CONSOLIDATED CASE DIGESTS in Political Law Review (3rd BATCH)
1.) BELGICA v EXEC SEC. OCHOA In 1999, the CDF was removed from the GAA and replaced by three
FACTS: The term “pork barrel”, a political parlance of American-English
origin, refers to an appropriation of government spending meant for localized
projects and secured solely or primarily to bring money to a representative’s
district.
The pork barrel system was temporarily discontinued when martial law was
declared. It reappeared in 1982 through an item in the General
Appropriations Act (“GAA”) called “Support for Local Development Projects”
(“SLDP”). SLDP started the giving of lump-sum allocations to individual
legislators. The SLDP also began to cover not only public works project or
“hard projects” but also covered “soft projects” such as those which would
fall under education, health and livelihood. After the EDSA People Power
Revolution and the restoration of democracy, the pork barrel was revived
through the “Mindanao Development Fund” and the “Visayas Development
Fund”.
In 1990, the pork barrel was renamed “Countrywide Development Fund”
(“CDF”). The CDF was meant to cover small local infrastructure and other
priority community projects. CDF Funds were, with the approval of the
President, released directly to implementing agencies subject to the
submission of the required list of projects and activities. Senators and
congressmen could identify any kind of project from “hard projects” such as
roads, buildings and bridges to “soft projects” such as textbooks, medicines,
and scholarships.
In 1993, the CDF was further modified such that the release of funds was to
be made upon the submission of the list of projects and activities identified
by individual legislators. This was also the first time when the Vice-
President was given an allocation.
The CDF contained the same provisions from 1994-1996 except that the
Department of Budget and Management was required to submit reports to
the Senate Committee on Finance and the House Committee on
Appropriations regarding the releases made from the funds.
separate forms of Congressional insertions: (i) Food Security Program Fund,
(ii) Lingap Para sa Mahihirap Fund, and (iii) Rural/Urban Development
Infrastructure Program Fund. All three contained a provision requiring prior
consultation with members of Congress for the release of funds.
In 2000, the Priority Development Assistance Fund (“PDAF”) appeared in
the GAA. PDAF required prior consultation with the representative of the
district before the release of funds. PDAF also allowed realignment of funds
to any expense category except personal services and other personnel
benefits.
In 2005, the PDAF introduced the program menu concept which is
essentially a list of general programs and implementing agencies from which
a particular PDAF project may be subsequently chosen by the identifying
authority. This was retained in the GAAs from 2006-2010.
It was during the Arroyo administration when the formal participation of non-
governmental organizations in the implementation of PDAF projects was
introduced. The PDAF articles from 2002-2010 were silent with respect to
specific amounts for individual legislators.
In 2011, the PDAF Article in the GAA contained an express statement on
lump-sum amounts allocated for individual legislators and the Vice-
President. It also contained a provision on realignment of funds but with the
qualification that it may be allowed only once.
The 2013 PDAF Article allowed LGUs to be identified as implementing
agencies. Legislators were also allowed identify programs/projects outside
of his legislative district. Realignment of funds and release of funds were
required to be favorably endorsed by the House Committee on
Appropriations and the Senate Committee on Finance, as the case may be.
“MALAMPAYA FUNDS AND PRESIDENTIAL SOCIAL FUND”, the use of
the term pork barrel was expanded to include certain funds of the President
such as the Malampaya Fund and the Presidential Social Fund (“PSF”).
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The Malampaya Fund was created as a special fund under Section 8 of
Presidential Decree (“PD”) No. 910 issued by President Ferdinand Marcos
on March 22, 1976.
The PSF was created under Section 12, Title IV of PD No. 1869, or the
Charter of the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (“PAGCOR”),
as amended by PD No. 1993. The PSF is managed and administered by
the Presidential Management Staff and is sourced from the share of the
government in the aggregate gross earnings of PAGCOR.
“PORK BARREL MISUSE”, In 1996, Marikina City Representative Romeo
Candozo revealed that huge sums of money regularly went into the pockets
of legislators in the form of kickbacks.
In 2004, several concerned citizens sought the nullification of the PDAF but
the Supreme Court dismissed the petition for lack of evidentiary basis
regarding illegal misuse of PDAF in the form of kickbacks.
In July 2013, the National Bureau of Investigation probed the allegation that
a syndicate defrauded the government of P10 billion using funds from the
pork barrel of lawmakers and various government agencies for scores of
ghost projects.
In August 2013, the Commission on Audit released the results of a three-
year audit investigation detailing the irregularities in the release of the PDAF
from 2007 to 2009.
Whistle-blowers also alleged that at least P900 million from the Malampaya
Funds had gone into a dummy NGO.
ISSUE: Whether the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork
Barrel laws are unconstitutional for violating the constitutional provisions on
(a) separation of powers, (b) non-delegability of legislative power, (c) checks
and balances, (d) accountability, (e) political dynasties, (f) local autonomy.
RULING:
ON CONGRESSIONAL PORK BARREL:
The separation of powers between the Executive and the Legislative
Departments has been violated.
The post-enactment measures including project identification, fund release,
and fund realignment are not related to functions of congressional oversight
and, hence, allow legislators to intervene and/or assume duties that properly
belong to the sphere of budget execution, which belongs to the executive
department. Legislators have been, in one form or another, authorized to
participate in the various operational aspects of budgeting, including ―the
evaluation of work and financial plans for individual activities and the ―
regulation and release of funds in violation of the separation of powers
principle. Any provision of law that empowers Congress or any of its
members to play any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law
violates the principle of separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional.
That the said authority to identify projects is treated as merely
recommendatory in nature does not alter its unconstitutional tenor since the
prohibition covers any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law.
Respondents also failed to prove that the role of the legislators is only
recommendatory in nature. They even admitted that the identification of the
legislator constitutes a mandatory requirement before the PDAF can be
tapped as a funding source.
The principle of non-delegability of legislative powers has been violated
The 2013 PDAF Article, insofar as it confers post-enactment identification
authority to individual legislators, violates the principle of non-delegability
since said legislators are effectively allowed to individually exercise the
power of appropriation, which – as settled in Philconsa – is lodged in
Congress.
That the power to appropriate must be exercised only through legislation is
clear from Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which states
that: ― No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of
an appropriation made by law.
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The legislators are individually exercising the power of appropriation
because each of them determines (a) how much of their PDAF fund would
go to and (b) a specific project or beneficiary that they themselves also
determine.
Checks and balances
Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the amount of P24.79 Billion only appears as
a collective allocation limit since the said amount would be further divided
among individual legislators who would then receive personal lump-sum
allocations and could, after the GAA is passed, effectively appropriate PDAF
funds based on their own discretion.
This kind of lump-sum/post-enactment legislative identification budgeting
system fosters the creation of a ―budget within a budget which subverts the
prescribed procedure of presentment and consequently impairs the
President‘s power of item veto.
It forces the President to decide between (a) accepting the entire PDAF
allocation without knowing the specific projects of the legislators, which may
or may not be consistent with his national agenda and (b) rejecting the
whole PDAF to the detriment of all other legislators with legitimate projects.
In fact, even without its post-enactment legislative identification feature, the
2013 PDAF Article would remain constitutionally flawed since it would then
operate as a prohibited form of lump-sum appropriation. This is because the
appropriation law leaves the actual amounts and purposes of the
appropriation for further determination and, therefore, does not readily
indicate a discernible item which may be subject to the President‘s power of
item veto.
The Congressional Pork Barrel partially prevents accountability as Congress
is incapable of checking itself or its members.
The fact that individual legislators are given post-enactment roles in the
implementation of the budget makes it difficult for them to become
disinterested observers when scrutinizing, investigating or monitoring the
implementation of the appropriation law.
The conduct of oversight would be tainted as said legislators, who are
vested with post-enactment authority, would, in effect, be checking on
activities in which they themselves participate.
The concept of post-enactment authorization violates Section 14, Article VI
of the 1987 Constitution, which prohibits members of Congress to intervene
in any matter before any office of the Government, because it renders them
susceptible to taking undue advantage of their own office.
The Court, however, cannot completely agree that the same post-enactment
authority and/or the individual legislator‘s control of his PDAF per se would
allow him to perpetuate himself in office.
The use of his PDAF for re-election purposes is a matter which must be
analyzed based on particular facts and on a case-to-case basis.
The constitutional provision regarding political dynasties is not self-
executing.
Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that the state
shall prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law, is not a self-
executing provision. Since there appears to be no standing law which
crystallizes the policy on political dynasties for enforcement, the Court must
defer from ruling on this issue.
The Congressional Pork Barrel violates constitutional principles on local
autonomy
The Congressional Pork Barrel goes against the constitutional principles on
local autonomy since it allows district representatives, who are national
officers, to substitute their judgments in utilizing public funds for local
development.
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The gauge of PDAF and CDF allocation/division is based solely on the fact
of office, without taking into account the specific interests and peculiarities of
the district the legislator represents. The allocation/division limits are clearly
not based on genuine parameters of equality, wherein economic or
geographic indicators have been taken into consideration. This concept of
legislator control underlying the CDF and PDAF conflicts with the functions
of the various Local Development Councils (“LDCs”) which are already
legally mandated to―assist the corresponding Sanggunian in setting the
direction of economic and social development, and coordinating
development efforts within its territorial jurisdiction. Considering that LDCs
are instrumentalities whose functions are essentially geared towards
managing local affairs, their programs, policies and resolutions should not
be overridden nor duplicated by individual legislators, who are national
officers that have no law-making authority except only when acting as a
body.
ON PRESIDENTIAL PORK BARREL
Section 8 of PD No. 910 and Section 12 of PD No. 1869 are valid
appropriation laws.
For an appropriation law to be valid under Section 29 (1), Article VI of the
1987 Constitution, which provides that “No money shall be paid out of the
Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law”, it is enough
that (a) the provision of law sets apart a determinate or determinable amount
of money and (b) allocates the same for a particular public purpose. Section
8 of PD 910 is a valid appropriation law because it set apart a determinable
amount: a Special Fund comprised of ― all fees, revenues, and receipts of
the [Energy Development] Board from any and all sources.
It also specified a public purpose: energy resource development and
exploitation programs and projects of the government and for such other
purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President. Section 12 of PD
No. 1869 is also a valid appropriation law because it set apart a
determinable amount: [a]fter deducting five (5%) percent as Franchise Tax,
the Fifty (50%) percent share of the Government in the aggregate gross
earnings of [PAGCOR], or 60%[,] if the aggregate gross earnings be less
than P150,000,000.00. It also specified a public purpose: priority
infrastructure development projects and x x x the restoration of damaged or
destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and authorized by
the Office of the President of the Philippines.
Section 8 of PD No. 910 and Section 12 of PD No. 1869 constitutes undue
delegation of legislation powers.
The phrase “and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by
the President” under Section 8 of PD 910 constitutes an undue delegation of
legislative power insofar as it does not lay down a sufficient standard to
adequately determine the limits of the President‘s authority with respect to
the purpose for which the Malampaya Funds may be used.
This phrase gives the President wide latitude to use the Malampaya Funds
for any other purpose he may direct and, in effect, allows him to unilaterally
appropriate public funds beyond the purview of the law.
This notwithstanding, it must be underscored that the rest of Section 8,
insofar as it allows for the use of the Malampaya Funds ―to finance energy
resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the
government, remains legally effective and subsisting.
Section 12 of PD No. 1869 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative
powers because it lies independently unfettered by any sufficient standard of
the delegating law.
The law does not supply a definition of “priority infrastructure development
projects” and hence, leaves the President without any guideline to construe
the same.
The delimitation of a project as one of “infrastructure” is too broad of a
classification since the said term could pertain to any kind of facility.
2.) ARAULLO vs. AQUINO
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FACTS: When President Benigno Aquino III took office, his administration
noticed the sluggish growth of the economy. The World Bank advised that
the economy needed a stimulus plan. Budget Secretary Florencio “Butch”
Abad then came up with a program called the Disbursement Acceleration
Program (DAP).
The DAP was seen as a remedy to speed up the funding of government
projects. DAP enables the Executive to realign funds from slow moving
projects to priority projects instead of waiting for next year’s appropriation.
So what happens under the DAP was that if a certain government project is
being undertaken slowly by a certain executive agency, the funds allotted
therefor will be withdrawn by the Executive. Once withdrawn, these funds
are declared as “savings” by the Executive and said funds will then be re-
allotted to other priority projects. The DAP program did work to stimulate the
economy as economic growth was in fact reported and portion of such
growth was attributed to the DAP (as noted by the Supreme Court).
Other sources of the DAP include the unprogrammed funds from the
General Appropriations Act (GAA). Unprogrammed funds are standby
appropriations made by Congress in the GAA.
Meanwhile, in September 2013, Senator Jinggoy Estrada made an exposé
claiming that he, and other Senators, received Php50M from the President
as an incentive for voting in favor of the impeachment of then Chief Justice
Renato Corona. Secretary Abad claimed that the money was taken from the
DAP but was disbursed upon the request of the Senators.
This apparently opened a can of worms as it turns out that the DAP does not
only realign funds within the Executive. It turns out that some non-Executive
projects were also funded; to name a few: Php1.5B for the CPLA (Cordillera
People’s Liberation Army), Php1.8B for the MNLF (Moro National Liberation
Front), P700M for the Quezon Province, P50-P100M for certain Senators
each, P10B for Relocation Projects, etc.
This prompted Maria Carolina Araullo, Chairperson of the Bagong
Alyansang Makabayan, and several other concerned citizens to file various
petitions with the Supreme Court questioning the validity of the DAP. Among
their contentions was:
DAP is unconstitutional because it violates the constitutional rule which
provides that “no money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in
pursuance of an appropriation made by law.”
Secretary Abad argued that the DAP is based on certain laws particularly
the GAA (savings and augmentation provisions thereof), Sec. 25(5), Art. VI
of the Constitution (power of the President to augment), Secs. 38 and 49 of
Executive Order 292 (power of the President to suspend expenditures and
authority to use savings, respectively).
ISSUES:
I. Whether or not the DAP violates the principle “no money shall be paid out
of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law” (Sec.
29(1), Art. VI, Constitution).
II. Whether or not the DAP realignments can be considered as
impoundments by the executive.
III. Whether or not the DAP realignments/transfers are constitutional.
IV. Whether or not the sourcing of unprogrammed funds to the DAP is
constitutional.
V. Whether or not the Doctrine of Operative Fact is applicable.
HELD:
I. No, the DAP did not violate Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. DAP
was merely a program by the Executive and is not a fund nor is it an
appropriation. It is a program for prioritizing government spending. As such,
it did not violate the Constitutional provision cited in Section 29(1), Art. VI of
the Constitution. In DAP no additional funds were withdrawn from the
Treasury otherwise, an appropriation made by law would have been
required. Funds, which were already appropriated for by the GAA, were
merely being realigned via the DAP.
II. No, there is no executive impoundment in the DAP. Impoundment of
funds refers to the President’s power to refuse to spend appropriations or to
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retain or deduct appropriations for whatever reason. Impoundment is
actually prohibited by the GAA unless there will be an unmanageable
national government budget deficit (which did not happen). Nevertheless,
there’s no impoundment in the case at bar because what’s involved in the
DAP was the transfer of funds.
III. No, the transfers made through the DAP were unconstitutional. It is true
that the President (and even the heads of the other branches of the
government) are allowed by the Constitution to make realignment of funds,
however, such transfer or realignment should only be made “within their
respective offices”. Thus, no cross-border transfers/augmentations may be
allowed. But under the DAP, this was violated because funds appropriated
by the GAA for the Executive were being transferred to the Legislative and
other non-Executive agencies.
Further, transfers “within their respective offices” also contemplate
realignment of funds to an existing project in the GAA. Under the DAP, even
though some projects were within the Executive, these projects are non-
existent insofar as the GAA is concerned because no funds were
appropriated to them in the GAA. Although some of these projects may be
legitimate, they are still non-existent under the GAA because they were not
provided for by the GAA. As such, transfer to such projects is
unconstitutional and is without legal basis.
On the issue of what are “savings”
These DAP transfers are not “savings” contrary to what was being declared
by the Executive. Under the definition of “savings” in the GAA, savings only
occur, among other instances, when there is an excess in the funding of a
certain project once it is completed, finally discontinued, or finally
abandoned. The GAA does not refer to “savings” as funds withdrawn from a
slow moving project. Thus, since the statutory definition of savings was not
complied with under the DAP, there is no basis at all for the transfers.
Further, savings should only be declared at the end of the fiscal year. But
under the DAP, funds are already being withdrawn from certain projects in
the middle of the year and then being declared as “savings” by the Executive
particularly by the DBM.
IV. No. Unprogrammed funds from the GAA cannot be used as money
source for the DAP because under the law, such funds may only be used if
there is a certification from the National Treasurer to the effect that the
revenue collections have exceeded the revenue targets. In this case, no
such certification was secured before unprogrammed funds were used.
V. Yes. The Doctrine of Operative Fact, which recognizes the legal effects of
an act prior to it being declared as unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, is
applicable. The DAP has definitely helped stimulate the economy. It has
funded numerous projects. If the Executive is ordered to reverse all actions
under the DAP, then it may cause more harm than good. The DAP effects
can no longer be undone. The beneficiaries of the DAP cannot be asked to
return what they received especially so that they relied on the validity of the
DAP. However, the Doctrine of Operative Fact may not be applicable to the
authors, implementers, and proponents of the DAP if it is so found in the
appropriate tribunals (civil, criminal, or administrative) that they have not
acted in good faith.
3.) JOKER P. ARROYO, ET. AL. vs. JOSE DE VENECIA, ET. AL.
G.R. No. 127255 June 26, 1998
FACTS: A petition was filed challenging the validity of RA 8240, which
amends certain provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code.
Petitioners, who are members of the House of Representatives, charged
that there is violation of the rules of the House which petitioners claim are
constitutionally-mandated so that their violation is tantamount to a violation
of the Constitution.
The law originated in the House of Representatives. The Senate approved it
with certain amendments. A bicameral conference committee was formed to
reconcile the disagreeing provisions of the House and Senate versions of
the bill. The bicameral committee submitted its report to the House. During
the interpellations, Rep. Arroyo made an interruption and moved to adjourn
for lack of quorum. But after a roll call, the Chair declared the presence of a
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quorum. The interpellation then proceeded. After Rep. Arroyo’s
interpellation of the sponsor of the committee report, Majority Leader Albano
moved for the approval and ratification of the conference committee report.
The Chair called out for objections to the motion. Then the Chair declared:
“There being none, approved.” At the same time the Chair was saying this,
Rep. Arroyo was asking, “What is that…Mr. Speaker?” The Chair and Rep.
Arroyo were talking simultaneously. Thus, although Rep. Arroyo
subsequently objected to the Majority Leader’s motion, the approval of the
conference committee report had by then already been declared by the
Chair.
On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of
Representatives and the President of the Senate and certified by the
respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress. The enrolled bill was
signed into law by President Ramos.
ISSUE:
Whether R.A. No. 8240 is null and void because it was passed in violation of
the rules of the House;
Whether the certification of Speaker De Venecia that the law was properly
passed is false and spurious;
Whether the Chair, in the process of submitting and certifying the law
violated House Rules; and
Whether a certiorari/prohibition will be granted.
HELD: That after considering the arguments of the parties, the Court finds
no ground for holding that Congress committed a grave abuse of discretion
in enacting R.A. No. 8240 This case is therefore dismissed.
RATIO: To disregard the "enrolled bill" rule in such cases would be to
disregard the respect due the other two departments of our government. It
would be an unwarranted invasion of the prerogative of a coequal
department for this Court either to set aside a legislative action as void
because the Court thinks the House has disregarded its own rules of
procedure, or to allow those defeated in the political arena to seek a
rematch in the judicial forum when petitioners can find their remedy in that
department itself.
The Court has not been invested with a roving commission to inquire into
complaints, real or imagined, of legislative skullduggery. It would be acting
in excess of its power and would itself be guilty of grave abuse of its
discretion were it to do so. The suggestion made in a case may instead
appropriately be made here: petitioners can seek the enactment of a new
law or the repeal or amendment of R.A. No. 8240. In the absence of
anything to the contrary, the Court must assume that Congress or any
House thereof acted in the good faith belief that its conduct was permitted
by its rules, and deference rather than disrespect is due the judgment of that
body.
