastic, but the new ruler, Sheikh Tamim, con-
gratulated the interim president, Adly Mansour. A spokesman from the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs added, “Qatar will continue to back Egypt in
its leading role in the Arab and Muslim worlds.” Qatar was not backing
off financial pledges it had made during Mursi’s presidency. It was Egypt,
however, which in September 2013 returned $2 billion that Qatar depos-
ited with Egypt’s Central Bank.7
Egypt had reasons to be disappointed with Qatar. First, many
Brotherhood leaders who escaped the crackdown in Egypt found ref-
uge in Qatar. Qatar began to be more critical of the transition Egypt was
undergoing. Qatar’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs expressed regret over the
killing of 55 Morsi supporters on 8 July 2013. Two weeks later, Qatar
issued another statement, expressing its “concern over the developments
in Egypt, especially with the increasing number of civilian victims” and
surprise over “the continued detention of elected President Mohamed
Morsi which threatens the achievements made by the 25 January (2011)
revolt.”8
More importantly, not only the local media but also Al Jazeera con-
tinued pro-Brotherhood coverage. Soon after the coup, in fact, 22 staff
in Egypt resigned from Al Jazeera, accusing the channel of being pro-
Brotherhood. The resignations must have been due in part to the pressure
Al Jazeera staff must have been facing in Egypt. That pressure became
all the more apparent when Egypt detained three Al Jazeera journalists
in December 2013. Later in the same month, Egypt declared the MB
organization to be terrorists. Qatar condemned the declaration. A state-
ment from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs said, “the decision to designate
popular political movements as terrorist organisations, and labeling peace-
ful demonstrations as terrorism, did not succeed in stopping the peaceful
protests.” The statement added that this decision “was only a prelude to a
shoot-to-kill policy on demonstrators.”9
Qatar was facing more serious setbacks. Egypt’s decision in fact came
after three Gulf states, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain, withdrew
their ambassadors from Doha, a move Egypt hoped was “the beginning
of a correction of the course taken by the Qatari government, which is
contrary to our brothers in the Gulf Cooperation Council.”10 Like Egypt,

the three Gulf states accused Qatar of intervening in the internal affairs of
other countries. Qatar, the three states claimed, was supporting an organi-
zation that was a threat to “the security and stability of GCC countries.”11
Possibly well before this historic rift between the GCC states, Qatar had
already been under immense pressure from its neighbors. In late November
2013, Qatar’s ruler, Sheikh Tamim, visited Riyadh to meet King Abdullah
of Saudi Arabia, a meeting claimed to be mediated by Kuwait’s ruler.
It was in this meeting that Sheikh Tamim was claimed to have made a
commitment not to interfere in the internal affairs of other GCC states.
According to Dubai-based Gulf News, Sheikh Tamim “was given an ulti-
matum by Saudi Arabia … to change Qatar’s ways and bring the country
in line with the rest of the GCC with regard to regional issues.”12 It should
be noted that this was not Sheikh Tamim’s first visit to Saudi Arabia since
his ascendance to the throne. He made his first foreign visit as the ruler
to Saudi Arabia in early July 2013. He was again in Saudi Arabia in late
October 2013, and then paid another visit in November. Sheikh Tamim
paid visits to other Gulf states, Kuwait, Bahrain, and the UAE, in his first
months in power, apparently trying to appease their concerns, mend ties,
and prevent a total collapse. Sheikh Tamim’s efforts proved to be in vain.
As Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt withdrew their ambassa-
dors from Doha in early March 2014, Qatar was totally isolated.
Turkey was in no different a position. Less than a month after the
coup, Turkey was feeling the isolation into which it had been plunged. If
Turkey was indeed isolated, İbrahim Kalın, then Erdoğan’s chief advisor
on foreign policy and now his deputy secretary-general, said that isola-
tion was precious. “This was not isolation,” he added, “but the show of
an honorable posture.”13 To a great extent, this isolation was due to the
vocal, repeated, and emotional reaction to the military coup in Egypt from
Erdoğan, by then Turkey’s prime minister.
In his first speech, Erdoğan said,
Egyptians also know very well that every will that does not depend on the
people is a dictatorship. We expect the formation of a healthy environment
where those who come after elections go after elections. Wherever and
against whomever it is staged, coups are evil, inhumane and open enemy
of the people, national will and democracy. I specifically invite the whole
world to have a sincere, principled, moral stand against coups and send to
the people of Egypt our sincere greetings as their brothers.14
128 B. BAŞKAN
This was Erdoğan’s first statement, but not his last. For months to
come, Erdoğan frequently brought up the issue in his public speeches
and targeted the Egyptian military with his scorching criticisms, often
in a non-diplomatic fashion. Even five months after the military coup,
Egypt was still on Erdoğan’s agenda. On 21 November 2013, Erdoğan
reminded the country in a press conference that 100 days had passed
since what Erdoğan termed “the Adawiyya Massacre,” in which Erdoğan
claimed more than 2000 people were massacred and 7000 wounded.
Erdoğan also said that since that day more than 3000 people had been (in
his words) “martyred,” more than 20,000 wounded, and more than 2000
people jailed in Egypt. Erdoğan also said in the conference, “I applaud Mr.
Mursi’s [upright] standing in front of the judiciary; I respect him; I do
not have respect for those who judge him. His attitude, his standing, and
his statements there are those of a real democrat who gives a real fight for
freedom. For this reason for me he is respected.”15
This must have been enough for Egypt. Two days later, Egypt declared
Turkey’s ambassador to Cairo “persona non grata” and asked him to leave
Egypt. Egypt also reduced the diplomatic representation in Turkey to
chargé d’affaires level. It is worth quoting the statement of the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs of Egypt to note the frustration on the Egyptian side:
Egypt’s government has denounced recent remarks by the Turkish Prime

