Documenti di Didattica
Documenti di Professioni
Documenti di Cultura
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
Duke University Press and Philosophical Review are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend
access to The Philosophical Review.
http://www.jstor.org
This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.72.225 on Sun, 18 Nov 2012 10:16:09 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
REASONS AND CAUSES IN THE PHAEDO1
29I
This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.72.225 on Sun, 18 Nov 2012 10:16:09 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
GREGORT VLASTOS
292
This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.72.225 on Sun, 18 Nov 2012 10:16:09 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
REASONS AND CAUSES
i. Whydid thePersiansinvadeAttica?BecausetheAthenians
had raidedSardis.
2. Whyis thisstatueso heavy?Becauseit is made ofbronze.
3. Whyis he takingafter-dinner walks?Because of his health.
is
4. Why the angle at the semicircle
a rightangle? Becauseit
is equal to thehalfoftworightangles.7
293
This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.72.225 on Sun, 18 Nov 2012 10:16:09 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
GREGORY VLASTOS
294
This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.72.225 on Sun, 18 Nov 2012 10:16:09 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
REASONS AND CAUSES
295
This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.72.225 on Sun, 18 Nov 2012 10:16:09 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
GREGORY VLASTOS
296
This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.72.225 on Sun, 18 Nov 2012 10:16:09 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
REASONS AND CAUSES
14 Let me say here once forall that in my opinion the "Socrates" of this
297
This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.72.225 on Sun, 18 Nov 2012 10:16:09 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
GREGORT VLASTOS
This new method and its distinctiveaitiai are put forwardas the
logical pendants of a philosophical "hypothesis,"'6 that of the
Theory of Forms or Ideas, which is terselyformulatedas follows
in the more complete of the two statementsin our passage:"7
each oftheFormsexistsand it is in virtueofparticipating
in themthat
otherthingsare named afterthem(sc. forForms) [1o2AIo-B2].18
The formula has in view three sets of items and the relation of
"participation":19
298
This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.72.225 on Sun, 18 Nov 2012 10:16:09 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
REASONS AND CAUSES
ing setofcategorialproperties:
theyare immutable,20
incorpo-
real,21 divine;22they cannot be known by means of sense-
but onlyby "recollection."24
experience,23
(2) The individualpersonsand objectsof ordinaryexperi-
ence,designatedby propernamesand definitedescriptions.
(3) The immanent characters
oftheseindividuals,
designated
by adjectives,abstractnouns,and commonnouns.The very
same wordsalso name Forms.This becomesstrikingly clearon
thoserare occasionson whichPlato explicitlyjuxtaposesthe
Form with the cognatecharacterto bringout the fact that,
thoughcloselyconnected,theyare ontologically distinct.He
does so twice in our passage, contrasting"Greatnessitself"
with "greatnessin us" (Io2D),25 and again "the Opposite
itself. . in the nature of things" (1r'v EDrj 9VCYEt) with "the
opposite itself. . . in us" (-r'vJ Wv),26 and both with "the
299
This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.72.225 on Sun, 18 Nov 2012 10:16:09 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
GREGORY VLASTOS
300
This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.72.225 on Sun, 18 Nov 2012 10:16:09 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
REASONS AND CAUSES
and x is F (that is, x has the character,F) if,and only if,x partici-
pates in 4P. "Participation" here designatesthat one-way relation
of ontological dependence between temporal things and eternal
Forms which is so fundamental a tenet of this philosophy. For
Plato nothingcould existin space and timewitha definitecharac-
ter,F, if theredid not exista correspondingA, while the converse
would not be true at all. The existenceof a specificForm, say, of
a chiliagon,would of itselfnot offerthe slightestassurance of its
physical instantiation;not only the Form of the Ideal City (Rep.