In view of what is essential:
Merely internal rules of procedure of the House rather than constitutional
requirements for the enactment of a law, i.e., Art. VI, 26-27 are VIOLATED.
First, in Osmeña v. Pendatun, it was held: "At any rate, courts have
declared that 'the rules adopted by deliberative bodies are subject to
revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting
them.' And it has been said that 'Parliamentary rules are merely procedural,
and with their observance, the courts have no concern. They may be
waived or disregarded by the legislative body.' Consequently, 'mere
failure to conform to parliamentary usage will not invalidate the action (taken
by a deliberative body) when the requisite number of members have agreed
to a particular measure.'"
Rules are hardly permanent in character. The prevailing view is that they
are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body
adopting them as they are primarily procedural. Courts ordinarily have no
concern with their observance. They may be waived or disregarded by the
legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to them does not
have the effect of nullifying the act taken if the requisite numbers of
members have agreed to a particular measure.
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In view of the Courts jurisdiction
This Court's function is merely to check whether or not the governmental
branch or agency has gone beyond the constitutional limits of its jurisdiction,
not that it erred or has a different view. In the absence of a showing . . . of
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, there is no
occasion for the Court to exercise its corrective power. . . . It has no power
to look into what it thinks is apparent error. If, then, the established rule is
that courts cannot declare an act of the legislature void on account merely
of noncompliance with rules of procedure made by itself, it follows that
such a case does not present a situation in which a branch of the
government has "gone beyond the constitutional limits of its
jurisdiction".
In view of House Rules:
No rule of the House of Representatives has been cited which specifically
requires that in cases such as this involving approval of a conference
committee report, the Chair must restate the motion and conduct a viva
voce or nominal voting.
Nor does the Constitution require that the yeas and the nays of the
Members be taken every time a House has to vote, except only in the
following instances: upon the last and third readings of a bill, at the
request of one-fifth of the Members present, and in re-passing a bill
over the veto of the President.
In view of grave abuse
Indeed, the phrase "grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction" has a settled meaning in the jurisprudence of procedure. It
means such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment by a tribunal
exercising judicial or quasi judicial power as to amount to lack of power.
In view of the enrolled bill doctrine
Under the enrolled bill doctrine, the signing of H. No. 7198 by the Speaker
of the House and the President of the Senate and the certification by the
secretaries of both Houses of Congress that it was passed on November
21, 1996 are conclusive of its due enactment.
This Court quoted from Wigmore on Evidence the following excerpt which
embodies good, if old-fashioned democratic theory: “Instead of trusting a
faithful Judiciary to check an inefficient Legislature, they should turn to
improve the Legislature. The sensible solution is not to patch and mend
casual errors by asking the Judiciary to violate legal principle and to do
impossibilities with the Constitution; but to represent ourselves with
competent, careful, and honest legislators, the work of whose hands on the
statute-roll may come to reflect credit upon the name of popular
government.”
(In view of justifiability according to PUNO, J)
With due respect, I do not agree that the issues posed by the petitioner
are non-justifiable. Nor do I agree that we will trivialize the principle of
separation of power if we assume jurisdiction over the case at bar. Even in
the United States, the principle of separation of power is no longer an
impregnable impediment against the interposition of judicial power on cases
involving breach of rules of procedure by legislators.
The Constitution empowers each house to determine its rules of
proceedings. It may not by its rules ignore constitutional restraints or violate
fundamental rights, and there should be a reasonable relation between the
mode or method of proceedings established by the rule and the result which
is sought to be attained. But within these limitations all matters of method
are open to the determination of the House, and it is no impeachment of the
rule to say that some other way would be better, more accurate, or even
more just.
4.) ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST vs. ERMITA
G.R. No. 168056 September 1, 2005
FACTS:
1.) They question the constitutionality of Sections 4, 5 and 6 of R.A.
No. 9337, amending Sections 106, 107 and 108, respectively, of
the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC).
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a.) Section 4 imposes a 10% VAT on sale of goods and
properties.
b.) Section 5 imposes a 10% VAT on importation of goods
c.) Section 6 imposes a 10% VAT on sale of services and use or
lease of properties
2.) These questioned provisions contain a uniform proviso authorizing
the President, upon recommendation of the Secretary of Finance,
to raise the VAT rate to 12%, effective January 1, 2006:
a.) Value-added tax collection as a percentage of Gross Domestic
Product (GDP) of the previous year exceeds two and four-fifth
percent (2 4/5%); or
b.) National government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the
previous year exceeds one and one-half percent (1 %)
3.) Petitioners argue that the law is unconstitutional, as it constitutes
abandonment by Congress of its exclusive authority to fix the rate
of taxes under Article VI, Section 28(2) of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution.
Article VI, Section 28(2): The Congress may, by
law, authorize the President to fix within
specified limits, and subject to such limitations
and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates,
import and export quotas, tonnage and
wharfage dues and other duties or imposts
within the framework of the national
development program of the Government.
ISSUES: One of the substantive issues is whether Sections 4, 5 and 6 of
R.A. No. 9337, amending Sections 106, 107 and 108 of the NIRC, violate
the following provisions of the Constitution specifically Article VI, Section
28(2) for ABAKADA Guro vs Ermita.
Petitioners contend:
1.) Delegating to the President the legislative power to tax is contrary
to republicanism.
2.) The law also effectively nullified the Presidents power of control,
which includes the authority to set aside and nullify the acts of her
subordinates like the Secretary of Finance, by mandating the fixing
of the tax rate by the President upon the recommendation of the
Secretary of Finance.
RULING: The principle of non-delegation of powers is instructive for the
following contentions. The principle of separation of powers ordains that
each of the three great branches of government has exclusive cognizance of
and is supreme in matters falling within its own constitutionally allocated
sphere.
A logical corollary to the doctrine of separation of powers is the principle of
non-delegation of powers, as expressed in the Latin maxim: potestas
delegata non delegari potest which means what has been delegated,
cannot be delegated. This doctrine is based on the ethical principle that
such as delegated power constitutes not only a right but a duty to be
performed by the delegate through the instrumentality of his own judgment
and not through the intervening mind of another.
With respect to the Legislature, Section 1 of Article VI of the Constitution
provides that the Legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the
Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives.
The powers which Congress is prohibited from delegating are those
which are strictly, or inherently and exclusively, legislative. Purely
legislative power, which can never be delegated, has been described as the
authority to make a complete law complete as to the time when it shall take
effect and as to whom it shall be applicable and to determine the expediency
of its enactment.
Delegation is only permissible on the following premises: If the law
(a) is complete in itself, setting forth therein the policy to be executed,
carried out, or implemented by the delegate;
(b) fixes a standard the limits of which are sufficiently determinate and
determinable to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his
functions. A sufficient standard is one which defines legislative policy, marks
its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it.
It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative command is to be
effected.
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In Wayman vs. Southard, the Supreme Court of the United States ruled that
the legislature may delegate a power not legislative which it may itself
rightfully exercise. The power to ascertain facts is such a power which may
be delegated. There is nothing essentially legislative in ascertaining the
existence of facts or conditions as the basis of the taking into effect of
a law.
Clearly, the legislature may delegate to executive officers or bodies the
power to determine certain facts or conditions, or the happening of
contingencies, on which the operation of a statute is, by its terms, made to
depend, but the legislature must prescribe sufficient standards, policies or
limitations on their authority. While the power to tax cannot be delegated to
executive agencies, details as to the enforcement and administration of an
exercise of such power may be left to them, including the power to
determine the existence of facts on which its operation depends.
The rationale for this is that the preliminary ascertainment of facts as basis
for the enactment of legislation is not of itself a legislative function, but is
simply ancillary to legislation. Thus, the duty of correlating information and
making recommendations is the kind of subsidiary activity which the
legislature may perform through its members, or which it may delegate to
others to perform.
The case before the Court is not a delegation of legislative power. It is
simply a delegation of ascertainment of facts upon which enforcement and
administration of the increase rate under the law is contingent. The
legislature has made the operation of the 12% rate effective January 1,
2006, contingent upon a specified fact or condition. It leaves the entire
operation or non-operation of the 12% rate upon factual matters outside of
the control of the executive.
The Court finds no merit to the contention of petitioners ABAKADA GURO
Party List, et al. that the law effectively nullified the Presidents power of
control over the Secretary of Finance by mandating the fixing of the tax rate
by the President upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Finance.
WHEREFORE, Republic Act No. 9337 not being unconstitutional, the
petitions in G.R. Nos. 168056, 168207, 168461, 168463, and 168730, are
hereby DISMISSED.
5.) BENJAMIN E. CAWALING, JR. VS. THE COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, AND REP. FRANCIS JOSEPH G. ESCUDERO
[G.R. No. 146319. October 26, 2001]
FACTS: This involves two separate petitions challenging the constitutionality
of Republic Act No. 8806 which created the City of Sorsogon and the validity
of the plebiscite conducted pursuant thereto.
On August 16, 2000, President Joseph E. Estrada signed into law R.A. No.
8806, an Act Creating The City Of Sorsogon By Merging The Municipalities
Of Bacon And Sorsogon In The Province Of Sorsogon, And Appropriating
Funds Therefor. Pursuant to Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC), on December 16, 2000, conducted a
plebiscite in the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon and submitted the
matter for ratification.
Plebiscite City Board of Canvassers (PCBC) proclaimed the creation of the
City of Sorsogon as having been ratified and approved by the majority of the
votes cast in the plebiscite. Invoking his right as a resident and taxpayer,
Benjamin E. Cawaling, Jr. filed petition for certiorari (G.R. No. 146319)
seeking the annulment of the plebiscite on the following grounds:
A. The December 16, 2000 plebiscite was conducted beyond the
required 120-day period from the approval of R.A. 8806, in
violation of Section 54 thereof; and
B. Respondent COMELEC failed to observe the legal requirement
of twenty (20) day extensive information campaign in the
Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon before conducting the
plebiscite.
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On January 4, 2001, petitioner instituted another petition for prohibition (G.R.
No. 146342), seeking to enjoin the further implementation of R.A. No. 8806
for being unconstitutional, contending that:
1. The creation of Sorsogon City by merging two municipalities
violates Section 450(a) of the Local Government Code of
1991 (in relation to Section 10, Article X of the Constitution)
which requires that only a municipality or a cluster of
barangays may be converted into a component city; and
2. R.A. No. 8806 contains two (2) subjects, namely, the (a)
creation of the City of Sorsogon and the (b) abolition of the
Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon, thereby violating the
one subject-one bill rule prescribed by Section 26(1), Article
VI of the Constitution.
During the pendency of these cases, specifically during the May 14, 2001
elections, the newly-created Sorsogon City had the first election of its
officials; and has been regularly discharging its corporate and political
powers pursuant to its charter, R.A. No. 8806.
ISSUE: Is the creation of the City of Sorsorgon violates Section 10, Article X
of the Constitution
Section 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created,
divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in
accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and
subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the
political units directly affected. (Emphasis ours)
The criteria for the creation of a city is prescribed in Section 450 of the Local
Government Code of 1991 (the Code), thus:
Section 450. Requisites for Creation. (a) A municipality or a cluster of
barangays may be converted into a component city if it has an average
annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of at least Twenty
million (P20,000,000.00) for the last two (2) consecutive years based on
1991 constant prices, and if it has either of the following requisites:
(i) a contiguous territory of at least one hundred (100) square
kilometers, as certified by the Lands Management Bureau; or
(ii) a population of not less than one hundred fifty thousand
(150,000) inhabitants, as certified by the National Statistics
Office:
Provided, That, the creation thereof shall not reduce the land area,
population, and income of the original unit or units at the time of said
creation to less than the minimum requirements prescribed herein.
(b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created city shall be
properly identified by metes and bounds. The requirement on
land area shall not apply where the city proposed to be
created is composed of one (1) or more islands. The territory
need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands.
(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing
to the general fund, exclusive of specific funds, transfers, and
non-recurring income. (Emphasis ours)
RULING: No. The phrase A municipality or a cluster of barangays may
be converted into a component city is not a criterion but simply one of
the modes by which a city may be created. Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution, quoted earlier and which petitioner cited in support of his
posture, allows the merger of local government units to create a
province, city, municipality or barangay in accordance with the criteria
established by the Code. Thus, Section 8 of the Code distinctly provides:
Section 8. Division and Merger. Division and merger of existing local
government units shall comply with the same requirements herein
prescribed for their creation: Provided, however, That such division shall
not reduce the income, population, or land area of the local government unit
or units concerned to less than the minimum requirements prescribed in this
Code: Provided, further, That the income classification of the original local
government unit or units shall not fall below its current income classification
prior to such division.
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Section 26 (1). Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one
subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.
Contrary to petitioners assertion, there is only one subject embraced in the
title of the law, that is, the creation of the City of Sorsogon. The
abolition/cessation of the corporate existence of the Municipalities of Bacon
and Sorsogon due to their merger is not a subject separate and distinct from
the creation of Sorsogon City. Such abolition/cessation was but the logical,
natural and inevitable consequence of the merger. Otherwise put, it is the
necessary means by which the City of Sorsogon was created. Hence, the
title of the law, An Act Creating the City of Sorsogon by Merging the
Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon in the Province of Sorsogon, and
Appropriating Funds Therefor, cannot be said to exclude the incidental effect
of abolishing the two municipalities, nor can it be considered to have
deprived the public of fair information on this consequence.
It is well-settled that the one title-one subject rule does not require the
Congress to employ in the title of the enactment language of such precision
as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details
therein. The rule is sufficiently complied with if the title is comprehensive
enough as to include the general object which the statute seeks to
effect, and where, as here, the persons interested are informed of the
nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its
operation. Moreover, this Court has invariably adopted a liberal rather than
technical construction of the rule so as not to cripple or impede legislation.
For the validity of the plebiscite conducted by the COMELEC for the
ratification of the creation of Sorsogon City. The Act was approved on
August 16, 2000 by former President Joseph E. Estrada. Thus, petitioner
claims, the December 16, 2000 plebiscite was conducted one (1) day late
from the expiration of the 120-day period after the approval of the Act. This
120-day period having expired without a plebiscite being conducted, the Act
itself expired and could no longer be ratified and approved in the plebiscite
held on December 16, 2000.
The COMELEC is correct. In addition, Section 10 of the Code
provides:Section 10. Plebiscite Requirement. No creation, division,
merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of boundaries of local government
units shall take effect unless approved by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite called for the purpose in the political unit or units directly
affected. Such plebiscite shall be conducted by the Commission on
Elections within one hundred twenty (120) days from the date of the
effectivity of the law or ordinance affecting such action, unless said law or
ordinance fixes another date.
Petitions are dismissed.
6.) LIBAN vs. GORDON
G.R. No. 175352, July 15 2009
FACTS: In 1947, President Roxas signed R.A. 95, otherwise known as the
Philippine National Red Cross (“PNRC”) Charter. The Republic of the
Philippines, adhering to the Geneva Conventions, established the PNRC as
a voluntary organization for the purpose contemplated in the Geneva Red
Cross Convention.
The PNRC is a non-profit, donor-funded, voluntary, humanitarian
organization, whose mission is to bring timely, effective, and compassionate
humanitarian assistance for the most vulnerable without consideration of
nationality, race, religion, gender, social status, or political affiliation. The
PNRC provides 6 major services: Blood Services, Disaster Management,
Safety Services, Community Health and Nursing, Social Services and
Voluntary Service.
Liban et al. are officers of the Board of Directors of the Quezon City Red
Cross Chapter. In 2006, during Gordon’s incumbency as a member of the
Senate, he was elected Chairman of the PNRC Board of Governors.
Liban et al.’s position: In Camporedondo v. NLRC, it was held that the
PNRC is a GOCC. In accepting and holding the position of Chairman of the
PNRC Board of Governors, Gordon has automatically forfeited his seat in
the Senate. Incumbent national legislators lose their elective posts upon
their appointment to another government office.
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Gordon’s position:
(1) He has been working as a Red Cross volunteer for the past 40 years. He
was already Chairman of the PNRC Board of Governors when he was
elected Senator in May 2004, having been elected Chairman in 2003 and re-
elected in 2005.
(2) PNRC is not a GOCC
(3) The prohibition under Art. 6, §13 of the Constitution does not apply in the
present case since volunteer service to the PNRC is neither an office nor an
employment
ISSUE: Whether the office of the PNRC Chairman is a government office or
an office in a GOCC.
HELD: NO. PNRC is a private organization performing public functions.
The PNRC is a member of the National Society of the International Red
Cross and Red Crescent Movement (“Movement”). The Fundamental
Principles of the Movement provide a universal standard of reference for all
its members. The PNRC, as a member, has the duty to uphold the
Fundamental Principles and ideals of the Movement. In order to be
recognized as a National Society, the PNRC has to be autonomous. The
reason for this autonomy is fundamental.
To be accepted by warring belligerents as neutral workers during
international or internal armed conflicts, the PNRC volunteers must not be
seen as belonging to any side of the armed conflict. The PNRC cannot be
seen as a GOCC, and neither can the PNRC volunteers be identified as
government personnel or as instruments of government policy. Otherwise,
the insurgents or separatists will treat PNRC volunteers as enemies. Thus,
the PNRC must not only be, but must also be seen to be, autonomous,
neutral and independent.
The following are proof that the PNRC is not a GOCC:
(1) The PNRC does not have government assets and does not receive any
appropriation from Congress. The PNRC is financed primarily by private
contributions.
(2) The PNRC is not controlled by the government. Under its Charter, only 6
of the 30 members of the Board of Governors are appointed by the
President (of the 24 remaining, 18 are elected by the chapter delegates of
the PNRC and the other 6 are elected by the 24 members already chosen).
The PNRC Board of Governors elects the Chairman and all its other officers.
Gordon was elected, as all PNRC Chairmen are elected, by a private sector-
controlled PNRC Board
(3) The PNRC Chairman is neither appointed by the President nor by the
head of any department, agency, commission or board of the Executive,
Judicial or Legislative branches. Hence, the PNRC Chairman is not an
official or employee of the Philippine Government. Not being a government
official or employee, the PNRC Chairman, as such, does not hold a
government office or employment.
(4) The PNRC board’s decisions or actions are not reviewable by the
President. Neither can the President reverse or modify the decisions or
actions of the Chairman, it is the Board that can review, reverse or modify
the decisions or actions of the Chairman. This proves again that the office of
the Chairman is a private office, not a government office.
In the Camporedondo ruling, the test used was whether the corporation was
created by its own special charter for the exercise of a public function or by
incorporation under the general corporation law. Since the PNRC was
created under a special charter, the Court then ruled that it is a government
corporation. However, it failed to consider the definition of a GOCC in the
Administrative Code.
A GOCC must be owned by the government, and in the case of a stock
corporation, at least a majority of its capital stock must be owned by the
government. In the case of a non-stock corporation, by analogy at least a
majority of the members must be government officials holding such
membership by appointment or designation by the government. Under this
criterion, and as discussed earlier, the government does not own or control
PNRC.
Section 16, Article XII of the Constitution provides:
The Congress shall not, except by general law, provide for the formation,
organization, or regulation of private corporations. Government-owned or
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controlled corporations may be created or established by special charters in
the interest of the common good and subject to the test of economic viability.
Congress cannot enact a law creating a private corporation with a special
charter. Such legislation would be unconstitutional. Private corporations may
exist only under a general law. If the corporation is private, it must
necessarily exist under a general law. Under existing laws, the general law
is the Corporation Code, except that the Cooperative Code governs the
incorporation of cooperatives. The Constitution authorizes Congress to
create GOCCs through special charters. Since private corporations cannot
have special charters, it follows that Congress can create corporations with
special charters only if such corporations are government-owned or
controlled.
