I. Pragmatics.

An introduction

The term pragmatics was introduced by Ch. Morris

(Foundation of the Theory of signs -1938) who described
the process of semiosis (the production of significance
through systems of signs); he divided semiotic
investigation into three areas and made the distinction
between syntax, semantics, and pragmatics.

Syntax deals with formal relations between signs in

abstraction from their signification and their
interpreters. It is “the way words relate to each other,
without taking into account the world outside...”
(Cutting, 2002:1)

Semantics is interested in the relations between

signs and their referents independently of the way
signs are used; it is “the study of what the words
mean by themselves, out of context, as they are in a
dictionary.” (Cutting, 2002:1)

Pragmatic the action of using the language

s the study of the “relation of signs to
(from the their interpreters”
Greek the study of language use
Pragma = seeks to explain aspects of meaning
action) which are beyond the plain sense of
words or structures
examines the way signs are used

Two meanings of the term pragmatics have been taken

into consideration:
a) the “continental” one (developed in Netherlands,
Denmark, France, Norway and Belgium and represented
by Dubois, Benveniste, Todorov) that starts from the
distinction between utterance (as a product) and the
process of uttering (as an activity) (Dubois, 1969:100-
110). An utterance is defined in terms of its
communicative function (of its meaning and use in

5
connected discourse). Pragmatics is the study of the way
language is used in different situations (through the
analysis of its psychological, social, and psycholinguistic
aspects).
b) the British and American philosophy of language and
linguistics considers that the use of language means, at
the same time, action and interaction. Thus, pragmatics
becomes a systematic investigation of the way in which
individuals use language in a particular context, with a
particular goal in mind (as each communicative act, be it
oral or written, is not only a transfer of information, but it
also presupposes successful interpretation of the
communicative intention of the sender, from the part of
the receiver of the message) (Ionescu-Ruxăndoiu,
1999:29). This means preoccupation for
 what people mean when they use the language
 language as a vehicle for action and interaction
 the role of the context in establishing the meaning
of utterances
 the use of deixis/indexicality
 identification of presuppositions and implicature
 the use of speech acts (utterances are interpreted
as speech acts that have intended purposes: to
request, to recommend, to apologize, to thank,
etc.).
As a discipline within language science, the roots of
pragmatics lie in the work of Herbert Paul Grice on
conversational implicature and the Cooperative Principle,
and in the work of Stephen Levinson, Penelope Brown and
Geoff Leech on politeness
Researchers have offered several definitions to
pragmatics:
“Pragmatics is the study of language from the point of
view of users, especially of the choices they make, the
constraints they encounter in using language in social
interaction and the effects their use of language has on
other participants in the act of communication.”
“Pragmatics studies the factors that govern our choice
of language in social interaction and the effects of our
choice on others.” Crystal (1997:301)

6
 “Pragmatics is the study of relations between language
and context that are grammaticalized (i.e. encoded in
lexicon, morphology, syntax or phonology), or encoded
in the structure of a language.” Brown and Levinson
(1978)

“At the most elementary level, pragmatics can be

defined as the study of language use….the study of
linguistic phenomena from the point of view of their
usage properties and processes.” Verschueren (1999)

“Pragmatics can be usefully defined as the study of

how utterances have meanings in situations.”
“Pragmatics is the study of the relations between
language and context that are basic to an account of
language understanding.”
“Pragmatics is the study of the ability of language
users to pair sentences with the contexts in which they
would be appropriate.”
“Pragmatics is the study of deixis […], implicature,
presupposition, speech acts, and aspects of discourse
structure.” Levinson (1983:21-27)

“Pragmatics is concerned with the study of meaning as

communicated by a speaker (or writer) and interpreted
by a listener (or reader)”. Yule (1996:32)

“Pragmatics tells us it`s all right to use language in

various, unconventional ways, as long as we know, as
language users, what we`re doing.” It is “the science
of language as it is used by real, live people, for their
own purposes and within their limitations and
affordances.”
“Pragmatics is where the action is…” Mey (2009:2-6)
There are certain areas that pragmatics is interested in:
 speaking (as production of utterances)
 the study of meaning (the speaker meaning –
what people mean by their utterances; and the
contextual meaning – the interpretation of what
people mean in a particular context, as well as
the way in which context influences what is said)

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  the study of what is beyond what is said, that is
the study of the meaning of an invisible part of
what is communicated (this is based on the idea
that when people communicate, there always
remains a part which is not said. Therefore,
people have to make inferences, on the basis of
shared assumptions and expectation, in order to
recognize the speaker`s intended meaning)
 the study of the expression of relative (physical,
social, conceptual) distance between the
communication partners (a thing that determines
how much needs to be said)
 the study of the relationships between linguistic
forms and the people who produce/use these
forms.
The pragmatic study of language brings some
advantages (the study of people`s intentions/goals, of
their intended meaning and of their actions performed
through language) and also, a big disadvantage:
human concepts are difficult to analyse in a consistent
and objective way.

II. Pragmatics and the conversational

discourse
II.1. Conversation

Conversation the familiar predominant kind of talk in

which two or more participants freely
alternate in speaking, which generally
occurs outside specific institutional
settings (Levinson, 1983:284)
the prototype of language use
(Ionescu-Ruxăndoiu, 1999:39)

8
 pragmatically speaking, it is a very
serious and necessary activity, having
a cohesive function and facilitating
diverse forms of social interaction
(Mey, 1981)
an aspect of the human oral
communication between two or more
than two participants engaged in daily
interaction, that has a (somehow)
informal and spontaneous character,
and that ensures participants their
integration into a group, that is, their
participation to social life (Bonta,
2004a: 27)

The term conversation (Bonta, 2004:14-20) got its present

meaning at the end of the Renaissance period, in Italy
(Dandry, 1999:58), when “conversazione’’ (“entretien
verbal entre colloquants’’) came into contrast with the
Latin “conversatio-onis” (relationship, familiarity,
intimacy, rapports between people having the same
customs or belonging to the same environment.’’ Later
(16th/17th century), the first conversation treaties
appeared in France, where conversation was defined as “a
game of the spirit, where each partner, just like in the
epoch dances, was constantly changing the place,
becoming an intelligent speaker or an attentive listener’’
(Izdrăilă and Ghihor, 1996:201). Many researchers and
dictionaries have associated the term with that of
meeting, debate, transaction, dialogue, interview,
consultation, discussion, negotiation, colloquy, dialogue,
or even dispute. The common paradigm is the exchange
of messages between the interlocutors that are in each
other`s presence (face-to-face). André-Larochebouvy
(1984) identifies some other common features between
them: the oral character; the presence of two or more
than two interlocutors; the immediate and direct access to
the partner`s reactions (feedback) to the message; the
important role of the context in message interpretation
and evaluation, as well as the possibility of using diverse
codes (visual, olfactory, tactile, auditory).

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The difference between the terms is given by
a) the type of interaction: the difference, for example,
between a conversation (considered to be a
symmetrical type of interaction) and an interview
(considered an asymmetrical type of interaction)
b) the ends/goals: the difference between an interview
(having a pre-established goal) and a conversation
(having a spontaneous character and the goal of
preserving relationships between participants)
c) the character of the exchange: the difference
between a negotiation (formal character) and a
conversation (informal character)
d) the type of relationships participants establish
between them: the difference between a debate
(relationship of competition) and a conversation
(relationship of cooperation)
e) the spatial-temporal limit: the difference between a
meeting, or an interview (they both have pre-
established/defined limits) and a conversation
(whose limits are not fix; they are imposed by
external and internal factors)
f) the structure of the exchange.
The characteristics of any conversation, as identified by
Ionescu-Ruxăndoiu, (1999:39-42) include a series of key
words:
a) interaction
Any conversation is created through the interaction
between partners who share a common territory.
Participants to interaction take roles (sender; receiver;
audience). The sender of the messages needs to signal his
role through verbal or nonverbal markers. Thus, address
terms, greetings, as well as the different rituals, together
with positioning of the body and gaze play an important
role in this respect. In his turn, the receiver needs to
signal his active “presence’’ through verbal or nonverbal
“listening cues” (body orientation, smile, vocal
confirmations under the form of “Ya”, “Sure”, “Hmm”, for
example). The producer of the messages can control the
interaction partner`s attention given to them and
feedback plays an important role. The interaction between
the sender and the receiver is based on a coordination of

10
their efforts of producing and interpreting utterances. At
the same time, between the two interlocutors there
always needs to exist an interactional timing (Kerbrat-
Orrechioni, 1996) that represents the entire set of
mechanisms through which the interactants
“adjust/accommodate” to each other. The production and
the interpretation of utterances depend on both
participants to conversation (who change the roles of
producer and interpreter during the interaction and take
into account the data they possess about each other).
This is why the evolution of any conversation is not
predictable.
b) context
Any conversation is inherently contextual (each type of
conversation takes place in a communicative context).
The context influences both content and form. Any
conversation creates a context permanently (each turn
modifies the already existing context and this thing
cannot be ignored, as participants have to consider it in
any moment of their interchange). The context
establishes the degree of coherence of the respective
conversation.
c) content
Participants to the interaction establish the content, in an
explicit or implicit way. Topic and language register choice
is strictly linked to the interactional timing. A great
number of phatic markers characterizes any conversation.
d) structure
Any conversation has an organized structure. Its
development depends on a succession of participants`
turns, through which participants negotiate meanings in
interaction.
Conversations have various rules that are linked to the
communicative context in which they are produced.
Conversation rules are unwritten ones, learned through
imitation (from generation to generation) and more
flexible than the ones that characterize other types of
interaction (interviews, discussions, negotiations, etc).
These rules are context, social and cultural-dependent
and they represent the object of study of the Conversation
analysis.

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II.2. Discourse analysis vs. Conversation analysis

any continuous stretch of language larger

than a sentence
an organized set of utterances reflecting,
or in relation with an organized set of
thoughts…(De Saussaure)
Discours
verbal communication in its situational and
e
social context
meaningful units of language (meaningful
= their “corresponding to a speaker`s
intention to pass on a given message” (De
Saussaure)

a subfield of pragmatics…as it is concerned

with language use (De Saussaure)
interested in the organization of discourse
*organization = the sum of relations which
Discours
hold between the units of text… and
e
between each unit and the whole”
analysis
(Goutsos, as cited in Berzlánovich , 2008).
analyses of the rules that allow for the
production of well-formed units of
language, larger than sentences

the analysis of conversational

content and conversational formal
Conversation aspects
analysis analysis of talk-in-interaction
(developed by it is interested in the analysis of
Sacks, ordinary language through which
Schegloff, interpersonal socially organized
Jefferson and actions are performed
Pomeranz) turn-taking and adjacency pairs are
basic notions in the analysis of
conversations
Pragmatics and discourse analysis are “approaches to
studying language`s relation to the contextual

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background features” (Cutting, 2002:1) and this means
that they have much in common.
There exist similarities between pragmatics and discourse
analysis. “They both study context, text and function.”
(Cutting 2002:2) and the meaning that words get in
context (as meanings are influenced by knowledge about
the physical and the social world, by socio-psychological
factors, as well as by knowledge of the time and place
where words are uttered). Both studies are interested in
how individuals in interaction communicate more
information than the words they use and they both
analyse the discourse (the use of language) or text
(pieces of spoken or written discourse), being preoccupied
by the mechanisms through which “stretches of language
become meaningful and unified for their users” (Cook
1989, as cited in Cutting, 2002). This is called coherence
(in discourse analysis) and relevance (in pragmatics).
They are both concerned with function (the speaker`s
short-term purpose in speaking and long-term goals in
interacting verbally) (Cutting, 2002).
There also exist differences between pragmatics and
discourse analysis. Discourse analysis gives much
attention to the structure of text; it “studies how large
chunks of language beyond the sentence level are
organized” and how what one speaker says can influence
the next speaker`s response. (Cutting 2002:2)
Pragmatics` concern is represented by the social
principles of discourse; it takes “a socio-cultural
perspective on language usage”, being interested in the
unwritten rules (maxims of conversation) that people
have in view when they engage in a process of co-
operation. (Cutting 2002:2)
According to Schiffrin (1987), analysis of discourse needs
to go beyond its surface description and study the layers
of meaning of which it is made up: exchange (turns,
adjacency pairs), information structure (what both
speaker and hearer know), action (the use of speech
acts), participation framework (participants to discourse:
speaker, hearer) and pragmatic markers (discourse
markers) that achieve and integrate meaning/meanings
into discourse.

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Discourse analysis (DA) is generally contrasted to
Conversation analysis (CA), although there exist
similarities between them: they both show that language
can be studied in its own right; they are based on
qualitative research and they analyse the functions of
language and the process of meaning-making.
Moeschler and Reboul (1999) identify certain similarities
between discourse analysis and conversational analysis:
 they are both interested in the oral discourse,
especially in the analysis of natural conversations,
that represent, according Moeschler & Reboul
(1999:447) any verbal interaction in which
participants are face-to-face or at a distance, and in
which situational, contextual, gestural, intentional
factors play an important role
 they are interested in the sequential organization of
conversations and, especially, in the rules that
govern their coherence
 they are preoccupied with the logic of the actions in
conversations (discourse analysis links the logical
principles to the speech act theory; conversation
analysis insists on the canonical sequences
produced by the speakers in a preferred way).
There also exist differences between discourse analysis
and conversation analysis
 Discourse analysis (DA) uses deductive methods
when analyzing units larger than sentences. Its
research is based on the isolation of a group of
discourse units and establishing “chaining” rules,
meant to distinguish between coherent and
incoherent discourses. It is a a type of analysis that
resembles the grammatical one: the interest is in
the linguistic analysis of larger units than sentence.
 Conversation analysis (CA) observes, gathers, and
analyses a corpus of language use of conversations
“as they take place in real life.” (Mey, 1993:195).
Conversation is seen as the result of the interaction
between two ore more individuals who often have
divergent interests. Its main interest is the
sequential organization of talk-in-interaction (not
only conversations, but also, such interactions as

14
 those in courtrooms, therapy sessions, political
speeches, interviews), as well as the rules that allow
interlocutors in conversation to adjust their turns.
CA applies to spoken language and its methods of
research have an inductive character.
The first to analyse conversations were the
ethnomethodologists; they tape-recorded and transcribed
daily conversations and concluded that these are
governed by rules and have a well-organized structure.
The ethnomethodological model was suggested by
Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson (in the 70`s). Their basic
idea was that there exists am implicit system of
conversational analysis, which has two main components:
the analysis of the turn structure and the analysis of turn-
taking system rules. (to be analysed in III.5)
At the same time, ethnomethodologists were interested in
the hierarchical organization of the conversation
constituents as well as in the diverse types of functional-
pragmatic relationships between them.
Analysing conversation constituents, Moeschler (1985)
distinguishes between exchange, turn and speech act.
Thus, for him, the exchange is the smallest hierarchical
dialogical unit, made up of two conversational
contributions produced by different individuals engaged in
the conversational process (the minimal exchange). The
turn represents the largest unit, with a monologic
character. Turns may include one or more than one speech
acts (this establishes the difference between a simple turn
and a complex one).The speech act represents the
smallest unit of a turn. It is “the discursive segment
associated with a single propositional content”
(Moeschler, 1985:83).

The model offers a complex analysis of the exchange. In

line with Moeschler, Goffman (1973) distinguishes
between confirmation exchanges (in opening and closing
exchanges) and repair exchanges. The confirmation
exchanges have a ritualistic character; they are made up
of two parts (greeting- greeting, for example) and are
meant to confirm the positive attitude of one interactant
towards what the other one said/produced). The repair

15
exchanges have also the character of a ritual (Goffman)
and they are meant to “repair’’ one type of offense brough
by the interlocutor (see Pragmatics of requests and
apologies). Generally, such an exchange is made up of
three parts.
The integrative model belongs to Willis Edmondson
(1981). He started from the idea that the model
suggested by ethnmethdologists does not account for the
relationship existing between what it is said and what is
really realized through a succession of turns. This is why
Edmondson makes the difference between a deep
structure (that defines the possible structural interactional
background) and a surface structure (including the real
sequences of the interactional acts produced during a
conversation). In his opinion, any conversation has a
hierarchical structure that consists in acts produced by
the same speaker (a move); several alternative moves
produced by both interactants constitute an exchange;
several exchanges (be they coordinated or belonging to a
main one) give birth to phase; ordered succession of such
phases represent an encounter.
According to Edmondson (as cited in Ionescu-Ruxandoiu,
1999:67), the basic types of interactional moves are:
a) Proffer (a move through which the participants to
conversation introduce a topic)
b) Satisfy (a move through which the previous speaker
finds out that his perlocutionary aim was efficient)
c) Contra (a move through which the speaker tries to
determine the interlocutor to withdraw his initial
Proffer)
d) Counter (a move through which the speaker tries to
sanction the content of the previous move,
determining the partner to reconsider his previous
words)
e) Re-offer (a move through which the one who
initiated an exchange suggests an altered version of
his first Proffer).
Conversations have also a set of elements that are
called fumblings and that belong neither to the group
of interactional acts, nor to that of illocutionary acts.

16
 Among them, Edmondson (as cited in Ionescu-
Ruxandoiu, 1999:79) includes
a) starters (elements that signal the speaker`s
assuming the role)
b) let-me-explain (elements with explanatory function)
c) underscorers (elements that underline the topic
under discussion or the position of the speaker
towards it)
d) cajolers (flattering elements)
e) asides (elements that do not belong to the on-going
conversation; they refer to spatial or temporal
dimensions that belong to the communication
situation).
Edmondson gives much attention to the analysis of
exchanges. In his opinion, these may be of two main
types: main exchanges and subordinate exchanges.
Subordinate eschanges, in their turn, are subdivided into
a) pre-exchanges (meant to initiate a main exchange
and to underline the speaker`s interactional
strategy)
b) post-exchanges (follow a main exchange)
c) pre-responding (exchanges inserted within the main
one).
Exchanges are coordinated through two types of
processes: chaining (a set of pieces of information on the
same topic) or reciprocation (the participants to
conversation offer the same type of information).

III. Language as cooperation

III.1. Context and contextualization

The term context derives from texere (Latin “to weave”);

the related verb contexere = “to weave together”; “to
interweave”. Sociolinguistics and anthropological
linguistics revealed its important role in communication. It
represents a social construct, generated, developed, and
negotiated during social interactions. Interactants bring
their contribution to its permanent change and
enrichment.

17
The fact that pragmatics analyses language in context
makes it necessary that context should be studied in all
its aspects. First, a distinction needs to be made between
context outside text and co-text.
Cutting (2002:3-15) distinguishes between
a) the situational context (the situation in which the
interaction occurs; the physical setting)
b) the background knowledge context (what
participants to interaction know about each other and
the world; the context of assumed background
knowledge). In its turn, it can be subdivided into
(1)cultural general background knowledge (the
knowledge people have about life in general); people
can have mutual knowledge (especially if they belong
to the same group) and (2) interpersonal knowledge
(specific knowledge about speakers themselves, about
their life and individual development/experiences).
People may have shared interpersonal knowledge
(knowledge people acquired during their previous
encounters/stages of their interactional history)
Context has much influence upon utterances. Thus, one
and the same utterance may get different meanings,
according to the context in which it is uttered:
A (to B): They have called twice and asked about
you.
The utterance may be interpreted as: (1) simple
information offered by A to B; (2) an announcement
bringing good news to B; (3)a reproach.

III.2. Co-text
In Cutting`s opinion (2002), co-textual context is the third
type of context with an important role in the analysis of
utterances` meaning; it represents the context of the text
itself.

Cohesion designates the connectedness of the elements

at the surface level; ‘’surface-level ties showing
relationships among elements in the text.’’ (Tannen,
1990:167) This connectedness contributes to the
organization of the conversational discourse. Cohesion is
expressed partly through grammar and partly through

18
vocabulary (“through lexico-grammatical items – Halliday
& Hasan, 1976).
1. Grammatical cohesion includes (Cutting, 2002)
Substitution – meant to ensure cohesion by means of
elements that help the speaker avoid repetition; it
consists in the replacement of an item by another one and
can be of various types: nominal substitution, verbal
substitution or clausal substitution:

A: I`d like those shoes, please!

B: Which ones?

A: Why didn`t you say anything?

B: My words didn`t come as easily as they used
to do.

