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THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 164195. February 6, 2007.]

APO FRUITS CORPORATION and HIJO PLANTATION,


INC., petitioners, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J : p

Apo Fruits Corporation (AFC) and Hijo Plantation, Inc. (HPI) are the registered
owners of five parcels of agricultural lands located in San Isidro, Tagum, Davao
Province, to wit:

APO FRUITS CORPORATION

Transfer Certificate ofArea (Ha.)

Title (TCT) 1 No.

T-113359 2 115.2179

T-113366 3 525.1304

HIJO PLANTATION, INC. 4

TCT No.Area (Ha.)

T-10361155.8408

T-10362170.7980

T-10363478.8920 5

On 12 October 1995, AFC and HPI voluntarily offered to sell the above parcels of
land to the government. 6 After the initial processing at the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR) of the Voluntary Offer to Sell (VOS) 7 application of AFC
and HPI, it was referred to the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) for initial
valuation. On 16 October 1996, AFC and HPI received separately from the DAR's
Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO) of Davao province a notice of land
acquisition and valuation, informing AFC that the value of the properties has
been placed at P86,900,925.88 or P165,484.47 per hectare 8 while HPI's
properties were valued at P164,478,178.14. 9 Both AFC and HPI considered the
valuations unreasonably low and inadequate as just compensation for the
properties.

On 5 November 1996, AFC rejected the valuation for both TCTs No. T-113366
and No. 113359. 10 AFC applied for the shifting of the mode of acquisition for TCT
No. 113359 11 from VOS to Voluntary Land Transfer/Direct Payment
Scheme. 12 HPI also rejected the valuation of its three parcels of land covered by
TCTs No. T-10361, No. T-10362 and No. T-10363. 13

Owing to the rejection by both AFC and HPI of LBP's valuation, the DAR
requested LBP to deposit the amounts equivalent to their valuations in the
names and for the accounts of AFC and HPI. 14 AFC thereafter withdrew the
amount of P26,409,549.86, while HPI withdrew the amount of P45,481,706.76,
both in cash from LBP. The DAR PARO then directed the Register of Deeds of
Davao to cancel the TCTs of AFC and HPI to the said properties and to issue a
new one in the name of the Republic of the Philippines.

After the issuance of the certificate of title in the name of the Republic of the
Philippines, the Register of Deeds of Davao, upon the request of the DAR, issued
TCTs and Certificates of Land Ownership Award to qualified farmer-beneficiaries.

On 14 February 1997, AFC and HPI filed separate complaints for determination
of just compensation with the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB). Despite the
lapse of more than three years from the filing of the complaints, the DARAB
failed and refused to render a decision on the valuation of the land. Hence, two
complaints 15 for determination and payment of just compensation were filed by
AFC and HPI before Branch 2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tagum City
(acting as a Special Agrarian Court), which were subsequently consolidated.

Agrarian Case No. 54-2000 16 filed by AFC covers two parcels of land in San
Isidro, Tagum, Davao, with an aggregate area of 640.3483 hectares previously
assessed by LBP with a valuation of P86,900,925.88.
On the other hand, Agrarian Case No. 55-2000 17 filed by HPI relates to the other
three parcels of land in Tagum City, with a total area of 814.5308 hectares,
likewise, previously assessed by LBP with a valuation of P164,478,178.14. DIcSHE

Summons was served on 23 May 2000 to defendants DAR and LBP. The trial
court appointed as Commissioners 18 persons it considered competent, qualified
and disinterested to determine the proper valuation of the properties.

LBP submitted its Answer on 26 July 2000, 19 while the DAR Secretary,
represented by PARO Pedro P. Gumabao, filed its Answer 20 on 18 August 2000.

The pre-trial order issued by the trial court reads:

This Court will determine the all-embracing concept of Just


Compensation, and whether the plaintiff is entitled to damages, and also
whether the value of the land and improvements as determined by the
Land Valuation of Land Bank for the determination of just compensation,
and whether the plaintiff has violated Section 13 of DARAB new rules
and procedure. 21

The commissioners, together with all the representatives of the parties,


conducted an ocular inspection first on 25 August 2000 22 and again on 16
December 2000.23

On 21 May 2001, the court-appointed commissioners submitted their appraisal


report. 24

On 14 September 2001, the case was considered submitted for decision. 25

After hearing, the trial court rendered a decision 26 dated 25 September 2001,
the fallo thereof reads:

WHEREFORE, consistent with all the foregoing premises, judgment is


hereby rendered by this Special Agrarian Court where it has determined
judiciously and now hereby fixed the just compensation for the
1,388.6027 hectares of lands and its improvements owned by the
plaintiffs: APO FRUITS CORPORATION and HIJO PLANTATION, INC., as
follows:

First — Hereby ordering after having determined and fixed the


fair, reasonable and just compensation of the 1,338.6027
hectares of land and standing crops owned by plaintiffs —
APO FRUITS CORPORATION and HIJO PLANTATION, INC.,
based at only P103.33 per sq. meter, ONE BILLION
THREE HUNDRED EIGHTY-THREE MILLION ONE
HUNDRED SEVENTY-NINE THOUSAND PESOS
(P1,383,179,000.00), Philippine Currency, under the
current value of the Philippine Peso, to be paid jointly and
severally to the herein PLAINTIFFS by the Defendants-
Department of Agrarian Reform and its financial
intermediary and co-defendant Land Bank of the
Philippines, thru its Land Valuation Office;

Second — Hereby ordering Defendants — DEPARTMENT OF


AGRARIAN REFORM and/or LAND BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES, thru its Land Valuation Office, to pay
plaintiffs-APO FRUITS CORPORATION and HIJO
PLANTATION, INC., interests on the above-fixed amount of
fair, reasonable and just compensation equivalent to the
market interest rates aligned with 91-day Treasury Bills,
from the date of the taking in December 9, 1996, until fully
paid, deducting the amount of the previous payment which
plaintiffs received as/and from the initial valuation;

