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ADOPTION

1. G.R. Nos. 168992-93 May 21, 2009


IN RE: PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF MICHELLE P. LIM, MONINA P. LIM, Petitioner. CARPIO, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Monina P. Lim (petitioner) seeking to set aside the Decision1 dated 15
September 2004 of the Regional Trial Court, General Santos City, Branch 22 (trial court), in SPL. PROC. Case Nos. 1258
and 1259, which dismissed without prejudice the consolidated petitions for adoption of Michelle P. Lim and Michael Jude P.
Lim.

The following facts are undisputed. Petitioner is an optometrist by profession. On 23 June 1974, she married Primo Lim
(Lim). They were childless. Minor children, whose parents were unknown, were entrusted to them by a certain Lucia Ayuban
(Ayuban). Being so eager to have a child of their own, petitioner and Lim registered the children to make it appear that they
were the children’s parents. The children2 were named Michelle P. Lim (Michelle) and Michael Jude P. Lim (Michael).
Michelle was barely eleven days old when brought to the clinic of petitioner. She was born on 15 March 1977.3 Michael was
11 days old when Ayuban brought him to petitioner’s clinic. His date of birth is 1 August 1983.4

The spouses reared and cared for the children as if they were their own. They sent the children to exclusive schools. They
used the surname "Lim" in all their school records and documents. Unfortunately, on 28 November 1998, Lim died. On 27
December 2000, petitioner married Angel Olario (Olario), an American citizen.

Thereafter, petitioner decided to adopt the children by availing of the amnesty5 given under Republic Act No. 85526 (RA
8552) to those individuals who simulated the birth of a child. Thus, on 24 April 2002, petitioner filed separate petitions for the
adoption of Michelle and Michael before the trial court docketed as SPL PROC. Case Nos. 1258 and 1259, respectively. At
the time of the filing of the petitions for adoption, Michelle was 25 years old and already married, while Michael was 18 years
and seven months old.

Michelle and her husband gave their consent to the adoption as evidenced by their Affidavits of Consent.7 Michael also gave
his consent to his adoption as shown in his Affidavit of Consent.8 Petitioner’s husband Olario likewise executed an Affidavit
of Consent9 for the adoption of Michelle and Michael.

In the Certification issued by the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), Michelle was considered as an
abandoned child and the whereabouts of her natural parents were unknown.10 The DSWD issued a similar Certification for
Michael.11

The Ruling of the Trial Court : On 15 September 2004, the trial court rendered judgment dismissing the petitions. The trial
court ruled that since petitioner had remarried, petitioner should have filed the petition jointly with her new husband. The trial
court ruled that joint adoption by the husband and the wife is mandatory citing Section 7(c), Article III of RA 8552 and Article
185 of the Family Code.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the decision but the motion was denied in the Order dated 16 June 2005. In
denying the motion, the trial court ruled that petitioner did not fall under any of the exceptions under Section 7(c), Article III of
RA 8552. Petitioner’s argument that mere consent of her husband would suffice was untenable because, under the law,
there are additional requirements, such as residency and certification of his qualification, which the husband, who was not
even made a party in this case, must comply.

As to the argument that the adoptees are already emancipated and joint adoption is merely for the joint exercise of parental
authority, the trial court ruled that joint adoption is not only for the purpose of exercising parental authority because an
emancipated child acquires certain rights from his parents and assumes certain obligations and responsibilities.

Hence, the present petition. Issue : Petitioner appealed directly to this Court raising the sole issue of whether or not
petitioner, who has remarried, can singly adopt.

The Court’s Ruling: Petitioner contends that the rule on joint adoption must be relaxed because it is the duty of the court and
the State to protect the paramount interest and welfare of the child to be adopted. Petitioner argues that the legal maxim
"dura lex sed lex" is not applicable to adoption cases. She argues that joint parental authority is not necessary in this case
since, at the time the petitions were filed, Michelle was 25 years old and already married, while Michael was already 18 years
of age. Parental authority is not anymore necessary since they have been emancipated having attained the age of majority.
We deny the petition.

Joint Adoption by Husband and Wife

It is undisputed that, at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, petitioner had already remarried. She filed the petitions
by herself, without being joined by her husband Olario. We have no other recourse but to affirm the trial court’s decision
denying the petitions for adoption. Dura lex sed lex. The law is explicit. Section 7, Article III of RA 8552 reads:

SEC. 7. Who May Adopt. - The following may adopt:

(a) Any Filipino citizen of legal age, in possession of full civil capacity and legal rights, of good moral character, has not been
convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude, emotionally and psychologically capable of caring for children, at least
sixteen (16) years older than the adoptee, and who is in a position to support and care for his/her children in keeping with the
means of the family. The requirement of sixteen (16) year difference between the age of the adopter and adoptee may be
waived when the adopter is the biological parent of the adoptee, or is the spouse of the adoptee’s parent;
(b) Any alien possessing the same qualifications as above stated for Filipino nationals: Provided, That his/her country has
diplomatic relations with the Republic of the Philippines, that he/she has been living in the Philippines for at least three (3)
continuous years prior to the filing of the application for adoption and maintains such residence until the adoption decree is
entered, that he/she has been certified by his/her diplomatic or consular office or any appropriate government agency that
he/she has the legal capacity to adopt in his/her country, and that his/her government allows the adoptee to enter his/her
country as his/her adopted son/daughter: Provided, further, That the requirements on residency and certification of the alien’s
qualification to adopt in his/her country may be waived for the following:

(i) a former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative within the fourth (4th) degree of consanguinity or affinity; or
(ii) one who seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of his/her Filipino spouse; or
(iii) one who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his/her spouse a relative within the fourth (4th)
degree of consanguinity or affinity of the Filipino spouses; or
(c) The guardian with respect to the ward after the termination of the guardianship and clearance of his/her financial
accountabilities.
Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in the following cases:
(i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of the other; or
(ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own illegitimate son/daughter: Provided, however, That the other spouse has
signified his/her consent thereto; or
(iii) if the spouses are legally separated from each other.

In case husband and wife jointly adopt, or one spouse adopts the illegitimate son/daughter of the other, joint parental
authority shall be exercised by the spouses. (Emphasis supplied)

The use of the word "shall" in the above-quoted provision means that joint adoption by the husband and the wife is
mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept of joint parental authority over the child which is the ideal situation. As the
child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to require the spouses to adopt jointly. The
rule also insures harmony between the spouses.12

The law is clear. There is no room for ambiguity. Petitioner, having remarried at the time the petitions for adoption were filed,
must jointly adopt. Since the petitions for adoption were filed only by petitioner herself, without joining her husband, Olario,
the trial court was correct in denying the petitions for adoption on this ground.