Minister on 21 November … The remarks represent a new series of his state-
ments which reflect unaccepted insistence on challenging the great Egyptian
people’s will, ignoring its legal choice and intervention within local issues,
and including fabrications and reversing the truth since 30 June.” The state-
ment also made it clear: “The people and government of Egypt assures its
appreciation of the Turkish people and blames the Turkish government for
the consequences of the bilateral relations reached, which urged taking such
procedures.16
Erdoğan reserved his harshest criticisms, fortunately, for unspecified

international powers, not explicitly naming Saudi Arabia and the UAE,
but still implicating them. Once Erdoğan said, for example, that there
were no countries other than Turkey and Qatar who provided support
for the Morsi administration. Morsi received support from neither the
Western countries nor the Islamic or Gulf countries. “Why is this double-
dealing, and until when? To the coup administration, immediately after
the coup was staged, support of $16 billion dollars came. I now ask the
coup administration, those who gave $16 billion dollars, if you ask me,
they are partners of this coup administration, because a person is with a
person whom he likes. Tell me who is your friend, let me tell you who you
are.”17
Four days later, Erdoğan said, “The West has not done well in the test
on the military coup in Egypt. The Islamic world has not done well in the
test on the disaster in Egypt. Right now the Islamic world is no different
from Joseph’s brothers, who threw Joseph into the well … Those who
are treasonous towards their brothers will sooner or later be ashamed.”18
Erdoğan’s deputy, Bekir Bozdağ, was more explicit in his accusations.
On a television program, he said, “There are kingdoms in the Middle East.
All kings are behind the coup-maker Sisi and his friends. Why? Because
there are monarchical administrations who say, ‘[I]f democracy, human
rights, freedom, appreciation of equality and justice succeeds in Egypt, if
administrations change according to the will of the peoples and welfare
increases, one day our people will also say let us be like Egypt, and then
what happens to our throne and crown?’ ”19
Even though no country’s name was specifically mentioned in these
remarks, it was obvious that the JDP government was targeting Saudi
Arabia and the UAE in particular. A prominent columnist, who writes
extensively on Turkey’s foreign policy, quoted the above remarks in his
piece and titled it “Erdoğan is burning the bridges with Saudi Arabia.”
This prophecy has not been fulfilled, however. In the ensuing months,
Erdoğan simply stopped criticizing the Gulf states for their support of
Egypt20 even though he continued to criticize Egypt and the West. He
thus saved Turkey’s relations with the Gulf states from a total collapse.
What might have saved the relations, in fact, was the ongoing Syrian crisis.
Despite the territorial advances made by the FSA and other armed groups,
the Assad regime survived. This was partly due to the extremely frag-
mented nature of the opposition in Syria and the failure of Saudi Arabia,
Qatar, and Turkey to unify them. At a time when the civil war has reached
a stalemate in Syria, Turkey and especially Saudi Arabia simply could not
afford to break ranks.
This might explain why Turkey’s exports to the Gulf states had not expe-
rienced any drastic change. Turkey’s total exports to the GCC declined
from $13.4 billion in the period from August 2012 to July 2013 to $8.9
billion in the period from August 2013 to July 2014. This decrease was
not related to Turkey’s standing on the military coup in Egypt, however,
because the former figure was extraordinarily high and peculiar to that
130 B. BAŞKAN
year. Turkey’s total exports to the GCC were around $6.9 billion in the
period from August 2010 to July 2011.
There were some signs of tension in Turkey’s relations with Saudi
Arabia and the UAE. The fifth joint ministerial meeting of the Turkey–
GCC High Level Strategic Dialogue, for example, has not been held
despite the agreement in the fourth meeting, held in Istanbul on 28
January 2012, that the fifth would take place in Bahrain.21 It was also
rumored that Saudi Arabia, along with Egypt, had led a campaign in 2014
against Turkey’s candidacy for a non-permanent membership seat in the
UN Security Council.22
It was also illustrative that among the Gulf rulers, only the ruler of Qatar,
Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad al Thani, attended the dinner of Erdoğan’s
inauguration as the president of the Republic of Turkey. The other repre-
sentations from the GCC were at lower levels: the deputy prime minister
from Kuwait, ministers of foreign affairs from Bahrain, Oman, and Saudi
Arabia, and no representation from the UAE.23 This can be compared to
the list of attendees from the Gulf at the inauguration of Abdal Fattah al
Sisi as the president of Egypt: the ruler of Kuwait, Crown Prince of Saudi
Arabia, the president of the UAE, the King of Bahrain, and the personal
representative of the Sultan of Oman.24 The King of Saudi Arabia did not
attend the inauguration, but instead stopped by Cairo on his way from
Morocco to Saudi Arabia to congratulate al Sisi in person.25
Turkey’s prime minister, Erdoğan, unlike Qatar’s ruler, Tamim bin
Hamad, could not simply take a more conciliatory stance toward the mili-
tary coup in Egypt. This was in large part due to the different conditions
the two faced at home. Thanks to the wholehearted support of his father,
Sheikh Hamad, who was very much beloved by his people, Sheikh Tamim
was not facing a domestic challenge to his rule at the time of the coup. His
challenge was to break the isolation Qatar had been forced into, but he
had to do this without seeming too compromising on certain values that
Qatar had claimed to cherish.
Erdoğan faced a different challenge. He was the prime target of a wave
of street protests that first erupted in Istanbul in late May 2013 in reaction
to the government’s plan to demolish the Gezi Park, the only green area in
Taksim. As the protests rapidly spread to other cities and drew millions to
the streets, Erdoğan sought to counter-mobilize and solidify his own sup-
porters. By strongly and emotionally reacting to the military coup in Egypt,
Erdoğan was in fact sending messages to his own supporters, most of whom
had at least ideological sympathy with the MB, more than anyone else.
Erdoğan and his supporters also saw, in reality of their imagination,

the same dark forces behind the Gezi protests and the military coup in
Egypt. The following phrase, very commonly heard from Erdoğan’s sup-
porters, captured the communal feeling: “They did not succeed in Turkey.
Then, they tried in Egypt and succeeded.” A pro-government academic,
Ramazan Gözen, said, “I do not think that these developments [the mili-
tary coup in Egypt] are independent of the Gezi Parki incidents in Turkey.
They could not succeed in Turkey, but succeeded in Egypt.”26
Erdoğan himself portrayed the Gezi protests as an internationally engi-
neered plot to overthrow his own government. For Erdoğan, the military
coup in Egypt was the same thing. In a speech addressed to the JDP’s pro-
vincial leaders, Erdoğan reminded them of the military coups in Turkey
and said,
Now the West’s logic that democracy is not ballot box or democracy is
not just the ballot box was employed at that time and now there are those
who want to employ it again. We on the other hand say that democracy’s
road passes through the ballot box, the ballot box is itself the national will.
Now it is this that is now executed in Egypt. What do they say in Egypt?
Democracy is not the ballot box. Who is behind this? Israel. Behind the
military coup in Egypt is Israel. We have the evidence.27
It is worth remembering that the protesters in Turkey also raised the

same slogan, “democracy is not just ballot box.” Thus, Erdoğan implicitly
linked the two and presented himself as a victim, like Muhammed Morsi.
He thus consolidated his party base, but Turkey paid a price. Turkey
continued to lose friends and thus influence in the region. In the most
recent Gaza crisis, which erupted in the summer of 2014 with Israel’s
incursion into Gaza, Turkey could hardly find a seat at the table to bro-
ker a cease-fire, despite its close ties to Hamas. As Gönül Tol put it,
“Marginalized and isolated in regional affairs four years after the start of
the Arab uprisings, Turkey will have to settle for a secondary role in the
Hamas-Israeli conflict.”28
THE RISE OF ISID AND THE HOUTHIS

