Administrative Laws

I. General Principles

1. Defined. That branch of public law which fixes the organization and determines the competence of
administrative authorities and indicates to the individual remedies for the violation of his rights.

2. Kinds:

a) Statutes setting up administrative authorities. b) Rules, regulations or orders of such administrative

authorities promulgated pursuant to the purposes for which they were created. c) Determinations,
decisions and orders of such administrative authorities made in the settlement of controversies arising
in their particular fields. d) Body of doctrines and decisions dealing with the creation, operation and
effect of determinations and regulations of such administrative authorities.

3. Administration.

a) Meaning. Understood in two different senses:

i) As a function: the execution, in non-judicial matters, of the law or will of the State as expressed by
competent authority.

ii) As an organization: that group or aggregate of persons in whose hands the reins of government are
for the time being.

b) Distinguished from government.

c) Kinds:

i) Internal: legal side of public administration, e.g., matters concerning personnel, fiscal and planning
activities.

ii) External: deals with problems of government regulations, e.g., regulation of lawful calling or
profession, industries or businesses.

B. Administrative Bodies or Agencies

1. Defined. Organ of government, other than a court and other than a legislature, which affects the
rights of private parties either through adjudication or rule-making.

2. Creation. They are created either by:

a) Constitutional provision; b) Legislative enactment; or c) Authority of law.

3. Criterion: A body or agency is administrative where its function is primarily regulatory even if it
conducts hearings and determines controversies to carry out its regulatory duty. On its rule-making
authority, it is administrative when it does not have discretion to determine what the law shall be but
merely prescribes details for the enforcement of the law.
4. Types:

a) Bodies set up to function in situations where the government is offering some gratuity, grant or
special privilege, e.g., Bureau of Lands.

b) Bodies set up to function in situations wherein the government is seeking to carry on certain of the
actual business of government, e.g., BIR.

c) Bodies set up to function in situations wherein the government is performing some business service
for the public, e.g., MWSS.

d) Bodies set up to function in situations wherein the government is seeking to regulate business
affected with public interest, e.g., LTFRB.

e) Bodies set up to function in situations wherein the government is seeking under the police power to
regulate private business and individuals, e.g., SEC.

f) Bodies set up to function in situations wherein the government is seeking to adjust individual
controversies because of a strong social policy involved, e.g., ECC.

g) Bodies set up to make the government a private party, e.g.,

GSIS.

Election Law

I. GENERAL PRINCIPLES

A. Definitions.

1. Suffrage: the right to vote in the election of officers chosen by the people and in the determination of
questions submitted to the people. Includes within its scope: election, plebiscite, initiative and
referendum.

2. Election: the means by which the people choose their officials for a definite and fixed period and to
whom they entrust for the time being the exercise of the powers of government. Kinds:

a) Regular: one provided by law for the election of officers either nationwide or in certain subdivisions
thereof, after the expiration of the full term of the former officers. b) Special: one held to fill a vacancy
in office before the expiration of the full term for which the incumbent was elected.

B. Theories on Suffrage.

1. Natural right theory: Suffrage is a natural and inherent right of every citizen who is not disqualified by
reason of his own reprehensible conduct or unfitness. 2. Social expediency: Suffrage is a public office or
function conferred upon the citizen for reasons of social expediency; conferred upon those who are fit
and capable of discharging it. 3. Tribal theory: It is a necessary attribute of membership in the State. 4.
Feudal theory: It is an adjunct of a particular status, generally tenurial in character, i.e., a vested
privilege usually accompanying ownership of land. 5. Ethical theory: It is a necessary and essential
means for the development of society.

C. Theory prevailing in the Philippines: Suffrage is both a privilege and an obligation.

D. System of election adopted in the Philippines: Since 1901, the Australian system, first conceived by
Francis S. Dutton, a member of the Legislature of South Australia. The distinguishing feature of the
system is strict secrecy in balloting.

E. Constitutional mandate on Congress [Sec. 2, Art. V, Constitution]:

1. To provide a system for securing the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot, and for absentee voting by
qualified Filipinos abroad.

a) Sec. 12, R. A. 7166 provides for absentee voting, but is applicable only to the elections for the
President, Vice President and Senators, and limited to members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
and the Philippine National Police and other government officers and employees who are duly
registered voters and who, on election day, may temporarily be assigned in connection with the
performance of election duties to places where they are not registered voters.

b) R.A. 9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003) addressed the need for overseas Filipinos to be
able to vote in Philippine elections. See following Chapter on VOTERS: QUALIFICATION AND
REGISTRATION, for more detailed discussion.