Neither does petitioner fall under any of the three exceptions enumerated in Section 7. First, the children to be adopted are
not the legitimate children of petitioner or of her husband Olario. Second, the children are not the illegitimate children of
petitioner. And third, petitioner and Olario are not legally separated from each other.

The fact that Olario gave his consent to the adoption as shown in his Affidavit of Consent does not suffice. There are certain
requirements that Olario must comply being an American citizen. He must meet the qualifications set forth in Section 7 of RA
8552 such as: (1) he must prove that his country has diplomatic relations with the Republic of the Philippines; (2) he must
have been living in the Philippines for at least three continuous years prior to the filing of the application for adoption; (3) he
must maintain such residency until the adoption decree is entered; (4) he has legal capacity to adopt in his own country; and
(5) the adoptee is allowed to enter the adopter’s country as the latter’s adopted child. None of these qualifications were
shown and proved during the trial.

These requirements on residency and certification of the alien’s qualification to adopt cannot likewise be waived pursuant to
Section 7. The children or adoptees are not relatives within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity of petitioner or of
Olario. Neither are the adoptees the legitimate children of petitioner.

Effects of Adoption

Petitioner contends that joint parental authority is not anymore necessary since the children have been emancipated having
reached the age of majority. This is untenable.

Parental authority includes caring for and rearing the children for civic consciousness and efficiency and the development of
their moral, mental and physical character and well-being.13 The father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental
authority over the persons of their common children.14 Even the remarriage of the surviving parent shall not affect the
parental authority over the children, unless the court appoints another person to be the guardian of the person or property of
the children.15

It is true that when the child reaches the age of emancipation — that is, when he attains the age of majority or 18 years of
age16 — emancipation terminates parental authority over the person and property of the child, who shall then be qualified
and responsible for all acts of civil life.17 However, parental authority is merely just one of the effects of legal adoption.
Article V of RA 8552 enumerates the effects of adoption, thus:

ARTICLE V
EFFECTS OF ADOPTION SEC. 16. Parental Authority. - Except in cases where the biological parent is the spouse of the
adopter, all legal ties between the biological parent(s) and the adoptee shall be severed and the same shall then be vested
on the adopter(s).

SEC. 17. Legitimacy. - The adoptee shall be considered the legitimate son/daughter of the adopter(s) for all intents and
purposes and as such is entitled to all the rights and obligations provided by law to legitimate sons/daughters born to them
without discrimination of any kind. To this end, the adoptee is entitled to love, guidance, and support in keeping with the
means of the family.
SEC. 18. Succession. - In legal and intestate succession, the adopter(s) and the adoptee shall have reciprocal rights of
succession without distinction from legitimate filiation. However, if the adoptee and his/her biological parent(s) had left a will,
the law on testamentary succession shall govern.

Adoption has, thus, the following effects: (1) sever all legal ties between the biological parent(s) and the adoptee, except
when the biological parent is the spouse of the adopter; (2) deem the adoptee as a legitimate child of the adopter; and (3)
give adopter and adoptee reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the relationship of parent and child, including but not
limited to: (i) the right of the adopter to choose the name the child is to be known; and (ii) the right of the adopter and adoptee
to be legal and compulsory heirs of each other.18 Therefore, even if emancipation terminates parental authority, the adoptee
is still considered a legitimate child of the adopter with all the rights19 of a legitimate child such as: (1) to bear the surname of
the father and the mother; (2) to receive support from their parents; and (3) to be entitled to the legitime and other
successional rights. Conversely, the adoptive parents shall, with respect to the adopted child, enjoy all the benefits to which
biological parents are entitled20 such as support21 and successional rights.22

We are mindful of the fact that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, hold the interests and welfare of the child to be
of paramount consideration. They are designed to provide homes, parental care and education for unfortunate, needy or
orphaned children and give them the protection of society and family, as well as to allow childless couples or persons to
experience the joys of parenthood and give them legally a child in the person of the adopted for the manifestation of their
natural parental instincts. Every reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and
compassionate objectives of the law.23 But, as we have ruled in Republic v. Vergara:24

We are not unmindful of the main purpose of adoption statutes, which is the promotion of the welfare of the children.
Accordingly, the law should be construed liberally, in a manner that will sustain rather than defeat said purpose. The law
must also be applied with compassion, understanding and less severity in view of the fact that it is intended to provide
homes, love, care and education for less fortunate children. Regrettably, the Court is not in a position to affirm the trial court’s
decision favoring adoption in the case at bar, for the law is clear and it cannot be modified without violating the proscription
against judicial legislation. Until such time however, that the law on the matter is amended, we cannot sustain the
respondent-spouses’ petition for adoption. (Emphasis supplied)1avvphi1.zw+

Petitioner, being married at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, should have jointly filed the petitions with her
husband. We cannot make our own legislation to suit petitioner.

Petitioner, in her Memorandum, insists that subsequent events would show that joint adoption could no longer be possible
because Olario has filed a case for dissolution of his marriage to petitioner in the Los Angeles Superior Court.

We disagree. The filing of a case for dissolution of the marriage between petitioner and Olario is of no moment. It is not
equivalent to a decree of dissolution of marriage. Until and unless there is a judicial decree for the dissolution of the marriage
between petitioner and Olario, the marriage still subsists. That being the case, joint adoption by the husband and the wife is
required. We reiterate our ruling above that since, at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, petitioner was married to
Olario, joint adoption is mandatory.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision dated 15 September 2004 of the Regional Trial Court,
General Santos City, Branch 22 in SPL. PROC. Case Nos. 1258 and 1259. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED.

2. G.R. No. 188801, October 15, 2014

ROSARIO MATA CASTRO AND JOANNE BENEDICTA CHARISSIMA M. CASTRO, A.K.A. "MARIA SOCORRO M.
CASTRO" AND "JAYROSE M. CASTRO," Petitioners, v. JOSE MARIA JED LEMUEL GREGORIO AND ANA MARIA
REGINA GREGORIO, Respondents. LEONEN, J.:

The policy of the law is clear. In order to maintain harmony, there must be a showing of notice and consent. This cannot be
defeated by mere procedural devices. In all instances where it appears that a spouse attempts to adopt a child out of
wedlock, the other spouse and other legitimate children must be personally notified through personal service of summons. It
is not enough that they be deemed notified through constructive service.

This is a petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the decision2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 101021, which
denied the petition for annulment of judgment filed by petitioners. The petition before the appellate court sought to annul the
judgment of the trial court that granted respondents' decree of adoption.3chanrobleslaw

The case originally stemmed from the adoption of Jose Maria Jed Lemuel Gregorio (Jéd) and Ana Maria Regina Gregorio
(Regina) by Atty. Jose G. Castro (Jose). Jose is the estranged husband of Rosario Mata Castro (Rosario) and the father of
Joanne Benedicta Charissima M. Castro (Joanne), also known by her baptismal name, "Maria Socorro M. Castro" and her
nickname, "Jayrose."