Fortunately for Turkey and Qatar, the summer of 2014 presented an
opportunity to mend their ties with others and break their isolation. As
the regime in Egypt consolidated its power, the MB had ceased to be a
132 B. BAŞKAN
major concern. The region faces a much more serious threat. This was
the rise of the Islamic State (IS). ISIS was born as al Qaeda in Iraq in
reaction to the US invasion of Iraq. It changed its name to Islamic State
in Iraq (ISI) in 2006. When it expanded its activities into Syria after the
latter plunged into a civil war, it changed its name again and became ISIS,
or the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. In June 2014, it launched a major
offensive in Iraq, swiftly taking control of Mosul and other towns in Iraq.
In late June, ISIS changed its name to “Islamic State (IS)” and declared
itself a caliphate.
As Iraq’s Armed Forces proved to be totally incapable and the IS con-
tinued to make advances in Syria, the USA started “targeted airstrikes”
against IS. The USA also worked to bring together a coalition of regional
states, preferably Sunni, to confront IS. Turkey was high on the US list. On
5 September 2014, US President Barack Obama met with Erdoğan, now
Turkey’s president. This was their first meeting since May 2013. Within
a week, first the US Secretary of Defense and then the US Secretary of
State visited Ankara, all to persuade Turkey to participate in the broad
coalition that the USA aimed to bring together against IS. The USA
also led the convening of a major summit in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, on 11
September 2014, attended by the USA, Saudi Arabia, other Gulf states,
Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, and Lebanon. Turkey’s minister of foreign affairs also
attended this summit. This was the first high-level meeting Turkey had
ever had with Saudi Arabia or Egypt after the military coup in Egypt.
The rise of IS in Iraq and Syria provided an opportunity for Saudi
Arabia, Qatar, and Turkey. All three states held that IS was a problem, but
so was the Assad regime in Syria. More importantly, in their views, the two
problems were intimately linked. Sheikh Tamim of Qatar, for example,
said in an interview he gave to CNN in September 2014, “The main cause
of all this is the regime in Syria, and this regime should be punished,”
said Sheikh Tamim and added, “If we think that we’re going to get rid of
the terrorist movements and leave those regimes doing what—this regime
especially, doing what he is doing—then terrorist movements will come
back again.”29
Turkey’s position was pretty much the same. Erdoğan once said in a
press conference he held with the president of France that “the world
should not just stand by the IS.” But, he also complained that the US-led
coalition forces only targeted IS in Syria. “Why Kobani only,” he said,
“why not Hama, why not Homs?” In Syria, “there is a terrorist organi-
zation [the IS], but there is also Esad who spread state terror. It is not
possible that an approach that does not take a stand against the Asad
regime … cannot fight IS.”30 Saudi Arabia’s Minister of Foreign Affairs
Saud al Faisal basically made the same call, albeit indirectly. Defeating IS
required, in Saud Al Faisal’s view, “combat troops on the ground.” To this
end, al Faisal claimed “there is an urgent need to strengthen the forces of
moderation represented in the Syrian free army and all other moderate
opposition forces.”31 His brother, Turki al Faisal, who was former chief
intelligence of Saudi Arabia, was more explicit: “the conflict in Syria par-
ticularly has been a main source of this growth in these terrorist activities.”
Turki al Faisal also made a call to support what he called moderate opposi-
tion so that “it can meet not only the challenge of the Assad brutality, but
also these groups that have come into Syria.”32
During the same period, the Houthis were making their own ter-
ritorial advances in Yemen. The Houthis had been present in Yemen
since the 1990s, and had been waging an armed rebellion against the
government of Yemen since 2004. In the next decade, the conflict
ebbed and flowed, but no side had decisively defeated the other. In
summer 2014, the Houthis launched a major offensive from their
stronghold, the Saada province, into the south, the Amran province.
In mid-September, they made a fateful move and captured the capital
city, Sanaa.
Saudi Arabia had long seen the Houthis as Iran’s proxy, and therefore,
their rise constituted nothing but another score for Iran in what Saudi
Arabia now considered its backwater. Saudi Arabia needed allies to con-
front this challenge. An end to Qatar’s isolation within the GCC came in
November as Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain returned their ambas-
sadors to Doha. Qatar had been trying to overcome the rift from the very
beginning, and to this end even expelled some Brotherhood leaders in
September 2014.
An opportunity to break the ice with Turkey arose in January 2015.
President Erdoğan paid a visit to Saudi Arabia to attend the funeral of
King Abdullah. It is noteworthy that Erdoğan’s last official visit to the
Kingdom was almost three years previously in April 2012. Turkey also
declared a one-day mourning for the King’s death.
One month after the funeral, in late February 2015, Erdoğan was in
Saudi Arabia again, now on a scheduled visit to Saudi Arabia. Just one
month after Erdoğan’s visit, Saudi Arabia brought together a coalition
of nine Arab states and began massive airstrikes against the Houthis in
Yemen.
134 B. BAŞKAN
We do not have official acknowledgment, but it is highly likely that