2. To design a procedure for the disabled and the illiterate to vote without the assistance of other
persons.

F. Election period. Unless otherwise fixed by the Comelec in special cases, the election period shall
commence 90 days before the day of the election and shall end 30 days thereafter [Sec. 9, Art. IX-C,
Constitution].

VOTERS: QUALIFICATION AND REGISTRATION

A. Qualifications for suffrage: “Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines not otherwise
disqualified by law, who are at least eighteen years of age, and who shall have resided in the Philippines
for at least one year and in the place wherein they propose to vote for at least six months immediately
preceding the election. No literacy, property, or other substantive requirement shall be imposed on the
exercise of suffrage [Sec. 1, Art. V, Constitution].

1. Any person who transfers residence to another city, municipality or country solely by reason of his
occupation, profession or employment in private or public service, education, etc., shall not be deemed
to have lost his original residence [Sec. 117, B.P 881],
2. In Makalintal v. Comelec, G.R. No. 157013, July 3, 2003, challenged as unconstitutional was Sec. 5(d)
of R.A. 9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003), which provides that among those disqualified
to vote is an immigrant or a permanent resident (of another country) who is recognized as such in the
host country, unless he/she executes an affidavit declaring the he/ she shall resume actual, physical,
permanent residence in the Philippines not later than three years from approval of his/her registration
under the said Act, and that he/she had not applied for citizenship in another country.. On this
challenge, the Supreme Court said that inasmuch as the essence of R.A. 9189 is to enfranchise overseas
qualified Filipinos, the Court should take a holistic view of the pertinent provisions of both the
Constitution and R.A. 9189. The law was enacted in obeisance to the mandate of the first paragraph of
Sec. 2, Art. V of the Constitution, that Congress shall provide a system for voting by qualified Filipinos
abroad. It must be stressed that Sec. 2 does not provide for the parameters of the exercise of legislative
authority in enacting said law. Hence, in the absence of restrictions, Congress is presumed to have duly
exercised its function as defined in Art. VI of the Constitution.

a) In this case, the Supreme Court continued by saying that contrary to the claim of petitioner, the
execution of the affidavit itself is not the enabling or enfranchising act. The affidavit required is not only
proof of the intention of the immigrant or permanent resident to go back and resume residency in the
Philippines, but more significantly, it serves as an explicit expression that he had not in fact abandoned
his domicile of origin. It must be emphasized that Sec. 5(d) does not only require an affidavit or a
promise to “resume actual physical permanent residence in the Philippines not later than three years
from the approval of his/her registration”, the Filipino abroad must also declare that they have not
applied for citizenship in another country. Thus, they must return to the Philippines otherwise, their
failure to return “shall be cause for the removal” of their names “from the National Registry of absentee
voters and his/her permanent disqualification to vote in absentia”.

B. Disqualifications [Sec. 118, B.P. 881]:

1. Any person sentenced by final judgment to suffer imprisonment for not less than one year (unless
granted a plenary pardon or an amnesty); but right is reacquired upon the expiration of 5 years after
service of sentence.

2. Any person adjudged by final judgment of having committed any crime involving disloyalty to the
government or any crime against national security (unless restored to full civil and political rights in
accordance with law); but right is reacquired upon the expiration of 5 years after service of sentence.

3. Insane or incompetent persons as declared by competent authority.

C. Registration of voters. It shall be the duty of every citizen to register and cast his vote [Sec. 4, B.P.
881]. In order that a qualified elector may vote in any election, plebiscite or referendum, he must be
registered in the Permanent List of Voters for the city or municipality in which he resides [Sec. 115, BP
881],

1. Registration does not confer the right to vote; it is but a condition precedent to the exercise of the
right. Registration is a regulation, not a qualification [Yra v. Abano, 52 Phil 380],
2. General Registration of voters. Immediately after the barangay elections in 1997, the existing certified
list of voters shall cease to be effective and operative. For purposes of the May 1998 elections and all
elections, plebiscites, referenda, initiatives and recalls subsequent thereto, the Comelec shall undertake
a general registration of voters [Sec. 7, R.A. 8189 (The Voters Registration Act of 1996)]. 3

3. System of Continuing Registration. The personal filing of application of registration of voters shall be
conducted daily in the office of the Election Officer during regular office hours. No registration shall,
however, be conducted during the period starting 120 days before a regular election and 90 days before
a special election [Sec. 8, R.A. 8189].

a) \nAkbayan Youth v. Comelec, G.R. No. 147066, March 26, 2001, the Supreme Court upheld the action
of the Comelec denying petitioners’ request for two (2) additional registration days in order to
enfranchise more than 4 million youth between the ages 18-21 who failed to register on or before
December 27, 2000. The law was simply followed by the Comelec, and it is an accepted doctrine in
administrative law that the determination of administrative agencies as to the operation,
implementation and application of a law is accorded great weight, considering that these specialized
government bodies are, by their nature and functions, in the best position to know what they can
possibly do or not do under prevailing circumstances.