A: Will they come with us?

B: They said so.

Ellipsis – means the omission of an item; it is “the form of

substitution in which the item is replaced by nothing”
(Halliday & Hasan, 1976). It can be either nominal or
verbal.
A: I like that blouse!
B: I like the same.

A: Have you finished the report?

B: Yes, I have [finished the report/it].

Reference – In a context, utterances are linked to a

particular place and time in which they are produced. The
act of using the language to refer to entities in the context
is known as reference. Through referring expressions, the
listener is helped to identify the referents (the entities
referred to). The referring expressions pointing to the
referent in the context is called deixis. Deixis means
“'pointing' via language” (Yule 1996: 9). There exist
 exophoric reference (not in the text; understood in
the context): Take a look at this or The book is
over there (where this and over there refer to
something that only the speaker and the listener

19
 have access at in the respective context); the same
can be identified in
 endophoric reference (that refers to something
within the text); it either precedes the referent
(cataphoric reference) or follows it (anaphoric
reference): She bought the dictionary for John. He
needs it. (He is anaphoric as it ensures back
reference); These are two examples of subjects at
school: English and Maths. (These is cataphoric; it
refers to forward referents)
Deictic expressions may fall in several categories:
a) person deixis – expressions, more exactly personal
pronouns that point to a person directly involved
(the speaker or the addressee); a person who is not
directly involved (an overhearer— who hears the
utterance but who is not directly addressed) and a
person/more persons mentioned in the utterance
b) place/spatial deixis – they are expressions that
point at a location relevant to the utterance, “relative
to anchorage points in the speech event” - Levinson,
1983:79); they are adverbs (here/there), demonstrative
adjectives and demonstrative pronouns (this/that).
Here/this and there/that indicate proximity or distance,
respectively, from the speaker.
c) time deixis – are expressions that point at a
moment in time (time involved in or referred to in an
utterance): now, then, the next day, tomorrow. Now
has proximal reference while then has distal reference.
The same is valid for tenses of the verb: present tense
has proximal reference, while past tense has distal
reference.
d) discourse deixis - “the use of expressions within
some utterances to refer to some portion of the
discourse that contains that utterance (including the
utterance itself)’’(Levinson, 1983:85):
“I bet you haven`t heard this story” (reference to a
forthcoming portion of the discourse
“That was the funniest story I have ever heard’’
(reference to the preceding portion)
e) social deixis – expressions that encode different
social information; “that aspects of sentences which

20
 reflect or establish or are determined by certain
realities of the social situation in which the speech act
occurs (Fillmore, 1975, as cited in Levinson, 1983:89);
this includes the social identities of participants and
the relationships between them. Honorifics are the best
example of social deixis.

Conjunctions – elements that ensure the cohesion of the

discourse establishing the relationships between a
sentence (or a part of it) and the preceding/following
sentence (or a part of it).
Including them in the category of discourse markers,
Halliday & Hassan (1976) mentioned the following types:
additives, adversatives, causals, and temporals.
Additive conjunctions may be, in their turn, a) simple
(and; and also; nor, neither; not...neither; or; or else); b)
emphatic (furthermore, besides, additionally, moreover;
alternatively); c) ”afterthought” (by the way); d)
comparative (likewise, similarly; on te other hand;
conversely); 5) appositive (that is, I mean, for instance,
for example).
Adversative conjunctions may be: a) adversative proper
(yet, though); b)contrastive (actually; in fact); c)
corrective (instead, rather, on the contrary); d) dissmissive
(whichever, at any rate, in any case).
Causal conjunctions include: therefore, consequently, so,
thus, therefore, in consequence, as a result, for, because,
otherwise.
Temporal conjunctions include next, afterwards, after
that, soon, presently, finally, in conclusion.

2. Lexical cohesion – contributes to the semantic

structuring of discourse (Martin 1992, as cited in
Berzlánovich, 2008). It includes
Repetition – the same word/phrase is repeated along the
conversational discourse, in order to clarify things,
highlight ideas, remind or insist.
Synonyms (create lexical cohesion at semantic level) –
are used in order to avoid repetition of a word.
Lexical chains – the use of words that are related to the
ones already mentioned

21
General terms - words such as thing, stuff, person,
whose meaning is context-dependent .

Coherence – “underlying organizing structure making

the words and sentences into a unified discourse that has
cultural significance for those who create or comprehend
it’’ (Tannen, 1990:167). The conversational text is an
integrated whole, when it is based on relations of
closeness (causality, time, location) between its concepts
and sentences, and when this semantic continuity is
recognized/identified by the speakers.
Coherence can be analysed at two levels; thus, literature
distinguished between local coherence (“relations
between utterances, sentences and propositions that are
pairwise and structures as sequential continuations” –
says Ellis, 1999:90) or global cohesion (”A goal-oriented
plan that offers overall control and is functionally related
to local surface connection” – Ellis, 1999:90).

Following Van Dijk (1977), Moeschler introduces the notion

of appropriateness and operates the distinction between
contextual appropriateness and cotextual
appropriateness.
For him, cotextual appropriateness is in close relationship
with certain conditions, defined as sequencing
constraints. He sonsiders that these conditions result from
the relationship between intiative moves and reactive
moves. Thus, an initiative move of the type of a question,
for example (Is it late?) imposes some conditions on the
answer: the thematic condition; the condition of
propositional content; the illocutionary condition and that
of the argumentative orientation. The answer (the
reactive move) needs to satisfy all these conditions. The
more it does so, the more cotextually appropriate it is.
When the thematic condition, the condition of
propositional content and the illocutionary condition are
satisfied, discourse is said to be coherent. If only the
thematic condition and the condition of propositional
content are satisfied, discourse is said to be cohesive. So
a coherent discourse is always cohesive, whereas the
reverse is false.

22
III.3. Grice and the Cooperative Principle

“Make your conversational contribution

Grice`s
such as is required, at the stage at which
Cooperati
it occurs, by the accepted purpose or
ve
direction of the talk exchange in which
Principle
you are engaged” (Grice,1989: 26).

Aitchison (1995) distinguishes between a narrow sense of

pragmatics (the study of how listeners arrive at the
intended meaning of the speaker) and a broad sense of
the same term (pragmatics interested in the general
principles followed by human beings when they are
communicating with one another). The Cooperative
Principle is such a principle.

The principle helps participants to conversation to

evaluate each other`s contribution and, at the same time,
to make sense of what is said. It describes how the
effective communication is achieved (how meaning is
achieved) in common social situation. Its four sub-
principles were called maxims:
(1)The Maxim of Quantity (the speaker`s contribution is
expected to be as informative as required):
1. Make your contribution as informative as is required
(for the current purposes of the exchange)
2. Do not make your contribution more informative
than is required.
(2) The Maxim of Quality (the speaker is expected to tell
the truth or to provide adequate evidence for what he/she
states): Try to make your ontribution one that is true.
1. Do not say what you believe to be false.
2. Do not say that for which you lack adequate
evidence.

(3) The Maxim of Relation (the speaker`s contribution

should be relevant to the topic of the conversation): Try to
be relevant.

23
(4) The Maxim of Manner (the speaker should speaks
clearly and avoid ambiguity or obscurity): Be perspicuous.
1. Avoid obscurity of expression.
2. Avoid ambiguity.
3. Be brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity).
4. Be orderly.

Speakers make sense of utterances they exchange even

though, sometime, some elements are missing. This is
possible because the missing elements are implicated. As
participants to the verbal exchange cooperate in meaning
making, they can sense the implicatures produced
(additional meanings, intended by the speaker and
generated by the hearer). Grice considers that pragmatic
interpretation relies much on inferencing processes
(helped by the literal meaning of utterances, the
Cooperative Principle, the conversation maxims, the
contextual assumptions).
He distinguishes between
a) conventional implicatures (that are always
lexicalized and convey the same extra meaning, no
matter the context in which they are produced).
According to Grice, they are carried by a restricted
number of words, such as: but, therefore, even, yet.
The example he offers is
He is poor but honest. (honesy - contrary to
expectations in relation to financial underprivileges)
b) conversational implicatures (that are context-
dependent; they convey different meanings in
different contexts).
A: Have you seen my glasses?
B: Somewhere around here...
Brown and Yule (1983: 33) have the following comment to
make:
…implicatures are pragmatic aspects of
meaning and have certain identifiable
characteristics. They are partially derived
from the conventional or literal meaning of an
utterance, produced in a specific context
which is shared by the speaker and the
hearer, and depend on the recognition by the

24
 speaker and the hearer of the Co-operative
Principle and its maxims... [they] must be
treated as inherently indeterminate since they
derive from a supposition that the speaker
has the intention of conveying meaning and
obeying the Co-operative Principle.
When it comes about meaning, pragmatic inferences are
generated by either observing the maxims or by
disregarding them, as not all utterances conform to
maxims. Speakers sometimes disregard the maxims,
consciously or not. The violations of maxims form the
bases for inferences that participants draw from what is
said in interaction. Grice (1975) and Thomas (1995:64)
identified five ways of failing to observe a maxim:
1. flouting a maxim - this happens “when speakers
appear not to follow the maxims but expect hearers to
appreciate the meaning implied…” (Cutting, 2002: 37).
In other terms, the speaker, although violating a maxim, is
still cooperating; the violation is a sign of his/her indirectly
saying something. By doing so, he/she suggests the
hearer to try to identify a meaning which is different from
the expressed one. This additional (implicit) meaning is
what Grice called “conversational implicature’’ (what the
speaker can imply, suggest or mean as distinct from what
he/she literally said. It is important to mention the fact
that conversational implicatures occur only in a particular
context of utterance. (Thomas, 1995:58)
Flouts exploiting the maxim of Quality occur when
speakers say something that is not untrue or for which
he/she cannot offer an adequate evidence:
A: Do you know where Ottawa is?
B: It`s in the United States.
Flouting the maxim of Quality produces irony, banter,
metaphor or euphemism. Leech (1983:144) explains the
difference between irony and banter: “While irony is an
apparently friendly way of being offensive (mock-
politeness), the type of verbal behaviour known as
“banter” is an offensive way of being friendly (mock-
impoliteness).”
Flouts exploiting the maxim of Quantity result in speakers
offering more or less information than required:

25
 A: What have you seen there?
B: Many things...
According tot Brown and Levinson, flouting the maxim of
Quantity results in understatement, overstatement or
tautology.
Flouts exploiting the maxim of Relevance occur when the
speakers give a response that is irrelevant to the topic
“by abruptly changing the subject or by overtly failing to
address the other person’s goal in asking a question”
(Thomas, 1995:70) :
A: Can you help him with the report?
B: I`m not at home in the afternoon.
while flouts exploiting the maxim of Manner occur any
time the speakers` contributions are represented by
ambiguous or unclear utterances:
A: What are you doing?
B: Ttrying to offer some stuff to all those who
often cry under the moon no matter the
weather.
Flouting this maxim produces ambiguity, vagueness and
ellipsis.
2. violating a maxim is an opposite process to that of
flouting.
It is a deliberate process, as the speaker intentionally
does not want the hearer to get another meaning but the
expressed one.
Violation of the maxim of Quantity can take the form of
tautology:
A: Look at what he was able to do! What do you
say?
B: Men will be men...
Violation of the maxim of Quality is to be noticed in an
example like:
A: I am thirsty. (a statement, interpreted by the
hearer as a request)
B: Help yourself to some juice! (by means of
conversational implicature, the hearer interprets it
as a request)
Violation of the maxim of Relevance can be illustrated by
A: Can you help him with the report?
B: I`m not his friend.

26
3. infringing a maxim occurs especially in cases of
imperfect linguistic performance of the interlocutors,
due to causes such as excitement, nervousness,
drunkness
4. opting out occurs when speakers decide not to
cooperate in a conversation
A: Have you finished with the report?
B: It`s none of your business.

The fact that the speakers are conscious of the maxims

and their importance, as well as the fact that they want
“to show that they are trying to observe them”, is proved
by the use of some expressions, called hedges, such as
the following ones, used for different types of maxims
(Yule, 1996: 38-39):
a) for quality maxim:
As far as I know, he has already arrived in Bucharest.
I may be mistaken, but I think they have already
announced the exam results.
She will phone tonight, I guess.
b) for relation maxim:
I don`t know if this is important, but not all the
guests are present; can we start?
c) for manner maxim:
I don`t know if this is clear at all, but I think all
should be present there at the same time.

III.4. Relevance Theory in practice:

Relevance the theory of utterance

theory interpretation
(Sperber the theory based on the idea that
&Wilson- communication does not mean only
Relevance: encoding, transfer and decoding of
Communication messages, but also other elements,
among which inferences and context

27
 and Cognition, the theory that insists on the idea
1986/1995) that understanding an utterance
does not mean only linguistic
decoding; it also means the
speaker`s intended meaning, the
speaker`s intended implications, the
speaker`s attitude towards what is
said or implied, as well as the
intended context
studies in Relevance theory included
studies on topics such as:
disambiguation, discourse particles,
translation, metaphor, bridging,
speech acts and mood, irony, scalar
implicature

Relevance Theory claims that the human cognitive system

has developed a variety of both innate and acquired
mechanisms directed towards two process: to allocate
attention to inputs with the greatest expected relevance
and to process inputs in the most relevan-enhancing way.
It represents an inferential approach to pragmatics and is
based on a definition of relevance and two principles of
relevance:
 the Cognitive Principle (considers that human
cognition is geared to the maximisation of
relevance)
 the Communicative Principle (considers that
utterances create expectations of optimal
relevance).

Relevance is a primary component of all aspects of

human communication (which, according to Grice, is
based on expression and recognition of intentions). The
term was introduced by Sperber and Wilson (1986),
building on earlier work in pragmatics, in particular the
work of Grice.
Their theory centers round the following ideas:
 both speakers and hearers in conversation assume
that their interlocutors are rational and cooperative;
a communicator provides evidence of his intention

28
 to convey a certain meaning, which is inferred by
the audience on the basis of the evidence provided
 this triggers the idea that any conversation
develops on the relevance that the hearer finds in
what has been said. In consequence, the maxims
suggested by Grice can be reduced to a single one:
that of relevance
 the goal of inferential pragmatics is to explain how
the hearer infers the speaker’s meaning on the
basis of the evidence provided
 the expectations of relevance raised by an
utterance are precise enough, and predictable
enough, to guide the hearer towards the speaker’s
meaning
 relevance has to be calculated through assumptions
and inferences (contextual assumptions helping the
process of inferencing)
 there are varying degrees of relevance (in fact,
there exists an inverse correlation of effort and
relevance: the more processing it takes to
understand the speaker`s intention in an utterance,
the less relevant that particular utterance is)
 in daily life, hearers/listeners attempt to extract the
most relevant meaning of an utterance with the
least processing effort, and speakers’ efforts should
take this into account and should accommodate this
(Sperber & Wilson, 1986)
 a new piece of information is relevant in a given
context by interacting with it to yield cognitive
effects in three possible ways (Curco-Cobos,
1997:169): by strengthening the existing
assumption in the context; by contradicting and
weakening an existing assumption or by combining
with existent assumptions and creating contextual
implications.

III.4.1. Pragmatics of irony

the use of words to express the

Irony opposite of the literal meaning
an ironic expression or utterance

29
An object of study since ancient times, irony has got a
complex communicative value. Recent studies on irony
focus on cognitive, linguistic aspects of ironic language
use, starting from the general idea that it is a result of the
incongruity between the context and the statement.
According to Simpson (2011:34) “Irony has a frequent and
common definition: saying what is contrary to what is
meant.” ; it is an incongruity between what is expected to
be and what is, or a situation or result showing such
incongruity.
Literature has iddentified:
 verbal irony – the most common type, based on the
difference between the intended and expressed
meaning
 situational irony – the incongruity between what is
expected and what actually occurs in the situation
(its understanding is strictly linked to the context in
which it occurs)
 dramatic irony – a type of situational irony that
occurs in drama
Researchers have made a distinction between strong and
weak implicatures and this explains, besides other things,
the variety of ways in which utterances can achieve
relevance. Irony, has been shown, is based on
implicature.
In the analysis of irony from the perspective of the
meaning it conveys, three positions are important for our
study

a) Grice `s theory on verbal irony

Grice claims that in the act of communication people
cooperate with each other (The Cooperative Principle), by
being informative, truthful, relevant and unambiguous
(the four maxims).

The speakers` meaning consists in what the speakers say

(the surface level interpretation of an utterance) and what
they imply (the deep level interpretation of an utterance)
(Hussein, 2009:796).That is, a speaker may intend an

30
illocutionary effect that is not directly accessed via a
word-by-word analysis of a sentence.(Hussein, 2009:796)
According to Grice's theory, speakers can create
conversational implicatures either by appealing directly to
the maxims of the Cooperative Principle or deliberately
violating one or more of these maxims. (Creusere:
1999:216)
Grice considered irony as an indirect way to create
conversational implicature through the violation of the
maxim of quality/truthfulness. He (1975:53) treated it
from the perspective of classical rhetoric (literally saying
one thing and figuratively meaning the opposite) and put
it into contrast to metaphor and hyperbole, having in view
the kind of implicature it conveys. According to Grice
(Sperber& Wilson, 1986/1995) a metaphor implicates a
simile based on what was said, hyperbole implicates a
weakening of what was said and irony implicates the
opposite of what was said.
b) Relevance theorists`view on irony
Relevance theorists consider that irony occurs
spontaneously, withought being taught or learned and it
cannot be compared to metaphor or hyperbole. They treat
irony as a case of echoic mention and claim that
”recognition of an ironical utterance as a case of mention
is crucial to its interpretation.’’ (Hussein, 2009:800)

Sperber and Wilson provided a detailed account of irony.

They consider that verbal irony involves the expression of
a tacitly dissociative attitude – wry, sceptical, bitter or
mocking – to an attributed utterance or thought. Thus,
they offer the following example and comment upon it:
Peter: That was a fantastic party.
Mary:
a. [happily] Fantastic.
b. [puzzled] Fantastic?
c. [scornfully] Fantastic!
The first thing to mention is that Mary produces an echoic
utterance. Generally (Wilson& Sperber, 1992:70), through
such an utterance, “the speaker may indicate that he
endorses or dissociates himself from the thought or
utterance he is echoing: e.g. that he is puzzled, angry,

31
amused, intrigued, sceptical, or any combination of
these.’’ The same idea is present in Attardo`s (2000)
conception: “the speaker of an echoic utterance must
necessarily have a certain attitude (positive, negative and
neutral) towards the echoic utterance itself.’’ (Hussein,
2009:800)
Thus, in (a), Mary echoes Peter's utterance in order to
indicate that she agrees with it; in (b), she indicates that
she is wondering about it; and in (c) she indicates that she
disagrees with it. In Relevance Theory terms, it is ironical
because it is ironical, as “
verbal irony consists in echoing a tacitly attributed
thought or utterance with a tacitly dissociative attitude.’’

The same idea can be noticed in (Sperber&Wilson,

1995:239):
a. Peter: it is a lovely day for a picnic. [They go for a
picnic and it rains]
b. Mary: (sarcastically): it's a lovely day for a picnic,
indeed.

Relevance theorists, thus, consider that irony "invariably

involves the implicit expression of the attitude, and that
the relevance of an ironical utterance invariably depends
at least in part, on the information it conveys about the
speaker's attitude to the opinion echoed". (Sperber and
Wilson, 1986: 239) In their opinion, the implicature of an
ironical sentence depends on three factors (Sperber &
Wilson, 1990 as cited in Hussein, 2009:801):
a) A recognition of the utterance as echoic;
b) Identification of the source of the opinion echoed;
c) Recognition that the speaker's attitude to the opinion
echoed is one of rejection/ disapproval.
According to Sperber& Wilson (1995) listeners understand
ironic utterances by appealing to implicit or explicit
thought, behaviour, utterances or social norms.

The main function of irony is to reveal a speaker's attitude

towards a situation; "the speaker reminds the listener not
only of a shared expectation or social norm but also what
should have, as opposed to what had, occurred in a

32
situation." (Creusere, 1999: 218 as cited in Hussein,
2009:802). Onother function of irony is that of showing
incongruity between expectations and reality:
You are so funny.
You are so kind.
The positive statements above are incongruous with the
speaker`s expectations (punctuality and kindness) in
situations in which actions were not the expected ones.
The two statements illustrate the speaker`s
disappointment as regards the incongruity that occurred.