Thus, although the PNRC is created by a special charter, it cannot be
considered a GOCC in the absence of the essential elements of ownership
and control by the government. In creating the PNRC as a corporate entity,
Congress was in fact creating a private corporation. However, the
constitutional prohibition against the creation of private corporations by
special charters provides no exception even for non-profit or charitable
corporations. Consequently, the provisions of the PNRC Charter, insofar as
it creates a private corporation and grants it corporate powers is void for
being unconstitutional.
7.) LIBAN VS GORDON (2011)
FACTS: Petitioners Liban, et al., who were officers of the Board of Directors
of the Quezon City Red Cross Chapter, filed with the Supreme Court what
they styled as “Petition to Declare Richard J. Gordon as Having Forfeited
His Seat in the Senate” against respondent Gordon, who was elected
Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) Board of Governors
during his incumbency as Senator.
Petitioners alleged that by accepting the chairmanship of the PNRC Board of
Governors, respondent Gordon ceased to be a member of the Senate
pursuant to Sec. 13, Article VI of the Constitution, which provides that “[n]o
Senator . . . may hold any other office or employment in the Government, or
any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-
owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries, during his term
without forfeiting his seat.” Petitioners cited the case of Camporedondo vs.
NLRC, G.R. No. 129049, decided August 6, 1999, which held that the
PNRC is a GOCC, in supporting their argument that respondent Gordon
automatically forfeited his seat in the Senate when he accepted and held the
position of Chairman of the PNRC Board of Governors.
Formerly, in its Decision dated July 15, 2009, the Court, voting 7-5, held that
the office of the PNRC Chairman is NOT a government office or an office in
a GOCC for purposes of the prohibition in Sec. 13, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution. The PNRC Chairman is elected by the PNRC Board of
Governors; he is not appointed by the President or by any subordinate
government official. Moreover, the PNRC is NOT a GOCC because it is a
privately-owned, privately-funded, and privately-run charitable organization
and because it is controlled by a Board of Governors four-fifths of which are
private sector individuals. Therefore, respondent Gordon did not forfeit his
legislative seat when he was elected as PNRC Chairman during his
incumbency as Senator.
The Court however held further that the PNRC Charter, R.A. 95, as
amended by PD 1264 and 1643, is void insofar as it creates the PNRC as a
private corporation since Section 7, Article XIV of the 1935 Constitution
states that “[t]he Congress shall not, except by general law, provide for the
formation, organization, or regulation of private corporations, unless such
corporations are owned or controlled by the Government or any subdivision
or instrumentality thereof.” The Court thus directed the PNRC to incorporate
under the Corporation Code and register with the Securities and Exchange
Commission if it wants to be a private corporation. The fallo of the Decision
read:
WHEREFORE, we declare that the office of the Chairman of the Philippine
National Red Cross is not a government office or an office in a government-
owned or controlled corporation for purposes of the prohibition in Section 13,
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. We also declare that Sections 1, 2, 3,
4(a), 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13 of the Charter of the Philippine National
Red Cross, or Republic Act No. 95, as amended by Presidential Decree
Nos. 1264 and 1643, are VOID because they create the PNRC as a private
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corporation or grant it corporate powers.
Respondent Gordon filed a Motion for Clarification and/or for
Reconsideration of the Decision. The PNRC likewise moved to intervene
and filed its own Motion for Partial Reconsideration. They basically
questioned the second part of the Decision with regard to the
pronouncement on the nature of the PNRC and the constitutionality of
some provisions of the PNRC Charter.
ISSUE: Was it correct for the Court to have passed upon and decided on the
issue of the constitutionality of the PNRC charter? Corollarily: What is the
nature of the PNRC?
RULING: [The Court GRANTED reconsideration and MODIFIED the
dispositive portion of the Decision by deleting the second sentence thereof.]
NO, it was not correct for the Court to have decided on the
constitutional issue because it was not the very lis mota of the case.
The PNRC is sui generis in nature; it is neither strictly a GOCC nor a
private corporation.
The issue of constitutionality of R.A. No. 95 was not raised by the parties,
and was not among the issues defined in the body of the Decision; thus, it
was not the very lis mota of the case. We have reiterated the rule as to
when the Court will consider the issue of constitutionality in Alvarez v.
PICOP Resources, Inc., thus:
This Court will not touch the issue of unconstitutionality unless it is the
very lis mota. It is a well-established rule that a court should not pass upon a
constitutional question and decide a law to be unconstitutional or invalid,
unless such question is raised by the parties and that when it is raised, if the
record also presents some other ground upon which the court may [rest] its
judgment, that course will be adopted and the constitutional question will be
left for consideration until such question will be unavoidable.
[T]his Court should not have declared void certain sections of . . . the
PNRC Charter. Instead, the Court should have exercised judicial restraint
on this matter, especially since there was some other ground upon which the
Court could have based its judgment. Furthermore, the PNRC, the entity
most adversely affected by this declaration of unconstitutionality, which was
not even originally a party to this case, was being compelled, as a
consequence of the Decision, to suddenly reorganize and incorporate under
the Corporation Code, after more than sixty (60) years of existence in
this country.
Since its enactment, the PNRC Charter was amended several times,
particularly on June 11, 1953, August 16, 1971, December 15, 1977, and
October 1, 1979, by virtue of R.A. No. 855, R.A. No. 6373, P.D. No. 1264,
and P.D. No. 1643, respectively. The passage of several laws relating to the
PNRC’s corporate existence notwithstanding the effectivity of the
constitutional proscription on the creation of private corporations by law is a
recognition that the PNRC is not strictly in the nature of a private corporation
contemplated by the aforesaid constitutional ban.
A closer look at the nature of the PNRC would show that there is none like
it[,] not just in terms of structure, but also in terms of history, public service
and official status accorded to it by the State and
the international community. There is merit in PNRC’s contention that its
structure is sui generis. It is in recognition of this sui generis character of
the PNRC that R.A. No. 95 has remained valid and effective from the time of
its enactment in March 22, 1947 under the 1935 Constitution and during the
effectivity of the 1973 Constitution and the 1987 Constitution. The PNRC
Charter and its amendatory laws have not been questioned or challenged on
constitutional grounds, not even in this case before the Court now.
[T]his Court [must] recognize the country’s adherence to the Geneva
Convention and respect the unique status of the PNRC in consonance with
its treaty obligations. The Geneva Convention has the force and effect of
law. Under the Constitution, the Philippines adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of the land. This
constitutional provision must be reconciled and harmonized with Article XII,
Section 16 of the Constitution, instead of using the latter to negate the
former. By requiring the PNRC to organize under the Corporation Code just
like any other private corporation, the Decision of July 15, 2009 lost sight of
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the PNRC’s special status under international humanitarian law and as an
auxiliary of the State, designated to assist it in discharging its obligations
under the Geneva Conventions.
The PNRC, as a National Society of the International Red Cross and Red
Crescent Movement, can neither “be classified as an instrumentality of the
State, so as not to lose its character of neutrality” as well as its
independence, nor strictly as a private corporation since it is regulated by
international humanitarian law and is treated as an auxiliary of the State.
Although [the PNRC] is neither a subdivision, agency, or instrumentality of
the government, nor a GOCC or a subsidiary thereof . . . so much so that
respondent, under the Decision, was correctly allowed to hold his position as
Chairman thereof concurrently while he served as a Senator, such a
conclusion does not ipso facto imply that the PNRC is a “private
corporation” within the contemplation of the provision of the Constitution,
that must be organized under the Corporation Code. [T]he sui
generis character of PNRC requires us to approach controversies involving
the PNRC on a case-to-case basis.
In sum, the PNRC enjoys a special status as an important ally and auxiliary
of the government in the humanitarian field in accordance with its
commitments under international law. This Court cannot all of a sudden
refuse to recognize its existence, especially since the issue of the
constitutionality of the PNRC Charter was never raised by the parties. It
bears emphasizing that the PNRC has responded to almost all national
disasters since 1947, and is widely known to provide a substantial portion of
the country’s blood requirements. Its humanitarian work is
unparalleled. The Court should not shake its existence to the core in an
untimely and drastic manner that would not only have negative
consequences to those who depend on it in times of disaster and armed
hostilities but also have adverse effects on the image of the Philippines in
the international community. The sections of the PNRC Charter that were
declared void must therefore stay.
[Thus, R.A. No. 95 remains valid and constitutional in its entirety. The Court
MODIFIED the dispositive portion of the Decision by deleting the second
sentence, to now read as follows:
WHEREFORE, we declare that the office of the Chairman of the Philippine
National Red Cross is not a government office or an office in a government-
owned or controlled corporation for purposes of the prohibition in Section 13,
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.]
8.) SENATE vs. ERMITA
FACTS: Multiple scandals involving anomalous transactions about the North
Rail Project, the Garci tapes (wiretapping controversy), and the fertilizer
scam surfaced on 2005. These prompted the Senate to conduct a public
hearing to investigate the said anomalies particularly the alleged overpricing
in the North Rail Project. The investigating Senate committee issued
invitations to certain department heads and military officials to speak before
the committee as resource persons. Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita
submitted that he and some of the department heads cannot attend the said
hearing due to pressing matters that need immediate attention. AFP Chief of
Staff Senga likewise sent a similar letter. Senate President Franklin Drilon
denied the requests for they were sent belatedly and arrangements were
already made and scheduled. Subsequently, then President Gloria Arroyo
issued EO 464 which took effect immediately.
EO 464 prohibited Department heads, Senior officials of executive
departments who in the judgment of the department heads are covered by
the executive privilege; Generals and flag officers of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines and such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of
Staff are covered by the executive privilege; Philippine National Police
(PNP) officers with rank of chief superintendent or higher and such other
officers who in the judgment of the Chief of the PNP are covered by the
executive privilege; Senior national security officials who in the judgment of
the National Security Adviser are covered by the executive privilege; and
such other officers as may be determined by the President, from appearing
in such hearings conducted by Congress without first securing the
president’s approval.
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The department heads and the military officers who were invited by the
Senate committee then invoked EO 464 to exempt themselves. Despite EO
464, the scheduled hearing proceeded with only 2 military personnel
attending. For defying President Arroyo’s order barring military personnel
from testifying before legislative inquiries without her approval, Brig. Gen.
Gudani and Col. Balutan were relieved from their military posts and were
made to face court martial proceedings. EO 464’s constitutionality was
assailed for it is alleged that it infringes on the rights and duties of Congress
to conduct investigation in aid of legislation and conduct oversight functions
in the implementation of laws.
ISSUE: Whether EO 464 contravenes the power of inquiry vested in
Congress
HELD: (YES, in part) The Supreme Court discussed the two different
functions of the Legislature to determine the constitutionality of EO 464: The
power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation and the power to conduct
inquiry during question hour.
Question Hour: The power to conduct inquiry during question hours is
recognized in Article 6, Section 22 of the 1987 Constitution, which reads:
“The heads of departments may, upon their own initiative, with the consent
of the President, or upon the request of either House, as the rules of each
House shall provide, appear before and be heard by such House on any
matter pertaining to their departments. Written questions shall be submitted
to the President of the Senate or the Speaker of the House of
Representatives at least three days before their scheduled appearance.
Interpellations shall not be limited to written questions, but may cover
matters related thereto. When the security of the State or the public interest
so requires and the President so states in writing, the appearance shall be
conducted in executive session.”
The objective of conducting a question hour is to obtain information in
pursuit of Congress’ oversight function. When Congress merely seeks to be
informed on how department heads are implementing the statutes which it
had issued, the department heads’ appearance is merely requested.
The Supreme Court construed Section 1 of E.O. 464 as those in relation to
the appearance of department heads during question hour as it explicitly
referred to Section 22, Article 6 of the 1987 Constitution.
In aid of Legislation: The Legislature’s power to conduct inquiry in aid of
legislation is expressly recognized in Article 6, section21 of the 1987
Constitution, which reads:
“The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective
committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its
duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in, or
affected by, such inquiries shall be respected.”
The power of inquiry in aid of legislation is inherent in the power to legislate.
A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of
information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to
affect or change. And where the legislative body does not itself possess the
requisite information, recourse must be had to others who do possess it.
But even where the inquiry is in aid of legislation, there are still recognized
exemptions to the power of inquiry, which exemptions fall under the rubric of
“executive privilege”. This is the power of the government to withhold
information from the public, the courts, and the Congress. This is recognized
only to certain types of information of a sensitive character. When Congress
exercise its power of inquiry, the only way for department heads to exempt
themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. They are not exempt by
the mere fact that they are department heads. Only one official may be
exempted from this power -- the President.
Section 2 & 3 of E.O. 464 requires that all the public officials enumerated in
Section 2(b) should secure the consent of the President prior to appearing
before either house of Congress. The enumeration is broad. In view thereof,
whenever an official invokes E.O.464 to justify the failure to be present, such
invocation must be construed as a declaration to Congress that the
President, or a head of office authorized by the President, has determined
that the requested information is privileged.
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The letter sent by the Executive Secretary to Senator Drilon does not
explicitly invoke executive privilege or that the matter on which these officials
are being requested to be resource persons falls under the recognized
grounds of the privilege to justify their absence. Nor does it expressly state
that in view of the lack of consent from the President under E.O. 464, they
cannot attend the hearing. The letter assumes that the invited official
possesses information that is covered by the executive privilege. Certainly,
Congress has the right to know why the executive considers the requested
information privileged. It does not suffice to merely declare that the
President, or an authorized head of office, has determined that it is so.
The claim of privilege under Section 3 of E.O. 464 in relation to Section 2(b)
is thus invalid. It is not asserted. It is merely implied. Instead of providing
precise and certain reasons for the claim, it merely invokes E.O. 464,
coupled with an announcement that the President has not given her
consent.
When an official is being summoned by Congress on a matter which, in his
own judgment, might be covered by executive privilege, he must be afforded
reasonable time to inform the President or the Executive Secretary of the
possible need for invoking the privilege. This is necessary to provide the
President or the Executive Secretary with fair opportunity to consider
whether the matter indeed calls for a claim of executive privilege. If, after the
lapse of that reasonable time, neither the President nor the Executive
Secretary invokes the privilege, Congress is no longer bound to respect the
failure of the official to appear before Congress and may then opt to avail of
the necessary legal means to compel his appearance.
Wherefore, the petitions are partly granted. Sections 2(b) and 3 of E.O. 464
are declared void. Section 1(a) however is valid.
9.) ROMULO L. NERI vs. SENATE COMMITTEE ON
ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS AND
INVESTIGATIONS
FACTS: The Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC)
entered into a contract with Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment
(ZTE) for the supply of equipment and services for the National Broadband
Network (NBN) Project approximately P16 Billion Pesos. The Project was to
be financed by the People's Republic of China.. The investigation was
claimed to be relevant to the consideration of three (3) pending bills in the
Senate
Respondent Committees initiated the investigation by sending invitations to
certain personalities and cabinet officials involved in the NBN Project.
Petitioner was among those invited. However, he attended only the
September 26 hearing, claiming he was "out of town" during the other dates.
Businessman Jose de Venecia III testified that several high executive
officials and power brokers were using their influence to push the approval
of the NBN Project by the NEDA. It appeared that the Project was initially
approved as a Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) project but, the NEDA
acquiesced to convert it into a government-to-government project, to be
financed through a loan from the Chinese Government.
Petitioner testified before respondent Committees for eleven (11) hours. He
disclosed that then Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Chairman
Benjamin Abalos offered him P200 Million in exchange for his approval of
the NBN Project. He further narrated that he informed President Arroyo
about the bribery attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe.
However, when probed further on what they discussed about the NBN
Project, petitioner refused to answer, invoking "executive privilege". In
particular, he refused to answer the questions on (a) whether or not
President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project,6 (b) whether or not she
directed him to prioritize it,7 and (c) whether or not she directed him to
approve
Respondent Committees issued a Subpoena Ad Testificandum to petitioner,
requiring him to appear and testify
However, Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita requested respondent
Committees to dispense with petitioner's testimony on the ground of
executive privilege. Sec. Neri sought guidance on the possible invocation of
executive privilege on the following questions, to wit:
a) Whether the President followed up the (NBN) project?
b) Were you dictated to prioritize the ZTE?
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c) Whether the President said to go ahead and approve the project after
being told about the alleged bribe?
Following the ruling in Senate v. Ermita, the foregoing questions fall under
conversations and correspondence between the President and public
officials which are considered executive privilege
Maintaining the confidentiality of conversations of the President is necessary
in the exercise of her executive and policy decision making process. The
expectation of a President to the confidentiality of her conversations and
correspondences, like the value which we accord deference for the privacy
of all citizens, is the necessity for protection of the public interest in candid,
objective, and even blunt or harsh opinions in Presidential decision-making.
Disclosure of conversations of the President will have a chilling effect on the
President, and will hamper her in the effective discharge of her duties and
responsibilities, if she is not protected by the confidentiality of her
conversations.
The context in which executive privilege is being invoked is that the
information sought to be disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as
economic relations with the People's Republic of China. Given the
confidential nature in which these information were conveyed to the
President, he cannot provide the Committee any further details of these
conversations, without disclosing the very thing the privilege is designed to
protect.
This Office is constrained to invoke the settled doctrine of executive privilege
as refined in Senate v. Ermita, and has advised Secretary Neri accordingly.
Considering that Sec. Neri has been lengthily interrogated on the subject in
an unprecedented 11-hour hearing, wherein he has answered all questions
propounded to him except the foregoing questions involving executive
privilege, we therefore request that his testimony ZTE / NBN project be
dispensed with. Petitioner did not appear before respondent Committees,
the latter issued the show cause Letter requiring him to explain why he
should not be cited in contempt.
petitioner replied to respondent Committees, manifesting that it was not his
intention to ignore the Senate hearing and that he thought the only
remaining questions were those he claimed to be covered by executive
privilege Respondent Committees found petitioner's explanations
unsatisfactory citing him in contempt of respondent Committees and
ordering his arrest and detention at the Office of the Senate Sergeant-At-
Arms until such time that he would appear and give his testimony.
Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the above Order. He emphasized
his willingness to testify on new matters, however, respondent Committees
did not respond to his request for advance notice of questions. Petitioner
contends that respondent Committees' show cause Letter and contempt
Order were issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. He stresses that his conversations with President
Arroyo are "candid discussions meant to explore options in making policy
decisions." According to him, these discussions "dwelt on the impact of the
bribery scandal involving high government officials on the country's
diplomatic relations and economic and military affairs and the possible loss
of confidence of foreign investors and lenders in the Philippines."
He also emphasizes that his claim of executive privilege is upon the order of
the President and within the parameters laid down in Senate v. Ermita and
United States v. Reynolds.11 Lastly, he argues that he is precluded from
disclosing communications made Respondent Committees assert the
contrary. They argue that (1) petitioner's testimony is material and pertinent
in the investigation conducted in aid of legislation; (2) there is no valid
justification for petitioner to claim executive privilege; (3) there is no abuse of
their authority to order petitioner's arrest; and (4) petitioner has not come to
court with clean hands.
President Arroyo issued Memorandum Circular No. 151. She advised
executive officials and employees to follow and abide by the Constitution,
existing laws and jurisprudence, including, among others, the case of
Senate v. Ermita when they are invited to legislative inquiries in aid of
legislation
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ISSUE: Whether the communications elicited by the subject three (3)
questions covered by executive privilege?
HELD: We grant the petition.
At the outset, a glimpse at the landmark case of Senate v. Ermita18
becomes imperative. Senate draws in bold strokes the distinction between
the legislative and oversight powers of the Congress, as embodied under
Sections 21 and 22, respectively, of Article VI of the Constitution
Senate cautions that while the above provisions are closely related and
complementary to each other, they should not be considered as pertaining
to the same power of Congress. Section 21 relates to the power to conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation. Its aim is to elicit information that may be used
for legislation. On the other hand, Section 22 pertains to the power to
conduct a question hour, the objective of which is to obtain information in
pursuit of Congress' oversight function.19 Simply stated, while both powers
allow Congress or any of its committees to conduct inquiry, their objectives
are different.
The power of Congress to compel the appearance of executive officials
under section 21 and the lack of it under Section 22 find their basis in the
principle of separation of powers. While the executive branch is a co-equal
branch of the legislature, it cannot frustrate the power of Congress to
legislate by refusing to comply with its demands for information
The power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is broad.