Third — Hereby ordering Defendants — DEPARTMENT OF


AGRARIAN REFORM and/or LAND BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES, thru its Land Valuation Office, to pay jointly
and severally the Commissioners' fees herein taxed as part
of the costs pursuant to Section 12, Rule 67 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, equivalent to, and computed at
Two and One-Half (21/2) percent of the determined and
fixed amount as the fair, reasonable and just
compensation of plaintiffs' land and standing crops plus
interest equivalent to the interest of the 91-Day Treasury
Bills from date of taking until full payment;

Fourth — Hereby ordering Defendants — DEPARTMENT OF


AGRARIAN REFORM and/or LAND BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES, thru its Land Valuation Office, to pay jointly
and severally the attorney's fees to plaintiffs equivalent to,
and computed at ten (10%) Percent of the determined and
fixed amount as the fair, reasonable and just
compensation of plaintiffs' land and standing crops, plus
interest equivalent to the 91-Day Treasury Bills from date
of taking until the full amount is fully paid;
Fifth — Hereby ordering Defendants — DEPARTMENT OF
AGRARIAN REFORM and/or LAND BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES, thru its Land Valuation Office to deduct from
the total amount fixed as fair, reasonable and just
compensation of plaintiffs' properties the initial payment
paid to the plaintiffs;

Sixth — Hereby ordering Defendants — DEPARTMENT OF


AGRARIAN REFORM and/or LAND BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES, thru its Land Valuation Office, to pay the
costs of the suit; and

Seventh — Hereby ordering Defendants — DEPARTMENT OF


AGRARIAN REFORM and/or LAND BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES, thru its Land Valuation Office, to pay all the
aforementioned amounts thru The Clerk of Court of this
Court, in order that said Court Officer could collect for
payment any docket fee deficiency, should there be any,
from the plaintiffs. 27

LBP filed a Motion for Reconsideration 28 on 5 October 2001 mainly on the


ground that the trial court based its valuation on the value of residential and
industrial lands in the area forgetting that the lands involved are agricultural. LBP
also sought a reconsideration of the award of attorney's fees, the interest on the
compensation over the lands and the order of the trial court regarding the
payment of commissioners' fees.

In an Order dated 5 December 2001, 29 the trial court modified its decision as
follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the


following modifications as they are hereby made on the dispositive
portion of this Court's consolidated decision be made and entered in the
following manner, to wit:

On the Second Paragraph of the Dispositive Portion which now reads as


follows, as modified:

Second — Hereby ordering Defendants — DEPARTMENT


OF AGRARIAN REFORM and/or LAND BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES, thru its Land Valuation Office, to pay
plaintiffs-APO FRUITS CORPORATION and HIJO
PLANTATION, INC., interest at the rate of Twelve
(12%) Percent per annum on the above-fixed
amount of fair, reasonable and just compensation
computed from the time the complaint was filed
until the finality of this decision. After this decision
becomes final and executory, the rate of TWELVE
(12%) PERCENT per annum shall be additionally
imposed on the total obligation until payment
thereof is satisfied, deducting the amounts of the
previous payments by Defendant-LBP received as
initial valuation;

On the Third Paragraph of the Dispositive Portion which Now Reads As


Follows, As Modified:

Third — Hereby ordering Defendants — DEPARTMENT OF


AGRARIAN REFORM and/or LAND BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES, thru its Land Valuation Office, to pay
jointly and severally the Commissioners' fees herein
taxed as part of the costs pursuant to Section 12,
Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
equivalent to, and computed at Two and One-Half
(2 1/2) percent of the determined and fixed
amount as the fair, reasonable and just
compensation of plaintiffs' land and standing crops
and improvements;

On the Fourth Paragraph of the Dispositive Portion which Now Reads As


follows, As Modified:

Fourth — Hereby ordering Defendants — DEPARTMENT OF


AGRARIAN REFORM and/or LAND BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES, thru its Land Valuation Office, to pay
jointly and severally the attorney's fees to plaintiffs
equivalent to, and computed at ten (10%) Percent
of the determined and fixed amount as the fair,
reasonable and just compensation of plaintiffs' land
and standing crops and improvements.

Except for the above-stated modifications, the consolidated decision


stands and shall remain in full force and effect in all other respects
thereof. 30
From this Order, LBP filed a Notice of Appeal dated 27 December 2001. 31 The
same was given due course in the Order of the RTC dated 15 May 2002. 32 In the
same Order, the RTC set aside its Order dated 5 December 2001 granting
execution pending appeal.

Subsequently, the trial court, citing this Court's ruling in the case of " Land Bank
of the Philippines v. De Leon," 33 that a petition for review, not an ordinary
appeal, is the proper mode of appeal from a decision on the determination of
just compensation rendered by a special agrarian court, issued an Order dated 4
November 200234 recalling its Order dated 15 May 2002 and directed LBP to file a
Petition for Review within the reglementary period. LBP filed a Motion for
Reconsideration 35claiming that the case of Land Bank of the Philippines v. De
Leon was not yet final at that time; hence, it is not certain whether the decision
in that case would have a retroactive effect and that appeal is the appropriate
remedy. This was denied by the trial court in its Order dated 12 February
2003. 36

On 28 March 2003, LBP filed a Petition for Certiorari 37 before the Court of
Appeals assailing the 4 November 2002 and 12 February 2003 orders of the trial
court.

The Court of Appeals found the petition of LBP meritorious. In a decision 38 dated
12 February 2004, the Court of Appeals held:

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the assailed orders dated


November 4, 2002 and February 12, 2003 are NULLIFIED and,
accordingly, SET ASIDE. 39

AFC and HPI filed a joint Motion for Reconsideration 40 which the Court of
Appeals denied in its Resolution dated 21 June 2004. 41

Earlier, on 23 January 2003, DAR filed its own separate petition before the Court
of Appeals by way of a Petition for Review. 42 In a Resolution 43 dated 2 April
2003, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition of the DAR for failure to state
the material dates under Rule 42, Section 2, 44 of the Rules of Court. The
appellate court held:

The importance of stating the material dates cannot be overemphasized.


It is only through a statement thereof in the petition can it be
determined whether or not the petition was filed on time. For its failure
to state the material dates, the petition can and should be outrightly
dismissed.
xxx xxx xxx

The petition is also defective in that it failed to attach material portions


of the record as would support the allegations in the petition. More
specifically, copies of the alleged motion for reconsideration filed by the
DAR, the order denying it, and the notice of appeal were not attached to
the petition.

