Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 82585 November 14, 1988

MAXIMO V. SOLIVEN, ANTONIO V. ROCES, FREDERICK K. AGCAOLI, and

GODOFREDO L. MANZANAS,petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. RAMON P. MAKASIAR, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court
of Manila, Branch 35, UNDERSECRETARY SILVESTRE BELLO III, of the
Department of Justice, LUIS C. VICTOR, THE CITY FISCAL OF MANILA and
PRESIDENT CORAZON C. AQUINO, respondents.

G.R. No. 82827 November 14, 1988

LUIS D. BELTRAN, petitioner,

vs.
THE HON. RAMON P. MAKASIAR, Presiding Judge of Branch 35 of the Regional
Trial Court, at Manila, THE HON. LUIS VICTOR, CITY FISCAL OF MANILA,
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, SUPERINTENDENT OF THE WESTERN
POLICE DISTRICT, and THE MEMBERS OF THE PROCESS SERVING UNIT
AT THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA, respondents.

G.R. No. 83979 November 14, 1988.

LUIS D. BELTRAN, petitioner,

vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY CATALINO MACARAIG, SECRETARY OF
JUSTICE SEDFREY ORDOÑEZ, UNDERSECRETARY OF JUSTICE
SILVESTRE BELLO III, THE CITY FISCAL OF MANILA JESUS F.
GUERRERO, and JUDGE RAMON P. MAKASIAR, Presiding Judge of Branch 35
of the Regional Trial Court, at Manila, respondents.

Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala and Cruz for petitioners in G.R. No. 82585.

Perfecto V. Fernandez, Jose P. Fernandez and Cristobal P. Fernandez for petitioner in

G.R. Nos. 82827 and 83979.

RE S O LUTI ON

PER CURIAM:
In these consolidated cases, three principal issues were raised: (1) whether or not
petitioners were denied due process when informations for libel were filed against them
although the finding of the existence of a prima faciecase was still under review by the
Secretary of Justice and, subsequently, by the President; (2) whether or not the
constitutional rights of Beltran were violated when respondent RTC judge issued a
warrant for his arrest without personally examining the complainant and the witnesses, if
any, to determine probable cause; and (3) whether or not the President of the Philippines,
under the Constitution, may initiate criminal proceedings against the petitioners through
the filing of a complaint-affidavit.

Subsequent events have rendered the first issue moot and academic. On March 30, 1988,
the Secretary of Justice denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration and upheld the
resolution of the Undersecretary of Justice sustaining the City Fiscal's finding of a prima
facie case against petitioners. A second motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner
Beltran was denied by the Secretary of Justice on April 7, 1988. On appeal, the President,
through the Executive Secretary, affirmed the resolution of the Secretary of Justice on
May 2, 1988. The motion for reconsideration was denied by the Executive Secretary on
May 16, 1988. With these developments, petitioners' contention that they have been
denied the administrative remedies available under the law has lost factual support.

It may also be added that with respect to petitioner Beltran, the allegation of denial of due
process of law in the preliminary investigation is negated by the fact that instead of
submitting his counter- affidavits, he filed a "Motion to Declare Proceedings Closed," in
effect waiving his right to refute the complaint by filing counter-affidavits. Due process
of law does not require that the respondent in a criminal case actually file his counter-
affidavits before the preliminary investigation is deemed completed. All that is required is
that the respondent be given the opportunity to submit counter-affidavits if he is so
minded.

The second issue, raised by petitioner Beltran, calls for an interpretation of the
constitutional provision on the issuance of warrants of arrest. The pertinent provision
reads:

Art. III, Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature
and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of
arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the
judge after examination nder oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the persons or things to be seized.

The addition of the word "personally" after the word "determined" and the deletion of the
grant of authority by the 1973 Constitution to issue warrants to "other responsible officers
as may be authorized by law," has apparently convinced petitioner Beltran that the
Constitution now requires the judge to personally examine the complainant and his
witnesses in his determination of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest.
This is not an accurate interpretation.

What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the
issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself
of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not
required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following established
doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting
documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the
basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable
cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and require the submission of supporting
affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of
probable cause.

Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise judges would be unduly laden with the
preliminary examination and investigation of criminal complaints instead of
concentrating on hearing and deciding cases filed before their courts.

On June 30, 1987, the Supreme Court unanimously adopted Circular No. 12, setting
down guidelines for the issuance of warrants of arrest. The procedure therein provided is
reiterated and clarified in this resolution.

It has not been shown that respondent judge has deviated from the prescribed procedure.
Thus, with regard to the issuance of the warrants of arrest, a finding of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction cannot be sustained.

Anent the third issue, petitioner Beltran argues that "the reasons which necessitate
presidential immunity from suit impose a correlative disability to file suit." He contends
that if criminal proceedings ensue by virtue of the President's filing of her complaint-
affidavit, she may subsequently have to be a witness for the prosecution, bringing her
under the trial court's jurisdiction. This, continues Beltran, would in an indirect way
defeat her privilege of immunity from suit, as by testifying on the witness stand, she
would be exposing herself to possible contempt of court or perjury.

The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity from suit is to
assure the exercise of Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or
distraction, considering that being the Chief Executive of the Government is a job that,
aside from requiring all of the office holder's time, also demands undivided attention.

But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of the office
and may be invoked only by the holder of the office; not by any other person in the
President's behalf. Thus, an accused in a criminal case in which the President is
complainant cannot raise the presidential privilege as a defense to prevent the case from
proceeding against such accused.
Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from waiving the
privilege. Thus, if so minded the President may shed the protection afforded by the
privilege and submit to the court's jurisdiction. The choice of whether to exercise the
privilege or to waive it is solely the President's prerogative. It is a decision that cannot be
assumed and imposed by any other person.

As regards the contention of petitioner Beltran that he could not be held liable for libel
because of the privileged character or the publication, the Court reiterates that it is not a
trier of facts and that such a defense is best left to the trial court to appreciate after
receiving the evidence of the parties.

As to petitioner Beltran's claim that to allow the libel case to proceed would produce a
"chilling effect" on press freedom, the Court finds no basis at this stage to rule on the
point.

The petitions fail to establish that public respondents, through their separate acts, gravely
abused their discretion as to amount to lack of jurisdiction. Hence, the writs of certiorari
and prohibition prayed for cannot issue.

WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of

jurisdiction on the part of the public respondents, the Court Resolved to DISMISS the
petitions in G. R. Nos. 82585, 82827 and 83979. The Order to maintain the status quo
contained in the Resolution of the Court en banc dated April 7, 1988 and reiterated in the
Resolution dated April 26, 1988 is LIFTED.