THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. NO. 164815 : February 22, 2008]

SR. INSP. JERRY C. VALEROSO, Petitioner, v. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

REYES, R.T., J.:

THE law looks forward, never backward. Lex prospicit, non respicit. A new law has a prospective, not retroactive,
effect.1 However, penal laws that favor a guilty person, who is not a habitual criminal, shall be given retroactive
effect.1-a These are the rule, the exception and exception to the exception on effectivity of laws.

Ang batas ay tumitingin sa hinaharap, hindi sa nakaraan. Gayunpaman, ang parusa ng bagong batas ay iiral
kung ito ay pabor sa taong nagkasala na hindi pusakal na kriminal.

We apply the exception rather than the rule in this Petition for Review on Certiorari of the decision of the Court of
Appeals (CA), affirming with modification that of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Quezon City, finding
petitioner liable for illegal possession of a firearm.

The Facts

On July 10, 1996, at around 9:30 a.m., SPO2 Antonio M. Disuanco of the Criminal Investigation Division, Central
Police District Command, received a dispatch order2 from the desk officer.3 The order directed him and three (3)
other policemen to serve a warrant of arrest4issued by Judge Ignacio Salvador against petitioner Sr. Insp. Jerry C.
Valeroso in a case for kidnapping with ransom.5

After a briefing, the team conducted the necessary surveillance on petitioner, checking his hideouts in Cavite,
Caloocan, and Bulacan.6Eventually, the team proceeded to the Integrated National Police (INP) Central Station at
Culiat, Quezon City, where they saw petitioner as he was about to board a tricycle. 7 SPO2 Disuanco and his team
approached petitioner.8 They put him under arrest, informed him of his constitutional rights, and bodily searched
him.9 Found tucked in his waist10 was a Charter Arms, bearing Serial Number 5231511 with five (5) live
ammunition.12

Petitioner was then brought to the police station for questioning. 13

A verification of the subject firearm at the Firearms and Explosives Division at Camp Crame revealed that it was not
issued to petitioner but to a certain Raul Palencia Salvatierra of Sampaloc, Manila. 14Epifanio Deriquito, the records
verifier, presented a certification15 to that effect signed by Edwin C. Roque, chief records officer of the Firearms and
Explosive Division.16

Petitioner was then charged with illegal possession of firearm and ammunition under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
1866,17 as amended. The Information read:

That on or about the 10th day of July, 1996, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused without any authority of
law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his/her possession and under his/her custody and
control

One (1) cal. 38 "Charter Arms" revolver bearing Serial No. 52315 with five (5) live ammo. without first having
secured the necessary license/permit issued by the proper authorities.
CONTRARY TO LAW.

Quezon City, Philippines, July 15, 1996.

(Sgd.)

GLORIA VICTORIA C. YAP

Assistant City Prosecutor18

With the assistance of his counsel de parte, Atty. Oscar Pagulayan, petitioner pleaded not guilty when arraigned on
October 9, 1996.19Trial on the merits ensued.

SPO2 Disuanco and Deriquito testified for the prosecution in the manner stated above.

Upon the other hand, the defense version was supplied by the combined testimonies of petitioner Sr. Insp. Jerry C.
Valeroso, SPO3 Agustin R. Timbol, Jr. and Adrian Yuson.

Petitioner recounted that on July 10, 1996, he was fast asleep in the boarding house of his children located at Sagana
Homes, BarangayNew Era, Quezon City.20 He was roused from his slumber when four (4) heavily armed men in
civilian clothes bolted the room.21 They trained their guns at him22 and pulled him out of the room. They then tied
his hands and placed him near the faucet.23 The raiding team went back inside and searched and ransacked the
room.24 SPO2 Disuanco stood guard outside with him. 25 Moments later, an operative came out of the room and
exclaimed, "Hoy, may nakuha akong baril sa loob!" 26

Petitioner was told by SPO2 Disuanco that "we are authorized to shoot you because there's a shoot to kill order
against you, so if you are planning do so something, do it right now." 27 He was also told that there was a standing
warrant for his arrest.28 However, he was not shown any proof when he asked for it. 29 Neither was the raiding group
armed with a valid search warrant.30

According to petitioner, the search done in the boarding house was illegal. The gun seized from him was duly
licensed and covered by necessary permits. He was, however, unable to present the documentation relative to the
firearm because it was confiscated by the police. Petitioner further lamented that when he was incarcerated, he was
not allowed to engage the services of a counsel. Neither was he allowed to see or talk to his family. 31

Petitioner contended that the police had an axe to grind against him. While still with the Narcotics Command, he
turned down a request of Col. Romulo Sales to white-wash a drug-related investigation involving friends of the said
police officer. Col. Sales was likewise subject of a complaint filed with the Ombudsman by his wife. Col. Sales was
later on appointed as the head of the unit that conducted the search in his boarding house. 32

SPO3 Timbol, Jr. of the Narcotics Command testified that he issued to petitioner a Memorandum Receipt dated July
1, 199333 covering the subject firearm and its ammunition. This was upon the verbal instruction of Col. Angelito
Moreno. SPO3 Timbol identified his signature34 on the said receipt.35

Adrian Yuson, an occupant of the room adjacent to where petitioner was arrested, testified that on July 10, 1996,
two (2) policemen suddenly entered his room as he was preparing for school. 36 They grabbed his shoulder and led
him out.37 During all those times, a gun was poked at him.38 He was asked where petitioner was staying. Fearing for
his life, he pointed to petitioner's room.39

Four (4) policemen then entered the room.40 He witnessed how they pointed a gun at petitioner, who was clad only
in his underwear.41 He also witnessed how they forcibly brought petitioner out of his room. 42While a policeman
remained near the faucet to guard petitioner, three (3) others went back inside the room. 43 They began searching the
whole place. They forcibly opened his locker,44 which yielded the subject firearm.45
 RTC and CA Dispositions

On May 6, 1998, the trial court found petitioner guilty as charged, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of Section 1 of
Presidential Decree No. 1866 as amended by Republic Act No. 8294 and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty
of prision correccional in its maximum period or from 4 years, 2 months and 1 day as minimum to 6 years as
maximum and to pay the fine in the amount of Fifteen Thousand Pesos (P15,000.00).

The gun subject of this case is hereby ordered confiscated in favor of the government. Let the same be put in trust in
the hands of the Chief of the PNP.

SO ORDERED.46

Petitioner moved to reconsider47 but his motion was denied on August 27, 1998.48 He appealed to the CA.

On May 4, 2004, the appellate court affirmed with modification the RTC disposition. The fallo of the CA decision
reads:

Verily, the penalty imposed by the trial court upon the accused-appellant is modified to 4 years and 2 months as
minimum up to 6 years as maximum.

WHEREFORE, withthe foregoing MODIFICATION as to the penalty, the decision appealed from is
hereby AFFIRMED in all other respects.

SO ORDERED.49

His motion for reconsideration50 having been denied through a Resolution dated August 3, 2004, 51 petitioner
resorted to the present petition under Rule 45.

Issues

Petitioner raises the following issues for Our consideration:

I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERRORS OF LAW IN AFFIRMING

THE CONVICTION OF PETITIONER DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT.

II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERRORS OF FACT AND LAW IN
SUSTAINING THE LEGALITY OF THE SEARCH AND THE VALIDITY AND ADMISSIBILITY OF THE
EVIDENCE OBTAINED THEREFROM DESPITE THE OVERWHELMING PROOF THAT THE SAME IS THE
FRUIT OF THE POISONOUS TREE.

III. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERRORS OF LAW IN NOT
UPHOLDING THE REGULARITY AND VALIDITY SURROUNDING THE ISSUANCE OF THE
MEMORANDUM RECEIPTS (SIC) IN FAVOR OF PETITIONER WHICH PROVES HIS INNOCENCE OF THE
CRIME CHARGE (SIC).52 (Underscoring supplied)cralawlibrary

Our Ruling
In illegal possession of firearm and ammunition, the prosecution has the burden of proving the twin elements of (1)
the existence of the subject firearm and ammunition, and (2) the fact that the accused who possessed or owned the
same does not have the corresponding license for it.53

The prosecution was able to discharge its burden.

The existence of the subject firearm and its ammunition was established through the testimony of SPO2
Disuanco.54 Defense witness Yuson also identified the firearm.55 Its existence was likewise admitted by no less than
petitioner himself.56

As for petitioner's lack of authority to possess the firearm, Deriquito testified that a verification of the Charter Arms
Caliber .38 bearing Serial No. 52315 with the Firearms and Explosives Division at Camp Crame revealed that the
seized pistol was not issued to petitioner. It was registered in the name of a certain Raul Palencia Salvatierra of
Sampaloc, Manila.57 As proof, Deriquito presented a certification signed by Roque, the chief records officer of the
same office.58

The Court on several occasions ruled that either the testimony of a representative of, or a certification from, the
Philippine National Police (PNP) Firearms and Explosive Office attesting that a person is not a licensee of any
firearm would suffice to prove beyond reasonable doubt the second element of possession of illegal firearms. 59 The
prosecution more than complied when it presented both.

The certification is outside the scope of the hearsay rule.

The general rule is that a witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge; that is,
which are derived from his own perception.60 Otherwise, the testimony is objectionable for being hearsay. 61

On this score, the certification from the Firearms and Explosives Division is an exception to the hearsay rule by
virtue of Rule 130, Section 44 of the Rules of Court which provides:

Sec. 44. Entries in official records. - Entries in official records made in the performance of his official duty by a
public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty specifically enjoined by law, are prima
facieevidence of the facts therein stated.

It may be true that the contents of said certification are only primafacie evidence of the facts stated there. However,
the failure of petitioner to present controverting evidence makes the presumption unrebutted. Thus, the presumption
stands.

Petitioner, however, raises several points which he says entitles him to no less than an acquittal.

The assessment of credibility of witnesses lies with the trial court.

First, petitioner says that the seizure of the subject firearm was invalid. The search was conducted after his arrest
and after he was taken out of the room he was occupying.62

This contention deserves scant consideration.

Petitioner's version of the manner and place of his arrest goes into the factual findings made by the trial court and its
calibration of the credibility of witnesses. However, as aptly put by Justice Ynares-Santiago in People v. Rivera:63

x x x the manner of assigning values to declarations of witnesses on the witness stand is best and most competently
performed by the trial judge who had the unmatched opportunity to observe the witnesses and assess their credibility
by the various indicia available but not reflected on record. The demeanor of the person on the stand can draw the
line between fact and fancy or evince if the witness is telling the truth or lying through his teeth. We have
consistently ruled that when the question arises as to which of the conflicting versions of the prosecution and the
defense is worthy of belief, the assessment of the trial courts are generally viewed as correct and entitled to great
weight. Furthermore, in an appeal, where the culpability or innocence of the accused depends on the issue of
credibility of witnesses and the veracity of their testimonies, findings of the trial court are given the highest degree
of respect if not finality.64 (Underscoring supplied)cralawlibrary

The trial court found the prosecution version worthy of credence and belief. We find no compelling reason not to
accept its observation on this score.

Worth noting is the fact that petitioner is a ranking police officer who not only claims to be highly decorated, 65 but
have effected a number of successful arrests66 as well. Common sense would dictate that he must necessarily be
authorized to carry a gun. We thus agree with the Office of the Solicitor General that framing up petitioner would
have been a very risky proposition. Had the arresting officers really intended to cause the damnation of petitioner by
framing him up, they could have easily "planted" a more incriminating evidence rather than a gun. That would have
made their nefarious scheme easier, assuming that there indeed was one.

The pieces of evidence show that petitioner is not legally authorized to possess the subject firearm and its five (5)
ammunition.

Second, petitioner insists that he is legally authorized to possess the subject firearm and its ammunition on the basis
of the Memorandum Receipt issued to him by the PNP Narcotics Command.67

Although petitioner is correct in his submission that public officers like policemen are accorded presumption of
regularity in the performance of their official duties,68 it is only a presumption; it may be overthrown by evidence to
the contrary. The prosecution was able to rebut the presumption when it proved that the issuance to petitioner of the
Memorandum Receipt was anything but regular.

SPO3 Timbol, Jr. testified that he issued the Memorandum Receipt to petitioner based on the verbal instruction of
his immediate superior, Col. Moreno.69 However, a reading of Timbol's testimony on cross-examination70 would
reveal that there was an unusual facility by which said receipt was issued to petitioner. Its issuance utterly lacked the
usual necessary bureaucratic constraints. Clearly, it was issued to petitioner under questionable circumstances.

Failure to offer an unlicensed firearm as evidence is not fatal provided there is competent testimony as to its
existence.

Third, petitioner claims that the subject firearm and ammunition should have been excluded as evidence because
they were not formally offered by the prosecution 71 in violation of Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. 72

We note that petitioner contradicted himself when he argued for the validity of the Memorandum Receipt and, at the
same time, for the exclusion in evidence of the subject firearm and its ammunition. Petitioner's act may result to an
absurd situation where the Memorandum Receipt is declared valid, while the subject firearm and its ammunition
which are supposedly covered by the Memorandum Receipt are excluded as evidence. That would have made the
Memorandum Receipt useless.

In any case, petitioner's contention has no leg to stand on.

Contrary to petitioner's claim, the subject firearm73 and its five (5) live ammunition74 were offered in evidence by
the prosecution.75Even assuming arguendo that they were not offered, petitioner's stance must still fail. The
existence of an unlicensed firearm may be established by testimony, even without its presentation at trial. In People
v. Orehuela,76 the non-presentation of the pistol did not prevent the conviction of the accused.

The doctrine was affirmed in the recent case of People v. Malinao.77

As previously stated, the existence of the subject firearm and its five (5) live ammunition were established through
the testimony of SPO2 Disuanco.78 Yuson also identified said firearm.79 Petitioner even admitted its existence.80

We hasten to add that there may also be conviction where an unlicensed firearm is presented during trial but through
inadvertence, negligence, or fortuitous event (for example, if it is lost), it is not offered in evidence, as long as there
is competent testimony as to its existence.

Penal and civil liabilities

Petitioner was charged with the crime of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition under the first paragraph of
Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866, as amended. It provides that "[t]he penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period
to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose,
or possess any firearm, part of firearm, ammunition or machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be used in
the manufacture of any firearm or ammunition."

P.D. No. 1866, as amended, was the governing law at the time petitioner committed the offense on July 10, 1996.
However, R.A. No. 8294 amended P.D. No. 1866 on July 6, 1997, 81 during the pendency of the case with the trial
court. The present law now states:

SECTION 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of Firearms or Ammunition or

Instruments Used or Intended to be Used in the Manufacture of Firearms or Ammunition. - The penalty of prision
correccional in its maximum period and a fine of not less than Fifteen Thousand Pesos (P15,000) shall be imposed
upon any person who shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess any low-powered firearm,
such as rimfire handgun, .380 or .32 and other firearm of similar firepower, part of firearm, ammunition, or
machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or
ammunition: Provided, That no other crime was committed. (Underscoring supplied)cralawlibrary

As a general rule, penal laws should not have retroactive application, lest they acquire the character of an ex post
facto law.82 An exception to this rule, however, is when the law is advantageous to the accused. According to Mr.
Chief Justice Araullo, this is "not as a right" of the offender, "but founded on the very principles on which the right
of the State to punish and the commination of the penalty are based, and regards it not as an exception based on
political considerations, but as a rule founded on principles of strict justice." 83

Although an additional fine of P15,000.00 is imposed by R.A. No. 8294, the same is still advantageous to the
accused, considering that the imprisonment is lowered to prision correccional in its maximum
period84 from reclusion temporalin its maximum period to reclusion perpetua85 under P.D. No. 1866.

Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, prision correccional maximum which ranges from four (4) years, two (2)
months and one (1) day to six (6) years, is the prescribed penalty and will form the maximum term of the
indeterminate sentence. The minimum term shall be one degree lower, which is prision correccional in its medium
period (two [2] years, four [4] months and one [1] day to four [4] years and two [2] months).86 Hence, the penalty
imposed by the CA is correct. The penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional medium, as
minimum term, to six (6) years of prision correccional maximum, as maximum term, is in consonance with the
Court's ruling in Gonzales v. Court of Appeals87 and Barredo v. Vinarao.88

As to the subject firearm and its five (5) live ammunition, their proper disposition should be made under Article 45
of the Revised Penal Code89 which provides, among others, that the proceeds and instruments or tools of the crime
shall be confiscated and forfeited in favor of the government.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 4, 2004 is AFFIRMED in full.

SO ORDERED.
 THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 104528. January 18, 1996]
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, petitioner, vs. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, HOUSING AND LAND
USE REGULATORY BOARD, ALFONSO MAGLAYA, ANGELINA MAGLAYA P. REYES,
JORGE C. BERNARDINO, CORAZON DE LEON, VICTORIANO ACAYA, FLORENCIA
CULTURA, MARIA CAMPOS, ERNESTO SARMIENTO, SANTIAGO TAMONAN, APOLONIA
TADIAQUE, SIMEON DE LEON, NATIVIDAD J. CRUZ, NATIVIDAD B. LORESCO, FELICIDAD
GARCIA, ANA ANITA TAN, LUCAS SERVILLION, JOSE NARAWAL, represented by their duly
authorized Attorney-in-Fact, CORAZON DE LEON AND SPOUSES LEOPOLDO AND CARMEN
SEBASTIAN, respondents.

RESOLUTION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

May a buyer of a property at a foreclosure sale dispossess prior purchasers on installment of individual lots
therein, or compel them to pay again for the lots which they previously bought from the defaulting mortgagor-
subdivision developer, on the theory that P.D. 957, The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers Protective Decree, is
not applicable to the mortgage contract in question, the same having been executed prior to the enactment of P.D.
957? This is the question confronting the Court in this Petition challenging the Decision dated March 10, 1992 of the
Office of the President of the Philippines in O.P. Case No. 4249, signed by. the Executive Secretary, Franklin M.
Drilon, by authority of the President.
Private respondents were buyers on installment of subdivision lots from Marikina Village, Inc. (represented by
spouses Antonio and Susana Astudillo). Notwithstanding the land purchase agreements it executed over said lots, the
subdivision developer mortgaged the lots in favor of the petitioner, Philippine National Bank. Unaware of this
mortgage, private respondents duly complied with their obligations as lot buyers and constructed their houses on the
lots in question.
Subsequently, the subdivision developer defaulted and PNB foreclosed on the mortgage. As highest bidder at
the foreclosure sale, the bank became owner of the lots.
Acting on suits brought by private respondents (which were later consolidated), the HLURB Office of Appeals,
Adjudication and Legal Affairs (OAALA) in a decision rendered on October 28, 1988 ruled that PNB -- without
prejudice to seeking relief against Marikina Village, -- Inc. may collect from private respondents only the remaining
amortizations, in accordance with the land purchase agreements they had previously entered into with Marikina
Village, Inc., and cannot compel private respondents to pay all over again for the lots they had already bought from
said subdivision developer. On May 2, 1989, the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board affirmed this decision.
On March 10, 1992, the Office of the President, invoking P.D. 957, likewise concurred with the HLURB. Hence, the
present recourse to this Court.
Under Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95, appeals from judgments or final orders of the x x x Office of
the President x x x may be taken to the Court of Appeals x x x. However, in order to hasten the resolution of this case,
which was deemed submitted for decision three years ago, the Court resolved to make an exception to the said Circular
in the interest of speedy justice.
Petitioner bank raised the following issues:

1 .The Office of the President erred in applying P.D. 957 because said law was enacted only on July 12, 1976, while
the subject mortgage was executed on December 18, 1975; and

2. Petitioner Bank is not privy to the contracts between private respondents and mortgagor-subdivision developer,
hence, the Office of the President erred in ordering petitioner Bank to accept private respondents remaining
amortizations and issue the corresponding titles after payment thereof.
Normally, pursuant to Article 4 of the Civil Code, (1)aws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is
provided. However, it is obvious and indubitable that P.D. 957 was intended to cover even those real estate
mortgages, like the one at issue here, executed prior to its enactment, and such intent (as succinctly captured in the
preamble quoted below) must be given effect if the laudable purpose of protecting innocent purchasers is to be
achieved:

WHEREAS, it is the policy of the State to afford its inhabitants the requirements of decent human settlement and to
provide them with ample opportunities for improving their quality of life;

WHEREAS, numerous reports reveal that many real estate subdivision owners, developers, operators, and/or
sellers have reneged on their representations and obligations to provide and maintain properly subdivision roads,
drainage, sewerage, water systems, lighting systems, and other similar basic requirements, thus endangering the
health and safety of home and lot buyers;

WHEREAS, reports of alarming magnitude also show cases of swindling and fraudulent manipulations perpetrated
by unscrupulous subdivision and condominium sellers and operators, such as failure to deliver titles to the buyers or
titles free from liens and encumbrances, and to pay real estate taxes, and fraudulent sales of the same subdivision
lots to different innocent purchasers for value; (Italics supplied).

While P.D. 957 did not expressly provide for retroactivity in its entirety, yet the same can be plainly inferred
from the, unmistakable intent of the law to protect innocent lot buyers from scheming subdivision developers. As
between these small lot buyers and the gigantic financial institutions which the developers deal with, it is obvious that
the law -- as an instrument of social justice -- must favor the weak. Indeed, the petitioner Bank had at its disposal vast
resources with which it could adequately protect its loan activities, and therefore is presumed to have conducted the
usual due diligence checking and ascertained (whether thru ocular inspection or other modes of investigation) the
actual status, condition, utilization and occupancy of the property offered as collateral. It could not have been unaware
that the property had been built on by small lot buyers. On the other hand, private respondents obviously were
powerless to discover the attempt of the land developer to hypothecate the property being sold to them. It was precisely
in order to deal with this kind of situation that P.D. 957 was enacted, its very essence and intendment being to provide
a protective mantle over helpless citizens who may fall prey to the razzmatazz of what P.D. 957 termed unscrupulous
subdivision and condominium sellers.1
The intent of the law, as culled from its preamble and from the situation, circumstances and condition it sought
to remedy, must be enforced. Sutherland, in his well-known treatise on Statutory Construction (quoted with approval
by this Court in an old case of consequence, Ongsiako vs. Gamboa2), says:

The intent of a statute is the law. If a statute is valid it is to have effect according to the purpose and intent of the
lawmaker. The intent is the vital part, the essence of the law, and the primary rule of construction is to ascertain and
give effect to the intent. The intention of the legislature in enacting a law is the law itself, and must be enforced
when ascertained, although it may not be consistent with the strict letter of the statute. Courts will not follow the
letter of a statute when it leads away- from the true intent and purpose of the legislature and to conclusions
inconsistent with the general purpose of the act. Intent is the spirit which gives life to a legislative enactment. In
construing statutes the proper course is to start out and follow the true intent of the legislature and to adopt that sense
which harmonizes best with the context and promotes in the fullest manner the apparent policy and, objects of the
legislature.3

Truly, this Court cannot allow the injustice that will be wrought by a strictly prospective application of the law.
Little people who have toiled for years through blood and tears would be deprived of their homes through no fault of
their own. As the Solicitor General, in his comment, argues:

Verily, if P.D. 957 were to exclude from its coverage the aforecited mortgage contract, the vigorous regulation
which PD. 957 seeks to impose on unconscientious subdivision sellers will be translated into a feeble exercise of
police power just because the iron hand of the State cannot particularly touch mortgage contracts badged with the
fortunate accident of having been constituted prior to the enactment of P.D. 957. Indeed, it would be illogical in the
extreme if P.D. 957 is to be given full force and effect and yet, the fraudulent practices and manipulations it seeks to
curb in the first instance can nevertheless be liberally perpetrated precisely because PD. 957 cannot be applied to
existing antecedent mortgage contracts. The legislative intent could not have conceivably permitted a loophole
which all along works to the prejudice of subdivision lot buyers (private respondents). 4

Likewise noteworthy are certain provisions of P.D. 957, which themselves constitute strong arguments in favor
of the retroactivity of PD. 957 as a whole. These are Sections 20, 21 and 23 thereof, which by their very terms have
retroactive effect and will impact upon even those contracts and transactions entered into prior to PD. 957 5 enactment:

SEC. 20. Time of Completion. - Every owner or developer shall construct and provide the facilities, improvements,
infrastructures and other forms of development, including water supply and lighting facilities, which are offered and
indicated in the approved subdivision or condominium plans, brochures, prospectus, printed matters, letters or in any
form of advertisement, within one year from the date of the issuance of the license for the subdivision or
condominium project or such other period of time as may be fixed by the Authority.

SEC. 21. Sales Prior to Decree. - In cases of subdivision lots or condominium units sold or disposed of prior to the
effectivity of this Decree, it shall be incumbent upon the owner or developer of the subdivision or condominium
project to complete compliance with his or its obligations as provided in the preceding section within two years from
the date of this Decree unless otherwise extended by the Authority or unless an adequate performance bond is filed
in accordance with Section 6 hereof.

Failure of the owner or developer to comply with the obligations under this and the preceding provisions shall
constitute a violation punishable under Section 38 and 39 of this Decree.

SEC. 23. Non-Forfeiture of Payments. -No installment payment made by a buyer in a subdivision or condominium
project for the lot or unit he contracted to buy shall be forfeited in favor of the owner or developer when the buyer,
after due notice to the owner or developer, desists from further payment due to the failure of the owner or developer
to develop the subdivision or condominium project according to the approved plans and within the time limit for
complying with the same. Such buyer may, at his option, be reimbursed the total amount paid including amortization
interests but excluding delinquency interests, with interest thereon at the legal rate. (Italics supplied)

As for objections about a possible violation of the impairment clause, we find the following statements of Justice
Isagani Cruz enlightening and pertinent to the case at bench:

Despite the impairment clause, a contract valid at the time of its execution may be legally modified or even
completely invalidated by a subsequent law. If the law is a proper exercise of the police power, it will prevail over
the contract.

Into each contract are read the provisions of existing law and, always, a reservation of the police power as long as
the agreement deals with a matter affecting the public welfare. Such a contract, it has been held, suffers a congenital
infirmity, and this is its susceptibility to change by the legislature as a postulate of the legal order.

This Court ruled along similar lines in Juarez vs. Court of Appeals6:

The petitioner complains that the retroactive application of the law would violate the impairment clause. The
argument does not impress. The impairment clause is now no longer inviolate; in fact, there are many who now
believe it is an anachronism in the present-day society. It was quite useful before in protecting the integrity of
private agreements from government meddling, but that was when such agreements did not affect the community in
general. They were indeed purely private agreements then. Any interference with them at that time was really an
unwarranted intrusion that could properly struck down.

But things are different now. More and more, the interests of the public have become involved in what are supposed
to be still private agreements, which have as a result been removed from the protection of the impairment clause.
These agreements have come within the embrace of the police power, that obtrusive protector of the public interest.
It is a ubiquitous policeman indeed. As long as the contract affects the public welfare one way or another so as to
require the interference of the State, then must the police power be asserted, and prevail, over the impairment clausq.