This is based on the proposition that a legislative body cannot legislate
wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions
which the legislation is intended to affect or change. Inevitably, adjunct
thereto is the compulsory process to enforce it. But, the power, broad as it
is, has limitations. To be valid, it is imperative that it is done in accordance
with the Senate or House duly published rules of procedure and that the
rights of the persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries be respected.
The power extends even to executive officials and the only way for them to
be exempted is through a valid claim of executive privilege. This directs us
to the consideration of the question -- is there a recognized claim of
executive privilege despite the revocation of E.O. 464?
There is a Recognized Claim of Executive Privilege Despite the Revocation
of E.O. 464 Senate v. Ermita, have comprehensively discussed the concept
of executive privilege, we deem it imperative to explore it once more in view
of the clamor for this Court to clearly define the communications covered by
executive privilege.
In Senate v. Ermita, the concept of presidential communications privilege is
fully discussed. As may be gleaned from the above discussion, the claim of
executive privilege is highly recognized in cases where the subject of inquiry
relates to a power textually committed by the Constitution to the President,
such as the area of military and foreign relations. Under our Constitution, the
President is the repository of the commander-in-chief, appointing, pardoning,
and diplomatic powers. Consistent with the doctrine of separation of powers,
the information relating to these powers may enjoy greater confidentiality
than others.
Nixon, In Re Sealed Case and Judicial Watch, somehow provide the
elements of presidential communications privilege, to wit:
1) The protected communication must relate to a "quintessential and non-
delegable presidential power."
2) The communication must be authored or "solicited and received" by a
close advisor of the President or the President himself. The judicial test is
that an advisor must be in "operational proximity" with the President.
3) The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege
that may be overcome by a showing of adequate need, such that the
information sought "likely contains important evidence" and by the
unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating
authority
In the case at bar, Executive Secretary Ermita premised his claim of
executive privilege on the ground that the communications elicited by the
three (3) questions "fall under conversation and correspondence between
the President and public officials" necessary in "her executive and policy
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decision-making process" and, that "the information sought to be disclosed
might impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the People's
Republic of China." Simply put, the bases are presidential communications
privilege and executive privilege on matters relating to diplomacy or foreign
relations.
Using the above elements, we are convinced that, indeed, the
communications elicited by the three (3) questions are covered by the
presidential communications privilege. First, the communications relate to a
"quintessential and non-delegable power" of the President, i.e. the power to
enter into an executive agreement with other countries. This authority of the
President to enter into executive agreements without the concurrence of the
Legislature has traditionally been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence.45
Second, the communications are "received" by a close advisor of the
President. Under the "operational proximity" test, petitioner can be
considered a close advisor, being a member of President Arroyo's cabinet.
And third, there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would
justify the limitation of the privilege and of the unavailability of the
information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority
For the third element, United States v. Nixon held that a claim of executive
privilege is subject to balancing against other interest. In other words,
confidentiality in executive privilege is not absolutely protected by the
Constitution. Respondent Committees argue that a claim of executive
privilege does not guard against a possible disclosure of a crime or
wrongdoing.
In this regard, Senate v. Ermita stressed that the validity of the claim of
executive privilege depends not only on the ground invoked but, also, on the
procedural setting or the context in which the claim is made. Furthermore, in
Nixon, the President did not interpose any claim of need to protect military,
diplomatic or sensitive national security secrets. In the present case,
Executive Secretary Ermita categorically claims executive privilege on the
grounds of presidential communications privilege in relation to her executive
and policy decision-making process and diplomatic secrets.
But under Nixon v. Sirica, the showing required to overcome the
presumption favoring confidentiality turned, not on the nature of the
presidential conduct that the subpoenaed material might reveal, but, instead,
on the nature and appropriateness of the function in the performance of
which the material was sought, and the degree to which the material was
necessary to its fulfillment. Here also our task requires and our decision
implies no judgment whatever concerning possible presidential involvement
in culpable activity. On the contrary, we think the sufficiency of the
Committee's showing must depend solely on whether the subpoenaed
evidence is demonstrably critical to the responsible fulfillment of the
Committee's functions.
The sufficiency of the Committee's showing of need has come to depend,
therefore, entirely on whether the subpoenaed materials are critical to the
performance of its legislative functions.
Respondent Committees further contend that the grant of petitioner's claim
of executive privilege violates the constitutional provisions on the right of the
people to information on matters of public concern. We might have agreed
with such contention if petitioner did not appear before them at all. But
petitioner made himself available to them during the September 26 hearing,
where he was questioned for eleven (11) hours. Not only that, he expressly
manifested his willingness to answer more questions from the Senators, with
the exception only of those covered by his claim of executive privilege.
The right to public information, like any other right, is subject to limitation.
The distinction between such rights is laid down in Senate v. Ermita:
There are, it bears noting, clear distinctions between the right of Congress to
information which underlies the power of inquiry and the right of people to
information on matters of public concern. For one, the demand of a citizen
for the production of documents pursuant to his right to information does not
have the same obligatory force as a subpoena duces tecum issued by
Congress. Neither does the right to information grant a citizen the power to
exact testimony from government officials. These powers belong only to
Congress, not to an individual citizen.
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Thus, while Congress is composed of representatives elected by the people,
it does not follow, except in a highly qualified sense, that in every exercise of
its power of inquiry, the people are exercising their right to information.
Constitutional precepts particularly those pertaining to delicate interplay of
executive-legislative powers and privileges which is the subject of careful
review by numerous decided cases.
The Claim of Executive Privilege is Properly Invoked. The case of Senate v.
Ermita only requires that an allegation be made "whether the information
demanded involves military or diplomatic secrets, closed-door Cabinet
meetings, etc." The particular ground must only be specified. The
enumeration is not even intended to be comprehensive."58 The following
statement of grounds satisfies the requirement:
The context in which executive privilege is being invoked is that the
information sought to be disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as
economic relations with the People's Republic of China. Given the
confidential nature in which these information were conveyed to the
President, he cannot provide the Committee any further details of these
conversations, without disclosing the very thing the privilege is designed to
protect.
At any rate, as held further in Senate v. Ermita, the Congress must not
require the executive to state the reasons for the claim with such particularity
as to compel disclosure of the information which the privilege is meant to
protect. This is a matter of respect to a coordinate and co-equal department
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The subject Order dated
January 30, 2008, citing petitioner Romulo L. Neri in contempt of the Senate
Committees and directing his arrest and detention, is hereby nullified.
10.) QUARTO V. OMBUDSMAN
GR 169042, 5 October 2011
FACTS: Quarto is the Chief of the Central Equipment and Spare Parts
Division (CESPD), Bureau of Equipment (BOE), Department of Public Works
and Highways (DPWH), Port Area, Manila. As CESPD Chief, he is also the
Head of the Special Inspectorate Team (SIT) of the DPWH. The
respondents are members of the SIT.
On January 9, 2002, DPWH Secretary Simeon Datumanong created a
committee to investigate alleged anomalous transactions involving the
repairs and/or purchase of spare parts of DPWH service vehicles in
2001. On January 17, 2002, the committee designated the DPWH Internal
Audit Service (IAS) as its Technical Working Group to conduct the actual
investigation.
DPWH-IAS learned that the emergency repairs and/or purchase of spare
parts of DPWH service vehicles basically undergo the following
documentary process:
I. Determination of repairs and/or spare parts needed
a. The end-user requesting repair brings the service vehicle to the
Motorpool Section, CESPD for initial inspection and preparation of
Job Order; and
b. Based on the Job Order, the SIT conducts a pre-repair
inspection (to determine the necessity of repair and whether the
repair is emergency in nature) and prepares a Pre-Repair
Inspection Report, with a recommendation for its approval by the
CESPD Chief.
II. Preparation and Approval of Requisition for Supplies and/or Equipment
with accompanying documents (Job Order and Pre-Inspection Report)
a. The Procurement Section, Administrative Manpower
Management Service (AMMS) prepares the Requisition for
Supplies and Equipment (RSE), the Canvass Quotation of three
Suppliers, the Certificate of Emergency Purchase, and the
Certificate of Fair Wear and Tear;
b. The end-user signs the RSE with the recommending approval of
the concerned head of office; and
c. The AMMS Director approves the RSE.
III. Repair of Vehicles
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a. The end-user selects the repair shop/auto supply from
accredited establishments;
b. The selected repair shop/auto supply repairs the service vehicle
and issues the corresponding sales invoice and/or official receipt;
c. The end-user accepts the repair and executes a Certificate of
Acceptance;
d. The SIT conducts a post-repair inspection (to check if the vehicle
was repaired and whether the repair conformed to specifications)
and prepares a Post-Repair Inspection Report, with a
recommendation for its approval by the CESPD Chief. The
Motorpool and the end-user would prepare the Report of Waste
Materials also for the signature of the CESPD Chief; and
e. The Assets and Supply Management and Control Division
recommends payment of the expense/s incurred.
DPWH-IAS discovered that from March to December 2001, several
emergency repairs and/or purchase of spare parts of hundreds of
DPWH service vehicles, which were approved and paid by the
government, did not actually take place, resulting in government
losses of approximately P143 million for this ten-month period alone.
Atty. Irene D. Ofilada of the DPWH-IAS filed before the Office of the
Ombudsman a Complaint-Affidavit and a Supplemental Complaint-
Affidavit charging several high-ranking DPWH officials and employees
– including the petitioner, the respondents, and other private
individuals who purportedly benefited from the anomalous
transactions – with Plunder, Money Laundering, Malversation, and
violations of RA No. 3019 and the Administrative Code.
The Ombudsman filed with the Sandiganbayan several informations
charging a number of DPWH officials and employees with plunder, estafa
through falsification of official/commercial documents and violation of
Section 3(e), RA No. 3019. On the other hand, the Ombudsman granted the
respondents’ request for immunity in exchange for their testimonies and
cooperation in the prosecution of the cases filed.
The petitioner initially filed a certiorari petition with the
Sandiganbayan, questioning the Ombudsman’s grant of immunity in
the respondents’ favour.
SANDIGANBAYAN: DISMISSED.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the Ombudsman under RA No. 6770 (the Ombudsman
Act of 1989) expressly grants him the power to grant immunity from
prosecution to witnesses.
2. Nature of the power to grant immunity.
RULING: Yes.
Quarto’s contention: While conceding that the Ombudsman has the power
and the discretion to grant immunity to the respondents, the petitioner
asserts that this power must be exercised within the confines of Section 17,
Rule 119 of the Rules of Court which requires, inter alia, that the proposed
witness must not appear to be the "most guilty." By ignoring this provision
and extending immunity to the respondents whose false reports ultimately
led to the payment for supposed repairs, and who are, thus, the "real
culprits," the Ombudsman gravely abused his discretion – a fatal defect
correctible by certiorari.
1. Yes. It is within the context of the Court’s policy of non-interference
with the Ombudsman’s exercise of his investigatory and
prosecutory powers, the petitioner failed to establish that the grant
of immunity to the respondents was attended by grave abuse of
discretion.
The respondents’ exclusion in the informations is grounded on the
Ombudsman’s grant of immunity
Mandamus is the proper remedy to compel the performance of a ministerial
duty imposed by law upon the respondent. In matters involving the exercise
of judgment and discretion, mandamus may only be resorted to, to compel
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the respondent to take action; it cannot be used to direct the manner or the
particular way discretion is to be exercised.
In the exercise of his investigatory and prosecutorial powers, the
Ombudsman is generally no different from an ordinary prosecutor in
determining who must be charged. He also enjoys the same latitude of
discretion in determining what constitutes sufficient evidence to support a
finding of probable cause (that must be established for the filing of an
information in court) and the degree of participation of those involved or the
lack thereof. His findings and conclusions on these matters are not ordinarily
subject to review by the courts except when he gravely abuses his
discretion, i.e., when his action amounts to an evasion of a positive duty or a
virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or when he acts outside the
contemplation of law.
If, on the basis of the same evidence, the Ombudsman arbitrarily excludes
from an indictment some individuals while impleading all others, the remedy
of mandamus lies since he is duty-bound, as a rule, to include in the
information all persons who appear responsible for the offense involved.
RA 6770, Sec. 17. Immunities. – x x x.
Under such terms and conditions as it may determine, taking into account
the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court, the Ombudsman may
grant immunity from criminal prosecution to any person whose
testimony or whose possession and production of documents or other
evidence may be necessary to determine the truth in any hearing,
inquiry or proceeding being conducted by the Ombudsman or under
its authority, in the performance or in the furtherance of its
constitutional functions and statutory objectives. The immunity
granted under this and the immediately preceding paragraph shall not
exempt the witness from criminal prosecution for perjury or false
testimony nor shall he be exempt from demotion or removal from
office.
2. Nature of the power to grant immunity.
The power to grant immunity from prosecution is essentially a legislative
prerogative. The exclusive power of Congress to define crimes and their
nature and to provide for their punishment concomitantly carries the power
to immunize certain persons from prosecution to facilitate the attainment of
state interests, among them, the solution and prosecution of crimes with
high political, social and economic impact. In the exercise of this power,
Congress possesses broad discretion and can lay down the conditions and
the extent of the immunity to be granted.
The authority to choose the individual to whom immunity would be granted is
a constituent part of the process and is essentially an executive function. RA
No. 6770 fully recognizes this prosecutory prerogative by empowering the
Ombudsman to grant immunity, subject to "such terms and conditions" as he
may determine. The only textual limitation imposed by law on this authority
is the need to take "into account the pertinent provisions of the Rules of
Court," – i.e., Section 17, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court
11.) BAGABUYO vs. COMELEC
MOTION: Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus with a prayer for issuance of
TRO and writ of preliminary injunction
FACTS: On October 10, 2006, Cagayan de Oro's then Congressman
Constantino G. Jaraula filed and sponsored House Bill No. 5859: "An Act
Providing for the Apportionment of the Lone Legislative District of the City of
Cagayan De Oro."3 This law eventually became Republic Act (R.A.) No.
9371.4 It increased Cagayan de Oro's legislative district from one to two. For
the election of May 2007, Cagayan de Oro's voters would be classified as
belonging to either the first or the second district, depending on their place of
residence. The constituents of each district would elect their own
representative to Congress as well as eight members of the Sangguniang
Panglungsod.
On March 13, 2007, the COMELEC en Banc promulgated Resolution No.
78376 implementing R.A. No. 9371. Petitioner Rogelio Bagabuyo filed the
present petition against the COMELEC. In asking for the nullification of R.A.
No. 9371 and Resolution No. 7837 on constitutional grounds, the petitioner
argued that the COMELEC cannot implement R.A. No. 9371 without
providing for the rules, regulations and guidelines for the conduct of a
plebiscite which is indispensable for the division or conversion of a local
government unit. He prayed for the issuance of an order directing the
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respondents to cease and desist from implementing R.A. No. 9371 and
COMELEC Resolution No. 7837, and to revert instead to COMELEC
Resolution No. 7801 which provided for a single legislative district for
Cagayan de Oro.
Since the Court did not grant the petitioner's prayer for a temporary
restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction, the May 14 National and
Local Elections proceeded according to R.A. No. 9371 and Resolution No.
7837.
ISSUE: (a) Whether or not the law, of which pertains to the legislative
apportionment of a city, involve the division and conversion of a local
government unit, necessitating a plebiscite.
RULING: NO. Petition is DISMISSED.
The Court upheld respondent’s arguments saying that such law only
increased the representation of CDO in the House of Representatives and
Sangguniang Panglungsod. Creation, division, merger, abolition, and
alteration of boundaries under Art. X Sec. 10 requires the commencement of
a plebiscite, while legislative apportionment or reapportionment under Art.
VI, Sec.5 need not. There was also no change in CDO’s territory, population,
income and classification.
Legislative apportionment is defined by Black’s Law Dictionary as the
determination of the number of representatives which a State, county or
other subdivision may send to a legislative body. It is he allocation of seats
in a legislative body in proportion to the population; the drawing of voting
district lines so as to equalize population and voting power among the
districts. Reapportionment, on the other hand, is the realignment or change
in legislative districts brought about by changes in population and mandated
by the constitutional requirement of equality of representation. RA 9371
does not have the effect of dividing the City of Cagayan de Oro into two
political and corporate units and territories. Rather than divide the city either
territorially or as a corporate entity, the effect is merely to enhance voter
representation by giving each city voter more and greater say, both in
Congress and in the Sangguniang Panglunsod. The City, for its part, now
has twice the number of congressmen speaking for it and voting in the halls
of Congress. Since the total number of congressmen in the country has not
increased to the point of doubling its numbers, the presence of two
congressman (instead of one) from the same city cannot but be a
quantitative and proportional improvement in the representation of Cagayan
de Oro City in Congress
RATIO/DOCTRINE: Creation, division, merger, abolition, and alteration of
boundaries under Art. X Sec. 10 requires the commencement of a plebiscite,
while legislative apportionment or reapportionment under Art. VI, Sec.5 need
not. They are related but are different from each other. Both provisions
mentioned above are within the vested authority of the legislature. The
Legislature undertakes the apportionment and reapportionment of legislative
districts, and likewise acts on local government units by setting standards for
their creation, division, merger, abolition and alteration of boundaries and by
actually creating, dividing, merging, abolishing local government units and
altering their boundaries through legislation. Other than this, not much
commonality exists between the two provisions since they are inherently
different although they interface and relate with one another. In the case at
bar, no division of CDO city takes place or is mandated. CDO city politically
remains a single unit and its administration is not divided along territorial
line. Its territory remains completely whole and intact; there is only the
addition of another legislative district and the delineation of the city into two
districts for purposes of representation in the House of Representatives.
Thus, Art. X, Sec.10 of the Constitution does not come into play and no
plebiscite is necessary to validly apportion Cagayan de Oro into two districts
Nature and Areas of Application.
The legislative district that Article VI, Section 5 speaks of may, in a sense,
be called a political unit because it is the basis for the election of a member
of the House of Representatives and members of the local legislative body.
It is not, however, a political subdivision through which functions of
government are carried out. It can more appropriately be described as
a representative unit that may or may not encompass the whole of a city or a
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province, but unlike the latter, it is not a corporate unit. Not being a corporate
unit, a district does not act for and in behalf of the people comprising the
district; it merely delineates the areas occupied by the people who will
choose a representative in their national affairs. Unlike a province, which
has a governor; a city or a municipality, which has a mayor; and a barangay,
which has a punong barangay, a district does not have its own chief
executive. The role of the congressman that it elects is to ensure that the
voice of the people of the district is heard in Congress, not to oversee the
affairs of the legislative district. Not being a corporate unit also signifies that
it has no legal personality that must be created or dissolved and has no
capacity to act. Hence, there is no need for any plebiscite in the creation,
dissolution or any other similar action on a legislative district.
The local government units, on the other hand, are political
and corporate units. They are the territorial and political subdivisions of the
state.35 They possess legal personality on the authority of the Constitution
and by action of the Legislature. The Constitution defines them as entities
that Congress can, by law, create, divide, abolish, merge; or whose
boundaries can be altered based on standards again established by both the
Constitution and the Legislature.36 A local government unit's corporate
existence begins upon the election and qualification of its chief executive
and a majority of the members of its Sanggunian.
As a political subdivision, a local government unit is an "instrumentality of
the state in carrying out the functions of government."38 As a corporate entity
with a distinct and separate juridical personality from the State, it exercises
special functions for the sole benefit of its constituents. It acts as "an agency
of the community in the administration of local affairs"39 and the mediums
through which the people act in their corporate capacity on local
concerns.40 In light of these roles, the Constitution saw it fit to expressly
secure the consent of the people affected by the creation, division, merger,
abolition or alteration of boundaries of local government units through a
plebiscite.
These considerations clearly show the distinctions between a legislative
apportionment or reapportionment and the division of a local government
unit. Historically and by its intrinsic nature, a legislative apportionment does
not mean, and does not even imply, a division of a local government unit
where the apportionment takes place. Thus, the plebiscite requirement that
applies to the division of a province, city, municipality or barangay under the
Local Government Code should not apply to and be a requisite for the
validity of a legislative apportionment or reapportionment.