For all the foregoing, the court has no alternative but to dismiss the
petition.cSCADE

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. 45

The Decision of the Court of Appeals in the Petition filed by the DAR in CA-G.R.
SP No. 74879 became final and executory and entry of judgment was issued by
the appellate court on 7 May 2003. 46

On the other hand, from the decision of the Court of Appeals in the Petition filed
by LBP in CA-G.R. SP No. 76222, AFC and HPI filed the present Petition for
Review onCertiorari raising the following issues:

I.

WHETHER OR NOT THE QUESTIONED DECISION AND RESOLUTION


ARE IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR WITH THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF
THE SUPREME COURT?

II.

WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT LBP IS BOUND BY THE DECISION OF


COURT OF APPEALS IN CA-G.R. SP NO. 74879 AND IS THEREFORE
PRECLUDED FROM FILING CA-G.R. SP NO. 76222?

III.

WHETHER OR NOT THE FILING BY RESPONDENT LBP OF CA-G.R. SP


NO. 76222 IS ALREADY BARRED BY RES JUDICATA?

IV.

WHETHER OR NOT THE RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT IN THE


ARLENE DE LEON CASE, GIVING ONLY PROSPECTIVE EFFECT TO ITS
EARLIER RESOLUTION AS TO THE PROPER MODE OF APPEAL FROM
DECISIONS OF SPECIAL AGRARIAN COURTS IS APPLICABLE IN THE
INSTANT CASE?

V.

WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT LBP WAS DEPRIVED OF DUE


PROCESS AND/OR OF ITS RIGHT TO APPEAL?

VI.

WHETHER OR NOT THE SUBJECT PETITION (CA-G.R. SP NO. 76222)


WAS MERELY INTERPOSED TO DELAY THE EXECUTION OF SPECIAL
AGRARIAN COURT'S "DECISION" WHICH IS BASED ON EVIDENCE DULY
PRESENTED AND PROVED? 47

AFC and HPI pray that the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 76222 be reversed and set aside and that the Decision of the RTC
dated 25 September 2001 in Agrarian Cases No. 54-2000 and No. 55-2000 be
declared as final and executory. 48

In the case of Land Bank of the Philippines v. De Leon, decided on 10 September


2002, respondents are the registered owners of a parcel of land. They voluntarily
offered the subject property for sale to the government pursuant to Republic Act
No. 6657. Unable to agree on the valuation of the property offered by the DAR,
respondents filed a petition with the RTC (acting as a Special Agrarian Court) to
fix the just compensation of the property. In due time, the RTC rendered
judgment fixing the compensation of the property. Before the Court of Appeals,
the DAR and LBP filed separate petitions. The DAR filed a Petition for Review of
the decision of the RTC which was assigned to the Special 3rd Division of the
appellate court. LBP, on the other hand, raised the case on appeal to the Court
of Appeals by way of ordinary appeal. The same was assigned to the 4th Division
of the Court of Appeals. The petition of the DAR was given due course. On the
other hand, the Court of Appeals dismissed LBP's ordinary appeal on the ground
that the same was erroneous. LBP filed a petition for review before this Court.
In Land Bank, we explained:

A petition for review, not an ordinary appeal, is the proper procedure in


effecting an appeal from decisions of the Regional Trial Courts acting as
Special Agrarian Courts in cases involving the determination of just
compensation to the landowners concerned. Section 60 of RA 6657
clearly and categorically states that the said mode of appeal should be
adopted. There is no room for a contrary interpretation. Where the law
is clear and categorical, there is no room for construction, but only
application. 49

LBP filed a Motion for Reconsideration. In a Resolution of this Court dated 20


March 2003, this Court emphasized the prospective application of the Decision
dated 10 September 2002.

WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration dated October 16, 2002


and the supplement to the motion for reconsideration dated November
11, 2002 are PARTIALLY GRANTED. While we clarify that the Decision of
this Court dated September 10, 2002 stands, our ruling therein that a
petition for review is the correct mode of appeal from decisions of
Special Agrarian Courts shall apply only to cases appealed after
the finality of this Resolution. 50(Emphasis supplied.)

Essentially therefore, the rule is that a decision of the RTC acting as a Special
Agrarian Court should be brought to the Court of Appeals via a Petition for
Review. The Court of Appeals will no longer entertain ordinary appeals thereon.
However, this rule applies only after the finality of the Resolution of this Court
in Land Bank of the Philippines v. De Leon dated 20 March 2003.

In this case, the Court of Appeals correctly ruled when it gave due course to the
appeal of LBP. LBP's Notice of Appeal was filed on 27 December 2001. This was
given due course by the RTC in an Order dated 15 May 2002. LBP's appeal was,
thus, perfected before this Court's Resolution in the aforementioned Land Bank
of the Philippines v. De Leon case. Hence, the Court of Appeals could give due
course to LBP's petition.

Next we proceed to determine the issue of whether or not the petition of LBP
before the Court of Appeals is barred by the disposition of the Petition for Review
filed by the DAR in CA-G.R. SP No. 74879 on the ground of res judicata. EHASaD

The following are the elements of res judicata:

(a)The former judgment must be final;

(b)The court which rendered judgment must have jurisdiction over the
parties and the subject matter;

(c)It must be a judgment on the merits; and

(d)There must be between the first and second actions identity of


parties, subject matter, and cause of action. 51
In this case, the third element of res judicata, i.e., that the former judgment
must be on the merits, is not present. It must be remembered that the dismissal
of CA-G.R. SP No. 74879 was based on technicality, that is, for failure on the
part of the DAR to state material dates required by the rules. Having been
dismissed based on a technicality and not on the merits, the principle of res
judicata does not apply. Res judicata applies only where judgment on the merits
is finally rendered on the first. 52

Having disposed of the procedural issues involved herein, we shall now proceed
to resolve the substantive questions in this case.