The decision of the Court of Appeals in Breta and Hamor vs. Lao, et al.7, penned by then Court of Appeals
Associate Justice Jose A. R. Melo, now a respected member of this Court, is persuasive, the. factual circumstances
therein being of great similarity to the antecedent facts of the case at bench:

Protection must be afforded small homeowners who toil and save if only to purchase on installment a tiny home lot
they can call their own. The consuming dream of every Filipino is to be able to buy a lot, no matter how small, so
that he may somehow build a house. It has, however, been seen of late that these honest, hard-living individuals are
taken advantage of, with the delivery of titles delayed, the subdivision facilities, including the most essential such as
water installations not completed, or worse yet, as in the instant case, after almost completing the payments for the
property and after constructing a house, the buyer is suddenly confronted by the stark reality, contrived or otherwise,
in which another person would now appear to be owner.

xxx xxx xxx

We cannot over emphasize the fact that the BANK cannot barefacedly argue that simply because the title or titles
offered as security were clean of any encumbrance or lien, that it was thereby relieved of taking any other step to
verify the over-reaching implications should the subdivision be auctioned on foreclosure. The BANK could not have
closed its eyes that it was dealing over a subdivision where there were already houses constructed. Did it not enter
the mind of the responsible officers of the BANK that there may even be subdivision residents who have almost
completed their installment payments? (Id., pp. 7 & 9).

By the foregoing citation, this Court thus adopts by reference the foregoing as part of this Decision.
The real estate mortgage in the above cited case, although constituted in 1975 and outside the beneficial aegis of
P.D. 957, was struck down by the Court of Appeals which found in favor of subdivision lot buyers when the rights of
the latter clashed with the mortgagee banks right to foreclose the property. The Court of Appeals in that case upheld
the decision of the trial court declaring the real estate mortgage as null and void.
As to the second issue of non-privity, petitioner avers that, in view of the provisions of Article 13 11 of the Civil
Code, PNB, being a total stranger to the land purchase agreement, cannot be made to take the developers place.
We disagree. P.D. 957 being applicable, Section 18 of said law obliges petitioner Bank to accept the payment of
the remaining unpaid amortizations tendered by private respondents.

SEC. 18. Mortgages. - No mortgage on any unit or lot shall be made by the owner or developer without prior written
approval of the Authority. Such approval shall not be granted unless it is shown that the proceeds of the mortgage
loan shall be used for the development of the condominium or subdivision project and effective measures have been
provided to ensure such utilization. The loan value of each lot or unit covered by the mortgage shall be determined
and the buyer thereof, if any, shall be notified before the release of the loan. The buyer may, at his option, pay his
installment for the lot or unit directly to the mortgagee who shall apply the payments to the corresponding mortgage
indebtedness secured by the particular lot or unit being paid for, with a view to enabling said buyer to obtain title
over the lot or unit promptly after full payment thereof. (Italics supplied)

Privity of contracts as a defense does not apply in this case for the law explicitly grants to the buyer the option
to pay the installment payment for his lot or unit directly to the mortgagee (petitioner), which is required to apply such
payments to reduce the corresponding portion of the mortgage indebtedness secured by the particular lot or unit being
paid for. And, as stated earlier, this is without prejudice to petitioner Banks seeking relief against the subdivision
developer.
Finally, before closing this Resolution, we enjoin petitioner Bank to focus not only on the strictly legal issues
involved in this case but also to take another look at the larger issues including social justice and the protection of
human rights as enshrined in the Constitution; firstly, because legal issues are raised and decided not in a vacuum but
within the context of existing social, economic and political conditions, law being merely a brick in the up-building
of the social edifice; and secondly, petitioner, being THE state bank, is for all intents and purposes an instrument for
the implementation of state policies so cherished in our fundamental law. These consideration are obviously far more
weighty than the winning of any particular suit or the acquisition of any specific property. Thus, as the country strives
to move ahead towards economic self-sufficiency and to achieve dreams of NIC-hood and social well-being for the
majority of our countrymen, we hold that petitioner Bank, the premier bank in the country, which has in recent years
made record earnings and acquired an enviable international stature, with branches and subsidiaries in key financial
centers around the world, should be equally as happy with the disposition of this case as the private respondents, who
were almost deprived and dispossessed of their very homes purchased through their hard work and with their meager
savings.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the petition is hereby DENIED, petitioner having
failed to show any REVERSIBLE ERROR or GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION in the assailed decision. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
 FIRST DIVISION

COMMISSIONER OF G.R. No. 168129

INTERNAL REVENUE,
Petitioner, Present:

PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CORONA,
- versus - AZCUNA, and
GARCIA, JJ.

PHILIPPINE HEALTH Promulgated:

CARE PROVIDERS, INC.,
Respondent. April 24, 2007

x -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

DECISION

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

For our resolution is the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
as amended, seeking to reverse the Decision[1]dated February 18, 2005 and Resolution dated May 9, 2005 of the Court
of Appeals (Fifteenth Division) in CA-G.R. SP No. 76449.

The factual antecedents of this case, as culled from the records, are:

The Philippine Health Care Providers, Inc., herein respondent, is a

corporation organized and existing under the laws of the Republic of the Philippines. Pursuant to its Articles of
Incorporation,[2] its primary purpose is To establish, maintain, conduct and operate a prepaid group practice health
care delivery system or a health maintenance organization to take care of the sick and disabled persons enrolled in the
health care plan and to provide for the administrative, legal, and financial responsibilities of the organization.

On July 25, 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive Order (E.O.) No. 273, amending the National
Internal Revenue Code of 1977 (Presidential Decree No. 1158) by imposing Value-Added Tax (VAT) on the sale of
goods and services. This E.O. took effect on January 1, 1988.

Before the effectivity of E.O. No. 273, or on December 10, 1987, respondent wrote the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue (CIR), petitioner, inquiring whether the services it provides to the participants in its health care program are
exempt from the payment of the VAT.
On June 8, 1988, petitioner CIR, through the VAT Review Committee of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), issued
VAT Ruling No. 231-88 stating that respondent, as a provider of medical services, is exempt from the VAT
coverage. This Ruling was subsequently confirmed by Regional Director Osmundo G. Umali of Revenue Region No.
8 in a letter dated April 22, 1994.

Meanwhile, on January 1, 1996, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7716 (Expanded VAT or E-VAT Law) took effect, amending
further the National Internal Revenue Code of 1977. Then on January 1, 1998, R.A. No. 8424 (National Internal
Revenue Code of 1997) became effective. This new Tax Code substantially adopted and reproduced the provisions of
E.O. No. 273 on VAT and R.A. No. 7716 on E-VAT.

In the interim, on October 1, 1999, the BIR sent respondent a Preliminary Assessment Notice for deficiency in its
payment of the VAT and documentary stamp taxes (DST) for taxable years 1996 and 1997.

On October 20, 1999, respondent filed a protest with the BIR.

On January 27, 2000, petitioner CIR sent respondent a letter demanding payment of deficiency VAT in the amount
of P100,505,030.26 and DST in the amount of P124,196,610.92, or a total of P224,702,641.18 for taxable years 1996
and 1997. Attached to the demand letter were four (4) assessment notices.

On February 23, 2000, respondent filed another protest questioning the assessment notices.

Petitioner CIR did not take any action on respondents protests. Hence, on September 21, 2000, respondent filed with
the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) a petition for review, docketed as CTA Case No. 6166.

On April 5, 2002, the CTA rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant Petition for Review is PARTIALLY
GRANTED. Petitioner is hereby ORDERED TO PAY the deficiency VAT amounting
to P22,054,831.75 inclusive of 25% surcharge plus 20% interest from January 20, 1997 until fully
paid for the 1996 VAT deficiency and P31,094,163.87 inclusive of 25% surcharge plus 20%
interest from January 20, 1998 until paid for the 1997 VAT deficiency. Accordingly, VAT Ruling
No. 231-88 is declared void and without force and effect. The 1996 and 1997 deficiency DST
assessment against petitioner is hereby CANCELLED AND SET ASIDE. Respondent is
ORDERED to DESIST from collecting the said DST deficiency tax.

SO ORDERED.
Respondent filed a motion for partial reconsideration of the above judgment concerning its liability to pay the
deficiency VAT.

In its Resolution[3] dated March 23, 2003, the CTA granted respondents motion, thus:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant Motion for Partial Reconsideration is
GRANTED. Accordingly, the VAT assessment issued by herein respondent against petitioner for
the taxable years 1996 and 1997 is hereby WITHDRAWN and SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.
The CTA held:

Moreover, this court adheres to its conclusion that petitioner is a service contractor subject to
VAT since it does not actually render medical service but merely acts as a conduit between the
members and petitioners accredited and recognized hospitals and clinics.

However, after a careful review of the facts of the case as well as the Law and jurisprudence
applicable, this court resolves to grant petitioners Motion for Partial Reconsideration.We are in
accord with the view of petitioner that it is entitled to the benefit of non-retroactivity of rulings
guaranteed under Section 246 of the Tax Code, in the absence of showing of bad faith on its
part. Section 246 of the Tax Code provides:

Sec. 246. Non-Retroactivity of Rulings. Any revocation, modification or reversal

of any of the rules and regulations promulgated in accordance with the preceding
Sections or any of the rulings or circulars promulgated by the Commissioner shall
not be given retroactive application if the revocation, modification or reversal will
be prejudicial to the taxpayers, x x x.

Clearly, undue prejudice will be caused to petitioner if the revocation of VAT Ruling No. 231-88
will be retroactively applied to its case. VAT Ruling No. 231-88 issued by no less than the
respondent itself has confirmed petitioners entitlement to VAT exemption under Section 103 of
the Tax Code. In saying so, respondent has actually broadened the scope of medical services to
include the case of the petitioner. This VAT ruling was even confirmed subsequently by Regional
Director Ormundo G. Umali in his letter dated April 22, 1994(Exhibit M). Exhibit P, which served
as basis for the issuance of the said VAT ruling in favor of the petitioner sufficiently described the
business of petitioner and there is no way BIR could be misled by the said representation as to the
real nature of petitioners business. Such being the case, this court is convinced that petitioners
reliance on the said ruling is premised on good faith. The facts of the case do not show that
petitioner deliberately committed mistakes or omitted material facts when it obtained the said
ruling from the Bureau of Internal Revenue. Thus, in the absence of such proof, this court upholds
the application of Section 246 of the Tax Code. Consequently, the pronouncement made by the
BIR in VAT Ruling No. 231-88 as to the VAT exemption of petitioner should be upheld.
Petitioner seasonably filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 76449.

In its Decision dated February 18, 2005, the Court of Appeals affirmed the CTA Resolution.

Petitioner CIR filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied by the appellate court in its Resolution [4] dated May
9, 2005.
Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari raising these two issues: (1) whether respondents services are
subject to VAT; and (2) whether VAT Ruling No. 231-88 exempting respondent from payment of VAT has retroactive
application.

On the first issue, respondent is contesting petitioners assessment of its VAT liabilities for taxable years 1996 and
1997.

Section 102[5] of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1977, as amended by E.O. No. 273 (VAT Law) and R.A. No.
7716 (E-VAT Law), provides:

SEC. 102. Value-added tax on sale of services and use or lease of properties. (a) Rate and base of
tax. There shall be levied, assessed and collected, a value-added tax equivalent to 10% of gross
receipts derived from the sale or exchange of services, including the use or lease of properties.
The phrase sale or exchange of service means the performance of all kinds of services in
the Philippines for a fee, remuneration or consideration, including those performed or rendered by
construction and service contractors x x x.

Section 103[6] of the same Code specifies the exempt transactions from the provision of Section 102, thus:

SEC. 103. Exempt Transactions. The following shall be exempt from the value-added tax:
xxx
(l) Medical, dental, hospital and veterinary services except those rendered by professionals
xxx

The import of the above provision is plain. It requires no interpretation. It contemplates the exemption from
VAT of taxpayers engaged in the performance of medical, dental, hospital, and veterinary services. In Commissioner
of International Revenue v. Seagate Technology (Philippines),[7] we defined an exempt transaction as one involving
goods or services which, by their nature, are specifically listed in and expressly exempted from the VAT, under the
Tax Code, without regard to the tax status of the party in the transaction. In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v.
Toshiba Information Equipment (Phils.) Inc.,[8] we reiterated this definition.

In its letter to the BIR requesting confirmation of its VAT-exempt status, respondent described its services as follows:

Under the prepaid group practice health care delivery system adopted by Health Care, individuals
enrolled in Health Cares health care program are entitled to preventive, diagnostic, and corrective
medical services to be dispensed by Health Cares duly licensed physicians, specialists, and other
professional technical staff participating in said group practice health care delivery system
established and operated by Health Care. Such medical services will be dispensed in a hospital or
clinic owned, operated, or accredited by Health Care. To be entitled to receive such medical
services from Health Care, an individual must enroll in Health Cares health care program and pay
 an annual fee. Enrollment in Health Cares health care program is on a year-to-year basis and
enrollees are issued identification cards.

From the foregoing, the CTA made the following conclusions:

a) Respondent is not actually rendering medical service but merely acting as a conduit
between the members and their accredited and recognized hospitals and clinics.
b) It merely provides and arranges for the provision of pre-need health care services to its
members for a fixed prepaid fee for a specified period of time.
c) It then contracts the services of physicians, medical and dental practitioners, clinics and
hospitals to perform such services to its enrolled members; and
d) Respondent also enters into contract with clinics, hospitals, medical professionals and
then negotiates with them regarding payment schemes, financing and other procedures
in the delivery of health services.

We note that these factual findings of the CTA were neither modified nor reversed by the Court of Appeals. It
is a doctrine that findings of fact of the CTA, a special court exercising particular expertise on the subject of tax, are
generally regarded as final, binding, and conclusive upon this Court, more so where these do not conflict with the
findings of the Court of Appeals.[9] Perforce, as respondent does not actually provide medical and/or hospital
services, as provided under Section 103 on exempt transactions, but merely arranges for the same, its services
are not VAT-exempt.

Relative to the second issue, Section 246 of the 1997 Tax Code, as amended, provides that rulings, circulars,
rules and regulations promulgated by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue have no retroactive application if to apply
them would prejudice the taxpayer. The exceptions to this rule are: (1) where the taxpayer deliberately misstates or
omits material facts from his return or in any document required of him by the Bureau of Internal Revenue; (2) where
the facts subsequently gathered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue are materially different from the facts on which the
ruling is based, or (3) where the taxpayer acted in bad faith.

We must now determine whether VAT Ruling No. 231-88 exempting respondent from paying its VAT
liabilities has retroactive application.

In its Resolution dated March 23, 2003, the CTA found that there is no showing that respondent deliberately
committed mistakes or omitted material facts when it obtained VAT Ruling No. 231-88 from the BIR. The CTA held
that respondents letter which served as the basis for the VAT ruling sufficiently described its business and there is no
way the BIR could be misled by the said representation as to the real nature of said business.
 In sustaining the CTA, the Court of Appeals found that the failure of respondent to refer to itself as a health
maintenance organization is not an indication of bad faith or a deliberate attempt to make false representations. As the
term health maintenance organization did not as yet have any particular significance for tax purposes, respondents
failure to include a term that has yet to acquire its present definition and significance cannot be equated with bad faith.

We agree with both the Tax Court and the Court of Appeals that respondent acted in good faith. In Civil
Service Commission v. Maala,[10] we described good faith as that state of mind denoting honesty of intention and
freedom from knowledge of circumstances which ought to put the holder upon inquiry; an honest intention to abstain
from taking any unconscientious advantage of another, even through technicalities of law, together with absence of
all information, notice, or benefit or belief of facts which render transaction unconscientious.

According to the Court of Appeals, respondents failure to describe itself as a health maintenance organization,
which is subject to VAT, is not tantamount to bad faith. We note that the term health maintenance organization was
first recorded in the Philippine statute books only upon the passage of The National Health Insurance Act of 1995
(Republic Act No. 7875). Section 4 (o) (3) thereof defines a health maintenance organization as an entity that provides,
offers, or arranges for coverage of designated health services needed by plan members for a fixed prepaid
premium. Under this law, a health maintenance organization is one of the classes of a health care provider.

It is thus apparent that when VAT Ruling No. 231-88 was issued in respondents favor, the term health
maintenance organization was yet unknown or had no significance for taxation purposes. Respondent, therefore,
believed in good faith that it was VAT exempt for the taxable years 1996 and 1997 on the basis of VAT Ruling No.
231-88.

In ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corp. v. Court of Tax Appeals, [11] this Court held that under Section 246 of the
1997 Tax Code, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue is precluded from adopting a position contrary to one
previously taken where injustice would result to the taxpayer. Hence, where an assessment for deficiency
withholding income taxes was made, three years after a new BIR Circular reversed a previous one upon which the
taxpayer had relied upon, such an assessment was prejudicial to the taxpayer. To rule otherwise, opined the Court,
would be contrary to the tenets of good faith, equity, and fair play.

This Court has consistently reaffirmed its ruling in ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corp. in the later cases
of Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Borroughs, Ltd.,[12]Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Mega Gen. Mdsg.
Corp.[13] Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Telefunken Semiconductor
(Phils.) Inc.,[14] and Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals.[15] The rule is that the BIR rulings have
no retroactive effect where a grossly unfair deal would result to the prejudice of the taxpayer, as in this case.
 More recently, in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Benguet Corporation,[16] wherein the taxpayer was
entitled to tax refunds or credits based on the BIRsown issuances but later was suddenly saddled with deficiency taxes
due to its subsequent ruling changing the category of the taxpayers transactions for the purpose of paying its VAT,
this Court ruled that applying such ruling retroactively would be prejudicial to the taxpayer.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition and AFFIRM the assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 76449. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
 FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 137873. April 20, 2001]
D.M. CONSUNJI, INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MARIA J. JUEGO, respondents.

DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:

At around 1:30 p.m., November 2, 1990, Jose Juego, a construction worker of D.M. Consunji, Inc., fell 14 floors
from the Renaissance Tower, Pasig City to his death.
PO3 Rogelio Villanueva of the Eastern Police District investigated the tragedy and filed a report dated November
25, 1990, stating that:

x x x. [The] [v]ictim was rushed to [the] Rizal Medical Center in Pasig, Metro Manila where he was pronounced
dead on arrival (DOA) by the attending physician, Dr. Errol de Yzo[,] at around 2:15 p.m. of the same date.

Investigation disclosed that at the given time, date and place, while victim Jose A. Juego together with Jessie Jaluag
and Delso Destajo [were] performing their work as carpenter[s] at the elevator core of the 14th floor of the Tower D,
Renaissance Tower Building on board a [p]latform made of channel beam (steel) measuring 4.8 meters by 2 meters
wide with pinulid plywood flooring and cable wires attached to its four corners and hooked at the 5 ton chain block,
when suddenly, the bolt or pin which was merely inserted to connect the chain block with the [p]latform, got loose
xxx causing the whole [p]latform assembly and the victim to fall down to the basement of the elevator core, Tower
D of the building under construction thereby crushing the victim to death, save his two (2) companions who luckily
jumped out for safety.

It is thus manifest that Jose A. Juego was crushed to death when the [p]latform he was then on board and performing
work, fell. And the falling of the [p]latform was due to the removal or getting loose of the pin which was merely
inserted to the connecting points of the chain block and [p]latform but without a safety lock. [1]

On May 9, 1991, Jose Juegos widow, Maria, filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig a complaint for
damages against the deceaseds employer, D.M. Consunji, Inc. The employer raised, among other defenses, the widows
prior availment of the benefits from the State Insurance Fund.
After trial, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of the widow Maria Juego. The dispositive portion of the RTC
decision reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering defendant to pay plaintiff, as follows:

1. P50,000.00 for the death of Jose A. Juego.

2. P10,000.00 as actual and compensatory damages.

3. P464,000.00 for the loss of Jose A. Juegos earning capacity.

4. P100,000.00 as moral damages.

5. P20,000.00 as attorneys fees, plus the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.[2]

On appeal by D.M. Consunji, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the decision of the RTC in toto.
 D.M. Consunji now seeks the reversal of the CA decision on the following grounds:
• THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE POLICE REPORT WAS
ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE OF THE ALLEGED NEGLIGENCE OF PETITIONER.
• THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA
LOQUITOR [sic] IS APPLICABLE TO PROVE NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF PETITIONER.
• THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER IS PRESUMED
NEGLIGENT UNDER ARTICLE 2180 OF THE CIVIL CODE, AND
• THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT IS NOT PRECLUDED
FROM RECOVERING DAMAGES UNDER THE CIVIL CODE.[3]
Petitioner maintains that the police report reproduced above is hearsay and, therefore, inadmissible. The CA
ruled otherwise. It held that said report, being an entry in official records, is an exception to the hearsay rule.
The Rules of Court provide that a witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal
knowledge, that is, which are derived from his perception. [4] A witness, therefore, may not testify as what he merely
learned from others either because he was told or read or heard the same. Such testimony is considered hearsay and
may not be received as proof of the truth of what he has learned.[5] This is known as the hearsay rule.
Hearsay is not limited to oral testimony or statements; the general rule that excludes hearsay as evidence applies
to written, as well as oral statements.[6]
The theory of the hearsay rule is that the many possible deficiencies, suppressions, sources of error and
untrustworthiness, which lie underneath the bare untested assertion of a witness, may be best brought to light and
exposed by the test of cross-examination.[7] The hearsay rule, therefore, excludes evidence that cannot be tested by
cross-examination.[8]
The Rules of Court allow several exceptions to the rule,[9] among which are entries in official records. Section
44, Rule 130 provides:

Entries in official records made in the performance of his duty made in the performance of his duty by a public
officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law are prima
facie evidence of the facts therein stated.

In Africa, et al. vs. Caltex (Phil.), Inc., et al.,[10] this Court, citing the work of Chief Justice Moran, enumerated
the requisites for admissibility under the above rule:
(a) that the entry was made by a public officer or by another person specially enjoined by law to do so;
(b) that it was made by the public officer in the performance of his duties, or by such other person in the
performance of a duty specially enjoined by law; and
(c) that the public officer or other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts by him stated, which must
have been acquired by him personally or through official information.
The CA held that the police report meets all these requisites. Petitioner contends that the last requisite is not
present.
The Court notes that PO3 Villanueva, who signed the report in question, also testified before the trial court.
In Rodriguez vs. Court of Appeals,[11] which involved a Fire Investigation Report, the officer who signed the fire report
also testified before the trial court. This Court held that the report was inadmissible for the purpose of proving the
truth of the statements contained in the report but admissible insofar as it constitutes part of the testimony of the officer
who executed the report.

x x x. Since Major Enriquez himself took the witness stand and was available for cross-examination, the portions of
the report which were of his personal knowledge or which consisted of his perceptions and conclusions were not
hearsay. The rest of the report, such as the summary of the statements of the parties based on their sworn statements
(which were annexed to the Report) as well as the latter, having been included in the first purpose of the offer [as
part of the testimony of Major Enriquez], may then be considered as independently relevant statements which were
gathered in the course of the investigation and may thus be admitted as such, but not necessarily to prove the truth
thereof. It has been said that:

Where regardless of the truth or falsity of a statement, the fact that it has been made is relevant, the hearsay rule
does not apply, but the statement may be shown. Evidence as to the making of such statement is not secondary but
primary, for the statement itself may constitute a fact in issue, or be circumstantially relevant as to the existence of
such a fact.

When Major Enriquez took the witness stand, testified for petitioners on his Report and made himself available for
cross-examination by the adverse party, the Report, insofar as it proved that certain utterances were made (but not
their truth), was effectively removed from the ambit of the aforementioned Section 44 of Rule 130. Properly
understood, this section does away with the testimony in open court of the officer who made the official record,
considers the matter as an exception to the hearsay rule and makes the entries in said official record admissible in
evidence as prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. The underlying reasons for this exceptionary rule are
necessity and trustworthiness, as explained in Antillon v. Barcelon.

The litigation is unlimited in which testimony by officials is daily needed; the occasions in which the
officials would be summoned from his ordinary duties to declare as a witness are numberless. The public
officers are few in whose daily work something is not done in which testimony is not needed from
official sources. Were there no exception for official statements, hosts of officials would be found
devoting the greater part of their time to attending as witnesses in court or delivering deposition before an
officer. The work of administration of government and the interest of the public having business with
officials would alike suffer in consequence. For these reasons, and for many others, a certain verity is
accorded such documents, which is not extended to private documents. (3 Wigmore on Evidence, Sec.
1631).

The law reposes a particular confidence in public officers that it presumes they will discharge their several trusts
with accuracy and fidelity; and, therefore, whatever acts they do in discharge of their duty may be given in evidence
and shall be taken to be true under such a degree of caution as to the nature and circumstances of each case may
appear to require.

It would have been an entirely different matter if Major Enriquez was not presented to testify on his report. In that
case the applicability of Section 44 of Rule 143 would have been ripe for determination, and this Court would have
agreed with the Court of Appeals that said report was inadmissible since the aforementioned third requisite was not
satisfied. The statements given by the sources of information of Major Enriquez failed to qualify as official
information, there being no showing that, at the very least, they were under a duty to give the statements for record.

Similarly, the police report in this case is inadmissible for the purpose of proving the truth of the statements
contained therein but is admissible insofar as it constitutes part of the testimony of PO3 Villanueva.
In any case, the Court holds that portions of PO3 Villanuevas testimony which were of his personal knowledge
suffice to prove that Jose Juego indeed died as a result of the elevator crash. PO3 Villanueva had seen Juegos remains
at the morgue,[12] making the latters death beyond dispute. PO3 Villanueva also conducted an ocular inspection of the
premises of the building the day after the incident[13] and saw the platform for himself.[14] He observed that the platform
was crushed[15] and that it was totally damaged.[16] PO3 Villanueva also required Garcia and Fabro to bring the chain
block to the police headquarters. Upon inspection, he noticed that the chain was detached from the lifting machine,
without any pin or bolt.[17]
What petitioner takes particular exception to is PO3 Villanuevas testimony that the cause of the fall of the
platform was the loosening of the bolt from the chain block. It is claimed that such portion of the testimony is mere
opinion. Subject to certain exceptions,[18] the opinion of a witness is generally not admissible.[19]
Petitioners contention, however, loses relevance in the face of the application of res ipsa loquitur by the CA.
The effect of the doctrine is to warrant a presumption or inference that the mere fall of the elevator was a result of the
person having charge of the instrumentality was negligent. As a rule of evidence, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is
peculiar to the law of negligence which recognizes that prima facie negligence may be established without direct proof
and furnishes a substitute for specific proof of negligence. [20]
The concept of res ipsa loquitur has been explained in this wise:

While negligence is not ordinarily inferred or presumed, and while the mere happening of an accident or injury will
not generally give rise to an inference or presumption that it was due to negligence on defendants part, under the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, which means, literally, the thing or transaction speaks for itself, or in one jurisdiction,
that the thing or instrumentality speaks for itself, the facts or circumstances accompanying an injury may be such as
to raise a presumption, or at least permit an inference of negligence on the part of the defendant, or some other
person who is charged with negligence.

x x x where it is shown that the thing or instrumentality which caused the injury complained of was under the
control or management of the defendant, and that the occurrence resulting in the injury was such as in the ordinary
course of things would not happen if those who had its control or management used proper care, there is sufficient
evidence, or, as sometimes stated, reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by the defendant, that the
injury arose from or was caused by the defendants want of care. [21]

One of the theoretical bases for the doctrine is its necessity, i.e., that necessary evidence is absent or not
available.[22]

The res ipsa loquitur doctrine is based in part upon the theory that the defendant in charge of the instrumentality
which causes the injury either knows the cause of the accident or has the best opportunity of ascertaining it and that
the plaintiff has no such knowledge, and therefore is compelled to allege negligence in general terms and to rely
upon the proof of the happening of the accident in order to establish negligence. The inference which the doctrine
permits is grounded upon the fact that the chief evidence of the true cause, whether culpable or innocent, is
practically accessible to the defendant but inaccessible to the injured person.

