Art. 1270.

Condonation or remission is essentially gratuitous,

and requires the acceptance by the obligor. It may be
made expressly or impliedly.

One and the other kinds shall be subject to the rules

which govern inoffi cious donations. Express condonation
shall, furthermore, comply with the forms of donation.

(1) ‘Remission or Condonation’ Defi ned

It is “the gratuitous abandonment by the creditor of his

right.”

(2) Example
Gloria owes Edgardo P5.00. When the debt matured
Edgardo told Gloria that she need not pay the debt since he was
condoning it. Gloria, in turn, expressed her gratitude. Here, the
debt has been extinguished by remission

(3) Essential Requisites for Remission

(a) There must be an agreement (since acceptance of the offer

is required). (Art. 1270).
(b) The parties must be capacitated and must consent (therefore,
it is beyond the power of the courts or of Congress to
condone interest unless the creditor consents). (Banez v.
Young, L-4635, Oct. 27, 1952).
(c) There must be subject matter (object of the remission
— otherwise, there would be nothing to condone).
(d) The cause or consideration must be liberality (for remission
is ESSENTIALLY GRATUITOUS). (Otherwise, the act
may be a dation in payment, or a novation, or a compromise.)
(8 Manresa 329-330).
(e) The obligation remitted must have been demandable at the
time of remission (otherwise, the remission is useless). (8
Manresa 330).

(f) The remission must not be inoffi cious (otherwise, it would

be reducible, so that the legitimes of the compulsory heirs
would not be impaired).
QUERY: The law mentions “inoffi cious donations,”
but does not refer to the other grounds for revocation of
donations such as ingratitude. Now then, may the remission
be revoked on said other grounds?
ANS.: Yes, because remission is essentially a donation
(Castan), despite the exclusive mention of “inoffi cious.”
(g) Formalities of a donation are required in the case of an
express (not implied) remission. (Art. 1270).
Example: A remission of an obligation to give land
must be in a public instrument in order to be valid. (Art.
749, Civil Code).

QUERY: May an express remission defective in form

be considered an implied remission?
ANS.: No, otherwise, the requirement of the law on
express remission would be rendered useless. Thus, an
express remission, not made in due form, cannot affect the
creditor if it is withdrawn in due time. It would affect him
only when new acts of waiver confi rm the express purpose
of the former, as one of the bases on which tacit or implied
remission may rest. (8 Manresa 344).
(NOTE: If remission is made in a will, it is essential
that the will be VALID extrinsically, and PROBATED.
After all, such a remission is made EXPRESSLY. The will,
be it remembered, actually partakes of a donation mortis
causa.)

(h) Waivers or remissions are not to be presumed generally.

They must be clearly and convincingly shown, either by
express stipulation, or by acts admitting of no other reasonable
explanation. (Arrieta v. NARIC, L-15645, Jan. 31,
1964).

(4) Classes of Remission

(a) As regards its effect or extent:

1) total
2) partial (only a portion is remitted or the remission
may refer only to the accessory obligations)

(b) As regards its date of effectivity:

1) inter vivos (during life)

2) mortis causa (after death)
(This must have the formalities of a will and the will
must be probated.)

(c) As regards its form:

1) implied or tacit (this requires no formality) (conduct

is suffi cient)
2) express or formal (this requires the formalities of a
donation if inter vivos; of a will or codicil if mortis
causa)

(6) Effect if Remission Is Not Accepted by the Debtor

This would not be remission; however, if the creditor does
not really collect within the Statute of limitations (period of
prescription), the debt may be said to have been extinguished
by PRESCRIPTION.

(8) When Waiver or Abandonment Is Defective

Jovencio Luansing v. People of the
Philippines & Court of Appeals
L-23289, Feb. 28, 1969
FACTS: In a criminal action for seduction, the offended
party expressly reserved the right to fi le a separate civil action.
The CFI (now RTC) found the accused guilty, and imposed civil
liabilities. No motion for reconsideration was fi led by the offended
party. Issue: Was the imposition of civil liability proper,
despite the reservation?
HELD: No, the imposition of the civil liability was not
proper because:

(a) there was the reservation as to the civil aspect;

(b) the mere failure to fi le a motion for reconsideration does
not necessarily result in waiver or abandonment. Abandonment
requires a more convincing quantum of evidence
than mere forbearance to actually fi le the civil action, especially
when we consider the fact that the same could be
fi led even after the decision in the criminal case had been
rendered;
(c) proof should be given with respect to the amount.

Art. 1271. The delivery of a private document evidencing

a credit, made voluntarily by the creditor to the debtor,
implies the renunciation of the action which the former had
against the latter.

If in order to nullify this waiver it should be claimed to

be inoffi cious, the debtor and his heirs may uphold it by proving
that the delivery of the document was made in virtue of
payment of the debt.

(1) Effect of Delivery of Private Document Evidencing the

Credit
The Article speaks of a “private document,” not a public
one because in the case of the latter, a copy is easily obtainable,
being a public record. Note that with the delivery of the private
instrument, a remission or renunciation is presumed.