This Court is aware that in the instant case, since LBP's appeal before the Court
of Appeals is to be given due course, the normal procedure is for us to remand
the case to the appellate court for further proceedings. However, when there is
enough basis on which a proper evaluation of the merits of petitioner's case may
be had, the Court may dispense with the time-consuming procedure in order to
prevent further delays in the disposition of the case. 53 Indeed, remand of the
case to the lower court for further reception of evidence is not conducive to the
speedy administration of justice and it becomes unnecessary where the Court is
in a position to resolve the dispute based on the records before it. On many
occasions, the Court, in the public interest and expeditious administration of
justice, has resolved action on the merits, instead of remanding them for further
proceedings, as where the ends of justice would not be subserved by the remand
of the case 54 or where the trial court had already received all the evidence of
the parties. 55 Briefly stated, a remand of the instant case to the Court of Appeals
would serve no purpose save to further delay its disposition contrary to the spirit
of fair play.

It is already an accepted rule of procedure for us to strive to settle the entire


controversy in a single proceeding, 56 leaving no root or branch to bear the seeds
of future litigation. If, based on the records, the pleadings, and other evidence,
the dispute can be resolved by us, we will do so to serve the ends of justice
instead of remanding the case to the lower court for further proceedings. 57

The complete records of this case have already been elevated to this Court. The
pleadings on record will fully support this adjudication. We have painstakingly
gone over all of LBP's representations and arguments, and we found that the
material and decisive facts are hardly disputable. From another perspective, due
consideration should also be given to AFC and HPI for having voluntarily offered
to sell their properties, a clear indication of AFC and HPI's willingness to
participate in the agrarian reform program of the government. In turn, they must
be given compensation that is just and timely. Records indicate that the case has
been dragging on for more than ten years now without the landowners having
been fully compensated. We cannot countenance such a glaring indifference to
AFC and HPI's rights as land owners — they should be afforded all that is just
and due them. To be sure, they deserve nothing less than full compensation to
give effect to their substantive rights.

While eminent domain lies as one of the inherent powers of the state, there is no
requirement that it undertake a prolonged procedure, or that the payment of the
private owner be protracted as far as practicable. 58

It is not controverted that this case started way back on 12 October 1995, when
AFC and HPI voluntarily offered to sell the properties to the DAR. In view of the
failure of the parties to agree on the valuation of the properties, the Complaint
for Determination of Just Compensation was filed before the DARAB on 14
February 1997. Despite the lapse of more than three years from the filing of the
complaint, the DARAB failed to render a decision on the valuation of the land.
Meantime, the titles over the properties of AFC and HPI had already been
cancelled and in their place a new certificate of title was issued in the name of
the Republic of the Philippines, even as far back as 9 December 1996. A period
of almost 10 years has lapsed. For this reason, there is no dispute that this case
has truly languished for a long period of time, the delay being mainly attributable
to both official inaction and indecision, 59 particularly on the determination of the
amount of just compensation, to the detriment of AFC and HPI, which to date,
have yet to be fully compensated for the properties which are already in the
hands of farmer-beneficiaries, who, due to the lapse of time, may have already
converted or sold the land awarded to them.

Verily, these two cases could have been disposed with dispatch were it not for
LBP's counsel causing unnecessary delay. At the inception of this case, DARAB,
an agency of the DAR which was commissioned by law to determine just
compensation, sat on the cases for three years, which was the reason that AFC
and HPI filed the cases before the RTC. We underscore the pronouncement of
the RTC that "the delay by DARAB in the determination of just compensation
could only mean the reluctance of the Department of Agrarian Reform and the
Land Bank of the Philippines to pay the claim of just compensation by corporate
landowners." 60

To allow the taking of landowners' properties, and to leave them empty-handed


while government withholds compensation is undoubtedly oppressive. 61
It is in light of the foregoing that this Court will now undertake the final
resolution of the present controversy which, as already elucidated, is within the
power of this Court to do.

The concept of just compensation embraces not only the correct


determination of the amount to be paid to the owners of the land, but
also the payment of the land within a reasonable time from its taking.
Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered "just"
inasmuch as the property owner is being made to suffer the
consequences of being immediately deprived of his land while being
made to wait for a decade or more before actually receiving the
amount necessary to cope with his loss. 62 Just compensation is defined as
the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the
expropriator. 63 It has been repeatedly stressed by this Court that the measure is
not the taker's gain but the owner's loss. 64The word "just" is used to intensify
the meaning of the word "compensation" to convey the idea that the equivalent
to be rendered for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full, and
ample. 65

The two main issues, thus, for determination of this Court are the date of the
taking of the property and the amount of just compensation. 66

First, it is settled that the property was taken on 9 December 1996, when a
Certificate of Title was issued in favor of the Republic of the Philippines, and the
Certificates of Title of AFC and HPI were cancelled. The farmer-beneficiaries
themselves took possession of the subject properties on 2 January 1997. 67

Second, on payment of just compensation, we have previously held:

Eminent domain is an inherent power of the State that enables


it to forcibly acquire private lands intended for public use upon
payment of just compensation to the owner. Obviously, there is no
need to expropriate where the owner is willing to sell under terms also
acceptable to the purchaser, in which case an ordinary deed of sale may
be agreed upon by the parties. It is only where the owner is unwilling to
sell, or cannot accept the price or other conditions offered by the
vendee, that the power of eminent domain will come into play to assert
the paramount authority of the State over the interests of the property
owner. Private rights must then yield to the irresistible demands of the
public interest on the time-honored justification, as in the case of the
police power, that the welfare of the people is the supreme law.
But for all its primacy and urgency, the power of expropriation is by no
means absolute (as indeed no power is absolute). The limitation is found
in the constitutional injunction that "private property shall not be taken
for public use without just compensation" and in the abundant
jurisprudence that has evolved from the interpretation of this
principle. Basically, the requirements for a proper exercise of the
power are: (1) public use and (2) just
compensation. 68 (Emphases supplied.)

Section 57 of Republic Act No. 6657 (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law)


provides:

SEC. 57.Special Jurisdiction. — The Special Agrarian Courts shall have


original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination
of just compensation to landowners, and the prosecution of all criminal
offenses under this Act. The Rules of Court shall apply to all proceedings
before the Special Agrarian Courts, unless modified by this Act.

The Special Agrarian Courts shall decide all appropriate cases under
their special jurisdiction within thirty (30) days from submission of the
case for decision.