It has been said that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur furnishes a bridge by which a plaintiff, without knowledge of
the cause, reaches over to defendant who knows or should know the cause, for any explanation of care exercised by
the defendant in respect of the matter of which the plaintiff complains. The res ipsa loquitur doctrine, another court
has said, is a rule of necessity, in that it proceeds on the theory that under the peculiar circumstances in which the
doctrine is applicable, it is within the power of the defendant to show that there was no negligence on his part, and
direct proof of defendants negligence is beyond plaintiffs power. Accordingly, some courts add to the three
prerequisites for the application of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine the further requirement that for the res ipsa loquitur
doctrine to apply, it must appear that the injured party had no knowledge or means of knowledge as to the cause of
the accident, or that the party to be charged with negligence has superior knowledge or opportunity for explanation
of the accident.[23]

The CA held that all the requisites of res ipsa loquitur are present in the case at bar:

There is no dispute that appellees husband fell down from the 14th floor of a building to the basement while he was
working with appellants construction project, resulting to his death. The construction site is within the exclusive
control and management of appellant. It has a safety engineer, a project superintendent, a carpenter leadman and
others who are in complete control of the situation therein. The circumstances of any accident that would occur
therein are peculiarly within the knowledge of the appellant or its employees. On the other hand, the appellee is not
in a position to know what caused the accident. Res ipsa loquitur is a rule of necessity and it applies where evidence
is absent or not readily available, provided the following requisites are present: (1) the accident was of a kind which
does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent; (2) the instrumentality or agency which caused the injury was
under the exclusive control of the person charged with negligence; and (3) the injury suffered must not have been
due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person injured. x x x.
No worker is going to fall from the 14th floor of a building to the basement while performing work in a construction
site unless someone is negligent[;] thus, the first requisite for the application of the rule of res ipsa loquitur is
present. As explained earlier, the construction site with all its paraphernalia and human resources that likely caused
the injury is under the exclusive control and management of appellant[;] thus[,] the second requisite is also
present. No contributory negligence was attributed to the appellees deceased husband[;] thus[,] the last requisite is
also present. All the requisites for the application of the rule of res ipsa loquitur are present, thus a reasonable
presumption or inference of appellants negligence arises. x x x.[24]

Petitioner does not dispute the existence of the requisites for the application of res ipsa loquitur, but argues that
the presumption or inference that it was negligent did not arise since it proved that it exercised due care to avoid the
accident which befell respondents husband.
Petitioner apparently misapprehends the procedural effect of the doctrine. As stated earlier, the defendants
negligence is presumed or inferred[25] when the plaintiff establishes the requisites for the application of res ipsa
loquitur. Once the plaintiff makes out a prima facie case of all the elements, the burden then shifts to defendant to
explain.[26] The presumption or inference may be rebutted or overcome by other evidence and, under appropriate
circumstances a disputable presumption, such as that of due care or innocence, may outweigh the inference. [27] It is
not for the defendant to explain or prove its defense to prevent the presumption or inference from arising. Evidence
by the defendant of say, due care, comes into play only after the circumstances for the application of the doctrine has
been established.
In any case, petitioner cites the sworn statement of its leadman Ferdinand Fabro executed before the police
investigator as evidence of its due care. According to Fabro's sworn statement, the company enacted rules and
regulations for the safety and security of its workers. Moreover, the leadman and the bodegero inspect the chain block
before allowing its use.
It is ironic that petitioner relies on Fabros sworn statement as proof of its due care but, in arguing that private
respondent failed to prove negligence on the part of petitioners employees, also assails the same statement for being
hearsay.
Petitioner is correct. Fabro's sworn statement is hearsay and inadmissible. Affidavits are inadmissible as
evidence under the hearsay rule, unless the affiant is placed on the witness stand to testify thereon. [28] The
inadmissibility of this sort of evidence is based not only on the lack of opportunity on the part of the adverse party to
cross-examine the affiant, but also on the commonly known fact that, generally, an affidavit is not prepared by the
affiant himself but by another who uses his own language in writing the affiants statements which may either be
omitted or misunderstood by the one writing them. [29] Petitioner, therefore, cannot use said statement as proof of its
due care any more than private respondent can use it to prove the cause of her husbands death. Regrettably, petitioner
does not cite any other evidence to rebut the inference or presumption of negligence arising from the application of res
ipsa loquitur, or to establish any defense relating to the incident.
Next, petitioner argues that private respondent had previously availed of the death benefits provided under the
Labor Code and is, therefore, precluded from claiming from the deceaseds employer damages under the Civil Code.
Article 173 of the Labor Code states:

ART. 173. Extent of liability. Unless otherwise provided, the liability of the State Insurance Fund under this Title
shall be exclusive and in place of all other liabilities of the employer to the employee, his dependents or anyone
otherwise entitled to receive damages on behalf of the employee or his dependents. The payment of compensation
under this Title shall not bar the recovery of benefits as provided for in Section 699 of the Revised Administrative
Code, Republic Act Numbered Eleven hundred sixty-one, as amended, Republic Act Numbered Six hundred ten, as
amended, Republic Act Numbered Forty-eight hundred sixty-four as amended, and other laws whose benefits are
administered by the System or by other agencies of the government.

The precursor of Article 173 of the Labor Code, Section 5 of the Workmens Compensation Act, provided that:

SEC. 5. Exclusive right to compensation. The rights and remedies granted by this Act to an employee by reason of a
personal injury entitling him to compensation shall exclude all other rights and remedies accruing to the employee,
his personal representatives, dependents or nearest of kin against the employer under the Civil Code and other laws
because of said injury x x x.

Whether Section 5 of the Workmens Compensation Act allowed recovery under said Act as well as under the
Civil Code used to be the subject of conflicting decisions. The Court finally settled the matter in Floresca vs. Philex
Mining Corporation,[30] which involved a cave-in resulting in the death of the employees of the Philex Mining
Corporation. Alleging that the mining corporation, in violation of government rules and regulations, failed to take the
required precautions for the protection of the employees, the heirs of the deceased employees filed a complaint against
Philex Mining in the Court of First Instance (CFI). Upon motion of Philex Mining, the CFI dismissed the complaint
for lack of jurisdiction. The heirs sought relief from this Court.
Addressing the issue of whether the heirs had a choice of remedies, majority of the Court En Banc,[31] following
the rule in Pacaa vs. Cebu Autobus Company, held in the affirmative.

WE now come to the query as to whether or not the injured employee or his heirs in case of death have a right of
selection or choice of action between availing themselves of the workers right under the Workmens Compensation
Act and suing in the regular courts under the Civil Code for higher damages (actual, moral and exemplary) from the
employers by virtue of the negligence or fault of the employers or whether they may avail themselves cumulatively
of both actions, i.e., collect the limited compensation under the Workmens Compensation Act and sue in addition for
damages in the regular courts.

In disposing of a similar issue, this Court in Pacaa vs. Cebu Autobus Company, 32 SCRA 442, ruled that an injured
worker has a choice of either to recover from the employer the fixed amounts set by the Workmens Compensation
Act or to prosecute an ordinary civil action against the tortfeasor for higher damages but he cannot pursue both
courses of action simultaneously. [Underscoring supplied.]

Nevertheless, the Court allowed some of the petitioners in said case to proceed with their suit under the Civil
Code despite having availed of the benefits provided under the Workmens Compensation Act. The Court reasoned:

With regard to the other petitioners, it was alleged by Philex in its motion to dismiss dated May 14, 1968 before the
court a quo, that the heirs of the deceased employees, namely Emerito Obra, Larry Villar, Jr., Aurelio Lanuza,
Lorenzo Isla and Saturnino submitted notices and claims for compensation to the Regional Office No.1 of the then
Department of Labor and all of them have been paid in full as of August 25, 1967, except Saturnino Martinez whose
heirs decided that they be paid in installments x x x. Such allegation was admitted by herein petitioners in their
opposition to the motion to dismiss dated May 27, 1968 x x x in the lower court, but they set up the defense that the
claims were filed under the Workmens Compensation Act before they learned of the official report of the committee
created to investigate the accident which established the criminal negligence and violation of law by Philex, and
which report was forwarded by the Director of Mines to then Executive Secretary Rafael Salas in a letter dated
October 19, 1967 only x x x.

WE hold that although the other petitioners had received the benefits under the Workmens Compensation Act, such
may not preclude them from bringing an action before the regular court because they became cognizant of the fact
that Philex has been remiss in its contractual obligations with the deceased miners only after receiving compensation
under the Act. Had petitioners been aware of said violation of government rules and regulations by Philex, and of its
negligence, they would not have sought redress under the Workmens Compensation Commission which awarded a
lesser amount for compensation. The choice of the first remedy was based on ignorance or a mistake of fact, which
nullifies the choice as it was not an intelligent choice. The case should therefore be remanded to the lower court for
further proceedings. However, should the petitioners be successful in their bid before the lower court, the payments
made under the Workmens Compensation Act should be deducted from the damages that may be decreed in their
favor. [Underscoring supplied.]

The ruling in Floresca providing the claimant a choice of remedies was reiterated in Ysmael Maritime
Corporation vs. Avelino,[32] Vda. de Severo vs. Feliciano-Go,[33] and Marcopper Mining Corp. vs. Abeleda.[34] In the
last case, the Court again recognized that a claimant who had been paid under the Act could still sue under the Civil
Code. The Court said:
In the Robles case, it was held that claims for damages sustained by workers in the course of their employment
could be filed only under the Workmens Compensation Law, to the exclusion of all further claims under other
laws. In Floresca, this doctrine was abrogated in favor of the new rule that the claimants may invoke either the
Workmens Compensation Act or the provisions of the Civil Code, subject to the consequence that the choice of one
remedy will exclude the other and that the acceptance of compensation under the remedy chosen will preclude a
claim for additional benefits under the other remedy. The exception is where a claimant who has already been paid
under the Workmens Compensation Act may still sue for damages under the Civil Code on the basis of supervening
facts or developments occurring after he opted for the first remedy. (Underscoring supplied.)

Here, the CA held that private respondents case came under the exception because private respondent was
unaware of petitioners negligence when she filed her claim for death benefits from the State Insurance Fund. Private
respondent filed the civil complaint for damages after she received a copy of the police investigation report and the
Prosecutors Memorandum dismissing the criminal complaint against petitioners personnel. While stating that there
was no negligence attributable to the respondents in the complaint, the prosecutor nevertheless noted in the
Memorandum that, if at all, the case is civil in nature. The CA thus applied the exception in Floresca:

x x x We do not agree that appellee has knowledge of the alleged negligence of appellant as early as November 25,
1990, the date of the police investigators report. The appellee merely executed her sworn statement before the police
investigator concerning her personal circumstances, her relation to the victim, and her knowledge of the
accident. She did not file the complaint for Simple Negligence Resulting to Homicide against appellants
employees. It was the investigator who recommended the filing of said case and his supervisor referred the same to
the prosecutors office. This is a standard operating procedure for police investigators which appellee may not have
even known. This may explain why no complainant is mentioned in the preliminary statement of the public
prosecutor in her memorandum dated February 6, 1991, to wit: Respondent Ferdinand Fabro x x x are being charged
by complaint of Simple Negligence Resulting to Homicide. It is also possible that the appellee did not have a chance
to appear before the public prosecutor as can be inferred from the following statement in said memorandum:
Respondents who were notified pursuant to Law waived their rights to present controverting evidence, thus there
was no reason for the public prosecutor to summon the appellee. Hence, notice of appellants negligence cannot be
imputed on appellee before she applied for death benefits under ECC or before she received the first payment
therefrom. Her using the police investigation report to support her complaint filed on May 9, 1991 may just be an
afterthought after receiving a copy of the February 6, 1991 Memorandum of the Prosecutors Office dismissing the
criminal complaint for insufficiency of evidence, stating therein that: The death of the victim is not attributable to
any negligence on the part of the respondents. If at all and as shown by the records this case is civil in nature.
(Underscoring supplied.) Considering the foregoing, We are more inclined to believe appellees allegation that she
learned about appellants negligence only after she applied for and received the benefits under ECC. This is a mistake
of fact that will make this case fall under the exception held in the Floresca ruling.[35]

The CA further held that not only was private respondent ignorant of the facts, but of her rights as well:

x x x. Appellee [Maria Juego] testified that she has reached only elementary school for her educational attainment;
that she did not know what damages could be recovered from the death of her husband; and that she did not know
that she may also recover more from the Civil Code than from the ECC. x x x.[36]

Petitioner impugns the foregoing rulings. It contends that private respondent "failed to allege in her complaint
that her application and receipt of benefits from the ECC were attended by ignorance or mistake of fact. Not being an
issue submitted during the trial, the trial court had no authority to hear or adjudicate that issue."
Petitioner also claims that private respondent could not have been ignorant of the facts because as early as
November 28, 1990, private respondent was the complainant in a criminal complaint for "Simple Negligence Resulting
to Homicide" against petitioner's employees. On February 6, 1991, two months before the filing of the action in the
lower court, Prosecutor Lorna Lee issued a resolution finding that, although there was insufficient evidence against
petitioner's employees, the case was "civil in nature." These purportedly show that prior to her receipt of death benefits
from the ECC on January 2, 1991 and every month thereafter, private respondent also knew of the two choices of
remedies available to her and yet she chose to claim and receive the benefits from the ECC.
 When a party having knowledge of the facts makes an election between inconsistent remedies, the election is
final and bars any action, suit, or proceeding inconsistent with the elected remedy, in the absence of fraud by the other
party. The first act of election acts as a bar.[37] Equitable in nature, the doctrine of election of remedies is designed to
mitigate possible unfairness to both parties.It rests on the moral premise that it is fair to hold people responsible for
their choices. The purpose of the doctrine is not to prevent any recourse to any remedy, but to prevent a double redress
for a single wrong.[38]
The choice of a party between inconsistent remedies results in a waiver by election. Hence, the rule
in Floresca that a claimant cannot simultaneously pursue recovery under the Labor Code and prosecute an ordinary
course of action under the Civil Code. The claimant, by his choice of one remedy, is deemed to have waived the other.
Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right.[39]

[It] is an act of understanding that presupposes that a party has knowledge of its rights, but chooses not to assert
them. It must be generally shown by the party claiming a waiver that the person against whom the waiver is asserted
had at the time knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of the party's rights or of all material facts upon
which they depended. Where one lacks knowledge of a right, there is no basis upon which waiver of it can
rest. Ignorance of a material fact negates waiver, and waiver cannot be established by a consent given under a
mistake or misapprehension of fact.

A person makes a knowing and intelligent waiver when that person knows that a right exists and has adequate
knowledge upon which to make an intelligent decision. Waiver requires a knowledge of the facts basic to the
exercise of the right waived, with an awareness of its consequences. That a waiver is made knowingly and
intelligently must be illustrated on the record or by the evidence. [40]

That lack of knowledge of a fact that nullifies the election of a remedy is the basis for the exception in Floresca.
It is in light of the foregoing principles that we address petitioners contentions.
Waiver is a defense, and it was not incumbent upon private respondent, as plaintiff, to allege in her complaint
that she had availed of benefits from the ECC. It is, thus, erroneous for petitioner to burden private respondent with
raising waiver as an issue. On the contrary, it is the defendant who ought to plead waiver, as petitioner did in pages 2-
3 of its Answer;[41] otherwise, the defense is waived. It is, therefore, perplexing for petitioner to now contend that the
trial court had no jurisdiction over the issue when petitioner itself pleaded waiver in the proceedings before the trial
court.
Does the evidence show that private respondent knew of the facts that led to her husbands death and the rights
pertaining to a choice of remedies?
It bears stressing that what negates waiver is lack of knowledge or a mistake of fact. In this case, the fact that
served as a basis for nullifying the waiver is the negligence of petitioners employees, of which private respondent
purportedly learned only after the prosecutor issued a resolution stating that there may be civil liability. In Floresca,
it was the negligence of the mining corporation and its violation of government rules and regulations. Negligence, or
violation of government rules and regulations, for that matter, however, is not a fact, but a conclusion of law, over
which only the courts have the final say. Such a conclusion binds no one until the courts have decreed so. It appears,
therefore, that the principle that ignorance or mistake of fact nullifies a waiver has been misapplied in Floresca and
in the case at bar.
In any event, there is no proof that private respondent knew that her husband died in the elevator crash when on
November 15, 1990 she accomplished her application for benefits from the ECC. The police investigation report is
dated November 25, 1990, 10 days after the accomplishment of the form. Petitioner filed the application in her behalf
on November 27, 1990.
There is also no showing that private respondent knew of the remedies available to her when the claim before
the ECC was filed. On the contrary, private respondent testified that she was not aware of her rights.
Petitioner, though, argues that under Article 3 of the Civil Code, ignorance of the law excuses no one from
compliance therewith. As judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution form part of the
Philippine legal system (Article 8, Civil Code), private respondent cannot claim ignorance of this Courts ruling
in Floresca allowing a choice of remedies.
The argument has no merit. The application of Article 3 is limited to mandatory and prohibitory laws. [42] This
may be deduced from the language of the provision, which, notwithstanding a person's ignorance, does not excuse his
or her compliance with the laws. The rule in Floresca allowing private respondent a choice of remedies is neither
mandatory nor prohibitory. Accordingly, her ignorance thereof cannot be held against her.
Finally, the Court modifies the affirmance of the award of damages. The records do not indicate the total amount
private respondent ought to receive from the ECC, although it appears from Exhibit K [43] that she received P3,581.85
as initial payment representing the accrued pension from November 1990 to March 1991. Her initial monthly pension,
according to the same Exhibit K, was P596.97 and present total monthly pension was P716.40. Whether the total
amount she will eventually receive from the ECC is less than the sum of P644,000.00 in total damages awarded by
the trial court is subject to speculation, and the case is remanded to the trial court for such determination. Should the
trial court find that its award is greater than that of the ECC, payments already received by private respondent under
the Labor Code shall be deducted from the trial courts award of damages. Consistent with our ruling in Floresca, this
adjudication aims to prevent double compensation.
WHEREFORE, the case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City to determine whether the
award decreed in its decision is more than that of the ECC. Should the award decreed by the trial court be greater than
that awarded by the ECC, payments already made to private respondent pursuant to the Labor Code shall be deducted
therefrom. In all other respects, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-15127 May 30, 1961

EMETERIO CUI, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
ARELLANO UNIVERSITY, defendant-appellee.

G.A.S. Sipin, Jr., for plaintiff-appellant.

E. Voltaire Garcia for defendant-appellee.

CONCEPCION, J.:

Appeal by plaintiff Emeterio Cui from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila, absolving defendant
Arellano University from plaintiff's complaint, with costs against the plaintiff, and dismissing defendant's counter
claim, for insufficiency of proof thereon.

In the language of the decision appealed from:

The essential facts of this case are short and undisputed. As established by the agreement of facts Exhibits
X and by the respective oral and documentary evidence introduced by the parties, it appears conclusive that
plaintiff, before the school year 1948-1949 took up preparatory law course in the defendant University.
After finishing his preparatory law course plaintiff enrolled in the College of Law of the defendant from the
school year 1948-1949. Plaintiff finished his law studies in the defendant university up to and including the
first semester of the fourth year. During all the school years in which plaintiff was studying law in
defendant law college, Francisco R. Capistrano, brother of the mother of plaintiff, was the dean of the
College of Law and legal counsel of the defendant university. Plaintiff enrolled for the last semester of his
law studies in the defendant university but failed to pay his tuition fees because his uncle Dean Francisco
R. Capistrano having severed his connection with defendant and having accepted the deanship and
chancellorship of the College of Law of Abad Santos University, plaintiff left the defendant's law college
and enrolled for the last semester of his fourth year law in the college of law of the Abad Santos University
graduating from the college of law of the latter university. Plaintiff, during all the time he was studying law
in defendant university was awarded scholarship grants, for scholastic merit, so that his semestral tuition
fees were returned to him after the ends of semester and when his scholarship grants were awarded to him.
The whole amount of tuition fees paid by plaintiff to defendant and refunded to him by the latter from the
first semester up to and including the first semester of his last year in the college of law or the fourth year,
is in total P1,033.87. After graduating in law from Abad Santos University he applied to take the bar
examination. To secure permission to take the bar he needed the transcripts of his records in defendant
Arellano University. Plaintiff petitioned the latter to issue to him the needed transcripts. The defendant
refused until after he had paid back the P1,033 87 which defendant refunded to him as above stated. As he
could not take the bar examination without those transcripts, plaintiff paid to defendant the said sum under
protest. This is the sum which plaintiff seeks to recover from defendant in this case.

Before defendant awarded to plaintiff the scholarship grants as above stated, he was made to sign the
following contract covenant and agreement:

"In consideration of the scholarship granted to me by the University, I hereby waive my right to transfer to
another school without having refunded to the University (defendant) the equivalent of my scholarship
cash.
 (Sgd.) Emeterio Cui".

It is admitted that, on August 16, 1949, the Director of Private Schools issued Memorandum No. 38, series of 1949,
on the subject of "Scholarship," addressed to "All heads of private schools, colleges and universities," reading:

1. School catalogs and prospectuses submitted to this, Bureau show that some schools offer full or partial
scholarships to deserving students — for excellence in scholarship or for leadership in extra-curricular
activities. Such inducements to poor but gifted students should be encouraged. But to stipulate the
condition that such scholarships are good only if the students concerned continue in the same school
nullifies the principle of merit in the award of these scholarships.

2. When students are given full or partial scholarships, it is understood that such scholarships are merited
and earned. The amount in tuition and other fees corresponding to these scholarships should not be
subsequently charged to the recipient students when they decide to quit school or to transfer to another
institution. Scholarships should not be offered merely to attract and keep students in a school.

3. Several complaints have actually been received from students who have enjoyed scholarships, full or
partial, to the effect that they could not transfer to other schools since their credentials would not be
released unless they would pay the fees corresponding to the period of the scholarships. Where the Bureau
believes that the right of the student to transfer is being denied on this ground, it reserves the right to
authorize such transfer.

that defendant herein received a copy of this memorandum; that plaintiff asked the Bureau of Private Schools to pass
upon the issue on his right to secure the transcript of his record in defendant University, without being required to
refund the sum of P1,033.87; that the Bureau of Private Schools upheld the position taken by the plaintiff and so
advised the defendant; and that, this notwithstanding, the latter refused to issue said transcript of records, unless said
refund were made, and even recommended to said Bureau that it issue a written order directing the defendant to
release said transcript of record, "so that the case may be presented to the court for judicial action." As above stated,
plaintiff was, accordingly, constrained to pay, and did pay under protest, said sum of P1,033.87, in order that he
could take the bar examination in 1953. Subsequently, he brought this action for the recovery of said amount, aside
from P2,000 as moral damages, P500 as exemplary damages, P2,000 as attorney's fees, and P500 as expenses of
litigation.

In its answer, defendant reiterated the stand it took, vis-a-vis the Bureau of Private Schools, namely, that the
provisions of its contract with plaintiff are valid and binding and that the memorandum above-referred to is null and
void. It, likewise, set up a counterclaim for P10,000.00 as damages, and P3,000 as attorney's fees.

The issue in this case is whether the above quoted provision of the contract between plaintiff and the defendant,
whereby the former waived his right to transfer to another school without refunding to the latter the equivalent of his
scholarships in cash, is valid or not. The lower court resolved this question in the affirmative, upon the ground that
the aforementioned memorandum of the Director of Private Schools is not a law; that the provisions thereof are
advisory, not mandatory in nature; and that, although the contractual provision "may be unethical, yet it was more
unethical for plaintiff to quit studying with the defendant without good reasons and simply because he wanted to
follow the example of his uncle." Moreover, defendant maintains in its brief that the aforementioned memorandum
of the Director of Private Schools is null and void because said officer had no authority to issue it, and because it
had been neither approved by the corresponding department head nor published in the official gazette.