The perception of irony as such is influenced by the

degree of situational disparity (Ivanko and Pexman, as
cited in Hussein, 2009:803). According to Gibbs (1994: 37)
"recognition of the incongruity between what people say
and what they do reflects the cognitive ability of people to
process, and does not need to be particularly effortful.
Instead, understanding irony requires parallel activation of
literal and figurative meanings." This seems evident
because, in some situation, while we are speaking
ironically, we may also be making literal statement.

c) Clark and Gerrig (1984) offered a point of view which

is an alternative to the echoic concept supported by
Relevance Theory.
They see irony as pretence: speakers expressing an ironic
utterance pretend to have borrowed an attitude which is
not their own.

III.4.2. Pragmatics of humour

the ability to find things funny

the way in which people see that some
Humour
things are funny
the quality of being funny

Humour is a prevalent feature in many forms of

interaction. Contemporary philosophers make the
distinction between humour (including the categories and
genres of the funny and witty) and amusement (as
pertaining to humour). They also mention its

33
psychological role and social impact. Different theories
have offered different conceptions on humour. Thus,
a) Superiority theory - takes an emotional
perspective on humour (amusement = affective
phenomena) and insists on the emotions involved
in laughter.
It considers that a humorous experience is a result of
feelings of supremacy over other people or over ourselves
at a previous time.
b) Incongruity based theory – repesents a
cognitive approach to humour (amusement comes
from inappropriate situations, surprising oucomes
or logical inconsistency): the humorous structure
or situation does not fit the patterns that we
consider expected/appropriate
c) Linguistic approach - verbal humour is
inherent in the linguistic code and the alternative
interpretations of an utterance derive fully from
structures of meaning present in the text and the
co-text (Curcó-Cobos, 1997:3)
d) Pragmatic approach to humour – Curcó-
Cobos(1997:3) argues that the pragmatic
approach is the proper way to approach verbal
humour; the focus of interest is on the role of
inference in the interpretation of humorous
effects.

Humour springs from a funny or ridiculous utterance

based on the topic of discussion, from puns,
exaggerations or surprise elements in a conversational
exchange. At the content level, “it expresses a certain
attitude towards a target (person or institution).
(Rovenţa-Frumuşani, 1999:162) Its target may be a person
(on a high or low position), a thing, a phenomenon, an
institution, an attitude, or another utterance.
The most common type of humour is brought by jokes.
The pragmatic aspect of the joke is represented by an
intention to amuse, to create a feeling of enjoyment for an
audience, to enliven casual conversations. According to
Yamaguchi (as cited in Curcó-Cobos, 1997:136), jokes
sometimes involve the temporary violation of a maxim

34
(attributtable to the character in the joke and not to the
joke-teller; the intention is to produce an ambiguity on
which the joke rests). Speech act theorists (Curcó-Cobos,
1997:141) also insist on the fact that there are two main
possible sources of humurous effects: exploitation of
violations at the locutionary, illocutionary or
perlocutionary level, and the violation of the felicity
conditions of a given act. The most frequent cases are
those in which humour is generated at the locutionary and
illocutionary level. At the perlocutionary level, humurous
effects derive from the illocutioanry force of the act
performed.
Relevance theorists consider that intentional verbal
humour springs from ostensive communication; it arises
from the processing of utterances, which are a kind of
ostensive stimuli (Curcó-Cobos, 1997:166). The Relevance
theory approach to pragmatics views it as the study of the
inferential processes that lead a hearer to retrieve the
intended meaning the speaker expressed through the
utternace.

A joke is considered the proptotypical form of verbal

humour (Dynel, 2009). It is a humorous anecdote,
remark, physical act or short story meant to provoke
laughter. Its action is evident at both the content and the
relational level of the act of communication. It is a
“discourse unit consisting of two parts, the set up and the
punch line. ” (Sherzer, 1985:216). Any joke can be
interpreted as being based on either
1. a voluntary act (the locutor tells the joke with some
objective in mind, strictly connected with the function of
the joke: to provoke laughter, to establish a good rapport
with the others, to offer a piece of advice, to educate, to
help the joke performer get some popularity or fame) or
2. an involuntary act (a result of the joke teller`s “inability
to handle the system of the language in a certain
situation”, says Rovenţa-Frumuşani,1999:164 ).
Jokes are rule-governed. The rules operate at three
levels/frames: the level/frame of the joke structural
organization, the subjective level, and the social level. The

35
joke teller`s intentions and mode of presentation make up
the subjective frame of the joke.
Good knowledge of the joke as well as its previous
practice ensures its effectiveness in front of an audience
whose likes, dislikes and reactions the joke teller knows
or, he can even guess (if the joke performer does not
choose the appropriate joke for the audience in front of
him, this might have negative consequences; if he knows
the audience very well, he can become popular and get
the fame of a “good/excellent joke teller”). Narration or
visual representation helps the joke teller construct the
cognitive frame. As a rule (an unwritten one), the joke
teller must be skillful in presenting the content. His careful
choice of words, as well as their correct arrangement in
sentences ensure vividness and increase his expectations
as regards the audience`s reaction: “to get it”. The joke
mechanism (the one which ensures laughter) also requires
good organization of the material presented, no
omisssion of the pertinent details and the joke teller
offering the maximum meaning with the minimum
decoding effort from the part of the audience.
Stylistically speaking, the material should be handled with
verbal emphasis and pauses, sometimes, in order to
increase suspans and expectations. Laughing at one`s
own joke reduces efectiveness.

The set-up takes the form of a narrative or dialogue and

includes the characters, the setting and the story, meant
to create a set of logical expectations from the part of the
hearer; it offers a script/frame to the audience (Bonta,
2006). It can be preceded by a sort of “indicator” of the
locutor`s voluntary intention of telling the joke “I`ve got a
good joke”; “I gotta joke” or “Have you heard the one
about…”. In the case of the first indicator, the audience`s
expectations may sometimes be higher than the locutor`s
performance or than the pragmatic effect the joke really
has. The punch line (in the final sentence) is followed by
the audience`s verbal or nonverbal (or a combination of
these) “response”: smile; laughter; (laughter) + verbal
appreciation:“That`s a good one. /That`s really funny”;
“Oh, that`s awful.”; “That`s not funny at all”.

36
At its macrostructural level, the set-up is based on the
pattern of a “detective story” that operates certain
selections in the factual presentation, in order to produce
the surprise effect, represented by the punch line”
(Rovenţa- Frumuşani, 1999:166). The “joke reports some
sort of single experience in which someone is some sort of
hero” says Sacks (Schenkein, 1978:261) and the joke
teller is not a character in the joke. The set-up is often
elaborate (the sequences are specifically sequentially
connected) and repetitive and it offers the content
material within a certain interpretative frame. The use of
repetitions and sometimes of stereotypes are meant to
make the audience establish certain familiar patterns in
the brain, resort to their own cultural knowledge, thus
helping them in the decoding of the message and
reaching the humorous effect.

The joke is “temporally and sequentially organized”, in

Sack`s opinion (Schenkein, 1978: 252). The temporal
organization refers to the fact that it has “the canonical
form for narratives”: the story proceeds in a simple
temporal order, which preserves the temporal format of
the events it reports. The sequential organization refers to
the fact that “it is constructed such that an appreciation
of the point in it turns on an appreciation of its position as
subsequent to some other point” (Schenkein, 1978: 262).
The conversational joke performance represents a
particularly salient example of interaction between the
teller and the listeners. (Norrick, 2009)

What follows afterwords, the new information, under the

form of the punch line, creates an additional frame (this
should be plausible and comprehensible) that produces a
tension in respect to the first one, due to the incongruity
existing between them. The result is the surprising,
unexpected interpretation of the first frame. (Bonta,
2006). At this moment, the audience resorts to a sort of
problem-solving process in the attempt of “solving” the
tension between the body text and the punch line: the
process of reframing through a cognitive effort. The

37
reconciliation of the two can be translated as “getting the
joke”/understanding it/decoding the intended meaning
and the result is the release of tension through laughter.
That moment, the recipient of the joke is a potential teller
of the respective joke.
When explaining joke mechanisms, the Relevance
theorists insist on the aspect of context reorganization.
They explain this process in the following way:
a) when processing of the joke starts, the interpretation of
utterances give access to a set of assumptions from the
part of the hearer (this is the initial context of
interpretation); the hearer makes a specific hypothesis as
regards what he is being communicated
b) when the punch line is offered, the hearer finds himself
in a new context of interpretation
c) the hearer needs to reorganize the context and go from
the first interpretation to the second one. This
reorganization of the context is, according to Ferrar
(Curcó-Cobos, 1997:177), the first leyer of processing. The
second leyer in humurously intended utterances is
represented by the hearer`s own efforts, once he/she has
recognized the joke as an “instance of interpretive use’’.
There are various types of jokes, that can be classified
according to various criteria:
 the type of act at its basis
From this perspective, the difference is between verbal
jokes (based on a linguistic act) and practical jokes
/pranks (based on a physical act; they involve actions,
performance – typical examples are those made on
Halloween or April Fool Day ).
 the content
From this perspective, we distinguish between political
jokes (which refer to politicians, political clichés,
politicians` blunders, political ideologies), blonde jokes
(about blonde women), ethnic jokes (frequently offensive,
they are about an ethnic group, exploiting racial
stereotypes), religious jokes (about religions or individuals
belonging to them) and sexiest jokes.
 the cognitive effort required from the audience
Within this criterion, jokes are classified into cognitive
jokes (based on abstract cognitive processing in the brain)

38
and jokes based on lower-level cognitive processing in the
brain (all the other jokes);
 the manner in which the joke teller organizes and
presents the joke
In this case, the distinction is between question-answer
jokes (resembling riddles), nonsense jokes (humour
comes from the audience’s irritation when hearing them)
and narrative jokes (having characters, a setting, plot
progression and a punch line)
 functions of jokes
Jokes have many functions: to entertain (make the
audience laugh), to express some kind of aggression –
considered by Freud to be fulfilled through the hostile
jokes (express hostility, aggression, prejudice, satire); to
establish rapport between interlocutors (strengthen
friendship).
The practice of joking can be analysed from different
perspectives: linguistic, discoursal, pragmatic,
sociological, or anthropological. (Bonta, 2006)

III.5. Pragmatics of dialogue in conversation. Turn

taking, adjacency pairs, preference, conversation
acts .

Conversational structure has been studied both by

Discourse Analysis and Conversation Analysis.
a) The Sociological model
Ethnomethodologists (Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson,
1974; 1978) established the properties of any
conversation. They refer to
 interlocutors (speaker and hearer): they change
roles; each of them talks at a time, observing
his/her turn (the basic unit of conversational
exchange, being the TCU – turn construction unit)
 the turns that interlocutors take: their order, as well
as their size, is not fix, but varies
 speakers employ a turn-allocation system (turn-
allocation strategies: a current speaker may select a
next speaker; parties may self-select in starting to
talk) and aim at a transition from one turn to
another with no gap or overlap

39
  each TCU ends in a transition-relevance place (the
point at which another speaker can take the turn)
 there exists a set of rules that apply at each
transition-relevance place (where both speaker and
hearer have some choices as who is to take the
turn
 the presence of gaps
 the presence of overlaps (more than one speaker at
a time)
 the presence of interruptions (that violate the
current speaker`s turn)
 the length of conversation (it is not fixed; it varies)
 there exist signals that show the desire to yield,
take, or maintain the floor: discourse markers, pauses
and silence, pitch, and intonation.
In Goffman`s (1981) opinion, a turn is the opportunity to
hold the floor and not necessarily what is said while
holding it. Edelsky’s (1981) proposed that floor in face-to-
face conversation is constructed jointly over a series of
turns. According to him, turn definitions can be included
into two main groups:
a) mechanical – reference is made to turns as units of
talk in interaction (with an end boundary), without
taking into account the social context of their
production
b) interactional – reference is made to turns in terms of
the intention of the turn taker (operating according
to what happens during the respective interaction).
Edelsky (1981) also points out that speakers are more
concerned with completing topics than structural units.

b) The Psychological model

Duncan and his co-workers were preoccupied with the
verbal and nonverbal signals and interactional rules that
govern the speaking turns. Thus, according to Duncan
(1972) in every interaction, speakers and hearers indicate
“their status with regard to the turn ”(Taboada) through
different signals:
 intonation (change in pitch, duration, intensity)
 silence

40
  hesitation markers (Maclay and Oswood, 1959 as
cited in Taboada) that fill a pause
 drawl - distinct lengthening of either the final
syllable or the stressed syllable of a terminal clause.
 gaze
 body motion (hand gesture, turn of the body
towards the potential interlocutor, head movement)
 fixed expressions (...or something; you know; but
uh)
 syntax (complete grammatical unit).

Schiffrin (1987) suggested some discourse markers with

an important role in turn-taking: well, and, so, and but,
that show differences in the content of the turn they start
(cooperative, continuative, contrastive). Other disocurse
markers having similar functions can be added, such as
Ok or anyway, yeah, right, uhhuh, and, so, I mean..

Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson (1978) have established

the rules for the turn-taking system (C = current speaker;
N = next speaker; TRP = the transition relevance place):
 Rule 1. – applies initially at the first TRP of any turn:
a)if C selects N in current turn, then C must stop
speaking, and N must speak next, transition occurring
at the first TRP after N-selection
b)if C does not select N, then any (other) party may
self-select, first speaker gaining rights to the next turn
c)if C has not selected N, and no other party self-
selects under option (b), then C may (but need not)
continue (i.e. claims the rights to a further turn-
constructional unit)
 Rule 2 – applies at all subsequent TRPs
 When Rule 1 c) has been applied by C, then at the
nest TRP Rule 1 (a)-(c) apply, and recursively at the
next TRP, until speaker change is effected
(Levinson, 1983:298)
Sacks identifies inter-turn silence and distinguishes
between lapses (which occur when Rule 1 is not applied) ;
gaps (before application of 1b or 1c) and attributable
silence (after the application of Rule 1a).

41
Transition relevance places are marked by words or
constructions, as well as by paralinguistic markers. Thus,
1. the current speaker pauses waiting for somebody else
to talk
2. the current speaker uses vocatives or interjections
3. the current speaker indicates that he/she has finished
his/her turn by means of his/her accent or tone
4. the current speaker selects the next speaker in different
ways

There also exist mechanisms of self-selection. In case of

overlaps, there occur two possible situations:
 one speaker drops out
 if one speaker does not drop out, a real competition
for the floor may occur; the winner makes use of
paraverbal signs (tone of voice; pitch of voice) to be
acknowledged as such.

Another local management organization in conversation is

represented by adjacency pairs. According to Sacks and
Schegloff “an organizational pattern recurrent in
conversation is that of two adjacent utterances, which are
produced by different speakers, and are related to each
other in such a way that they form a pair type…”
(Tsui,1994:11). Thus, “Given the recognizable production
of a first pair part, on its first possible completion its
speaker should stop and a next speaker should start and
produce a second pair part from the pair type of which the
first is recognizably a member.’’ (Sacks and Schegloff, as
cited in Tsui, 1994:11)

Such pairs include question-answer, greeting-greeting,

offer-acceptance, apology-minimization, etc. (Levinson,
1983:303). They are “deeply inter-related with the turn-
taking system as techniques for selecting a next speaker.
Therefore, they are made up of a first part and a second
part; the first one requires the second; the second is
relevant and expectable (the notion of conditional
relevance – Levinson, 1983:306).

42
In offering the second part, two different situations may
occur: the second part can come/be produced very quickly
or with some delay. This introduces the concept of
preference organization: some parts are preferred (are
expected by the interlocutor), while others are
dispreferred.
Thus, an offer is given two possible answers: acceptance
or rejection. The acceptance is the preferred second, while
the rejection is the dispreferred one. An invitation can be
accepted (acceptance plays the role of a preferred
second) or declined (declination plays the role of a
dispreferred second):
A: Have another cake!
B: Thanks. I`ll take another one; they are delicious.

A: Have another cake!

B: No, thank you. That`s enough for me.

A: Come with us to the concert! It will be fun.

B: Wow! Sure! When is that?

A: Come with us to the concert! it will be fun.

B: Well, thanks for inviting me. I`d love to, but I`m
afraid I have to work till late.

The dispreferred seconds have some characteristics:

a) they are offered after some significant delay
b) the speaker prefaces the second with some specific
markers, such as the particle well / Err denoting some
hesitation
c) the use of thanks (as a sign of appreciation for the
invitation, suggestion, piece of advice); the use of reasons
for refusals, the use of apologies if relevant (for requests
or invitations)
d) the declination as such.

Preference organization is a fundamental priciple in talk-

in-interaction, that was first observed and analysed by
Sacks (1987).

43
Traum and Hinkelman (as cited in Schiffrin, 2005:120-121)
introduce a new framework of what they call ‘conversation
acts’, which claims to deal with the actions performed in
dialogue in a more general manner than other accounts.
They describe four different levels of action in dialogue:

(1) Turn-taking acts - they ensure the speaker and

hearer`s control over the dialogue; they allow
participants to conversation to keep, release, take, or
pass up their turns

(2) Grounding acts - let the participants know that a

common ground exists between them; they are of the
type: initiate, continue, acknowledge, repair, request-
repair, request-acknowledge and cancel.

(3) Core speech acts - they include inform, accept,

request, wh-question, suggest, evaluate, request-
permission, offer and promise.

(4) Argumentation acts - they are combinations of speech

acts that are meant to achieve goals in conversation.
Argumentation acts constitute the overarching plan in
the production of the current sequence of utterances.
In order to convince, for example, one can combine
two speech acts: inform and question.

III.6. Pragmatic markers

Pragmati constructions that are present in speech

c markers and that are meant to support interaction
without adding semantic meaning to it

Fraser`s (1996) detailed presentation of pragmatic

markers starts from a number of statements :
1. pragmatics has in view the messages conveyed in a
certain context and their effect upon the hearer
2. “performance features and context…modify what is
actually conveyed by the utterance, excluding some
messages, modifying others, and adding still others”
(1996:167)

44
3. sentence meaning (the information encoded by
linguistic expression) has two aspects: the propositional
content (the content meaning) and a nonpropositional
part (different signals, analysed by Fraser as pragmatic
markers, which “correspond to the different types of
potential direct messages a sentence may convey ”)
(Fraser, 1996:168)
4. pragmatic markers “are the linguistically encoded clues
which signal the speaker's potential communicative
intentions” (1996:168)
5. pragmatic markers are not part of the propositional
content of the sentence
6. pragamtic markers are carriers of meaning
7. nearly all pragmatic markers can occur in sentence-
initial position

Fraser distinguishes between :

Basic markers – they encode information that “signals
more or less specifically the force of the direct basic
message of the sentence.” (Fraser, 1996 :171) In their
turn, they are subdivided into
a) structural markers (the syntactic structure of
sentences signal their force, that of being
declarative, imperative or interrogative)
b) lexical basic markers, that are, in their turn,
subdivided into
- performative expressions (I promise that I shall call
as soon as possible.// My request is that you give
it to me.)
- pragmatic idioms (Could you please tell me the
truth ?//Maybe she is ill today.//Perhaps they are
his best friends.//How about going there ?//I smell
a rat.// OK//Yes, do it !)
c) hybrid markers – combining the two above-
mentioned types (structural and performative) (He
worked there, didn`t he ?// She hasn`t signed it,
has she ? Shut the door, will you ?//Could you
help me ?//Why not do that ?)

Commentary markers – are “lexical expressions which

have both a representational meaning specifying an entire

45
message, and a procedural meaning signaling that this
message is to function as a comment on some aspect of
the basic message” (Fraser, 1996:179) (Frankly, I don`t
know what to say.// Stupidly, we missed the bus.//Sadly,
she didn`t arrive.//Hopefully, they will succeed.)

Parallel markers – they signal an entire message in

addition to the basic one. They include vocative markers
(Waiter, the bill, please !//Ladies and gentlemen, may
I have your attention, please ?//Mom, can I go there,
too ?), solidarity markers (My friend, we shall never say
that !//As your boss, I`ll take another decision.) or
speaker displeasure markers (Get your damned hands off
me !)