592AB), but infinitely many otherForms as well existwhich have
been uninstantiatedsince time began and may so remain forever
in Plato's universe.So much of his intentionis clear enough. But
if we probe further,pressing him to tell us just what it is that
happens when a particularF achieves the required "participation"
in a 0, Plato has no definiteanswer forus, and he is well aware of
this fact. He makes no effortto conceal fromthe reader that he
has yet to reach a clear-cut conception of what "participation"
involves,speaking of the relation of Beauty to beautifulthingsas
"presence (wcapovuca) or association (Kotvcvia) or whateverbe
the right word for it" (IooD5-6).30 Here is somethingPlato has
not yet cleared up to his satisfaction,though he doubtless expects
he will, remaining quite certain for the present that some such
relation exists and that, were it not for this, the fact that things
have characterswould be unintelligible.31
30The above translationproceeds on the assumptionthat Wyttenbach's
emendationof vrpoayevojuEVr7in the MS. to 7rpoaayopevojuEv7) (which appears
to have confirmation in a papyrus:cf. Hackforth'snote ad loc.) is correct.If
we stickto the MS. reading (cf. R. S. Bluck,Plato'sPhaedo[London, I955],
ad loc.) or accept Cornford'semendation (p. 77, n. I) to 7rpoayEvojuCvov, the
last clause in theabove citationwould read "in whatevermannerit may come
about" or "whatevertherelationship maybe." The difference willnotbe great
in eithercase, and will not affectat all the importantthingin thecitation,se.
theavowal of uncertaintyin ELTE &r on Kai orr. For Plato's use of ZiLe T7r?
(augmentedin thethirdexampleby sore Ogres)to avow uncertainty, see Parm.
i83D, Tra vap' q'jzrvotolucpairaETE,
7vre -Tcrravirad 1WEIrat, 7im.48C, EtTEacpx?)EbTe
apX&aelTE0'7m SOKEV Tep' TOcv~V,and Laws 899B, eoreCv a/aam evovaat . .. EL. 07er
E
TE Kal o0ws'.
30I
This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.72.225 on Sun, 18 Nov 2012 10:16:09 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
GREGORY VLASTOS
302
This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.72.225 on Sun, 18 Nov 2012 10:16:09 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
REASONS AND CAUSES
303
This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.72.225 on Sun, 18 Nov 2012 10:16:09 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
GREGORYVLASTOS
304
This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.72.225 on Sun, 18 Nov 2012 10:16:09 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
REASONS AND CAUSES
305
This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.72.225 on Sun, 18 Nov 2012 10:16:09 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
GREGORr VLASTOS
(f; Ao'yov&tolmv To6 etval) when we ask and answerour questions,is it ever
invariablythesame or does it vary?Equalityitself,Beautyitself,each 'whatis'
in itself,the reality(avror &aaaTov S carnv, TrOov), does it ever admit the least
alteration?"(Phaedo78DI-5). Burnetrightlyremarksad. loc.in his Commen-
tarythat"we musttakeAo'yov Toi dvat together as equivalentto Aoyovng ovrala
or 'definition'(comparingRep. 534B3, S&aAElKOV KaAcis TOV AOyov EKaTaTov
rqs ovalas) and as governing
Aacqgaivovrra the genitive4w." Cf. also Rep.533A8-B2,
and also Laws895DE, wherethedistinctionis drawn betweenthe name, the
ovaia it names,and the AMyog of this ovtata. It is a mistake to suppose that
thereis any Formofwhichthereis no Ao'yog.The view that in Symp.2 I iA it is
said or impliedthatoftheFormof Beauty "there is no logosnor knowledge"
(R. C. Cross,"Logosand Formsin Plato," Mind [63], 433 ff.,at p. 443) is
not warrantedby the text,which only says that Beauty "will not appear"
(ae'Sc pavraaOXc7asta)as logosor knowledge(sinceit will appear as thatofwhich
we have logosand knowledge).
306
This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.72.225 on Sun, 18 Nov 2012 10:16:09 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
REASONS AND CAUSES
45Note thatwhen Plato says in the Timaeusthat the Ideal Model may be
"likened"to the "father"ofgeneration,theReceptacleto the "mother,"and
the thingsthatcomposeour world to the "offspring"(5oD2-4), he makes it
veryclear thathe assignsno causal functionto the Ideas in respectofeitherof
the two kindsof causality(teleologicaland mechanical)whichhe recognizes
in that dialogue (46C7 if.). The metaphoricalremarksin Rep. 5o6E, 507A,
and 5o8B, about the sun as the "offspring" of the Idea of the Good mustbe
interpreted in the lightofwhat Plato meanswhenhe saysin the Timaeusthat
the whole of the naturaluniverse,notjust the sun, is the "offspring" of the
Ideas generally,notjust oftheIdea ofthe Good. In the Timaeusthemetaphor
is employedin thecontextofa cosmologicalschemewhichenablesus to control
the intendedmeaningin a way whichis altogetherdenied us by the allusive
unexplicateduse ofthemetaphorin BookVI oftheRepublic. Whenthe"father"
metaphoris used in the Timaeusin a contextwhich makes it clear that the
metaphordoes express(teleological)causal agency,it is applied not to the
Forms,but to the Demiurge(28C3-4) in contradistinction to the Forms.