To implement the provisions of Republic Act No. 6657, Rule XIII, Section 11 of
the DARAB Rules of Procedure, provides:

Land Valuation and Preliminary Determination and Payment of Just


Compensation. — The decision of the Adjudicator on land valuation and
preliminary determination and payment of just compensation
shall not be appealable to the Board but shall be brought directly to the
Regional Trial Courts designated as Special Agrarian Courts within fifteen
(15) days from receipt of the notice thereof. Any party shall be entitled
to only one motion for reconsideration. (Emphasis supplied.)

The next question now crops up, who shall determine just compensation? It is
now settled that the valuation of property in eminent domain is essentially a
judicial function which is vested with the RTC acting as Special Agrarian Court.
The same cannot be lodged with administrative agencies 69 and may not be
usurped by any other branch or official of the government. 70

We now come to the issue of just compensation.

LBP argues that the trial court's valuation of the subject landholdings has
incorporated irrelevant and/or immaterial factors such as the schedule of market
values given by the City Assessor of Tagum, the comparative sales of adjacent
lands and the commissioners' report. 71

Section 17 of Republic Act No. 6657, which is particularly relevant, providing as it


does the guideposts for the determination of just compensation, reads, as
follows:

Sec. 17.Determination of Just Compensation. — In determining just


compensation, the cost of acquisition of the land, the current value of
like properties, its nature, actual use and income, the sworn valuation by
the owner, the tax declarations, and the assessment made by
government assessors shall be considered. The social and economic
benefits contributed by the farmers and the farm-workers and by the
Government to the property as well as the non-payment of taxes or
loans secured from any government financing institution on the said
land shall be considered as additional factors to determine its
valuation. 72

The RTC provided the following elucidation in its assailed decision:

The recommendation of the Commissioners' Report for a value of P85.00


per sq.m. or P850,000.00 per hectare (sic) is founded on evidence. The
schedule of market values of the City of Tagum as per its 1993 and 1994
Revision of Assessment and Property Classification (Exhibit "J-6" and
"CC-6") give the lowest value for residential land at P100/sq.m. for 4th
class residential land in 1993. In 1994, it gave the lowest value of
P80.00/sq.m. for barangay residential lot. It appears that certain
portions of the land in question have been classified as Medium
Industrial District (Exhibit "J-4" and "CC-4"). The lowest value as for
industrial land, 3rd class in a barangay is P130.00 sq.m. The average of
these figures, using the lowest values in Exhibit "6" and "CC-6" yields
the figure of P103.33 which is even higher by 22.2% than that
recommended by the Commissioners. It is even of judicial notice that
assessments made by local governments are much lower than real
market value. Likewise, the value of the improvements thereon, not
even considered in the average of P103.33. If considered, this will
necessarily result in a higher average value.

In said Appraisal Report, mention has been made on "improvements,"


and our Supreme Court in Republic vs. Gonzales, 50 O.G. 2461, decreed
the rule, as follows:
If such improvements are permanent in character, consisting of
good paved road, playgrounds, water system, sewerage and
general leveling of the land suitable for residential lots together
with electric installations and buildings, the same are important
factors to consider in determining the value of the land. The
original cost of such improvements may be considered, with due
regard to the corresponding depreciation. (Davao vs. Dacudao, L-
3741, May 8, 1952).

Note should be taken that in said Appraisal Report, permanent


improvements on plaintiffs' lands have been introduced and found
existing, e.g., all weather-road network, airstrip, pier, irrigation system,
packing houses, among others, wherein substantial amount of capital
funding have been invested in putting them up.

This Court, however, notes that the comparative sales (Exhibits "A" to
"F") referred to in the Appraisal Report are sales made after the taking
of the land in 1996. However, in the offer of evidence, the plaintiff
offered additional comparative sales of adjacent land from late 1995 to
early 1997, ranging from a high of P580.00/sq.meter in September 1996
(Exhibit "L-4" for plaintiff Apo and "EE-4" for plaintiff Hijo) to a low of
P146.02/sq.meter in October 1997 (Exhibits "L-2" and "EE-2"). The
other sales in 1996 were in January 1996 for P530.00/sq.meter (Exhs.
"L-3" and "EE-3") and in December 1996 for P148.64/sq.meter (Exhs.
"L-2" and "EE-1"). On the other hand, the sale in December 1995 (Exhs.
"L-5" and "EE-5") was made for P530.00/sq.meter." The average selling
price based on the foregoing transaction is P386.93/sq.meter. The same
is even higher by around 350% than the recommended value of P85.00,
as per the Commissioners' Report.

The Cuervo Appraisal Report, on the other hand, gave a value of


P84.53/sq. meter based on the Capitalized Income Approach. The said
approach considered only the use of the land and the income generated
from such use.

The just compensation for the parcels of land under consideration,


taking into account the Schedule of Market Values given by the City
Assessor of Tagum (Exhs. "J-6" for Apo "CC-6" for Hijo), the
comparative sales covering adjacent lands at the time of taking of
subject land, the Cuervo Report, and the Appraisal Report is hereby
fixed at P103.33/sq.meter.

The valuation given by Cuervo and the Appraisal Report of P84.53 and
P85.00, respectively, in this Court's judgment, is the minimum value of
the subject landholdings and definitely cannot in anyway be the price at
which plaintiffs APO and/or HIJO might be willing to sell, considering
that the parcels of land adjacent thereto were sold at much higher
prices, specifically from a low of P146.02/sq.meter to a high of P580.00.
The average of the lowest value under the 1993 and 1994 Revision of
Assessment and Property Classification (Exhibits "J-6" and "CC-6") were
already at P103.33/sq.meter, even without considering the
improvements introduced on the subject landholdings.

Moreover, the Commission made the findings that "portions of the land
subject of th(e) report may . . . increase to P330.00/sq.meter,
specifically th(e) strips of land surrounding the provincial roads" and
made the conclusion that "(c)learly, the value recommended by th(e)
Commission, which is only about P85.00/sq.meter is way below the . . .
assessed values, which effectively was fixed (as early as) 1994 or earlier
than the Voluntary Offer to Sell of the above plaintiffs' properties." In
the absence of any evidence to the contrary, the said assessed values
are presumed to be prevailing [in] December 1996, the time of taking of
plaintiffs' landholdings. The Commission further stated that the average
of the said "assessed values as submitted by the City Assessor of Tagum
City (is) P265.00/sq.meter." This Court, therefore, finds it unfair that the
just compensation for the subject landholdings should only be fixed at
P85.00/sq.meter.