Discourse markers - signal “the relationship of the basic

message to the foregoing discourse” (Fraser,1996:186);
they give information about the way in which the message
should be interpreted and of the type: However, nobody
has waited for too long.//After all, what do you want from
me?
Fraser divides them into four groups :
1. topic change markers (By the way, what are they
thinking about that ?//Speaking about apples,
how often do you eat one ?//That reminds me
about one of my sad days in Canada.//Before I
forget, I`d like to tell you the latest news.)
2. contrastive markers (They said it is not dangerous
to go there. Even so, I shall not do that !//I don`t
think we shouldn`t leave right now. On the other
hand, they are all tired after such a busy day.// We
had an argument last year, as far as I remember. In
spite of all that, I shall help her, no matter what.)
3. elaborative markers – bring a sort of refinement on
the preceding discourse (I like all those flowers. In
particular, I love the blue one.//They signed for the
petition. Similarly, he did it, too.)
4. inferential markers (I don`t like it. After all, I am
not obliged to like all kind of music.// Have you
finished your garden work ? Of course, I have.// It

46
 rained hard yesterday. Therefore, we had to stay
indoors all day long.)

IV. Language as action

Contemporary discourse analysis highlights the view of

language as social action.Language performs actions by
using speech acts; their analysis means, in fact, the
analysis of language in concrete communication
situations.

an utterance that has a performative

function in language and communication
Speech Act Theory – was introduced by J.
Austin (How to Do Things With Words,
Speech act
1962) and developed by J.R. Searle
Speech Act Theory – is a source of
inspiration for all action-based
approaches to language

Conversation is made of a sequence of speech acts. The

structure of conversation is not only based on a hierarchy
of constituents, but it is also functional.

The most important ideas that Critical Discourse Analysis

and Conversational Analysis contribute the research in
this field are

47
 1. intentionality (interlocutors are intentionally
motivated in their use of language)
2. the role of the Speaker and the Hearer in the
production and interpretation of speech acts
The Speaker addresses his utterance to someone he
expects to recognize his/her intention expressed through
the speech act produced; the Hearer is expected to
cooperate in the decoding of the message conveyed
through the Speaker`s utterance and, in his turn,
contribute new utterances that can help common
understanding and cooperation.
Cognitive pragmatics insisted on the fact the expressive
meaning (the literal one) is the first step in the
reconstruction of a speaker’s communicative intention.
The full intention transmitted – therefore, the full
understanding of it – needs to take into consideration that
which is called the speaker’s behavior game, as it is
realized in the communicative act.
3. language as a powerful tool in constructing and
maintaining social and political reality
4. the social contract (interlocutors need to observe
the social contract of cooperation in interaction
(Grice, 1975)
This presupposes joint meaning construction, saving and
maintaining interlocutors` faces (hence the use of
politeness strategies).
5. multi-functionality of utterances (one utterance may
fulfill different speech acts
An utterance may have different meanings, according to
the context and co-text in which it is used (and this
contributes to its effectiveness), as well as according to
different recipients and the assumed shared knowledge
between interlocutors
6. the role of the speech event (the circumstances that
surround an utterance) in its interpretation
Yule (1996:48) considers that it is ‘‘the speech event that
determines the interpretation of an utterance as
performing a particular speech act.”
Speech act theory is considered as the most
representative theoretical framework within the pragmatic
domain.

48
According to Kasper (2004:125), speech act research is
concerned with semantic structures (‘‘conventions of
means’’) and linguistic resources (‘‘conventions of form’’)
by which speech acts are implemented
(pragmalinguistics, ‘‘the linguistic interface of
pragmatics’’) and the social conditions for carrying out
speech acts appropriately and effectively
(sociopragmatics, ‘‘the sociological interface of
pragmatics’’).

In the production of an utterance, Austin identified

a) a locutionary act (the basic act of the respective
utterance; it consists in the simple fact of producing it and
depends on the speaker` knowledge of the language, as
well as on the context of utterance)
b) an illocutionary act (what we really do when performing
the respective locutionary act: we make a request, we
thank, we promise, we congratulate someone on
something, we offer a recommendation, a piece of
information/advice, we apologise, etc.). Thus, each speech
act gets a conventional illocutionary force which depends
on the speaker`s intention regarding his/her
motivation/what he/she wants to do with the respective
utterance/by producing it.
c) a perlocutionary act (the effect of the act upon the
hearer: by uttering, we make the hearer feel sad, happy,
we develop a certain attitude in him, “such effects being
special to the circumstances of utterance” – says
Levinson, 1983:236). It dictates the speaker`s choices of
the language structures and the degree of
directness/indirectness in performing the speech act.

In Searle`s (1971:40) opinion, “to perform illocutionary

acts is to engage in a rule-governed form of behavior.” He
considers that an illocutionary act has a propositional
content and an illocutionary force: F(p). F represents the
illocutionary force (ordering, thanking, promising,
requesting) and p is a variable containing the
propositional expression.

49
The fact that the same utterance can get different
illocutionary forces made Austin and Searle distinguish
between several (felicity) conditions that need to be
fulfilled in order to transform the speech act into a
felicitous one:
a) In Austin`s view, the felicity conditions include
 preparatory conditions (both the circumstances
and participants are appropriate to its successful
performance) (Dinu, 2012)
 executive condition (evaluates the correct
execution of the speech act)
 sincerity condition (the speaker should be sincere
in uttering and the hearer should count on this
sincerity, unless he has no reason to consider it
otherwise)
 fulfillment condition (has in view the expected
effect the speech act had upon the hearer)
Searle refined/systematized Austin`s felicity conditions
and offered the following classification:
 general condition on the participants (the need of
their knowing the code and acting meaningfully)
 content condition (refers to the textual content of
the speech act)
 preparatory conditions (the conditions for a promise
are different from those for a threat, for example; in
the case of a promise there are two preparatory
conditions: “first, the event will not happen by itself,
and second, the event will have a beneficial effect”
– says Yule,1996)
 sincerity condition (for a threat or a promise, the
speaker “genuinely intends to carry out the future
action”)
 essential condition (“covers the fact that by the act
of uttering a promise, I thereby intend to create an
obligation to carry out the action I promised” - Yule,
1996:51)
Searle gives the example of the felicity conditions for the
illocutionary verb promise to be ‘’felicitous’’ (Levinson,
1983:239):
(1) The speaker said he would perform a future
action.

50
 (2) He intends to do it.
(3) He believes he can do it.
(4) He thinks he would not do it anyway in the
normal course of events.
(5) He thinks the addressee wants him to do it
(rather than not to do it).
(6) He intends to place himself under an
obligation to do it by uttering the sentence
‘I promise...’.
(7) Both speaker and addressee comprehend the
sentence.
(8) They are both conscious, normal human
beings.
(9) They are both in normal circumstances – e.g.
not acting in a play [or telling jokes].
(10) The utterance contains some illocutionary force-
indicating device (IFID) which is only properly
uttered if all the appropriate conditions pertain.
According to him,
(1) = the propositional content condition
(2) = the sincerity condition
(3) – (5) = the preparatory conditions
(6) = the essential condition
(7) – (10) = general to all speech acts
(1) – (6) = the specific preconditions necessary for, and
constitutive of, the act of promising.

Searle`s classification of speech acts includes

Assertives – the speech acts commit the speaker to the
truth of the respective proposition; they are of the type:
asserting, stating, informing, evaluating, announcing,
drawing a conclusion, representing, reporting a state or
fact, claiming, classifying, describing, denying, insisting,
predicting.

Directives – speech acts through which the speaker tries

to determine the hearer to do something/perform an

51
action. They are such acts as: asking, requesting,
demanding, ordering, begging, excusing, questioning,
instructing, forbidding, offering a piece of advice, urging,
warning, suggesting, recommending, dismissing.

Commissives/promisives – the speaker expresses his

intention to do that; the acts constrain the speaker to do
something in future. They are of the type: offering,
promising, agreeing, threatening, guaranteeing, refusing,
inviting, pledging, swearing, volunteering.

Expressives – they “express an inner state of the

speaker, insofar as it is essentially subjective, says
nothing about the world” (Mey, 1993:165).They are of the
type of: excusing, thanking, apologizing, congratulating,
confessing, regretting, praising, apologizing.
Declarations –(acts that bring changes in the
institutional state of affairs; their being felicitous depends
on the speaker`s belonging to an institution that offers
legitimacy to the speaker and the speech act he/she
performs. They are of the type: declaring, christening,
excommunicating, firing from employment, condemning.

As for the illocutionary acts, they can initiate

conversations, can be part of the reactive utterances or
the feedback. Thus, assertives can initiate conversation
and receive different types of answers:
 admittance of reality
A: I think the day will be wonderful.
B: Right. The weather forecast says so.
 doubting reality
A: I think the day will be wonderful.
B: Do you really believe that?
 rejection of evaluation:
A: I think the day will be wonderful.
B: I don`t think so.
In their quality of answer acts, they occur after
 open questions that play the role of requests
for information
A: How was your day, yesterday?

52
 B: Quite busy. Much work to do at home, much
work at the office
 directives
A: Take those pills twice a day!
B: The doctor told me to take them three times a
day.

Leech (1983) appreciated the fact that these acts tend to

collaboration and are neuter as far as politeness is
concerned. When they are component parts of negative
evaluations, of criticism and negative self-evaluations
they become impolite.

Directives
 initiate conversation as they are: requests for action
or permission, questions of different types,
invitations, orders, pieces of advice, commands or
recommendations
Can I help you?
Come with us! We`ll have fun!
Don`t do that; it`s dangerous!
 some of them, such as requests, invitations and
recommendations, leave the interlocutor the
possibility of an option (that of submitting to the act
or not)
A: Can you tell me his phone number, please?
B: Sure; put it down: 0745…

A: Can you tell me his phone number, please?

B: Sorry, I`ve never had it.
 they generally get nonverbal and also verbal
positive or negative answers.
A: Shut the door, please!
B1: … (slams the door)
B2: Sure, just a minute!
B3: Leave it so! It`s warm in here!
 they can become potentially “threatening” for both
interlocutors` faces
A: Come here immediately!
B: Don`t shut at me, please!

53
 Promissives are generally part of the body of
conversation.
 they are expressed by means of the performative
verb (although sometimes it may be missing):
A: I`ll call you. (I promise) – the performative
verb is implicit. The future tense lets the interlocutor
know that he/she was made a promise. The speaker
can add the performative, in order to make
himself/herself clearer or give more force to his
speech act.
A: I promise to call you.

Expressives are polite acts:

 they generally have a ritualistic character; this is
proved by the fact that they use set formula and the
answers are predictable
A: Have I hurt you? Oh, I`m terribly sorry!
B: No problem! That`s OK.

Speech acts can be direct or indirect.

A direct speech act displays a direct relationship
between its structure and its function:
A:Take the book from the desk! (an imperative with
the function of a request/command)
A: The book is on the desk. (a statement with the
function of an assertive).
As speech acts are threatening to the interlocutors` faces
(Brown and Levinson, 1987), daily communication resorts
to indirectness (a communication strategy, present in
both verbal and nonverbal communication), as “a major
communiactive skill to keep a harmonious interpersonal
relationships.” (Zhang, 2009:99). According to Searle
(1975), indirectness refers to “those cases in which one
illocutionary act is performed indirectly by ways of
performing another.” In his speech act theory, Searle
(1975) mentioned two types of indirectness:
a) conventional indirectness - in the case of utterance
based on acts that are conventionally used for
certain functional purposes which are not assigned
to them in their grammatical forms.

54
Searle offers the example of an utterance such as Can
you pass the salt? , in which the interrogative expressing
a question is used with the function of a request for
action. Hence, the interlocutor`s answer: noverbal action
(that of passing the salt-cellar to the speaker).
b) non-conventional indirectness (“hints”) that is
present in utterances that are ambiguous (in their
propositional content, their illocutionary force, or in
both).
The example offered by Zhang (2009:100) for this case is
the utterance I have to study for an exam in response to
an invitation to a movie. In such an example, there exists
a mismatch between the literal meaning of the utterance
and the intended meaning (refusal).

An indirect speech act displays an indirect relationship

between its structure and its communicative function.
Thus,
A: Why don`t you stop talking? - is an indirect
speech act; it is a question that replaces an order:
Stop talking!
A: There is quite dark in here; I cannot read a thing –
is an indirect speech act; it is a statement that
replaces the imperative: Switch on the light! (which
sounds more like an order – that is, more impolite)

For Thomas (1995:119), “indirectness occurs when there

is a mismatch between the expressed meaning and the
implied meaning.” She considers that there are four major
claims linked with indirectness:
a) pragmatics is concerned with intentional indirectness
(the speaker wants the hearer to infer the meaning)
b) indirectness is costly and risky (the act is produced with
the speaker`s careful attention for choosing the linguistic
structure which produces little threat to the hearer`s face
and, at the same time, there is the risk, from the part of
the hearer, not to be understood by him)
c) speakers should seek to obtain some social or
communicative advantage through employing
indirectness

55
d) indirectness is largely related to politeness phenomena
(it is meant to avoid any threat to the hearer`s face)
Indirectness occurs, in most cases, as an intentional act
from the part of the speaker.

Individuals and cultures vary widely in how, when and why

they choose indirectness as a communicative instrument.
There are factors that govern indirectness in all languages
and cultural communities:
a) The relative power of the Speaker over the Hearer
(one`s power is given by age, knowledge, expertise,
social status, professional role, authority, the
uniform he/she wears, etc); people perceived as
powerful are more indirectly addressed than the
ones who are not perceived as such
b) The social distance between the Speaker and the
Hearer (given by differences established by social
class, race, religion, ethnicity, sexuality). People
tend to use indirectness towards interlocutors they
perceive as being socially distant.
c) The degree of imposition entailed by the act in
question (less indirectness is used when the requested act
does not imply too much effort from the part of the
interlocutor)
d) The relative rights and obligations between the
Speaker and the Hearer (rights and obligations are
established in the small or large community people belong
to: one has the right to ask for something and the other
one has the duty to comply).

IV. I. Pragmatics of requests

an act or an instance of asking for

Request
something

In the context of pragmatic analysis, a request has got

several (more or less) similar definitions. Thus, it has been
defined as
a) “a speech act expressing the speaker’s desire for
the hearer to do something with the added provison

56
 that the hearer takes this expressed desire as the
reason to act.” (Bach & Harnish, 1984:48)
b) a face threatening speech act which demands for
action of some kind from the other person
c) a speech act with a manipulatory illocutionary point
(Barron)
d) a face threatening act, as the speaker imposes on
the freedom of action of the hearer (Brown and
Levinson, 1987:66)

Blum-Kulka, et al (1989) mention that a request in English

includes three segments:
1. Attention or Alerter (address terms that are meant to
draw the hearer`s attention)
2. Head Act (the actual request)
3. Supportive Move (a phrase whose role is to modify the
illocutionary force of the request; it may occur before or
after the head act)
A similar point of view is expressed by Sifianou (1999).
According tohim, the structure of a request includes two
main components:
a) the core request or head act – the main utterance
with the function of requesting and that can stand
by itself; it may come before or after peripheral
elements
b) the peripheral elements – which are meant to soften
or aggravate the propositional content.
Their use can bring a change in the degree of politensess.
The speaker`s abilitiy to use them properly is part of
pragmatic proficiency - “the ability to use language not
only correctly as far as grammar and vocabulary are
concerned but also appropriately so that language use fits
the social context in which it is being used.” (Nikula,
1996:29). The peripheral elements, in their turn, can be
internal (linguistic elements within the same speech act)
or external (elements that are to be found in the linguistic
context of the repsective speech act)

The understanding of the request characteristics,

structure and mechanism needs to take into consideration
 Grice`s Cooperative Principle

57
  the face-saving necessity
 necessity of avoiding conflict
 the social appropriateness of the request

Social appropriateness is accomplished through the use of

indirectness and of internal and external modifications
(Barron). The speaker resorts to indirectness as this is
considered to create the impression that the hearer may
have the possibility of choice: to comply, or not, to the
request. Internal and external modifiers are meant to
make the speech act of request more acceptable and less
threatening, by reducing the degree of imposition on the
hearer. This is why, for example, the speaker uses the
politeness marker “please’’ (at the beginning or, more
often, at the end of the request). Bonn (2000) insists on
the fact that strategies to perform requests vary
according to context and along factors such as social
power, role and status.
Searle`s (1991) felicity conditions for indirect directives
may help in getting formalized requests for information,
for example:
1. Can you make it clearer for me? (the preparatory
condition: ability)
2. I want to talk with you about the content of our
project work (sincerity condition: wish or desire)
3. Will you detail the results of your latest work?
(propositional condition: performance/willingness to
perform the future act)
4. Listen, I`m interested in your final results in the
project. (essential condition: an attempt to get the
hearer to perform the act)
A detailed analysis of requests was made by Blum-Kulka
et al. (1989) through a cross linguistic study (CCSARP),
meant to offer the image of a cross-cultural request
variation. Thus, the authors reached the following
conclusions: culture influences the speaker`s choice of
direct or indirect strategies in making a request (as
different cultures have different politeness norms); proper
requests are preceded by prerequests; prerequests have
the role of checking feasibility of compliance and
overcoming possible grounds for refusal; sometimes,

58
prerequests may function as indirect requests; there
exists a scale of indirectness that includes:
a) Direct strategies
1. Mood derivable (the grammatical mood indicates the
presence of a request): Clean up this mess,
please! //Close the door!
2. Explicit performatives: I`m asking you to clean up the
mess.
3. Hedged performatives: I`d like to ask you to clean up
the mess.
4. Obligation statements: You`ll have to clean up the
mess.
5. Want statements: I really wish you`d clean up the
mess.
b) Conventionally indirect strategies
1. Suggestory formulae: How about cleaning up the mess?
2. Query preparatory: Could you clean up the mess,
please?
c) Non-conventionally indirect strategies (hints)
1. Strong hints: You have left the kitchen in a mess.
2.Mild hints (no reference to the request proper; the
context is that which allows it for the interpretation as a
request): I`m too tired to clean the mess in the kitchen.
The internal modifications (Head Act), in the authors
opinion, may mitigate or, on the contrary, aggravate the
request. They include:
a) Downgraders
1. Syntactic downgraders
 interrogative: Could you do the cleaning up?
 negation: I wonder if you wouldn`t mind doing
the cleaning up.
 past tense: I wanted to ask you to do the
cleaning up.
 embedded if clause: I would appreciate if you
did the cleaning up.
2. Lexical downgraders
 consultative devices: Do you think I could ask
you to do the cleaning up?
 understaters: Could you do a bit of cleaning up?
 hedges: It would really help if you did
something about the mess in the kitchen.

59
  downtoner: Will you be able to perhaps clean up
the mess?
 politeness devise: Can I ask you to do the
cleaning up, please?
b) Upgraders
 intensifiers: Clean up this mess, it`s disgusting !
 expletives (the speaker offers his negative
emotional attitude): You haven`t cleaned up that
bloody /awful mess!

External modifications (Supportive Moves) affect the

context in which they are embedded. Through this, they
modify the illocutionary force of the request. They include:
1. Checking on availability: Have you got a minute?
Can you clean up the mess in the kitchen?
2. Getting a precommitment: Will you do me a
favour? Could you perhaps clean up the mess?
3. Sweetener: You are the quickest in doing
something. Would it be possible to do the cleaning
in the kitchen tonight?
4. Disarmer: I know that you are very busy
tonight, but can you quickly clean up the mess in
the kitchen?
5. Cost minimizer: Sorry, could you, if you are still
here, in the kitchen, do some cleaning up ?
In his speech act theory, Searle (1975) considers that
some sentence-structures are quite standardly used to
make indirect requests. He identifies six groups:
Group 1. Sentences concerning the hearer’s ability to
perform an action (A): Can you pass the salt? // You could
be a little more quiet.
Group 2. Sentences concerning the speaker’s wish or want
that hearer will do (A): I would like you to go now.// I wish
you wouldn’t do that.// I’d rather you didn’t do that.
Group 3. Sentences concerning the hearer’s doing (A):
Won’t you stop making that noise?// Will you quit it?
Group 4. Sentences concerning the hearer’s desire or
willingness to do (A): Would you be willing to write me a
letter of recommendation?// Would it be convenient for
you to come on Wednesday?