4. Disqualification. The same grounds as the disqualifications for suffrage.

5. Illiterate or disabled voters. Any illiterate person may register with the assistance of the Election
Officer or any member of an accredited citizen’s arms. The application for registration of a physically
disabled person may be prepared by any relative within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or
affinity or by the Election Officer or any member of an accredited citizen’s arm using the data supplied
by the applicant [Sec. 14, R.A. 8189],

6. Election Registration Board [Sec. 15, R.A. 8189]. There shall be in each city and municipality as many
Election Registration Boards as there are election officers therein. The Board shall be composed of the
Election Officer as chairman, and as members, the public school official most senior in rank and the local
civil registrar, or in his absence, the city or municipal treasurer. No member of the Board shall be related
to each other or to any incumbent city or municipal elective official within the fourth civil degree of
consanguinity or affinity. Every registered party and such organizations as may be authorized by the
Commission shall be entitled to a watcher in every registration board.

7. Challenges to right to register [Sec. 18, R.A. 8189]. Any voter, candidate or representative of a
registered political party may challenge in writing any application for registration, stating the grounds
therefor. The challenge shall be under oath and attached to the application, together with the proof of
notice of hearing to the challenger and the applicant. Oppositions to contest a registrant’s application
for inclusion in the voters’ list must, in all cases, be filed not later than the second Monday of the month
in which the same is scheduled to be heard or processed by the Election Registration Board. The hearing
on the challenge shall be heard on the third Monday of the month and the decision shall be rendered
before the end of the month. 8
8. Deactivation of Registration [Sec. 27, R.A. 8189]. The Board shall deactivate the registration and
remove the registration records of the persons from the corresponding precinct book of voters and
place the same, properly marked and dated in indelible ink, in the inactive file after entering the cause
or causes of deactivation: [a] Any person who has been sentence by final judgment to suffer
imprisonment for not less than one year, such disability not having been removed by plenary pardon or
amnesty; Provided, however, that any person disqualified to vote (because of this) shall automatically
reacquire the right to vote upon expiration of five years after service of sentence as certified by the
clerks of courts; [b] any person who has been adjudged by final judgment by a competent court or
tribunal of having caused/committed any crime involving disloyalty to the duly constituted government,
such as rebellion, sedition, violation of the anti-subversion and firearms laws, or any crime against
national security, unless restored to his full civil and political rights in accordance with law, Provided that
he shall regain his right to vote automatically upon expiration of five years from service of sentence; [c]
any person declared by competent authority to be insane or incompetent unless such disqualification
has been subsequently removed by a declaration of a proper authority that such person is no longer
insane or incompetent; [d] any person who did not vote in the two successive preceding regular
elections as shown by their voting records (for this purpose, regular elections do not include the
Sangguniang Kabataan elections); [e] any person whose registration has been ordered excluded by the
court; and [f] any person who has lost his Filipino citizenship.

9. Reactivation of Registration [Sec. 28, R.A. 8189]. Any voter whose registration has been deactivated
may file with the Election Officer a sworn application for reactivation of his registration in the form of an
affidavit stating that the grounds for the deactivation no longer exist any time but not later than 120
days before a regular election and 90 days before a special election. The Election Officer shall submit
such application to the Election Registration Board for appropriate action.

10. Preparation and Posting of the Certified List of Voters [Sec. 30, R.A. 8189]. The Board shall prepare
and post a certified list of voters 90 days before a regular election and 60 days before a special election
and furnish copies thereof to the provincial, regional and national central files. Copies of the certified
list, along with a list of deactivated voters categorized by precinct per barangay shall also be posted in
the office of the Election Officer and in the bulletin board of each city/municipal hall.

D. Inclusion and Exclusion proceedings.

1. Common rules governing judicial proceedings in the matter of inclusion, exclusion and correction of
names of voters.

a) Petition for inclusion, exclusion or correction of names of voters shall be filed during office hours.

b) Notice of the place, date and time of the hearing of the petition shall be served upon the members of
the Board and the challenged voter upon filing of the petition.

c) A petition shall refer only to one precinct and shall implead the Board as respondents.
d) No costs shall be assessed agaipst any party in these proceedings. However, if the court finds that the
application has been filed solely to harass the adverse party and cause him to incur expenses, it shall
order the culpable party to pay the costs and incidental expenses.

e) Any voter, candidate or political party affected by the proceedings may intervene and present his
evidence.

f) The decision shall be based on the evidence presented and in no case rendered upon a stipulation of
facts. If the question is whether or not the voter is real or fictitious, his non-appearance on the day set
for hearing shall be prima facie evidence that the challenged voter is fictitious.

g) The petition shall be heard and decided within 10 days from the date of its filing. Cases appealed to
the RTC shall be decided within 10 days from receipt of the appbal. In all cases, the court shall decide
these petitions not later than 15 days before the election and the decision shall become final and
executory.