12.) ALDABA vs. COMELEC
GR NO. 188078 | 25 Jan. 2010
FACTS: Petitioners, taxpayers, registered voters and residents of Malolos
City, Bulacan filed this petition contending that RA 9591 is unconstitutional
for failing to meet the minimum population threshold of 250,000 for a city to
merit representation in Congress as provided under Sec. 5(3), Art. VI of the
1987 Constitution and Sec. 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987
Constitution.
On 1 May 2009, RA 9591 lapsed into law, amending Malolos City Charter,
by creating a separate legislative district for the city. At the time the
legislative bills for RA 9591 were filed in Congress in 2007, namely, House
Bill No. 3162 (later converted to House Bill No. 3693) and Senate Bill No.
1986, the population of Malolos City was 223,069.
House Bill No. 3693 cites the undated Certification of Regional Director
Alberto N. Miranda of Region III of the NSO as authority that the population
of the City of Malolos will be 254,030 by the year 2010. The Certification
states that the population of Malolos, Bulacan in connection with the
proposed creation of Malolos City as a lone congressional district of the
Province of Bulacan.
ISSUE: Whether RA 9591 is UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
HELD: YES. The 1987 Constitution requires that for a city to have a
legislative district, the city must have a population of at least 250,000. The
question here is whether the City of Malolos has a population of at least
250,000 for the purpose of creating a legislative district for the City of
Malolos in time for the 10 May 2010 elections.
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The Certification of Regional Director Miranda, which is based on
demographic projections, is without legal effect because Miranda has no
basis and no authority to issue the Certification. The Certification is also void
on its face because based on its own growth rate assumption, the population
of Malolos will be less than 250,000 in the year 2010 elections.
The 2007 Census places the population of Malolos at 223,069 as of 1 Aug
2007. Based on growth rate of 3.78%, the population of Malolos will grow to
only 248,365 as of 1 Aug 2010. Even if the growth rate is compounded
yearly, the population of Malolos of 223,069 as of 1 Aug 2007 will grow to
only 249,333 as of 1 Aug 2010.
All these conflict with what the Certification states that the population of
Malolos will be 254,030 by the year 2010.
A city that has attained a population of 250,000 is entitled to a legislative
district only in the immediately following election. In short, a city must
first attain the 250,000 population, and thereafter, in the immediately
following election, such city shall have a district representative. There
is no showing in the present case that the City of Malolos has attained or will
attain a population of 250,000, whether actual or projected, before the 10
May 2010 elections.
Compliance with constitutional standards on the creation of legislative
districts is important because the aim of legislative apportionment is to
equalize population and voting power among districts.
13.) SENATOR BENIGNO C. AQUINO III V. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 189793, April 7, 2010
Perez, J.
FACTS: This case comes before this Court by way of a Petition for Certiorari
and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. In this original action,
petitioners Senator Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III and Mayor Jesse
Robredo, as public officers, taxpayers and citizens, seek the nullification
as unconstitutional of Republic Act No. 9716, entitled "An Act
Reapportioning the Composition of the First (1st) and Second (2nd)
Legislative Districts in the Province of Camarines Sur and Thereby
Creating a New Legislative District From Such Reapportionment."
Petitioners consequently pray that the respondent Commission on Elections
be restrained from making any issuances and from taking any steps relative
to the implementation of Republic Act No. 9716.
 Republic Act No. 9176 created an additional legislative district for
the province of Camarines Sur by reconfiguring the existing first
and second legislative districts of the province. The said law
originated from House Bill No. 4264 and was signed into law by
President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo on 12 October 2009.
 To that effect, the first and second districts of Camarines Sur were
reconfigured in order to create an additional legislative district for
the province. Hence, the first district municipalities of Libmanan,
Minalabac, Pamplona, Pasacao, and San Fernando were
combined with the second district Municipalities of Milaor and
Gainza to form a new second legislative district.
 Petitioners claim that the reapportionment introduced by Republic
Act No. 9716 violates the constitutional standards that requires a
minimum population of two hundred fifty thousand ( 250,000) for
the creation of a legislative district. Thus, the proposed first district
will end up with a population of less than 250,000 or only 176,383.
ISSUE: Whether a population of 250,000 is an indispensable constitutional
requirement for the creation of a new legislative district in a province.
HELD: NO. The second sentence of Section 5 (3), Article VI of the
constitution states that: “ Each city with a population of at least two hundred
fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative.”
 As already mentioned, the petitioners rely on the second sentence
of Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, coupled with
what they perceive to be the intent of the framers of the
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Constitution to adopt a minimum population of 250,000 for each
legislative district.
 The provision draws a plain and clear distinction between the
entitlement of a city to a district on one hand, and the entitlement of
a province to a district on the other. For while a province is entitled
to at least a representative, with nothing mentioned about
population, a city must first meet a population minimum of 250,000
in order to be similarly entitled.
 The use by the subject provision of a comma to separate the
phrase "each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty
thousand" from the phrase "or each province" point to no other
conclusion than that the 250,000 minimum population is only
required for a city, but not for a province.
 Plainly read, Section 5(3) of the Constitution requires a 250,000
minimum population only for a city to be entitled to a
representative, but not so for a province.
 There is no specific provision in the Constitution that fixes a
250,000 minimum population that must compose a legislative
district.
 The Mariano case limited the application of the 250,000 minimum
population requirement for cities only to its initial legislative district.
In other words, while Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution
requires a city to have a minimum population of 250,000 to be
entitled to a representative, it does not have to increase its
population by another 250,000 to be entitled to an additional
district.
 There is no reason why the Mariano case, which involves the
creation of an additional district within a city, should not be applied
to additional districts in provinces. Indeed, if an additional
legislative district created within a city is not required to represent a
population of at least 250,000 in order to be valid, neither should
such be needed for an additional district in a province, considering
moreover that a province is entitled to an initial seat by the mere
fact of its creation and regardless of its population.
 Apropos for discussion is the provision of the Local Government
Code on the creation of a province which, by virtue of and upon
creation, is entitled to at least a legislative district. Thus, Section
461 of the Local Government Code states:
Requisites for Creation. – (a) A province may be created if it has an
average annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance,
of not less than Twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00) based on
1991 constant prices and either of the following requisites:
(i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand
(2,000) square kilometers, as certified by the Lands
Management Bureau; or
(ii) a population of not less than two hundred fifty
thousand (250,000) inhabitants as certified by the National
Statistics Office.
 Notably, the requirement of population is not an indispensable
requirement, but is merely an alternative addition to the
indispensable income requirement.
 Mariano, it would turn out, is but a reflection of the pertinent ideas
that ran through the deliberations on the words and meaning of
Section 5 of Article VI.
Translated in the terms of the present case:
 1. The Province of Camarines Sur, with an estimated population of
1,693,821 in 2007 is ─ based on the formula and constant number
of 250,000 used by the Constitutional Commission in nationally
apportioning legislative districts among provinces and cities ─
entitled to two (2) districts in addition to the four (4) that it was given
in the 1986 apportionment. Significantly, petitioner Aquino
concedes this point.40 In other words, Section 5 of Article VI as
clearly written allows and does not prohibit an additional district for
the Province of Camarines Sur, such as that provided for in
Republic Act No. 9786;
 2. Based on the pith and pitch of the exchanges on the Ordinance
on the protests and complaints against strict conformity with the
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population standard, and more importantly based on the final
districting in the Ordinance on considerations other than population,
the reapportionment or the recomposition of the first and second
legislative districts in the Province of Camarines Sur that resulted in
the creation of a new legislative district is valid even if the
population of the new district is 176,383 and not 250,000 as
insisted upon by the petitioners.
3. The factors mentioned during the deliberations on House Bill No.
4264, were:
(a) the dialects spoken in the grouped municipalities;
(b) the size of the original groupings compared to that of the
regrouped municipalities;
(c) the natural division separating the municipality subject of the
discussion from the reconfigured District One; and
(d) the balancing of the areas of the three districts resulting from
the redistricting of Districts One and Two.
 Each of such factors and in relation to the others considered
together, with the increased population of the erstwhile Districts
One and Two, point to the utter absence of abuse of discretion,
much less grave abuse of discretion, that would warrant the
invalidation of Republic Act No. 9716.
 The ruling is that population is not the only factor but is just
one of several other factors in the composition of the
additional district. Such settlement is in accord with both the text
of the Constitution and the spirit of the letter, so very clearly given
form in the Constitutional debates on the exact issue presented by
this petition.
14.) BANAT vs. COMELEC
FACTS: On 27 June 2002, BANAT filed a Petition to Proclaim the Full
Number of Party-List Representatives Provided by the Constitution,
docketed as NBC No. 07-041 (PL) before the NBC. BANAT filed its petition
because "the Chairman and the Members of the COMELEC have recently
been quoted in the national papers that the COMELEC is duty bound to and
shall implement the Veterans ruling, that is, would apply the Panganiban
formula in allocating party-list seats."
BANAT filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus assailing the ruling in
NBC Resolution No. 07-88. BANAT did not file a motion for reconsideration
of NBC Resolution No. 07-88.
On 9 July 2007, Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher asked the COMELEC,
acting as NBC, to reconsider its decision to use the Veterans formula as
stated in its NBC Resolution No. 07-60 because the Veterans formula is
violative of the Constitution and of Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A. No. 7941).
On the same day, the COMELEC denied reconsideration during the
proceedings of the NBC.
ISSUE:
WON Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 is unconstitutional.
WON The three-seat cap, as a limitation to the number of seat remains a
valid limitation.
HELD:
A.
We examine what R.A. No. 7941 prescribes to allocate seats for party-list
representatives. The first clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 states
that parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%)
of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat
each. This clause guarantees a seat to the two-percenters.
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The second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 provides that those
garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to
additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes. This is where
petitioners and intervenors problem with the formula in Veterans lies.
Veterans interprets the clause in proportion to their total number of votes to
be in proportion to the votes of the first party. This interpretation is contrary
to the express language of R.A. No. 7941.
We rule that, in computing the allocation of additional seats, the continued
operation of the two percent threshold for the distribution of the additional
seats as found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 is
unconstitutional. This Court finds that the two percent threshold makes it
mathematically impossible to achieve the maximum number of available
party list seats when the number of available party list seats exceeds 50.
The continued operation of the two percent threshold in the distribution of
the additional seats frustrates the attainment of the permissive ceiling that
20% of the members of the House of Representatives shall consist of party-
list representatives.
To illustrate: There are 55 available party-list seats. Suppose there are 50
million votes cast for the 100 participants in the party list elections. A party
that has two percent of the votes cast, or one million votes, gets a
guaranteed seat. Let us further assume that the first 50 parties all get one
million votes. Only 50 parties get a seat despite the availability of 55 seats.
Because of the operation of the two percent threshold, this situation will
repeat itself even if we increase the available party-list seats to 60 seats and
even if we increase the votes cast to 100 million. Thus, even if the maximum
number of parties get two percent of the votes for every party, it is always
impossible for the number of occupied party-list seats to exceed 50 seats as
long as the two percent threshold is present.
We therefore strike down the two percent threshold only in relation to
the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of
Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941. The two percent threshold presents an
unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Section 5(2), Article
VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of the broadest
possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the
House of Representatives.
In determining the allocation of seats for party-list representatives under
Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941, the following procedure shall be observed:
1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest
to the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the
elections.
2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent
(2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one
guaranteed seat each.
3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in
paragraph 1, shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total
number of votes until all the additional seats are allocated.
4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than
three (3) seats.
In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be
included because they have already been allocated, at one seat each, to
every two-percenter. Thus, the remaining available seats for allocation as
additional seats are the maximum seats reserved under the Party List
System less the guaranteed seats. Fractional seats are disregarded in the
absence of a provision in R.A. No. 7941 allowing for a rounding off of
fractional seats.
B.
Congress, in enacting R.A. No. 7941, put the three-seat cap to prevent any
party from dominating the party-list elections.
Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major political parties
from participating in the party-list system. On the contrary, the framers of the
Constitution clearly intended the major political parties to participate in party-
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list elections through their sectoral wings. In fact, the members of the
Constitutional Commission voted down, 19-22, any permanent sectoral
seats, and in the alternative the reservation of the party-list system to the
sectoral groups.[33] In defining a party that participates in party-list elections
as either a political party or a sectoral party, R.A. No. 7941 also clearly
intended that major political parties will participate in the party-list elections.
Excluding the major political parties in party-list elections is manifestly
against the Constitution, the intent of the Constitutional Commission, and
R.A. No. 7941. This Court cannot engage in socio-political engineering and
judicially legislate the exclusion of major political parties from the party-list
elections in patent violation of the Constitution and the law.
Read together, R.A. No. 7941 and the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission state that major political parties are allowed to establish, or
form coalitions with, sectoral organizations for electoral or political purposes.
The qualifications of party-list nominees are prescribed in Section 9 of R.A.
No. 7941:
Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. No person shall be nominated as
party-list representative unless he is a natural born citizen of the Philippines,
a registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period of not less than
one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the elections, able to read
and write, bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to
represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and
is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the election.
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25)
but not more than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election. Any
youth sectoral representative who attains the age of thirty (30) during his
term shall be allowed to continue until the expiration of his term.
Under Section 9 of R.A. No. 7941, it is not necessary that the party-list
organizations nominee wallow in poverty, destitution and infirmity[34] as
there is no financial status required in the law. It is enough that the nominee
of the sectoral party/organization/coalition belongs to the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors,[35] that is, if the nominee represents the
fisherfolk, he or she must be a fisherfolk, or if the nominee represents the
senior citizens, he or she must be a senior citizen.
Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 mandates the filling-up of the
entire 20% allocation of party-list representatives found in the Constitution.
The Constitution, in paragraph 1, Section 5 of Article VI, left the
determination of the number of the members of the House of
Representatives to Congress: The House of Representatives shall be
composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless
otherwise fixed by law, x x x. The 20% allocation of party-list representatives
is merely a ceiling; party-list representatives cannot be more than 20% of the
members of the House of Representatives. However, we cannot allow the
continued existence of a provision in the law which will systematically
prevent the constitutionally allocated 20% party-list representatives from
being filled. The three-seat cap, as a limitation to the number of seats that a
qualified party-list organization may occupy, remains a valid statutory device
that prevents any party from dominating the party-list elections.
15.) ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY vs. COMELEC
FACTS: Petitioner is a national organization which represents the lesbians,
gays, bisexuals, and trans-genders. It filed a petition for accreditation as a
party-list organization to public respondent. However, due to moral grounds,
the latter denied the said petition. To buttress their denial, COMELEC cited
certain biblical and quranic passages in their decision. It also stated that
since their ways are immoral and contrary to public policy, they are
considered nuissance. In fact, their acts are even punishable under the
Revised Penal Code in its Article 201.
A motion for reconsideration being denied, Petitioner filed this instant
Petition on Certiorari under Rule 65 of the ROC.
Ang Ladlad argued that the denial of accreditation, insofar as it justified the
exclusion by using religious dogma, violated the constitutional guarantees
against the establishment of religion. Petitioner also claimed that the
Assailed Resolutions contravened its constitutional rights to privacy,
freedom of speech and assembly, and equal protection of laws, as well as
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constituted violations of the Philippines’ international obligations against
discrimination based on sexual orientation.
In its Comment, the COMELEC reiterated that petitioner does not have a
concrete and genuine national political agenda to benefit the nation and that
the petition was validly dismissed on moral grounds. It also argued for the
first time that the LGBT sector is not among the sectors enumerated by the
Constitution and RA 7941, and that petitioner made untruthful statements in
its petition when it alleged its national existence contrary to actual
verification reports by COMELEC’s field personnel.
Issue:
WON Respondent violated the Non-establishment clause of the Constitution;
WON Respondent erred in denying Petitioners application on moral and
legal grounds.
Held: Respondent mistakenly opines that our ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani
stands for the proposition that only those sectors specifically enumerated in
the law or related to said sectors (labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth,
veterans, overseas workers, and professionals) may be registered under the
party-list system. As we explicitly ruled in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor
Party v. Commission on Elections, “the enumeration of marginalized and
under-represented sectors is not exclusive”. The crucial element is not
whether a sector is specifically enumerated, but whether a particular
organization complies with the requirements of the Constitution and RA
7941.
Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that “[n]o law shall be made
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof.” At bottom, what our non-establishment clause calls for is
“government neutrality in religious matters.” Clearly, “governmental reliance
on religious justification is inconsistent with this policy of neutrality.” We thus
find that it was grave violation of the non-establishment clause for the
COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang
Ladlad. Be it noted that government action must have a secular purpose.
Respondent has failed to explain what societal ills are sought to be
prevented, or why special protection is required for the youth. Neither has
the COMELEC condescended to justify its position that petitioner’s
admission into the party-list system would be so harmful as to irreparably
damage the moral fabric of society.
We also find the COMELEC’s reference to purported violations of our penal
and civil laws flimsy, at best; disingenuous, at worst. Article 694 of the Civil
Code defines a nuisance as “any act, omission, establishment, condition of
property, or anything else which shocks, defies, or disregards decency or
morality,” the remedies for which are a prosecution under the Revised Penal
Code or any local ordinance, a civil action, or abatement without judicial
proceedings. A violation of Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code, on the
other hand, requires proof beyond reasonable doubt to support a criminal
conviction. It hardly needs to be emphasized that mere allegation of violation
of laws is not proof, and a mere blanket invocation of public morals cannot
replace the institution of civil or criminal proceedings and a judicial
determination of liability or culpability.
As such, we hold that moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient
governmental interest to justify exclusion of homosexuals from participation
in the party-list system. The denial of Ang Ladlad’s registration on purely
moral grounds amounts more to a statement of dislike and disapproval of
homosexuals, rather than a tool to further any substantial public interest.
16.) ATONG PAGLAUM vs. COMELEC
This case partially abandoned the rulings in Ang Bagong Bayani vs
COMELEC and BANAT vs COMELEC.
FACTS: Atong Paglaum, Inc. and 51 other parties were disqualified by the
Commission on Elections in the May 2013 party-list elections for various
reasons but primarily for not being qualified as representatives for
marginalized or underrepresented sectors.
Atong Paglaum et al then filed a petition for certiorari against COMELEC
alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of COMELEC in disqualifying
them.
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ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion
in disqualifying the said party-lists.
HELD: No. The COMELEC merely followed the guidelines set in the cases
of Ang Bagong Bayani and BANAT. However, the Supreme Court remanded
the cases back to the COMELEC as the Supreme Court now provides for
new guidelines which abandoned some principles established in the two
aforestated cases. The new guidelines are as follows:
I. Parameters. In qualifying party-lists, the COMELEC must use the
following parameters:
1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system:
(1) national parties or organizations, (2) regional parties or
organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or organizations.
2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or
organizations do not need to organize along sectoral lines and do
not need to represent any “marginalized and underrepresented”
sector.
3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided
they register under the party-list system and do not field candidates
in legislative district elections. A political party, whether major or
not, that fields candidates in legislative district elections can
participate in party-list elections only through its sectoral wing that
can separately register under the party-list system. The sectoral
wing is by itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a
political party through a coalition.
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be “marginalized
and underrepresented” or lacking in “well-defined political
constituencies.” It is enough that their principal advocacy pertains
to the special interest and concerns of their sector. The sectors that
are “marginalized and underrepresented” include labor, peasant,
fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors that
lack “well-defined political constituencies” include professionals, the
elderly, women, and the youth.
5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations
that represent the “marginalized and underrepresented” must
belong to the “marginalized and underrepresented” sector they
represent. Similarly, a majority of the members of sectoral parties
or organizations that lack “well-defined political constituencies”
must belong to the sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral
parties or organizations that represent the “marginalized and
underrepresented,” or that represent those who lack “well-defined
political constituencies,” either must belong to their respective
sectors, or must have a track record of advocacy for their
respective sectors. The nominees of national and regional parties
or organizations must be bona-fide members of such parties or
organizations.