60
Group 5. Sentences concerning reasons for doing (A): You
ought to be more polite. // Why don’t you want to be
quiet?
Group 6. Sentences embedding one of these elements
inside one another, or embedding an explicit directive
illocutionary verb inside one of these elements: I would
appreciate it if you could make less noise.

IV.2. Pragmatics of suggestions

an idea about what someone should

Suggestio do or how someone should behave
n something that is said in an indirect
way

According to Searle, suggestion represents a directive

speech act; the speaker’s purpose in using it is to get the
hearer to commit him/herself to some future course of
action (Searle,1976). Brown and Levinson (1987), in their
politeness theory, consider that suggestion is a speech
act that can be face-threatening. This triggers the
necessity of the speaker`s careful choice of the
appropriate pattern when performing the speech act of
suggesting.

Martinez-Flor (2005) sees suggestions as components of a

broader speech act that involves the act of advice. He
mentions the difference existing between the two acts:
while suggestions (inclusive-we type) imply benefits for
both the speaker and the hearer, a piece of advice implies
benefits only for the hearer. He also offers a taxonomy of
suggestion linguistic realization strategies and
distinguishes between
a)direct strategies – the speaker cleraly states what
he/she means; direct suggestions are performed by:
 performative verbs: I suggest that you go home
right now.
 noun of suggestion: My suggestion is that you go
home right now.
 imperative: Go home right now!

61
  negative imperative (considered as impolite way
of making suggestions): Don`t stay here, in the
rain, for too long.
b)conventionalised forms strategies – although not as
direct as the first type, they allow the hearer to
understand the speaker`s intention. They are realized
through
 interrogative forms: Why don`t you go home right
now?// What about going home right now?
 expressions of possibility/probability: You may stay
here a little longer.
 the verb should: You should go home right now.
 the verb need: You need to go home right now.
 conditional forms: If I were you, I would go home
right now.
c)indirect strategies – the speaker does not clearly
state his/her suggestion and this leaves the hearer
infer the suggestion. The realization is through
 impersonal constructions: A good idea would be
to...
 hints: I`ve heard that it is dangerous to go there.
(to be inferred by the hearer as a suggestion not
to go there)

IV.3. Pragmatics of complaints

a statement that something is

unsatisfactory or unacceptable
an expression of dissatisfaction
Complaint
the act of saying or writing that you
are unhappy or dissatisfied with
something

In pragmatics, complaints enter the category of

expressive speech acts that are used to signal the
speaker`s attitude towards something that is unsatisfying
or unacceptable. Through it, the speaker expresses
displeasure, disapproval, annoyance or blame with
respect to the respective fact/action/phenomenon
(Trosborg, 1995), in a direct or an indirect way.

62
According to Heinemann & Traverso (2009:2383), almost
any type of comment ‘‘with even the slightest negative
valence’’ can be treated as a complaint. Olshtain and
Weinbach (1987) consider that a complaint results when a
speaker expects a favourable event to occur, and instead
his/her expectations are somehow violated; the recipient
of the complaint usually is the person responsible for
having ‘‘enabled or failed to prevent the offensive event.”

According to Boxer (1993), a direct complaint is addressed

to somebody who is considered responsible for the
offensive action (Can you stop talking?// Could you keep
quiet?// Could you stay still? Your comings and goings out
drive me crazy). An indirect complaint, (Boxer, 1996:219)
is “the expression of dissatisfaction to an interlocutor
about oneself or someone/something that is not present”;
in other words, it is not addressed to the person who is
responsible for the offence (They are always hammering
at late hours. Isn`t that horrible?// She does never come
in time, does she? What shall we do?).
A simple direct complaint may include:
1. (not compulsory) warning for the forthcoming
complaint: You know, you told me that the room
faces the sea. Now, once here...// When we last met
you promised that we would work together...
2. the core complaint: I can notice that you gave me
the key for room 13 that does not face the sea; it
faces the highway
3. Repair/Request for solution: I would appreciate if
you could change the room// Would you mind giving
me the room you promised?
Olshtain & Weinbach (1985) mention some strategies that
individuals follow in the case of complaints:
1. below the level reproach - the speaker does not
blame the offender directly and even avoids to
mention the offensive act directly. He uses remarks
such as: don`t worry about it; such things may
happen
2. expression of annoyance or disapproval – the
offender is not held directly responsible for the

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 violation produced. The speaker indirectly mentions
the violations: this is unacceptable behaviour
3. explicit complaint – the speaker expresses his/her
disapproval/annoyance in a direct way and blames
the interlocutor in an unmitigated way: you are a
liar; you`re such an inconsiderate person; your
attitude is not the expected one; you should have
said that beforehand
4. accusation and warning – the speaker addresses
directly to the complainee, expressing his
disappointment/disapproval; he also announces
some potential consequences for the interlocutor:
Next time, you`ll be punished.

Sometimes, even a threat may follow the accusation and

warning: If you don`t finish it in time, I`ll have to discuss
it with our principal.
Researchers have found out that a complaint may be
realized through a single strategy, or through two or even
more discourse strategies. This is why the notion of
‘‘speech act set’’ (Cohen and Olshtain, 1993) was
introduced. For a better understanding, a difference may
be made between: Look what you have done! (complaint)
and Look what you have done! You should say you are
sorry (complaint + suggestion).
In fact, many of complaints are followed by suggestions,
pieces of advice or recommendation.

IV. 4. Pragmatics of promises

a declaration or assurance that one will do
something or that a particular thing will
happen (Oxford Dictionary)
promise
what results from promising (i.e. is
effected by the very act of promising)
(Conison, 1997:283)
A promise “is the simplest, most direct, and most
individualistic way in which we voluntarily come to have
obligations.” (Conison, 1997:274). Conison includes the
speech act of promising into the group of speech acts
called “reflexive reason-generating speech acts’’, (the
class of commissives), besides: vowing, swearing,

64
resolving – that is, the speech acts that give the speaker a
reason to do what he says, and at the same time, oblige
him to do it. Some of these speech acts can be preformed
both publicly and in private (such as vows, for example),
while others (such as promising) are performed publicly
(while communicating with another person).
The act of promising observes the following felicity
conditions:
a) futurity condition (linked to the propositional
content rule): the act/performance is to take place
in the future
b) preparatory condition (includes Benefit condition =
the performance by the other party is truly desired;
and non-expectancy condition = one feels obliged
to do the act)
c) sincerity rule (ability condition): one must actively
do something to bring about the performance
requested
Promising has both illocutionary and performative
features. (Conison, 1997:283). There is a clear distinction
between sincere promises (the speaker intends to do the
act he promised) and insincere promises (the speaker
does not intend to do the act he promised). Searle
mentions that in both cases the speaker undertakes an
obligation to do something; this triggers the conclusion
that even an insincere promise is a promise, from a formal
point of view.
The perlocutionary effect of the act of promising is very
important: the promissee needs to feel that he/she is
owed something by the one who makes the promise.
According to Searle, the hearer wants/accepts the
thing/act promised by the speaker; otherwise, what the
speaker promises, becomes a threat. In the same line with
Searle, Salgueiro (2010:213) insists on the fact that
promises and threats are similar speech acts and pose
analogous problems for Speech Act Theory.
A promise may have several functions; it can be used to
convince someone about the future accomplishment of a
certain act, to express acceptance or refusal.
V. Pragmatics of politeness and
impoliteness

65
 behaviour that is respectful and
considerate of other people
Politenes
the entire range of strategies and
s
mechanisms that are apt to regulate the
relationships between interlocutors

Individuals` cooperation in interaction means not only

accomplishing certain discursive objectives they have in
mind (informing/getting informed, persuading, etc.) but
also establishing, developing and maintaining
relationships. This is why individuals need to take into
consideration certain ways of behaving when in
interaction (and not only). Their dilemma arises from their
double desire: that of accomplishing different objectives
and, at the same time, that of preserving their image, as
well as the others`. Thus, behaving polite becomes a
necessity. Pragmatically, being polite means permanently
being aware of the others` needs and goals and
preserving a good relationship with them.

Research into the pragmatics of politeness aims at

identifying what social motivations are inherent in and
what social meanings are attached to the choice of verbal
strategies (that is, “politeness strategies”) for the
accomplishment of communicative goals (Van Dijk). For
Brown and Levinson (1987), politeness is the intentional,
strategic behaviour of an individual, that is meant to
satisfy self and other`s face wants in case of threat. The
idea is based on Goffman`s conception regarding the
individual`s desire of presenting and maintaining a public
image of themselves, that is their “face”: “the positive
social value a person effectively claims for himself by the
lines others assume he has taken during a particular
contact (Goffman 1976:5).

According to Goffman’s theory, face is sacred and

inviolable to every single person, but it is permannetly
subject of being “threatened” by the acts produced in
interaction with the others.

66
Each communicative act (asking questions, giving orders,
promising, inviting, refusing, agreeing, disagreeing, etc)
can become potentially threatening, that is, it can become
a Face Threatening Act (FTA) that can affect
communication and ruin the relationship between
individuals, because they make individuals “lose their
face(s)” - the positive face (corresponding to Goffman`s
concept of “face”) or the negative face (corresponding to
Goffman`s concept of “territory”).
Thus, there are several types of threatening acts
(Bonta, 2014):
a) threatening acts for the negative face of the one
performing them:
 the case of a person who offers something to
somebody. The act of offering implies waste of time,
energy and money (that is, a FTA towards the
negative face/territory of the person performing it);
 the case of a promise made to someone; it might
make the person waste time and energy;
 the case of a commitment to do something that the
individual does not want to do.

b) threatening acts for the positive face of the one

performing them
It is the case of a person who is in a sense wrong and
unable to control himself; a person
 who cries in front of the others (an act that
discloses someone`s weakness);
 who makes confessions (confession can also
change the already established self-image);
 who finds excuses; who apologizes (through
excuses we admit that we have already
“attacked” the partner`s “face”/image);
 who resorts to self-criticism (through self-
criticism one admits that he/she has done
something wrong);
 who is unable to control his physical or emotional
self.

c) threatening acts for the negative face of the

other (who suffers them)

67
It is the case of a person
 who makes any request or asks for favours that will
make the other one waste his time, spend some
money or give one thing (an “attack” of the territory
of one`s possessions);
 who gives orders, commands, pieces of advice or
recommendations (thus placing oneself on a higher
position);
 who interrupts the other one while he is speaking
(thus “attacking” his temporal territory);
 who expresses anger, envy, hatred towards the
interlocutor;
 who threatens the other one through visual, tactile,
olfactory or sonorous aggressions (“attacking” the
other person`s bodily territory);
 who minimizes the distance between him and the
other person (thus “attacking” his spatial territory);
 who maximizes the distance between him and the
other person (thus proving lack of concern, lack of
desire for communication or an asymmetrical
relationship);

d) threatening acts for the positive face of the other

(who suffers them)
It is the case of the person
 who resorts to reproaches, refusals, insults, injuries
or mockery, thus endangering the vanity, narcissism
or self-esteem of the other person;
 who disapproves the other one;
 who contradicts the interlocutor;
 who makes the other person feel
ashamed/embarrassed;
 who approaches topics that are inappropriate or
sensititve for the interaction partner.
The concept of face proposed by Brown and Levinson is
more concrete; they divide face into two groups,
according to individual needs: negative face and positive
face. The former means that people have the freedom of
action without interference while the latter means the
indivudal`s desire to be approved, appreciated, loves by
the others. In accordance with these two types of faces,

68
Brown and Levinson mention two types of politensess:
positive politeness and negative politeness.

Being positively polite means showing approval,

agreement with the others, thanking them for rendered
services, making invitations, offering presents. Negative
politeness, in its turn, resorts to some other strategies.
Through it, the individual tries to protect independence
and freedom of action. According to Brown & Levinson
(1987:129), negative politeness means minimizing a
particular imposition of a face threatening act. Therefore,
the speaker applies some strategies: he does not impose
own opinions to the others; he avoids producing threats of
any kind (insults, criticism, mockery, disagreement,
refusals); he offers the others the right of making choices;
he excuses for his wrong acts; he offers justifications.

Leech (1983) listed six politeness principles according to

the English culture:
1. Tact Maxim: minimizing cost to other or maximizing
benefit to other
2. Generosity Maxim: minimizing benefit to self or
maximizing cost to self
3. Approbation Maxim: minimizing dispraise of other or
maximizing praise of other
4. Modesty Maxim: minimizing praise of self or maximizing
dispraise of self.
5. Agreement Maxim: minimizing disagreement between
self and other or maximizing agreement between self and
other
6. Sympathy Maxim: minimizing antipathy between self
and other or maximizing sympathy between self and
other.

Sometimes, individuals express disagreement to others,

complain or blame on others’ work, produce such acts as
physical injuries, insults or mockery, sometimes they utter
some impolite or taboo words. These all belong to the
category of face-threatening acts (they show that the
speaker is not considerate of the other`s social value).
Such acts like commands or requests will also threaten

69
the other`s positive or negative face. In such cases,
individuals become impolite. Impoliteness may affect the
relationship between them in certain degrees.

Although politeness is a universal phenomenon in all

social groups, every culture or particular group imposes
their own particular principles or standards. This explains
the emotional force of insulting words and their capacity
to demean the listener, according to the culture or the
group he/she belongs to.
Culpeper (2011:23) considers that “Impoliteness comes
about when (1) the speaker communicates face-attack
intentionally, when (2) the hearer perceives and/ or
constructs behaviour as intentionally face-attacking, or a
combination of (1) and (2)”.

V.1. Pragmatics of compliments

an utterance that expresses polite

behaviour
a polite expression of praise or
Complime
admiration
nt
positively affective speech acts
a positive politeness strategy (Brown and
Levinson, 1987)

Compliments are part of daily life and they are used in a

variety of social situations as they have a variety of
functions. They are mainly meant to reduce the distance
between interlocutors, to establish, confirm or reinforce
the relationship between them. Through compliments,
individuals express their admiration of someone`s
appearance, work, behaviour, taste or something he/she
owns or possesses. They can also show encouragment
and appreciation. As they are part of the strategy of
positive politeness, compliments reduce the threat
produced by speech acts such as requests or apologies
(Brown and Levinson, 1987).
Their position in an exchange is not fix. They may begin
the interaction, they may be part of the interaction main
body or they may finish it.

70
Researchers have established some characteristics of
compliments
 compliments are context-dependent and most part
of them are addressed to people of the same age or
social status (Knapp et al., 1984)
 there exist differences in paying and receiving
compliments, as far as the culture of the person is
concerned (there are cultures who easily
pay/accept compliments, while others do not)
 there exist differences in paying and receiving
compliments as far as the gender of the person is
concerned (women pay and receive more
compliments than men; men tend to compliment
women more often than they compliment other
men
 there exist differences in the element/thing that is
complimented. Thus, individuals may compliment
their interlocutor`s appearance/ physical traits,
their abilities, or possessions. Women get more
compliments for their appearance and skills.
 there are differences in the way in which
compliments are perceived. Women perceive
compliments as affective positive acts, while men
consider them as evaluative judgements
 compliment responses depend on cultural values
and norms.

In a detailed study, Holmes (1988) offered even more

differences between women and men in the production
and exchange of compliments, insisting on the fact that
women strengthen the positive force of the compliment
more often than men; men attenuate or hedge the force
of the compliment more often than women; women
compliment each other on appearance more often than on
any other topic and, at the same time, women of higher
status are more likely to receive compliments than higher
status men.

The most frequent types of compliments are the ones in

which the speaker compliments

71
  someone`s way of behaving (Pronoun+to
be+adjective: You are very kind.)
 someone`s appearance (Pronoun+to look+adj: You
look very nice! ; You+to be+[intensifier] +adj: You
look so pretty!)
 someone`s possessions (NP+to be+adj: Your hat is
lovely! ; Pronoun+is+adj+NP: That is a beutiful
house!)
 someone`s performance (NP+to be+[intensifier]
+adj: Your work is [really] good.)
 someone`s skills/abilities (NP+to be+[intensifier]
+adj: Your handwriting is [very]bautiful.
 someone`s personality traits (You+to be+adj)
All the compliments based on the use of adjectives enter
the group called adjectival compliments. Other
compliments are based on semantically positive verbs (to
like, to love, to admire, to be impressed - says Wolfson,
1989). Their structure is
I+[intensifier]+like/love+NP: I like/love your new
dress.

Compliment responses have been also been a topic of

interest in research. The most important thing discussed
is the paradox that receivers of compliments confrunt
with: that of agreeing with the compliment and, at the
same time, remaining modest and avoiding self-praising
(Leech, 1983). Herbert (1998) distinguishes between
compliment responses based on agreement and
compliment responses based on nonagreement.
The responses in the first group include the following
types:
 appreciation token (the person complimented
accepts the compliment in a verbal or nonverbal
way): Thank you. // [nod]
 comment acceptance: the addressee of the
compliment accepts it and offers a comment:
Thanks// Yeah, I like it, too// This is my favourite
dress, too.
 praise upgrade: the addressee accepts the
compliment and he/she contributes (more or less) to
the force of the compliment: Yes, it suits me well.

72
  comment history: the addressee offers a comment
on the compliment, mentioning the way in which
the thing/object was acquired: My mom gave it to
me.// I bought it when I visited Rome.
 reassignment: the addressee agrees with the
compliment but he/she transfers merits to another
person: My sister bought it for me.// My mother
made it.
 return: the addressee raises the addresser, too:
Yours looks nice, too.// So is yours.
Nonagreement responses may include the following types:
 scale down: the addressee diminishes the force of
the compliment; he/she mentions some flaw in the
object or overstatement of the compliment: It`s not
that new.// It`s old enough.// It`s not what it seems
to be.
 question: the addressee questions the addresser`s
sincerity or the compliment appropriateness: Do
you really think so? // Is that so?
 disagreemnt: the addressee completely disagrees
with the compliment: I don`t like it// I hate it.
 qualification: the addressee merely qualifies the
addresser`s assertion: Well, but Mary`s is nicer.
 no acknowledgement: the addressee does not
respond to the compliment or, pretending he/she
has not heard it, changes the topic.
Herbert also mentions the possibility of another response;
he calls it request interpretation (the addressee
interprets the compliment as a request from the part of
the addresser and answers accordingly: Do you want to
borrow it?)

V. 2. Pragmatics of apologies

an acknowledgement of an offence or
Apology failure, done in a regretful way

An apology is a speech act through which the speaker

offers support to the hearer after having produced a
threatening act; the speaker admits his fault and, at the

73
same time, takes responsibility for the act he produced. In
terms of politeness theory, an apology is
 a face-threatening act for the speaker (he admits his
fault/having produced a threatening act towards one
of the hearer`s faces)
 a face-saving act for the speaker (is meant to
present him as a responsible, polite person)
 a face-threatening act for the face of the hearer
(who might feel embarrassesd)

An apology is a compensatory action to an offence – in

Goffman`s (1971) terms; it represents a remedial that is
meant to reestablish the social armony after an offense. It
is also Meier that considers apology as a ”Repair Work”
framework that can account for the language used in
different situations that call for some kind of social repair.
Research in the field mentions the following aspects:
 the offender`s obligation to apologize affects
the choice of the apologetic formula
 the severity of the threatening act affects the
apology intensification and the formality of the
apologetic formula, as well as the choice of
formula with respect to gender; it is the
representative contextual factor in the sosico-
pragmatic set of the apology (Olshtain,
1989:160)
 apology performance is affected by the context
external factors, social power and social
distance
 apology formula and apology intensification are
culturally-bound elements
 social distance influences apology behaviour
 there exist different apology strategies
Fraser (1980:263) identified nine strategies for
apologizing:
1. announcing that you are apologizing: I hereby
apologize for...
2. stating one`s obligation to apologize: I must apologize
for...
3. offering to apologize: I would like to offer my apology
for...

74
4. requesting the hearer accept an apology: Please accept
my apology for...
5. expressing regret for an offese: I`m very/terribly/so
sorry for...
6. requesting forgiveness for the offense: Please
excuse/forgive me for...
7. acknowledging responsibility for the offending act: This
was my fault..
8. promising forbearance from a similar offending act: I
promise you that that will never happen
9. offering redress: Please, let me pay for the damage
I`ve done.