Rosario alleged that she and Jose were married on August 5, 1962 in Laoag City. Their marriage had allegedly been
troubled. They had a child, Rose Marie, who was born in 1963, but succumbed to congenital heart disease and only lived for
nine days. Rosario allegedly left Jose after a couple of months because of the incompatibilities between
them.4chanrobleslaw

Rosario and Jose, however, briefly reconciled in 1969. Rosario gave birth to Joanne a year later. She and Jose allegedly
lived as husband and wife for about a year even if she lived in Manila and Jose stayed in Laoag City. Jose would visit her in
Manila during weekends. Afterwards, they separated permanently because Rosario alleged that Jose had homosexual
tendencies.5 She insisted, however, that they "remained friends for fifteen (15) years despite their
separation(.)"6chanrobleslaw
On August 1, 2000, Jose filed a petition7 for adoption before the Regional Trial Court of Batac, Ilocos Norte. In the petition,
he alleged that Jed and Regina were his illegitimate children with Lilibeth Fernandez Gregorio (Lilibeth),8 whom Rosario
alleged was his erstwhile housekeeper.9 At the time of the filing of the petition, Jose was 70 years old.10chanrobleslaw

According to the Home Study Report11 conducted by the Social Welfare Officer of the trial court, Jose belongs to a
prominent and respected family, being one of the three children of former Governor Mauricio Castro.

He was also a well-known lawyer in Manila and Ilocos Norte.12 The report mentioned that he was once married to Rosario,
but the marriage did not produce any children.13 It also stated that he met and fell in love with Lilibeth in 1985, and Lilibeth
was able to bear him two children, Jed on August 1987, and Regina on March 1989.14 Under "Motivation for Adoption," the
social welfare officer noted:

Since, he has no child with his marriaged [sic] to Rosario Mata, he was not able to fulfill his dreams to parent a child.
However, with the presence of his 2 illegitimate children will fulfill his dreams [sic] and it is his intention to legalize their
relationship and surname. . . . At the time of the report, Jose was said to be living with Jed and Regina temporarily in Batac,
Ilocos Norte.16 The children have allegedly been in his custody since Lilibeth's death in July 1995.17chanrobleslaw

On October 16, 2000, the trial court approved the adoption,18 having ruled that "[n]o opposition had been received by this
Court from any person including the government which was represented by the Office of the Solicitor General."19 A
certificate of finality20 was issued on February 9, 2006.

Meanwhile, on July 3, 2006, Rosario, through her lawyer, Atty. Rene V. Saguisag, filed a complaint for disbarment against
Jose with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.21 In her complaint, she alleged that Jose had been remiss in providing
support for their daughter, Joanne, for the past 36 years.22 She alleged that she single-handedly raised and provided
financial support to Joanne while Jose had been showering gifts to his driver and alleged lover, Larry R. Rentegrado (Larry),
and even went to the extent of adopting Larry's two children, Jed and Regina, without her and Joanne's knowledge and
consent.23 She also alleged that Jose made blatant lies to the trial court by alleging that Jed and Regina were his illegitimate
children with Larry's wife, Lilibeth, to cover up for his homosexual relationship with Larry.24chanrobleslaw

In his answer before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Jose denies being remiss in his fatherly duties to Joanne during
her minority. He alleged that he always offered help, but it was often declined.25 He also alleged that he adopted Jed and
Regina because they are his illegitimate children. He denied having committed any of the falsification alluded to by Rosario.
He also stated that he had suffered a stroke in 1998 that left him paralyzed. He alleged that his income had been diminished
because several properties had to be sold to pay for medical treatments.26 He then implored the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines to weigh on the case with "justice and equity."27chanrobleslaw

On October 8, 2006, Jose died in Laoag City, Ilocos Norte.28chanrobleslaw

On October 18, 2007, Rosario and Joanne filed a petition for annulment of judgment under Rule 47 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure with the Court of Appeals, seeking to annul the October 16, 2000 decision of the trial court approving Jed and
Regina's adoption.29chanrobleslaw

In their petition, Rosario and Joanne allege that they learned of the adoption sometime in 2005.30 They allege that Rosario's
affidavit of consent, marked by the trial court as "Exh. K,"31 was fraudulent.32 They also allege that Jed and Regina's birth
certificates showed different sets of information, such as the age of their mother, Lilibeth, at the time she gave birth. They
argue that one set of birth certificates states the father to be Jose and in another set of National Statistic Office certificates
shows the father to be Larry, Jose's driver and alleged lover.33 It was further alleged that Jed and Regina are not actually
Jose's illegitimate children but the legitimate children of Lilibeth and Larry who were married at the time of their
birth.34chanrobleslaw

On May 26, 2009, the Court of Appeals denied the petition.

While admittedly, no notice was given by the trial court to Rosario and Joanne of the adoption, the appellate court ruled that
there is "no explicit provision in the rules that the spouse and legitimate child of the adopter . . . should be personally notified
of the hearing."35chanrobleslaw

The appellate court "abhor[red] the mind baffling scheme employed by [Jose] in obtaining an adoption decree in favor of [his
illegitimate children] to the prejudice of the interests of his legitimate heirs"36 but stated that its hands were bound by the trial
court decision that had already attained "finality and immutability."37chanrobleslaw

The appellate court also ruled that the alleged fraudulent information contained in the different sets of birth certificates
required the determination of the identities of the persons stated therein and was, therefore, beyond the scope of the action
for annulment of judgment. The alleged fraud was also perpetrated during the trial and could not be classified as extrinsic
fraud, which is required in an action for annulment of judgment.38chanrobleslaw

When Rosario and Joanne's motion for reconsideration was denied on July 10, 2009,39 they filed this petition.

The issue before this court is whether the Court of Appeals erred in denying the petition for annulment for failure of
petitioners to (1) show that the trial court lacked jurisdiction and (2) show the existence of extrinsic fraud.