2. Jurisdiction in inclusion and exclusion cases [Sec. 33, R.A. 8189], The Municipal and Metropolitan Trial
Courts shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases of inclusion and exclusion of voters in
their respective cities and municipalities. Decisions of the Municipal or Metropolitan Trial Courts may be
appealed by the aggrieved party to the Regional Trial Court within five days from receipt of notice
thereof. Otherwise, said decision shall become final and executory. The RfC shall decide the appeal
within 10 days from the time it is received and the decision shall immediately become final and
executory. No motion for reconsideration shall be entertained.

3. Petition for Inclusion [Sec. 34, R.A. 8189]. Any person whose application for registration has been
disapproved by the Board or whose name has been stricken out from the list may file with the court a
petition to include his name in the permanent list of voters in his precinct at any time except 105 days
prior to a regular election or 75 days prior to a special election. It shall be supported by a certificate of
disapproval or his application and proof of service of notice of his petition upon the Board. The petition
shall be decided within 15 days after its filing. 4

4. Petition for Exclusion [Sec. 35, R.A. 8189], Any registered voter, representative of a political party or
the Election Officer, may file with the a sworn petition for the exclusion of a voter from the permanent
list of voters giving the name, address and the precinct of the challenged voter at any time except 100
days prior to a regular election or 65 days prior to a special election. The petition shall be accompanied
by proof of notice to the Board and to the challenged voter, and shall be decided within 10 days from its
filing.

E. Annulment of Book of Voters [Sec. 39, R.A. 8189]. The Commission shall, upon verified petition of any
voter or election qfficer or duly registered political party, and after notice and hearing, annul any book
of voters that is not prepared in accordance with the provisions of this law, or was prepared through
fraud, bribery, forgery, impersonation, intimidation, force or any similar irregularity, dr which contains
data that are statistically improbable. No order, ruling or decision annulling a book of voters shall be
executed within 90 days before an election.
1. However, the annulment of the list of voters shall not constitute a ground for a pre-proclamation
contest [Ututalum v. Comelec, 181 SCRA 335].

CANDIDATES; CERTIFICATES OF CANDIDACY

A. Qualifications.

1. Qualifications prescribed by law are continuing requirements and must be possessed for the duration
of the officer’s active tenure. Once any of the required qualifications is lost, his title to the office may be
seasonably challenged. See Frivaldo v. Comelec, 174 SCRA 245; Labo v. Comelec, 176 SCRA 1].

2. When should the qualification/s be possessed. The Local Government Code does not specify any
particular date when the candidate must possess Filipino citizenship. Philippine citizenship is required to
ensure that no alien shall govern our people. An official begins to govern only upon his proclamation
and on the day that his term begins. Since Frivaldo took his oath of allegiance on June 30, 1995, when
his application for repatriation was granted by the Special Committee on Naturalization created under
PD 825, he was, therefore, qualified to be proclaimed and to assume office. Sec. 39 of the Local
Government Code speaks of qualifications of elective officials, not of candidates. Furthermore,
repatriation retroacts to the date of the filing of his application (for repatriation) on August 17, 1994
[Frivaldo v. Comelec, 257 SCRA 727].

B. Disqualifications.

1. Under the Omnibus Election Code [B.P. 881]:

a) Declared as incompetent or insane by competent authority.

b) Sentenced by final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion or any offense for which he has
been sentenced to a penalty of more than 18 months imprisonment.

c) Sentenced by final judgment for a crime involving moral turpitude.

i) In Villaber v. Comelec, G.R. No. 148326, November 15, 2001, it was held that violation of Batas
Pambansa No. 22 is a crime involving moral turpitude, because the accused knows at the time of the
issuance of the check that he does not have sufficient funds in, or credit with, the drawee bank for the
payment of the check in full upon presentment. A conviction thereof shows that the accused is guilty of
deceit, and certainly relates to and affects the good moral character of the person.

ii) Violation of the Anti-Fencing Law involves moral turpitude, and the only legal effect of probation is to
suspend the implementation of the sentence. Thus, the disqualification still subsists [De la Torre v.
Comelec, 258 SCRA 483]. This is modified by Moreno v. Comelec, infra.

d) Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country (unless he has
waived his status as such) [Sec. 68, B.P. 881]. See Caasi v. Comelec, 191 SCRA 229, where the Supreme
Court said that a “green card” is ample proof that the holder thereof is a permanent resident of, or an
immigrant to, the United States.