Following Fraser`s taxonomy, literature has identified five

frequently used strategies that individuals use in the act
of apologizing (Olshtein & Cohen, 1983)
1. an explicit expression of an apology – a sentence with a
performative verb apologise, forgive, excuse, be sorry.
They are explicit performative expressions. Among them,
I`m sorry is dominant. An intensifier can be added (very,
really, terribly) in order to intensify the act of apologizing.
It has been found out that the difference between sorry
and excuse lies in the nature of the offense (whether it is
related to personal injuries or a social rule).
In the authors`view, the expression of apology should
include: an expression of regret (I`m sorry); an offer of
apology (I apologize) and a request for forgiveness
(Excuse me/Forgive me)
2. an explanation/account – this strategy includes an
excuse or a justification as apology. The offender explains
the situation that indirectly caused him to produce the
offence. Depending on the cultural context, either an
external factor or the offender himself is considered to be
”guilty’’ (the case of a person who comes late to the office
and blames the alarm-clock that did not ring, or the
means of transport, for the example).
3. an expression of acknowledging responsibility -
includes: accepting the blame (It is my fault; I am guilty
for that); expressing self-deficiency (I was confused; I
wasn`t thinking); recognizing the other person as

75
deserving apology (You are right) and expressing lack of
intent (I didn`t mean to)
4. an offer of repair
5. a promise of nonoccurrence

The last two startegies are context-specific.

In 1986, Cohen, Olshtain and Rosenstein contribute a list
of ”modifiers” to their already established classes of
strategies. Thus, they mention:
1. intensity of an apology – terribly, very
2. minimizing or denying responsibility – It`s your
own fault for trusting my directions
3. emotionals – Oh!
4. minimizing the offence – You can find another job
5. comments – Are you all right/OK?

Cohen and Olsthain`s set of modifiers was developed in

the CCSARP coding manual and they were given the name
of “internal modifiers” of the Illocutionary Force Indicating
Devices (a set of formulaic expressions of the speaker`s
explicit apology).

Apologies are accepted or rejected in an explicit or

implicit way. Acceptance is made through expressions that
 minimize or even elliminate the effect of the
threatening act: That's all right// That's OK. ; It
doesn't matter.// No harm done.// Never mind.//
Forget about it.
 focus on the speaker and his ability of showing
understanding, solidarity, cooperation with the
interlocutor (the offender): I [quite] understand.//
You couldn't help it.
 show no necessity for apology: Don't apologize.//
Don't worry about it.// Don't mention it.

V. 3. Pragmatics of thanking

to tell someone that you are grateful for

something that he/she has done or given
(to)Thank
to express gratitude to someone, especially by
saying “Thank you”

76
According to Leech (1983), thanking is a speech act which
is intrinsically polite or courteous. In the analysis of the
speech act of thanking, Aijmer (1996) suggests several
important things:
1. the analysis should be done in the context of
pragmatic frames (different variables for the context of
utterance that need to be known by speakers, as this
makes them successful in communicative situations)
(Jacobson:65)
2. there exist some formal features for thanking:
 function (thanking can be used to support the phatic
function; when used in simple form such as thank
you/thanks, it may signal acceptance and when
used in intensified form, such as thank you very
much, it can express gratitude);
 intonation (the simple form is pronounced with
rising intonation, while the intensified one, with
falling intonation);
 continuation patterns (the intensified forms are
continued by that`s OK, for example) and
 discourse-specific features.
3. there exist situational features for thanking:
 setting (variables such as at work/at someone`s
house/on social occasions)
 participants (variables according to their social
roles)
 the type of thanking (difference is made between
thanking forms offered for minor or major
favours/services, or difference between thanking
linked to material or immaterial things (thanks for
material things, gifts, services or hospitality vs.
thanks for compliments, congratulations or well-
wishes, offers, promises, invtations, suggestions or
information)

Leech (1983) considers that politeness can be maximized

by boosting, by using intensifying adverbs or by using
prosodic devices. One can express their thanks
a) explicitly (Thank you for your help. // Thanks a lot.)

77
b) implicitly (appreciation goes to the thing and not to the
act of giving Wow! It`s wonderful! // Wow, it`s so nice! or,
praise goes to the person who made the offer: It`s very
kind of you…// You`ve been very nice to…. ).

Aijmer (1996:46) studied the intensifiers of the simple

thankig structure. His findings resembeld those in the
Corpus of English Dialogue and they fall into two
categories:
a)Thank you + intensifier
I thank you kindly; I thank you a hundred (thousand)
times; I thank you with all my heart; I thank you
hartily; I humbly thank you
b)thanks + intensifier
thanks; thanks with all my heart; a thousand thanks;
great thanks
Aijmer was also preoccupied with the continuation of the
act of thanking (the “responder”) and considered it as a
strategy employed by the speaker according to his/her
intentionality (the goal he has in mind). Thus, responses
to the act of thanking may include: that`s Ok (that
minimizes the factor); great pleasure (to express
pleasure) and you are welcome (that expresses
appreciation of the addressee) (Aijmer, 1996:40).

Pragmatics of thanking indicates that there are certain

contexts where thanking is needed to express politeness
and, at the same time, there exist rules that govern the
strength of gratitude in the respective contexts
(connected with the speaker`s being direct, sincere and
concise, as well as with the speaker`s tailoring the thanks
to the person and to the desired effect).

V.4. Pragmatics of refusals

an expression through which one expresses

unwillingness to accept or grant an offer or
Refusal request
an act of showing(saying) that you will not
do, accept or give something

78
The speech act of refusal presupposes the speaker`s
answer (saying “No’’) to a request, invitation, offer or
suggestion. Within the context of adjacency pair analysis,
a refusal is considered to be a dispreferred second. It is,
thus, a face-threatening act towards the person who
requests something or makes an invitation, as it
contradicts this person`s expectations.

Martines-Flor& Usó-Juan (2011:47) point out that “The

appropriate choice of refusal strategies may depend on
sociopragmatic issues such as the social status of the
requester relative to the refuser (low, equal, high), social
distance between the interactants (stranger,
acquaintance, intimate) and the setting”.
Due to their face-threatening nature, refusals tend to be
indirect, include mitigation, and/or delay within the turn or
across turns (Houck & Gass, 1999 as cited in Martinez-
For&Usó-Juan, 2011:56), as the refusal utterer wants to
avoid any offence towards the interlocutor`s face(s).

The fact that it is (generally) expressed through indirect

strategies, a refusal requires a high level of pragmatic
competence (Chen, 1996 as cited in Tanck). Tanck
considers that quite often, more than a speech act is
necessary for a speaker to achieve the desired
communicative purpose, while Chen identifies a set of
three such speech acts that are set into motion:
a) an expression of regret (I`m sorry; I feel really sorry)
b) the direct refusal (I can`t do that. // I can`t come to
your party)
c) an excuse (I have much to study for the next week
exam.). This is more or less elaborate, offering more
or less details (according to the situation and the
cultural context in which the speech act is
produced).
Sometimes, in certain situational or cultural contexts, the
excuse is followed by an alternative.

All these prove that the strategies used by the one who
produces this speech act are very complex. Different
classifications have been proposed in this respect. They

79
include both direct or indirect semantic formulas
(expressions of different sorts that are meant to perform a
refusal) and adjuncts (those expressions that only
accompany a refusal, as they are not refusals in
themselves) (Martinez-For & Usó-Juan (2011:57).

Among the direct strategies, two subtypes are frequent in

daily conversations: bluntness (marked by the
performative verb I refuse or by the use of the harsh
“No”) and negation of proposition (the use of expressions
that include negations: I can`t. // I don`t think so.)
(Martinez-For & Usó-Juan (2011:57)
Politeness requirements make that the indirect strategies
include more subtypes than the direct one. Thus, the
speaker may resort to:
 plain indirect strategies (including mitigation
devices): It seems I can`t.
 reason or explanation (I have to study for the exam)
 regret or apology (I`m [terribly; awfully] sorry)
 alternative (I can go there if you decide to go on
Sunday and not on Saturday.)
 disagreement/criticism (You should not ask me to do
it)
 statement of principle/philosophy (moral beliefs are
brought into discussion: I never do such a thing.)
 avoidance (that can be of verbal or nonverbal
nature: the speaker can resort to hedges: Well // I`ll
see..
 silence, when he/she ignores the request.

Samples of conversations for analysis

First Date Conversation Transcript1

Girl: He's here. Bye Dad.

Dad: Wait, wait, wait . . . Where are you going?
Girl: Dad. I've already told mom. I'm going out tonight.
1
https://www.google.ro/webhp?sourceid=chrome-
instant&ion=1&espv=2&ie= UTF-8#q=transcript +of+
conversation&start=160

80
Dad: Who with? You mean you're going on a date?
Girl: Yeah. Mom met Dirk yesterday. [Dirk!?] He's sooo cool. We're
going on a double-date with Cindy and Evan.
Dad: Dirk.
Girl: I have to go.
Dad: Wait, wait. I want to meet this guy.
Girl: He's waiting for me.
Dad: Well, so what are you going to do tonight? Going to the library?
Girl: Dad! We're going out to eat, and then we're going to catch a
movie.
Dad: What movie and what is it rated?
Girl: It's a science fiction thriller called . . . well, I don't know what it is
called, but it's rated PG.
Dad: And where's the movie showing?
Girl: Down at the Campus Plaza Movie Theater.
Dad: Hey, I was thinking about seeing a movie down there tonight,
too.
Girl: Ah, Dad.
Dad: Hey, Let me meet that guy.
[Father looks out the living room window . . .
Hey, that guy has a moustache!
Girl: Dad. That's not Dirk. That's his older brother. He's taking us
there! Can I go now?
Dad: Well . . .
Girl: Mom said I could, and mom knows his parents.
Dad: Well . . .
Girl: Dad.
Dad: Okay, but be home by 8:00.
Girl: Eight!? The movie doesn't start until 7:30. Come on, Dad.
Dad: Okay. Be back by 11:00.
Girl: Love you, Dad.
Dad: Love you, too.
Girl: Bye.
Dad:Bye

2
Conversation between students

Levi: what lesson do you have next?

Jack: Got maths next.
Levi: with who?
Jack: Mr.Askan
Levi: The one that looks like you?
Jack: no he don’t look like me!
Levi: yes he does.
Jack: no he doesn’t.
Levi: yes he does.
2
http://jack.student.edutronic.net/2012/10/05/transcript-of-spoken-
conversation/

81
Jack: you look like Mr.U!
Levi: was that funny?!
Jack: hmm, yeah.
Levi: init Alfie looks like Mr.Durant?
Levi: don’t laugh!
Alfie: I got MR.U next.
Alfie: did you get that homework, the sheets?
Levi: who me?
Jack: yeah, week 1, week2 yeah I got that.
Alfie: have you done it?
Jack: no, not yet its not due till Thursday.
Alfie: we’ve done three.
Jack: we’re just on week three.
Levi: what did you do yestoday?
Jack: went gym
Levi: with who?
Jack: my brother.
Levi: who’s your brother?
Jack: ably!
Levi: ohh yeah!
Jack: did you forget ?
Levi: yeah.
Jack: what lesson you got next?
Levi: ermmmm…..ermmmm…ermm..
Jack: ok, don’t worry.
Levi: RE!
Jack: with who?
Levi: ermmmmmm…ermmmm
Jack: ah let’s change the subject!
Levi: no! Mr.Evans.
Levi: it’s calm.
Jack: who’s in your class?
Levi: errrmmmm……couple people.
Alfie: with who?
Levi: errmmmmmm…
Alfie: you don’t know who’s in your class?
Levi: do you want me to name everyone?
Alfie: Naa, just a couple people!
Levi: ermm..billy, rashad, Ryan and Ann Marie.
Jack: is it jokes?
Levi: um..yeah.
Alfie: do you have miss.naylan-Francis?
Levi: an Mr.Evans.
Alfie: have you had Miss.Naylan-Francis or just Mr.Evans?
Levi: na miss.naylan-Francis, cos Mr.evans isn’t a RE teacher!
Alfie: yeah I know but she might not have been in!
Levi: ermm..anyway..
‘’My dear Sir Thomas, I perfectly comprehend you, and do justice to
the generosity and delicacy of your opinion… (J. Austin, Mansfield
Park:4)

82
‘’My dear little cousin’’, said he, with all the gentleness of an excellent
nature ”what can be the matter?” (J. Austin, Mansfield Park)
Turn-taking
“There is a great deal of truth in what you say,” replied Sir Thomas (J.
Austin, Mansfield Park)

Full interview between President Obama and Bill

O'Reilly3

BILL O’REILLY: One of my, uh, points on the Factor is that poverty is
driven by the dissolution of the American family, that is the prime
mover, okay. On your watch, median income has dropped seventeen
percent among working families in this country. That's not a good
record, it’s not all your fault, part of it was this terrible recession, we
all know that. Everybody knows that.
PRESIDENT OBAMA : Okay.
O’REILLY: All right. But 72 percent of babies in African-American
community are born out of wedlock.
PRESIDENT OBAMA : Yeah.
O’REILLY: Why isn’t there a campaign by you and the first lady to
address that problem very explicitly?
PRESIDENT OBAMA: Actually, Bill, we address it explicitly all the time.
I-I’ll send you at least 10 speeches I’ve made since I’ve been
president talking about the importance of men taking responsibility
for their children. Talking about the importance of, uh, young people,
uh, delaying gratification. Talking about the importance of, uh, when it
comes to child rearing, paying child support, spending time with your
kids, reading with them. So, whether it’s getting publicity or not is a
whole different question.
O’REILL”: But —
PRESIDENT OBAMA: This is something that we focus on all the time.
O’REILLY: Would you say it’s been a hallmark of your administration
to make that issue, because I don’t believe it has. I know you’ve given
the speeches, and I know you know — understand the problem,
because you’re a community organizer from Chicago.
PRESIDENT OBAMA : Yes.
O’REILLY: All right? But I don’t see the pressure from the Federal
government to go in and say, this is wrong, this is — this is killing,
um, futures of babies and children.
PRESIDENT OBAMA : Well first of all, I’ve just got to say, Bill, we talk
about it all the time, we’ll continue to talk about it, we’re convening,
for example, philanthropists and business people, city by city, who
are interested in addressing these kinds of problems at the local level.
There is an economic component to it as well, though.

3
http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2014/02/03/transcript-full-interview-
between-president-obama-and-bill-oreilly.html

83
O’REILLY: Sure.
PRESIDENT OBAMA: Because — because what’s interesting, when
you look at what’s going on right now, you’re starting to see in a lot of
white working class homes, similar problems — when men can’t find
good work, when the economy is shutting ladders of opportunity off
from people, whether they’re black, white, Hispanic, it doesn’t matter.
Then that puts pressure as well on the home. So you’ve got an
interaction between the economy that isn’t generating enough good
jobs for folks who traditionally could get blue-collar jobs even if they
didn’t have a higher education, and some legitimate social concerns,
uh. That compound the problem and so we want to hit both. We want
to make sure that we’re putting folks back to work and making sure
that they’re well-paid —
O’REILLY [OVERLAP]: But this is —
PRESIDENT OBAMA [OVERLAP]: We also want to make sure that we’re
dealing with some of the social issues that you’re addressing.
O’REILLY: The secret to getting a je — good job is education. And in
these chaotic families, the children aren’t well-educated because it
isn’t — it isn’t, um, encouraged at home as much as it is in other
precincts. Now, school vouchers is a way to level the playing field.
Why do you oppose school vouchers when it would give poor people a
chance to go to better schools?
PRESIDENT OBAMA: Actually — every study that’s been done on
school vouchers, Bill, says that it has very limited impact if any —
O’REILLY: Try it.
PRESIDENT OBAMA: On — it has been tried, it’s been tried in
Milwaukee, it’s been tried right here in DC —
O’REILLY [OVERLAP]: And it worked here.
PRESIDENT OBAMA: No, actually it didn’t. When you end up taking a
look at it, it didn’t actually make that much of a difference. So what
we have been supportive of is, uh, something called charters. Which,
within the public school system gives the opportunity for creative
experiments by teachers, by principals to-to start schools that have a
different approach. And —
O’REILLY [OVERLAP]: You would revisit that? I-I just think — I used be,
teach in a Catholic school, a-and I just know —
PRESIDENT OBAMA [OVERLAP]: Bill — you know, I — I’ve taken, I’ve
taken — I’ve taken a look at it. As a general proposition, vouchers has
not significantly improved the performance of kids that are in these
poorest communities —
O’REILLY [OVERLAP] [INAUDIBLE] -
PRESIDENT OBAMA : Some charters — some charters are doing great.
Some Catholic schools do a great job, but what we have to do is make
sure every child —
O’REILLY [OVERLAP] : I got three more questions.
PRESIDENT OBAMA : Go ahead.
O’REILLY: All right. Keystone pipeline, new study comes in,
environmental impact, negligible. Forty-two thousand jobs. You’re
gonna okay it, I assume.

84
PRESIDENT OBAMA : Well first of all, it’s not forty two thousand.
That’s — that’s not, uh, correct, it’s a couple thousand to build the
pipeline, but —
O’REILLY [OVERLAP]: Forty-two all told.
PRESIDENT OBAMA: Well, that, bottom line is what we’re gonna do is
to, uh, the process now goes agencies comment on what the State
Department did, public’s allowed to comment, Kerry’s gonna, uh, give
me a recommendation, uh —
O’REILLY [OVERLAP]: All right, so I assume we’re gonna do that, after
five years —
PRESIDENT OBAMA [OVERLAP] [INAUDIBLE] -
O’REILLY: Okay. I’ll take that as a yes. Little Sisters of the Poor, come
on, give them the little waiver that they don’t have to —
PRESIDENT OBAMA [OVERLAP]: They have, you know —
O’REILLY [OVERLAP]: Come on, the Little Sisters of the Poor? Give
them what they want.
PRESIDENT OBAMA: Bill, I —
O’REILLY: Right now. Let’s-let’s just do this.
PRESIDENT OBAMA: Bill, take, here-here’s the way this thing works. All
they have to do is sign a form saying they don’t — they are a religious
institution —
O’REILLY: And then they get what they want, right?
PRESIDENT OBAMA : And — and they get what they want. What they
— the problem is they don’t want to sign the form —
O’REILLY [OVERLAP] : Well, we’ll —
PRESIDENT OBAMA: Because they think that that somehow, uh, uh,
makes them complicit.
O’REILLY: I’m happy now that the Little Sisters are going to get what
they want. Uh, now. Um. FOX News. Uh, I can’t speak for FOX News.
All right, but I’m — I’m, you know, the table setter here [INAUDIBLE] -.
PRESIDENT OBAMA [OVERLAP] [INAUDIBLE] -
O’REILLY: Do you think I’m being unfair to you, do you think I’ve been
giving you PRESIDENT OBAMA [OVERLAP]: Absolutely. Of course you
have, Bill. But, I like you anyway, Bill.
O’REILLY [OVERLAP]: Okay, but — give me how I’m unfair.
PRESIDENT OBAMA [OVERLAP] : It-it-but — look —
O’REILLY: Give me how I’m unfair. Come on, you can’t make that
accusation without telling me.
PRESIDENT OBAMA: Bill — we’ve just run through an interview in
which you asked about health, uh, health care not working, IRS
where-where we, uh, wholly corrupt, Benghazi —
O’REILLY: All right.
PRESIDENT OBAMA: Right, so the list of issues that you talk about —
O’REILLY [OVERLAP]: But these are unanswered questions —
PRESIDENT OBAMA: Yeah, but-but-but they’re defined by you guys in
a certain way. But this — look, this is okay. This-this is —
O’REILLY [OVERLAP]: Do you not —
PRESIDENT OBAMA: If you want to — if you want to be President of
the United States, then you know that you’re going to be subject to
criticism, and —

85
O’REILLY: But if it’s unfair, I-I want to know if it’s unfair. Is it un —
criticism is criticism. It’s my job to give you a hard time.
PRESIDENT OBAMA [OVERLAP]: Here — here — here’s what I would
say. I think regardless of whether it’s fair or not, uh, it has, uh, it has
made FOX News very successful.
O’REILLY: But if I’m unfair, I want —
PRESIDENT OBAMA [OVERLAP]: Here’s what — here’s the thing you
guys — here’s what you guys are gonna have to figure out is what are
— what are you gonna do when I’m gone? I’m telling you —
O’REILLY [OVERLAP] [INAUDIBLE] [LAUGHS] -
PRESIDENT OBAMA [OVERLAP] [INAUDIBLE] -
O’REILLY: Ah-ha-ha — ask President Clinton. Ask President Bush. I
gave President Bush a real hard time. Are you the most liberal
President in US History?
PRESIDENT OBAMA: Probably not.
O’REILLY: Probably not?
PRESIDENT OBAMA: Probably not. That’s-that’s fair to say.
O’REILLY [OVERLAP] : Who-who would be?
PRESIDENT OBAMA: You know, the truth of the matter is, is that when
you look at some of my policies, um, in a lot of ways, Richard Nixon
was more — more liberal than I was. Started the EPA. You know, uh,
you know, started, uh, uh, a whole lot of the regulatory state that, uh,
has helped make our air and water clean. Um.
O’REILLY: That’s interesting — Nixon — that’s interesting. I thought
you were gonna say FDR.
PRESIDENT OBAMA: Well, FDR — Johnson. But I tend not to think
about these things in terms of liberal and democrat — or liberal and
conservative because at any given time, the question is what does
the country need right now? And what — right now what the country
needs is, uh, roads, bridges, uh, infrastructure, we-we got 2 trillion
dollars worth of, uh, unmet needs. We could put — be putting
construction workers back to work right now, folks that you like to
champion. Why aren’t we doing it? That’s not a liberal or conservative
agenda —
O’REILLY [OVERLAP] [INAUDIBLE] -
PRESIDENT OBAMA [OVERLAP]: Well, why-why aren’t we funding it?
The, uh, when it comes — comes to something like basic research to
keep our innovation edge. That’s the thing that sent the man to
space, that’s the thing that created the internet. Why aren’t we —
why aren’t we funding —
O’REILLY [OVERLAP]: Because we have a seventeen trillion dollar
debt. We can’t do these things.
PRESIDENT OBAMA: No, the uh — but the reason we don’t do them is
because we’re not willing to make decisions, for example, uh, our tax
code is rife with loopholes —
O’REILLY [OVERLAP]: That’s true, you can’t —
PRESIDENT OBAMA [OVERLAP]: And for us to close those loopholes,
we could put people to work right now. Is that a Democrat — is that a
Democrat, Republican, conservative, liberal thing? It’s neither. It’s
common sense. That’s what we should be doing.