6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not
be disqualified if some of their nominees are disqualified, provided
that they have at least one nominee who remains qualified.
II. In the BANAT case, major political parties are disallowed, as has always
been the practice, from participating in the party-list elections. But, since
there’s really no constitutional prohibition nor a statutory prohibition, major
political parties can now participate in the party-list system provided that
they do so through their bona fide sectoral wing (see parameter 3
above).
Allowing major political parties to participate, albeit indirectly, in the party-
list elections will encourage them to work assiduously in extending their
constituencies to the “marginalized and underrepresented” and to those who
“lack well-defined political constituencies.”
Ultimately, the Supreme Court gave weight to the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission when they were drafting the party-list system
provision of the Constitution. The Commissioners deliberated that it was
their intention to include all parties into the party-list elections in order to
develop a political system which is pluralistic and multiparty. (In
the BANAT case, Justice Puno emphasized that the will of the people should
defeat the intent of the framers; and that the intent of the people, in ratifying
the 1987 Constitution, is that the party-list system should be reserved for the
marginalized sectors.)
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III. The Supreme Court also emphasized that the party-list system is NOT
RESERVED for the “marginalized and underrepresented” or for parties who
lack “well-defined political constituencies”. It is also for national or regional
parties. It is also for small ideology-based and cause-oriented parties who
lack “well-defined political constituencies”. The common denominator
however is that all of them cannot, they do not have the machinery – unlike
major political parties, to field or sponsor candidates in the legislative
districts but they can acquire the needed votes in a national election system
like the party-list system of elections.
If the party-list system is only reserved for marginalized representation, then
the system itself unduly excludes other cause-oriented groups from running
for a seat in the lower house.
As explained by the Supreme Court, party-list representation should not be
understood to include only labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous
cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, overseas workers, and other
sectors that by their nature are economically at the margins of society. It
should be noted that Section 5 of Republic Act 7941 includes, among others,
in its provision for sectoral representation groups of professionals, which are
not per se economically marginalized but are still qualified as “marginalized,
underrepresented, and do not have well-defined political constituencies” as
they are ideologically marginalized.
17.) COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS OF SENIOR CITIZENS IN THE
PHILIPPINES vs. COMELEC
FACTS: The present petitions were filed by the two rival factions within the
same party-list organization, the Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens
in the Phil., Inc. (SENIOR CITIZENS).
One group is headed by Godofredo V. Arquiza (Rep. Arquiza), the
organization’s incumbent representative in the House of Representatives.
This group shall be hereinafter referred to as the Arquiza Group. The other
group is led by Francisco G. Datol, Jr., the organization’s erstwhile third
nominee. This group shall be hereinafter referred to as the Datol Group.
On March 16, 2007, the COMELEC En Banc accredited SENIOR CITIZENS
as a party-list organization. SENIOR CITIZENS participated in the May 14,
2007 elections. However, the organization failed to get the required two
percent (2%) of the total votes cast. Thereafter, SENIOR CITIZENS was
granted leave to intervene in the case of BANAT v. COMELEC. In
accordance with the procedure set forth in BANAT for the allocation of
additional seats under the party-list system, SENIOR CITIZENS was
allocated one seat in Congress. Rep. Arquiza, then the organization’s first
nominee, served as a member of the House of Representatives.
Subsequently, SENIOR CITIZENS was allowed to participate in the May 10,
2010 elections. On May 5, 2010, the nominees of SENIOR CITIZENS
signed an agreement, entitled Irrevocable Covenant.
After the conduct of the May 10, 2010 elections, SENIOR CITIZENS ranked
second among all the party-list candidates and was allocated two seats in
the House of Representatives. The first seat was occupied by its first
nominee, Rep. Arquiza, while the second was given to its second nominee,
David L. Kho (Rep. Kho).
The split among the ranks of SENIOR CITIZENS came about not long after.
According to the Datol Group’s petition, the members of SENIOR CITIZENS
held a national convention on November 27, 2010 in order to address "the
unfulfilled commitment of Rep. Arquiza to his constituents." Further, a new
set of officers and members of the Board of Trustees of the organization
were allegedly elected during the said convention. SENIOR CITIZENS’ third
nominee, Francisco G. Datol, Jr., was supposedly elected as the
organization’s Chairman. Thereafter, on November 30, 2010, in an opposite
turn of events, Datol was expelled from SENIOR CITIZENS by the Board of
Trustees that were allied with Rep. Arquiza.
Thenceforth, the two factions of SENIOR CITIZENS had been engaged in a
bitter rivalry as both groups, with their own sets of officers, claimed
leadership of the organization.
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On December 14, 2011, Rep. Arquiza informed the office of COMELEC
Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. that the second nominee of SENIOR
CITIZENS, Rep. Kho, had tendered his resignation, which was to take effect
on December 31, 2011. The fourth nominee, Remedios D. Arquiza, was to
assume the vacant position in view of the previous expulsion from the
organization of the third nominee, Francisco G. Datol, Jr.
The letter of Rep. Arquiza was also accompanied by a petition in the name
of SENIOR CITIZENS. The petition prayed that the "confirmation and
approval of the replacement of Congressman David L. Kho, in the person of
the fourth nominee, Remedios D. Arquiza, due to the expulsion of the third
nominee, Francisco G. Datol, Jr., be issued immediately in order to pave the
way of her assumption into the office." But the same was dismissed.
Meanwhile, the Datol Group and the Arquiza Group filed their respective
Manifestations of Intent to Participate in the Party-list System of
Representation in the May 13, 2013 Elections under the name of SENIOR
CITIZENS.
On December 4, 2012, the COMELEC En Banc issued a Resolution
ordering the cancellation of the registration of SENIOR CITIZENS. The
resolution explained that:
It shall be recalled that on June 27, 2012, this Commission promulgated its
resolution in a petition that involved SENIOR CITIZENS titled "In Re: Petition
for Confirmation of Replacement of Resigned PartyList Nominee" and
docketed as EM No. 12-040. In the process of resolving the issues of said
case, this Commission found that SENIOR CITIZENS nominees specifically
nominees David L. Kho and Francisco G. Datol, Jr. have entered into a
term-sharing agreement.
Nominee David Kho’s term as party-list congressman is three (3) years
which starts on June 30, 2010 and to end on June 30, 2013 as directed no
less than by the Constitution of the Philippines. Section 7, Article VI of the
1987 Constitution states:
"Sec. 7. The Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for
a term of three years which shall begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at
noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election."
But following the term-sharing agreement entered into by SENIOR
CITIZENS, David Kho’s term starts on June 30, 2010 and ends on
December 31, 2011, the date of effectivity of Kho’s resignation. By virtue of
the term-sharing agreement, the term of Kho as member of the House of
Representatives is cut short to one year and six months which is merely half
of the three-year term. This is totally opposed to the prescription of the
Constitution on the term of a Member of the House of Representatives.
Hence, when confronted with this issue on term sharing done by SENIOR
CITIZENS, this Commission made a categorical pronouncement that such
term-sharing agreement must be rejected.
From the foregoing, SENIOR CITIZENS failed to comply with Section 7,
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Section 7, Rule 4 of Comelec
Resolution No. 9366. This failure is a ground for cancellation of
registration under Section 6 of Republic Act No. 7941.
ISSUE: WON THE CANCELLATION OF SENIOR CITIZEN’S
REGISTRATION IS PROPER DUE TO VIOLATION OF PROHIBITION ON
TERM-SHARING
The Datol Group argues that the public policy prohibiting term-sharing was
provided for under Section 7, Rule 4 of COMELEC Resolution No. 9366,
which was promulgated only on February 21, 2012. Hence, the resolution
should not be made to apply retroactively to the case of SENIOR CITIZENS
as nothing therein provides for its retroactive effect. When the term-sharing
agreement was executed in 2010, the same was not yet expressly
proscribed by any law or resolution.
Furthermore, the Datol Group points out that the mere execution of the
Irrevocable Covenant between the nominees of SENIOR CITIZENS for the
2010 elections should not have been a ground for the cancellation of the
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organization’s registration and accreditation because the nominees never
actually implemented the agreement.
In like manner, the Arquiza Group vehemently stresses that no term-sharing
actually transpired between the nominees of SENIOR CITIZENS. It
explained that whatever prior arrangements were made by the nominees on
the term-sharing agreement, the same did not materialize given that the
resignation of Rep. Kho was disapproved by the Board of Trustees and the
members of SENIOR CITIZENS.
Still, granting for the sake of argument that the term-sharing agreement was
actually implemented, the Arquiza Group points out that SENIOR CITIZENS
still cannot be held to have violated Section 7 of Resolution No. 9366. The
term-sharing agreement was entered into in 2010 or two years prior to the
promulgation of said resolution on February 21, 2012. Likewise, assuming
that the resolution can be applied retroactively, the Arquiza Group contends
that the same cannot affect SENIOR CITIZENS at it already earned a vested
right in 2010 as party-list organization.
Article 4 of the Civil Code states that "laws shall have no retroactive effect,
unless the contrary is provided." As held in Commissioner of Internal
Revenue v. Reyes,50 "the general rule is that statutes are prospective.
However, statutes that are remedial, or that do not create new or take away
vested rights, do not fall under the general rule against the retroactive
operation of statutes." We also reiterated in Lintag and Arrastia v. National
Power Corporation51 that:
It is a well-entrenched principle that statutes, including administrative rules
and regulations, operate prospectively unless the legislative intent to the
contrary is manifest by express terms or by necessary implication because
the retroactive application of a law usually divests rights that have already
become vested. This is based on the Latin maxim: Lex prospicit non respicit
(the law looks forward, not backward). (Citations omitted.)
RULING: True, COMELEC Resolution No. 9366 does not provide that it
shall have retroactive effect. Nonetheless, the Court cannot subscribe to the
argument of the Arquiza Group that SENIOR CITIZENS already earned a
vested right to its registration as a party-list organization.
Montesclaros v. Commission on Elections teaches that "a public office is not
a property right. As the Constitution expressly states, a ‘Public office is a
public trust.’ No one has a vested right to any public office, much less a
vested right to an expectancy of holding a public office." Under Section 2(5),
Article IX-C of the Constitution, the COMELEC is entrusted with the function
to "register, after sufficient publication, political parties, organizations, or
coalitions which, in addition to other requirements, must present their
platform or program of government." In fulfilling this function, the COMELEC
is duty-bound to review the grant of registration to parties, organizations, or
coalitions already registered in order to ensure the latter’s continuous
adherence to the requirements prescribed by law and the relevant rulings of
this Court relative to their qualifications and eligibility to participate in party-
list elections.
The Arquiza Group cannot, therefore, object to the retroactive application of
COMELEC Resolution No. 9366 on the ground of the impairment of
SENIOR CITIZENS’ vested right.
Be that as it may, even if COMELEC Resolution No. 9366 expressly
provided for its retroactive application, the Court finds that the COMELEC
En Banc indeed erred in cancelling the registration and accreditation of
SENIOR CITIZENS.
The reason for this is that the ground invoked by the COMELEC En Banc,
i.e., the term-sharing agreement among the nominees of SENIOR
CITIZENS, was not implemented. This fact was manifested by the Arquiza
Group even during the April 18, 2012 hearing conducted by the COMELEC
En Banc in E.M. No. 12-040 wherein the Arquiza Group manifested that it
was withdrawing its petition for confirmation and approval of Rep. Kho’s
replacement. Thereafter, in its Resolution dated June 27, 2012 in E.M. No.
12-040, the COMELEC En Banc itself refused to recognize the term-sharing
agreement and the tender of resignation of Rep. Kho. The COMELEC even
declared that no vacancy was created despite the execution of the said
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agreement. Subsequently, there was also no indication that the nominees of
SENIOR CITIZENS still tried to implement, much less succeeded in
implementing, the term-sharing agreement. Before this Court, the Arquiza
Group and the Datol Group insist on this fact of non-implementation of the
agreement. Thus, for all intents and purposes, Rep. Kho continued to hold
his seat and served his term as a member of the House of Representatives,
in accordance with COMELEC Resolution No. 9366 and the COMELEC En
Banc ruling in E.M. No. 12-040. Curiously, the COMELEC is silent on this
point.
Indubitably, if the term-sharing agreement was not actually implemented by
the parties thereto, it appears that SENIOR CITIZENS, as a party-list
organization, had been unfairly and arbitrarily penalized by the COMELEC
En Banc. Verily, how can there be disobedience on the part of SENIOR
CITIZENS when its nominees, in fact, desisted from carrying out their
agreement? Hence, there was no violation of an election law, rule, or
regulation to speak of. Clearly then, the disqualification of SENIOR
CITIZENS and the cancellation of its registration and accreditation have no
legal leg to stand on.
In sum, the due process violations committed in this case and the lack of a
legal ground to disqualify the SENIOR CITIZENS spell out a finding of grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
the COMELEC En Banc. We are, thus, left with no choice but to strike down
the assailed Omnibus Resolution dated May 10, 2013 in SPP No. 12-157
(PLM) and SPP No. 12-191 (PLM).
In light of the foregoing discussion, the Court finds no need to discuss the
other issues raised by the petitioners. In particular, the dispute between the
rival factions of SENIOR CITIZENS, not being an issue raised here, should
be threshed out in separate proceedings before the proper tribunal having
jurisdiction thereon.
Having established that the COMELEC En Banc erred in ordering the
disqualification of SENIOR CITIZENS and the cancellation of its registration
and accreditation, said organization is entitled to be proclaimed as one of
the winning party-list organizations in the recently concluded May 13, 2013
elections.
18.) ABANG LINGKOD vs. COMELEC
FACTS: ABANG LINGKOD is a sectoral organization that represents the
interests of peasant farmers and fisherfolks, and was registered under the
party-list system on December 22, 2009. It failed to obtain the number of
votes needed in the May 2010 elections for a seat in the House of
Representatives.
On August 16, 2012, ABANG LINGKOD, in compliance with the COMELEC
August 9, 2012 resolution, filed with the COMELEC pertinent documents to
prove its continuing compliance with the requirements under R.A. No. 7941.
In a Resolution dated November 7, 2012, the COMELEC En Banc cancelled
ABANG LINGKOD registration as a party-list group. It pointed out that
ABANG LINGKOD failed to establish its track record in uplifting the cause of
the marginalized and underrepresented; that it merely offered photographs
of some alleged activities it conducted after the May 2010 elections.
ABANG LINGKOD field a petitioner for certiorari alleging that the COMELEC
gravely abused its discretion in cancelling its registration under the party-list
system. The said petition was consolidated with the separate petitions filed
by 51 other party-list groups whose registration were cancelled or who were
denied registration under the party-list system. The said party-list groups,
including ABANG LINGKOD, were able to obtain status quo ante orders
from the court.
The Court remanded to the COMELEC the cases of previously registered
party-list groups, including that of ABANG LINGKOD, to determine whether
they are qualified under the party-list system pursuant to the new
parameters laid down by the Court and, in the affirmative, be allowed to
participate in the May 2013 party-list elections.
On May 10, 2013, the COMELEC issued the herein assailed Resolution,
which, inter alia, affirmed the cancellation of ABANG LINGKOD's registration
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under the party-list system. The COMELEC issued the Resolution dated
May 10, 2013 sans any summary evidentiary hearing, citing the proximity of
the May 13, 2013 elections as the reason therefor.
On May 12, 2013, ABANG LINGKOD sought a reconsideration of the
COMELEC's Resolution dated May 10, 2013. However, on May 15, 2013,
ABANG LINGKOD withdrew the motion for reconsideration it filed with the
COMELEC and, instead, instituted the instant petition with this Court,
alleging that there may not be enough time for the COMELEC to pass upon
the merits of its motion for reconsideration considering that the election
returns were already being canvassed and consolidated by the COMELEC.
ISSUE: Whether or not ABANG LINGKOD was denied due process?
HELD: ABANG LINGKOD was not denied of due process.
POLITICAL LAW: Administrative due process
The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or as
applied to administrative or quasi-judicial proceedings, an opportunity to
explain one's side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or
ruling complained of. A formal or trial type hearing is not at all times and in
all instances essential. The requirements are satisfied when the parties are
afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the
controversy at hand. What is frowned upon is the absolute lack of notice or
hearing.
In the instant case, while the petitioner laments that it was denied due
process, the Court finds that the COMELEC had afforded ABANG LINGKOD
sufficient opportunity to present evidence establishing its qualification as a
party-list group. It was notified through Resolution No. 9513 that its
registration was to be reviewed by the COMELEC. That ABANG LINGKOD
was able to file its Manifestation of Intent and other pertinent documents to
prove its continuing compliance with the requirements under R.A. No. 7941,
which the COMELEC set for summary hearing on three separate dates,
belies its claim that it was denied due process.
There was no necessity for the COMELEC to conduct further summary
evidentiary hearing to assess the qualification of ABANG LINGKOD
pursuant to Atong Paglaum. ABANG LINGKOD's Manifestation of Intent and
all the evidence adduced by it to establish its qualification as a party-list
group are already in the possession of the COMELEC. Thus, conducting
further summary evidentiary hearing for the sole purpose of determining
ABANG LINGKOD's qualification under the party-list system pursuant to
Atong Paglaum would just be a superfluity.
Contrary to ABANG LINGKOD's claim, the Court, in Atong Paglaum, did not
categorically require the COMELEC to conduct a summary evidentiary
hearing for the purpose of determining the qualifications of the petitioners
therein pursuant to the new parameters for screening party-list groups.
POLITICAL LAW: Cancellation of party-list registration
Court finds that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in cancelling
the registration of ABANG LINGKOD under the party-list system. The
COMELEC affirmed the cancellation of ABANG LINGKOD's registration on
the ground that it declared untruthful statement in its bid for accreditation as
a party-list group in the May 2013 elections, pointing out that it deliberately
submitted digitally altered photographs of activities to make it appear that it
had a track record in representing the marginalized and underrepresented.
Essentially, ABANG LINGKOD's registration was cancelled on the ground
that it failed to adduce evidence showing its track record in representing the
marginalized and underrepresented.
R.A. No. 7941 did not require groups intending to register under the party-list
system to submit proof of their track record as a group. The track record
requirement was only imposed in Ang Bagong Bayani where the Court held
that national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations seeking
registration under the party-list system must prove through their, inter alia,
track record that they truly represent the marginalized and
underrepresented.
In Atong Paglaum, the Court has modified to a great extent the
jurisprudential doctrines on who may register under the party-list system and
the representation of the marginalized and underrepresented. For purposes
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of registration under the party-list system, national or regional parties or
organizations need not represent any marginalized and underrepresented
sector; that representation of the marginalized and underrepresented is only
required of sectoral organizations that represent the sectors stated under
Section 5 of R.A. No. 7941 that are, by their nature, economically
marginalized and underrepresented.
Contrary to the COMELEC's claim, sectoral parties or organizations, such as
ABANG LINGKOD, are no longer required to adduce evidence showing their
track record, i.e. proof of activities that they have undertaken to further the
cause of the sector they represent. Indeed, it is enough that their principal
advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector.
Otherwise stated, it is sufficient that the ideals represented by the sectoral
organizations are geared towards the cause of the sector/s, which they
represent.
Dissenting, Mr. Justice Leonen, however, maintains that parties or
organizations intending to register under the party-list system are still
required to present a track record notwithstanding the Court's
pronouncement in Atong Paglaum; that the track record that would have to
be presented would only differ as to the nature of their group/organization.
He opines that sectoral organizations must prove their links with the
marginalized and underrepresented while national or regional parties or
organizations must show that they have been existing as a bona fide
organization.
19.) PIMENTEL v SENATE COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE
FACTS: On 15 September 2008, Senator Panfilo Lacson (Senator Lacson)
delivered a privilege speech entitled "Kaban ng Bayan, Bantayan!"2 In his
privilege speech, Senator Lacson called attention to the congressional
insertion in the 2008 General Appropriations Act, particularly the P200
million appropriated for the construction of the President Carlos P. Garcia
Avenue Extension from Sucat Luzon Expressway to Sucat Road in
Parañaque City including Right-of-Way (ROW), and another P200 million
appropriated for the extension of C-5 road including ROW.