It is similarly true, however, that the determination of just compensation


cannot be made to the prejudice of defendants or the government for
that matter.

Thus, the selling price of P580.00/sq. meter nor the average selling price
of P386.93/sq. meter or the average assessed value of P265.00/sq.
meter cannot be said to be the value at which defendants might be
willing to buy the subject landholdings.

This Court, therefore, finds the price of P103.33/sq. meter for the
subject landholdings fair and reasonable for all the parties. Said value is
even lower than the lowest selling price of P148.64 for sale of adjacent
land at the time of the taking of the subject landholdings [in] December
1996. It approximates, however, the average of the lowest values under
the 1993 and 1994 Revision of Assessment and Property Clarification
(Exhs. "J-6" and "CC-6") of P103.33. The said figure will further
increase, if the Court will further consider the improvements introduced
by plaintiffs, which should be the case. Moreover, the said value of
P103.33/sq. meter is more realistic as it does not depart from the
government recognized values as specified in the 1993 and 1994
Revised Assessment and Property Classification of Tagum City. This
Court finds the evidence of the plaintiffs sufficient and preponderant to
establish the value of P103.33/sq. meter. 73

The trial court further rationalized its award thus:

It may be admitted that plaintiffs' properties are agricultural; however, it


is simply beyond dispute that in going about the task of appraising real
properties, as in the instant cases, "all the facts as to the condition of
the property and its surroundings, its improvements and capabilities,
may be shown and considered in estimating its value." (Manila Railroad
Company vs. Velasquez, 32 Phil. 287, 314). It is undeniable that
plaintiffs' agricultural lands as borne out from the records hereof, and
remaining unrebutted, shows that all weather-roads network, airstrip,
pier, irrigation system, packing houses, and among numerous other
improvements are permanently in place and not just a measly, but
substantial amounts investments have been infused. To exclude these
permanent improvements in rendering its valuation of said properties
would certainly be less than fair. . . .

xxx xxx xxx

The plaintiffs' agricultural properties are just a stone's throw from the
residential and/or industrial sections of Tagum City, a fact defendants-
DAR and LBP should never ignore. The market value of the property
(plus the consequential damages less consequential benefits) is
determined by such factors as the value of like properties, its actual or
potential use, its size, shape and location as enunciated in B.H.
Berkenkotter & Co. vs. Court of Appeals, 216 SCRA 584 (1992). To
follow Defendants-DAR and LBP logic, therefore, would in effect restrict
and delimit the broad judicial prerogatives of this Court in determining
and fixing just compensation of properties taken by the State.

Proceedings before the Panel of Commissioners revealed that permanent


improvements as mentioned above exist inside the lands subject of this
complaints. It was also established during the trial proper upon
reception of the evidence of the plaintiffs which clearly revealed the
character, use and valuation of the lands surrounding the properties
involved in these cases, indicating the strategic location of the properties
subject of these cases. The findings being that surrounding properties
have been classified as residential, commercial or industrial. And yet
defendant-LBP refused to acknowledge the factual basis of the findings
of the Panel of Commissioners and insisted on its guideline in
determining just compensation. . . . 74
In arriving at its valuation of the subject properties, the RTC conducted a
thorough and meticulous examination of all determining factors. It did not rely
merely on the report of Commissioners nor on the Cuervo appraiser's report. It
took into consideration the schedule of market values of the City of Tagum per
its 1993 and 1994 Revision of Assessment and Property Classification, value of
the permanent improvements thereon, as well as comparative sales of adjacent
lands from early 1995 to early 1997, among other factors.

Contrary to LBP's claim, the above factors are neither irrelevant nor immaterial.
When the trial court arrived at the valuation of a landowner's property taking
into account its nature as irrigated land, location along the highway, market
value, assessor's value and the volume and value of its produce, such valuation
is considered in accordance with Republic Act No. 6657. 75

Even the Commissioners' report which the trial court took into consideration may
not be dismissed as irrelevant. In the first place the trial court acting as a special
agrarian court is authorized to appoint commissioners to assist in the
determination of just compensation. 76 In this case the Commissioners' report
was submitted only after ocular inspections were conducted on the landholdings
to give them a better idea of their real value. 77

Conspicuously, the trial court did not merely rely solely on the appraisal report
submitted by the Commissioners. The trial court conducted hearings for the
purpose of receiving the parties' evidence.

Clearly evident from the records of this case is that in the proceedings before the
Commission constituted by the RTC of Tagum City, Branch 2, to fix the just
compensation for the properties, the LBP and the DAR were given all the
opportunities to justify their stances. Thus:

[T]he Commission set another hearing on February 23, 2001 at 9:00


a.m. at the Function Room, Marbella mansion, Rizal Street, Davao City,
to give the LBP the opportunity to present evidence. The LBP counsels,
Attys. Batingana and Sembrano, instead of presenting witnesses and
other evidence, manifested that they will submit a position paper within
fifteen (15) days from the date of the hearing. This was granted by the
Chairman of the Commission, who also gave the plaintiff the opportunity
to submit within five (5) days, if they so desire, their rejoinder.

Inspite of the lapse of the period, the LBP failed to file its position paper.
xxx xxx xxx

The plaintiffs have presented evidence to establish the value of their


properties before the Court-appointed Commissioners, as well as before
this Court. The Commissioners who acted and performed their assigned
tasks under their Oaths of Office are deemed a surrogate or extension of
the Court itself. (Secs. 3 and 4, Rule 32 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure). Defendant-DAR and Defendant-LBP failed to present
evidence during the hearings set by the Commissioners on February 5,
2001, and February 23, 2001, for the presentation of their evidence.
This Court gave Defendant Land Bank and Defendant DAR additional
opportunities to present evidence. Defendant Land Bank and DAR asked
for extensions to submit their evidence in its motion dated July 27,
2001, which was granted by the Court. All exhibits and other documents
offered in evidence were admitted, after which this Court issued an
order that these two cases were submitted for resolution. 78

Given the already exhaustive analysis made by the RTC, this Court is convinced
that the trial court correctly determined the amount of just compensation due to
AFC and HPI. SCaITA

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED.