We do not deem it necessary or advisable to consider as the lower court did, the question whether plaintiff had
sufficient reasons or not to transfer from defendant University to the Abad Santos University. The nature of the issue
before us, and its far reaching effects, transcend personal equations and demand a determination of the case from a
high impersonal plane. Neither do we deem it essential to pass upon the validity of said Memorandum No. 38, for,
regardless of the same, we are of the opinion that the stipulation in question is contrary to public policy and, hence,
null and void. The aforesaid memorandum merely incorporates a sound principle of public policy. As the Director of
Private Schools correctly pointed, out in his letter, Exhibit B, to the defendant,

There is one more point that merits refutation and that is whether or not the contract entered into between
Cui and Arellano University on September 10, 1951 was void as against public policy. In the case of Zeigel
vs. Illinois Trust and Savings Bank, 245 Ill. 180, 19 Ann. Case 127, the court said: 'In determining a public
policy of the state, courts are limited to a consideration of the Constitution, the judicial decisions, the
statutes, and the practice of government officers.' It might take more than a government bureau or office to
lay down or establish a public policy, as alleged in your communication, but courts consider the practices
of government officials as one of the four factors in determining a public policy of the state. It has been
consistently held in America that under the principles relating to the doctrine of public policy, as applied to
the law of contracts, courts of justice will not recognize or uphold a transaction which its object, operation,
or tendency is calculated to be prejudicial to the public welfare, to sound morality or to civic honesty (Ritter
vs. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 169 U.S. 139; Heding vs. Gallaghere 64 L.R.A. 811; Veazy vs. Allen, 173 N.Y.
359). If Arellano University understood clearly the real essence of scholarships and the motives which
prompted this office to issue Memorandum No. 38, s. 1949, it should have not entered into a contract of
waiver with Cui on September 10, 1951, which is a direct violation of our Memorandum and an open
challenge to the authority of the Director of Private Schools because the contract was repugnant to sound
morality and civic honesty. And finally, in Gabriel vs. Monte de Piedad, Off. Gazette Supp. Dec. 6, 1941,
p. 67 we read: 'In order to declare a contract void as against public policy, a court must find that the
contract as to consideration or the thing to be done, contravenes some established interest of society, or
is inconsistent with sound policy and good moralsor tends clearly to undermine the security of individual
rights. The policy enunciated in Memorandum No. 38, s. 1949 is sound policy. Scholarship are awarded in
recognition of merit not to keep outstanding students in school to bolster its prestige. In the understanding
of that university scholarships award is a business scheme designed to increase the business potential of an
education institution. Thus conceived it is not only inconsistent with sound policy but also good morals.
But what is morals? Manresa has this definition. It is good customs; those generally accepted principles of
morality which have received some kind of social and practical confirmation. The practice of awarding
scholarships to attract students and keep them in school is not good customs nor has it received some kind
of social and practical confirmation except in some private institutions as in Arellano University. The
University of the Philippines which implements Section 5 of Article XIV of the Constitution with reference
to the giving of free scholarships to gifted children, does not require scholars to reimburse the
corresponding value of the scholarships if they transfer to other schools. So also with the leading colleges
and universities of the United States after which our educational practices or policies are patterned. In these
institutions scholarships are granted not to attract and to keep brilliant students in school for their
propaganda mine but to reward merit or help gifted students in whom society has an established interest or
a first lien. (Emphasis supplied.)

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and another one shall be entered sentencing the
defendant to pay to the plaintiff the sum of P1,033.87, with interest thereon at the legal rate from September 1, 1954,
date of the institution of this case, as well as the costs, and dismissing defendant's counterclaim. It is so ordered.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 103982 December 11, 1992

ANTONIO A. MECANO, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondent.

CAMPOS, JR., J.:

Antonio A. Mecano, through a petition for certiorari, seeks to nullify the decision of the Commission on Audit
(COA, for brevity) embodied in its 7th Indorsement, dated January 16, 1992, denying his claim for reimbursement
under Section 699 of the Revised Administrative Code (RAC), as amended, in the total amount of P40,831.00.

Petitioner is a Director II of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). He was hospitalized for cholecystitis from
March 26, 1990 to April 7, 1990, on account of which he incurred medical and hospitalization expenses, the total
amount of which he is claiming from the COA.

On May 11, 1990, in a memorandum to the NBI Director, Alfredo S. Lim (Director Lim, for brevity), he requested
reimbursement for his expenses on the ground that he is entitled to the benefits under Section 699 1 of the RAC, the
pertinent provisions of which read:

Sec. 699. Allowances in case of injury, death, or sickness incurred in performance of duty. —
When a person in the service of the national government of a province, city, municipality or
municipal district is so injured in the performance of duty as thereby to receive some actual
physical hurt or wound, the proper Head of Department may direct that absence during any period
of disability thereby occasioned shall be on full pay, though not more than six months, and in such
case he may in his discretion also authorize the payment of the medical attendance, necessary
transportation, subsistence and hospital fees of the injured person. Absence in the case
contemplated shall be charged first against vacation leave, if any there be.

xxx xxx xxx

In case of sickness caused by or connected directly with the performance of some act in the line of
duty, the Department head may in his discretion authorize the payment of the necessary hospital
fees.

Director Lim then forwarded petitioner's claim, in a 1st Indorsement dated June 22, 1990, to the Secretary of Justice,
along with the comment, bearing the same date, of Gerarda Galang, Chief, LED of the NBI, "recommending
favorable action thereof". Finding petitioner's illness to be service-connected, the Committee on Physical
Examination of the Department of Justice favorably recommended the payment of petitioner's claim.

However, then Undersecretary of Justice Silvestre H. Bello III, in a 4th Indorsement dated November 21, 1990,
returned petitioner's claim to Director Lim, having considered the statements of the Chairman of the COA in its 5th
Indorsement dated 19 September 1990, to the effect that the RAC being relied upon was repealed by the
Administrative Code of 1987.
Petitioner then re-submitted his claim to Director Lim, with a copy of Opinion No. 73, S. 1991 2 dated April 26, 1991
of then Secretary of Justice Franklin M. Drilon (Secretary Drilon, for brevity) stating that "the issuance of the
Administrative Code did not operate to repeal or abregate in its entirety the Revised Administrative Code, including
the particular Section 699 of the latter".

On May 10, 1991, Director Lim, under a 5th Indorsement transmitted anew Mecano's claim to then Undersecretary
Bello for favorable consideration. Under a 6th Indorsement, dated July 2, 1991, Secretary Drilon forwarded
petitioner's claim to the COA Chairman, recommending payment of the same. COA Chairman Eufemio C.
Domingo, in his 7th Indorsement of January 16, 1992, however, denied petitioner's claim on the ground that Section
699 of the RAC had been repealed by the Administrative Code of 1987, solely for the reason that the same section
was not restated nor re-enacted in the Administrative Code of 1987. He commented, however, that the claim may be
filed with the Employees' Compensation Commission, considering that the illness of Director Mecano occurred after
the effectivity of the Administrative Code of 1987.

Eventually, petitioner's claim was returned by Undersecretary of Justice Eduardo Montenegro to Director Lim under
a 9th Indorsement dated February 7, 1992, with the advice that petitioner "elevate the matter to the Supreme Court if
he so desires".

On the sole issue of whether or not the Administrative Code of 1987 repealed or abrogated Section 699 of the RAC,
this petition was brought for the consideration of this Court.

Petitioner anchors his claim on Section 699 of the RAC, as amended, and on the aforementioned Opinion No. 73, S.
1991 of Secretary Drilon. He further maintains that in the event that a claim is filed with the Employees'
Compensation Commission, as suggested by respondent, he would still not be barred from filing a claim under the
subject section. Thus, the resolution of whether or not there was a repeal of the Revised Administrative Code of
1917 would decide the fate of petitioner's claim for reimbursement.

The COA, on the other hand, strongly maintains that the enactment of the Administrative Code of 1987 (Exec. Order
No. 292) operated to revoke or supplant in its entirety the Revised Administrative Code of 1917. The COA claims
that from the "whereas" clauses of the new Administrative Code, it can be gleaned that it was the intent of the
legislature to repeal the old Code. Moreover, the COA questions the applicability of the aforesaid opinion of the
Secretary of Justice in deciding the matter. Lastly, the COA contends that employment-related sickness, injury or
death is adequately covered by the Employees' Compensation Program under P.D. 626, such that to allow
simultaneous recovery of benefits under both laws on account of the same contingency would be unfair and unjust to
the Government.

The question of whether a particular law has been repealed or not by a subsequent law is a matter of legislative
intent. The lawmakers may expressly repeal a law by incorporating therein a repealing provision which expressly
and specifically cites the particular law or laws, and portions thereof, that are intended to be repealed. 3 A declaration
in a statute, usually in its repealing clause, that a particular and specific law, identified by its number or title, is
repealed is an express repeal; all others are implied repeals. 4

In the case of the two Administrative Codes in question, the ascertainment of whether or not it was the intent of the
legislature to supplant the old Code with the new Code partly depends on the scrutiny of the repealing clause of the
new Code. This provision is found in Section 27, Book VII (Final Provisions) of the Administrative Code of 1987
which reads:

Sec. 27. Repealing Clause. — All laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations, or portions thereof,
inconsistent with this Code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.

The question that should be asked is: What is the nature of this repealing clause? It is certainly not an express
repealing clause because it fails to identify or designate the act or acts that are intended to be repealed. 5 Rather, it is
an example of a general repealing provision, as stated in Opinion No. 73, S. 1991. It is a clause which predicates the
intended repeal under the condition that substantial conflict must be found in existing and prior acts. The failure to
add a specific repealing clause indicates that the intent was not to repeal any existing law, unless an irreconcilable
inconcistency and repugnancy exist in the terms of the new and old laws. 6 This latter situation falls under the
category of an implied repeal.

Repeal by implication proceeds on the premise that where a statute of later date clearly reveals an intention on the
part of the legislature to abrogate a prior act on the subject, that intention must be given effect. 7 Hence, before there
can be a repeal, there must be a clear showing on the part of the lawmaker that the intent in enacting the new law
was to abrogate the old one. The intention to repeal must be clear and manifest;8 otherwise, at least, as a general
rule, the later act is to be construed as a continuation of, and not a substitute for, the first act and will continue so far
as the two acts are the same from the time of the first enactment. 9

There are two categories of repeal by implication. The first is where provisions in the two acts on the same subject
matter are in an irreconcilable conflict, the later act to the extent of the conflict constitutes an implied repeal of the
earlier one. The second is if the later act covers the whole subject of the earlier one and is clearly intended as a
substitute, it will operate to repeal the earlier law.10

Implied repeal by irreconcilable inconsistency takes place when the two statutes cover the same subject matter; they
are so clearly inconsistent and incompatible with each other that they cannot be reconciled or harmonized; and both
cannot be given effect, that is, that one law cannot be enforced without nullifying the other.11

Comparing the two Codes, it is apparent that the new Code does not cover nor attempt to cover the entire subject
matter of the old Code. There are several matters treated in the old Code which are not found in the new Code, such
as the provisions on notaries public, the leave law, the public bonding law, military reservations, claims for sickness
benefits under Section 699, and still others.

Moreover, the COA failed to demonstrate that the provisions of the two Codes on the matter of the subject claim are
in an irreconcilable conflict. In fact, there can be no such conflict because the provision on sickness benefits of the
nature being claimed by petitioner has not been restated in the Administrative Code of 1987. However, the COA
would have Us consider that the fact that Section 699 was not restated in the Administrative Code of 1987 meant
that the same section had been repealed. It further maintained that to allow the particular provisions not restated in
the new Code to continue in force argues against the Code itself. The COA anchored this argument on the whereas
clause of the 1987 Code, which states:

WHEREAS, the effectiveness of the Government will be enhanced by a new Administrative Code
which incorporate in a unified document the major structural, functional and procedural principles
and rules of governance; and

xxx xxx xxx

It argues, in effect, that what is contemplated is only one Code — the Administrative Code of 1987. This contention
is untenable.

The fact that a later enactment may relate to the same subject matter as that of an earlier statute is not of itself
sufficient to cause an implied repeal of the prior act, since the new statute may merely be cumulative or a
continuation of the old one. 12 What is necessary is a manifest indication of legislative purpose to repeal.13

We come now to the second category of repeal — the enactment of a statute revising or codifying the former laws
on the whole subject matter. This is only possible if the revised statute or code was intended to cover the whole
subject to be a complete and perfect system in itself. It is the rule that a subsequent statute is deemed to repeal a
prior law if the former revises the whole subject matter of the former statute.14 When both intent and scope clearly
evidence the idea of a repeal, then all parts and provisions of the prior act that are omitted from the revised act are
deemed repealed.15 Furthermore, before there can be an implied repeal under this category, it must be the clear intent
of the legislature that the later act be the substitute to the prior act. 16
According to Opinion No. 73, S. 1991 of the Secretary of Justice, what appears clear is the intent to cover only those
aspects of government that pertain to administration, organization and procedure, understandably because of the
many changes that transpired in the government structure since the enactment of the RAC decades of years ago. The
COA challenges the weight that this opinion carries in the determination of this controversy inasmuch as the body
which had been entrusted with the implementation of this particular provision has already rendered its decision. The
COA relied on the rule in administrative law enunciated in the case of Sison vs. Pangramuyen17 that in the absence
of palpable error or grave abuse of discretion, the Court would be loathe to substitute its own judgment for that of
the administrative agency entrusted with the enforcement and implementation of the law. This will not hold water.
This principle is subject to limitations. Administrative decisions may be reviewed by the courts upon a showing that
the decision is vitiated by fraud, imposition or mistake. 18 It has been held that Opinions of the Secretary and
Undersecretary of Justice are material in the construction of statutes in pari materia.19

Lastly, it is a well-settled rule of statutory construction that repeals of statutes by implication are not favored.20 The
presumption is against inconsistency and repugnancy for the legislature is presumed to know the existing laws on
the subject and not to have enacted inconsistent or conflicting statutes.21

This Court, in a case, explains the principle in detail as follows: "Repeals by implication are not favored, and will
not be decreed unless it is manifest that the legislature so intended. As laws are presumed to be passed with
deliberation with full knowledge of all existing ones on the subject, it is but reasonable to conclude that in passing a
statute it was not intended to interfere with or abrogate any former law relating to some matter, unless the
repugnancy between the two is not only irreconcilable, but also clear and convincing, and flowing necessarily from
the language used, unless the later act fully embraces the subject matter of the earlier, or unless the reason for the
earlier act is beyond peradventure renewed. Hence, every effort must be used to make all acts stand and if, by any
reasonable construction, they can be reconciled, the later act will not operate as a repeal of the earlier.22

Regarding respondent's contention that recovery under this subject section shall bar the recovery of benefits under
the Employees' Compensation Program, the same cannot be upheld. The second sentence of Article 173, Chapter II,
Title II (dealing on Employees' Compensation and State Insurance Fund), Book IV of the Labor Code, as amended
by P.D. 1921, expressly provides that "the payment of compensation under this Title shall not bar the recovery of
benefits as provided for in Section 699 of the Revised Administrative Code . . . whose benefits are administered by
the system (meaning SSS or GSIS) or by other agencies of the government."

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to GRANT the petition; respondent is hereby ordered to
give due course to petitioner's claim for benefits. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-39990 July 22, 1975

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
RAFAEL LICERA, defendant-appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio, Assistant Solicitor General Crispin V. Bautista and Solicitor Pedro
A. Ramirez for plaintiff-appellee.

Romeo Mercado (as Counsel de Oficio) for defendant-appellant.

CASTRO, J.:

This is an appeal, on a question of law, by Rafael Licera from the judgment dated August 14, 1968 of the Court of
First Instance of Occidental Mindoro convicting him of the crime of illegal possession of firearm and sentencing
him to imprisonment of five (5) years. We reverse the judgment of conviction, for the reasons hereunder stated.

On December 3, 1965 the Chief of Police of Abra de Ilog, Occidental Mindoro, filed a complaint, subscribed and
sworn to by him, with the municipal court of the said municipality, charging Rafael Licera with illegal possession of
a Winchester rifle, Model 55, Caliber .30. On August 13, 1966 the municipal court rendered judgment finding
Licera guilty of the crime charged, sentencing him to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging five years and one day
to six years and eight months of imprisonment. Licera appealed to the Court of First Instance of Occidental
Mindoro.

In the Court of First Instance, the parties agreed to the joint trial of the case for illegal possession of firearm and
another case, likewise filed against Licera with the municipal court but already forwarded to the said Court of First
Instance, for assault upon an agent of a person in authority, the two offenses having arisen from the same occasion:
apprehension of Licera by the Chief of Police and a patrolman of Abra de Ilog on December 2, 1965 for possession
of the Winchester rifle without the requisite license or permit therefor.

On August 14, 1968 the court a quo rendered judgment acquitting Licera of the charge of assault upon an agent of a
person in authority, but convicting him of illegal possession of firearm, sentencing him to suffer five years of
imprisonment, and ordering the forfeiture of the Winchester rifle in favor of the Government.

Licera's appeal to the Court of Appeals was certified on October 16, 1974 to this Court as involving only one
question of law.

Licera invokes as his legal justification for his possession of the Winschester rifle his appointment as secret agent on
December 11, 1961 by Governor Feliciano Leviste of Batangas. He claims that as secret agent, he was a "peace
officer" and, thus, pursuant to People vs. Macarandang,1 was exempt from the requirements relating to the issuance
of license to possess firearms. He alleges that the court a quo erred in relying on the later case of People vs.
Mapa2which held that section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code provides no exemption for persons appointed
as secret agents by provincial governors from the requirements relating to firearm licenses.
The principal question thus posed calls for a determination of the rule that should be applied to the case at bar that
enunciated in Macarandang or that in Mapa.

The appointment given to Licera by Governor Leviste which bears the date "December 11, 1961" includes a grant of
authority to Licera to possess the Winchester rifle in these terms: "In accordance with the decision of the Supreme
Court in G.R. No. L-12088 dated December 23, 1959, you will have the right to bear a firearm ... for use in
connection with the performance of your duties." Under the rule then prevailing, enunciated in Macarandang,3 the
appointment of a civilian as a "secret agent to assist in the maintenance of peace and order campaigns and detection
of crimes sufficiently put[s] him within the category of a "peace officer" equivalent even to a member of the
municipal police" whom section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code exempts from the requirements relating to
firearm licenses.

Article 8 of the Civil Code of the Philippines decrees that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the
Constitution form part of this jurisdiction's legal system. These decisions, although in themselves not laws,
constitute evidence of what the laws mean. The application or interpretation placed by the Court upon a law is part
of the law as of the date of the enactment of the said law since the Court's application or interpretation merely
establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that the construed law purports to carry into effect. 4

At the time of Licera's designation as secret agent in 1961 and at the time of his apprehension for possession of the
Winchester rifle without the requisite license or permit therefor in 1965, the Macarandang rule — the Courts
interpretation of section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code - formed part of our jurisprudence and, hence, of
this jurisdiction's legal system. Mapa revoked the Macarandang precedent only in 1967. Certainly, where a new
doctrine abrogates an old rule, the new doctrine should operate respectively only and should not adversely affect
those favored by the old rule, especially those who relied thereon and acted on the faith thereof. This holds more
especially true in the application or interpretation of statutes in the field of penal law, for, in this area, more than in
any other, it is imperative that the punishability of an act be reasonably foreseen for the guidance of society. 5

Pursuant to the Macarandang rule obtaining not only at the time of Licera's appointment as secret agent, which
appointment included a grant of authority to possess the Winchester rifle, but as well at the time as of his
apprehension, Licera incurred no criminal liability for possession of the said rifle, notwithstanding his non-
compliance with the legal requirements relating to firearm licenses.1äwphï1.ñët

ACCORDINGLY, the judgment a quo is reversed, and Rafael Licera is hereby acquitted. Costs de oficio.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-10010 August 1, 1916

CHU JAN, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
LUCIO BERNAS, defendant-appellant.

Sulpicio V. Cea for appellant.

ARAULLO, J.:

On the afternoon of June 26, 1913, a match was held in the cockpit of the municipality of Tabaco, Albay, between
two cocks belonging to the plaintiff and to the defendant respectively. Each of said persons had put up a wager of
P160; and as the referee of the cockpit had declared the defendant's cock the winner in the bout, the plaintiff brought
suit against the defendant in the justice of the peace court of the said pueblo, asking that his own rooster be declared
the winner. The justice of the peace court decided that the bout was a draw. From this judgment the defendant
appealed to the Court of First Instance of the province. For the purposes of the appeal, the plaintiff filed his
complaint and prayed this court to render judgment ordering the defendant to abide by and comply with the rules
and regulations governing cockfights, to pay the stipulated wager of P160; to return the other like amount (both
sums of wager being held for safe-keeping by the cockpit owner, Tomas Almonte) and to assess the costs of both
instances against the defendant.

The defendant denied each and all of the allegations of the complaint and moved to dismiss with the costs against
the plaintiff. On September 11, 1913, the said Court of First Instance rendered judgment dismissing the appeal
without special finding as to costs. The defendant excepted to this judgment as well as to an order dictated by the
same court on November 8th of the same year, on the plaintiff's motion, ordering the provincial treasurer of Albay
and, if necessary, the municipal treasurer of Tabaco of the same province, to release the deposit of P160 and return it
to its owner, the plaintiff Chinaman, Chu Jan. These proceedings have come before us on appeal by means of the
proper bill of exceptions.

The grounds for the dismissal pronounced by the lower court in the judgment appealed from ere that the court has
always dismissed cases of this nature, that he is not familiar with the rules governing cockfights and the duties of
referees thereof; that he does not know where to find the law on the subject and, finally, that he knows of no law
whatever that governs the rights to the plaintiff and the defendant in questions concerning cockfights.

The ignorance of the court or his lack of knowledge regarding the law applicable to a case submitted to him for
decision, the fact that the court does not know the rules applicable to a certain matter that is the subject of an appeal
which must be decided by him and his not knowing where to find the law relative to the case, are not reasons that
can serve to excuse the court for terminating the proceedings by dismissing them without deciding the issues. Such
an excuse is the less acceptable because, foreseeing that a case might arise to which no law would be exactly
applicable, the Civil Code, in the second paragraph of article 6, provides that the customs of the place shall be
observed, and, in the absence thereof, the general principles of law.

Therefore the judgment and the order appealed from, hereinbefore mentioned, are reversed and to record of the
proceedings shall remanded to the court from whence they came for due trial and judgment as provided by law. No
special finding is made with regard to costs. So ordered.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-42050-66 November 20, 1978

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE JUDGE AMANTE P. PURISIMA, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA, BRANCH
VII, and PORFIRIO CANDELOSAS, NESTOR BAES, ELIAS L. GARCIA, SIMEON BUNDALIAN, JR.,
JOSEPH C. MAISO, EDUARDO A. LIBORDO, ROMEO L. SUGAY, FEDERICO T. DIZON, GEORGE M.
ALBINO, MARIANO COTIA, JR., ARMANDO L. DIZON, ROGELIO B. PARENO, RODRIGO V.
ESTRADA, ALFREDO A. REYES, JOSE A. BACARRA, REYNALDO BOGTONG, and EDGARDO M.
MENDOZA, respondents.

G.R. No. L-46229-32 November 20, 1978

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
JUDGE MAXIMO A. MACEREN, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA, BRANCH XVIII, and
REYNALDO LAQUI Y AQUINO, ELPIDIO ARPON, VICTOR EUGENIO Y ROQUE and ALFREDO
VERSOZA, respondents.

G.R. No. L-46313-16 November 20, 1978

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
JUDGE MAXIMO A. MACEREN, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA, BRANCH XVIII, and
JUANITO DE LA CRUZ Y NUNEZ, SABINO BUENO Y CACAL, TIRSO ISAGAN Y FRANCISCO and
BEN CASTILLO Y UBALDO, respondents.

G.R. No. L-46997 November 20, 1978

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE WENCESLAO M. POLO, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Samar, and
PANCHITO REFUNCION, respondents.

Jose L. Gamboa, Fermin Martin, Jr. & Jose D. Cajucom, Office of the City of Fiscal of Manila and the Office of
Provincial Fiscal of Samar for petitioners.

Norberto Parto for respondents Candelosas, Baes and Garcia.

Amado C. de la Marced for respondents Simeon Bundalian Jr., et al.

Manuel F. de Jesus for all the respondents in L-46229-32 and L-46313-16.

Norberto L. Apostol for respondent Panchito Refuncion.

Hon. Amante P. Purisima for and in his own behalf.

MUÑOZ PALMA, J.:

These twenty-six (26) Petitions for Review filed by the People of the Philippines represented, respectively, by the
Office of the City Fiscal of Manila, the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Samar, and joined by the Solicitor General,
are consolidated in this one Decision as they involve one basic question of law.

These Petitions or appeals involve three Courts of First Instance, namely: the Court of First Instance of Manila,
Branch VII, presided by Hon. Amante P. Purisima (17 Petitions), the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch
XVIII, presided by Hon. Maximo A. Maceren (8 Petitions) and, the Court of First Instance of Samar, with Hon.
Wenceslao M. Polo, presiding, (1 Petition).

Before those courts, Informations were filed charging the respective accused with "illegal possession of deadly
weapon" in violation of Presidential Decree No. 9. On a motion to quash filed by the accused, the three Judges
mentioned above issued in the respective cases filed before them — the details of which will be recounted below —
an Order quashing or dismissing the Informations, on a common ground, viz, that the Information did not allege facts
which constitute the offense penalized by Presidential Decree No. 9 because it failed to state one essential element
of the crime.

Thus, are the Informations filed by the People sufficient in form and substance to constitute the offense of "illegal
possession of deadly weapon" penalized under Presidential Decree (PD for short) No. 9? This is the central issue
which we shall resolve and dispose of, all other corollary matters not being indispensable for the moment.

A — The Information filed by the People —

1. In L-42050-66, one typical Information filed with the Court presided by Judge Purisima follows:

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff, versus PORFIRIO CANDELOSAS Y DURAN,

accused.

Crim. Case No. 19639

VIOLATION OF PAR. 3, PRES. DECREE No. 9 OF PROCLAMATION 1081

INFORMATION

The undersigned accuses PORFIRIO CANDELOSAS Y DURAN of a violation of paragraph 3,

Presidential Decree No. 9 of Proclamation 1081, committed as follows:

That on or about the 14 th day of December, 1974, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly have in his possession
and under his custody and control one (1) carving knife with a blade of 6-½ inches and a wooden
handle of 5-1/4 inches, or an overall length of 11-¾ inches, which the said accused carried outside
of his residence, the said weapon not being used as a tool or implement necessary to earn his
livelihood nor being used in connection therewith.

Contrary to law. (p. 32, rollo of L-42050-66)

The other Informations are similarly worded except for the name of the accused, the date and place of the
commission of the crime, and the kind of weapon involved.
2. In L-46229-32 and L-46313-16, the Information filed with the Court presided by Judge Maceren follows:

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff, versus REYNALDO LAQUI Y AQUINO,

accused.

CRIM. CASE NO. 29677

VIOL. OF PAR. 3,

PD 9 IN REL. TO LOI

No. 266 of the Chief

Executive dated April 1, 1975

INFORMATION

The undersigned accuses REYNALDO LAQUI Y AQUINO of a VIOLATION OF

PARAGRAPH 3, PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 9 in relation to Letter of Instruction No. 266 of
the Chief Executive dated April 1, 1975, committed as follows:

That on or about the 28 th day of January, 1977, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and knowingly carry outside of his residence a
bladed and pointed weapon, to wit: an ice pick with an overall length of about 8½ inches, the same
not being used as a necessary tool or implement to earn his livelihood nor being used in
connection therewith.

Contrary to law. (p. 14, rollo of L-46229-32)

The other Informations are likewise similarly worded except for the name of the accused, the date and place of the
commission of the crime, and the kind of weapon involved.

3. In L-46997, the Information before the Court of First Instance of Samar is quoted hereunder:

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, complainant, versus PANCHITO REFUNCION, accused.