In their petition, petitioners argue that the appellate court erred in its application of the law on extrinsic fraud as ground to
annul a judgment.40 They argue that because of the fabricated consent obtained by Jose and the alleged false information
shown in the birth certificates presented as evidence before the trial court,41 they were not given the opportunity to oppose
the petition since the entire proceedings were concealed from them.42chanrobleslaw

Petitioners also argue that the appellate court misunderstood and misapplied the law on jurisdiction despite the denial of due
process, notice, and non-inclusion of indispensable parties.43 They argue that the adoption of illegitimate children requires
the consent, not only of the spouse, but also the legitimate children 10 years or over of the adopter, and such consent was
never secured from Joanne.44chanrobleslaw

Respondents, however, argue in their comment that petitioners could not have been deprived of their day in court since their
interest was "amply protected by the participation and representation of the Solicitor General through the deputized public
prosecutor."45chanrobleslaw

Respondents also argue that there was constructive notice through publication for three consecutive weeks in a newspaper
of general circulation, which constitutes not only notice to them but also notice to the world of the adoption proceedings.46
They argue that since the alleged fraud was perpetrated during the trial, it cannot be said to be extrinsic fraud but intrinsic
fraud, which is not a ground for annulment of judgment.47 They also argue that petitioners were not indispensable parties
because adoption is an action in rem and, as such, the only indispensable party is the state.48chanrobleslaw

The petition is granted.

Annulment of judgment under Rule 47 of the Rules of Civil Procedure

Under Rule 47, Section 1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, a party may file an action with the Court of Appeals to annul
judgments or final orders and resolutions in civil actions of Regional Trial Courts. This remedy will only be available if "the
ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no
fault of the petitioner."49chanrobleslaw

In Dare Adventure Farm Corporation v. Court of Appeals:50chanrobleslaw

A petition for annulment of judgment is a remedy in equity so exceptional in nature that it may be availed of only when other
remedies are wanting, and only if the judgment, final order or final resolution sought, to be annulled was rendered by a court
lacking jurisdiction or through extrinsic fraud. Yet, the remedy, being exceptional in character, is not allowed to be so easily
and readily abused by parties aggrieved by the final judgments, orders or resolutions. The Court has thus instituted
safeguards by limiting the grounds for the annulment to lack of jurisdiction and extrinsic fraud, and by prescribing in Section 1
of Rule 47 of the Rules of Court that the petitioner should show that the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for
relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner. A petition for annulment that
ignores or disregards any of the safeguards cannot prosper.

The attitude of judicial reluctance towards the annulment of a judgment, final order or final resolution is understandable, for
the remedy disregards the time-honored doctrine of immutability and unalterability of final judgments, a solid corner stone in
the dispensation of justice by the courts. The doctrine of immutability and unalterability serves a two-fold purpose, namely:
(a) to avoid delay in the administration of justice and thus, procedurally, to make orderly the discharge of judicial business;
and (b) to put an end to judicial controversies, at the risk of occasional errors, which is precisely why the courts exist. As to
the first, a judgment that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable and is no longer to be modified in any
respect even if the modification is meant to correct an erroneous conclusion of fact or of law, and whether the modification is
made by the court that rendered the decision or by the highest court of the land. As to the latter, controversies cannot drag
on indefinitely because fundamental considerations of public policy and sound practice demand that the rights and
obligations of every litigant must not hang in suspense for an indefinite period of time.51 (Emphasis supplied)

Because of the exceptional nature of the remedy, there are only two grounds by which annulment of judgment may be
availed of: extrinsic fraud, which must be brought four years from discovery, and lack of jurisdiction, which must be brought
before it is barred by estoppel or laches.52chanrobleslaw

Lack of jurisdiction under this rule means lack of jurisdiction over the nature of the action or subject matter, or lack of
jurisdiction over the parties.53 Extrinsic fraud, on the other hand, is "[that which] prevents a party from having a trial or from
presenting his entire case to the court, or [that which] operates upon matters pertaining not to the judgment itself but to the
manner in which it is procured."54chanrobleslaw

The grant of adoption over respondents should be annulled as the trial court did not validly acquire jurisdiction over the
proceedings, and the favorable decision was obtained through extrinsic fraud.

Jurisdiction over adoption proceedings


vis-a-vis the law on adoption

Petitioners argue that they should have been given notice by the trial court of the adoption, as adoption laws require their
consent as a requisite in the proceedings.

Petitioners are correct. It is settled that "the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the
commencement of the action."55 As Jose filed the petition for adoption on August 1, 2000, it is Republic Act No. 855256
which applies over the proceedings. The law on adoption requires that the adoption by the father of a child born out of
wedlock obtain not only the consent of his wife but also the consent of his legitimate children.

Under Article III, Section 7 of Republic Act No. 8552, the husband must first obtain the consent of his wife if he seeks to
adopt his own children born out of wedlock:

ARTICLE III
ELIGIBILITY
SEC. 7. Who May Adopt. — The following may adopt:

Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in the following cases:
(i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of the other; or
(ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own illegitimate son/daughter: Provided, however, That the other spouse has
signified, his/her consent thereto; or
(iii) if the spouses are legally separated from each other. . . (Emphasis supplied)

The provision is mandatory. As a general rule, the husband and wife must file a joint petition for adoption. The rationale for
this is stated in In Re: Petition for Adoption of Michelle P. Lim:57chanrobleslaw

The use of the word "shall" in the above-quoted provision means that joint adoption by the husband and the wife is
mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept of joint parental authority over the child which is the ideal situation. As the
child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to require the spouses to adopt jointly. The
rule also insures harmony between the spouses. The law provides for several exceptions to the general rule, as in a situation
where a spouse seeks to adopt his or her own children born out of wedlock. In this instance, joint adoption is not necessary.
However, the spouse seeking to adopt must first obtain the consent of his or her spouse.

In the absence of any decree of legal separation or annulment, Jose and Rosario remained legally married despite their de
facto separation. For Jose to be eligible to adopt Jed and Regina, Rosario must first signify her consent to the adoption.
Jose, however, did not validly obtain Rosario's consent. His submission of a fraudulent affidavit of consent in her name
cannot be considered compliance of the requisites of the law. Had Rosario been given notice by the trial court of the
proceedings, she would have had a reasonable opportunity to contest the validity of the affidavit. Since her consent was not
obtained, Jose was ineligible to adopt.

The law also requires the written consent of the adopter's children if they are 10 years old or older. In Article III, Section 9 of
Republic Act No. 8552:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

SEC. 9. Whose Consent is Necessary to the Adoption. — After being properly counseled and informed of his/her right to give
or withhold his/her approval of the adoption, the written consent of the following to the adoption is hereby required:

(c) The legitimate and adopted sons/daughters, ten (10) years of age or over, of the adopter(s) and adoptee, if any;
(Emphasis supplied)

The consent of the adopter's other children is necessary as it ensures harmony among the prospective siblings. It also
sufficiently puts the other children on notice that they will have to share their parent's love and care, as well as their future
legitimes, with another person. It is undisputed that Joanne was Jose and Rosario's legitimate child and that she was over 10
years old at the time of the adoption proceedings. Her written consent, therefore, was necessary for the adoption to be valid.