While the Decision, dated 12 February 2004, and Resolution, dated 21 June
2004, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 76222, giving due course to
LBP's appeal, are hereby AFFIRMED, this Court, nonetheless, RESOLVES, in
consideration of public interest, the speedy administration of justice, and the
peculiar circumstances of the case, to give DUE COURSE to the present Petition
and decide the same on its merits. Thus, the Decision, dated 25 September
2001, as modified by the Decision, dated 5 December 2001, of the Regional Trial
Court of Tagum City, Branch 2, in Agrarian Cases No. 54-2000 and No. 55-2000
is AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Ynares-Santiago, Austria-Martinez and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.


Footnotes

1.Records of Agrarian Case No. 55-2000, Book I, Annex C, p. 13; Both land titles
(TCTs No. 113359 and No. 113366) were previously covered by TCT No.
50976.

2.Id. at Annex A, p. 5.
3.Id. at 6.

4.Id. at 135.

5.Rollo, p. 259.

6.Pursuant to Republic Act No. 6657, as amended, otherwise known as the


Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, effective 15 June 1988. (Records
of Agrarian Case No. 55-2000, Book I, Annex B, p. 9.)

7.Voluntary Offer to Sell (VOS) — A scheme wherein landowner/s voluntarily offer


their agricultural lands, including improvements thereon, if any, for coverage.
(Records, p. 592) DAR Administrative Order No. 5, Series of 1998.

8.Records of Agrarian Case No. 55-2000, Book I, p. 13.

9.Id. at 15.

10.Id. at 19.

11.Id. at 19.

12.Republic Act No. 6657, Sec. 20.Voluntary Land Transfer. — Landowners of


agricultural lands subject to acquisition under this Act may enter into a
voluntary arrangement for direct transfer of their lands to qualified
beneficiaries subject to the following guidelines:

(a)All notices for voluntary land transfer must be submitted to the DAR within the first
year of the implementation of the CARP. Negotiations between the landowners
and qualified beneficiaries covering any voluntary land transfer which remain
unresolved after one (1) year shall not be recognized and such land shall
instead be acquired by the government and transferred pursuant to this Act.

(b)The terms and conditions of such transfer shall not be less favorable to the
transferee than those of the government's standing offer to purchase from the
landowner and to resell to the beneficiaries, if such offers have been made and
are fully known to both parties.

(c)The voluntary agreement shall include sanctions for non-compliance by either party
and shall be duly recorded and its implementation monitored by the DAR.

13.Records of Agrarian Case No. 55-2000, Book I, p. 461.

14.Id. at 464.
15.Agrarian Case No. 54-2000 entitled, Apo Fruits Corporation v. Secretary of
Agrarian Reform and Land Bank of the Philippines, and Agrarian Case No. 55-
2000 entitled, Hijo Plantation, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform and Land
Bank of the Philippines.

16.Records of Agrarian Case No. 54-2000, Book I, pp. 1-5.

17.Records of Agrarian Case No. 55-2000, Book I, pp. 1-5.

18.Id. at 71. Appointed were: Atty. Cesar V. Arañas, Retired Provincial Assessor of
Davao Province; Retired City Assessor of Davao City; and Retired Director —
Finance, Region XI, Davao City, to act as the Chairman of the Panel of
Commissioners;

Mr. Alfredo H. Silawan, incumbent City Assessor of Tagum City, Davao del Norte, to
act as Member.

Mr. Wilfredo G. dela Cerna, incumbent City Treasurer of Tagum City, Davao del Norte,
to act as Member.

19.Id. at 93.

20.Id. at 95.

21.Id. at 188.

22.Id. at 129.

23.Id. at 181.

24.Id. at 328. This Commission therefore recommends:

a)The amount of ONE BILLION ONE HUNDRED THIRTY-ONE MILLION SIX HUNDRED
THOUSAND PESOS (P1,131,600,000.00) under the current value of the
Philippine Peso, computed as the JUST COMPENSATION for the properties
covered by these cases, to be paid jointly and severally by the Department of
Agrarian Reform and/or the Land Bank of the Philippines and deposited in an
authorized bank;

b)Interest on the abovementioned amount equivalent to the market interest rates


aligned with 91-day treasury bills, from the date of taking in 1996, until fully
paid, to be paid jointly and severally by the Department of Agrarian Reform
and/or the Land Bank of the Philippines and deposited in an authorized bank;
c)Defendants DAR/LBP jointly and severally pay all the fees payable to the
Commissioners herein named, taxed, as part of all the costs per Section 12,
Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.

WHEREFORE, the Commission respectfully submits this Appraisal Report to this


Honorable Special Agrarian Court, with a firm belief that the amount arrived at
is JUST.

The Panel of Commissioners pray for such other reliefs as may be just and equitable
under the premises.

At Davao City and Tagum City, for the City of Tagum, this 17th day of May 2001.

(Sgd.) CESAR V. ARAÑAS(Sgd.) ALFREDO M. SILAWAN

ChairmanMember

25.Records of Agrarian Case No. 55-2000, Book I, p. 707.

26.Id. at 747-795. Penned by Acting Presiding Judge Erasto D. Salcedo.

27.CA rollo, pp. 131-133.

28.Records of Agrarian Case No. 55-2000, Book I, p. 792; DAR also filed its Motion for
Reconsideration on the same date, i.e., 5 October 2001. (Records of Agrarian
Case No. 55-2000, Book I, p. 799.)

29.CA rollo, pp. 141-160.

30.Id. at 158-160.

31.Id. at 161.

32.Id. at 166.

33.437 Phil. 347 (2002).

34.CA rollo, pp. 47-48.

35.Id. at 168.

36.Id. at 49-54.

37.Id. at 2-46. Docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 76222.


38.Id. at 579-588. Penned by Associate Justice Rebecca De Guia-Salvador with
Associate Justices Romeo A. Brawner and Jose C. Reyes, Jr., concurring.

39.Id. at 588.

40.Id. at 599.

41.Id. at 686.

42.Id. at 289-306. Docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 74879.

43.Id. at 631-636. Penned by Associate Justice Oswaldo D. Agcaoili with Associate


Justices Perlita J. Tria-Tirona and Edgardo F. Sundiam, concurring.