CRIM. CASE NO. 933

For:

ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF

DEADLY WEAPON

(VIOLATION OF PD NO. 9)

INFORMATION

The undersigned First Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Samar, accuses PANCHITO REFUNCION of
the crime of ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF DEADLY WEAPON or VIOLATION OF PD NO. 9
issued by the President of the Philippines on Oct. 2, 1972, pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081
dated Sept. 21 and 23, 1972, committed as follows:
 That on or about the 6th day of October, 1976, in the evening at Barangay Barruz, Municipality of
Matuginao, Province of Samar Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorabe Court,
the abovenamed accused, knowingly, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously carried with him outside
of his residence a deadly weapon called socyatan, an instrument which from its very nature is no
such as could be used as a necessary tool or instrument to earn a livelihood, which act committed
by the accused is a Violation of Presidential Decree No. 9.

CONTRARY TO LAW. (p. 8, rollo of L-46997)

B. — The Orders of dismissal —

In dismissing or quashing the Informations the trial courts concurred with the submittal of the defense that one
essential element of the offense charged is missing from the Information, viz: that the carrying outside of the
accused's residence of a bladed, pointed or blunt weapon is in furtherance or on the occasion of, connected with or
related to subversion, insurrection, or rebellion, organized lawlessness or public disorder.

1. Judge Purisima reasoned out, inter alia, in this manner:

... the Court is of the opinion that in order that possession of bladed weapon or the like outside
residence may be prosecuted and tried under P.D. No. 9, the information must specifically allege
that the possession of bladed weapon charged was for the purpose of abetting, or in furtherance of
the conditions of rampant criminality, organized lawlessness, public disorder, etc. as are
contemplated and recited in Proclamation No. 1081, as justification therefor. Devoid of this
specific allegation, not necessarily in the same words, the information is not complete, as it does
not allege sufficient facts to constitute the offense contemplated in P.D. No. 9. The information in
these cases under consideration suffer from this defect.

xxx xxx xxx

And while there is no proof of it before the Court, it is not difficult to believe the murmurings of
detained persons brought to Court upon a charge of possession of bladed weapons under P.D. No.
9, that more than ever before, policemen - of course not all can be so heartless — now have in
their hands P.D. No. 9 as a most convenient tool for extortion, what with the terrifying risk of
being sentenced to imprisonment of five to ten years for a rusted kitchen knife or a pair of scissors,
which only God knows where it came from. Whereas before martial law an extortion-minded
peace officer had to have a stock of the cheapest paltik, and even that could only convey the
coercive message of one year in jail, now anything that has the semblance of a sharp edge or
pointed object, available even in trash cans, may already serve the same purpose, and yet five to
ten times more incriminating than the infamous paltik.

For sure, P.D. No. 9 was conceived with the best of intentions and wisely applied, its necessity can
never be assailed. But it seems it is back-firing, because it is too hot in the hands of policemen
who are inclined to backsliding.

The checkvalves against abuse of P.D. No. 9 are to be found in the heart of the Fiscal and the
conscience of the Court, and hence this resolution, let alone technical legal basis, is prompted by
the desire of this Court to apply said checkvalves. (pp. 55-57, rollo of L-42050-66)

2. Judge Maceren in turn gave his grounds for dismissing the charges as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

 As earlier noted the "desired result" sought to be attained by Proclamation No. 1081 is the
maintenance of law and order throughout the Philippines and the prevention and suppression of
all forms of lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or rebellion. It is therefore
reasonable to conclude from the foregoing premises that the carrying of bladed, pointed or blunt
weapons outside of one's residence which is made unlawful and punishable by said par. 3 of P.D.
No. 9 is one that abetssubversion, insurrection or rebellion, lawless violence, criminality, chaos
and public disorder or is intended to bring about these conditions. This conclusion is further
strengthened by the fact that all previously existing laws that also made the carrying of similar
weapons punishable have not been repealed, whether expressly or impliedly. It is noteworthy that
Presidential Decree No. 9 does not contain any repealing clause or provisions.

xxx xxx xxx

The mere carrying outside of one's residence of these deadly weapons if not concealed in one's
person and if not carried in any of the aforesaid specified places, would appear to be not unlawful
and punishable by law.

With the promulgation of Presidential Decree No. 9, however, the prosecution, through Assistant
Fiscal Hilario H. Laqui, contends in his opposition to the motion to quash, that this act is now
made unlawful and punishable, particularly by paragraph 3 thereof, regardless of the intention of
the person carrying such weapon because the law makes it "mala prohibita". If the contention of
the prosecution is correct, then if a person happens to be caught while on his way home by law
enforcement officers carrying a kitchen knife that said person had just bought from a store in
order that the same may be used by one's cook for preparing the meals in one's home, such person
will be liable for punishment with such a severe penalty as imprisonment from five to ten years
under the decree. Such person cannot claim that said knife is going to be used by him to earn a
livelihood because he intended it merely for use by his cook in preparing his meals.

This possibility cannot be discounted if Presidential Decree No. 9 were to be interpreted and
applied in the manner that that the prosecution wants it to be done. The good intentions of the
President in promulgating this decree may thus be perverted by some unscrupulous law
enforcement officers. It may be used as a tool of oppression and tyranny or of extortion.

xxx xxx xxx

It is therefore the considered and humble view of this Court that the act which the President
intended to make unlawful and punishable by Presidential Decree No. 9, particularly by
paragraph 3 thereof, is one that abets or is intended to abet subversion, rebellion, insurrection,
lawless violence, criminality, chaos and public disorder. (pp. 28-30, rollo of L-46229-32)

3. Judge Polo of the Court of First Instance of Samar expounded his order dismissing the Information filed before
him, thus:

... We believe that to constitute an offense under the aforcited Presidential decree, the same should
be or there should be an allegation that a felony was committed in connection or in furtherance of
subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence and public disorder. Precisely Proclamation
No. 1081 declaring a state of martial law throughout the country was issued because of wanton
destruction to lives and properties widespread lawlessness and anarchy. And in order to restore
the tranquility and stability of the country and to secure the people from violence anti loss of lives
in the quickest possible manner and time, carrying firearms, explosives and deadly weapons
without a permit unless the same would fall under the exception is prohibited. This conclusion
becomes more compelling when we consider the penalty imposable, which is from five years to ten
years. A strict enforcement of the provision of the said law would mean the imposition of the
Draconian penalty upon the accused.
xxx xxx xxx

It is public knowledge that in rural areas, even before and during martial law, as a matter of
status symbol, carrying deadly weapons is very common, not necessarily for committing a crime
nor as their farm implement but for self-preservation or self-defense if necessity would arise
specially in going to and from their farm. (pp. 18-19, rollo of L-46997)

In most if not all of the cases, the orders of dismissal were given before arraignment of the accused. In the criminal
case before the Court of (First Instance of Samar the accused was arraigned but at the same time moved to quash
the Information. In all the cases where the accused were under arrest, the three Judges ordered their immediate
release unless held on other charges.

C. — The law under which the Informations in question were filed by the People.

As seen from the Informations quoted above, the accused are charged with illegal possession of deadly weapon in
violation of Presidential Decree No. 9, Paragraph 3.

We quote in full Presidential Decree No. 9, to wit:

PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 9

DECLARING VIOLATIONS OF GENERAL ORDERS NO. 6 and NO. 7 DATED SEPTEMBER 22,
1972, AND SEPTEMBER 23, 1972, RESPECTIVELY, TO BE UNLAWFUL AND PROVIDING
PENALTIES THEREFORE.

WHEREAS, pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081 dated September 21, 1972, the Philippines has
been placed under a state of martial law;

WHEREAS, by virtue of said Proclamation No. 1081, General Order No. 6 dated September 22,
1972 and General Order No. 7 dated September 23, 1972, have been promulgated by me;

WHEREAS, subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence, criminality, chaos and public
disorder mentioned in the aforesaid Proclamation No. 1081 are committed and abetted by the use
of firearms, explosives and other deadly weapons;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, Commander-in-Chief of all the Armed Forces

of the Philippines, in older to attain the desired result of the aforesaid Proclamation No. 1081 and
General Orders Nos. 6 and 7, do hereby order and decree that:

1. Any violation of the aforesaid General Orders Nos. 6 and 7 is unlawful and the violator shall,
upon conviction suffer:

(a) The mandatory penalty of death by a firing squad or electrocution as a Military,

Court/Tribunal/Commission may direct, it the firearm involved in the violation is unlicensed and
is attended by assault upon, or resistance to persons in authority or their agents in the
performance of their official functions resulting in death to said persons in authority or their
agent; or if such unlicensed firearm is used in the commission of crimes against persons, property
or chastity causing the death of the victim used in violation of any other General Orders and/or
Letters of Instructions promulgated under said Proclamation No. 1081:

(b) The penalty of imprisonment ranging from twenty years to life imprisonment as a Military
Court/Tribunal/commission may direct, when the violation is not attended by any of the
circumstances enumerated under the preceding paragraph;
 (c) The penalty provided for in the preceding paragraphs shall be imposed upon the owner,
president, manager, members of the board of directors or other responsible officers of any public
or private firms, companies, corporations or entities who shall willfully or knowingly allow any of
the firearms owned by such firm, company, corporation or entity concerned to be used in violation
of said General Orders Nos. 6 and 7.

2. It is unlawful to posses deadly weapons, including hand grenades, rifle grenades and other
explosives, including, but not limited to, "pill box bombs," "molotov cocktail bombs," "fire
bombs," or other incendiary device consisting of any chemical, chemical compound, or detonating
agents containing combustible units or other ingredients in such proportion, quantity, packing, or
bottling that ignites by fire, by friction, by concussion, by percussion, or by detonation of all or
part of the compound or mixture which may cause such a sudden generation of highly heated
gases that the resultant gaseous pressures are capable of producing destructive effects on
continguous objects or of causing injury or death of a person; and any person convicted thereof
shall be punished by imprisonment ranging from ten to fifteen years as a Military
Court/Tribunal/Commission may direct.

3. It is unlawful to carry outside of residence any bladed, pointed or blunt weapon such as "fan
knife," "spear," "dagger," "bolo," "balisong," "barong," "kris," or club, except where such articles
are being used as necessary tools or implements to earn a livelihood and while being used in
connection therewith; and any person found guilty thereof shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment
ranging from five to ten years as a Military Court/Tribunal/Commission may direct.

4. When the violation penalized in the preceding paragraphs 2 and 3 is committed during the
commission of or for the purpose of committing, any other crime, the penalty shall be imposed
upon the offender in its maximum extent, in addition to the penalty provided for the particular
offenses committed or intended to be committed.

Done in the City of Manila, this 2nd day of October in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and
seventy-two.

(SGD) FERDINAND E. MARCOS

President

Republic of the Philippines

D. — The arguments of the People —

In the Comment filed in these cases by the Solicitor General who as stated earlier joins the City Fiscal of Manila
and the Provincial Fiscal of Samar in seeking the setting aside of the questioned orders of dismissal, the main
argument advanced on the issue now under consideration is that a perusal of paragraph 3 of P.D. 9 'shows that the
prohibited acts need not be related to subversive activities; that the act proscribed is essentially a malum
prohibitum penalized for reasons of public policy.1

The City Fiscal of Manila in his brief adds further that in statutory offenses the intention of the accused who
commits the act is immaterial; that it is enough if the prohibited act is voluntarily perpetuated; that P.D. 9 provides
and condemns not only the carrying of said weapon in connection with the commission of the crime of subversion or
the like, but also that of criminality in general, that is, to eradicate lawless violence which characterized pre-martial
law days. It is also argued that the real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the caption or
preamble of the information nor from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated but by
the actual recital of facts in the complaint or information.2
E. — Our Ruling on the matter —

1. It is a constitutional right of any person who stands charged in a criminal prosecution to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him.3

Pursuant to the above, Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, expressly requires that for a complaint or
information to be sufficient it must, inter alia state the designation of the offense by the statute, and the acts or
omissions complained of as constituting the offense. This is essential to avoid surprise on the accused and to afford
him the opportunity to prepare his defense accordingly. 4

To comply with these fundamental requirements of the Constitution and the Rules on Criminal Procedure, it is
imperative for the specific statute violated to be designated or mentioned 4 in the charge. In fact, another
compelling reason exists why a specification of the statute violated is essential in these cases. As stated in the order
of respondent Judge Maceren the carrying of so-called "deadly weapons" is the subject of another penal statute and
a Manila city ordinance. Thus, Section 26 of Act No. 1780 provides:

Section 26. It should be unlawful for any person to carry concealed about his person any bowie
knife, dirk dagger, kris, or other deadly weapon: ... Any person violating the provisions of this
section shall, upon conviction in a court of competent jurisdiction, be punished by a fine not
exceeding five hundred pesos, or by imprisonment for a period not exceeding six months, or both
such fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the court.

Ordinance No. 3820 of the City of Manila as amended by Ordinance No. 3928 which took effect on December 4,
1957, in turn penalizes with a fine of not more than P200.00 or imprisonment for not more than one months, or
both, at the discretion of the court, anyone who shall carry concealed in his person in any manner that would
disguise its deadly character any kind of firearm, bowie knife, or other deadly weapon ... in any public
place. Consequently, it is necessary that the particular law violated be specified as there exists a substantial
difference between the statute and city ordinance on the one hand and P.D. 9 (3) on the other regarding the
circumstances of the commission of the crime and the penalty imposed for the offense.

We do not agree with petitioner that the above-mentioned statute and the city ordinance are deemed repealed by
P.D. 9 (3). 5 P. D. 9(3) does not contain any repealing clause or provision, and repeal by implication is not
favored. 6This principle holds true with greater force with regards to penal statutes which as a rule are to be
construed strictly against the state and liberally in favor of the accused. 7 In fact, Article 7 of the New Civil Code
provides that laws are repealed only by subsequent ones and their violation or non- observance shall not be excused
by disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary.

Thus we are faced with the situation where a particular act may be made to fall, at the discretion of a police officer
or a prosecuting fiscal, under the statute, or the city ordinance, or the presidential decree. That being the case, the
right becomes more compelling for an accused to be confronted with the facts constituting the essential elements of
the offense charged against him, if he is not to become an easy pawn of oppression and harassment, or of negligent
or misguided official action — a fear understandably shared by respondent Judges who by the nature of their
judicial functions are daily exposed to such dangers.

2. In all the Informations filed by petitioner the accused are charged in the caption as well as in the body of the
Information with a violation of paragraph 3, P.D. 9. What then are the elements of the offense treated in the
presidential decree in question?

We hold that the offense carries two elements: first, the carrying outside one's residence of any bladed, blunt, or
pointed weapon, etc. not used as a necessary tool or implement for a livelihood; and second, that the act of carrying
the weapon was either in furtherance of, or to abet, or in connection with subversion, rebellion, insurrection,
lawless violence, criminality, chaos, or public disorder.
It is the second element which removes the act of carrying a deadly weapon, if concealed, outside of the scope of the
statute or the city ordinance mentioned above. In other words, a simple act of carrying any of the weapons
described in the presidential decree is not a criminal offense in itself. What makes the act criminal or punishable
under the decree is the motivation behind it. Without that motivation, the act falls within the purview of the city
ordinance or some statute when the circumstances so warrant.

Respondent Judges correctly ruled that this can be the only reasonably, logical, and valid construction given to P.D.
9(3).

3. The position taken by petitioner that P.D. 9(3) covers one and all situations where a person carries outside his
residence any of the weapons mentioned or described in the decree irrespective of motivation, intent, or purpose,
converts these cases into one of "statutory construction." That there is ambiguity in the presidential decree is
manifest from the conflicting views which arise from its implementation. When ambiguity exists, it becomes a
judicial task to construe and interpret the true meaning and scope of the measure, guided by the basic principle that
penal statutes are to be construed and applied liberally in favor of the accused and strictly against the state.

4. In the construction or interpretation of a legislative measure — a presidential decree in these cases — the
primary rule is to search for and determine the intent and spirit of the law. Legislative intent is the controlling
factor, for in the words of this Court in Hidalgo v. Hidalgo, per Mr. Justice Claudio Teehankee, whatever is within
the spirit of a statute is within the statute, and this has to be so if strict adherence to the letter would result in
absurdity, injustice and contradictions. 8

There are certain aids available to Us to ascertain the intent or reason for P.D. 9(3).

First, the presence of events which led to or precipitated the enactment of P.D. 9. These events are clearly spelled
out in the "Whereas" clauses of the presidential decree, thus: (1) the state of martial law in the country pursuant to
Proclamation 1081 dated September 21, 1972; (2) the desired result of Proclamation 1081 as well as General
Orders Nos. 6 and 7 which are particularly mentioned in P.D. 9; and (3) the alleged fact that subversion, rebellion,
insurrection, lawless violence, criminality, chaos, aid public disorder mentioned in Proclamation 1081 are
committed and abetted by the use of firearms and explosives and other deadly weapons.

The Solicitor General however contends that a preamble of a statute usually introduced by the word "whereas", is
not an essential part of an act and cannot enlarge or confer powers, or cure inherent defects in the statute (p. 120,
rollo of L-42050-66); that the explanatory note or enacting clause of the decree, if it indeed limits the violation of
the decree, cannot prevail over the text itself inasmuch as such explanatory note merely states or explains the reason
which prompted the issuance of the decree. (pp. 114-115, rollo of 46997)

We disagree with these contentions. Because of the problem of determining what acts fall within the purview of P.D.
9, it becomes necessary to inquire into the intent and spirit of the decree and this can be found among others in the
preamble or, whereas" clauses which enumerate the facts or events which justify the promulgation of the decree and
the stiff sanctions stated therein.

A "preamble" is the key of the statute, to open the minds of the makers as to the mischiefs which
are to be remedied, and objects which are to be accomplished, by the provisions of the statute."
(West Norman Timber v. State, 224 P. 2d 635, 639, cited in Words and Phrases, "Preamble";
emphasis supplied)

While the preamble of a statute is not strictly a part thereof, it may, when the statute is in itself
ambiguous and difficult of interpretation, be resorted to, but not to create a doubt or uncertainty
which otherwise does not exist." (James v. Du Bois, 16 N.J.L. (1 Har.) 285, 294, cited in Words
and Phrases, "Preamble")

In Aboitiz Shipping Corporation, et al. v. The City of Cebu, et al. this Court had occasion to state that '(L)egislative
intent must be ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a whole, and not of an isolated part or a particular
provision alone. This is a cardinal rule of statutory construction. For taken in the abstract, a word or phrase might
easily convey a meaning quite different from the one actually intended and evident when the word or phrase is
considered with those with which it is associated. Thus, an apparently general provision may have a limited
application if read together with other provisions. 9

Second, the result or effects of the presidential decree must be within its reason or intent.

In the paragraph immediately following the last "Whereas" clause, the presidential decree states:

NOW, THEREFORE, I , FERDINAND E. MARCOS, Commander-in-Chief of an the Armed Forces

of the Philippines, in order to attain the desired result of the aforesaid Proclamation No. 1081 and
General Orders Nos. 6 and 7, do hereby order and decree that:

xxx xxx xxx

From the above it is clear that the acts penalized in P.D. 9 are those related to the desired result
of Proclamation 1081 and General Orders Nos. 6 and 7. General Orders Nos. 6 and 7 refer to
firearms and therefore have no relevance to P.D. 9(3) which refers to blunt or bladed weapons.
With respect to Proclamation 1081 some of the underlying reasons for its issuance are quoted
hereunder:

WHEREAS, these lawless elements having taken up arms against our duly constituted government
and against our people, and having committed and are still committing acts of armed insurrection
and rebellion consisting of armed raids, forays, sorties, ambushes, wanton acts of murders,
spoilage, plunder, looting, arsons, destruction of public and private buildings, and attacks against
innocent and defenseless civilian lives and property, all of which activities have seriously
endangered and continue to endanger public order and safety and the security of the nation, ...

xxx xxx xxx

WHEREAS, it is evident that there is throughout the land a state of anarchy and lawlessness,
chaos and disorder, turmoil and destruction of a magnitude equivalent to an actual war between
the forces of our duly constituted government and the New People's Army and their satellite
organizations because of the unmitigated forays, raids, ambuscades, assaults, violence, murders,
assassinations, acts of terror, deceits, coercions, threats, intimidations, treachery, machinations,
arsons, plunders and depredations committed and being committed by the aforesaid lawless
elements who have pledged to the whole nation that they will not stop their dastardly effort and
scheme until and unless they have fully attained their primary and ultimate purpose of forcibly
seizing political and state power in this country by overthrowing our present duly constituted
government, ... (See Book I, Vital Documents on the Declaration of Martial Law in the Philippines
by the Supreme Court of the Philippines, pp. 13-39)

It follows that it is only that act of carrying a blunt or bladed weapon with a motivation connected with or related to
the afore-quoted desired result of Proclamation 1081 that is within the intent of P.D. 9(3), and nothing else.

Statutes are to be construed in the light of purposes to be achieved and the evils sought to be
remedied. (U.S. v. American Tracking Association, 310 U.S. 534, cited in LVN Pictures v.
Philippine Musicians Guild, 110 Phil. 725, 731; emphasis supplied)

When construing a statute, the reason for its enactment should be kept in mind, and the statute
should be construed with reference to its intended scope and purpose. (Statutory Construction by
E.T. Crawford, pp. 604-605, cited in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Filipinas Compania de
Seguros, 107 Phil. 1055, 1060; emphasis supplied)
5. In the construction of P.D. 9(3) it becomes relevant to inquire into the consequences of the measure if a strict
adherence to the letter of the paragraph is followed.

It is a salutary principle in statutory construction that there exists a valid presumption that undesirable
consequences were never intended by a legislative measure, and that a construction of which the statute is fairly
susceptible is favored, which will avoid all objectionable, mischievous, indefensible, wrongful, evil, and injurious
consequences.9-a

It is to be presumed that when P.D. 9 was promulgated by the President of the Republic there was no intent to work
a hardship or an oppressive result, a possible abuse of authority or act of oppression, arming one person with a
weapon to impose hardship on another, and so on. 10

At this instance We quote from the order of Judge Purisima the following:

And while there is no proof of it before the Court, it is not difficult to believe the murmurings of
detained persons brought to Court upon a charge of possession of bladed weapons under P.D. No.
9, that more than ever before, policemen - of course not all can be so heartless — now have in
their hands P.D. No. 9 as a most convenient tool for extortion, what with the terrifying risk of
being sentenced to imprisonment of five to ten years for a rusted kitchen knife or a pair of scissors,
which only God knows where it came from. Whereas before martial law an extortion-minded
peace officer had to have a stock of the cheapest paltik, and even that could only convey the
coercive message of one year in jail, now anything that has the semblance of a sharp edge or
pointed object, available even in trash cans, may already serve the same purpose, and yet five to
ten times more incriminating than the infamous paltik. (pp. 72-73, rollo L-42050-66)

And as respondent Judge Maceren points out, the people's interpretation of P.D. 9(3) results in absurdity at times.
To his example We may add a situation where a law-abiding citizen, a lawyer by profession, after gardening in his
house remembers to return the bolo used by him to his neighbor who lives about 30 meters or so away and while
crossing the street meets a policeman. The latter upon seeing the bolo being carried by that citizen places him under
arrest and books him for a violation of P.D. 9(3). Could the presidential decree have been conceived to produce
such absurd, unreasonable, and insensible results?

6. Penal statutes are to be construed strictly against the state and liberally in favor of an accused.

American jurisprudence sets down the reason for this rule to be "the tenderness of the law of the rights of
individuals; the object is to establish a certain rule by conformity to which mankind would be safe, and the
discretion of the court limited." 11 The purpose is not to enable a guilty person to escape punishment through a
technicality but to provide a precise definition of forbidden acts.12

Our own decisions have set down the same guidelines in this manner, viz:

Criminal statutes are to be construed strictly. No person should be brought within their terms who
is not clearly within them, nor should any act be pronounced criminal which is not made clearly
so by the statute. (U.S. v. Abad Santos, 36 Phil. 243, 246)

The rule that penal statutes are given a strict construction is not the only factor controlling the
interpretation of such laws, instead, the rule merely serves as an additional, single factor to be
considered as an aid in determining the meaning of penal laws. (People v. Manantan, 5 SCRA
684, 692)

F. The Informations filed by petitioner are fatally defective.

The two elements of the offense covered by P.D. 9(3) must be alleged in the Information in order that the latter may
constitute a sufficiently valid charged. The sufficiency of an Information is determined solely by the facts alleged
therein.13 Where the facts are incomplete and do not convey the elements of the crime, the quashing of the
accusation is in order.

Section 2(a), Rule 117 of the Rules of Court provides that the defendant may move to quash the complaint or
information when the facts charged do not constitute an offense.

In U.S.U. Gacutan, 1914, it was held that where an accused is charged with knowingly rendering an unjust
judgment under Article 204 of the Revised Penal Code, failure to allege in the Information that the judgment was
rendered knowing it to be unjust, is fatal. 14

In People v. Yadao, 1954, this Court through then Justice Cesar Bengzon who later became Chief Justice of the
Court affirmed an order of the trial court which quashed an Information wherein the facts recited did not constitute
a public offense as defined in Section 1, Republic Act 145. 15

G. The filing of these Petitions was unnecessary because the People could have availed itself of other available
remedies below.

Pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court follow:

Rule 117, Section 7. Effect of sustaining the motion to quash. — If the motion to quash is sustained
the court may order that another information be filed. If such order is made the defendant, if in
custody, shall remain so unless he shall be admitted to bail. If such order is not made or if having
been made another information is not filed withuntime to be specified in the order, or within such
further time as the court may allow for good cause shown, the defendant, if in custody, shall be
discharged therefrom, unless he is in custody on some other charge.

Rule 110, Section 13. Amendment. — The information or complaint may be amended, in substance
or form, without leave of court, at any time before the defendant pleads; and thereafter and during
the trial as to all matters of form, by leave and at the discretion of the court, when the same can be
done without prejudice to the rights of the defendant.

xxx xxx xxx

Two courses of action were open to Petitioner upon the quashing of the Informations in these cases, viz:

First, if the evidence on hand so warranted, the People could have filed an amended Information to include the
second element of the offense as defined in the disputed orders of respondent Judges. We have ruled that if the facts
alleged in the Information do not constitute a punishable offense, the case should not be dismissed but the
prosecution should be given an opportunity to amend the Information. 16

Second, if the facts so justified, the People could have filed a complaint either under Section 26 of Act No. 1780,
quoted earlier, or Manila City Ordinance No. 3820, as amended by Ordinance No. 3928, especially since in most if
not all of the cases, the dismissal was made prior to arraignment of the accused and on a motion to quash.

Section 8. Rule 117 states that:

An order sustaining the motion to quash is not a bar to another prosecution for the same offense
unless the motion was based on the grounds specified in section 2, subsections (f) and (h) of this
rule.
Under the foregoing, the filing of another complaint or Information is barred only when the criminal action or
liability had been extinguished (Section 2[f]) or when the motion to quash was granted for reasons of double
jeopardy. (ibid., [h])

As to whether or not a plea of double jeopardy may be successfully invoked by the accused in all these cases should
new complaints be filed against them, is a matter We need not resolve for the present.