2. Under the Local Government Code [Sec. 40, R.A. 7160]: Applicable to candidates for local elective
office only:

a) Those sentenced bv final judgment for an offense punishable bv one year or more of imprisonment,
within two years after serving sentence.

i) Even if the candidate is under probation, the disqualification still subsists, because the effect of the
probation is only to suspend the implementation of the sentence [De la Torre v. Comelec, supra.]. This is
modified by Moreno v. Comelec, G.R. No. 168550, August 10, 2006, where the Supreme Court, citing
Baclayon v. Mutia, said that probation is not a sentence but is rather, in effect, a suspension of the
imposition of the sentence. The grant of probation to petitioner suspended the imposition of the
principal penalty of imprisonment, as well as the accessory penalties of suspension from public office
and from the right to follow a profession or calling, and that of perpetual special disqualification from
the right of suffrage. Thus, during the period of probation, the probationer is not disqualified from
running for a public office because the accessory penalty of disqualification from public office is put on
hold for the duration of the probation. Furthermore, in the case of Moreno, the trial court had already
issued an order finally discharging him, and under Sec. 16 of the Probation Law, the final discharge of
the probationer shall operate to restore to him all civil rights lost or suspended as a result of his
conviction, and to fully discharge his liability for any fine imposed as to the offense for which the
probation was granted.

b) Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case.

i) In Grego v. Comelec, G.R. No. 125955, June 19, 1997, it was held that an elective local official who was
removed from office as a result of an administrative case prior to January 1, 1992 (the date of effectivity
of the Local Government Code), is not disqualified from running for an elective local public office,
because Sec. 40 of the Local Government Code cannot be given retroactive effect.

ii) In Reyes v. Comelec, 254 SCRA 514, the Supreme Court ruled that the petitioner, a Municipal Mayor
who had been ordered removed from office by the Sanggunian Panlalawigan, was disqualified, even as
he alleged that the decision was not yet final because he had not yet received a copy of the decision,
inasmuch as it was shown that he merely refused to accept delivery of the copy of the decision.

c) Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines.

d) Those with dual citizenship.

i) In Mercado v. Manzano, 307 SCRA 630, reiterated in Valles v. Comelec, G.R. No. 137000, August 09,
2000, the Supreme Court clarified the “dual citizenship” disqualification and reconciled the same with
Sec. 5, Art. IV of the Constitution on “dual allegiance”. Recognizing situations in which a Filipino citizen
may, without performing any act and as an involuntary consequence of the conflicting laws of different
countries, be also a citizen of another State, the Court explained that “dual citizenship” as a
disqualification must refer to citizens with “dual allegiance”. Consequently, persons with mere dual
citizenship do not fall under the disqualification.

ii) Furthermore, for candidates with dual citizenship, it is enough that they elect Philippine citizenship
upon the filing of their certificate of candidacy to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship.
The filing of a certificate of candidacy suffices to renounce foreign citizenship, effectively removing any
disqualification as dual citizen. This is so, because in the certificate of candidacy, one declares that he is
a Filipino citizen, and that he will support and defend the Constitution and will maintain true faith and
allegiance to the same. Such declaration under oath operates as an effective renunciation of foreign
citizenship [Mercado v. Manzano, supra.].

iii) However, in the case of a former Filipino who lost Philippine citizenship and thereafter reacquires it
by taking the oath of allegiance as required in R.A. 9225, he must personally swear to an oath
renouncing all foreign citizenship at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy. The mere filing
of the certificate of candidacy is not sufficient, because Sec. 5 (2) of R.A. 9225 categorically requires the
individual to state in clear and unequivocal terms that he is renouncing all foreign citizenship, failing
which he is disqualified from running for an elective office [Lopez v. Comelec, G.R. No. 182701, July 23,
2008, reiterated in Jacot v. Del and Comelec, G.R. No. 179848, November 27, 2008].

e) Fugitives from justice in criminal and non-political case here and abroad. A “fugitive from justice”, as
defined by the Supreme Court in Marquez v. Comelec, 243 SCRA 538, “includes not only those who flee
after conviction to avoid punishment, but likewise those who, after being charged, flee to avoid
prosecution”. Rodriguez cannot be considered a “fugitive from justice”, because his arrival in the
Philippines from the U.S. preceded the filing of the felony complaint in the Los Angeles Court and the
issuance of the arrest warrant by the same foreign court, by almost five months [Rodriguez v. Comelec,
G.R. No. 120099, July 24, 1996].

f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acouired the right to reside abroad and
continue to avail of the same right after the effectivitv of the Local Government Code.

i) In Caasi v. Comelec, 191 SCRA 229, the Supreme Court said that possession of a “green card” is ample
evidence to show that the person is an immigrant to, or a permanent resident of, the United States of
America.

g) Those who are insane or feebleminded.