To circumvent this requirement, however, Jose manifested to the trial court that he and Rosario were childless, thereby
preventing Joanne from being notified of the proceedings. As her written consent was never obtained, the adoption was not
valid. For the adoption to be valid, petitioners' consent was required by Republic Act No. 8552. Personal service of summons
should have been effected on the spouse and all legitimate children to ensure that their substantive rights are protected. It is
not enough to rely on constructive notice as in this case. Surreptitious use of procedural technicalities cannot be privileged
over substantive statutory rights.

Since the trial court failed to personally serve notice on Rosario and Joanne of the proceedings, it never validly acquired
jurisdiction.

There was extrinsic fraud The appellate court, in denying the petition, ruled that while fraud may have been committed in this
case, it was only intrinsic fraud, rather than extrinsic fraud. This is erroneous.

In People v. Court of Appeals and Socorro Florece: Extrinsic fraud refers to any fraudulent act of the prevailing party in
litigation committed outside of the trial of the case, whereby the defeated party is prevented from fully exhibiting his side of
the case by fraud or deception practiced on him by his opponent, such as by keeping him away from court, by giving him a
false promise of a compromise, or where the defendant never had the knowledge of the suit, being kept in ignorance by the
acts of the plaintiff, or where an attorney fraudulently or without authority connives at his defeat.60 (Emphasis supplied)

An action for annulment based on extrinsic fraud must be brought within four years from discovery.61 Petitioners alleged that
they were made aware of the adoption only in 2005. The filing of this petition on October 18, 2007 is within the period
allowed by the rules.

The badges of fraud are present in this case. First, the petition for adoption was filed in a place that had no relation to any of
the parties. Jose was a resident of Laoag City, llocos Norte.62 Larry and Lilibeth were residents of Barangay 6, Laoag
City.63 Jed and Regina were born in San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte.64 Rosario and Joanne were residents of Parañaque City,
Manila.65 The petition for adoption, however, was filed in the Regional Trial Court of Batac, Ilocos Norte.66 The trial court
gave due course to the petition on Jose's bare allegation in his petition that he was a resident of Batac,67 even though it is
admitted in the Home Study Report that he was a practicing lawyer in Laoag City.68chanrobleslaw

Second, using the process of delayed registration,69 Jose was able to secure birth certificates for Jed and Regina showing
him to be the father and Larry as merely the informant.70 Worse still is that two different sets of fraudulent certificates were
procured: one showing that Jose and Lilibeth were married on December 4, 1986 in Manila,71 and another wherein the
portion for the mother's name was not filled in at all.72 The birth certificates of Jed and Regina from the National Statistics
Office, however, show that their father was Larry R. Rentegrado.73 These certificates are in clear contradiction to the birth
certificates submitted by Jose to the trial court in support of his petition for adoption.

Third, Jose blatantly lied to the trial court when he declared that his motivation for adoption was because he and his wife,
Rosario, were childless,74 to the prejudice of their daughter, Joanne. The consent of Rosario to the adoption was also
disputed by Rosario and alleged to be fraudulent.75chanrobleslaw

All these tactics were employed by Jose, not only to induce the trial court in approving his petition, but also to prevent
Rosario and Joanne from participating in the proceedings or opposing the petition.

The appellate court erroneously classified the fraud employed by Jose as intrinsic on the basis that they were "forged
instruments or perjured testimonies"76 presented during the trial. It failed to understand, however, that fraud is considered
intrinsic when the other party was either present at the trial or was a participant in the proceedings when such instrument or
testimony was presented in court, thus:

[I]ntrinsic fraud refers to the acts of a party at a trial that prevented a fair and just determination of the case, but the difference
is that the acts or things, like falsification and false testimony, could have been litigated and determined at the trial or
adjudication of the case. In other words, intrinsic fraud does not deprive the petitioner of his day in court because he can
guard against that kind of fraud through so many means, including a thorough trial preparation, a skillful, cross-examination,
resorting to the modes of discovery, and proper scientific or forensic applications. Indeed, forgery of documents and
evidence for use at the trial and perjury in court testimony have been regarded as not preventing the participation of any
party in the proceedings, and are not, therefore, constitutive of extrinsic fraud.77 (Emphasis supplied)

When fraud is employed by a party precisely to prevent the participation of any other interested party, as in this case, then
the fraud is extrinsic, regardless of whether the fraud was committed through the use of forged documents or perjured
testimony during the trial.

Jose's actions prevented Rosario and Joanne from having a reasonable opportunity to contest the adoption. Had Rosario
and Joanne been allowed to participate, the trial court would have hesitated to grant Jose's petition since he failed to fulfill
the necessary requirements under the law. There can be no other conclusion than that because of Jose's acts, the trial court
granted the decree of adoption under fraudulent circumstances.

The law itself provides for penal sanctions for those who violate its provisions. Under Article VII, Section 21 of Republic Act
No. 8552:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

ARTICLE VII
VIOLATIONS AND PENALTIES
SEC. 21. Violations and Penalties. —

(a) The penalty of imprisonment ranging from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years and/or a fine not
less than Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00), but not more than Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) at
the discretion of the court shall be imposed on any person who shall commit any of the following acts:
(i) obtaining consent for an adoption through coercion, undue influence, fraud, improper material inducement, or
other similar acts;
(ii) non-compliance with the procedures and safeguards provided by the law for adoption; or
(iii) subjecting or exposing the child to be adopted to danger, abuse, or exploitation.
(b) Any person who shall cause the fictitious registration of the birth of a child under the name(s) of a person(s) who
is not his/her biological parent(s) shall be guilty of simulation of birth, and shall be punished by prision mayor in
its medium period and a fine not exceeding Fifty thousand pesos (P50.000.00). (Emphasis supplied)

Unfortunately, Jose's death carried with it the extinguishment of any of his criminal liabilities.78 Republic Act No. 8552 also
fails to provide any provision on the status of adoption decrees if the adoption is found to have been obtained fraudulently.
Petitioners also cannot invoke Article VI, Section 19 of Republic Act No. 855279 since rescission of adoption can only be
availed of by the adoptee. Petitioners, therefore, are left with no other remedy in law other than the annulment of the
judgment.

The fraud employed in this case has been to Joanne's prejudice. There is reason to believe that Joanne has grown up having
never experienced the love and care of a father, her parents having separated a year after her birth. She has never even
benefited from any monetary support from her father. Despite all these adversities, Joanne was able to obtain a medical
degree from the University of the Philippines College of Medicine80 and is now working as a doctor in Canada.81 These
accomplishments, however, are poor substitutes if the injustice done upon her is allowed to continue.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision dated October 16, 2000 of the Regional Trial Court of Batac, Ilocos
Norte, Branch 17 in SP. Proc. No. 3445-17 is rendered NULL and VOID. SO ORDERED.