46 A numberof commentators entertainand, to all appearances,endorse
a substantially onlyto shyaway fromit a page or two
identicalinterpretation,
later,or even a line or two later. To recountthesevagariesin detail would
requirea special monograph(a rathertediousone). A singleillustration must
suffice.Cornford(in the workmentionedin n. 5, above) beginson p. 77 with
an impeccableglosson IooC4-6: "thefactthatthisroseis beautifulis thesame
thingas thefactthatthisrosepartakesofBeauty.We learnnothingabout any
causewhichwould bringthatfactintoexistence."But see what happenswhen
he proceeds(immediately)to iooDi-8, wherePlato, havingspokenthreelines
earlierofBeautyas (a) thereasonwhy (Sd&o)x is beautiful,goes on to speak
307
This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.72.225 on Sun, 18 Nov 2012 10:16:09 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
GREGORT VLASTOS
In thefirstplace,itmakesgoodsenseofthefactthatthisformula
is proposedas the "safe" but "ignorant"or "simple-minded"47
aitia. This is what it would obviouslybe for anyone who has
alreadyaccepted the metaphysical"hypothesis"on which this
aitia is so explicitly forall x, x is F
pegged.48On thishypothesis,
of it also as (b) what makes (proses)x beautifuland to say also (c) that x is
beautifulbecauseof (ace KaAli: instrumental dative; cf. n. 42, above) Beaut,
Cornfordbecomesgreatlyexercisedover the use of "makes" and wonders:
"Does it [the 'makes'] mean that the thing'sbeauty simplyconsists in the
presenceeitherof the Form itselfor of the characterlike thatof the Form,as
we saythatthepresenceofa gay colour'makes'thethinggay? Or does itmean
thatthe Form,existingindependently, causesthe thingto be (or to become)
beautifulbysomehowimparting itsowncharacterto thething?This isprecisely
thedilemmaon whichSocratesrefusesto pronounce.The languagemightbe
expresslydesignedto leave it unresolved"(italics are Cornford's).Now (b),
"makes," could not have causal importunless(c), "because of," did, sincethe
latteris usedtosaythesame thingin IooD7 as was said bytheuse of"makes" at
D4-5; and thisin turnis thesame thingas was expressedby the use of (a), 8V'
f&fin Di, theveryexpressionused at C5, where Cornfordwas certainthatit
had no causal import;how thencould he be leftuncertainas to theimportof
"makes" at IooD5? Moreover,any uncertainty on thisscorecould have been
resolvedby notingthat the "makes" is used in Socraticdialogues (cf. n. 43)
whereCornford wouldnotthinkofreadingcausal importintoit.That Cornford
himselfcannot be takingvery seriouslythe "dilemma" on which Socrates
supposedly"refusesto pronounce"in iooDi-8, appears on p. 79, wherehe
talksas thoughthe supposed"dilemma" has been firmlyresolvedin favorof
itsnoncausalhorn.He remarkson "Simmias comesto partakeofTallness" as
the Platonicanalysisof "Simmias becomestall": "This is a descriptionof the
same eventin otherwords.Nothingis said as to any 'cause' in our sense,which
would makesuch an eventtakeplace as itseffect."But he backslidesagain on
p. 8o in glossingIo3D (where,e.g., snow perishesat the approach of heat):
"Socratesseemstobe unawarethatonlytheefficient cause ofchangehe actually
describesis a physicalcause of preciselythe kindwhich,in the account ofhis
youthfulexperiences, If "comingto partakeof
he had rejectedas unsatisfying."