44.SEC. 2. Form and contents. — The petition shall be filed in seven (7) legible copies
. . .; (b) indicate the specific material dates showing that it was filed
on time; . . .

45.CA rollo, pp. 633-636.

46.Id. at 638.

47.Rollo, p. 262.

48.Id. at 287-288.

49.Land Bank of the Philippines v. De Leon, supra note 33 at 356.

50.Land Bank of the Philippines v. De Leon, 447 Phil. 495, 505 (2003).

51.TF Ventures, Inc. v. Matsuura, G.R. No 154177, 9 June 2004, 431 SCRA 526, 532-
533.

52.David v. Navarro, G.R. No. 145284, 11 February 2004, 422 SCRA 499, 511.

53.Somoso v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 78050, 23 October 1989, 178 SCRA 654,
663; Bach v. Ongkiko Kalaw, G.R. No. 160334, 11 September 2006.

54.Real v. Belo, G.R. No. 146224, 17 January 2007; Golangco v. Court of Appeals, 347
Phil. 771, 778 (1997); Heirs of Crisanta Y. Gabriel-Almoradie v. Court Appeals ,
G.R. No. 91385, 4 January 1994, 229 SCRA 15, 29; Republic v. Central Surety
& Insurance Co., 134 Phil. 631 (1968).

55.Samal v. Court of Appeals, 99 Phil 230, 233 (1956).


56.Bunao v. Social Security System, G.R. No. 159606, 13 December 2005, 477 SCRA
564, 571.

57.Vallejo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 156413, 14 April 2004, 427 SCRA 658,
668; San Luis v. Court of Appeals, 417 Phil. 598, 605 (2001); Chua v. Court of
Appeals, 338 Phil. 262, 273 (1997); Golangco v. Court of Appeals, 347 Phil.
771, 778 (1997).

58.Republic v. Gingoyon, G.R. No. 166429, 19 December 2005, 478 SCRA 474, 532.

59.Rocamora v. Regional Trial Court-Cebu (Branch VIII), G.R. No. L-65037, 23


November 1988, 167 SCRA 615, 624.

60.RTC Decision, p. 40; CA rollo, p. 124.

61.Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals , 327 Phil. 1047, 1055 (1996).

62.Estate of Salud Jimenez v. Philippine Export Processing Zone, G.R. No. 137285, 16
January 2001, 349 SCRA 240, 264; Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of
Appeals, id. at 1054, quoting Municipality of Makati v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
Nos. 89898-99, 1 October 1990, 190 SCRA 207, 213.

63.Manila Railroad Co. v. Velasquez, 32 Phil. 286, 313 (1915).

64.Province of Tayabas v. Perez, 66 Phil. 467, 469 (1938); J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v.
Land Tenure Administration, G.R. No. L-21064, 18 February 1970, 31 SCRA
413, 432; Manotok v. National Housing Authority, G.R. Nos. L-55166-67, 21
May 1987, 150 SCRA 89.

65.City of Manila v. Estrada, 25 Phil. 208, 234 (1913).

66.Records of Agrarian Case No. 55-2000, Book I, pp. 332, 344.

67.Id. at 345.

68.Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian


Reform, G.R. No. 78742, 14 July 1989, 175 SCRA 343, 376.

69.Land Bank of the Philippines v. Wycoco, 464 Phil. 83, 84 (2004); Export Processing
Zone Authority v. Dulay, G.R. No. L-59603, 29 April 1987, 149 SCRA 305,
312;Belen v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-45390, 15 April 1988, 160 SCRA 291,
295, citing National Power Corporation v. Jocson, G.R. Nos. 94193-99, 25
February 1992, 206 SCRA 520, 540; Land Bank of the Philippines v. Natividad,
G.R. No. 127198, 16 May 2005, 458 SCRA 441, 451; Republic v. Court of
Appeals, 331 Phil 1072 (1996), cited in Philippine Veterans Bank v. Court of
Appeals, 379 Phil. 141, 147 (2000).

70.Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian


Reform, supra note 68 at 380.

71.Rollo, p. 351.

72.Otherwise stated, the determination of just compensation involves the examination


of the following factors specified in Section 17 of Republic Act No. 6657 as
amended.

1.the cost of the acquisition of the land;

2.the current value of like properties;

3.its nature, actual use and income;

4.the sworn valuation by the owner; the tax declarations;

5.the assessment made by government assessors;

6.the social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the farmworkers
and by the government to the property; and

7.the non-payment of taxes or loans secured from any government financing


institution on the said land, if any.

These factors as provided under Section 17 of Republic Act No. 6657 have been
translated in a basic formula in DAR Administrative Order No. 6, Series of 1992,
as amended by DAR Administrative Order No. 11, Series of 1994, issued
pursuant to the DAR's rule-making power to carry out the object and purposes
of Republic Act No. 6657, as amended.

The formula stated in DAR Administrative Order No. 6, as amended, is as follows:

LV = (CNI x 0.6) + (CS x 0.3) + (MV x 0.1)

LV = Land Value

CNI = Capitalized Net Income

CS = Comparable Sales
MV = Market Value per Tax Declaration

The above formula shall be used if all the three factors are present, relevant and
applicable.

A.1When the CS factor is not present and CNI and MV are applicable, the formula
shall be:

LV = (CNI x 0.9) + (MV x 0.1)

A.2When the CNI factor is not present, and CS and MV are applicable, the formula
shall be:

LV = (CS x 0.9) + (MV x 0.1)

A.2When both the CS and CNI are not present and only MV is applicable, the formula
shall be:

LV = MV x 2 ((Land Bank of the Philippines v. Banal, G.R. No. 143276, 20 July 2004,
434 SCRA 543, 549-550.)

73.CA rollo, pp. 125-128.

74.Id. at 146-149.

75.Belen v. Court of Appeals, supra note 69 at 295; Land Bank of the Philippines v.
Natividad, supra note 69 at 452-453. ATICcS

76.Rule 67, Section 5, Revised Rules of Court.

77.B.H Berkenkotter and Co. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 89980, 14 December 1992,
216 SCRA 584, 589.

78.CA rollo, pp. 112-121.

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