3. G.R. No. 148311. March 31, 2005


IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA GARCIA HONORATO B. CATINDIG,
petitioner. SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

May an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural father, use the surname of her natural mother as her middle name?
This is the issue raised in the instant case.

The facts are undisputed. On August 31, 2000, Honorato B. Catindig, herein petitioner, filed a petition1 to adopt his minor
illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. He alleged therein, among others, that Stephanie was born on June 26,
1994;2 that her mother is Gemma Astorga Garcia; that Stephanie has been using her mother’s middle name and surname;
and that he is now a widower and qualified to be her adopting parent. He prayed that Stephanie’s middle name Astorga be
changed to "Garcia," her mother’s surname, and that her surname "Garcia" be changed to "Catindig," his surname.
On March 23, 2001,3 the trial court rendered the assailed Decision granting the adoption, thus:

"After a careful consideration of the evidence presented by the petitioner, and in the absence of any opposition to the
petition, this Court finds that the petitioner possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualification provided for by law
as an adoptive parent, and that as such he is qualified to maintain, care for and educate the child to be adopted; that the
grant of this petition would redound to the best interest and welfare of the minor Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. The Court
further holds that the petitioner’s care and custody of the child since her birth up to the present constitute more than enough
compliance with the requirement of Article 35 of Presidential Decree No. 603.

WHEREFORE, finding the petition to be meritorious, the same is GRANTED. Henceforth, Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia is
hereby freed from all obligations of obedience and maintenance with respect to her natural mother, and for civil purposes,
shall henceforth be the petitioner’s legitimate child and legal heir. Pursuant to Article 189 of the Family Code of the
Philippines, the minor shall be known as STEPHANIE NATHY CATINDIG.

Upon finality of this Decision, let the same be entered in the Local Civil Registrar concerned pursuant to Rule 99 of the Rules
of Court.

Let copy of this Decision be furnished the National Statistics Office for record purposes. SO ORDERED."4 On April 20, 2001,
petitioner filed a motion for clarification and/or reconsideration5 praying that Stephanie should be allowed to use the surname
of her natural mother (GARCIA) as her middle name. On May 28, 2001,6 the trial court denied petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration holding that there is no law or jurisprudence allowing an adopted child to use the surname of his biological
mother as his middle name.

Hence, the present petition raising the issue of whether an illegitimate child may use the surname of her mother as her
middle name when she is subsequently adopted by her natural father.

Petitioner submits that the trial court erred in depriving Stephanie of a middle name as a consequence of adoption because:
(1) there is no law prohibiting an adopted child from having a middle name in case there is only one adopting parent; (2) it is
customary for every Filipino to have as middle name the surname of the mother; (3) the middle name or initial is a part of the
name of a person; (4) adoption is for the benefit and best interest of the adopted child, hence, her right to bear a proper
name should not be violated; (5) permitting Stephanie to use the middle name "Garcia" (her mother’s surname) avoids the
stigma of her illegitimacy; and; (6) her continued use of "Garcia" as her middle name is not opposed by either the Catindig or
Garcia families.

The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), agrees with petitioner that Stephanie should be permitted to
use, as her middle name, the surname of her natural mother for the following reasons:

First, it is necessary to preserve and maintain Stephanie’s filiation with her natural mother because under Article 189 of the
Family Code, she remains to be an intestate heir of the latter. Thus, to prevent any confusion and needless hardship in the
future, her relationship or proof of that relationship with her natural mother should be maintained.

Second, there is no law expressly prohibiting Stephanie to use the surname of her natural mother as her middle name. What
the law does not prohibit, it allows.

Last, it is customary for every Filipino to have a middle name, which is ordinarily the surname of the mother. This custom has
been recognized by the Civil Code and Family Code. In fact, the Family Law Committees agreed that "the initial or surname
of the mother should immediately precede the surname of the father so that the second name, if any, will be before the
surname of the mother."7

We find merit in the petition. Use Of Surname Is Fixed By Law –

For all practical and legal purposes, a man's name is the designation by which he is known and called in the community in
which he lives and is best known. It is defined as the word or combination of words by which a person is distinguished from
other individuals and, also, as the label or appellation which he bears for the convenience of the world at large addressing
him, or in speaking of or dealing with him.8 It is both of personal as well as public interest that every person must have a
name.

The name of an individual has two parts: (1) the given or proper name and (2) the surname or family name. The given or
proper name is that which is given to the individual at birth or at baptism, to distinguish him from other individuals. The
surname or family name is that which identifies the family to which he belongs and is continued from parent to child. The
given name may be freely selected by the parents for the child, but the surname to which the child is entitled is fixed by law.9

Thus, Articles 364 to 380 of the Civil Code provides the substantive rules which regulate the use of surname10 of an
individual whatever may be his status in life, i.e., whether he may be legitimate or illegitimate, an adopted child, a married
woman or a previously married woman, or a widow, thus:

"Art. 364. Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the father.
Art. 365. An adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter.
xxx
Art. 369. Children conceived before the decree annulling a voidable marriage shall principally use the surname of the father.
Art. 370. A married woman may use:
(1) Her maiden first name and surname and add her husband's surname, or
(2) Her maiden first name and her husband's surname or
(3) Her husband's full name, but prefixing a word indicating that she is his wife, such as ‘Mrs.’
Art. 371. In case of annulment of marriage, and the wife is the guilty party, she shall resume her maiden name and surname.
If she is the innocent spouse, she may resume her maiden name and surname. However, she may choose to continue
employing her former husband's surname, unless:
(1) The court decrees otherwise, or
(2) She or the former husband is married again to another person.
Art. 372. When legal separation has been granted, the wife shall continue using her name and surname employed before the
legal separation.
Art. 373. A widow may use the deceased husband's surname as though he were still living, in accordance with Article 370.
Art. 374. In case of identity of names and surnames, the younger person shall be obliged to use such additional name or
surname as will avoid confusion.
Art. 375. In case of identity of names and surnames between ascendants and descendants, the word ‘Junior’ can be used
only by a son. Grandsons and other direct male descendants shall either:
(1) Add a middle name or the mother's surname,
(2) Add the Roman numerals II, III, and so on.
x x x"
Law Is Silent As To The Use Of
Middle Name –

As correctly submitted by both parties, there is no law regulating the use of a middle name. Even Article 17611 of the Family
Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 9255, otherwise known as "An Act Allowing Illegitimate Children To Use The
Surname Of Their Father," is silent as to what middle name a child may use. The middle name or the mother’s surname is
only considered in Article 375(1), quoted above, in case there is identity of names and surnames between ascendants and
descendants, in which case, the middle name or the mother’s surname shall be added.