the Saudis sought to persuade Erdoğan to commit Turkey militarily to
the operation. Saudi Arabia needed Turkey, because while the Kingdom
could effectively undertake airstrikes, it desperately needed troops on the
ground. As a matter of fact, Saudi Arabia approached Pakistan for the very
same reason.
Of course, Erdoğan could not offer much, as his hands were tied at
home due to the forthcoming parliamentary elections. Erdoğan would not
even make an attempt to commit Turkey militarily to such an operation.
Instead, Turkey provided diplomatic support. The statement issued by
Turkey’s ministry of foreign affairs said, we “support the military opera-
tion, the knowledge of which was given to our country by Saudi Arabia
before; we believe that this operation will make a contribution to the pre-
vention of the threat of civil war and chaos in the country [Yemen] and to
the revival of the legitimate authority of the state.”
Facing no such limitation at home, Sheikh Tamim could commit
Qatar’s Air Force to the Saudi-led operation against the Houthis. He thus
successfully mended ties with Saudi Arabia. This does not mean, however,
that Sheikh Tamim put Qatar back under Saudi Arabia’s wings. He seems
to be determined to keep Qatar as independent as possible from Saudi
Arabia. To this end, he had no alternative other than forging much closer
ties with Turkey. Since his ascendance to the throne, Sheikh Tamim has
paid several visits to Turkey. He even developed extremely friendly rela-
tions with President Erdoğan. In May 2015, for example, Sheikh Tamim
sent some 50 Arabian horses as a gift to the latter’s newly built palace in
Ankara. More importantly, Turkey and Qatar signed a ten-year military
agreement in December 2014. The most consequential item of the agree-
ment was that Turkey’s Armed Forces could be deployed in Qatar’s ter-
ritories for educational purposes and military exercises.33
NOTES
1. The speech is available at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs website in Turkish.
The translations are mine. http://www.mfa.gov.tr/disisleri-bakani-ahmet-
Davutoğlu_nun-diyarbakir-dicle-universitesinde-verdigi-_buyuk-
restorasyon_-kadim_den-kuresellesmeye-yeni.tr.mfa
2. The quotes are available in Turkey at http://www.mfa.gov.tr/disisleri-
bakani-ahmet-Davutoğlu_nun-diyarbakir-dicle-universitesinde-verdigi-_
buyuk-restorasyon_-kadim_den-kuresellesmeye-yeni.tr.mfa
3. The following excerpts are from Jeffrey Goldberg, “The Modern King in
the Arab Spring,” The Atlantic, March 18, 2013. Available at http://www.
theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2013/04/monarch-in-the-
middle/309270/
4. Michele Dunne and Scott Williamson, “Egypt’s Unprecedented Instability
by the Numbers,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Article,
March 24, 2014. Available at http://carnegieendowment.org/2014/
03/24/egypt-s-unprecedented-instability-by-numbers/h5j3
5. Andrew Hammond, “A very Gulf coup,” Turkish Review, 3(5) (Sept./Oct.
2013), pp.498–505.
6. “Sisi received $39.5 bn from Gulf, leaked recordings show,” Middle East
Monitor, Feb. 13, 2015. Available at https://www.middleeastmonitor.
com/news/africa/16952-sisi-received-395bn-from-gulf-leaked-
recordings-show
7. Qatar originally deposited $3 billion, $1 billion of which had already been
converted into money. Egypt returned the remaining US$2 billion. See
“Egypt’s Central Bank Returns $2 Billion Qatari Deposit,” Al-Monitor,
Sept. 24, 2013. Available at http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/busi-
ness/2013/09/qatar-egypt-tension-billion-dollars.html#
8. “Qatar joins calls for release of Egypt’s Morsi,” The Daily Star Lebanon, July
24, 2013. Available at http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Middle-
East/2013/Jul-24/224846-qatar-joins-calls-for-release-of-egypts-morsi.
ashx#axzz2Zwpui91e
9. “UPDATE 2- Egypt summons Qatari envoy after criticisms of crackdown,”
Reuters, Jan. 4, 2014. Available at http://www.reuters.com/arti-
cle/2014/01/04/egypt-brotherhood-qatar-idUSL6N0KE05S20140104
10. “Egypt recalls envoy from Qatar following Gulf decision.”
11. Cited in Jamal Abdullah, “Motives and Consequences of Ambassador
Withdrawals from Doha,” Al Jazeera Center for Studies Report, April 10,
2014. Available at http://studies.aljazeera.net/en/reports/2014/04/
201441061248251708.htm
12. “UAE, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain recall their ambassadors from Qatar,” Gulf
News, March 5, 2014. Available at http://gulfnews.com/news/uae/gov-
ernment/uae-saudi-arabia-and-bahrain-recall-their-
ambassadors-from-qatar-1.1299586
13. “Başbakan’ın başdanışmanı ‘değerli yalnızlık’ı açıkladı: Yalnız değiliz ama,”
Star, Aug. 26, 2013. Available at http://haber.star.com.tr/guncel/yalniz-
degiliz-ama-yalnizligi-goze-alacak-kadar-ilkeliyiz/haber-783839
14. “Batı Mısır’daki olaya hala darbe diyememiştir,” Anadolu Ajansı, July 5,
2013. Available at http://www.aa.com.tr/tr/rss/200923--darbelerin-
hedefi-halktir-demokrasidir
136 B. BAŞKAN
15. “Mursi’nin yargı karşısındaki duruşunu alkışlıyorum,” Anadolu Ajansı,