H. — We conclude with high expectations that police authorities and the prosecuting arm of the government true to
the oath of office they have taken will exercise utmost circumspection and good faith in evaluating the particular
circumstances of a case so as to reach a fair and just conclusion if a situation falls within the purview of P.D. 9(3)
and the prosecution under said decree is warranted and justified. This obligation becomes a sacred duty in the face
of the severe penalty imposed for the offense.

On this point, We commend the Chief State Prosecutor Rodolfo A. Nocon on his letter to the City Fiscal of Manila
on October 15, 1975, written for the Secretary, now Minister of Justice, where he stated the following:

In any case, please study well each and every case of this nature so that persons accused of
carrying bladed weapons, specially those whose purpose is not to subvert the duly constituted
authorities, may not be unduly indicted for the serious offenses falling under P.D. No. 9.17

Yes, while it is not within the power of courts of justice to inquire into the wisdom of a law, it is however a judicial
task and prerogative to determine if official action is within the spirit and letter of the law and if basic fundamental
rights of an individual guaranteed by the Constitution are not violated in the process of its implementation. We have
to face the fact that it is an unwise and unjust application of a law, necessary and justified under prevailing
circumstances, which renders the measure an instrument of oppression and evil and leads the citizenry to lose their
faith in their government.

WHEREFORE, We DENY these 26 Petitions for Review and We AFFIRM the Orders of respondent Judges
dismissing or quashing the Information concerned, subject however to Our observations made in the preceding
pages 23 to 25 of this Decision regarding the right of the State or Petitioner herein to file either an amended
Information under Presidential Decree No. 9, paragraph 3, or a new one under other existing statute or city
ordinance as the facts may warrant.

Without costs.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-5691 December 27, 1910

S. D. MARTINEZ and his wife, CARMEN ONG DE MARTINEZ, plaintiffs-appellees,

vs.
WILLIAM VAN BUSKIRK, defendant-appellant.

Lionel D. Hargis for appellant.

Sanz and Oppisso for appellee.

MORELAND, J.:

The facts found by the trial court are undisputed by either party in this case. They are —

That on the 11th day of September, 1908, the plaintiff, Carmen Ong de Martinez, was riding in a carromata
on Calle Real, district of Ermita, city of Manila, P.I., along the left-hand side of the street as she was going,
when a delivery wagon belonging to the defendant used for the purpose of transportation of fodder by the
defendant, and to which was attached a pair of horses, came along the street in the opposite direction to that
the in which said plaintiff was proceeding, and that thereupon the driver of the said plaintiff's carromata,
observing that the delivery wagon of the defendant was coming at great speed, crowded close to the
sidewalk on the left-hand side of the street and stopped, in order to give defendant's delivery wagon an
opportunity to pass by, but that instead of passing by the defendant's wagon and horses ran into the
carromata occupied by said plaintiff with her child and overturned it, severely wounding said plaintiff by
making a serious cut upon her head, and also injuring the carromata itself and the harness upon the horse
which was drawing it.

xxx xxx xxx

These facts are not dispute, but the defendant presented evidence to the effect that the cochero, who was
driving his delivery wagon at the time the accident occurred, was a good servant and was considered a safe
and reliable cochero; that the delivery wagon had sent to deliver some forage at Paco Livery Stable on
Calle Herran, and that for the purpose of delivery thereof the cochero driving the team as defendant's
employee tied the driving lines of the horses to the front end of the delivery wagon and then went back
inside of the wagon for the purpose of unloading the forage to be delivered; that while unloading the forage
and in the act of carrying some of it out, another vehicle drove by, the driver of which cracked a whip and
made some other noises, which frightened the horses attached to the delivery wagon and they ran away, and
the driver was thrown from the inside of the wagon out through the rear upon the ground and was unable to
stop the horses; that the horses then ran up and on which street they came into collision with the carromata
in which the plaintiff, Carmen Ong de Martinez, was riding.

The defendant himself was not with the vehicle on the day in question.

Upon these facts the court below found the defendant guilty of negligence and gave judgment against him for
P442.50, with interest thereon at the rate of 6 per cent per annum from the 17th day of October, 1908, and for the
costs of the action. The case is before us on an appeal from that judgment.
There is no general law of negligence in the Philippine Islands except that embodied in the Civil Code. The
provisions of that code pertinent to this case are —

Art. 1902. A person who by an act or omission causes damage to another when there is fault or negligence
shall be obliged to repair the damage so done.

Art. 1903. The obligation imposed by preceding article is demandable, not only for personal acts and
omissions, but also for those of the persons for whom they should be responsible.

The father, and on his death or incapacity the mother, is liable for the damages caused by the minors who
live with them.

Guardians are liable for the damages caused by minors or incapacitated persons who are under their
authority and live with them.

Owners of directors of an establishment or enterprise are equally liable for the damages caused by the
employees in the service of the branches in which the latter may be employed or on account of their duties.

The State is liable in this sense when it acts through a special agent, but not when the damages should have
been caused by the official to whom properly it pertained to do the act performed, in which case the
provisions of the preceding article shall be applicable.

Finally, masters or directors of arts and trades are liable for the damages caused by their pupils or
apprentices while they are under their custody.

The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the persons mentioned therein prove that they
employed all the diligence of a good father of a family to avoid the damage.

Passing the question whether or not an employer who has furnished a gentle and tractable team and a trusty and
capable driver is, under the last paragraph of the above provisions, liable for the negligence of such driver in
handling the team, we are of the opinion that the judgment must be reversed upon the ground that the evidence does
not disclose that the cochero was negligent.

While the law relating to negligence in this jurisdiction may possibly be some what different from that in Anglo-
Saxon countries, a question we do not now discuss, the rules under which the fact of negligence is determined are,
nevertheless, generally the same. That is to say, while the law designating the person responsible for a negligent act
may not be the same here as in many jurisdictions, the law determining what is a negligent act is the same here,
generally speaking, as elsewhere. (Supreme court of Spain, 4 December, 1903; 16 May, 1893; 27 June, 1894; 9
April, 1896; 14 March, 1901; 2 March, 1904; 7 February, 1905; 16 June, 1905; 23 June, 1905; 13 April, 1903; 7
March, 1902; 12 June, 1900; 2 March, 1907; 18 March, 1898; 3 June, 1901.)

It appears from the undisputed evidence that the horses which caused the damage were gentle and tractable; that the
cochero was experienced and capable; that he had driven one of the horses several years and the other five or six
months; that he had been in the habit, during all that time, of leaving them in the condition in which they were left
on the day of the accident; that they had never run away up to that time and there had been, therefore, no accident
due to such practice; that to leave the horses and assist in unloading the merchandise in the manner described on the
day of the accident was the custom of all cochero who delivered merchandise of the character of that which was
being delivered by the cochero of the defendant on the day in question, which custom was sanctioned by their
employers.

In our judgment, the cochero of the defendant was not negligent in leaving the horses in the manner described by the
evidence in this case, either under Spanish or American jurisprudence. (Lynch vs. Nurdin, 1 Q. B., 422;
Rumsey vs. Nelson, 58 Vt., 590; Drake vs. Mount, 33 N. J. L., 442; Hoboken Land and Improvement Co. vs. Lally,
48 N. J. L., 604; Wasmer vs. D. L. & W. R. R. Co., 80 N. Y., 212.) lawphi1.net

In the case of Hayman vs. Hewitt (Peake N. P. Cas., pt. 2, p. 170), Lord Kenyon said:

He was performing his duty while removing the goods into the house, and, if every person who suffered a
cart to remain in the street while he took goods out of it was obliged to employ another to look after the
horses, it would be impossible for the business of the metropolis to go on.

In the case of Griggs vs. Fleckenstein (14 Minn., 81), the court said:

The degree of care required of the plaintiff, or those in charged of his horse, at the time of the injury, is that
which would be exercised by a person of ordinary care and prudence under like circumstances. It can not be
said that the fact of leaving the horse unhitched is in itself negligence. Whether it is negligence to leave a
horse unhitched must be depend upon the disposition of the horse; whether he was under the observation
and control of some person all the time, and many other circumstances; and is a question to be determined
by the jury from the facts of each case.

In the case of Belles vs. Kellner (67 N. J. L., 255), it was held that it was error on the part of the trial court to refuse
to charge that "it is not negligence for the driver of a quite, gentle horse to leave him unhitched and otherwise
unattended on the side of a public highways while the driver is upon the sidewalk loading goods on the wagon." The
said court closed its opinion with these words:

There was evidence which could have fully justified the jury in finding that the horse was quite and gentle,
and that the driver was upon the sidewalk loading goods on the wagon, at time of the alleged injury, and
that the horse had been used for years in that way without accident. The refusal of the trial court to charge
as requested left the jury free to find was verdict against the defendant, although the jury was convinced
that these facts were proven.lawphil.net

In the case of Southworth vs. Ry. Co. (105 Mass., 342), it was held:

That evidence that a servant, whom traders employed to deliver goods, upon stopping with his horse and
wagon to deliver a parcel at a house from fifty to a hundred rods from a railroad crossing, left the horse
unfastened for four or five minutes while he was in the house, knowing that it was not afraid of cars, and
having used it for three or four months without ever hitching it or knowing it to start, is not conclusive, as a
matter of law, of a want of due care on his part.

The duty, a violation of which is claimed to be negligence in the respect in question, is to exercise reasonable care
and prudence. Where reasonable care is employed in doing an act not itself illegal or inherently likely to produce
damage to others, there will be no liability, although damage in fact ensues. (Milwaukee Ry. Co. vs. Arms, 91 U. S.,
489; Parrott vs. Wells, 15 Wall., 524; Brown vs. Kendall, 6 Cushing, 292; Jackson Architectural Iron
Works vs.Hurlbut, 158 N. Y., 34 Westerfield vs. Levis, 43 La. An., 63; Niosi vs. Empire Steam Laundry, 117 Cal.,
257.)

The act of defendant's driver in leaving the horses in the manner proved was not unreasonable or imprudent. Acts
the performance of which has not proved destructive or injurious and which have, therefore, been acquiesced in by
society for so long a time that they have ripened into custom, can not be held to be themselves unreasonable or
imprudent. Indeed the very reason why they have been permitted by society is that they beneficial rather than
prejudicial.itc-alf Accidents sometimes happen and injuries result from the most ordinary acts of life. But such are
not their natural or customary results. To hold that, because such an act once resulted in accident or injury, the actor
is necessarily negligent, is to go far. The fact that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is sometimes successfully invoked
in such a case, does not in any sense militate against the reasoning presented. That maxim at most only creates
aprima facie case, and that only in the absence of proof of the circumstances under which the act complained of was
performed. It is something invoked in favor of the plaintiff before defendant's case showing the conditions and
circumstances under which the injury occurred, the creative reason for the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur disappears.
This is demonstrated by the case of Inland and Seaboard Costing Co. vs. Tolson (139 U.S., 551), where the court
said (p. 554):

. . . The whole effect of the instruction in question, as applied to the case before the jury, was that if the
steamboat, on a calm day and in smooth water, was thrown with such force against a wharf properly built,
as to tear up some of the planks of the flooring, this would be prima facie evidence of negligence on the
part of the defendant's agent in making the landing, unless upon the whole evidence in the case this prima
facie evidence was rebutted. As such damage to a wharf is not ordinarily done by a steamboat under control
of her officers and carefully managed by them, evidence that such damage was done in this case was prima
facie, and, if unexplained, sufficient evidence of negligence on their part, and the jury might properly be so
instructed.

There was presented in this case, and by the plaintiffs themselves, not only the fact of the runway and the accident
resulting therefrom, but also the conditions under which the runaway occurred. Those conditions showing of
themselves that the defendant's cochero was not negligent in the management of the horse, the prima facie case in
plaintiffs' favor, if any, was destroyed as soon as made.

It is a matter of common knowledge as well as proof that it is the universal practice of merchants to deliver
merchandise of the kind of that being delivered at the time of the injury, in the manner in which that was then being
delivered; and that it is the universal practice to leave the horses in the manner in which they were left at the time of
the accident. This is the custom in all cities. It has not been productive of accidents or injuries. The public, finding
itself unprejudiced by such practice, has acquiesced for years without objection. Ought the public now, through the
courts, without prior objection or notice, to be permitted to reverse the practice of decades and thereby make
culpable and guilty one who had every reason and assurance to believe that he was acting under the sanction of the
strongest of all civil forces, the custom of a people? We think not.

The judgement is reversed, without special finding as to costs. So ordered.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. L-55960 November 24, 1988

YAO KEE, SZE SOOK WAH, SZE LAI CHO, and SY CHUN YEN, petitioners,
vs.
AIDA SY-GONZALES, MANUEL SY, TERESITA SY-BERNABE, RODOLFO SY, and HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

Montesa, Albon, & Associates for petitioners.

De Lapa, Salonga, Fulgencio & De Lunas for respondents.

CORTES, J.:

Sy Kiat, a Chinese national. died on January 17, 1977 in Caloocan City where he was then residing, leaving behind
real and personal properties here in the Philippines worth P300,000.00 more or less.

Thereafter, Aida Sy-Gonzales, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy-Bernabe and Rodolfo Sy filed a petition for the grant of
letters of administration docketed as Special Proceedings Case No. C-699 of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal
Branch XXXIII, Caloocan City. In said petition they alleged among others that (a) they are the children of the
deceased with Asuncion Gillego; (b) to their knowledge Sy Mat died intestate; (c) they do not recognize Sy Kiat's
marriage to Yao Kee nor the filiation of her children to him; and, (d) they nominate Aida Sy-Gonzales for
appointment as administratrix of the intestate estate of the deceased [Record on Appeal, pp. 4-9; Rollo, p. 107.]

The petition was opposed by Yao Kee, Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Cho and Sy Yun Chen who alleged that: (a) Yao Kee
is the lawful wife of Sy Kiat whom he married on January 19, 1931 in China; (b) the other oppositors are the
legitimate children of the deceased with Yao Kee; and, (c) Sze Sook Wah is the eldest among them and is
competent, willing and desirous to become the administratrix of the estate of Sy Kiat [Record on Appeal, pp. 12-13;
Rollo, p. 107.] After hearing, the probate court, finding among others that:

(1) Sy Kiat was legally married to Yao Kee [CFI decision, pp. 12-27; Rollo, pp. 49-64;]

(2) Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Cho and Sze Chun Yen are the legitimate children of Yao Kee with Sy
Mat [CFI decision, pp. 28-31; Rollo. pp. 65-68;] and,

(3) Aida Sy-Gonzales, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy-Bernabe and Rodolfo Sy are the acknowledged
illegitimate offsprings of Sy Kiat with Asuncion Gillego [CFI decision, pp. 27-28; Rollo, pp. 64-
65.]

held if favor of the oppositors (petitioners herein) and appointed Sze Sook Wah as the administratrix of the intestate
estate of the deceased [CFI decision, pp. 68-69; Rollo, pp. 105-106.]

On appeal the Court of Appeals rendered a decision modifying that of the probate court, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
 IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the lower Court is hereby MODIFIED and SET
ASIDE and a new judgment rendered as follows:

(1) Declaring petitioners Aida Sy-Gonzales, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy- Bernabe and Rodolfo Sy
acknowledged natural children of the deceased Sy Kiat with Asuncion Gillego, an unmarried
woman with whom he lived as husband and wife without benefit of marriage for many years:

(2) Declaring oppositors Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Chu and Sze Chun Yen, the acknowledged
natural children of the deceased Sy Kiat with his Chinese wife Yao Kee, also known as Yui Yip,
since the legality of the alleged marriage of Sy Mat to Yao Kee in China had not been proven to be
valid to the laws of the Chinese People's Republic of China (sic);

(3) Declaring the deed of sale executed by Sy Kiat on December 7, 1976 in favor of Tomas Sy
(Exhibit "G-1", English translation of Exhibit "G") of the Avenue Tractor and Diesel Parts Supply
to be valid and accordingly, said property should be excluded from the estate of the deceased Sy
Kiat; and

(4) Affirming the appointment by the lower court of Sze Sook Wah as judicial administratrix of
the estate of the deceased. [CA decision, pp. 11-12; Rollo, pp. 36- 37.]

From said decision both parties moved for partial reconsideration, which was however denied by respondent court.
They thus interposed their respective appeals to this Court.

Private respondents filed a petition with this Court docketed as G.R. No. 56045 entitled "Aida Sy-Gonzales, Manuel
Sy, Teresita Sy-Bernabe and Rodolfo Sy v. Court of Appeals, Yao Kee, Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Cho and Sy Chun
Yen" questioning paragraphs (3) and (4) of the dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals' decision. The Supreme
Court however resolved to deny the petition and the motion for reconsideration. Thus on March 8, 1982 entry of
judgment was made in G.R. No. 56045. **

The instant petition, on the other hand, questions paragraphs (1) and (2) of the dispositive portion of the decision of
the Court of Appeals. This petition was initially denied by the Supreme Court on June 22, 1981. Upon motion of the
petitioners the Court in a resolution dated September 16, 1981 reconsidered the denial and decided to give due
course to this petition. Herein petitioners assign the following as errors:

I. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN DECLARING THE

MARRIAGE OF SY KIAT TO YAO YEE AS NOT HAVE (sic) BEEN PROVEN VALID IN
ACCORDANCE WITH LAWS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.

II. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN DECLARING AIDA SY-

GONZALES, MANUEL SY, TERESITA SY-BERNABE AND RODOLFO SY AS NATURAL
CHILDREN OF SY KIAT WITH ASUNCION GILLEGO. [Petition, p. 2; Rollo, p. 6.]

I. Petitioners argue that the marriage of Sy Kiat to Yao Kee in accordance with Chinese law and custom was
conclusively proven. To buttress this argument they rely on the following testimonial and documentary evidence.

First, the testimony of Yao Kee summarized by the trial court as follows:

Yao Kee testified that she was married to Sy Kiat on January 19, 1931 in Fookien, China; that she
does not have a marriage certificate because the practice during that time was for elders to agree
upon the betrothal of their children, and in her case, her elder brother was the one who contracted
or entered into [an] agreement with the parents of her husband; that the agreement was that she
and Sy Mat would be married, the wedding date was set, and invitations were sent out; that the
said agreement was complied with; that she has five children with Sy Kiat, but two of them died;
 that those who are alive are Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Cho, and Sze Chun Yen, the eldest being Sze
Sook Wah who is already 38 years old; that Sze Sook Wah was born on November 7, 1939; that
she and her husband, Sy Mat, have been living in FooKien, China before he went to the
Philippines on several occasions; that the practice during the time of her marriage was a written
document [is exchanged] just between the parents of the bride and the parents of the groom, or any
elder for that matter; that in China, the custom is that there is a go- between, a sort of marriage
broker who is known to both parties who would talk to the parents of the bride-to-be; that if the
parents of the bride-to-be agree to have the groom-to-be their son in-law, then they agree on a date
as an engagement day; that on engagement day, the parents of the groom would bring some pieces
of jewelry to the parents of the bride-to-be, and then one month after that, a date would be set for
the wedding, which in her case, the wedding date to Sy Kiat was set on January 19, 1931; that
during the wedding the bridegroom brings with him a couch (sic) where the bride would ride and
on that same day, the parents of the bride would give the dowry for her daughter and then the
document would be signed by the parties but there is no solemnizing officer as is known in the
Philippines; that during the wedding day, the document is signed only by the parents of the
bridegroom as well as by the parents of the bride; that the parties themselves do not sign the
document; that the bride would then be placed in a carriage where she would be brought to the
town of the bridegroom and before departure the bride would be covered with a sort of a veil; that
upon reaching the town of the bridegroom, the bridegroom takes away the veil; that during her
wedding to Sy Kiat (according to said Chinese custom), there were many persons present; that
after Sy Kiat opened the door of the carriage, two old ladies helped her go down the carriage and
brought her inside the house of Sy Mat; that during her wedding, Sy Chick, the eldest brother of
Sy Kiat, signed the document with her mother; that as to the whereabouts of that document, she
and Sy Mat were married for 46 years already and the document was left in China and she doubt
if that document can still be found now; that it was left in the possession of Sy Kiat's family; that
right now, she does not know the whereabouts of that document because of the lapse of many
years and because they left it in a certain place and it was already eaten by the termites; that after
her wedding with Sy Kiat, they lived immediately together as husband and wife, and from then on,
they lived together; that Sy Kiat went to the Philippines sometime in March or April in the same
year they were married; that she went to the Philippines in 1970, and then came back to China;
that again she went back to the Philippines and lived with Sy Mat as husband and wife; that she
begot her children with Sy Kiat during the several trips by Sy Kiat made back to China. [CFI
decision, pp. 13-15; Rollo, pp. 50-52.]

Second, the testimony of Gan Ching, a younger brother of Yao Kee who stated that he was among the many people
who attended the wedding of his sister with Sy Kiat and that no marriage certificate is issued by the Chinese
government, a document signed by the parents or elders of the parties being sufficient [CFI decision, pp. 15-16;
Rollo, pp.
52-53.]

Third, the statements made by Asuncion Gillego when she testified before the trial court to the effect that (a) Sy Mat
was married to Yao Kee according to Chinese custom; and, (b) Sy Kiat's admission to her that he has a Chinese wife
whom he married according to Chinese custom [CFI decision, p. 17; Rollo, p. 54.]

Fourth, Sy Kiat's Master Card of Registered Alien issued in Caloocan City on October 3, 1972 where the following
entries are found: "Marital status—Married"; "If married give name of spouses—Yao Kee"; "Address-China; "Date
of marriage—1931"; and "Place of marriage—China" [Exhibit "SS-1".]

Fifth, Sy Kiat's Alien Certificate of Registration issued in Manila on January 12, 1968 where the following entries
are likewise found: "Civil status—Married"; and, 'If married, state name and address of spouse—Yao Kee
Chingkang, China" [Exhibit "4".]

And lastly, the certification issued in Manila on October 28, 1977 by the Embassy of the People's Republic of China
to the effect that "according to the information available at the Embassy Mr. Sy Kiat a Chinese national and Mrs.
Yao Kee alias Yui Yip also Chinese were married on January 19, 1931 in Fukien, the People's Republic of China"
[Exhibit "5".]

These evidence may very well prove the fact of marriage between Yao Kee and Sy Kiat. However, the same do not
suffice to establish the validity of said marriage in accordance with Chinese law or custom.

Custom is defined as "a rule of conduct formed by repetition of acts, uniformly observed (practiced) as a social rule,
legally binding and obligatory" [In the Matter of the Petition for Authority to Continue Use of the Firm Name
"Ozaeta, Romulo, de Leon, Mabanta and Reyes", July 30, 1979, SCRA 3, 12 citing JBL Reyes & RC Puno, Outline
of Phil. Civil Law, Fourth Ed., Vol. 1, p. 7.] The law requires that "a custom must be proved as a fact, according to
the rules of evidence" [Article 12, Civil Code.] On this score the Court had occasion to state that "a local custom as
a source of right can not be considered by a court of justice unless such custom is properly established by competent
evidence like any other fact" [Patriarca v. Orate, 7 Phil. 390, 395 (1907).] The same evidence, if not one of a higher
degree, should be required of a foreign custom.

The law on foreign marriages is provided by Article 71 of the Civil Code which states that:

Art. 71. All marriages performed outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in
the country where they were performed and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country,
except bigamous, Polygamous, or incestuous marriages, as determined by Philippine law.
(Emphasis supplied.) ***

Construing this provision of law the Court has held that to establish a valid foreign marriage two things must be
proven, namely: (1) the existence of the foreign law as a question of fact; and (2) the alleged foreign marriage by
convincing evidence [Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee, 43 Phil. 43, 49 (1922).]

In proving a foreign law the procedure is provided in the Rules of Court. With respect to an unwritten foreign law,
Rule 130 section 45 states that:

SEC. 45. Unwritten law.—The oral testimony of witnesses, skilled therein, is admissible as
evidence of the unwritten law of a foreign country, as are also printed and published books of
reports of decisions of the courts of the foreign country, if proved to be commonly admitted in
such courts.

Proof of a written foreign law, on the other hand, is provided for under Rule 132 section 25, thus:

SEC. 25. Proof of public or official record.—An official record or an entry therein, when
admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy
attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if
the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If the
office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be made by a
secretary of embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any
officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record
is kept and authenticated by the seal of his office.

The Court has interpreted section 25 to include competent evidence like the testimony of a witness to prove the
existence of a written foreign law [Collector of Internal Revenue v. Fisher 110 Phil. 686, 700-701 (1961) citing
Willamette Iron and Steel Works v. Muzzal, 61 Phil. 471 (1935).]

In the case at bar petitioners did not present any competent evidence relative to the law and custom of China on
marriage. The testimonies of Yao and Gan Ching cannot be considered as proof of China's law or custom on
marriage not only because they are
self-serving evidence, but more importantly, there is no showing that they are competent to testify on the subject
matter. For failure to prove the foreign law or custom, and consequently, the validity of the marriage in accordance
with said law or custom, the marriage between Yao Kee and Sy Kiat cannot be recognized in this jurisdiction.

Petitioners contend that contrary to the Court of Appeals' ruling they are not duty bound to prove the Chinese law on
marriage as judicial notice thereof had been taken by this Court in the case of Sy Joc Lieng v. Sy Quia [16 Phil. 137
(1910).]

This contention is erroneous. Well-established in this jurisdiction is the principle that Philippine courts cannot take
judicial notice of foreign laws. They must be alleged and proved as any other fact [Yam Ka Lim v. Collector of
Customs, 30 Phil. 46, 48 (1915); Fluemer v. Hix, 54 Phil. 610 (1930).]

Moreover a reading of said case would show that the party alleging the foreign marriage presented a witness, one Li
Ung Bieng, to prove that matrimonial letters mutually exchanged by the contracting parties constitute the essential
requisite for a marriage to be considered duly solemnized in China. Based on his testimony, which as found by the
Court is uniformly corroborated by authors on the subject of Chinese marriage, what was left to be decided was the
issue of whether or not the fact of marriage in accordance with Chinese law was duly proven [Sy Joc Lieng v. Sy
Quia, supra., at p. 160.]

Further, even assuming for the sake of argument that the Court has indeed taken judicial notice of the law of China
on marriage in the aforecited case, petitioners however have not shown any proof that the Chinese law or custom
obtaining at the time the Sy Joc Lieng marriage was celebrated in 1847 was still the law when the alleged marriage
of Sy Kiat to Yao Kee took place in 1931 or eighty-four (84) years later.

Petitioners moreover cite the case of U.S. v. Memoracion [34 Phil. 633 (1916)] as being applicable to the instant
case. They aver that the judicial pronouncement in the Memoracion case, that the testimony of one of the contracting
parties is competent evidence to show the fact of marriage, holds true in this case.

The Memoracion case however is not applicable to the case at bar as said case did not concern a foreign marriage
and the issue posed was whether or not the oral testimony of a spouse is competent evidence to prove the fact of
marriage in a complaint for adultery.