Notably, the law is likewise silent as to what middle name an adoptee may use. Article 365 of the Civil Code merely provides
that "an adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter." Also, Article 189 of the Family Code, enumerating the legal
effects of adoption, is likewise silent on the matter, thus:

"(1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be a legitimate child of the adopters and both shall acquire the
reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the relationship of parent and child, including the right of the adopted to use the
surname of the adopters;

However, as correctly pointed out by the OSG, the members of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees that drafted the
Family Code recognized the Filipino custom of adding the surname of the child’s mother as his middle name. In the Minutes
of the Joint Meeting of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees, the members approved the suggestion that the initial or
surname of the mother should immediately precede the surname of the father, thus

"Justice Caguioa commented that there is a difference between the use by the wife of the surname and that of the child
because the father’s surname indicates the family to which he belongs, for which reason he would insist on the use of the
father’s surname by the child but that, if he wants to, the child may also use the surname of the mother.

Justice Puno posed the question: If the child chooses to use the surname of the mother, how will his name be written?
Justice Caguioa replied that it is up to him but that his point is that it should be mandatory that the child uses the surname of
the father and permissive in the case of the surname of the mother.

Prof. Baviera remarked that Justice Caguioa’s point is covered by the present Article 364, which reads: Legitimate and
legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the father.

Justice Puno pointed out that many names change through no choice of the person himself precisely because of this
misunderstanding. He then cited the following example: Alfonso Ponce Enrile’s correct surname is Ponce since the mother’s
surname is Enrile but everybody calls him Atty. Enrile. Justice Jose Gutierrez David’s family name is Gutierrez and his
mother’s surname is David but they all call him Justice David. Justice Caguioa suggested that the proposed Article (12) be
modified to the effect that it shall be mandatory on the child to use the surname of the father but he may use the surname of
the mother by way of an initial or a middle name. Prof. Balane stated that they take note of this for inclusion in the Chapter on
Use of Surnames since in the proposed Article (10) they are just enumerating the rights of legitimate children so that the
details can be covered in the appropriate chapter.

Justice Puno remarked that there is logic in the simplification suggested by Justice Caguioa that the surname of the father
should always be last because there are so many traditions like the American tradition where they like to use their second
given name and the Latin tradition, which is also followed by the Chinese wherein they even include the Clan name.

Justice Puno suggested that they agree in principle that in the Chapter on the Use of Surnames, they should say that initial
or surname of the mother should immediately precede the surname of the father so that the second name, if any, will be
before the surname of the mother. Prof. Balane added that this is really the Filipino way. The Committee approved the
suggestion."12 (Emphasis supplied) In the case of an adopted child, the law provides that "the adopted shall bear the
surname of the adopters."13 Again, it is silent whether he can use a middle name. What it only expressly allows, as a matter
of right and obligation, is for the adoptee to bear the surname of the adopter, upon issuance of the decree of adoption.14

The Underlying Intent of

Adoption Is In Favor of the

Adopted Child – Adoption is defined as the process of making a child, whether related or not to the adopter, possess in
general, the rights accorded to a legitimate child.15 It is a juridical act, a proceeding in rem which creates between two
persons a relationship similar to that which results from legitimate paternity and filiation.16 The modern trend is to consider
adoption not merely as an act to establish a relationship of paternity and filiation, but also as an act which endows the child
with a legitimate status.17 This was, indeed, confirmed in 1989, when the Philippines, as a State Party to the Convention of
the Rights of the Child initiated by the United Nations, accepted the principle that adoption is impressed with social and moral
responsibility, and that its underlying intent is geared to favor the adopted child.18 Republic Act No. 8552, otherwise known
as the "Domestic Adoption Act of 1998,"19 secures these rights and privileges for the adopted.20

One of the effects of adoption is that the adopted is deemed to be a legitimate child of the adopter for all intents and
purposes pursuant to Article 18921 of the Family Code and Section 1722 Article V of RA 8552.23

Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, it follows that Stephanie is entitled to all the rights provided by law to a
legitimate child without discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear the surname of her father and her mother, as
discussed above. This is consistent with the intention of the members of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees as
earlier discussed. In fact, it is a Filipino custom that the initial or surname of the mother should immediately precede the
surname of the father.

Additionally, as aptly stated by both parties, Stephanie’s continued use of her mother’s surname (Garcia) as her middle name
will maintain her maternal lineage. It is to be noted that Article 189(3) of the Family Code and Section 1824, Article V of RA
8552 (law on adoption) provide that the adoptee remains an intestate heir of his/her biological parent. Hence, Stephanie can
well assert or claim her hereditary rights from her natural mother in the future.

Moreover, records show that Stephanie and her mother are living together in the house built by petitioner for them at 390
Tumana, San Jose, Baliuag, Bulacan. Petitioner provides for all their needs. Stephanie is closely attached to both her mother
and father. She calls them "Mama" and "Papa". Indeed, they are one normal happy family. Hence, to allow Stephanie to use
her mother’s surname as her middle name will not only sustain her continued loving relationship with her mother but will also
eliminate the stigma of her illegitimacy.

Liberal Construction of Adoption Statutes In Favor Of Adoption –

It is a settled rule that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, should be liberally construed to carry out the beneficent
purposes of adoption.25 The interests and welfare of the adopted child are of primary and paramount consideration,26
hence, every reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate objectives of
the law.27

Lastly, Art. 10 of the New Civil Code provides that: "In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed
that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail."

This provision, according to the Code Commission, "is necessary so that it may tip the scales in favor of right and justice
when the law is doubtful or obscure. It will strengthen the determination of the courts to avoid an injustice which may
apparently be authorized by some way of interpreting the law."28

Hence, since there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by her natural father, like Stephanie, to use, as middle
name her mother’s surname, we find no reason why she should not be allowed to do so.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is partly MODIFIED in the sense that Stephanie should be
allowed to use her mother’s surname "GARCIA" as her middle name.

Let the corresponding entry of her correct and complete name be entered in the decree of adoption. SO ORDERED.

4. G.R. No. 143939 November 22, 2001


HEIRS OF ROSARIO POSADAS REALTY, INC., petitioner, vs.ROSENDO BANTUG, respondent.
QUISUMBING, J.:

This is a petition for review seeking reversal of the decision dated August 20, 1999, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 49058, and its resolution dated June 7, 2000, denying reconsideration. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the
Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) that: (1) declared as null and void the contract to sell (Contract No. 151)
entered into by petitioner and respondent, (2) restrained petitioner from further demanding amortization payments from
respondent, (3) authorized respondent to suspend payment of amortization, and (4) ordered petitioner to cease from selling
lots in Rosario Heights, Parañaque until further orders.