Tallness" has no causal import,then Socrateswould not have the slightest
reasonforbeing"unaware" oftheexistenceofphysicalcausesofbecomingtall;
whythenshouldhe be "unaware" ofsuchcausesin thecase ofa thingceasingto
be snow (i.e., melting)and becominghot whenit comesto partake ofHeat?
47 It is safe: iooD8, Ei; IoIDI-3; I051B7-CI. It is "simple, artless,and
perhaps simple-minded (or stupid, ev7cos)" IooD3-4; "ignorant,"Io5C.
48 Plato,ofcourse,would notapplythesame description to the "hypothesis"
-i.e., to the TheoryofIdeas. Obviouslyhe would notthinkofthisas "simple-
minded,"noryetas havingthekindof"safety"he is now talkingabout,since
he presentsit as a "hypothesis"and refrains fromclaimingthathe has proved
it conclusivelyin thisdialogue (which,of course,does not implythathe does
not thinkit susceptibleof conclusiveproof:in the exchangewithSimmiasat
308
This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.72.225 on Sun, 18 Nov 2012 10:16:09 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
REASONS AND CAUSES
Io7A8-B9SocratesconcedesthattheTheorycallsforfurther
investigation,but
makesno avowal of uncertainty,
as was suggestedbyJowett'sinfluentialbut
gratuitousrendering of KaC' 0aov SvvaTov d'Ata-r' &vOpdiry by"witha sortof
confidence
hesitating in humanreason"nowhappilycorrected to "as faras
humanly possible"in the4threv.ed.,Oxford, I 953). The"safety"ofthepres-
ent aitia is due to its beingso immediatea consequenceof the "hypothesis"
thatonceyouacceptedthelatter youwould risknothing
furtherin maintaining
thisaitia.
49 ThisisnodoubtwhatShorey hadinmindwhenhespokeofthe"tautolog-
icallogic"ofthetheory thattheIdeasareaitiai(cf.thecitation in theopening
paragraph ofthispaperandthereferences inn. 3). Unhappilyhefailedtonote
thatthiscouldonlybe saidofthe"safe"aitia,andnotat all ofthe"cleverer"
one (to be discussedin thenextsectionofthispaper)whichis conspicuously
nontautological inform, thisbeingtheveryreasonwhyitiscalledthe"clever"
aitia.Evenin thecase ofthe"safe"aitiaa certainqualification is necessary
(cf.n. 78 below)ofwhichShoreytookno notice.
50 Theyarestated in 96D8-97B3, and resolved in IooE5-B7.I do notlump
96C2-D6withthepuzzles:thebelief thata mangrows bytheintakeoffoodand
drinkinvolves no absurdity whichneedsto be clearedup by themachinery
ofthe"safe"aitia:itwillbenoticed thatwhentheclearing up is donein iooE5
ff.thereisnomention orallusionto thebelief thatwe growbytakingin food
anddrink.The pointof96C2-D6issurely toillustrate wayinwhichan
another
infatuationwiththemethodology ofthenatural coulddoa tyro
philosophers far
moreharmthangood:itcouldlead himto"unlearn"(96C6)familiar truths,
persuading himthathe knewonlythosecauseswhichhe couldformulate in
thecategories ofan elaborate physicalsystem andhencetospurnexplanations
309
This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.72.225 on Sun, 18 Nov 2012 10:16:09 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
GREGORY VLASTOS
310
This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.72.225 on Sun, 18 Nov 2012 10:16:09 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
REASONS AND CAUSES
3II
This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.72.225 on Sun, 18 Nov 2012 10:16:09 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
GREGORY VLASTOS
312
This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.72.225 on Sun, 18 Nov 2012 10:16:09 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
REASONS AND CAUSES
313
This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.72.225 on Sun, 18 Nov 2012 10:16:09 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
GREGORY VLASTOS
314
This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.72.225 on Sun, 18 Nov 2012 10:16:09 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
REASONS AND CAUSES
315
This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.72.225 on Sun, 18 Nov 2012 10:16:09 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
GREGORY VLASTOS
3i6
This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.72.225 on Sun, 18 Nov 2012 10:16:09 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
REASONS AND CAUSES
65Cf. n. 29 above.