86
O’REILLY: All right.
PRESIDENT OBAMA: In fact, you and I, if we sat down, we could
probably agree on —
O’REILLY [OVERLAP]: Well, I’ve said that on air. We don’t disagree on
—
PRESIDENT OBAMA [OVERLAP]: Raising the minimum wage,
something that you —
O’REILLY [OVERLAP]: But one — one thing we do —
PRESIDENT OBAMA [OVERLAP] : Yes, right.
O’REILLY [OVERLAP]: I support this.
PRESIDENT OBAMA : I know. And that’s —
O’REILLY [OVERLAP]: You have to do it.
PRESIDENT OBAMA: And that’s —
O’REILLY [OVERLAP]: You want to get people off welfare, you raise the
— minimum wage.
PRESIDENT OBAMA [OVERLAP]: That’s not a liberal or a-a
conservative agenda.
O’REILLY [OVERLAP]: No, fine. But I think that you are much more
friendly to a nanny state than I am. I’m more of a self-reliance guy,
you’re more of a big government will solve your problems guy.
PRESIDENT OBAMA: And I — and I —
O’REILLY : That’s it.
PRESIDENT OBAMA: And I disagree with that because I think that
what used to be considered sensible we now somehow label as-as
liberal. Think about this — Social Security, Medicare —
O’REILLY [OVERLAP]: But you pay into that. It’s the freebies that are
the problem.
PRESIDENT OBAMA [OVERLAP]: Is it? What-what freebies are we
talking about? Welfare, actually is worth less now than it was 20, 30
— it’s worth less than it was under Ronald Reagan. And the uh —
O’REILLY [OVERLAP]: Take a look at the disability explosion. I mean,
it’s insane. The workplace isn’t any more dangerous now than it was it
was 20 —
PRESIDENT OBAMA [OVERLAP]: Well —
O’REILLY: years ago, it’s through the roof. You know people are
conning you.
PRESIDENT OBAMA [OVERLAP]: You know, Bill, the point is, we have
not massively expanded the welfare state. That’s just not true. When
you take a look at it, actually, that-the-the levers of support that we
provide to folks who are willing to work hard, they’re not that different
than they were thirty years ago, forty years ago, fifty years ago. You
and I took advantage of certain things. I don’t know about you, but I
got some loans to go to college.
O’REILLY [OVERLAP] : Nah, I painted houses, I didn’t get any —
PRESIDENT OBAMA [OVERLAP]: The, uh, well, I, no —
O’REILLY [OVERLAP]: See, that's who I am. I —
PRESIDENT OBAMA: I painted houses during the summer too. It still
wasn’t enough. So, the, uh, so my point is is that that’s not a nanny
state. That’s an investment in the future generation. G.I. Bill — is that
a nanny state? My grandfather came back for World War II, you’re

87
about to write a book on World War II. Smartest thing we ever did was
make an investment in the American people. When those guys came
back from war, that’s what created our middle class. We-we suddenly
trained up and created skills for folks. We gave ‘em subsidies so they
could go out and buy homes. Through the FHA, those things weren’t
giveaways. We-we understood that what that would do would create a
base middle class of folks who were able to, uh, work hard and get
ahead.
O’REILLY: The work ethic was different then than it is now.
PRESIDENT OBAMA [OVERLAP] : Well —
O’REILLY: All right, last questions.
PRESIDENT OBAMA : We’ll have to improve the work ethic.
O’REILLY: And here’s something that you and I agree on.
PRESIDENT OBAMA: What’s that?
O’REILLY: And I’ll tell everybody. You helped the Veterans. Now I
believe the VA should be doing a lot more than it’s doing. But you, I
have come to you four times, and every time you have, uh, done what
I have asked, and we have raised more than twenty million dollars for
wounded veterans and their families. And I — you know, so when they
say that you don’t care and all of that I know that’s not true. But
fundamentally, the self-reliance thing in America I think is going
down, and the nanny state is going up. Last word. You get it.
PRESIDENT OBAMA: Here’s-here’s-here’s what I believe. First of all,
biggest honor I’ve ever had and will ever have is serving as
Commander in Chief, and when you meet our military families and our
men and women in uniform, they-they, uh. They are so outstanding.
You just have to want to help. And you have done great work, Bill, uh,
on behalf of our veterans. Number two, I think self-reliance is alive
and well in America. I think the problem is people don’t see as many
opportunities to get ahead. My job as President, as long as I’m in this
office, is to give them the tools to get ahead. They gotta work hard,
they gotta be responsible, but if they are, let’s make sure that they
can make it in America. That’s what it’s all about. That’s how you and
I ended up sitting here talking.
O’REILLY: Mr. President, thanks, always a pleasure to talk with you.
PRESIDENT OBAMA : I enjoyed it, Bill. Thank you very much.

4
Memories about the University of Chicago

KRISTOL: Hi, welcome to CONVERSATIONS. I’m Bill Kristol. It’s a great

pleasure to be joined today by Leon and Amy Kass. Welcome.
AMY KASS: Thank you.
KRISTOL: Let’s begin at the beginning, you both went to the
University of Chicago and you both showed up there in the 50s, and
4
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transcript/

88
you both talked about how this was an important formative
experience for you. So I’m curious – as someone who didn’t go to the
University of Chicago – and has been, of course, wounded and
damaged ever since.
AMY: How did it leave its mark?
KRISTOL: You ended up going back there and teaching there for as
very distinguished professors there for many decades, so talk a little
bit about the University of Chicago.
LEON KASS: I’m a native of Chicago. I went to the college of the
University of Chicago as an early entrant after two years of high
school, age 15. Not to be recommend necessarily.
KRISTOL: Wasn’t great for your social life?
LEON: No, in some respects – because there were a lot of us. There
was a program – early entrance, left over from the Hutchins College. I
majored in the sciences. I was probably too young to really be moved
by the books that I now love and teach until my last year in the
college.
But it was formative partly because Chicago was still – the Hutchins –
Robert Hutchins had left, the climate of learning through great books
and through discussion, search, and inquiry was very much the way of
the place.
And the professors didn’t lecture. We would sit and read very often
short excerpts rather than whole books, but the questions were
searching questions, we were forced to defend our opinions, we were
forced to look into fundamental assumptions.
And both Amy and I got caught up in the ideology of the Hutchins
College, the liberal arts, and the great books.
KRISTOL: So, even as a science major in order to graduate you had to
take a full kind of liberal arts, great-books regimen?
LEON: There were 14 – before I got, there were 14 yearlong, what
would now be called, common core courses, which everybody took
and you got a B.A. in the liberal arts from the college. And if you
wanted to specialize, you did it afterwards.
When I got there, it was all sort of half-and-half. Half your time was on
a major, and I was in biology, but half the time was full-year courses
in humanities, full-year courses in social science, history of western
civ., a course on the organization and methods of the sciences and
the principles of knowledge, a kind of big philosophical integration –
KRISTOL: And these were required courses for everybody?
LEON: For everybody.
KRISTOL: So, there wasn’t like a “core” where you choose among the
ten courses?
LEON: No, everybody took the same things, and you could – anybody
you’d bump into had already – was doing these things, had done
these things, or would do them. Also, Amy and I were members of an
organization called the Student Orientation Board, which was a self-
perpetuating group of students who were responsible for orienting the
new students every fall and who met during the year to have
discussions on the aims of liberal education with invited faculty
members.

89
And we regarded ourselves as the defenders of the faith against the
barbarians who had taken over and who wanted to turn the University
of Chicago into a place that would be a home for brawn and beauty as
well as brains, as one of the deans then put it.
So we were little Hutchins ideologues and – I mean, the idea was, in
part, was learning for its own sake, great books for their own sake, but
also that this was indispensable for citizenship, and that something
like a rich philosophical education in all realms of human knowledge
was indispensable for citizenship in a country where the people were
sovereign.
KRISTOL: I want to ask Amy about that and to get the truer view of
what really – what it was really like at the University of Chicago?
LEON: I gave it the orthodox view.
KRISTOL: Was there any one professor – I’m just curious – as an
undergraduate who I don’t know guided you or, really, you became
close to?
LEON: My last year of the college – I mean, I had done very well in my
science classes, rather mediocre in the humanities, and I couldn’t
write to save my neck. It was terrible.
But my last year in the college, a fellow named Joe Schwab, who had
also trained as a geneticist and was a brilliant graduate student,
starting teaching in college, got very much interested in why it was –
he got interested in sort of the transference and counter-transference
problems of the classroom and why some people learned under some
circumstances and others not.
Became a psychoanalyst, wound up teaching every course in the
college except foreign language and Western Civ. All the social
sciences, all the humanities, the philosophical integration course,
math, everything.
And he was a bit of a bully but a real Socratic. And he showed me –
the first day of my senior year – that there were questions to which
the answers that I was carrying around in my head were inadequate.
It was a class – the first reading was the discussion of “the Cave” from
Book 7 of The Republic, and the question was, “Why did the
philosophers return to the cave?” And goody two-shoes over here
said, “Well, of course, to improve the lot of all the other people. It’s
their duty.”
And by the time the class was over, it was perfectly clear that the text
didn’t support such a philanthropic understanding, and it was the first
time it occurred to me that, you know, the pursuit of knowledge might
be happiness for the seeker and not simply instrumentally good and
useful for the larger community.
And the whole rest of the year – I mean, he really woke me up. I took
a full-year course with him, I took –
AMY: This was your last year.
LEON: It was my last year.
KRISTOL: I was thinking, too, what Amy said, that in a way you can
have a wonderful curriculum on paper, but if you don’t have the
teacher to wake you up –
LEON: Well, I –

90
KRISTOL: You still learned a lot, I’m sure.
LEON: I blame myself because I really was young.
KRISTOL: You were very young.
LEON: And I went to speak to Schwab, and I said you know – I also
took some classes from Richard McKeon, who was a bit of a bully and
in retrospect a horrible teacher.
KRISTOL: Famous Aristotle scholar, by the way.
LEON: Yeah, but I went to Schwab and said, “Look, I’ve been accepted
to medical school.” I said, “I’m thinking maybe – maybe I’d like to go
to graduate school in philosophy.” He said, “Kass, go to medical
school.” I said, “Why?” He said, “Look, if you’re really interested in
these philosophical things you can always do them later, it’ll come
out. But in the meantime, you love something, and you’ll be able to
do something in the world.”
KRISTOL: And make a living.
LEON: And make living.
KRISTOL: That’s so terrible.
LEON: But it was good advice.
AMY: You don’t think it was a comment on your philosophical ability?
LEON: Maybe that too.
KRISTOL: That’s harsh. And you, you showed up a couple years after
Leon?
AMY: Well, I showed up in 1959 and Leon was already in medical
school. And, in fact, I met Leon the first day I was at the University of
Chicago.
LEON: That was one of the privileges of being on the orientation
board.
AMY: He was on the orientation board, and he was one of those
selected to orient me to the college.
KRISTOL: If this happened today, there would be all kinds of legal
investigations and –
AMY: Well, it was the resident’s head from my floor that introduced us.
And she ran – went running up to Leon and said, “At last, we have
someone here who went to the University of Chicago for the right
reasons.”
And he said to me, “Oh, really, why did you come?” And I said, “Of all
the places that tried to send me their brochures and propaganda, I
liked Chicago most because its booklet didn’t have any pictures in it.”
So, I thought it was a serious place. That’s really what attracted me.
KRISTOL: You were a transfer student?
AMY: I was a transfer student there, yeah. But it was my big act of
rebellion. I came from New York City, and I was expected to go to
school in the East, and I told my parents if they didn’t – if – I didn’t
want to go to school in the East, and I could support myself if I went
to Antioch.
So, I went to Antioch the first year and then transferred to – as quickly
as I could – there.
KRISTOL: To Chicago?
AMY: To Chicago.
KRISTOL: In terms of your educational experience there –

91
AMY: Well, there – first of all, I would say, Leon – I quickly, as he said,
joined the orientation board, and this teacher that is so touted by
Leon – I was also a student of. And I thought he was a big bully. Just as
bully – just as much a bully as McKeon.
But the very first course I took at the University of Chicago was a
course by a man who subsequently did not get tenure. He was a
known socialist and the first reading was the Declaration of
Independence. We spent three weeks talking about the Declaration of
Independence. And I was blown away.
Stops on the first sentence, “When in the course of human
events . . .” He says, “Do human events have courses?,” and it was
going through that carefully and the conversations that it generated
outside of the classroom as well as inside of the classroom that really
converted me to a way of thinking, a way of reading, a way of
speaking, and so on.
So, I wouldn’t say he was the most influential teacher I had, the most
influential teacher was a man named Jack Weintraub, who was a
legend at the college, and he was in history. But that experience was
really formative for me.
KRISTOL: And was it the experience more of sort of reading the text
closely and thinking about the philosophic or implicitly philosophic
questions, or was it the experience of sort of America and what
America stood for so to speak?
AMY: Well, I had a long-standing interest in citizenship. I graduated
high school shortly after Sputnik and the National Defense Education
Act was passed, and everybody was promoting science education.
And I thought that both citizenship and the humanities were getting
short shrift. And, so I was really very interested in this and promoting
that, and this just fed into that interest.
KRISTOL: And then you graduated from Chicago?
AMY: I graduated from Chicago and – well, I did basically what was left
of the old Hutchins College and more. I didn’t – insofar as I had any
major at all you would call it “towards history.” But I really majored in
this man, Jack Weintraub. I took every course he offered and then I
did – I got a degree in tutorial studies, which meant I spent my last
year writing a long paper basically on historiography.
KRISTOL: So, in both your cases actually that – some individual
professors were key, the overall climate presumably helped make it
possible, I suppose, for those professors to teach the way they did.
LEON: And I think that’s really very important. In retrospect, I think
one would say a lot of the teachers weren’t so great. The curriculum
could have done with reading whole books rather than, you know,
short selections.
But what was key was they had a separate college faculty that did not
get tenure on the basis of publication, but on the basis of their
commitment to this curriculum of liberal education. They believed in
the enterprise. They made us believe in the enterprise and its
importance, and there was a kind of spirit of Chicago, a fundamental
inquiry argument, disputation, and asking really basic questions just
about everything, including about the sciences.

92
And that – and for years, I would – much later in professional life, I
would go to a meeting, and there would be conversations in the
meeting, and I would find somebody whose way of thinking or habit of
thought I really liked, and I was always both pleased and disappointed
to discover that they came from Chicago.
Because you’d like to think that what you learned there is not
idiosyncratic and just peculiar but is sort of universally an appropriate
way. Chicago placed its mark on people.
KRISTOL: Yeah, I was going to ask about that. Because I mean – I
guess other people I’ve spoken with who went to college in the late
50s, early 60s – and I think Sputnik was such a formative moment. I’m
a little too young – I remember it vaguely, but, I mean, a little bit
young for it to have been formative for me, I think – I was going to say
this was true beyond Chicago. Maybe there was a moment here
where people, both from the point of view of liberal education and
civic education, had a kind of both openness and sense of urgency
about it that went away or diminished a lot in later decades. Or
maybe it was more just a Chicago tradition or some combination of
the two, I suppose?
AMY: I think when I was in the college, that was true. There was more
of an urgency about it. But really what was distinctive about Chicago –
and I think remained distinctive throughout the 34 years that we
ended up teaching there, it was a place that you really didn’t have to
apologize for being serious.
It’s a – it was for us a place as undergraduates, a place where the
conversations in the classroom really were taken outside the
classroom and continued in the cafeteria and in your dormitory, and
so on.
So, Chicago was known as the place where fun comes to die.
KRISTOL: Right.
AMY: Well, I – when the newspapers published that story, I thought
they should be proud of it. They thought I was perverse, but that was
a different time.
LEON: In 1957, three friends and I got into a car and went Spring
Break traveling to the East and visited Harvard, where I had a friend,
now a rather infamous of the left and we went to classes with him. We
went to a big lecture class with Arthur Schlesinger Jr., as I recall. He
was raving about all of this.
And we thought, what a waste. I mean you, know, here were 300-400
people packed into the Sanders Theater, whatever it was; the fellow
was probably doing the same thing he’s done year in and year out;
one can read this, and where was the activity of sort of challenging
people and how they thought?
So, I remember we were – we were snobs, at least, about the kind of
education we were getting even compared with what was going on in
more respectable and elite places.

Conversation between co-workers5

93
LORI: Uhh, I came across this really funny website the other day… It’s,
umm, designed to where people can anonymously send an e-mail to
an annoying coworker…
MICHAEL: Mmm hmm…
L: Saying things like, “You really need to use deodorant [laughter]…
but we’re too shy to tell you”… and they, you know, you just put in
their e-mail address…
M: Okay
L: Umm, and it got me thinking about annoying coworkers…
M: Okay
L: Can…Do you have any memories of particularly irritating and
annoying people at work?
M: Well, I don’t remember anyone who was…smelly, ummm
[laughter]
M: But there was there was one guy who was rather irritating, umm,
he was, actually, he was someone who I, who I answered to, he was…
L: He was your manager?
M: He was…yeah…he was, he was a manager at my department.
L: Uh huh.
M: And..umm…what he would do would be if myself ..or..or..and one
of my colleagues were having a conversation that was in any way,
uhh, related to something other than the immediate job that we were
working on…
L: Uh huh.
M: …he would, uhh, jump in there and and and, uhh, tell us off! For
doing it…
L: Really?
M: For doing it…yeah!
L: For just chatting while you were working?
M: Yeah, oh yeah! It it it could be…you could be sitting at your desk
and your friend is sitting across from you and you could say, “So…you
have a good weekend, Steve?” and before you’ve even got a chance
to start the conversation, you know, our boss would, would chip in
and say [imitating odious boss] “Ah, gentlemen I don’t think that’s
work-related, could we have a bit less chatter please?”
L: [laughter] No! Did he..
M: And he did actually use to speak like that as well.
L: Really?
M: Yeah, that was, that was, his tone of voice was annoying but that
wasn’t the point, it was, it was just that he wouldn’t allow non-work-
related topics of conversation. Which…okay…
L: That’s right, because everyone knows that we all work much better
and more efficiently when we’re miserable.
M: [Laughter] Well, yeah… That’s uhh, I..he..I don’t think he cared
about that, but, okay, I mean, if if if that was … If it was going to be a
very draconian and strict regime at work, then I guess that’s fair

5
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coworkers

94
enough. But it wasn’t a two-way system and and and this was what
was particularly annoying, because when it was lunch time or break
time this same manager would not be averse to approaching me and
asking me about work-related issues whilst I was trying to eat my
lunch or, you know, whilst I was…
L: OK, and you were on, then, on your own time not on company time
while you’re eating lunch…
M: Oh yeah! Yeah, this this is company allotted, daily company time
when you know you’re supposed to go out and have a cigarette and
do whatever you do on your break time.
L: But it’s really considered your own personal time…
M: Absolutely! Yeah…
L: …your break from work…
M: Yeah
L: …and he had no problems encroaching on YOUR time.
M: No no.
L: OK.
M: No no..that was…so..
L: He sounds like somewhat of a jerk.
M: It was a..He was a hypocrite, for sure.
L: Can you do the voice again?
M: [Imitating odious manager]: The voice, oh he used to speak like
that… “But I don’t think this is very work related, so think we should
stop now.”
L: OK. Let`s stop now.