(2) Example
Steffi made a promissory note in favor of Agassi in the
amount of P100 million. After some time, Agassi voluntarily
delivered the promissory note to Steffi without collecting the
P100 million. Steffi is now in possession of said note. There is
a disputable presumption that there has been a remission. The
presumption is merely disputable and not conclusive because it
may be that the instrument was delivered only for examination
by Steffi or for collection. (See Lopez Vito v. Tambunting, 33 Phil.
226)

(3) Implied Remission

It should be noted that Art. 1271 gives us an example of
an implied remission.
(NOTE: The voluntary destruction by the creditor of the
instrument is likewise another form of implied remission.)
[NOTE: But the mere fact that the creditor has omitted a
certain debt or the name of the debtor from an inventory made
by him does not imply a tacit remission. (TS, Nov. 19, 1915).]

(4) Falsehood Not Allowed

It must not be thought that the second paragraph allows a
falsehood. The debtor and his heirs now claim that the instrument
was delivered not because of payment BUT only when
indeed there was a payment. The law must not be construed to
allow an immoral actuation.
(5) Confl ict of Presumption
It should be noted likewise that as between the presumption
of remission and the presumption of payment, the fi rst
(remission) ordinarily prevails.

Art. 1272. Whenever the private document in which the

debt appears is found in the possession of the debtor, it shall
be presumed that the creditor delivered it voluntarily, unless
the contrary is proved.

(1) Presumption of Voluntary Delivery

(a) While Art. 1271 gives a presumption of remission, Art. 1272
gives a presumption of voluntary delivery.
(b) Note again here that the law speaks of a private document.
(c) The presumption is disputable or prima facie, for the law
itself says “until the contrary is proved.” (Art. 1272; see
Lopez Vito v. Tambunting, 33 Phil. 226).

Lopez Vito v. Tambunting

33 Phil. 226
FACTS: A owed B a sum of money. B sent a receipt signed
by him to A through a collector, who was supposed to collect a
debt. A did not pay, however, although he kept the receipt. The
creditor (B) was able to prove that the only reason he had sent
the receipt was to collect the money. Issue: Is there remission
here?
HELD: No, there is no remission here; the creditor has
been able to prove the real reason why the debtor had in his
possession the receipt. Hence, the presumption of remission has
been overcome.

(2) Rule if the Instrument of Credit Is Still in Creditor’s

Hands
If the instrument of credit is still in the hands of the creditor,
this is evidence that the debt has not yet been paid, unless the contrary be fully proved. (Toribio v. Fox, 34 Phil.
913). To
rebut the presumption, ordinarily, a receipt of payment must
be presented. (Pinon & Manalac v. Osorio, 30 Phil. 365).

(3) Presumption in Joint or Solidary Obligations

Effect if the obligation is joint, or if it is solidary.
Example: A and B owe C P100,000, evidenced by a private
document.

(a) If the private document is found in the possession of A,

who is a joint debtor, what is the presumption?
ANS.: The presumption is that only A’s debt has been
remitted.
Reason: A’s debt is not P100,000 but only P50,000; in
other words, his debt is really distinct from B’s debt.

(b) If the private document is found in the possession of A who

is a solidary debtor, what is the presumption?
ANS.: Since this is a solidary obligation, the presumption
is that the whole obligation (not merely A’s share) has
been remitted.
(c) In both cases, may the presumption be rebutted?
ANS.: Yes, the presumption in both cases can be overcome
by superior contrary evidence. (8 Manresa 379).

Art. 1273. The renunciation of the principal debt shall

extinguish the accessory obligation; but the waiver of the
latter shall leave the former in force.

(1) Renunciation of Principal Extinguishes Accessory, But

Not Vice-Versa
This follows the rule of “accessory follows the principal.”

(2) Example
A remission of the penalty does not remit the principal obligation, but if the principal debt is condoned, the penalty
is
also condoned.

Art. 1274. It is presumed that the accessory obligation

of pledge has been remitted when the thing pledged, after
its delivery to the creditor, is found in the possession of the
debtor, or of a third person who owns the thing.

(1) Remission of Pledge

(a) Note here that only the accessory obligation of pledge is

presumed remitted. The principal obligation (the loan)
remains in force.

(b) The presumption is only disputable, for the debtor or

the third person may be in possession of the property by
theft or because it had been sent for repairs, or for similar
causes.

(2) Reason for the Presumption

It is essential in pledge that the thing be delivered to the
creditor, or to a third person by common agreement.

(3) Possession by a Third Person

The law says “or of a third person who owns the thing.”
Therefore, if the third person does not own the thing, the presumption
does not arise. As a matter of fact, the stranger may
just have found it or it may have been delivered to him only for
safekeeping.

Art. 1275. The obligation is extinguished from the time

the characters of creditor and debtor are merged in the same
person.

(1) ‘Merger or Confusion’ Defi ned

It is the meeting in one person of the qualities of creditor
and debtor with respect to the same obligation. (94 Sanchez
Roman 421).