66
Plato's relationhas to coverboth cases such as thoseof the Three-Odd,
Snow-Cold couplings,where the relationis clearlyantisymmetric, and also
othersin which,forall we knowto the contrary, Plato perhapsthoughtofthe
relationas symmetrical,as in thecase oftheFire-Hotcoupling.Whatis certain
(fromexampleslikeThree-Odd,Two-Even,etc.) is thatPlato thinksofpartici-
patingin I as a sufficient,but not also a necessary,conditionofparticipating
in (.
67 Having startedoffat Io3E2 ff.usingstillmorecumbersome language to
expressthe I-0 relation(which I have abbreviatedabove to "whateveris
'named' by r will also be 'named' by 0"), he shiftscasually to lE'7rnpEpEtVat
I04E io and usesitfrequently (I surmise:simplybecauseitis shorter),
thereafter
varyingit withthe expressiondiscussedin theprecedingnote,wherethe P-k
relationis indicatedvia theisomorphicG-F relation:ifG comesto be present
in x, thenx will be F. As Shoreypointsout (p. i i and n. 3 ofthesecondpaper
mentionedin n. 3 above; formoreexamplessee Bonitz,IndexAristotelicus) the
terms 7rnpe'pEv and avve7mlpleV as well as some of the othertermsused here
by Plato to expressrelationsbetweenForms are also used by Aristotleto
express relations
entailment between generalterms.
68 Ifwewere toconvert Plato'stalkaboutFormsintoset-theoretical
language
takingA, r, etc. to namesets,the"bringing-on" woulddenotethe
relation
inclusion ofthe"bringer-on" in the"brought-on," notthemembership ofthe
former inthelatter:Platoclearlyhasnointerest thattheForm,Fever,
insaying
is sick,or thattheForm,Fire,is hot.
317
This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.72.225 on Sun, 18 Nov 2012 10:16:09 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
GREGORr VLASTOS
F." Plato does not spell out any such formula as this. But an
examination of his text will show, I believe, that this is what the
sketchierphrasingsthereimply.For what he understandsby them
we must rely on his examples. There is a flockof them. First,he
gives additional arithmeticalcases of 1- P linkages: Five-Odd,
Two-Even, Four-Even, Ten-Even.69 Then, withoutany apparent
shiftingof gears, still talking about precisely the same relation,
explainingpreciselythe same aitia,he bringsin physical,biological,
and other examples of Form, F, entailing Form, P: Fire-Heat,
Snow-Cold, Fever-Sickness,Soul-Life.70Does this answer to the
"Why is x F?" question give us more reason thandid thepreceding
to thinkthat his Forms are meant to be causes ?
Let me press one of his examples, where Fever is the aitia of a
sickness.We may assume the followingbackground: A man dis-
plays the cluster of symptomswhich would have justified us in
classifyinghim as sick beforediagnosing his particular ailment:7'
he suffersfromweakness,loss of appetite, pain, and otherpsycho-
logical registersof physical distress.We examine him and see he
is veryhot.72 We inferthat he is sick becauseof this.7 Socrates steps
in at thispoint to tell us we are entitledto make thisinferenceonly
because the man participatesin the two Forms, Fever, Sickness,
69 104A4-B2; Io5A6-7; 105G9 ff.
70 He had alreadyintroducedtheFormsHot, Cold, Snow,Fire,to illustrate
therelationof incompatibility betweenForms(Io3CIo ff.)-a relationwhich
I leave out of my discussionin thispaper to avoid burdeningstillfurtherits
alreadyoverburdenedexposition.
71 These symptoms mustbe sufficient to warrantthe classification"sick,"
but not sufficientto warrantthe narrowerone "feverish,"else we would lose
the"cleverness"ofthepresentaitia: we would be back in theformally tautolo-
gous "safe" and "ignorant"aitia.And cf. the nextnote.
72 This is how we mustunderstand "fever"here (takingpyretosin its literal
sense,"burningheat,fieryheat" [Liddell and Scott,Greek-English Lexicon, s.v.,
I]-i.e., as that "excess of heat" in the body whichPlato takesto be a cause
of a varietyof ailmentsin all of which the patientis feverish:Tim.86A2-3,
'rO R-EV oVV (K 7vpog v7EpfoArp... voacrav . . ), if Fever-Sickness is to parallel the
Fire-Heat,Snow-Cold couplings,as it is surelymeantto do: if"fever"were
understoodhere to meana species of sicknessin the firstplace, the coupling
would not constitutean example of the "clever," i.e. informative, aitia.