The facts as amply summarized by the Court of Appeals are as follows: It appears that in September 1985, private
respondent Rosendo Bantug purchased on installment from petitioner a subdivision lot particularly identified as Lot 22, Block
4, Doña Rosario Heights Subdivision, Sucat, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, and evidenced by Contract to Sell No. 151.

After paying the downpayment and the twenty-one (21) monthly amortizations thereto, private respondent applied for a
housing loan with the Social Security System (SSS) in order to fully satisfy his obligation with petitioner. The loan application,
however, did not materialize due to petitioner's refusal to transfer the title of the property in private respondent's name as
required in the Letter of Guarantee issued by the SSS. Subsequently, private respondent ceased paying the monthly
amortization to petitioner, although he was able to obtain an extension to pay the balance from the latter.

Private respondent then applied for a loan with Premier[e] Development Bank, for the full satisfaction of his obligation with
petitioner, using the subject lot as collateral. However, when he requested petitioner to transfer the title of the subject lot in
his name as this was a requirement in the letter of guarantee of Premier[e] Development Bank, the [petitioner] unjustly
refused to do so despite its previous commitment as allegedly the letter of guarantee is non-acceptable. Exasperated by
petitioner's refusal to issue the deed of sale and to transfer the title of the subject property, private respondent sought redress
before the Office of Appeals, Adjudication and Legal Affairs; HLURB via a complaint for specific performance.1

Housing and Land Use Arbiter Cesar A. Manuel ruled that petitioner's notarial cancellation of the contract to sell was invalid
and meant only to harass respondent, since it was done after the filing of the complaint before the HLURB. While respondent
incurred delay in paying his amortization, petitioner condoned the same when it accepted late payments on several
occasions. However, he also noted that petitioner was not under any obligation to execute a deed of sale and transfer the
title of the property to respondent's name because the latter had not yet paid for the lot in full. Further, according to the
arbiter, petitioner was not obligated to accept the letter of guarantee of Premiere Development Bank since the letter
contained a mere offer from the bank that did not appear to have been accepted by respondent. The arbiter ruled that the
reliefs being sought by respondent were premature, considering that the Posadas heirs were still arguing among themselves
about the property and that the mortgage on the property was on the verge of being foreclosed by the Philippine Bank of
Communication. Respondent sought review of the arbiter's decision by HLURB's Board of Commissioners which, however,
affirmed the same. Respondent then appealed to the Office of the President, which denied it for lack of merit.

Respondent then brought the matter to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court upheld the resolution of the Office of the
President, except for the latter's ruling that petitioner was remiss in its duty to execute the deed of sale in favor of
respondent. In this regard, the Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the arbiter that petitioner did not have the obligation to
execute the deed of sale since respondent had not complied with the requirements therefor.

Still dissatisfied, petitioner filed the instant petition in this Court, raising the following issues:

I. [THE] COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ITS REFUSAL TO CONSIDER RESPONDENT'S DEFAULT AS MORE
THAN SUFFICIENT BASIS FOR CANCELLATION OF THE CONTRACT TO SELL NO. 151.
II. THE CONTRACT TO SELL NO. 151 HAVING BEEN LEGALLY CANCELLED, RESPONDENT HAS NO MORE
RIGHTS EXCEPT TO REFUND UNDER RA 6552 CERTAIN PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL PAYMENTS MADE,
[PARTICULARLY SINCE] RESPONDENT FAILED TO MEET THE MINIMUM REQUIREMENT OF PAYMENT
EQUIVALENT TO TWO (2) YEARS INSTALLMENT PAYMENT[S].

III. WITH OR WITHOUT CANCELLATION OF CONTRACT TO SELL NO. 151 RESPONDENT IS A BUILDER IN BAD FAITH
ON THE LAND OF ANOTHER AND LOSES WHAT IS BUILT WITHOUT RIGHTS TO INDEMNITY.

IV. [THE] COURT OF APPEALS' DECLARATION THAT PETITIONER [CANNOT] GUARANTEE [THAT] IT WILL BE ABLE
TO ISSUE TITLE FREE FROM LIENS AND ENCUMBRANCES HAS NO BASIS AS IT IS AGAINST EVIDENCE ON
RECORD.2

On April 10, 2001, before respondent had filed his comment to the petition, the parties filed a joint motion to render judgment
based on an amicable settlement. It appears that the parties had earlier settled their differences and agreed to the following
terms and conditions:

1. Petitioner accepts the validity of Contract to Sell 151 and rights of the respondent under such Contract to Sell;

2. Respondent tenders payment of the balance due petitioner on the purchase price of the lot subject of Contract to Sell in
the amount of PHP 31,502.42 plus an additional amount of PHP 51,413.15 as accrued interests and charges, which
petitioner accepts as payment in full of the purchase price of said lot;

3. Respondent makes known for the first time that as early as November 1995, he has transferred his rights in Contract to
Sell No. 151 in favor of CARMEN RAMOS KANEMATSU, of legal age married to Kazuhiko Kanematsu, holder of Republic of
the Philippines Passport No. FF-103796 issued November 29, 1999 with expiry date of November 29, 2004, which petitioner
approves pursuant to its rules on transfers of rights;

4. Petitioner will execute the necessary Deed of Absolute Sale of its title, interest and participation over Lot 22 Blk. 4 of the
Doña Rosario Heights Subdivision in favor of transferee CARMEN RAMOS KANEMATSU, however respondent undertakes
to cause the issuance of the proper title in the name of his transferee aforestated as well as assume all expenses incidental
thereto including unpaid real taxes as well as secure the signature on the Deed of Absolute Sale by the Estate of Juan
Posadas III; and will deliver said Deed of Absolute Sale together with the Owner's Duplicate of Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 387496 of the Register of Deeds for Rizal unto transferee CARMEN RAMOS KANEMUTSU [sic];

5. Parties declare that they each release the other from any and all claims whatsoever that one may have against the other,
so that parties herein mutually release and free each other from any and all claims of whatsoever nature and character and
that this Amicable Settlement absolutely and irrevocably terminates this litigation to their mutual satisfaction.3

The motion was signed by petitioner, represented by its vice president and treasurer Maria Elena M. Posadas, and by
respondent, assisted by their respective counsels. Finding the terms and conditions of the abovecited amicable settlement
between the parties not contrary to law, morals, good custom and public policy, the motion for judgment based thereon ought
to be granted.

Inasmuch as the parties to this case have already arrived at an amicable settlement, we find no need to pass upon the
issues raised by petitioner. The petition itself is now moot.

WHEREFORE, as prayed for, the joint motion to render judgment based on the amicable settlement between the parties
abovequoted is GRANTED. Herein petition is declared MOOT. Petitioner Heirs of Rosario Posadas Realty, Inc. and
respondent Rosendo Bantug are ORDERED to faithfully abide by the terms and conditions of their amicable settlement. No
pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.

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