Senator Lacson stated that C-5 is what was formerly called President Carlos
P. Garcia Avenue and that the second appropriation covers the same stretch
– from Sucat Luzon Expressway to Sucat Road in Parañaque City. Senator
Lacson inquired from DBM Secretary Rolando Andaya, Jr. about the double
entry and was informed that it was on account of a congressional insertion.
Senator Lacson further stated that when he followed the narrow trail leading
to the double entry, it led to Senator Villar, then the Senate President.
On even date, P.S. Resolution 706 was referred to the Committee on Ethics
and Privileges (Ethics Committee. On 17 November 2008, Senator Juan
Ponce Enrile (Senator Enrile) was elected Senate President. The Ethics
Committee was reorganized with the election of Senator Lacson as
Chairperson, and Senators Richard Gordon, Gregorio Honasan, Loren
Legarda, and Mar Roxas as members for the Majority. On 16 December
2008, Senator Lacson inquired whether the Minority was ready to name their
representatives to the Ethics Committee.5 After consultation with the
members of the Minority, Senator Pimentel informed the body that there
would be no member from the Minority in the Ethics Committee.6 On 26
January 2009, Senator Lacson reiterated his appeal to the Minority to
nominate their representatives to the Ethics Committee.7 Senator Pimentel
stated that it is the stand of the Minority not to nominate any of their
members to the Ethics Committee, but he promised to convene a caucus to
determine if the Minority’s decision on the matter is final.8 Thereafter, the
Senate adopted the Rules of the Senate Committee on Ethics and Privileges
(Committee Rules) which was published in the Official Gazette on 23 March
2009.9
On 20 April 2009, Senator Villar delivered a privilege speech10 where he
stated that he would answer the accusations against him on the floor and
not before the Ethics Committee. On 27 April 2009, Senator Lacson
delivered another privilege speech11 where he stated that the Ethics
Committee was not a kangaroo court. However, due to the accusation that
the Ethics Committee could not act with fairness on Senator Villar’s case,
Senator Lacson moved that the responsibility of the Ethics Committee be
undertaken by the Senate, acting as a Committee of the Whole. The motion
was approved with ten members voting in favor, none against, and five
abstentions.
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Respondent Senate Committee of the Whole conducted its hearings on 4
May 2009, with eleven Senators present, and on 7 May 2009, with eight
Senators present. On both hearings, petitioners objected to the application
of the Rules of the Ethics Committee to the Senate Committee of the Whole.
In particular, petitioners questioned the determination of the quorum. On 11
May 2009, petitioners proposed 11 amendments to the Rules of the Ethics
Committee that would constitute the Rules of the Senate Committee of the
Whole, out of which three amendments were adopted. On 14 May 2009,
Senator Pimentel raised as an issue the need to publish the proposed
amended Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole. On even date,
respondent proceeded with the Preliminary Inquiry on P.S. Resolution 706.
On 18 May 2009, the Chairman submitted a report on the Preliminary Inquiry
with a directive to all Senators to come up with a decision on the preliminary
report on 21 May 2009. On 21 May 2009, respondent declared that there
was substantial evidence to proceed with the adjudicatory hearing. The
preliminary conference was set on 26 May 2009.
Petitioners came to this Court for relief, raising the following grounds:
1. The transfer of the complaint against Senator Villar from the Ethics
Committee to the Senate Committee of the Whole is violative of Senator
Villar’s constitutional right to equal protection;
2. The Rules adopted by the Senate Committee of the Whole for the
investigation of the complaint filed by Senator Madrigal against Senator
Villar is violative of Senator Villar’s right to due process and of the majority
quorum requirement under Art. VI, Sec. 16(2) of the Constitution; and
3. The Senate Committee of the Whole likewise violated the due process
clause of the Constitution when it refused to publish the Rules of the Senate
Committee of the Whole in spite of its own provision [which] require[s] its
effectivity upon publication.13
In its Comment, respondent argues that:
1. The instant petition should be dismissed for failure to join or implead an
indispensable party. In the alternative, the instant petition should be archived
until such time that the said indispensable party has been joined or
impleaded and afforded the opportunity to be heard;
2. There was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent
Committee;
3. Petitioners are not entitled to a writ of prohibition for failure to prove grave
abuse of discretion on the part of respondent Committee of the Whole;
4. The principle of separation of powers must be upheld;
5. The instant petition must be dismissed for being premature. Petitioners
failed to observe the doctrine or primary jurisdiction or prior resort;
6. It is within the power of Congress to discipline its members for disorderly
behavior;
7. The determination of what constitutes disorderly behavior is a political
question which exclusively pertains to Congress;
8. The Internal Rules of the Senate are not subject to judicial review in the
absence of grave abuse of discretion; [and]
9. The Rules of the Ethics Committee, which have been duly published and
adopted [,] allow the adoption of supplementary rules to govern adjudicatory
hearings.14
ISSUES: Whether the petition is premature for failure to observe the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction or prior resort; and Whether the transfer of
the complaint against Senator Villar from the Ethics Committee to the
Senate Committee of the Whole is violative of Senator Villar’s right to equal
protection;
RULING:
Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction
Respondent asserts that the doctrine of primary jurisdiction "simply calls for
the determination of administrative questions, which are ordinarily questions
of fact, by administrative agencies rather than by courts of justice."16 Citing
Pimentel v. HRET,17 respondent avers that primary recourse of petitioners
should have been to the Senate and that this Court must uphold the
separation of powers between the legislative and judicial branches of the
government.
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not apply to this case. The Court
has ruled:
x x x It may occur that the Court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of a
particular case, which means that the matter involved is also judicial in
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character. However, if the case is such that its determination requires the
expertise, specialized skills and knowledge of the proper administrative
bodies because technical matters or intricate questions of fact are involved,
then relief must first be obtained in an administrative proceeding before a
remedy will be supplied by the courts even though the matter is within the
proper jurisdiction of the court. x x x18
The issues presented here do not require the expertise, specialized skills
and knowledge of respondent for their resolution. On the contrary, the issues
here are purely legal questions which are within the competence and
jurisdiction of the Court, and not an administrative agency or the Senate to
resolve.19
As regards respondent’s invocation of separation of powers, the Court
reiterates that "the inviolate doctrine of separation of powers among the
legislative, executive or judicial branches of government by no means
prescribes for absolute autonomy in the discharge by each of that part of the
governmental power assigned to it by the sovereign people."20 Thus, it has
been held that "the power of judicial review is not so much power as it is [a]
duty imposed on this Court by the Constitution and that we would be remiss
in the performance of that duty if we decline to look behind the barriers set
by the principle of separation of powers."21 The Court, therefore, is not
precluded from resolving the legal issues raised by the mere invocation by
respondent of the doctrine of separation of powers. On the contrary, the
resolution of the legal issues falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of this
Court.
Transfer of the Complaint from the Ethics Committee to the Senate
Committee on the Whole
Petitioners allege that the transfer of the complaint against Senator Villar to
the Senate Committee of the Whole violates his constitutional right to equal
protection. Petitioners allege that the Senate Committee of the Whole was
constituted solely for the purpose of assuming jurisdiction over the complaint
against Senator Villar. Petitioners further allege that the act was
discriminatory and removed Senator Villar’s recourse against any adverse
report of the Ethics Committee to the Senate as a body.
We do not agree with petitioners.
The Court notes that upon the election of Senator Enrile as Senate
President on 17 November 2008, the Ethics Committee was also
reorganized. Senator Lacson, who first called the Senate’s attention to the
alleged irregularities committed by Senator Villar, was elected as
Chairperson. On 16 December 2008, when Senator Lacson inquired
whether the Minority was ready to name their representatives to the Ethics
Committee, Senator Pimentel informed the body that there would be no
member from the Minority in the Ethics Committee. On 26 January 2009,
Senator Lacson reiterated his appeal to the Minority to nominate their
representatives to the Ethics Committee. Senator Pimentel informed him
that it is the stand of the Minority not to nominate any of their members to
the Ethics Committee. Senator Pimentel promised to convene a caucus to
determine if the Minority’s decision on the matter is final but the records did
not show that a caucus was convened.
It was because of the accusation that the Ethics Committee could not act
with fairness on Senator Villar’s case that Senator Lacson moved that the
responsibility of the Ethics Committee be undertaken by the Senate acting
as a Committee of the Whole, which motion was approved with ten
members voting in favor, none against, and five abstentions.
The Rules of the Ethics Committee provide that "all matters relating to the
conduct, rights, privileges, safety, dignity, integrity and reputation of the
Senate and its Members shall be under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Senate Committee on Ethics and Privileges."22 However, in this case, the
refusal of the Minority to name its members to the Ethics Committee stalled
the investigation. In short, while ordinarily an investigation about one of its
members’ alleged irregular or unethical conduct is within the jurisdiction of
the Ethics Committee, the Minority effectively prevented it from pursuing the
investigation when they refused to nominate their members to the Ethics
Committee. Even Senator Villar called the Ethics Committee a kangaroo
court and declared that he would answer the accusations against him on the
floor and not before the Ethics Committee. Given the circumstances, the
referral of the investigation to the Committee of the Whole was an
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extraordinary remedy undertaken by the Ethics Committee and approved by
a majority of the members of the Senate.
Adoption of the Rules of the Ethics Committee by the Senate Committee of
the Whole
Petitioners allege that the adoption of the Rules of the Ethics Committee by
the Senate Committee of the Whole is violative of Senator Villar’s right to
due process.
We do not agree.
Again, we reiterate that, considering the circumstances of this case, the
referral of the investigation by the Ethics Committee to the Senate
Committee of the Whole is an extraordinary remedy that does not violate
Senator Villar’s right to due process. In the same manner, the adoption by
the Senate Committee of the Whole of the Rules of the Ethics Committee
does not violate Senator Villar’s right to due process.
The Constitutional right of the Senate to promulgate its own rules of
proceedings has been recognized and affirmed by this Court. Thus:
First. Section 16(3), Article VI of the Philippine Constitution states: "Each
House shall determine the rules of its proceedings."
This provision has been traditionally construed as a grant of full discretionary
authority to the House of Congress in the formulation, adoption and
promulgation of its own rules. As such, the exercise of this power is
generally exempt from judicial supervision and interference, except on a
clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use of the power as will
constitute a denial of due process.
x x x. The issue partakes of the nature of a political question which, under
the Constitution, is to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity,
or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
legislative or executive branch of the government. Further, pursuant to his
constitutional grant of virtually unrestricted authority to determine its own
rules, the Senate is at liberty to alter or modify these rules at any time it may
see fit, subject only to the imperatives of quorum, voting and publication.23
The only limitation to the power of Congress to promulgate its own rules is
the observance of quorum, voting, and publication when required. As long
as these requirements are complied with, the Court will not interfere with the
right of Congress to amend its own rules.
However, if the Senate is constituted as a Committee of the Whole, a
majority of the Senate is required to constitute a quorum to do business
pursuant to Section 16(2), Article VI of the Constitution.35 Otherwise, there
will be a circumvention of this express provision of the Constitution on
quorum requirement. Obviously, the Rules of the Senate Committee of the
Whole require modification to comply with requirements of quorum and
voting which the Senate must have overlooked in this case. In any event, in
case of conflict between the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole
and the Constitution, the latter will of course prevail.
20.) REYES vs. COMELEC
GR 207264
FACTS: Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction
resolution of the Commission on Election ordering the cancellation of the
Certificate of Candidacy of petitioner for the position of the Representative of
the lone district of Marinduque. On October 31. 2012, Joseph Socorro Tan
filed with the Comelec an Amended Petition to Deny Due Course or to
Cancel the Certificate of Candidacy of Regina Ongsiako Reyes ,the
petitioner, on the ground that it contained material representations. On
March 27,2013, the COMELEC cancelled the certificate of candidacy of the
petitioner. She filed an MR on April 8, 2013.On May 14, 2013, COMELEC en
banc denied her MR.
However, on May 18, 2013, she was proclaimed winner of the May 13, 2013
Elections. On June 5, 2013, COMELEC declared the May 14, 2013
Resolution final and Executory. On the same day, petitioner took her oath of
office before Feliciano Belmonte, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives. She has yet to assume office at that time, as her term
officially starts at noon of June 30, 2013.According to petitioner, the
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COMELEC was ousted of its jurisdiction when she was duly proclaimed
because pursuant to Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, the
HRET has the exclusive jurisdiction to be the “sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications” of the Members of the
House of Representatives.
ISSUE: Whether or not COMELEC has jurisdiction over the petitioner who is
proclaimed as winner and who has already taken her oath of office for the
position of member of the House of Representative of Marinduque.
HELD: Yes, COMELEC retains jurisdiction because the jurisdiction of the
HRET begins only after the candidate is considered a Member of the House
of Representatives, as stated in Section 17, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution.
For one to be considered a Member of the House of Representatives, there
must be a concurrence of these requisites;
(1) valid proclamation;
(2) proper oath, and
(3) assumption of office.
Thus the petitioner cannot be considered a member of the HR yet as she
has not assumed office yet. Also, the 2ndrequirement was not validly
complied with as a valid oath must be made (1) before the Speaker of the
House of Representatives, and (2) in open session. Here, although she
made the oath before Speaker Belmonte, there is no indication that it was
made during plenary or in open session and, thus, it remains unclear
whether the required oath of office was indeed complied.
Furthermore, petition for certiorari will prosper only if grave abuse of
discretion is alleged and proved to exist. For an act to be struck down as
having been done with grave abuse of discretion, the abuse of discretion
must be patent and gross.
21.) ATTY. ISIDRO Q. LICO, ET. AL. vs. THE COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS
The pivotal and interrelated issues before Us in this case involve the
seemingly elementary matter of the Commission on Elections' (COMELEC)
jurisdiction over the expulsion of a sitting party-list representative: from the
House of Representatives, on the one hand; and from his party-list
organization, on the other.
The instant case involves two rival factions of the same party-list
organization, the Adhikaing Tinataguyod ng Kooperatiba (Ating Koop). One
group is headed by petitioner Atty. Isidro Q. Lico (the Lico Group), who
represents the organization in the House of Representatives, and the other
group by Amparo T. Rimas (respondents herein, or the Rimas Group).
FACTS: Ating Koop is a multi-sectoral party-list organization which was
registered on 16 November 2009 under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7941, also
known as the Party-List System Act (Party-List Law).
On 30 November 2009, Ating Koop filed its Manifestation of Intent to
Participate in the Party-List System of Representation for the 10 May 2010
Elections. On 6 March 2010, it filed with the COMELEC the list of its
nominees, with petitioner Lico as first nominee and Roberto Mascarina as
second nominee.
On 8 December 2010, COMELEC proclaimed Ating Koop as one of the
winning party-list groups.
Ating Koop issued Central Committee Resolution 2010-01, which
incorporated a term-sharing agreement signed by its nominees. Under the
agreement, petitioner Lico was to serve as Party-list Representative for the
first year of the three-year term.
On 14 May 2011, Ating Koop held its Second National Convention, during
which it introduced amendments to its Constitution and By-laws. Among the
salient changes was the composition of the Central Committee, which
would still be composed of 15 representatives but with five each coming
from Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao (5-5-5 equal representation). The
amendments likewise mandated the holding of an election of Central
Committee members within six months after the Second National
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Convention.In effect, the amendments cut short the three-year term of the
incumbent members (referred to hereafter as the Interim Central
Committee) of the Central Committee. The Interim Central Committee was
dominated by members of the Rimas Group.
Almost one year after petitioner Lico had assumed office, the Interim
Central Committee expelled him from Ating Koop for disloyalty.14 Apart from
allegations of malversation and graft and corruption, the Committee cited
petitioner Lico's refusal to honor the term-sharing agreement as factual
basis for disloyalty and as cause for his expulsion under Ating Koop's
Amended Constitution and By-laws.
The Rimas Group, claiming to represent Ating Koop, filed with COMELEC a
Petition against petitioner Lico which was subsequently raffled to the
Second Division, prayed that petitioner Lico be ordered to vacate the office
of Ating Koop in the House of Representatives, and for the succession of
the second nominee, Roberto Mascarina as Ating Koop's representative in
the House.
The COMELEC Second Division upheld the expulsion of petitioner Lico
from Ating Koop and declared Mascarina as the duly qualified nominee of
the party-list group.
The Lico Group filed a Motion for Reconsideration from the Second
Division's Resolution, which the COMELEC En Banc denied
COMELEC En Banc held that it had no jurisdiction to expel Congressman
Lico from the House of Representatives, considering that his expulsion from
Ating Koop affected his qualifications as member of the House, and
therefore it was the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET)
that had jurisdiction over the Petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not COMELEC had a jurisdiction over the issue?
HELD: NO. Comelec had no jurisdiction over the issue. The court find that
while the COMELEC correctly dismissed the Petition to expel petitioner Lico
from the House of Representatives for being beyond its jurisdiction, it
nevertheless proceeded to rule upon the validity of his expulsion from Ating
Koop - a matter beyond its purview.
Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution34 endows the HRET with
jurisdiction to resolve questions on the qualifications of members of
Congress. In the case of party-list representatives, the HRET acquires
jurisdiction over a disqualification case upon proclamation of the winning
party-list group, oath of the nominee, and assumption of office as member
of the House of Representatives.35 In this case, the COMELEC proclaimed
Ating Koop as a winning party-list group; petitioner Lico took his oath; and
he assumed office in the House of Representatives. Thus, it is the HRET,
and not the COMELEC, that has jurisdiction over the disqualification case.
What we find to be without legal basis, however, is the action of the
COMELEC in upholding the validity of the expulsion of petitioner Lico from
Ating Koop, despite its own ruling that the HRET has jurisdiction over the
disqualification issue. These findings already touch upon the qualification
requiring a party-list nominee to be a bona fide member of the party-list
group sought to be represented.
The rules on intra-party matters and on the jurisdiction of the HRET are not
parallel concepts that do not intersect. Rather, the operation of the rule on
intra-party matters is circumscribed by Section 17 of Article VI of the 1987
Constitution and jurisprudence on the jurisdiction of electoral tribunals. The
jurisdiction of the HRET is exclusive. It is given full authority to hear and
decide the cases on any matter touching on the validity of the title of the
proclaimed winner.
The Court held that it was for the HRET to interpret the meaning of the
requirement of bona fide membership in a party-list organization. It
reasoned that under Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution, the HRET is
the sole judge of all contests when it comes to qualifications of the
members of the House of Representatives.
22.) VELASCO vs. BELMONTE
G.R. No. 211140 January 12, 2016
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FACTS:
Velasco principally alleges that he is the "legal and rightful winner during the
May 13, 2013 elections in accordance with final and executory resolutions of
the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) and [this] Honorable Court;" thus,
he seeks the following reliefs:
a. that a WRIT OF MANDAMUS against the HON. SPEAKER FELICIANO
BELMONTE, JR. be issued ordering said respondent to administer the
proper OATH in favor of petitioner Lord Allan Jay Q. Velasco for the position
of Representative for the Lone District of Marinduque; -and allow petitioner
to assume the position of representative for Marinduque and exercise the
powers and prerogatives of said position of Marinduque representative;
b. that a WRIT OF MANDAMUS against SECRETARY-GENERAL
[MARILYN] BARUA-YAP be issued ordering said respondent to REMOVE
the name of Regina 0. Reyes in the Roll of Members of the House of
Representatives and to REGISTER the name of petitioner Lord Allan Jay Q.
Velasco, herein petitioner, in her stead; and
c. that a TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER be issued to RESTRAIN,
PREVENT and PROHIBIT respondent REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES from
usurping the position of Member of the House of Representatives for the
Lone District of Marinduque and from further exercising the prerogatives of
said position and performing the duties pertaining thereto, and DIRECTING
her to IMMEDIATELY VACATE said position.