73 A verysubstantialinference: ifvalid, it empowersto inferthathe is sick
just fromknowingthathe suffers from"excessofheat," as ofcoursewe could
notifwe werenotjustifiedin movingfrom"he is sickandsuffers fromexcessof
he suffers
heat" to "he is sickbecause fromexcessofheat" in thefirstplace.
318
This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.72.225 on Sun, 18 Nov 2012 10:16:09 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
REASOJNSAND CAUSES
thefirstofwhichentailsthesecond.Whenthisis abbreviatedto
"the Form,Fever,is what makeshim sick,"it has an alarming
ring.It soundsas thoughthe Form were a ghostlystand-infor
bacteria.But we need onlyrecalltheforegoing argumentwhich,
I trust,clearedtheFormofimputation ofcausalagencyin thecase
ofthe "safe"aitia,to assureourselvesthatthesame clearancecan
be givenitin thecase ofthepresentaitiaas well.Ifl isnotexpected
to be a cause whenitis said to "make"x to be F, thenbythesame
tokenP cannotbe expectedtobe a causewhenit is said to "make"
x to be F.74
May we then conclude that here, too, the "makes" in the
Platonicformulahas a strictly logico-metaphysical force-thatno
greatercausal significance is to be read into "the Form,Fever,
makesthemansick"thaninto"theForm,Sickness, is whatmakes
him sick"? Such had been Shorey'sclaim when he maintained
againstZellerthatin thewholeof thispassagePlatois concerned
withlogic,notphysics, adumbratinga theoryof syllogistic infer-
ence,notofcausal explanation. 75This is an attractiveinterpreta-
tion:one could wishit weretrue.And nothingwouldhave stood
in theway ofour takingit as trueifPlato had givenonlylogical
and mathematical examplesofthe F- 0 relation.If we had only
Three,Odd, Two, Even,and thelikeamongthe examples,then
certainlythe F- 0 couplingcould be strictly noncausal. That
Jones'sfamilymustbe odd-numbered because it happensto be a
threesome is indeedausterely irrelevantto thecausal orderofthe
world.Not so whenwe are toldthatJonesis sickbecausehe has
a fever,thata burninglog is hot because it is on fire,thatthe
whitestuffon the groundis cold becauseit is snow.To be sure,
none of the entailments holdingbetweenthe relevantFormsare
beingcreditedwithcausalagency.Buttheyare certainly expected
That theoccurrenceoffeveris thecause
tohavecausalimplications.
of the occurrenceof sicknesswould be a textbookexampleof a
319
This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.72.225 on Sun, 18 Nov 2012 10:16:09 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
GREGORr VLASTOS
320
This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.72.225 on Sun, 18 Nov 2012 10:16:09 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
REASONS AND CAUSES
321
This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.72.225 on Sun, 18 Nov 2012 10:16:09 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
GREGORY VLASTOS
322
This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.72.225 on Sun, 18 Nov 2012 10:16:09 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
REASONS AND CAUSES
83 He appears to be
disclaimingit by emphasizingSocrates' ignoranceof
naturalcauses (99C6-9; IooD3; ioiC9-DI).
84 Includingsome importantscientific doctrines,such as the sphericityof
the earth,itsstability"at the centerofthe heavens" (Io8E4-IoqA6), and the
impliedrepudiationof the ancientnotionof an absolute "up" and "down"
(I 12C1-2).
323
This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.72.225 on Sun, 18 Nov 2012 10:16:09 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
GREGORY VLASTOS
85 5iB7-52A4.
86 Cf. my "DisorderlyMotion in the Timaeus,"in R. E. Allen,op. cit.,pp.
382-383and notes.
87 53D4-6.
88 53D7-E8.
324
This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.72.225 on Sun, 18 Nov 2012 10:16:09 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
REASONS AND CAUSES
PrincetonUniversity
325
This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.72.225 on Sun, 18 Nov 2012 10:16:09 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions