Funa vs Agra
Issue: Was the designation of Agra as Acting Solgen and Justice Sec,
constitutional?
Ruling: No. It was unconstitutional. While all other appointive officials in the
civil service are allowed to hold other office or employment in the
government during their tenure when such is allowed by law or by the
primary functions of their positions, members of the Cabinet, their deputies
and assistants may do so only when expressly authorized by the
Constitution itself. Being designated as the Acting Secretary of Justice
concurrently with his position of Acting Solicitor General, therefore, Agra
was undoubtedly covered by Section 13, Article VII, supra, whose text and
spirit were too clear to be differently read. Hence, Agra could not validly
hold any other office or employment during his tenure as the Acting
Solicitor General, because the Constitution has not otherwise so provided.
Issue: Does incompatibility exist between the office of the Sec of Justice and
Office of Solgen?
Ruling: Yes. The crucial test in determining whether incompatibility exists
between two offices was laid out in People v. Green - whether one office is
subordinate to the other, in the sense that one office has the right to
interfere with the other. Clearly, the primary functions of the Office of the
Solicitor General are not related or necessary to the primary functions of
the Department of Justice. Considering that the nature and duties of the
two offices are such as to render it improper, from considerations of public
policy, for one person to retain both, an incompatibility between the offices
exists, further warranting the declaration of Agra’s designation as the Acting
Secretary of Justice, concurrently with his designation as the Acting Solicitor
General, to be void for being in violation of the express provisions of the
Constitution.
Posadas vs Sandiganbayan GR 168951, July 17, 2013
Issue: By holding concurrent positions as University Chancellor and TMC
Project Director, did Posadas violate the constitutional provision against
double employment and double compensation?
Ruling: Yes. Under Section 2(d), Rule III of the Revised Omnibus Rules on
Appointments and Other Personnel Actions, appointments of personnel
under Foreign-assisted projects shall be issued and approved as
coterminous with the project. The MOA itself provides that the “services of
the contractual personnel of the University for the Project shall be
discontinued upon its completion or termination.” The appointment of Dr.
Posadas as TMC Project Director falls within the prohibition against holding
of multiple positions since there is no distinction in Section 7, Article IX-B as
to the employment status, i.e., whether permanent, temporary or
coterminous. Petitioners failed to cite any law to justify Dr. Posadas’
holding of concurrent positions as Chancellor and TMC Project Director.
(additional for recit) Section 7, Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution: Unless
otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no
appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the
Government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof,
including government-owned or controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries.
Rule XVIII of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of E.O. No. 292,44
Sec. 1. No appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in
the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof,
including government-owned or controlled corporations with original
charters or their subsidiaries, unless otherwise allowed by law or by the
primary functions of his position.
Sec. 2. No elective or appointive public officer or employee shall receive
additional, double, or indirect compensation, unless specifically authorized
by law,