(2) Reason or Basis for Merger

If a debtor is his own creditor, enforcement of the obligation
becomes absurd, since one cannot claim against himself.
(3) Requisites of a Valid Merger

(a) It should take place between the principal debtor and creditor.
Therefore, confusion of the creditor with the person of
the guarantor does not extinguish the principal obligation.
(Art. 1276). Of course, in a case like this, the accessory
obligation of guaranty is extinguished.
Therefore also, there can be no confusion or merger if
the debtor and creditor represent (different) juridical entities
even if the offi cers of both are the SAME. (Kapisanan
ng mga Manggagawa sa MRR v. Credit Union, etc., L-
14332, May 20, 1960).

(b) The merger must be clear and defi nite. (Testate Estate of
Mota v. Serra, 47 Phil. 464).

(c) The very obligation involved must be the same or identical

(because if the debtor acquires certain rights from the
creditor with respect to other things, there is no merger).
(Testate Estate of Mota v. Serra, 47 Phil. 464).
(NOTE: If an heir is a debtor of the deceased, merger
does not necessarily follow, for other creditors may be
prejudiced.)

(4) Example of Merger

A makes a check payable to bearer, and hands the check
to C, who hands it to D who fi nally hands it to A. Here A owes
himself. This is a clear case of merger, and hence the obligation
of A is extinguished.

(5) Effect of Transfer of Rights

Mere transfer to a third person of rights belonging to both
the debtor and the creditor BUT not the credit as against the
debt does not result in merger. (Testate Estate of Mota v. Serra,
47 Phil. 464

(6) Extinction of Real Rights

Real rights, such as usufruct over property, may be extinguished
by merger when the naked owner himself become the
usufructuary.
(NOTE: This is also denominated “consolidation of ownership.”)

Example:
A had two brothers B and C. A gave a parcel of land to B in
usufruct (right to the use and right to the fruits), and the same
parcel to C in naked ownership. If later C donates the naked
ownership of the land to B, B will now have the full ownership
(his ownership is consolidated), and it is as if merger had resulted.

(7) Revocability of Confusion or Merger

If the reason for the confusion ceases, the obligation is
REVIVED

(8) Effect if Mortgagee Becomes the Owner of the Mortgaged

Property
If the mortgagee becomes the owner of the property that had
been mortgaged to him, the mortgage is naturally extinguished,
but the principal obligation may remain. (See Yek Ton Lin Fire
v. Yusingco, 64 Phil. 1062).

Example:
I borrowed P1,000,000 from my brother, and as security,
I mortgaged my land in his favor. Later I sold the land to him.
The mortgage is extinguished but I still owe him P1,000,000.
(NOTE: Had he assigned his credit of P1,000,000 to a friend
and the friend assigned the credit to me, both the principal
obligation and the mortgage are extinguished.)

Art. 1276. Merger which takes place in the person of the

principal debtor or creditor benefi ts the guarantors. Confusion
which takes place in the person of any of the latter does
not extinguish the obligation.

(1) Effect of Merger on Guarantors

“Accessory follows the principal” (the guaranty being considered
the accessory obligation); hence, if there is merger with
respect to the principal debt, the guaranty is extinguished; note,
however, the second sentence of the Article.

(2) Examples
(a) A owes B P700,000, guaranteed by C. B assigns his credit
to X. X assigns the credit to Y. Y assigns the credit to A.
A’s obligation is extinguished and C is released from his
obligation as guarantor.

(b) A owes B P700,000, guaranteed by C. B assigns his credit

to X. X assigns his credit to Y. Y assigns his credit to C,
the guarantor. Does A still have to pay C?
ANS.: Yes. However, the contract of guaranty is extinguished,
but not A’s obligation to pay the P700,000.

(3) Problems
(a) A owes B with C’s land given as security by way of mortgage.
Later B becomes the owner of one-third of C’s land
(said one-third share having been sold or donated to him
by C). Is the mortgage extinguished?
ANS.: The mortgage is extinguished regarding B’s
one-third share of the land because of merger. This is evident
because otherwise, if the debt is not paid, B would
hold his own property as security and this would be absurd.
However, the mortgage continues to subsist on the twothirds
of the land still belonging to C.

(b) Suppose in the preceding problem, B became the owner of

the whole of C’s land, what happens to the mortgage?
ANS.: For the same reason hereinabove given, the
mortgage is completely extinguished. However, does A’s
debt in favor of B still exist? The answer is evidently YES,
for extinguishment of the accessory obligation does not by
itself extinguish the principal obligation which is the loan.
This time, however, it would be a case of a loan without
security.
Art. 1277. Confusion does not extinguish a joint obligation
except as regards the share corresponding to the creditor or
debtor in whom the two characters concur.

Merger in Joint Obligations

A and B jointly owe C P1,000,000. If C assigns the entire
credit to A, A’s share is extinguished, but B’s share remains. In
other words, B would still owe A the sum of P500,000. In a joint
obligation, the debts are distinct and separate from each other.