Nov. 21, 2013. Available at http://www.aa.com.tr/tr/haberler/254621--
mursinin-yargi-karsisindaki-durusunu-alkisliyorum.
16. “Turkish President hopes relations with Egypt return to normal,” Egypt
Independent, Nov. 23, 2013. Available at http://www.egyptindependent.
com/news/turkish-president-hopes-relations-egypt-return-normal.
17. Cited in Sedat Ergin, “Erdoğan Suudilerle köprüleri atıyor,” Hürriyet, Aug.
20, 2013. Available at http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/yazarlar/24552407.
asp
18. “Erdoğan: Mısır’da darbenin arkasında İsrail var,” Radikal, Aug. 21, 2013.
Available http://www.radikal.com.tr/politika/Erdoğan_misirda_darbenin_
arkasinda_israil_var-1146951
19. Cited in Sedat Ergin, “Erdoğan Suudilerle köprüleri atıyor.”
20. Erdoğan’s personal interests might have played a critical role in his silence.
In a recording of a phone call between a Saudi businessman, Yasin al Qadi,
and Bilal Erdoğan, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s son, leaked to the public, al
Qadi asks Bilal to arrange a meeting with his father, the Prime Minister. Al
Qadi tells Bilal that he wants to explain why Erdoğan should not use harsh
words against Saudi Arabia. In another leaked recording, now between
Erdoğan the father and Erdoğan the son, the father asks the son about who
might have posted a tweet harshly critical of Saudi Arabia. Bilal confides that
he himself posted it. Erdoğan gets extremely angry with Bilal to the point
that he says, “We are searching for the enemy outside, but the enemy is
inside.” Erdoğan adds, “Do you think these guys will trust us again? Hurry
and remove the tweet.” Obviously, Yasin al Qadi was quite persuasive in
explaining why Erdoğan should not criticize Saudi Arabia. The recordings
are available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=77bT5uuEVT8
21. In September 2008, the GCC declared Turkey as a strategic partner in the
annual meeting of ministers of foreign affairs of GCC states. In the same
meeting, Turkey and the GCC agreed to hold joint ministerial meetings
every year. The first meeting was held in Istanbul in July 2009. See decision
# 38 in the joint statement of the fourth ministerial meeting available at
http://www.mfa.gov.tr/joint-statement-turkey-gcc-high-level-strategic-
dialogue- 4th-joint-ministerial-meeting_-28january-2012_-istanbul-_-
turkey.en.mfa
22. Benny Avni, “Turkey Loses U.N. Security Council Seat in Huge Upset,”
Newsweek, Oct. 16, 2014. Available at http://www.newsweek.com/venezuela-
malaysia-angola-new-zealand-win-un-council-seats-277962
23. For the list of attendees, see “Çankaya Köşkü’nde tarihi tören,” Anadolu
Ajansı, Aug. 29, 2014. Available at http://www.aa.com.tr/tr/haberler/
380754--cankaya-koskunde-tarihi-toren.
24. “Foreign dignitaries attend al-Sisi inauguration,” Daily News Egypt, June 8,
2014. Available at http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2014/06/08/
foreign-dignitaries-attend-al-sisi-inauguration/
25. “King Abdullah pays visit to Egypt,” Asharq al Awsat, June 21, 2014.
Available at http://www.aawsat.net/2014/06/article55333494
26. “Mısır’da ordunun yönetime el koyması,” Haberler.Com, July 4, 2013.
h t t p : / / w w w. h a b e r l e r. c o m / m i s i r - d a - o r d u n u n - y o n e t i m e - e l -
koymasi-4798472-haberi/
27. “Erdoğan: Mısır’da darbenin arkasında İsrail var,” Radikal, Aug 21, 2013.
Available http://www.radikal.com.tr/politika/Erdoğan_misirda_darbenin_
arkasinda_israil_var-1146951
28. Gönül Tol, “Gaza crisis shows Turkey’s declining regional influence,”
Middle East Institute Blog, July 29, 2014. Available at http://www.mei.
edu/content/at/gaza-crisis-shows-turkeys-declining-regional-influence
29. Mick Krever, “Qatar’s Emir: We don’t fund terrorists,” CNN, Sept. 25,
2014. Available at http://edition.cnn.com/2014/09/25/world/meast/
qatar-emir/
30. “Suriye’de sadece Kobani yok,” DHA, Oct. 31, 2014. Available at http://
www.dha.com.tr/suriyede-sadece-kobani-yok_792788.html
31. “Saudi Foreign Minister: Kingdom at forefront of fighting terrorism,”
Khaleej Times, Dec. 4, 2014. Available at http://www.khaleejtimes.com/
kt-article-display-1.asp?xfile=data/middleeast/2014/December/middlee-
ast_December41.xml&section=middleeast
32. Mick Krever, “Syria ‘a festering wound’ that fostered ISIS, says former Saudi
intelligence chief,” CNN, July 1, 2014. Available at http://amanpour.
blogs.cnn.com/2014/07/01/syria-a-festering-wound-
that-fostered-isis-says-former-saudi-intelligence-chief/
33. For what Turkey seeks from the agreement, see Menekşe Tokyay, “What
does the Turkey-Qatar military deal mean for Arab conflicts,” Al Arabiya,
June 25, 2015. See http://english.alarabiya.net/en/perspective/analy-
sis/2015/06/25/What-does-Turkey-Qatar-military-deal-mean-for-Arab-
conflicts-.html. For what Qatar seeks from the agreement, see Feyza
Gümüşlüoğlu, “Katar’da 100 yıl sonra Türk askeri,” Star, June 26, 2015.
Available at http://haber.star.com.tr/acikgorus/katarda-100-yil-sonra-
turk-askeri/haber-1038052
CHAPTER 7
The Future Place of Turkey in the Middle

East
Abstract This chapter briefly assesses the future of Turkey’s place in the
Middle East and by implication the future of Turkey–Qatar relations. It
argues that Turkey’s place in the region will ultimately depend on its will-
ingness and capability to balance Iran in the region. The chapter ques-
tions whether Turkey has such a capacity and willingness. Yet, the chapter
also prophesizes that Turkey will continue to seek ways to keep, even
strengthen, relations with the Arab Gulf states. The rise of new challenges
in the region might make Turkey indispensable to improve Arab Gulf
security.
Keywords Turkey • Qatar • the Middle East • the Gulf Security • Saudi-
Iran Rivalry
Turkey’s place in the Middle East is to a certain extent linked to its role in
Arab Gulf security. These wealthy states more or less share the same struc-
tural weakness, a weakness that is in large part a legacy of the desert, in
addressing their own security. Especially, after Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in
1990, they became too dependent on US military protection, and with its
rhetoric and action in the post-9/11 period the US itself became a security
problem for the Arab Gulf states. The perception that Iran benefited from
the US invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq and expanded its sphere of influ-
ence across the region simply aggravated this.

East, DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-51771-5_7
140 B. BAŞKAN
In the 2000s Turkey found a niche in this security environment. Certainly

Turkey could not replace the USA. With its existing economic, demo-
graphic, and military power, Turkey could at the very best be a regional
power, a regional power that could not fill the USA’s shoes. That task was
simply beyond Turkey’s reach, but Turkey might well balance Iran, as Iraq
had done previously. The Arab Gulf states thus welcomed Turkey as an
active player in the region, and meanwhile Turkey sought to develop stron-
ger relations with the Middle East for its own, primarily economic reasons.
Facing a rising Iran in the mid-2000s, Saudi Arabia needed allies to
counter the challenge. Since then the Kingdom waged its own campaign
to undermine Iran’s influence and expand its own in the region. Iraq,
Syria, and Lebanon were sites of Saudi-Iranian rivalry, or as some regional
experts called it, “the new cold war.” In this rivalry Saudi Arabia, and its
Sunni Arab allies, had sought to draw Turkey to its side, and in this Saudi
Arabia met with some success. In its rivalry with Iran over countries such
as Iraq and Lebanon, Saudi Arabia could receive the support of Turkey.
Most notably, of course, Turkey and Saudi Arabia cooperated to topple
Iran’s ally, the Assad regime in Syria, and to this end diplomatically, logisti-
cally, and financially supported the opposition.
With the rise of what King Abdullah of Jordan called the Muslim
Brotherhood Crescent, Turkey itself became part of the security challenge
for the Arab Gulf states, especially for Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Kuwait.
When the Arab Spring brought the Muslim Brotherhood–affiliated politi-
cal parties to power, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Kuwait, particularly,
became extremely worried that their own Islamists would be emboldened
by this development and, more importantly, would now be backed by
regional powers sympathetic to them.
One of those regional powers turned out to be Turkey. Wholeheartedly
embracing the Arab Spring, Turkey began to act more and more like a radi-
cal state, radical in the sense that it frequently questioned the status quo of
state borders and political structures in the Middle East. Turkey approached
Egypt immediately after Mubarak stepped down. During Muhammed
Mursi’s presidency, in particular, Turkey and Egypt fully aligned their
foreign policies. The prospect of the two most populous countries in the
Middle East forming an axis posed an existential threat to Saudi Arabia and
the UAE. It must be emphasized that this axis was not simply formed out
of strategic calculation; a populist Islamist ideology cemented it. Not in
vain did King Abdullah of Jordan call it “a radical alliance.”
It should not be surprising then that Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and
Kuwait turned out to be the prime financial backers of the military coup
THE FUTURE PLACE OF TURKEY IN THE MIDDLE EAST 141
in Egypt, which really brought an abrupt end to the Muslim Brotherhood

Crescent formed by Turkey and Egypt in alliance with Qatar. With the
consolidation of the post-coup regime in Egypt, the existential security
threat posed by the MB to the Arab Gulf states, especially Saudi Arabia,
the UAE, and Kuwait, came to an end, at least for the moment.
In the aftermath of the military coup in Egypt, Turkey and Qatar
became increasingly isolated in the region and became closer to each other
in order break that isolation. The rise of the ISIS in Iraq and Syria, and of
the Houthis in Yemen, came at a propitious moment. It gave both Turkey
and Qatar a precious opportunity to repair their relations with the other
Arab Gulf states. To what extent the relationships have been repaired is
hard to tell. Turkey and Qatar have continued to develop stronger bilat-
eral relations; so can we conjecture that there must still be problems. Time
will tell; however, by developing stronger bilateral ties, both Turkey and
Qatar might in fact be further alienating the other Arab Gulf states.
Turkey might be a useful ally for Qatar as the latter seeks to balance
its much stronger neighbors, Saudi Arabia and the UAE. For these coun-
tries, Turkey’s utility depends on how willing it is to balance Iran. The
problem is that Turkey is not willing to do that. It must be remembered
that Turkey kept its good relations with Iran both before and after the
Arab Spring. Over the issue of the Iranian nuclear program, an issue about
which Saudi Arabia has been much concerned, Turkey definitely pursued
a pro-Iran policy. Turkey not only objected to the imposition of economic
sanctions on Iran, but also actively helped Iran avoid economic sanctions
through gold trade.
The most likely scenario is that Turkey will continue to appease both
Saudi Arabia and Iran. The recent case of Yemen is illustrative. Turkey
indeed expressed the concerns of Saudi Arabia. Turkey’s president,
Erdoğan, for example, said, “What the Houthis do in Yemen is just a
sectarian conflict … Iran must change this perspective. Whatever force or
power it has in Yemen, it must withdraw. In the same way, it must with-
draw from Syria. In the same way it must withdraw from Iraq. It must
show respect to the territorial integrity of these countries.”1 This was all he
did about Yemen; however, he did not commit Turkey militarily to such
an operation. He did not even attempt to do so. In fact, shortly after this
statement, Erdoğan paid a visit to Iran and co-chaired the second meeting
of the Turkey-Iran High Level Strategic Cooperation Council.
The fact of the matter is that for Turkey, Iran has always been, and
will likely continue to be, at least as important as the Arab Gulf states.
It is one of the three most populous countries in the region. It has oil
142 B. BAŞKAN
and natural gas. It is strategically located. Relations with Iran acquire a

particular significance for two reasons. First, Turkey has its own energy
problem, already importing oil and gas from Iran. Second, Turkey dreams
of becoming a major energy transit hub, and Iran is important to the real-
ization of this dream. Iran is not only a major gas and oil producer, but
also sits on the most convenient transit road to the Central Asian Turkic
republics.
As an old adage, reported in Mahmut Kaşgarlı’s eleventh-century dic-
tionary, Divan-ı Lugati’t Türk, once said, “Tatsız Türk, başsız börk bol-
mas.” “As there is no head without a hat, there is no Turk without an
Iranian.”
NOTES
1. “Erdoğan’dan İran’a sert tepki!,” İHA, March 26, 2015. Available at
http://www.iha.com.tr/haber-Erdoğandan-irana-sert-tepki-450145/.
INDEX
A 115n30, 115n31, 118n63,

Abdal Majid al Zindani, 62 118n74, 119n80, 126, 135n11
Abdel Fatah Al Sisi, 126 Al Nahda, Tunisia, 95, 99
Abdullah Bishara, 20 Al Qaddafi International Prize for
Abdullah Gül, 53, 64, 65, 70, 94 Human Rights, 54
Abdullah, King of Jordan, 53 al Qaeda, 7–10, 12, 21, 25, 26, 90,
Abdullah, King of Saudi Arabia, 102 108, 121n104, 132
Abdullah Ocalan, 37–9, 71n4 Angela Merkel, 84
Abu’l Ala Mawdudi, 61 Anti-Defamation League, 55
Adawiyya Massacre, 128 Arab League, 38, 67, 89, 91, 103
Adly Mansour, 125, 126 Arab Spring, 4–6, 6n1, 6n4, 28,
African Union, 22 31n36, 74n45, 83–113
Ahmed Shafik, 98 Axis of Evil, 11, 17, 18
Ahmed Yassin, 68
Ahmet Davutoğlu, 60, 76n84, 87,
91, 114n16, 114n17, 123, B
134n1, 134n2 Bani Tamim, 111
Ali Abdallah Saleh, 89, 90 Barack Obama, 28, 102, 132
Ali Al Qaradaghi, 65 Bashar Al Assad, 22, 28, 105
Ali Khamenei, 26–7 Bekir Bozdağ, 129
Ali Larijani, 51 Broader Middle East and
Al Jazeera, 42, 59, 60, 72n17, 72n18, North Africa Partnership
76n78, 76n83, 77n86, 77n87, Initiative (BMENA), 10, 46, 47
84–6, 89, 90, 113n5, 113n7, Brookings, 49, 69
114n8, 114n12–114n14, Bülent Arınç, 64

East, DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-51771-5
144 INDEX
Bülent Ecevit, 39 Foundation of Turkey Voluntary

Bush administration, 10–12, 17, 18, Organizations (TGTV), 63, 64,
20, 22, 46 77n95
Freedom Agenda, 12, 21
Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), 95,
C 98, 99, 110
Colin Powell, 9 Free Syrian Army (FSA), 90, 91, 93,
Condoleezza Rice, 11, 13n11 129
Council on Foreign Relations, 26 FSA. See Free Syrian Army (FSA)
D G
democracy promotion, 13n15, 21, Gaza, 55, 56, 66–8, 70, 77n99, 92,
30n25, 30n27, 31n36. See also 101, 105, 106, 118n71, 119n76,
Freedom Agenda 131, 137n28
Dhahi Khalfan, 110, 121n110 GCC. See Gulf Cooperation Council
Doha Agreement, 57 (GCC)
George W. Bush, 7–11, 12n8, 13n12,
22, 23, 47, 48, 74n42, 114n15
E Gezi Park/ Gezi Protests, 130, 131
ECFR. See European Council of Fatwa Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), 18,
and Research (ECFR) 20, 27, 30n20, 39, 40, 51, 54,
Education City, 43, 59 67, 74n54, 74n55, 89, 127, 129,
Ehud Barak, 41 130, 133, 136n21
EU. See European Union (EU) Gulf Security, 5, 6, 20, 29n19, 110,
European Council of Fatwa and 114n15, 139
Research (ECFR), 64 Gulf Security Dialogue, 20, 29n19
European Union (EU), 37, 46, 47,
50–2, 93, 112
H
Hafez al Assad, 22
F Hamad bin Jassim Al Thani, 48
Fatah, 57, 66, 106, 126 Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, 40, 48
Federation of Islamic Organizations in Hamas, 3, 18, 19, 28, 35, 56, 57, 64,
Europe (FIOE), 62–4 66–71, 78n105, 78n108,
FIOE. See Federation of Islamic 78n111, 79n117, 90, 92, 93,
Organizations in Europe (FIOE) 102, 105, 106, 112, 116n38,
First Gulf War, 37, 40 116n39, 120n97, 120n99,
FJP. See Freedom and Justice Party 120n100, 131, 132
(FJP) Hasan al Banna, 57, 61, 66, 98
Foundation of Human Rights and Hasan al Turabi, 60, 62
Freedoms (IHH), 64, 70 Hasan Nasrallah, 19
INDEX 145
Hashemi Rafsanjani, 27 J
Hawar Islands, 41 Jabhat al Nusra, 90
Hezbollah, 19, 28, 57, 68, 92, 93 Jacques Chirac, 19
Hikmet, 64 Jamal Abdal Nasser, 95
Hosni Mubarak, 16, 85, 86, 102, 103 Jassim Sultan, 58
Houthi/Houthis, 16, 28, 57, 131–4, JDP. See Justice and Development
141 Party (JDP)
Hussein, King of Jordan, 68 Jihad, Holy War, 108
John Kerry, 69
Justice and Development Party (JDP),
I 36, 37, 39, 45, 46, 51, 52, 55,
Ibrahim Ghousheh, 69 60, 61, 63–5, 69, 70, 85, 95,
Ibrahim Kalın, 127 114n16, 123, 129
IHH. See Foundation of Human
Rights and Freedoms (IHH)
Imad al Alami, 92 K
IMF. See International Monetary Fund Khairat al-Shatir, 96, 97, 117n53
(IMF) Khaled Meshaal, 68
International Monetary Fund (IMF), King Faisal International Prize for
103, 125 Service to Islam, 53, 54
International Union of Muslim Kurdish Separatism/Kurdish
Scholars (IUMS), 64, 65 Separationism, 36, 37, 39
Iranian Revolution, 16, 26
Iraq’s Invasion of Kuwait, 24, 27, 48,
62, 108, 139 M
Islah Society, the UAE, 110 Mahmoud Ahmedinejad, 18, 19, 51,
Islamic Community Milli Görüş, 63 54, 104
Islamic Quartet, 104, 120n90 Mahmoud al Zahar, 106
Islamic Society of Germany, 63 Mamoun Al Hudaibi, 62
Islamic State in Iraq and Damascus Mavi Marmara, 55, 65, 70
(ISID)/Islamic State in Iraq and MB. See Muslim Brotherhood/ the
Levant (ISIL), or Islamic State Brotherhood (MB)
(IS), 132, 137n32, 141 Mehmed Zahid Kotku, 61
Islamic World, 9, 53, 55, 63, 65, 92, MEPI. See Middle East Partnership
114n15, 115n23, 129 Initiative (MEPI)
Ismail Haniya, 92 Middle East, 4–6, 8–12, 12n7, 13n15
Issam al Bashir, 65 Middle East Partnership Initiative
Istanbul Initiative, 53 (MEPI), 9, 10, 12n7
IUMS. See International Union of Moammer Qaddafi, 22
Muslim Scholars (IUMS) Mohammed Bouazizi, 84
Iyad Allawi, 53 Mohammed ibn Abdal Wahhab, 111,
Izz al Din Ibrahim, 59 121n113
146 INDEX
Muhammed Khatami, 27, 38, 41 O

Muhammed Mehdi Akef, 62 OIC. See Organization of Islamic
Moussa Abu Marzouk, 92 Conference (OIC)
Moza bint Nasser, 44, 73n29 Organization of Islamic Conference
Muhammed Abdal Rahman Khalifa, (OIC), 104, 105
61, 121n113 Osama bin Laden, 8, 25, 108
Muhammed Morsi, 3–5, 83, 98, Oslo Accords, 66, 67
101, 112, 113, 118n66, 120n96, Outstanding Personality in the Islamic
131, 140 World Award, 55
Muhammed Qutb, 61
Muslim Brotherhood Crescent, 105,
106, 121n101, 124, 140 P
Muslim Brotherhood/ the Palestine Issue/Palestine-Israel
Brotherhood (MB), 3, 5, 64, Conflict, 18, 69, 70
75n72, 76n77, 77n90, 77n94, Palestinian Liberation Organization
77n99, 95–106, 109, 111, (PLO), 37, 67
117n49, 117n50, 117n60, Palestinian National Authority, 78
121n101, 121n108, 121n112, Pan-Arabism, 107
124, 140 Paul Wolfowitz, 47
Muslim World League, 107 Persian/Arab Gulf or the Gulf, 5, 6,
Mustafa Mashour, 62 13n10, 16, 18–20, 23–7, 29n10,
29n11, 30n20, 31n41, 31n45,
31n46, 53, 67, 72n11, 84, 86,
N 93, 94, 114n115, 139–41
Nabil Al Arabi, 104 PKK, 7, 38, 39, 52, 71n4, 71n5
National Order Party, 36 Platform of Common Wisdom, 63,
National Salvation Party, 36 64, 77n95
National Transitional Council, Political Islam, 36, 39, 45, 61, 69, 71,
Libya, 89 77n88, 78n109, 99
NATO, 47, 53, 69, 74n52, 89,
115n24, 115n26
Nayif bin Abdal Aziz al Saud, 109 Q
Necmettin Erbakan, 36, 61, 63, 64, Qatar Foundation, 43, 44, 49
69 Qatar Investment Authority (QIA), 50
New Cold War in the Middle East, 51
9/11 attacks, 5–12, 15, 36
Non-Aligned Movement, 104 R
Nouri Maliki, 28 Raed Saleh, 70
Nuclear Fuel Swap Deal, 52 RAND, 25, 29n13, 29n16, 49
Nuclear Program (of Iran), 12, 19, 20, Rashid Ghannoushi, 60, 62
30n23, 75n70, 141 Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, 3, 45, 53, 60,
Nureddin Şirin, 61 64, 65, 73n34, 112, 136n20
INDEX 147
Republican People’s Party (RPP), 39 Turkey-Iran High Level Strategic

Ruhullah Khomeini, 26 Cooperation Council, 141
Turki al Faisal, 20, 133
Turkish Armed Forces (TSK), 36,
S 45, 71n6
Saad Hariri, 53 Tzipi Livni, 55
Saddam Hussein, 10, 16, 19
Sahwa/Sahwis, 107, 108
Saud Al Faisal, 16, 20, 133 U
Saudi-Iran Rivalry, 5, 26–8, 51–4, 57 Union of NGOs of the Islamic World
Shia Crescent, 28n5 (UNIW), 63, 64
Shia Revival, 17, 29n8 Union of the Good, 70
Shia/Shias/Shi’ites, 16, 17, 19, 21, UNIW. See Union of NGOs of the
26, 28, 28n5, 29n7, 29n8, Islamic World (UNIW)
30n28, 88, 115n21 UN Millennium Summit, 41
Shimon Peres, 41, 54, 55 UN Security Council, 19, 55, 66,
Soft power, 42, 50, 75n68, 78n113 89, 130
State Branding, 44, 58, 72n24
Sykes-Picot, 124
Syrian Accountability and Lebanese W
Sovereignty Restoration Act, 22 Wadah Khanfar, 60, 76n84, 77n88
Syrian National Council, 91 Wahhabism, 40, 111
War on Terror, 8, 9, 18, 31n43
Welfare Party, 36, 62, 64, 69
T World Assembly of Muslim Youth, 107
Taksim, 130 World Economic Forum, 54
Taliban, 8, 12, 16, 18, 38, 48, 108
Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, 3
Tariq al Suwaidan, 65 Y
TGTV. See Foundation of Turkey Yasser Arafat, 66
Voluntary Organizations (TGTV) Yitzhak Rabin, 66
Theodore Herzl, 69 Yusuf al Qaradawi, 58, 59, 64, 65, 71,
Tim Sebastian, 56 76n74
Tom Lantos, 22
TSK. See Turkish Armed Forces (TSK)
Turkey-GCC High Level Strategic Z
Dialogue, 130 Zein el Abidine bin Ali, 84

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TURKEY AND

QATAR IN THE TANGLED

Turkey and Qatar

ISBN 978-1-137-51770-8 ISBN 978-1-137-51771-5 (eBook)

Library of Congress Control Number: 2016936669

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2016

Printed on acid-free paper

This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by Springer Nature

order to explain state/regime behavior—or more specifically the behavior

Part I 9/11 and the Changing Regional Landscape 5

2 The Earthquake: The 9/11 Attacks and the US Response 7

3 Unsettling the Middle East: The Implications of the US

Part II The Rise of Turkey and Qatar 33

4 Enter Turkey and Qatar 35

Part III The Arab Spring: The Rise and Fall

5 The Arab Spring Erupts, Turkey and Qatar Respond 83

6 The Coup and Its Aftermath 123

7 The Future Place of Turkey in the Middle East 139

Keywords Turkey-Qatar Relations • post-9/11 Middle East • the Arab

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2016 1

9/11 and the Changing

The Earthquake: The 9/11 Attacks

Keywords the 9/11 attacks • the US Invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq

On 11 September 2001, al Qaeda, an international terrorist organization

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2016 7

The comments of the US president, George W. Bush, made on the same

December 12, 2002. Available at http://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/

Unsettling the Middle East:

Keywords Post-9/11 Middle East • Saudi-Iran Rivalry • the Arabs’

The USA responded to the 9/11 attacks by overthrowing the regimes in

THE RISE OF IRAN AS A REGIONAL HEGEMON

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2016 15

IRAN’S DEFENSIVE/AGGRESSIVE ATTITUDE

toward Iran, and as such posed an imminent security threat. Mehran

Threat perceptions in Tehran grew exponentially in the aftermath of the

More importantly, the USA completely encircled Iran. Pro-US gov-

Ahmedinejad’s staunch position on the Palestine–Israel conflict, and

and Germany were ongoing. Ahmedinejad’s election was a big blow to

THE ARABS’ OWN PREDICAMENT: LEADERSHIP CRISIS

support, the USA can seriously cripple an authoritarian regime’s willing-

experts, in Washington, DC, began to question whether Egypt deserved

THE PARADOX OF THE ARAB GULF STATES

Beginning in the mid-twentieth century, six Arab Gulf states came to

THE SAUDI–IRAN RIVALRY REVIVED

Iran-backed groups. Due to the US presence there, Saudi Arabia’s involve-

5. Quoted in Rannie Amiri, “The Shia Crescent Revisited,” CounterPunch,

The Rise of Turkey and Qatar

Enter Turkey and Qatar

Abstract This chapter discusses how the post-9/11 regional context

Keywords Turkey’s Foreign Policy • Qatar’s Foreign Policy

ACQUIRING IMMUNITY TO US PRESSURE: THE 1990S

Relations between Turkey and Israel had in fact begun to warm up

109,000 in 1970 and then to 477,000 in 1990.9 From a small population,

Qatar’s gross domestic product (GDP), in current prices, decreased from

Educational reform, led by the Qatar Foundation, slowly evolved, and

The formation of the Central Municipal Council through direct elections,

Sheikha Moza assumed more public positions29 and began to appear in

TURKEY AND QATAR FACING THE POST-9/11 REGION

Almost two years later, George W. Bush pointed to Turkey as a model.

Erdoğan and Turkey thus represented a golden combination for the

FOREIGN POLICY ACTIVISM

export destinations was to be commended, however. In addition to other

growth. With a lack of international experience, however, they needed a