Conversation between LBJ and Martin Luther King, Jr. 6

11/25/63 - 9:20PM
LBJ: …interest and your cooperation, and your communication,
and a good many people told me that they heard about your
statement. I guess [it was] on TV wasn’t it?
MLK: Yes, that’s right—
LBJ: I—
MLK: --uh-huh.
LBJ: I’ve been locked up in this office, and I haven’t seen it. But I
want to tell you how grateful I am, and how worthy I’m going to
try to be of all your hopes.
MLK: Well, thank you very much. I’m so happy to hear that, and I
knew that you had just that great spirit, and you know you have
our support and backing—
LBJ: Well—
MLK: --because we know what a difficult period this is.
[Inaudible]

6
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conversation-between-lbj-and-martin-luther-king-jr

95
LBJ: It’s just an impossible period. We’ve got a budget coming up
that’s—we’ve got nothing to do with it; it’s practically already
made. And we’ve got a civil rights bill that hadn’t even passed
the House, and it’s November, and Hubert Humphrey told me
yesterday everybody wanted to go home. We’ve got a tax bill
that they haven’t touched. We just got to let up—not let up on
any of them and keep going and--

MLK: Yes.
LBJ: --I guess they’ll say that I’m repudiated. But I’m going to ask
the Congress Wednesday to just stay there until they pass them
all. They won’t do it. But we’ll just keep them there next year
until they do, and we just won’t give up an inch.
MLK: Uh-uh. Well this is mighty fine. I think it’s so imperative. I
think one of the great tributes that we can pay in memory of
President Kennedy is to try to enact some of the great,
progressive policies that he sought to initiate.
LBJ: Well, I’m going to support them all, and you can count on
that. And I’m going to do my best to get other men to do
likewise, and I’ll have to have y’all’s help.
MLK: Right.
LBJ: I never needed it more than I do now.
MLK: Well, you know you have it, and just feel free to call on us
for anything.
LBJ: Thank you so much, Martin.
MLK: All right. Give my—
LBJ: Call me when you’re—
MLK: --regards to the family.
LBJ: I sure will. And call me when you’re down here next time.
MLK: I certainly will, Mr. President.
LBJ: Let’s get together. And any suggestions you’ve got, bring
them in.
MLK: Fine, I certainly will do that.
LBJ: Thank you so much.
MLK: Thank you for calling.

Conversation between Sandra Vland and the State

Trooper Brian Encia7

State Trooper Brian Encinia: Hello ma’am. We’re the Texas Highway
Patrol and the reason for your stop is because you failed to signal the
lane change. Do you have your driver’s license and registration with
you? What’s wrong? How long have you been in Texas?
Sandra Bland: Got here just today.

7
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55b03a 88e4 b 0a9b948 53b 1f1

96
Encinia: OK. Do you have a driver's license? (Pause) OK, where you
headed to now? Give me a few minutes.
(Bland inaudible)
(Encinia returns to his car for several minutes, then approaches Bland
again.)
Encinia: OK, ma'am. (Pause.) You OK?
Bland: I'm waiting on you. This is your job. I'm waiting on you.
When're you going to let me go?
Encinia: I don't know, you seem very really irritated.
Bland: I am. I really am. I feel like it's crap what I'm getting a ticket
for. I was getting out of your way. You were speeding up, tailing me, so
I move over and you stop me. So yeah, I am a little irritated, but that
doesn’t stop you from giving me a ticket, so [inaudible] ticket.
Encinia: Are you done?
Bland: You asked me what was wrong, now I told you.
Encinia: OK.
Bland: So now I'm done, yeah.
Encinia: You mind putting out your cigarette, please? If you don't
mind?
Bland: I'm in my car, why do I have to put out my cigarette?
Encinia: Well you can step on out now.
Bland: I don’t have to step out of my car.
Encinia: Step out of the car.
Bland: Why am I ...
Encinia: Step out of the car!
Bland: No, you don’t have the right. No, you don't have the right.
Encinia: Step out of the car.
Bland: You do not have the right. You do not have the right to do this.
Encinia: I do have the right, now step out or I will remove you.
Bland: I refuse to talk to you other than to identify myself. [crosstalk] I
am getting removed for a failure to signal?
Encinia: Step out or I will remove you. I’m giving you a lawful order.
Get out of the car now or I’m going to remove you.
Bland: And I’m calling my lawyer.
Encinia: I’m going to yank you out of here. (Reaches inside the car.)
Bland: OK, you’re going to yank me out of my car? OK, alright.
Encinia (calling in backup): 2547.
Bland: Let’s do this.
Encinia: Yeah, we’re going to. (Grabs for Bland.)
Bland: Don’t touch me!
Encinia: Get out of the car!
Bland: Don’t touch me. Don't touch me! I’m not under arrest -- you
don't have the right to take me out of the car.
Encinia: You are under arrest!
Bland: I’m under arrest? For what? For what? For what?
Encinia (to dispatch): 2547 county fm 1098 (inaudible) send me
another unit. (To Bland) Get out of the car! Get out of the car now!
Bland: Why am I being apprehended? You're trying to give me a ticket
for failure ...
Encinia: I said get out of the car!

97
Bland: Why am I being apprehended? You just opened my --
Encinia: I‘m giving you a lawful order. I’m going to drag you out of
here.
Bland: So you’re threatening to drag me out of my own car?
Encinia: Get out of the car!
Bland: And then you’re going to [crosstalk] me?
Encinia: I will light you up! Get out! Now! (Draws stun gun and points
it at Bland.)
Bland: Wow. Wow. (Bland exits car.)
Encinia: Get out. Now. Get out of the car!
Bland: For a failure to signal? You’re doing all of this for a failure to
signal?
Encinia: Get over there.
Bland: Right. yeah, lets take this to court, let's do this.
Encinia: Go ahead.
Bland: For a failure to signal? Yup, for a failure to signal!
Encinia: Get off the phone!
Bland: (crosstalk)
Encinia: Get off the phone! Put your phone down!
Bland: I’m not on the phone. I have a right to record. This is my
property. Sir?
Encinia: Put your phone down right now. Put your phone down!
(Bland slams phone down on her trunk.)
Bland: For a fucking failure to signal. My goodness. Y'all are
interesting. Very interesting.
Encinia: Come over here. Come over here now.
Bland: You feelin' good about yourself?
Encinia: Stand right here. Stand right there.
Bland: You feelin' good about yourself? For a failure to signal? You feel
real good about yourself don’t you? You feel good about yourself don’t
you?
Encinia: Turn around. Turn around. Turn around now. Put your hands
behind your back.
Bland: Why am I being arrested?
Encinia: Turn around ...
Bland: Why can't you ...
Encinia: I’m giving you a lawful order. I will tell you.
Bland: Why am I being arrested?
Encinia: Turn around!
Bland: Why won’t you tell me that part?
Encinia: I’m giving you a lawful order. Turn around ...
Bland: Why will you not tell me what's going on?
Encinia: You are not complying.
Bland: I’m not complying 'cause you just pulled me out of my car.
Encinia: Turn around.
Bland: Are you fucking kidding me? This is some bull...
Encinia: Put your hands behind your back.
Bland: 'Cause you know this straight bullshit. And you're full of shit.
Full of straight shit. That's all y’all are is some straight scared cops.

98
South Carolina got y’all bitch asses scared. That’s all it is. Fucking
scared of a female.
Encinia: If you would’ve just listened.
Bland: I was trying to sign the fucking ticket -- whatever.
Encinia: Stop moving!
Bland: Are you fucking serious?
Encinia: Stop moving!
Bland: Oh I can’t wait 'til we go to court. Ooh I can’t wait. I cannot
wait 'til we go to court. I can’t wait. Oh I can’t wait! You want me to sit
down now?
Encinia: No.
Bland: Or are you going to throw me to the floor? That would make
you feel better about yourself?
Encinia: Knock it off!
Bland: Nah that would make you feel better about yourself. That
would make you feel real good wouldn't it? Pussy ass. Fucking pussy.
For a failure to signal you’re doing all of this. In little ass Praire View,
Texas. My God they must have ...
Encinia: You were getting a warning, until now you’re going to jail.
Bland: I’m getting a -- for what? For what?
Encinia: You can come read.
Bland: I’m getting a warning for what? For what!?
Encinia: Stay right here.
Bland: Well you just pointed me over there! Get your mind right.
Encinia: I said stay over here. Stay over here.
Bland: Ooh I swear on my life, y'all are some pussies. A pussy-ass cop,
for a fucking signal you’re gonna take me to jail.
Encinia (to dispatch, or an officer arriving on scene): I got her in
control she’s in some handcuffs.
Bland: For a fucking ticket. What a pussy. What a pussy. You’re about
to break my fucking wrist!
Encinia: Stop moving.
Bland: I’m standing still! You keep moving me, goddammit.
Encinia: Stay right here. Stand right there.
Bland: Don't touch me. Fucking pussy -- for a traffic ticket (inaudible).
(door slams)
Encinia: Come read right over here. This right here says 'a warning.'
You started creating the problems.
Bland: You asked me what was wrong!
Encinia: Do you have anything on your person that's illegal?
Bland: Do I feel like I have anything on me? This a fucking maxi dress.
Encinia: I’m going to remove your glasses.
Bland: This a maxi dress. (Inaudible) Fucking assholes.
Encinia: Come over here.
Bland: You about to break my wrist. Can you stop? You’re about to
fucking break my wrist! Stop!!!
Encinia: Stop now! Stop it! If you would stop resisting.
Female officer: Stop resisting ma’am.
Bland: (cries) For a fucking traffic ticket, you are such a pussy. You are
such a pussy.

99
Female officer: No, you are. You should not be fighting.
Encinia: Get on the ground!
Bland: For a traffic signal!
Encinia: You are yanking around, when you pull away from me, you’re
resisting arrest.
Bland: Don’t it make you feel real good don’t it? A female for a traffic
ticket. Don’t it make you feel good Officer Encinia? You're a real man
now. You just slammed me, knocked my head into the ground. I got
epilepsy, you motherfucker.
Encinia: Good. Good.
Bland: Good? Good?
Female officer: You should have thought about it before you started
resisting.
Bland: Make you feel real good for a female. Y'all strong, y'all real
strong.
Encinia: I want you to wait right here.
Bland: I can’t go anywhere with your fucking knee in my back, duh!
Encinia: (to bystander): You need to leave! You need to leave!
(Bland continues screaming, but much of it is inaudible)
Encinia: For a warning you’re going to jail.
Bland: Whatever, whatever.
Encinia: You're going to jail for resisting arrest. Stand up.
Bland: If I could, I can't.
Encinia: OK, roll over.
Bland: I can't even fucking feel my arms.
Encinia: Tuck your knee in, tuck your knee in.
Bland: (Crying): Goddamn. I can't [muffled].
Encinia: Listen, listen. You're going to sit up on your butt.
Bland: You just slammed my head into the ground and you do not
even care ...
Encinia: Sit up on your butt.
Female officer: Listen to how he is telling you to get up.
Bland: I can't even hear.
Female officer: Yes you can.
Encinia: Sit up on your butt.
Bland: He slammed my fucking head into the ground.
Encinia: Sit up on your butt.
Bland: What the hell.
Encinia: Now stand up.
Bland: All of this for a traffic signal. I swear to God. All of this for a
traffic signal. (To bystander.) Thank you for recording! Thank you! For
a traffic signal -- slam me into the ground and everything! Everything!
I hope y'all feel good.
Encinia: This officer saw everything.
Female officer: I saw everything.
Bland: And (muffled) No you didn't. You didn't see everything leading
up to it ...
Female officer: I'm not talking to you.
Bland: You don't have to.
Encinia: 2547 county. Send me a first-available, for arrest.

100
Female officer: You okay? You should have Tess check your hand.
Encinia: Yeah, I'm good.
Encinia: She started yanking away and then she kicked me, so I took
her straight to the ground.
Female officer: And there you got it right there... I'll search it for you if
you want.
Female officer: Yeah.
Second male: I know one thing for sure, it's on video.
Female officer: Yeah.
Second male: You hurt?
Encinia: No.
Encinia (to female officer): Did you see her when we were right here?
Female officer: Yeah, I saw her cause that's where I (inaudible).
Encinia: This is when she pulled with the cuffs.
Paramedic: Your ring got you there?
Encinia: I had the chain, well, not the chain, but
Paramedic: You got the two loops?
Encinia: She didn't kick me too hard but she still kicked me though.
Paramedic: Not through the skin, but you got a nice scratch. I'm a
paramedic, that's why I know.
Encinia: I know that, that's why I made you look.
Paramedic: Did she do that?
Encinia: Yeah that's her.
Paramedic: Yeah that's cut through the skin.
Encinia: I wrapped it around her head and got her down.
Encinia (on radio): This is a traffic stop, had a little bit of a incident.
(Silence for several minutes.)
Encinia (apparently to a supervisor): I tried to de-escalate her. It
wasn't getting anywhere, at all. I mean I tried to put the Taser away. I
tried talking to her and calming her down, and that was not working.

Fictional conversations

Example 1.
‘’Would it make you happy to write to William?”
“Yes, very.”
“Then let it be done now…”
“But, cousin, will it go to the post?”
(J. Austin, Mansfield Park)
Example 2.
“I hope I am not ungrateful, aunt”, said Fanny, modestly.
“No, my dear; I hope not. I have always found you a very good girl.”
Änd am I never to live here againa?”
“Never, my dear; but you are sure of a comfortable home.”
(J. Austin, Mansfield Park)
Example 3.

101
 “I see what you are at. You are quizzing me and Miss Anderson.”
“No, indeed…”
(J. Austin, Mansfield Park)
Example 4.
“Miss Price has a brother at sea”, sai Edmund.
“At sea, has she? In the king`s service, of course?”
(J. Austin, Mansfield Park)
Example 5.
“Fanny”, sai Edmund, aftlooking at her attentively”, “I am sure you
have the headache.”…”How long have you had it?”
“Since a little before DINNER. It is nothing but the heat.”
“Did you go out in the heat?”
“Go out! to be sure she did, “sai Mrs. Norris.
(J. Austin, Mansfield Park)

Example 6.
‘’I thoroughly understand you,”cried mrs Norris; “ you are everything
that is generous and considerate, and I am sure we shall never
disagree on this point. “
(J. Austin, Mansfield Park)
Example 7.
“It was foolish of me not to think of all that; but I am disappointed.”
(J. Austin, Mansfield Park:87)
Example 8.
“I can never be important to anyone.”
“What is to prevent you?”
“Everything. My situation, my foolishness , and awkwardness.”
“As to your foolishness and awkwardness, my dear Fanny, believe me,
you never have a shadow of either, but in using the words so
improperly….I do not know any betterqualification for a friend and
companion”
“You are too kind.”said Fanny, colouring at such praise; “how shall I
ever thank you as I ought, for thinking so well of me?”
(J. Austin, Mansfield Park)
Example 9.
“Oh! do not say so
“I must say it, and I say it with pleasure.”
(J. Austin, Mansfield Park)

Example 10.
‘It is very kind of you, Mr. Knightley, to come out at this late hour to
call upon us. I am afraid you must have had a shocking walk.’
‘Not at all, sir. It is a beautiful moonlight night; and so mild that I must
draw back from your great fire.’
‘But you must have found it very damp and dirty. I wish you may not
catch cold.’
‘Dirty, sir! Look at my shoes. Not a speck on them.’
‘Well! that is quite surprising, for we have had a vast deal of rain here.
It rained dreadfully hard for half an hour while we were at breakfast. I
wanted them to put off the wedding.’

102
‘By the bye—I have not wished you joy. Being pretty well aware of
what sort of joy you must both be feeling, I have been in no hurry with
my congratulations; but I hope it all went off tolerably well. How did
you all behave? Who cried most?’
‘Ah! poor Miss Taylor! ‘Tis a sad business.’
‘Poor Mr. and Miss Woodhouse, if you please; but I cannot possibly
say ‘poor Miss Taylor.’ I have a great regard for you and Emma; but
when it comes to the question of dependence or independence!—At
any rate, it must be better to have only one to please than two.’
‘Especially when one of those two is such a fanciful, troublesome
creature!’ said Emma playfully. ‘That is what you have in your head, I
know—and what you would certainly say if my father were not by.’
‘I believe it is very true, my dear, indeed,’ said Mr. Woodhouse, with a
sigh.
‘I am afraid I am sometimes very fanciful and troublesome.’
‘My dearest papa! You do not think I could mean you, or suppose Mr.
Knightley to mean you. What a horrible idea! Oh no! I meant only
myself. Mr. Knightley loves to find fault with me, you know— in a joke
—it is all a joke. We always say what we like to one another.’
(Jane Austin – Emma)

Example 11.
‘Emma knows I never flatter her,’ said Mr. Knightley, ‘but I meant no
reflection on any body. Miss Taylor has been used to have two persons
to please; she will now have but one. The chances are that she must
be a gainer.’
‘Well,’ said Emma, willing to let it pass—‘you want to hear about the
wedding; and I shall be happy to tell you, for we all behaved
charmingly. Every body was punctual, every body in their best looks:
not a tear, and hardly a long face to be seen. Oh no; we all felt that
we were going to be only half a mile apart, and were sure of meeting
every day.’
(Jane Austin – Emma)
Example 12.
‘I do not understand what you mean by ‘success,’’ said Mr. Knightley.
‘Success supposes endeavour. Your time has been properly and
delicately spent, if you have been endeavouring for the last four years
to bring about this marriage. A worthy employment for a young lady’s
mind! But if, which I rather imagine, your making the match, as you
call it, means only your planning it, your saying to yourself one idle
day, ‘I think it would be a very good thing for Miss Taylor if Mr. Weston
were to marry her,’ and saying it again to yourself every now and
then afterwards, why do you talk of success? Where is your merit?
What are you proud of? You made a lucky guess; and that is all that
can be said.’
‘And have you never known the pleasure and triumph of a lucky
guess?— I pity you.—I thought you cleverer— for, depend upon it a
lucky guess is never merely luck. There is always some talent in it.
And as to my poor word ‘success,’ which you quarrel with, I do not
know that I am so entirely without any claim to it. You have drawn two

103
pretty pictures; but I think there may be a third—a something
between the do-nothing and the do-all. If I had not promoted Mr.
Weston’s visits here, and given many little encouragements, and
smoothed many little matters, itmight not have come to any thing
after all. I think you must know Hartfield enough to comprehend that.’
(Jane Austin – Emma)
Example 13.
The horses stopped to breathe again, and the guard got down to skid
the wheel for the descent, and open the coach-door to let the
passengers in.
‘Tst! Joe!’ cried the coachman in a warning voice, looking down from
his box.
‘What do you say, Tom?’ They both listened.
‘I say a horse at a canter coming up, Joe.’
‘I say a horse at a gallop, Tom,’ returned the guard, leaving his hold
of the door, and mounting nimbly to his place. ‘Gentlemen! In the
kings name, all of you!’
(Ch. Dickens – The Tale of Two Cities)

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