City of General Santos vs COA
G.R. No. 199439, April 22, 2014
Issue: Can Government agencies and local governments provide
supplementary retirement or pension plans for their employees?
Ruling: No. In order to be able to deliver more effective and efficient
services, the law allows local government units the power to reorganize. In
doing so, they should be given leeway to entice their employees to avail of
severance benefits that the local government can afford. However, local
government units may not provide such when it amounts to a
supplementary retirement benefit scheme. Section 28, paragraph (b) of
Commonwealth Act No. 186, otherwise known as the Government Service
Insurance Act, as amended by Republic Act No. 4968 proscribes all
supplementary retirement or pension plans for government employees:
(b) Hereafter no insurance or retirement plan for officers or employees shall
be created by any employer. All supplementary retirement or pension plans
heretofore in force in any government office, agency, or instrumentality or
corporation owned and controlled by the government, are hereby declared
inoperative or abolished: Provided, That the rights of those who are already
eligible to retire thereunder shall not be affected.
Funa vs. Duque, G.R. No. 191672, Nov. 25, 2014
Issue: Is the ex officio designation of CSC Chairman Duque, Pursuant to EO
846, as member of the governing boards of the GSIS, PHIC, ECC and HDMF---
valid and consitutuional?
NO. It is unconstitutional for violating the prohibition against holding
multiple offices and impairing the independence of the CSC. When the CSC
Chairman sits as a member of the governing Boards of the GSIS,
PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF, he may exercise powers and functions, which
are not anymore derived from his position as CSC Chairman, such as
imposing interest on unpaid or unremitted contributions, issuing guidelines
for the accreditation of health care providers, or approving restructuring
proposals in the payment of unpaid loan amortizations. The Court also
notes that Duque’s designation as member of the governing Boards of the
GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF entitles him to receive per diem, a form
of additional compensation that is disallowed by the concept of an ex officio
position by virtue of its clear contravention of the proscription set by
Section 2, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution. This situation goes against
the principle behind an ex officio position, and must, therefore, be held
unconstitutional.
Issue: Is Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-a, Book V of Executive Order No. 292---
valid and constitutional?
Yes. Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of EO 292 is clear that the CSC
Chairman’s membership in a governing body is dependent on the condition
that the functions of the government entity where he will sit as its Board
member must affect the career development, employment status, rights,
privileges, and welfare of government officials and employees. Based on
this, the Court finds no irregularity in Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V
of EO 292 because matters affecting the career development, rights and
welfare of government employees are among the primary functions of the
CSC and are consequently exercised through its Chairman. The CSC
Chairman’s membership therein must, therefore, be considered to be
derived from his position as such. Accordingly, the constitutionality of
Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of EO 292 is upheld.
MARINA v. COA
G.R. No. 185812 January 13, 2015
(guys, di ko sure sa last two issues if pareho rba sila or ag first issue is more
general and ag second is case-specific)
Issue: Does the grant of allowances and benefits to the officers and
employees of MARINA constitute double compensation?
Ruling: Yes. Republic Act No. 6758 deems all allowances and benefits
received by government officials and employees as incorporated in the
standardized salary, unless excluded by law or an issuance by the
Department of Budget and Management. The integration of the benefits
and allowances is by legal fiction.
The disallowed benefits and allowances of petitioner Maritime Industry
Authority’s officials and employees were not excluded by law or an issuance
by the Department of Budget and Management. Thus, these were deemed
already given to the officials and employees when they received their basic
salaries. Their receipt of the disallowed benefits and allowances was
tantamount to double compensation.
Issue: In case of disallowance, who should be liable to refund the amounts
released?
Ruling: Officers who acted in bad faith or were grossly negligent. With
regard to the disallowance of salaries, emoluments, benefits, and
allowances of government employees, prevailing jurisprudence provides
that recipients or payees need not refund these disallowed amounts when
they received these in good faith. Government officials and employees who
received benefits or allowances, which were disallowed, may keep the
amounts received if there is no finding of bad faith and the disbursement
was made in good faith.
On the other hand, officers who participated in the approval of the
disallowed allowances or benefits are required to refund only the amounts
received when they are found to be in bad faith or grossly negligent
amounting to bad faith.
Issue: Who should be liable to refund the amounts released and paid to the
officers and employees of MARINA which were disallowed by COA?
Ruling: The approving officers and Erlinda Baltazar. The records do not show
the reason why Erlinda Baltazar, petitioner Maritime Industry Authority’s
cashier, received high amounts for the allowances as shown in the notices
of disallowance.
The amount given to Erlinda Baltazar is exorbitant especially when
contrasted with the other officers and employees of petitioner Maritime
Industry Authority receiving the same allowance. The disparity in the
amounts given to Erlinda Baltazar compared to the other officers and
employees is too substantial to consider her and the approving officers to
be in good faith when Erlinda Baltazar received the amounts. Thus, Erlinda
Baltazar and the approving officers are solidarily liable to refund all amounts
received by Erlinda Baltazar based on what was disallowed by respondent
Commission on Audit.
Carpio-Morales vs Binay
Issue: In this jurisdiction, is there legal authority to sustain the
condonation doctrine?
Ruling: Generally speaking, condonation has been defined as "[a] victim's
express or implied forgiveness of an offense, [especially] by treating the
offender as if there had been no offense."
Court simply finds no legal authority to sustain the condonation doctrine in
this jurisdiction. It was a doctrine adopted from one class of US rulings way
back in 1959 and thus, out of touch from - and now rendered obsolete by -
the current legal regime. In consequence, it is high time for this Court to
abandon the condonation doctrine that originated from Pascual, and
affirmed in the cases following the same, such as Aguinaldo, Salalima,
Mayor Garcia, and Governor Garcia, Jr. which were all relied upon by the
CA. Court's abandonment of the condonation doctrine should be
prospective in application for the reason that judicial decisions applying or
interpreting the laws or the Constitution, until reversed, shall form part of
the legal system of the Philippines. Unto this Court devolves the sole
authority to interpret what the Constitution means, and all persons are
bound to follow its interpretation.

Tetangco vs COA GR 215061, June 6, 2017

Issue: Can petitioners invoke good faith in approving the grant of EMEs to
the ex officio members of the monetary board?

Ruling: No. This COA found that the MBM, in approving the irregular
allowance, were remiss in their duty to protect the interest of the Bank.
They ought to know that the ex officio members of the Monetary Board
were already receiving the same allowance from their respective
Departments, hence, they were no longer entitled to the additional EMEs.
For failure of MBM to exercise the highest degree of responsibility required
by law, their defense of good faith fails. The disregard of several case laws
and COA directives, as in this case amounts to gross negligence, hence,
petitioners cannot be presumed in good faith.