3. Additional grounds for disqualification [Sec. 68, B.P. 881], After having filed a certificate of candidacy,
the following shall be disqualified from continuing as candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding
the office:

a) One who has given money or other material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters
or public officials performing electoral functions.

b) One who committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy.

c) One who spent in his election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by the Code.

d) One who has solicited, received or made contributions prohibited under Sec. 89 (transportation, food
and drinks), Sec. 95 (public or private financial institutions, public utilities or exploitation of natural
resources, contractors of public works or other government contracts; franchise holders or
concessionaires; educational institutions receiving grants from the government, officials of the Civil
Service or the AFP, foreigners or foreign corporations), Sec. 96 (foreign-sourced contributions), Sec. 97
(raising of funds through lotteries, cockfights, boxing bouts, bingo, beauty contests, etc.), and Sec. 104
(prohibited contributions to churches, schoolbuildings, roads, bridges, medical clinics, etc.).

e) One who has violated the provisions of Sec. 80 (campaign period), Sec. 83 (removal, destruction of
lawful election propaganda), Sec. 85 (prohibited forms of propaganda). Sec. 86 (regulation of
propaganda through mass media). In Pangkat Laguna v. Comelec, G.R. No. 148075, February 4, 2002, the
Supreme Court held that the acts of Laguna .Governor Lazaro in ordering the purchase of trophies,
basketballs, volleyballs, chessboard sets, and the distribution of medals and pins to various schools, did
not constitute a violation of Sec. 80 on premature campaigning. Respondent Lazaro was not in any way
directly or indirectly soliciting votes; she was merely performing the duties and tasks imposed upon her
by law, which duties she had sworn to perform as Governor of Laguna.

f) One who has violated the provisions of Sec. 261 (election

offenses).

C. Certificate of Candidacy.

1. Effect of filing certificate of candidacy:

a) Officials holding appointive offices, including active members of AFP and officers of government-
owned or -controlled corporations shall be considered ipso facto resigned [Sec. 66, B.P. 881]. In PNOC
Energy Development Corporation v. NLRC, G.R. No. 100947, May 31, 1993, it was held that this section
applies even to employees of government-owned or -controlled corporations without an original
charter.

2. Formal defects in the certificate of candidacy.

a) While the certificate of candidacy is required to be under oath, the election of a candidate cannot be
annulled on the sole ground of formal defects in his certificate, such as lack of the required oath [De
Guzman v. Board of Canvassers, 48 Phil 211],

b) In Jurilla v. Comelec, G.R. No. 105435, June 2, 1994, it was held that the omission by the candidate
(for Councilor in Quezon City) to indicate in his certificate of candidacy his precinct number and the
particular barangay where he is a registered voter, is not sufficient ground to disqualify the candidate,
because the Local Government Code does not require these data to be indicated in the certificate. It is
enough that he is a registered voter in the precinct where he intends to vote which should be within the
district where he is running for office. 3

3. Death, disqualification or withdrawal of candidate. If after the last day for the filing of certificates of
candidacy, an official candidate of a registered political party dies, withdraws or is disqualified for any
cause, only a person belonging to and certified by the same political party may file a certificate of
candidacy for the office not later than mid-day of the day of the election [Sec. 77, B.P. 881].

a) In Luna v. Comelec, G.R. No. 165983, April 24, 2007, Luna filed her certificate of candidacy for the
position of Vice-Mayor of Lagayan, Abra, as substitute for Hans Roger who withdrew his COC. Private
respondents challenged the validity of the substitution, alleging that Hans Roger was only 20 years old
and, therefore, disqualified to run for Vice Mayor; accordingly, he cannot be substituted by Luna. The
Supreme Court ruled that the substitution was valid. When a candidate files his COC, the Comelec has
only a ministerial duty to receive and acknowledge its receipt pursuant to Sec. 76 of the Omnibus
Election Code. Since Hans withdrew his COC, and the Comelec found that Luna complied with all the
procedural requirements for a valid substitution, Luna could validly substitute for Hans Roger.

