REPORT ON BOILER TUBE FAILURES OF KOTHAGUDEM THERMAL POWER STATION (2X250

MW) STAGE V OF UNITS -IX & X

dt: 14.08.2014

During discussions held between CMD / BHEL and CMD / TS GENCO, TS GENCO
reported that repeated tube failures in certain sections of Units -9 & 10 of KTPS V
stage are occurring. BHEL promised to study and suggest remedial measures for the
same.

Accordingly self (JESURAM NESAMONEY, Senior Manager) visited KTPS V

stage on 13.08.2014 & 14.08.2014 and had detailed discussions with senior officers,
also carried out walk down inspection of both units 9 & 10 along with TSGENCO
officers. It is noted that these boilers have crossed 134000 running hours (unit-9) and
125000 running hours (Unit-10). RLA study of both the boilers were carried out in July’
2011 (unit-9) and September’ 2012 (unit-10). But not much abnormalities / deviations
observed during the above RLA studies. And so far no major / capital replacement
carried out.

From 2011-12 onwards tube failure details reported were furnished by

TSGENCO, the analysis as follows.

Area wise failure

UNIT-9:

Year First pass Second pass Total

WW PLSH RH, roof LTSH / SCW Economiser
tube, Spacer / SHH-5
tube
2011-12 --- --- --- 4 5 9
2012-13 2 --- 3 7 4 16
2013-14 --- --- 1 7 7 15
2014-15 --- --- 1 --- --- 1
Total 2 --- 5 18 16 41

UNIT-10:

Year First pass Second pass Total

WW PLSH RH, roof tube, LTSH / SCW / Economiser
Spacer tube SHH-5
2011-12 1 1 1 2 1 6
2012-13 1 --- --- 4 2 7
2013-14 1 --- --- 3 1 5
2014-15 --- --- --- 1 1 2
Total 3 1 1 10 5 20
NATURE OF FAILURE:

Nature Unit -9 Unit-10 Total

of 2011-12 2012-13 2013-14 2014-15 2011-12 2012-13 2013-14 2014-15
failure
Flue gas 5 8 11 1 1 4 1 1 32
erosion
Thermal 4 5 2 --- 3 2 3 1 20
fatigue
Weld --- 3 --- --- 1 --- 1 --- 5
defects
Others --- --- 2 --- 1 1 --- --- 4
Total 9 16 15 1 6 7 5 2 61

From the above, failure statistics reveal that first pass failure are quite normal
and sporadic in nature. Where as in second pass failures are abnormal and also
repeated / generic in nature. The prime causes of failures are flue gas erosion, thermal
fatigue (crack) and welding defects. For unit -9 both flue gas erosion and thermal
fatigue are predominant and unit -10 thermal fatigue is predominant. The tube failures
rates on an average was 2-3 per annum upto 2009-10, after that the failure rate
increased drastically (tube failure details since commissioning enclosed). This could be
due to coal quality deterioration because which flue gas quantity / velocity increased
causing more second pass erosion, beside that the aging of boiler is added cause as unit
-IX crossed more than 1, 34, 000 running hours and 1, 25, 000 running hours (unit –X).
In unit -9 more failures are observed from Economiser assembly 145 to 159, which
could be due to flue gas lancing on right end of the boiler, for which the gap between
steam cooled wall and Economiser assembly should be checked. Another major
observation is more failure in second pass bottom ring header stubs of both units.
After analysis it is observed that the down ward expansion of the economiser ash
hopper is restricted to 100 mm as against requirement of 200 mm as per design,
which causes thermal fatigue & contributing more stub failures in second pass
bottom ring header stubs of both the units. And also it is recommended to carry
out BHEL suggested modification work in the corner pleated panel area, which
could be one of the reasons for frequent corner stub failures (the sketch enclosed
for ready reference). It is also noted that, both units are being operated with high
coal flow value i.e. 200 TPH as against normal 185 TPH.

THE PROBABLE CAUSES FOR FLUE GAS EROSION:

1. Actual velocity of the flue gas in the zone (LTSH & Economiser) is more than the
designed velocity due to the variation in coal properties. The gap between steam
cooled wall and LTSH / Economiser assemblies not maintained as per the
designed value i.e. LTSH area end design gap – 134 mm & Economiser area design
gap - 115 mm.
2. Unit operating condition like high excess air and high coal flow
 3. Not providing erosion prevention castable refractory in the bend portion of
steam cooled walls (LRSB & Man hole doors area)

4. Coal properties i.e. Ash constituents containing high concentrations of aluminium

oxide and silicon compounds, which cause more erosion.

5. Erosion due to long running hours (ageing)

6. In tube mill operation, if the ball segregation is not done as per OEM
recommendations, steel grits will be carried along with pulverised fuel, which will
accelerate second pass erosion.

THE PROBABLE CAUSES FOR THERMAL FATIGUE FAILURES:

1. Constraints to free thermal expansion

2. Frequent start up and shutdown of units
3. Not following OEM recommendations of start up and shut down Procedures.

THE PROBABLE CAUSES FOR WELD DEFECTS:

1. Improper welding procedures.

2. Usage of incorrect welding electrodes and current settings.
3. Improper electrode backing (not proper heating).
4. Improper welding techniques (i. e. say for example not taking up of root /
tig welding followed by arc welding).
5. Welder competency.

SPECIFIC SUGGESTIONS FOR THIS SITE BASED ON FIELD OBSERVATIONS:

1) In the next annual over haul economiser and LTSH assemblies are to be
thoroughly inspected i.e. visual, thickness and DPT etc. and map the
erosion pattern.
2) Based on the above inspection, where ever tube thickness is reduced to
minimum acceptable limit, replace the tube / assembly.
3) If the erosion levels are within the acceptable limits, tube shall be
protected by fixing anti erosion SS shields (Shrouds) / sacrifice shields.
4) As repeated failures observed from 145 to 159 and 1 to 5 assemblies of
unit -9 Economiser, the same may be planned for replacement in the
available opportunity.
5) As already units have crossed 134000 running hours (unit-9) and 125000
running hours (unit-10), plan for replacement of economiser assemblies in
phased manner.
 6) The gap between steam cooled wall and LTSH / Economiser assemblies
(end coils) should be measured during the overhaul and maintained as per
the designed value i.e. LTSH area end design gap – 134 mm & Economiser
area design gap - 115 mm. The deviations, if any, shall be rectified as per
the attached sketch.
7) The eroded tube mill balls are to be replaced as per OEM
recommendations to minimize the carryover of steel grits along with
pulverised coal.
8) The minimum downward expansion movement of 200 mm between
economiser hopper and ash handling system connected to economiser ash
hopper to be ensured by providing proper expansion bellows in the ash
handling system side, as the present condition expansion movement
permitted is 100 mm only. The same may be corrected in the next
overhaul.
9) Second pass ring header corner pleated panel modification shall be carried
out as per the BHEL recommendations (sketch is attached).
10) During next annual overhaul, second pass ring header attachment with ash
hopper arrangement is to be checked as per BHEL drawing No. 0-00-268-
05119. Deviation if any notice is to be corrected.

11) The start up and shutdown procedures shall be followed as per OEM
recommendations.
12) Operating the units with required coal quality will help in minimizing the
unwanted pressure parts failures.
13) It may be checked whether the second pass opening area bends (LTSH &
Man hole doors) are provided with castable refractory material or not. If
not available, the same may be provided as per the attached sketch.

JESURAMNESAMONEY,
Senior Manager,
FES / BHEL / Trichy,

Copy submitted to the Chief Engineer / O&M / KTPS V & VI Stages / Paloncha.