In her Comment, Reyes contends that the petition is actually one for quo
warranto and not mandamus given that it essentially seeks a declaration that
she usurped the subject office; and the installation of Velasco in her place by
Speaker Belmonte, Jr. when the latter administers his oath of office and
enters his name in the Roll of Members. She argues that, being a collateral
attack on a title to public office, the petition must be dismissed as enunciated
by the Court in several cases.28
As to the issues presented for resolution, Reyes questions the jurisdiction of
the Court over Quo Warranto cases involving Members of the House of
Representatives. She posits that "even if the Petition for Mandamus be
treated as one of Quo Warranto, it is still dismissible for lack of jurisdiction
and absence of a clear legal right on the part of [Velasco]. "29 She argues
that numerous jurisprudence have already ruled that it is the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal that has the sole and exclusive
jurisdiction over all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of Members of the House of Representatives. Moreover, she
insists that there is also an abundance of case law that categorically states
that the COMELEC is divested of jurisdiction upon her proclamation as the
winning candidate, as, in fact, the HRET had already assumed jurisdiction
over quo warranto cases30 filed against Reyes by several individuals.
Given the foregoing, Reyes concludes that this Court is "devoid of original
jurisdiction to annul [her] proclamation. "31 But she hastens to point out that
(i) "[e]ven granting for the sake of argument that the proclamation was
validly nullified, [Velasco] as second placer cannot be declared the winner x
x x" as he was not the choice of the people of the Province of Marinduque;
and (ii) Velasco is estopped from asserting the jurisdiction of this Court over
her (Reyes) election because he (Velasco) filed an Election Protest Ad
Cautelam in the HRET.
ISSUE:
The propriety of issuing a writ of mandamus to compel Speaker Belmonte,
Jr. and Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap to perform the specific acts sought by Velasco
in this petition.
RULING: The petition has merit.
After a painstaking evaluation of the allegations in this petition, it is readily
apparent that this special civil action is really one for mandamus and not a
quo warranto case, contrary to the asseverations of the respondents.
A petition for quo warranto is a proceeding to determine the right of a person
to the use or exercise of a franchise or office and to oust the holder from its
enjoyment, if his claim is not well-founded, or if he has forfeited his right to
enjoy the privilege. Where the action is filed by a private person, he must
prove that he is entitled to the controverted position; otherwise, respondent
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has a right to the undisturbed possession of the office. In this case, given the
present factual milieu, i.e., (i) the final and executory resolutions of this Court
in G.R. No. 207264; (ii) the final and executory resolutions of the COMELEC
in SPA No. 13-053 (DC) cancelling Reyes's Certificate of Candidacy; and
(iii) the final and executory resolution of the COMELEC in SPC No. 13-010
declaring null and void the proclamation of Reyes and proclaiming Velasco
as the winning candidate for the position of Representative for the Lone
District of the Province of Marinduque - it cannot be claimed that the present
petition is one for the determination of the right of Velasco to the claimed
office.
To be sure, what is prayed for herein is merely the enforcement of clear
legal duties and not to try disputed title. That the respondents make it
appear so will not convert this petition to one for quo warranto.
Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended, provides that any
person may file a verified petition for mandamus "when any tribunal,
corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of
an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office,
trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment
of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law." A petition for
mandamus will prosper if it is shown that the subject thereof is a ministerial
act or duty, and not purely discretionary on the part of the board, officer or
person, and that the petitioner has a well-defined, clear and certain right to
warrant the grant thereof.
The difference between a ministerial and discretionary act has long been
established. A purely ministerial act or duty is one which an officer or tribunal
performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to
the mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own
judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. If the law
imposes a duty upon a public officer and gives him the right to decide how or
when the duty shall be performed, such duty is discretionary and not
ministerial. The duty is ministerial only when the discharge of the same
requires neither the exercise of official discretion or judgment.
As the facts stand in this case, Speaker Belmonte, Jr. and Sec. Gen. Barua-
Y ap have no discretion whether or not to administer the oath of office to
Velasco and to register the latter's name in the Roll of Members of the
House of Representatives, respectively. It is beyond cavil that there is in
existence final and executory resolutions of this Court in G.R. No. 207264
affirming the final and executory resolutions of the COMELEC in SPA No.
13-053 (DC) cancelling Reyes's Certificate of Candidacy. There is likewise a
final and executory resolution of the COMELEC in SPC No. 13-010
declaring null and void the proclamation of Reyes, and proclaiming Velasco
as the winning candidate for the position of Representative for the Lone
District of the Province of Marinduque.
The foregoing state of affairs collectively lead this Court to consider the facts
as settled and beyond dispute - Velasco is the proclaimed winning candidate
for the Representative of the Lone District of the Province of Marinduque.
Reyes argues in essence that this Court is devoid of original jurisdiction to
annul her proclamation. Instead, it is the HRET that is constitutionally
mandated to resolve any questions regarding her election, the returns of
such election, and her qualifications as a Member of the House of
Representatives especially so that she has already been proclaimed, taken
her oath, and started to discharge her duties as a Member of the House of
Representatives representing the Lone District of the Province of
Marinduque. But the confluence of the three acts in this case - her
proclamation, oath and assumption of office - has not altered the legal
situation between Velasco and Reyes.
The important point of reference should be the date the COMELEC finally
decided to cancel the Certificate of Candidacy (COC) of Reyes which was
on May 14, 2013. The most crucial time is when Reyes's COC was
cancelled due to her non-eligibility to run as Representative of the Lone
District of the Province of Marinduque - for without a valid COC, Reyes could
not be treated as a candidate in the election and much less as a duly
proclaimed winner. That particular decision of the COMELEC was
promulgated even before Reyes' s proclamation, and which was affirmed by
this Court's final and executory Resolutions dated June 25, 2013 and
October 22, 2013.
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THIS COURT WILL NOT GIVE PREMIUM TO THE ILLEGAL ACTIONS OF
A SUBORDINATE ENTITY OF THE COMELEC, the PBOC who, despite
knowledge of the May 14, 2013 resolution of the COMELEC En Banc
cancelling Reyes' s COC, still proclaimed her as the winning candidate
on May 18, 2013. Note must also be made that as early as May 16, 2013,
a couple of days before she was proclaimed, Reyes had already
received the said decision cancelling her COC. These points clearly
show that the much argued proclamation was made in clear defiance
of the said COMELEC En Banc Resolution.
The present Petition for Mandamus seeks the issuance of a writ of
mandamus to compel respondents Speaker Belmonte, Jr. and Sec. Gen.
Barua-Yap to acknowledge and recognize the final and executory Decisions
and Resolution of this Court and of the COMELEC by administering the oath
of office to Velasco and entering the latter's name in the Roll of Members of
the House of Representatives. In other words, the Court is called upon to
determine whether or not the prayed for acts, i.e., (i) the administration of
the oath of office to Velasco; and (ii) the inclusion of his name in the Roll of
Members, are ministerial in character vis-a-vis the factual and legal milieu of
this case. As we have previously stated, the administration of oath and the
registration of Velasco in the Roll of Members of the House of
Representatives for the Lone District of the Province of Marinduque are no
longer a matter of discretion or judgment on the part of Speaker Belmonte,
Jr. and Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap. They are legally duty-bound to recognize
Velasco as the duly elected Member of the House of Representatives for the
Lone District of Marinduque in view of the ruling rendered by this Court and
the COMELEC'S compliance with the said ruling, now both final and
executory.
It will not be the first time that the Court will grant Mandamus to compel the
Speaker of the House of Representatives to administer the oath to the
rightful Representative of a legislative district and the Secretary-General to
enter said Representative's name in the Roll of Members of the House of
Representatives. In Codilla, Sr. v. De Venecia,46 the Court decreed:
Under Rule 65, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, any person
may file a verified petition for mandamus "when any tribunal, corporation,
board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which
the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station,
or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or
office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law." For a petition for
mandamus to prosper, it must be shown that the subject of the petition for
mandamus is a ministerial act or duty, and not purely discretionary on the
part of the board, officer or person, and that the petitioner has a well-
defined, clear and certain right to warrant the grant thereof.
The distinction between a ministerial and discretionary act is well delineated.
A purely ministerial act or duty is one which an officer or tribunal performs in
a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate
of a legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment
upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. If the law imposes a duty
upon a public officer and gives him the right to decide how or when the duty
shall be performed, such duty is discretionary and not ministerial. The duty is
ministerial only when the discharge of the same requires neither the
exercise of official discretion or judgment.
In the case at bar, the administration of oath and the registration of the
petitioner in the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives
representing the 4th legislative district of Leyte is no longer a matter of
discretion on the part of the public respondents. The facts are settled and
beyond dispute: petitioner garnered 71,350 votes as against respondent
Locsin who only got 53,447 votes in the May 14, 2001 elections. The
COMELEC Second Division initially ordered the proclamation of respondent
Locsin; on Motion for Reconsideration the COMELEC en banc set aside the
order of its Second Division and ordered the proclamation of the petitioner.
The Decision of the COMELEC en banc has not been challenged before this
Court by respondent Locsin and said Decision has become final and
executory.
It is well past the time for everyone concerned to accept what has been
adjudicated and take judicial notice of the fact that Reyes's ineligibility to run
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for and be elected to the subject position had already been long affirmed by
this Court. Any ruling deviating from such established ruling will be contrary
to the Rule of Law and should not be countenanced.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Mandamus is GRANTED.
23.) DARYL GRACE J. ABAYON vs. THE HONORABLE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL
FACTS: In G.R. 189466, petitioner Daryl Grace J. Abayon is the first
nominee of the Aangat Tayo party-list organization that won a seat in the
House of Representatives during the 2007 elections. Respondents filed a
petition for quo warranto with respondent HRET against petitioner Abayon.
They claimed that Aangat Tayo was not eligible for a party-list seat in the
House of Representatives, since it did not represent the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors since she did not belong to the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, she being the wife of an incumbent congressional
district representative.
It was Aangat Tayo that was taking a seat in the House of Representatives,
and not Abayon who was just its nominee. All questions involving her
eligibility as first nominee, said Abayon, were internal concerns of Aangat
Tayo.
In G.R.189506, petitioner Jovito S. Palparan, Jr. is the first nominee of the
Bantay party-list group that won a seat in the 2007 elections for the
members of the House of Representatives. Lesaca and the others alleged
that Palparan was ineligible to sit in the House of Representatives as party-
list nominee because he did not belong to the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors that Bantay represented, namely, the victims of
communist rebels, Civilian Armed Forces Geographical Units (CAFGUs),
former rebels, and security guards.
Petitioner Palparan countered that the HRET had no jurisdiction over his
person since it was actually the party-list Bantay, not he, that was elected to
and assumed membership in the House of Representatives. Palparan
claimed that he was just Bantay’s nominee. Consequently, any question
involving his eligibility as first nominee was an internal concern of Bantay.
Such question must be brought, he said, before that party-list group, not
before the HRET.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent HRET has jurisdiction over the question
of qualifications of petitioners Abayon and Palparan.
HELD: Although it is the party-list organization that is voted for in the
elections, it is not the organization that sits as and becomes a member of
the House of Representatives. Section 5, Article VI of the
Constitution,5 identifies who the “members” of that House are:
Sec. 5. (1). The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more
than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who
shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces,
cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of
their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive
ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a partylist
system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
(Underscoring supplied)
Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution9 provides that the HRET shall be
the sole judge of all contests relating to, among other things, the
qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives. Since, as
pointed out above, party-list nominees are “elected members” of the House
of Representatives no less than the district representatives are, the HRET
has jurisdiction to hear and pass upon their qualifications. By analogy with
the cases of district representatives, once the party or organization of the
party-list nominee has been proclaimed and the nominee has taken his oath
and assumed office as member of the House of Representatives, the
COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests relating to his qualifications
ends and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins.
The Court holds that respondent HRET did not gravely abuse its discretion
when it dismissed the petitions for quo warranto against Aangat Tayo party-
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list and Bantay party-list but upheld its jurisdiction over the question of the
qualifications of petitioners Abayon and Palparan.
24.) TY-DELGADO vs. HRET
FACTS: Pichay was convicted by final judgment for four counts of libel. On 9
October 2012, Pichay filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of
Member of the House of Representatives for the First Legislative District of
Surigao del Sur.
Petitioner Mary Elizabeth Ty-Delgado (Ty-Delgado) filed a petition for
disqualification under Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code against
Pichay before the Commission on Elections on the ground that Pichay was
convicted of libel, a crime involving moral turpitude. She argued that when
Pichay paid the fine on 17 February 2011, the five-year period barring him to
be a candidate had yet to lapse.
Pichay claimed that libel does not necessarily involve moral turpitude. He
contended that he did not personally perform the acts prohibited and his
conviction for libel was only because of his presumed responsibility as
president of the publishing company.
On 16 May 2013, the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Surigao del Sur
proclaimed Pichay as the duly elected Member of the House of
Representatives for the First Legislative District of Surigao del Sur. Ty-
Delgado filed an ad cautelam petition for quo warranto before the HRET
reiterating that Pichay is ineligible to serve as Member of the House of
Representatives because: (1) he was convicted by final judgment of four
counts of libel, a crime involving moral turpitude; and (2) only two years have
passed since he served his sentence or paid on 17 February 2011 the
penalty imposed on him.
HRET held that Pichay did not participated the writing of the libelous articles
but his conviction was in line with his duty as the president of the publishing
company. Based on the circumstances, the HRET concluded that Pichay’s
conviction for libel did not involve moral turpitude.
ISSUE: W/N the HRET gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction when it failed to disqualify Pichay for his conviction for
libel, a crime involving moral turpitude
RULING: YES. A sentence by final judgment for a crime involving moral
turpitude is a ground for disqualification under Section 12 of the Omnibus
Election Code:
Sec. 12. Disqualifications. — Any person who has been declared by
competent authority insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced by final
judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion or for any offense for which
he was sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months or for a crime
involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold
any office unless he has been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty
Moral turpitude is defined as everything which is done contrary to justice,
modesty, or good morals; an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the
private and social duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in
general.
In the present case, Pichay admits his conviction for four counts of libel. In
Tulfo v. People of the Philippines, the Court found Pichay liable for
publishing the four defamatory articles, which are libelous per se, with
reckless disregard of whether they were false or not. The fact that another
libelous article was published after the filing of the complaint can be
considered as further evidence of malice. Thus, Pichay clearly acted with
actual malice, and intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable harm. He
committed an “act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties
which he owes his fellow men, or society in general,” and an act which is
“contrary to justice, honesty, or good morals
The crime of libel would not even be consummated without his participation
as publisher of the libelous articles. One who furnishes the means for
carrying on the publication of a newspaper and entrusts its management to
servants or employees whom he selects and controls may be said to cause
to be published what actually appears, and should be held responsible
therefor, whether he was individually concerned in the publication or
not.
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Having been convicted of the crime of libel, Pichay is disqualified under
Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code for his conviction for a crime
involving moral turpitude.
Under Section 12, the disqualification shall be removed after the expiration
of a period of five years from his service of sentence. In Teves v.
Comelec, we held that the five-year period of disqualification would end only
on 25 May 2010 or five years from 24 May 2005, the day petitioner paid the
fine he was sentenced to pay in Teves v. Sandiganbayan. In this case, since
Pichay served his sentence when he paid the fine on 17 February 2011, the
five-year period shall end only on 16 February 2016. Thus, Pichay is
disqualified to become a Member of the House of Representatives until then.
Considering his ineligibility due to his disqualification under Section 12,
which became final on 1 June 2009, Pichay made a false material
representation as to his eligibility when he filed his certificate of candidacy
on 9 October 2012 for the 2013 elections. Pichay's disqualification under
Section 12 is a material fact involving the eligibility of a candidate under
Sections 74 and 78 of the Omnibus Election Code.
In the present case, Pichay misrepresented his eligibility in his certificate of
candidacy because he knew that he had been convicted by final judgment
for a crime involving moral turpitude. Thus, his representation that he was
eligible for elective public office constitutes false material representation as
to his qualification or eligibility for the office.
A person whose certificate of candidacy had been denied due course and/or
cancelled under Section 78 is deemed to have not been a candidate at all,
because his certificate of candidacy is considered void ab initio and thus,
cannot give rise to a valid candidacy and necessarily to valid votes. In
both Jalosjos, Jr. v. Commission on Elections and Aratea v. Commission on
Elections, we proclaimed the second placer, the only qualified candidate
who actually garnered the highest number of votes, for the position of
Mayor. We found that since the certificate of candidacy of the candidate with
the highest number of votes was void ab initio, he was never a candidate at
all, and all his votes were considered stray votes.
Accordingly, we find that the HRET committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of or excess of jurisdiction when it failed to disqualify
Pichay for his conviction for libel, a crime involving moral turpitude. Since
Pichay's ineligibility existed on the day he filed his certificate of candidacy
and he was never a valid candidate for the position of Member of the House
of Representatives, the votes cast for him were considered stray votes.
Thus, the qualified candidate for the position of Member of the House of
Representatives for the First Legislative District of Surigao del Sur in the 13
May 2013 elections who received the highest number of valid votes shall be
declared the winner. Based on the Provincial Canvass Report, the qualified
candidate for the position of Member of the House of Representatives for the
First Legislative District of Surigao del Sur in the 13 May 2013 elections who
received the highest number of valid votes is petitioner Mary Elizabeth Ty-
Delgado.
Fundamental is the rule that grave abuse of discretion arises when a lower
court or tribunal patently violates the Constitution, the law or existing
jurisprudence. While it is well-recognized that the HRET has been
empowered by the Constitution to be the "sole judge" of all contests relating
to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the House of
Representatives, the Court maintains jurisdiction over it to check "whether or
not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction" on the part of the latter. In other words, when the HRET utterly
disregards the law and settled precedents on the matter before it, it commits
grave abuse of discretion.37
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We REVERSE and SET ASIDE the
Decision dated 18 March 2015 and Resolution dated 3 August 2015 of the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal in HRET Case No. 13-022.
Respondent Philip A. Pichay is ineligible to hold and serve the office of
Member of the House of Representatives for the First Legislative District of
Surigao del Sur. Petitioner Mary Elizabeth Ty-Delgado is DECLARED the
winner for the position of Member of the House of Representatives for the
First Legislative District of Surigao del Sur in the 13 May 2013 elections.
Considering that the term of the present House of Representatives will end
on 30 June 2016, this Decision is immediately executory.
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25.) POBRE VS DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO
FACTS: Petitioner Antero Pobre made aware to the court the contents of
Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago’s speech delivered on the senate floor.
The following excerpts are the ones in question:
x x x I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I am homicidal.
I am suicidal. I am humiliated, debased, degraded. And I am not only that, I
feel like throwing up to be living my middle years in a country of this nature. I
am nauseated. I spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and
his cohorts in the Supreme Court. I am no longer interested in the position
[of Chief Justice] if I was to be surrounded by idiots. I would rather be in
another environment but not in the Supreme Court of idiots x x x
disciplinary action is well taken. Indeed, her privilege speech is not
actionable criminally or in a disciplinary proceeding under the Rules of
Court.
Despite this, the court feels that the lady senator has gone beyond the limits
of decency and good conduct for the statements made which were
intemperate and highly improper in substance. The court is not hesitant to
impose some form of disciplinary sanctions on her, but the factual and legal
circumstances of this case, however deter the Court from doing so, even
without any sign of remorse from her.
Petition is DISMISSED.

According to Pobre, the words of the lady senator were disrespectful and
requested that the latter be disbarred or be subjected to disciplinary action.

Respondent
Sen. Miriam Defensor-Santiago argued that the statements she made were
covered by the constitutional provision on parliamentary immunity, being
part of a speech she delivered in the discharge of her duty as a member of
Congress or its committee. She claims to have made those comments to
expose anomalies with regard to the selection process of the Judicial Bar
Council for the next Chief Justice.

The argument of the respondent is based on Article VI Section 11which

states that: “A Senator or Member of the House of Representative shall, in
all offenses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be
privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session. No member shall be
questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in
the Congress or in any committee thereof.”

ISSUE: Whether Miriam Defesor-Santiago can be charged for her

comments on the Judiciary

HELD: No. The court ruled in favor of Sen. Miriam in this case. The plea of
Senator Santiago for the dismissal of the complaint for disbarment or

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