4. Withdrawal of Certificate of Candidacy. The withdrawal of the certificate of candidacy shall effect the
disqualification of the candidate to be elected for the position [Ycain v. Caneja, 81 Phil 773], The
withdrawal of the withdrawal, for the purpose of reviving the certificate of candidacy, must be made
within the period provided by law for the filing of certificates of candidacy [Monsale v. Nico, 83 Phil
758].

a) There is nothing in Sec. 73, B.P. 881, which mandates that the affidavit of withdrawal must be filed
with the same office where the certificate of candidacy to be withdrawn was filed. Thus, it can be filed
directly with the main office of the Comelec, the office of the regional election director concerned, the
office of the provincial election supervisor of the province to which the municipality belongs, or the
office of the municipal election officer of the municipality. Accordingly, in this case, the Supreme Court
held that there was valid withdrawal by petitioner of her certificate of candidacy for Mayor of Baybay,
Leyte [Loreto-Go v. Comelec, G.R. No. 147741, May 10, 2001].. 5

5. Filing of two certificates of candidacy. When a person files two certificates of candidacy for different
offices, he becomes ineligible for either position [Sec. 73, B.P. 881]. He may withdraw one of his
certificates by filing a sworn declaration with the Commission before the deadline for the filing of
certificates of candidacy. In Loreto-Go v. Comelec, supra., the petitioner filed two certificates; one for
Governor of Leyte, and another for Mayor of Baybay, Leyte. With the Supreme Court ruling that she had
validly withdrawn her certificate of candidacy for Mayor of Baybay, she was, therefore, considered a
bona fide candidate for Governor of Leyte.

6. Duty of the Comelec. Subject to its authority over nuisance candidates and its power to deny due
course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy under Sec. 78, B.P. 881, the Comelec shall have only the
ministerial duty to receive and acknowledge receipt of the certificates of candidacy [Sec. 76, B.P. 881],
a) As early as in Abcede v. Imperial, 103 Phil 136, the Supreme Court said that the Commission has no
discretion to give or not to give due course to a certificate of candidacy filed in due form. While the
Commission may look into patent defects in the certificate, it may not go into matters not appearing on
their face.

b) Accordingly, the Comelec may not, by itself, without proper proceedings, deny due course to or
cancel a certificate of candidacy filed in due form. Sec, 78, B.P. 881, which treats of a petition to deny
due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy on the ground that any material representation
therein is false, requires that the candidate must be notified of the petition against him, and he should
be given the opportunity to present evidence in his behalf [Cipriano v. Comelec, G.R. No. 158830, August
10, 2004].

7. Instances when the Comelec may go beyond the face of the certificate of candidacy:

a) Nuisance candidates [R.A. 6646]. The Comelec may, motu propio, or upon verified petition of an
interested party, refuse to give due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy if it is shown that the
said certificate was filed: (i) To put the election process in mockery or disrepute; (ii) To cause confusion
among the voters by the similarity of the names of the registered candidates; or (iii) By other
circumstances or acts which clearly demonstrate that the candidate has no bona fide intention to run for
the office for which the certificate has been filed, and thus prevent a faithful determination of the true
will of the electorate.

i) The proclamation of the winning candidate renders moot and academic a motion for reconsideration
filed by a candidate who had been earlier declared by the Comelec to be a nuisance candidate [Garcia v.
Comelec G R No. 121139, July 12, 1996].

b) Petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy. A verified petition may be filed
exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained in the certificate as required under
Sec. 74 is false. The petition may be filed not later than 25 days from the time of the filing of the
certificate of candidacy, and shall be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than 15 days
before the

i) Jurisdiction over a petition to cancel a certificate of candidacy lies with the Comelec in division, not
with the Comelec en banc [Garvida v. Sales, G.R. No. 122872, September 10, 1997], To deny due course
or to cancel a certificate of candidacy entails the exercise by the Comelec of its quasi-judicial, not simply
its administrative, powers. Hence, the Court may only compel the Comelec to exercise its discretion and
resolve the matter but it may not control the manner of exercising such discretion [Quizon v. Comelec,
G. R. No. 177927, February 15, 2008],

ii) In Villaberv. Comelec, G.R. No. 148326, November 15, 2001, respondent Douglas Cagas filed a petition
for the cancellation of petitioner’s certificate of candidacy on the ground that the latter made a false
material representation in his certificate when he said that he is “eligible for the office sought to be
elected to” since he had been convicted of violating B.P. 22, a crime involving moral turpitude.
iii) In Loong v. Comelec, 216 SCRA 760, it was held that the petition for the cancellation of the certificate
of candidacy of Loong for alleged misrepresentation as to his age, filed by Ututalum beyond the 25-day
period from the last day for filing certificates of candidacy cannot be given due course. Neither can it be
treated as a quo warranto petition since there has been no proclamation yet. The ruling in Frivaldo v.
Comelec cannot be invoked, because in the latter case, the ground for disqualification was citizenship.
[As pointed out by Justice Gutierrez in his concurring opinion, where the disqualification is based on age,
residence, or any of the other grounds for ineligibility, the prescriptive period should be applied strictly.]

iv) A facsimile of a petition for disqualification is not a genuine pleading; it is not sanctioned by the
Comelec Rules of Procedure. Thus, the Comelec should not have acted on it, but should have awaited
receipt of the original petition filed through registered mail [Garvida v. Sales, 271 SCRA 767].

c) Filing of a disqualification case on any of the grounds enumerated in Sec. 68, B.P. 881. i)

i) The jurisdiction of the Comelec to disqualify candidates is limited to those enumerated in Sec. 68, B.P.
881. All other election offenses are beyond the ambit of the Comelec jurisdiction. They are criminal and
not administrative in nature, and the power of the Comelec over such cases is confined to the conduct
of preliminary investigation on the alleged election offense for the purpose of prosecuting the alleged
offenders before the courts of justice [Codilla v. Comelec, G.R. No. 150605, December 10, 2004],

ii) Under Section 2, Comelec Resolution No. 2050, the Comelec is mandated to dismiss a complaint for
the disqualification of a candidate who has been charged with an election offense but who has already
been proclaimed as the winner by the Municipal Board of Canvassers. In this case, the petitioners had
already been proclaimed winners on May 18, 2001, and the private respondents filed their complaint for
the disqualification of petitioners only on June 23, 2001. The Comelec found probable cause against the
petitioners for the offense charged, and directed its Law Department to file the appropriate
Information. Clearly, then, the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction when it issued the assailed resolution disqualifying the petitioners from the
positions they were respectively elected to [Albana v. Comelec, G.R. No. 163302, July 23, 2004],

8. Effect of disqualification case. Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be
disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a
candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and
receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the
trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any
intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such
candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong [Sec. 6, R.A. 6646],

a) Note that the Comelec can suspend proclamation only when evidence of the winning candidate’s guilt
is strong [Codilla v. Comelec, supra.].

b) The use of the word “may” indicates that the suspension of the proclamation is merely permissive. If
the Comelec does not find any sufficient ground to suspend proclamation, then a proclamation may be
made [Grego v. Comelec, 274 SCRA 481].
c) Where the decision of the Comelec disqualifying the candidate is not yet final and executory on
election day, the Board of Election Inspectors (BEI), in the exercise of its ministerial duty, is under
obligation to count and tally the votes cast in favor of the candidate [Papandayan v. Comelec, G.R. No.
147909, April 16, 2002],

d) In Ortega v. Comelec, 211 SCRA 297, companion case to Labo v. Comelec, the Supreme Court held
that it is incorrect to argue that since a candidate has been disqualified, the votes intended for the
disqualified candidate should, in effect, be considered null and void. This would amount to
disenfranchising the electorate in whom sovereignty resides, x x x The rule would have been different if
the electorate, fully aware in fact and in law of a candidate’s disqualification, so as to bring such
awareness within the realm of notoriety, would nonetheless cast their votes in favor of the ineligible
candidate. In such case, the electorate may be said to have waived the validity and efficacy of their
votes by notoriously misapplying their franchise or throwing away their votes, in which case the eligible
candidate obtaining the next highest number of votes may be deemed elected. [Note that in this case,
the Comelec resolution disqualifying Labo had not yet become final on the day of the election.] This was
reiterated in Aquino v. Comelec, 248 SCRA 400, where the Supreme Court said that if Aquino were
disqualified before the elections, the votes for him, given the acrimony which attended the campaign,
would not have automatically gone to second-placer Syjuco. The same rule was applied in Nolasco v.
Comelec, 275 SCRA 762, Sunga v. Comelec, 288 SCRA 76, and Codilla v. Comelec, supra..

e) In Aznar v. Comelec, 185 SCRA 703, it was held that a petition for disqualification cannot be treated as
a petition for quo warranto as the former is unquestionably premature.

f) In Marcos v. Comelec, 248 SCRA 300, it was held that Secs. 6 and 7, R.A. 6646, in relation to Sec. 78,
B.P. 881, show that the Comelec does not lose jurisdiction even with the lapse of the period provided in
Sec. 78, B.P. 881. It is settled doctrine that a statute requiring rendition of judgment within a specified
period is generally construed to be merely directory.

g) In Nolasco v. Comelec, 275 SCRA 762, it was held that by virtue of the constitutional grant of plenary
authority to the Comelec, it has jurisdiction over proclamation and disqualification cases, and the
Comelec may not be hamstrung by its own procedure in Resolution No. 2050, even if the petition for
disqualification is filed after the election. These petitions for disqualification are subject to summary
hearing.