Accordingly, in the absence of proof of the Chinese law on marriage, it should be presumed that it is the same as
ours *** [Wong Woo Yiu v. Vivo, G.R. No. L-21076, March 31, 1965, 13 SCRA 552, 555.] Since Yao Kee
admitted in her testimony that there was no solemnizing officer as is known here in the Philippines [See Article 56,
Civil Code] when her alleged marriage to Sy Mat was celebrated [CFI decision, p. 14; Rollo, p. 51], it therefore
follows that her marriage to Sy Kiat, even if true, cannot be recognized in this jurisdiction [Wong Woo Yiu v.
Vivo, supra., pp. 555-556.]

II. The second issue raised by petitioners concerns the status of private respondents.

Respondent court found the following evidence of petitioners' filiation:

(1) Sy Kiat's Master Card of Registered Alien where the following are entered: "Children if any:
give number of children—Four"; and, "Name—All living in China" [Exhibit "SS-1";]

(2) the testimony of their mother Yao Kee who stated that she had five children with Sy Kiat, only
three of whom are alive namely, Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Chu and Sze Chin Yan [TSN, December
12, 1977, pp. 9-11;] and,

(3) an affidavit executed on March 22,1961 by Sy Kiat for presentation to the Local Civil
Registrar of Manila to support Sze Sook Wah's application for a marriage license, wherein Sy Kiat
expressly stated that she is his daughter [Exhibit "3".]
Likewise on the record is the testimony of Asuncion Gillego that Sy Kiat told her he has three daughters with his
Chinese wife, two of whom—Sook Wah and Sze Kai Cho—she knows, and one adopted son [TSN, December
6,1977, pp. 87-88.]

However, as petitioners failed to establish the marriage of Yao Kee with Sy Mat according to the laws of China,
they cannot be accorded the status of legitimate children but only that of acknowledged natural children. Petitioners
are natural children, it appearing that at the time of their conception Yao Kee and Sy Kiat were not disqualified by
any impediment to marry one another [See Art. 269, Civil Code.] And they are acknowledged children of the
deceased because of Sy Kiat's recognition of Sze Sook Wah [Exhibit "3"] and its extension to Sze Lai Cho and Sy
Chun Yen who are her sisters of the full blood [See Art. 271, Civil Code.]

Private respondents on the other hand are also the deceased's acknowledged natural children with Asuncion Gillego,
a Filipina with whom he lived for twenty-five (25) years without the benefit of marriage. They have in their favor
their father's acknowledgment, evidenced by a compromise agreement entered into by and between their parents and
approved by the Court of First Instance on February 12, 1974 wherein Sy Kiat not only acknowleged them as his
children by Asuncion Gillego but likewise made provisions for their support and future inheritance, thus:

xxx xxx xxx

2. The parties also acknowledge that they are common-law husband and wife and that out of such
relationship, which they have likewise decided to definitely and finally terminate effective
immediately, they begot five children, namely: Aida Sy, born on May 30, 1950; Manuel Sy, born
on July 1, 1953; Teresita Sy, born on January 28, 1955; Ricardo Sy now deceased, born on
December 14, 1956; and Rodolfo Sy, born on May 7, 1958.

3. With respect to the AVENUE TRACTOR AND DIESEL PARTS SUPPLY ... , the parties
mutually agree and covenant that—

(a) The stocks and merchandize and the furniture and equipments ..., shall be
divided into two equal shares between, and distributed to, Sy Kiat who shall
own
one-half of the total and the other half to Asuncion Gillego who shall transfer
the same to their children, namely, Aida Sy, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy, and Rodolfo
Sy.

(b) the business name and premises ... shall be retained by Sy Kiat. However, it
shall be his obligation to give to the aforenamed children an amount of One
Thousand Pesos ( Pl,000.00 ) monthly out of the rental of the two doors of the
same building now occupied by Everett Construction.

xxx xxx xxx

(5) With respect to the acquisition, during the existence of the

common-law husband-and-wife relationship between the parties, of the real estates and properties
registered and/or appearing in the name of Asuncion Gillego ... , the parties mutually agree and
covenant that the said real estates and properties shall be transferred in equal shares to their
children, namely, Aida Sy, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy, and Rodolfo Sy, but to be administered by
Asuncion Gillego during her lifetime ... [Exhibit "D".] (Emphasis supplied.)

xxx xxx xxx

This compromise agreement constitutes a statement before a court of record by which a child may be voluntarily
acknowledged [See Art. 278, Civil Code.]
Petitioners further argue that the questions on the validity of Sy Mat's marriage to Yao Kee and the paternity and
filiation of the parties should have been ventilated in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court.

Specifically, petitioners rely on the following provision of Republic Act No. 5502, entitled "An Act Revising Rep.
Act No. 3278, otherwise known as the Charter of the City of Caloocan', with regard to the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court:

SEC. 91-A. Creation and Jurisdiction of the Court.—

xxx xxx xxx

The provisions of the Judiciary Act to the contrary notwithstanding, the court shall have exclusive
original jurisdiction to hear and decide the following cases:

xxx xxx xxx

(2) Cases involving custody, guardianship, adoption, revocation of adoption, paternity and
acknowledgment;

(3) Annulment of marriages, relief from marital obligations, legal separation of spouses, and
actions for support;

(4) Proceedings brought under the provisions of title six and title seven, chapters one to three of
the civil code;

xxx xxx xxx

and the ruling in the case of Bartolome v. Bartolome [G.R. No. L-23661, 21 SCRA 1324] reiterated in Divinagracia
v. Rovira [G.R. No. L-42615, 72 SCRA 307.]

With the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, the
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts were abolished. Their functions and jurisdiction are now vested with the
Regional Trial Courts [See Section 19 (7), B.P. Blg. 129 and Divinagracia v. Belosillo, G.R. No. L-47407, August
12, 1986, 143 SCRA 356, 360] hence it is no longer necessary to pass upon the issue of jurisdiction raised by
petitioners.

Moreover, even without the exactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 we find in Rep. Act No. 5502 sec. 91-A last
paragraph that:

xxx xxx xxx

If any question involving any of the above matters should arise as an incident in any case pending
in the ordinary court, said incident shall be determined in the main case.

xxx xxx xxx

As held in the case of Divinagracia v. Rovira [G.R. No. L42615. August 10, 1976, 72 SCRA 307]:

xxx xxx xxx

It is true that under the aforequoted section 1 of Republic Act No. 4834 **** a case involving
paternity and acknowledgment may be ventilated as an incident in the intestate or testate
 proceeding (See Baluyot vs. Ines Luciano, L-42215, July 13, 1976). But that legal provision
presupposes that such an administration proceeding is pending or existing and has not been
terminated. [at pp. 313-314.] (Emphasis supplied.)

xxx xxx xxx

The reason for ths rule is not only "to obviate the rendition of conflicting rulings on the same issue by the Court of
First Instance and the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court" [Vda. de Baluyut v. Luciano, G.R. No. L-42215, July
13, 1976, 72 SCRA 52, 63] but more importantly to prevent multiplicity of suits. Accordingly, this Court finds no
reversible error committed by respondent court.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
 FIRST DIVISION

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL G.R. No. 162155

REVENUE and ARTURO V.
PARCERO in his official
capacity as Revenue District
Officer of Revenue District
No. 049 (Makati),
Petitioners, Present:

PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
- v e r s u s - CORONA,
AZCUNA and
GARCIA, JJ.

PRIMETOWN PROPERTY
GROUP, INC.,
Respondent. Promulgated:
August 28, 2007

x-----------------------------------------x

DECISION

CORONA, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari[1] seeks to set aside the August 1, 2003 decision[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA)

in CA-G.R. SP No. 64782 and its February 9, 2004 resolution denying reconsideration. [3]

On March 11, 1999, Gilbert Yap, vice chair of respondent Primetown Property Group, Inc., applied for the refund or

credit of income tax respondent paid in 1997. In Yap's letter to petitioner revenue district officer Arturo V. Parcero of

Revenue District No. 049 (Makati) of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), [4] he explained that the increase in the

cost of labor and materials and difficulty in obtaining financing for projects and collecting receivables caused the real

estate industry to slowdown.[5]As a consequence, while business was good during the first quarter of 1997, respondent

suffered losses amounting to P71,879,228 that year.[6]

According to Yap, because respondent suffered losses, it was not liable for income taxes. [7] Nevertheless, respondent

paid its quarterly corporate income tax and remitted creditable withholding tax from real estate sales to the BIR in the

total amount of P26,318,398.32.[8] Therefore, respondent was entitled to tax refund or tax credit.[9]
On May 13, 1999, revenue officer Elizabeth Y. Santos required respondent to submit additional documents to support

its claim.[10] Respondent complied but its claim was not acted upon. Thus, on April 14, 2000, it filed a petition for

review[11] in the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA).

On December 15, 2000, the CTA dismissed the petition as it was filed beyond the two-year prescriptive period for

filing a judicial claim for tax refund or tax credit. [12]It invoked Section 229 of the National Internal Revenue Code

(NIRC):

Sec. 229. Recovery of Taxes Erroneously or Illegally Collected. -- No suit or proceeding shall be
maintained in any court for the recovery of any national internal revenue tax hereafter alleged to
have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected, or of any penalty claimed to have been
collected without authority, or of any sum alleged to have been excessively or in any manner
wrongfully collected, until a claim for refund or credit has been duly filed with the Commissioner;
but such suit or proceeding may be maintained, whether or not such tax, penalty, or sum has been
paid under protest or duress.

In any case, no such suit or proceeding shall be filed after the expiration of two (2) years from
the date of payment of the tax or penalty regardless of any supervening cause that may arise
after payment: Provided, however, That the Commissioner may, even without a claim therefor,
refund or credit any tax, where on the face of the return upon which payment was made, such
payment appears clearly to have been erroneously paid. (emphasis supplied)

The CTA found that respondent filed its final adjusted return on April 14, 1998. Thus, its right to claim a refund or

credit commenced on that date.[13]

The tax court applied Article 13 of the Civil Code which states:

Art. 13. When the law speaks of years, months, days or nights, it shall be understood that years are
of three hundred sixty-five days each; months, of thirty days; days, of twenty-four hours, and
nights from sunset to sunrise.

If the months are designated by their name, they shall be computed by the number of days which
they respectively have.

In computing a period, the first day shall be excluded, and the last included. (emphasis supplied)

Thus, according to the CTA, the two-year prescriptive period under Section 229 of the NIRC for the filing of judicial

claims was equivalent to 730 days. Because the year 2000 was a leap year, respondent's petition, which was filed 731

days[14] after respondent filed its final adjusted return, was filed beyond the reglementary period. [15]
Respondent moved for reconsideration but it was denied.[16] Hence, it filed an appeal in the CA.[17]

On August 1, 2003, the CA reversed and set aside the decision of the CTA.[18] It ruled that Article 13 of the Civil Code

did not distinguish between a regular year and a leap year. According to the CA:

The rule that a year has 365 days applies, notwithstanding the fact that a particular year is a leap
year.[19]

In other words, even if the year 2000 was a leap year, the periods covered by April 15, 1998 to April 14, 1999 and

April 15, 1999 to April 14, 2000 should still be counted as 365 days each or a total of 730 days. A statute which is

clear and explicit shall be neither interpreted nor construed. [20]

Petitioners moved for reconsideration but it was denied.[21] Thus, this appeal.

Petitioners contend that tax refunds, being in the nature of an exemption, should be strictly construed against

claimants.[22] Section 229 of the NIRC should be strictly applied against respondent inasmuch as it has been

consistently held that the prescriptive period (for the filing of tax refunds and tax credits) begins to run on the day

claimants file their final adjusted returns.[23] Hence, the claim should have been filed on or before April 13, 2000 or

within 730 days, reckoned from the time respondent filed its final adjusted return.

The conclusion of the CA that respondent filed its petition for review in the CTA within the two-year prescriptive

period provided in Section 229 of the NIRC is correct. Its basis, however, is not.

The rule is that the two-year prescriptive period is reckoned from the filing of the final adjusted return. [24] But how

should the two-year prescriptive period be computed?

As already quoted, Article 13 of the Civil Code provides that when the law speaks of a year, it is understood to be

equivalent to 365 days. In National Marketing Corporation v. Tecson,[25] we ruled that a year is equivalent to 365 days

regardless of whether it is a regular year or a leap year. [26]

However, in 1987, EO[27] 292 or the Administrative Code of 1987 was enacted. Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I

thereof provides:

Sec. 31. Legal Periods. Year shall be understood to be twelve calendar months; month of thirty
days, unless it refers to a specific calendar month in which case it shall be computed according to
the number of days the specific month contains; day, to a day of twenty-four hours and; night from
sunrise to sunset. (emphasis supplied)

A calendar month is a month designated in the calendar without regard to the number of days it may contain. [28] It is

the period of time running from the beginning of a certain numbered day up to, but not including, the corresponding

numbered day of the next month, and if there is not a sufficient number of days in the next month, then up to and

including the last day of that month.[29] To illustrate, one calendar month from December 31, 2007 will be from January

1, 2008 to January 31, 2008; one calendar month from January 31, 2008 will be from February 1, 2008 until February

29, 2008.[30]

A law may be repealed expressly (by a categorical declaration that the law is revoked and abrogated by another) or

impliedly (when the provisions of a more recent law cannot be reasonably reconciled with the previous

one).[31] Section 27, Book VII (Final Provisions) of the Administrative Code of 1987 states:

Sec. 27. Repealing clause. All laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulation, or portions thereof,
inconsistent with this Code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.

A repealing clause like Sec. 27 above is not an express repealing clause because it fails to identify or designate the

laws to be abolished.[32] Thus, the provision above only impliedly repealed all laws inconsistent with the

Administrative Code of 1987.

Implied repeals, however, are not favored. An implied repeal must have been clearly and unmistakably intended by

the legislature. The test is whether the subsequent law encompasses entirely the subject matter of the former law and

they cannot be logically or reasonably reconciled.[33]

Both Article 13 of the Civil Code and Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987 deal with

the same subject matter the computation of legal periods. Under the Civil Code, a year is equivalent to 365 days

whether it be a regular year or a leap year. Under the Administrative Code of 1987, however, a year is composed of

12 calendar months. Needless to state, under the Administrative Code of 1987, the number of days is irrelevant.

There obviously exists a manifest incompatibility in the manner of computing legal periods under the Civil Code and

the Administrative Code of 1987. For this reason, we hold that Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative

Code of 1987, being the more recent law, governs the computation of legal periods. Lex posteriori derogat priori.

Applying Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987 to this case, the two-year prescriptive

period (reckoned from the time respondent filed its final adjusted return[34] on April 14, 1998) consisted of 24 calendar

months, computed as follows:

Year 1 1st calendar April 15, 1998 to May 14, 1998

month
2nd calendar May 15, 1998 to June 14, 1998
month
3rd calendar June 15, 1998 to July 14, 1998
month
4th calendar July 15, 1998 to August 14, 1998
month
5th calendar August 15, 1998 to September 14, 1998
month
6th calendar September 15, 1998 to October 14, 1998
month
7th calendar October 15, 1998 to November 14, 1998
month
8th calendar November 15, 1998 to December 14, 1998
month
9th calendar December 15, 1998 to January 14, 1999
month
10th calendar January 15, 1999 to February 14, 1999
month
11th calendar February 15, 1999 to March 14, 1999
month
12th calendar March 15, 1999 to April 14, 1999
month
Year 2 13th calendar April 15, 1999 to May 14, 1999
month
14th calendar May 15, 1999 to June 14, 1999
month
15th calendar June 15, 1999 to July 14, 1999
month
16th calendar July 15, 1999 to August 14, 1999
month
 17th calendar August 15, 1999 to September 14, 1999
month
18th calendar September 15, 1999 to October 14, 1999
month
19th calendar October 15, 1999 to November 14, 1999
month
20th calendar November 15, 1999 to December 14, 1999
month
21st calendar December 15, 1999 to January 14, 2000
month
22nd calendar January 15, 2000 to February 14, 2000
month
23rd calendar February 15, 2000 to March 14, 2000
month
24th calendar March 15, 2000 to April 14, 2000
month

We therefore hold that respondent's petition (filed on April 14, 2000) was filed on the last day of the 24 th calendar

month from the day respondent filed its final adjusted return. Hence, it was filed within the reglementary period.

Accordingly, the petition is hereby DENIED. The case is REMANDED to the Court of Tax Appeals which is ordered

to expeditiously proceed to hear C.T.A. Case No. 6113 entitled Primetown Property Group, Inc. v. Commissioner of

Internal Revenue and Arturo V. Parcero.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-68470 October 8, 1985

ALICE REYES VAN DORN, petitioner,

vs.
HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR., as Presiding Judge of Branch CX, Regional Trial Court of the National
Capital Region Pasay City and RICHARD UPTON respondents.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:\

In this Petition for certiorari and Prohibition, petitioner Alice Reyes Van Dorn seeks to set aside the Orders, dated
September 15, 1983 and August 3, 1984, in Civil Case No. 1075-P, issued by respondent Judge, which denied her
Motion to Dismiss said case, and her Motion for Reconsideration of the Dismissal Order, respectively.

The basic background facts are that petitioner is a citizen of the Philippines while private respondent is a citizen of
the United States; that they were married in Hongkong in 1972; that, after the marriage, they established their
residence in the Philippines; that they begot two children born on April 4, 1973 and December 18, 1975,
respectively; that the parties were divorced in Nevada, United States, in 1982; and that petitioner has re-married also
in Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn.

Dated June 8, 1983, private respondent filed suit against petitioner in Civil Case No. 1075-P of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch CXV, in Pasay City, stating that petitioner's business in Ermita, Manila, (the Galleon Shop, for short),
is conjugal property of the parties, and asking that petitioner be ordered to render an accounting of that business, and
that private respondent be declared with right to manage the conjugal property. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case
on the ground that the cause of action is barred by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings before the Nevada
Court wherein respondent had acknowledged that he and petitioner had "no community property" as of June 11,
1982. The Court below denied the Motion to Dismiss in the mentioned case on the ground that the property involved
is located in the Philippines so that the Divorce Decree has no bearing in the case. The denial is now the subject of
this certiorari proceeding.

Generally, the denial of a Motion to Dismiss in a civil case is interlocutory and is not subject to appeal. certiorari
and Prohibition are neither the remedies to question the propriety of an interlocutory order of the trial Court.
However, when a grave abuse of discretion was patently committed, or the lower Court acted capriciously and
whimsically, then it devolves upon this Court in a certiorari proceeding to exercise its supervisory authority and to
correct the error committed which, in such a case, is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. 1 Prohibition would then lie
since it would be useless and a waste of time to go ahead with the proceedings. 2 Weconsider the petition filed in this
case within the exception, and we have given it due course.

For resolution is the effect of the foreign divorce on the parties and their alleged conjugal property in the
Philippines.

Petitioner contends that respondent is estopped from laying claim on the alleged conjugal property because of the
representation he made in the divorce proceedings before the American Court that they had no community of
property; that the Galleon Shop was not established through conjugal funds, and that respondent's claim is barred by
prior judgment.
For his part, respondent avers that the Divorce Decree issued by the Nevada Court cannot prevail over the
prohibitive laws of the Philippines and its declared national policy; that the acts and declaration of a foreign Court
cannot, especially if the same is contrary to public policy, divest Philippine Courts of jurisdiction to entertain
matters within its jurisdiction.

For the resolution of this case, it is not necessary to determine whether the property relations between petitioner and
private respondent, after their marriage, were upon absolute or relative community property, upon complete
separation of property, or upon any other regime. The pivotal fact in this case is the Nevada divorce of the parties.

The Nevada District Court, which decreed the divorce, had obtained jurisdiction over petitioner who appeared in
person before the Court during the trial of the case. It also obtained jurisdiction over private respondent who, giving
his address as No. 381 Bush Street, San Francisco, California, authorized his attorneys in the divorce case, Karp &
Gradt Ltd., to agree to the divorce on the ground of incompatibility in the understanding that there were neither
community property nor community obligations. 3 As explicitly stated in the Power of Attorney he executed in favor
of the law firm of KARP & GRAD LTD., 336 W. Liberty, Reno, Nevada, to represent him in the divorce
proceedings:

xxx xxx xxx

You are hereby authorized to accept service of Summons, to file an Answer, appear on my behalf
and do an things necessary and proper to represent me, without further contesting, subject to the
following:

1. That my spouse seeks a divorce on the ground of incompatibility.

2. That there is no community of property to be adjudicated by the Court.

3. 'I'hat there are no community obligations to be adjudicated by the court.

xxx xxx xxx 4

There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the United States. The
decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For instance, private respondent cannot sue
petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the Union. What he is contending in this case is that the divorce is not
valid and binding in this jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local law and public policy.

It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, 5 only Philippine nationals
are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of public
police and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines,
provided they are valid according to their national law. 6 In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private
respondent from the marriage from the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. As
stated by the Federal Supreme Court of the United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794, 799:

The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by a court of competent
jurisdiction are to change the existing status or domestic relation of husband and wife, and to free
them both from the bond. The marriage tie when thus severed as to one party, ceases to bind
either. A husband without a wife, or a wife without a husband, is unknown to the law. When the
law provides, in the nature of a penalty. that the guilty party shall not marry again, that party, as
well as the other, is still absolutely freed from the bond of the former marriage.

Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no
standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is
bound by the Decision of his own country's Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose
decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said Court from asserting his right
over the alleged conjugal property.

To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still married to private
respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just.
Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private
respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She
should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is granted, and respondent Judge is hereby ordered to dismiss the Complaint filed in
Civil Case No. 1075-P of his Court.

Without costs.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 80116 June 30, 1989

IMELDA MANALAYSAY PILAPIL, petitioner,

vs.
HON. CORONA IBAY-SOMERA, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch XXVI; HON. LUIS C. VICTOR, in his capacity as the City Fiscal of Manila; and ERICH
EKKEHARD GEILING, respondents.

REGALADO, J.:

An ill-starred marriage of a Filipina and a foreigner which ended in a foreign absolute divorce, only to be followed
by a criminal infidelity suit of the latter against the former, provides Us the opportunity to lay down a decisional rule
on what hitherto appears to be an unresolved jurisdictional question.

On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private respondent Erich
Ekkehard Geiling, a German national, were married before the Registrar of Births, Marriages and Deaths at
Friedensweiler in the Federal Republic of Germany. The marriage started auspiciously enough, and the couple lived
together for some time in Malate, Manila where their only child, Isabella Pilapil Geiling, was born on April 20,
1980. 1

Thereafter, marital discord set in, with mutual recriminations between the spouses, followed by a separation de facto
between them.

After about three and a half years of marriage, such connubial disharmony eventuated in private respondent
initiating a divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany before the Schoneberg Local Court in January, 1983.
He claimed that there was failure of their marriage and that they had been living apart since April, 1982. 2
Petitioner, on the other hand, filed an action for legal separation, support and separation of property before the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XXXII, on January 23, 1983 where the same is still pending as Civil Case
No. 83-15866. 3

On January 15, 1986, Division 20 of the Schoneberg Local Court, Federal Republic of Germany, promulgated a
decree of divorce on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. The custody of the child was granted to
petitioner. The records show that under German law said court was locally and internationally competent for the
divorce proceeding and that the dissolution of said marriage was legally founded on and authorized by the applicable
law of that foreign jurisdiction. 4

On June 27, 1986, or more than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, private respondent filed two
complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that, while still married to said respondent,
petitioner "had an affair with a certain William Chia as early as 1982 and with yet another man named Jesus Chua
sometime in 1983". Assistant Fiscal Jacinto A. de los Reyes, Jr., after the corresponding investigation,
recommended the dismissal of the cases on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. 5 However, upon review, the
respondent city fiscal approved a resolution, dated January 8, 1986, directing the filing of two complaints for
adultery against the petitioner. 6 The complaints were accordingly filed and were eventually raffled to two branches
of the Regional Trial Court of Manila. The case entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Imelda Pilapil and William
Chia", docketed as Criminal Case No. 87-52435, was assigned to Branch XXVI presided by the respondent judge;
while the other case, "People of the Philippines vs. Imelda Pilapil and James Chua", docketed as Criminal Case No.
87-52434 went to the sala of Judge Leonardo Cruz, Branch XXV, of the same court. 7

On March 14, 1987, petitioner filed a petition with the Secretary of Justice asking that the aforesaid resolution of
respondent fiscal be set aside and the cases against her be dismissed. 8 A similar petition was filed by James Chua,
her co-accused in Criminal Case No. 87-52434. The Secretary of Justice, through the Chief State Prosecutor, gave
due course to both petitions and directed the respondent city fiscal to inform the Department of Justice "if the
accused have already been arraigned and if not yet arraigned, to move to defer further proceedings" and to elevate
the entire records of both cases to his office for review. 9

Petitioner thereafter filed a motion in both criminal cases to defer her arraignment and to suspend further
proceedings thereon. 10 As a consequence, Judge Leonardo Cruz suspended proceedings in Criminal Case No. 87-
52434. On the other hand, respondent judge merely reset the date of the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 87-52435
to April 6, 1987. Before such scheduled date, petitioner moved for the cancellation of the arraignment and for the
suspension of proceedings in said Criminal Case No. 87-52435 until after the resolution of the petition for review
then pending before the Secretary of Justice. 11 A motion to quash was also filed in the same case on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction, 12 which motion was denied by the respondent judge in an order dated September 8, 1987. The
same order also directed the arraignment of both accused therein, that is, petitioner and William Chia. The latter
entered a plea of not guilty while the petitioner refused to be arraigned. Such refusal of the petitioner being
considered by respondent judge as direct contempt, she and her counsel were fined and the former was ordered
detained until she submitted herself for arraignment. 13 Later, private respondent entered a plea of not guilty. 14

On October 27, 1987, petitioner filed this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for a
temporary restraining order, seeking the annulment of the order of the lower court denying her motion to quash. The
petition is anchored on the main ground that the court is without jurisdiction "to try and decide the charge of
adultery, which is a private offense that cannot be prosecuted de officio (sic), since the purported complainant, a
foreigner, does not qualify as an offended spouse having obtained a final divorce decree under his national law prior
to his filing the criminal complaint." 15

On October 21, 1987, this Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the respondents from implementing
the aforesaid order of September 8, 1987 and from further proceeding with Criminal Case No. 87-52435.
Subsequently, on March 23, 1988 Secretary of Justice Sedfrey A. Ordoñez acted on the aforesaid petitions for
review and, upholding petitioner's ratiocinations, issued a resolution directing the respondent city fiscal to move for
the dismissal of the complaints against the petitioner. 16
We find this petition meritorious. The writs prayed for shall accordingly issue.

Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, 17 the crime of adultery, as well as four other crimes against chastity,
cannot be prosecuted except upon a sworn written complaint filed by the offended spouse. It has long since been
established, with unwavering consistency, that compliance with this rule is a jurisdictional, and not merely a formal,
requirement. 18 While in point of strict law the jurisdiction of the court over the offense is vested in it by the
Judiciary Law, the requirement for a sworn written complaint is just as jurisdictional a mandate since it is that
complaint which starts the prosecutory proceeding 19 and without which the court cannot exercise its jurisdiction to
try the case.

Now, the law specifically provides that in prosecutions for adultery and concubinage the person who can legally file
the complaint should be the offended spouse, and nobody else. Unlike the offenses of seduction, abduction, rape and
acts of lasciviousness, no provision is made for the prosecution of the crimes of adultery and concubinage by the
parents, grandparents or guardian of the offended party. The so-called exclusive and successive rule in the
prosecution of the first four offenses above mentioned do not apply to adultery and concubinage. It is significant that
while the State, as parens patriae, was added and vested by the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure with the power to
initiate the criminal action for a deceased or incapacitated victim in the aforesaid offenses of seduction, abduction,
rape and acts of lasciviousness, in default of her parents, grandparents or guardian, such amendment did not include
the crimes of adultery and concubinage. In other words, only the offended spouse, and no other, is authorized by law
to initiate the action therefor.

Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to institute the action, it necessarily follows that
such initiator must have the status, capacity or legal representation to do so at the time of the filing of the criminal
action. This is a familiar and express rule in civil actions; in fact, lack of legal capacity to sue, as a ground for a
motion to dismiss in civil cases, is determined as of the filing of the complaint or petition.

The absence of an equivalent explicit rule in the prosecution of criminal cases does not mean that the same
requirement and rationale would not apply. Understandably, it may not have been found necessary since criminal
actions are generally and fundamentally commenced by the State, through the People of the Philippines, the
offended party being merely the complaining witness therein. However, in the so-called "private crimes" or those
which cannot be prosecuted de oficio, and the present prosecution for adultery is of such genre, the offended spouse
assumes a more predominant role since the right to commence the action, or to refrain therefrom, is a matter
exclusively within his power and option.

This policy was adopted out of consideration for the aggrieved party who might prefer to suffer the outrage in
silence rather than go through the scandal of a public trial. 20 Hence, as cogently argued by petitioner, Article 344 of
the Revised Penal Code thus presupposes that the marital relationship is still subsisting at the time of the institution
of the criminal action for, adultery. This is a logical consequence since the raison d'etre of said provision of law
would be absent where the supposed offended party had ceased to be the spouse of the alleged offender at the time
of the filing of the criminal case. 21

In these cases, therefore, it is indispensable that the status and capacity of the complainant to commence the action
be definitely established and, as already demonstrated, such status or capacity must indubitably exist as of the time
he initiates the action. It would be absurd if his capacity to bring the action would be determined by his
status beforeor subsequent to the commencement thereof, where such capacity or status existed prior to but ceased
before, or was acquired subsequent to but did not exist at the time of, the institution of the case. We would thereby
have the anomalous spectacle of a party bringing suit at the very time when he is without the legal capacity to do so.

To repeat, there does not appear to be any local precedential jurisprudence on the specific issue as to when precisely
the status of a complainant as an offended spouse must exist where a criminal prosecution can be commenced only
by one who in law can be categorized as possessed of such status. Stated differently and with reference to the
present case, the inquiry ;would be whether it is necessary in the commencement of a criminal action for adultery
that the marital bonds between the complainant and the accused be unsevered and existing at the time of the
institution of the action by the former against the latter.
American jurisprudence, on cases involving statutes in that jurisdiction which are in pari materia with ours, yields
the rule that after a divorce has been decreed, the innocent spouse no longer has the right to institute proceedings
against the offenders where the statute provides that the innocent spouse shall have the exclusive right to institute a
prosecution for adultery. Where, however, proceedings have been properly commenced, a divorce subsequently
granted can have no legal effect on the prosecution of the criminal proceedings to a conclusion. 22

In the cited Loftus case, the Supreme Court of Iowa held that —

'No prosecution for adultery can be commenced except on the complaint of the husband or wife.'
Section 4932, Code. Though Loftus was husband of defendant when the offense is said to have
been committed, he had ceased to be such when the prosecution was begun; and appellant insists
that his status was not such as to entitle him to make the complaint. We have repeatedly said that
the offense is against the unoffending spouse, as well as the state, in explaining the reason for this
provision in the statute; and we are of the opinion that the unoffending spouse must be such when
the prosecution is commenced. (Emphasis supplied.)

We see no reason why the same doctrinal rule should not apply in this case and in our jurisdiction, considering our
statutory law and jural policy on the matter. We are convinced that in cases of such nature, the status of the
complainant vis-a-vis the accused must be determined as of the time the complaint was filed. Thus, the person who
initiates the adultery case must be an offended spouse, and by this is meant that he is still married to the accused
spouse, at the time of the filing of the complaint.

In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of
Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as private
respondent is concerned 23 in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the matter of status of persons.

Thus, in the recent case of Van Dorn vs. Romillo, Jr., et al., 24 after a divorce was granted by a United States court
between Alice Van Dornja Filipina, and her American husband, the latter filed a civil case in a trial court here
alleging that her business concern was conjugal property and praying that she be ordered to render an accounting
and that the plaintiff be granted the right to manage the business. Rejecting his pretensions, this Court perspicuously
demonstrated the error of such stance, thus:

There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the
United States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For instance,
private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the Union. ...

It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only
Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered
contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces
abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their
national law. ...

Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He
would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control
over conjugal assets. ... 25

Under the same considerations and rationale, private respondent, being no longer the husband of petitioner, had no
legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he
filed suit.

The allegation of private respondent that he could not have brought this case before the decree of divorce for lack of
knowledge, even if true, is of no legal significance or consequence in this case. When said respondent initiated the
divorce proceeding, he obviously knew that there would no longer be a family nor marriage vows to protect once a
dissolution of the marriage is decreed. Neither would there be a danger of introducing spurious heirs into the family,
which is said to be one of the reasons for the particular formulation of our law on adultery, 26 since there would
thenceforth be no spousal relationship to speak of. The severance of the marital bond had the effect of dissociating
the former spouses from each other, hence the actuations of one would not affect or cast obloquy on the other.

The aforecited case of United States vs. Mata cannot be successfully relied upon by private respondent. In applying
Article 433 of the old Penal Code, substantially the same as Article 333 of the Revised Penal Code, which punished
adultery "although the marriage be afterwards declared void", the Court merely stated that "the lawmakers intended
to declare adulterous the infidelity of a married woman to her marital vows, even though it should be made to appear
that she is entitled to have her marriage contract declared null and void, until and unless she actually secures a
formal judicial declaration to that effect". Definitely, it cannot be logically inferred therefrom that the complaint can
still be filed after the declaration of nullity because such declaration that the marriage is void ab initio is equivalent
to stating that it never existed. There being no marriage from the beginning, any complaint for adultery filed after
said declaration of nullity would no longer have a leg to stand on. Moreover, what was consequently contemplated
and within the purview of the decision in said case is the situation where the criminal action for adultery was
filed beforethe termination of the marriage by a judicial declaration of its nullity ab initio. The same rule and
requisite would necessarily apply where the termination of the marriage was effected, as in this case, by a valid
foreign divorce.

Private respondent's invocation of Donio-Teves, et al. vs. Vamenta, hereinbefore cited, 27 must suffer the same fate
of inapplicability. A cursory reading of said case reveals that the offended spouse therein had duly and seasonably
filed a complaint for adultery, although an issue was raised as to its sufficiency but which was resolved in favor of
the complainant. Said case did not involve a factual situation akin to the one at bar or any issue determinative of the
controversy herein.

WHEREFORE, the questioned order denying petitioner's motion to quash is SET ASIDE and another one
entered DISMISSING the complaint in Criminal Case No. 87-52435 for lack of jurisdiction. The temporary
restraining order issued in this case on October 21, 1987 is hereby made permanent.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 133743 February 6, 2007

EDGAR SAN LUIS, Petitioner,

vs.
FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, Respondent.

x ---------------------------------------------------- x

G.R. No. 134029 February 6, 2007

RODOLFO SAN LUIS, Petitioner,

vs.
FELICIDAD SAGALONGOS alias FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, Respondent.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Before us are consolidated petitions for review assailing the February 4, 1998 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 52647, which reversed and set aside the September 12, 1995 2 and January 31, 1996 3Resolutions
of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 134 in SP. Proc. No. M-3708; and its May 15, 1998
Resolution 4 denying petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.

The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T. San Luis (Felicisimo), who was the former
governor of the Province of Laguna. During his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three marriages. His first marriage
was with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which were born six children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar,
Linda, Emilita and Manuel. On August 11, 1963, Virginia predeceased Felicisimo.

Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he had a son, Tobias. However,
on October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed a Complaint for Divorce 5 before the Family Court of
the First Circuit, State of Hawaii, United States of America (U.S.A.), which issued a Decree Granting Absolute
Divorce and Awarding Child Custody on December 14, 1973. 6

On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad San Luis, then surnamed Sagalongos, before Rev. Fr.
William Meyer, Minister of the United Presbyterian at Wilshire Boulevard, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. 7 He
had no children with respondent but lived with her for 18 years from the time of their marriage up to his death on
December 18, 1992.

Thereafter, respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and the settlement of Felicisimo’s
estate. On December 17, 1993, she filed a petition for letters of administration 8 before the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City, docketed as SP. Proc. No. M-3708 which was raffled to Branch 146 thereof.

Respondent alleged that she is the widow of Felicisimo; that, at the time of his death, the decedent was residing at
100 San Juanico Street, New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro Manila; that the decedent’s surviving heirs are
respondent as legal spouse, his six children by his first marriage, and son by his second marriage; that the decedent
left real properties, both conjugal and exclusive, valued at ₱30,304,178.00 more or less; that the decedent does not
have any unpaid debts. Respondent prayed that the conjugal partnership assets be liquidated and that letters of
administration be issued to her.

On February 4, 1994, petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the children of Felicisimo by his first marriage, filed a
motion to dismiss 9 on the grounds of improper venue and failure to state a cause of action. Rodolfo claimed that the
petition for letters of administration should have been filed in the Province of Laguna because this was Felicisimo’s
place of residence prior to his death. He further claimed that respondent has no legal personality to file the petition
because she was only a mistress of Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his death, was still legally married to
Merry Lee.

On February 15, 1994, Linda invoked the same grounds and joined her brother Rodolfo in seeking the dismissal 10of
the petition. On February 28, 1994, the trial court issued an Order 11 denying the two motions to dismiss.

Unaware of the denial of the motions to dismiss, respondent filed on March 5, 1994 her opposition 12 thereto. She
submitted documentary evidence showing that while Felicisimo exercised the powers of his public office in Laguna,
he regularly went home to their house in New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro Manila which they bought
sometime in 1982. Further, she presented the decree of absolute divorce issued by the Family Court of the First
Circuit, State of Hawaii to prove that the marriage of Felicisimo to Merry Lee had already been dissolved. Thus, she
claimed that Felicisimo had the legal capacity to marry her by virtue of paragraph 2, 13 Article 26 of the Family
Code and the doctrine laid down in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 14

Thereafter, Linda, Rodolfo and herein petitioner Edgar San Luis, separately filed motions for reconsideration from
the Order denying their motions to dismiss. 15 They asserted that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot
be given retroactive effect to validate respondent’s bigamous marriage with Felicisimo because this would impair
vested rights in derogation of Article 256 16 of the Family Code.
On April 21, 1994, Mila, another daughter of Felicisimo from his first marriage, filed a motion to disqualify Acting
Presiding Judge Anthony E. Santos from hearing the case.

On October 24, 1994, the trial court issued an Order 17 denying the motions for reconsideration. It ruled that
respondent, as widow of the decedent, possessed the legal standing to file the petition and that venue was properly
laid. Meanwhile, the motion for disqualification was deemed moot and academic 18 because then Acting Presiding
Judge Santos was substituted by Judge Salvador S. Tensuan pending the resolution of said motion.

Mila filed a motion for inhibition 19 against Judge Tensuan on November 16, 1994. On even date, Edgar also filed a
motion for reconsideration 20 from the Order denying their motion for reconsideration arguing that it does not state
the facts and law on which it was based.

On November 25, 1994, Judge Tensuan issued an Order 21 granting the motion for inhibition. The case was re-
raffled to Branch 134 presided by Judge Paul T. Arcangel.

On April 24, 1995, 22 the trial court required the parties to submit their respective position papers on the twin issues
of venue and legal capacity of respondent to file the petition. On May 5, 1995, Edgar manifested 23 that he is
adopting the arguments and evidence set forth in his previous motion for reconsideration as his position paper.
Respondent and Rodolfo filed their position papers on June 14, 24 and June 20, 25 1995, respectively.

On September 12, 1995, the trial court dismissed the petition for letters of administration. It held that, at the time of
his death, Felicisimo was the duly elected governor and a resident of the Province of Laguna. Hence, the petition
should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna and not in Makati City. It also ruled that respondent was without legal
capacity to file the petition for letters of administration because her marriage with Felicisimo was bigamous, thus,
void ab initio. It found that the decree of absolute divorce dissolving Felicisimo’s marriage to Merry Lee was not
valid in the Philippines and did not bind Felicisimo who was a Filipino citizen. It also ruled that paragraph 2, Article
26 of the Family Code cannot be retroactively applied because it would impair the vested rights of Felicisimo’s
legitimate children.

Respondent moved for reconsideration 26 and for the disqualification 27 of Judge Arcangel but said motions were
denied. 28

Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed and set aside the orders of the trial court in its assailed
Decision dated February 4, 1998, the dispositive portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, the Orders dated September 12, 1995 and January 31, 1996 are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE; the Orders dated February 28 and October 24, 1994 are REINSTATED; and the records of the case is
REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings. 29

The appellante court ruled that under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the term "place of residence" of the
decedent, for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate, refers to the personal, actual or physical
habitation, or actual residence or place of abode of a person as distinguished from legal residence or domicile. It
noted that although Felicisimo discharged his functions as governor in Laguna, he actually resided in Alabang,
Muntinlupa. Thus, the petition for letters of administration was properly filed in Makati City.

The Court of Appeals also held that Felicisimo had legal capacity to marry respondent by virtue of paragraph 2,
Article 26 of the Family Code and the rulings in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 30 and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera. 31 It found
that the marriage between Felicisimo and Merry Lee was validly dissolved by virtue of the decree of absolute
divorce issued by the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii. As a result, under paragraph 2, Article 26,
Felicisimo was capacitated to contract a subsequent marriage with respondent. Thus –

With the well-known rule – express mandate of paragraph 2, Article 26, of the Family Code of the Philippines, the
doctrines in Van Dorn, Pilapil, and the reason and philosophy behind the enactment of E.O. No. 227, — there is no
justiciable reason to sustain the individual view — sweeping statement — of Judge Arc[h]angel, that "Article 26,
par. 2 of the Family Code, contravenes the basic policy of our state against divorce in any form whatsoever." Indeed,
courts cannot deny what the law grants. All that the courts should do is to give force and effect to the express
mandate of the law. The foreign divorce having been obtained by the Foreigner on December 14, 1992, 32 the
Filipino divorcee, "shall x x x have capacity to remarry under Philippine laws". For this reason, the marriage
between the deceased and petitioner should not be denominated as "a bigamous marriage.

Therefore, under Article 130 of the Family Code, the petitioner as the surviving spouse can institute the judicial
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased. x x x 33

Edgar, Linda, and Rodolfo filed separate motions for reconsideration 34 which were denied by the Court of Appeals.

35
On July 2, 1998, Edgar appealed to this Court via the instant petition for review on certiorari. Rodolfo later filed a
manifestation and motion to adopt the said petition which was granted. 36

In the instant consolidated petitions, Edgar and Rodolfo insist that the venue of the subject petition for letters of
administration was improperly laid because at the time of his death, Felicisimo was a resident of Sta. Cruz, Laguna.
They contend that pursuant to our rulings in Nuval v. Guray 37 and Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban
City, 38"residence" is synonymous with "domicile" which denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when
absent, one intends to return. They claim that a person can only have one domicile at any given time. Since
Felicisimo never changed his domicile, the petition for letters of administration should have been filed in Sta. Cruz,
Laguna.

Petitioners also contend that respondent’s marriage to Felicisimo was void and bigamous because it was performed
during the subsistence of the latter’s marriage to Merry Lee. They argue that paragraph 2, Article 26 cannot be
retroactively applied because it would impair vested rights and ratify the void bigamous marriage. As such,
respondent cannot be considered the surviving wife of Felicisimo; hence, she has no legal capacity to file the
petition for letters of administration.

The issues for resolution: (1) whether venue was properly laid, and (2) whether respondent has legal capacity to file
the subject petition for letters of administration.

The petition lacks merit.

Under Section 1, 39 Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration of the estate of Felicisimo
should be filed in the Regional Trial Court of the province "in which he resides at the time of his death." In the case
of Garcia Fule v. Court of Appeals, 40 we laid down the doctrinal rule for determining the residence – as
contradistinguished from domicile – of the decedent for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate:

[T]he term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal residence or domicile."
This term "resides," like the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the
object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules –
Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature – residence rather than domicile is the significant
factor. Even where the statute uses the word "domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in
the technical sense. Some cases make a distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as generally
used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term "inhabitant." In
other words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical
habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay
thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or
domicile. Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires
bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it one’s domicile. No particular length of time of
residence is required though; however, the residence must be more than temporary. 41 (Emphasis supplied)
It is incorrect for petitioners to argue that "residence," for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of the estate
of Felicisimo, is synonymous with "domicile." The rulings in Nuval and Romualdez are inapplicable to the instant
case because they involve election cases. Needless to say, there is a distinction between "residence" for purposes of
election laws and "residence" for purposes of fixing the venue of actions. In election cases, "residence" and
"domicile" are treated as synonymous terms, that is, the fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one has
the intention of returning. 42 However, for purposes of fixing venue under the Rules of Court, the "residence" of a
person is his personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or place of abode, which may not necessarily
be his legal residence or domicile provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency. 43 Hence, it is
possible that a person may have his residence in one place and domicile in another.

In the instant case, while petitioners established that Felicisimo was domiciled in Sta. Cruz, Laguna, respondent
proved that he also maintained a residence in Alabang, Muntinlupa from 1982 up to the time of his death.
Respondent submitted in evidence the Deed of Absolute Sale 44 dated January 5, 1983 showing that the deceased
purchased the aforesaid property. She also presented billing statements 45 from the Philippine Heart Center and
Chinese General Hospital for the period August to December 1992 indicating the address of Felicisimo at "100 San
Juanico, Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa." Respondent also presented proof of membership of the deceased in the Ayala
Alabang Village Association 46 and Ayala Country Club, Inc., 47 letter-envelopes 48 from 1988 to 1990 sent by the
deceased’s children to him at his Alabang address, and the deceased’s calling cards 49 stating that his home/city
address is at "100 San Juanico, Ayala Alabang Village, Muntinlupa" while his office/provincial address is in
"Provincial Capitol, Sta. Cruz, Laguna."

From the foregoing, we find that Felicisimo was a resident of Alabang, Muntinlupa for purposes of fixing the venue
of the settlement of his estate. Consequently, the subject petition for letters of administration was validly filed in the
Regional Trial Court 50 which has territorial jurisdiction over Alabang, Muntinlupa. The subject petition was filed on
December 17, 1993. At that time, Muntinlupa was still a municipality and the branches of the Regional Trial Court
of the National Capital Judicial Region which had territorial jurisdiction over Muntinlupa were then seated in
Makati City as per Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 3. 51 Thus, the subject petition was validly filed before
the Regional Trial Court of Makati City.

Anent the issue of respondent Felicidad’s legal personality to file the petition for letters of administration, we must
first resolve the issue of whether a Filipino who is divorced by his alien spouse abroad may validly remarry under
the Civil Code, considering that Felicidad’s marriage to Felicisimo was solemnized on June 20, 1974, or before the
Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988. In resolving this issue, we need not retroactively apply the provisions of
the Family Code, particularly Art. 26, par. (2) considering that there is sufficient jurisprudential basis allowing us to
rule in the affirmative.

The case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 52 involved a marriage between a foreigner and his Filipino wife, which
marriage was subsequently dissolved through a divorce obtained abroad by the latter. Claiming that the divorce was
not valid under Philippine law, the alien spouse alleged that his interest in the properties from their conjugal
partnership should be protected. The Court, however, recognized the validity of the divorce and held that the alien
spouse had no interest in the properties acquired by the Filipino wife after the divorce. Thus:

In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the standards of American
law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. As stated by the Federal Supreme Court of the United States in
Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794, 799:

"The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by a competent jurisdiction are to
change the existing status or domestic relation of husband and wife, and to free them both from the bond. The
marriage tie, when thus severed as to one party, ceases to bind either. A husband without a wife, or a wife without a
husband, is unknown to the law. When the law provides, in the nature of a penalty, that the guilty party shall not
marry again, that party, as well as the other, is still absolutely freed from the bond of the former marriage."

Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no
standing to sue in the case below as petitioner’s husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is
bound by the Decision of his own country’s Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose
decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said Court from asserting his right
over the alleged conjugal property. 53

As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court ruled that she should no longer be considered married
to the alien spouse. Further, she should not be required to perform her marital duties and obligations. It held:

To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still marriedto
private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot
be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to
private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal
property. She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be
served.54 (Emphasis added)

This principle was thereafter applied in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera 55 where the Court recognized the validity of a
divorce obtained abroad. In the said case, it was held that the alien spouse is not a proper party in filing the adultery
suit against his Filipino wife. The Court stated that "the severance of the marital bond had the effect of dissociating
the former spouses from each other, hence the actuations of one would not affect or cast obloquy on the other." 56

Likewise, in Quita v. Court of Appeals, 57 the Court stated that where a Filipino is divorced by his naturalized
foreign spouse, the ruling in Van Dorn applies. 58 Although decided on December 22, 1998, the divorce in the said
case was obtained in 1954 when the Civil Code provisions were still in effect.

The significance of the Van Dorn case to the development of limited recognition of divorce in the Philippines cannot
be denied. The ruling has long been interpreted as severing marital ties between parties in a mixed marriage and
capacitating the Filipino spouse to remarry as a necessary consequence of upholding the validity of a divorce
obtained abroad by the alien spouse. In his treatise, Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino cited Van Dorn stating that "if the
foreigner obtains a valid foreign divorce, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine
law." 59In Garcia v. Recio, 60 the Court likewise cited the aforementioned case in relation to Article 26. 61

In the recent case of Republic v. Orbecido III, 62 the historical background and legislative intent behind paragraph 2,
Article 26 of the Family Code were discussed, to wit:

Brief Historical Background

On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as the
"Family Code," which took effect on August 3, 1988. Article 26 thereof states:

All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they
were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles
35, 37, and 38.

On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code, Executive Order No. 227 was likewise
signed into law, amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the Family Code. A second paragraph was added to Article 26.
As so amended, it now provides:

ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country
where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited
under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to
remarry under Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)
xxxx
Legislative Intent

Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the intent of Paragraph 2 of Article 26,
according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil Code Revision Committee, is to avoid the absurd
situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer
married to the Filipino spouse.

Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. The Van
Dorn case involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The Court held therein that a
divorce decree validly obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino
spouse is capacitated to remarry under Philippine law. 63 (Emphasis added)

As such, the Van Dorn case is sufficient basis in resolving a situation where a divorce is validly obtained abroad by
the alien spouse. With the enactment of the Family Code and paragraph 2, Article 26 thereof, our lawmakers
codified the law already established through judicial precedent.1awphi1.net

Indeed, when the object of a marriage is defeated by rendering its continuance intolerable to one of the parties and
productive of no possible good to the community, relief in some way should be obtainable. 64 Marriage, being a
mutual and shared commitment between two parties, cannot possibly be productive of any good to the society where
one is considered released from the marital bond while the other remains bound to it. Such is the state of affairs
where the alien spouse obtains a valid divorce abroad against the Filipino spouse, as in this case.

Petitioners cite Articles 15 65 and 17 66 of the Civil Code in stating that the divorce is void under Philippine law
insofar as Filipinos are concerned. However, in light of this Court’s rulings in the cases discussed above, the Filipino
spouse should not be discriminated against in his own country if the ends of justice are to be served. 67 In Alonzo v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 68 the Court stated:

But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its results; and likewise, we may add, by its purposes. It is a
cardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning of the law, the first concern of the judge should be to discover in its
provisions the intent of the lawmaker. Unquestionably, the law should never be interpreted in such a way as to cause
injustice as this is never within the legislative intent. An indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for we presume the
good motives of the legislature, is to render justice.

Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in consonance with justice. Law and justice are
inseparable, and we must keep them so. To be sure, there are some laws that, while generally valid, may seem
arbitrary when applied in a particular case because of its peculiar circumstances. In such a situation, we are not
bound, because only of our nature and functions, to apply them just the same, in slavish obedience to their language.
What we do instead is find a balance between the word and the will, that justice may be done even as the law is
obeyed.

As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not unfeelingly apply the law as it is worded, yielding like
robots to the literal command without regard to its cause and consequence. "Courts are apt to err by sticking too
closely to the words of a law," so we are warned, by Justice Holmes again, "where these words import a policy that
goes beyond them."

xxxx

More than twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice "as the constant and perpetual wish to render every one his
due." That wish continues to motivate this Court when it assesses the facts and the law in every case brought to it for
decision. Justice is always an essential ingredient of its decisions. Thus when the facts warrants, we interpret the law
in a way that will render justice, presuming that it was the intention of the lawmaker, to begin with, that the law be
dispensed with justice. 69
Applying the above doctrine in the instant case, the divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which
absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the legal personality to file the present
petition as Felicisimo’s surviving spouse. However, the records show that there is insufficient evidence to prove the
validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo under the laws of
the U.S.A. In Garcia v. Recio, 70 the Court laid down the specific guidelines for pleading and proving foreign law
and divorce judgments. It held that presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient and that proof of its
authenticity and due execution must be presented. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document
may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy
thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such
copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine
foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his
office. 71

With regard to respondent’s marriage to Felicisimo allegedly solemnized in California, U.S.A., she submitted
photocopies of the Marriage Certificate and the annotated text 72 of the Family Law Act of California which
purportedly show that their marriage was done in accordance with the said law. As stated in Garcia, however, the
Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws as they must be alleged and proved. 73

Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial court for further reception of evidence on the divorce decree
obtained by Merry Lee and the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo.

Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry respondent in 1974, nevertheless, we find that the latter
has the legal personality to file the subject petition for letters of administration, as she may be considered the co-
owner of Felicisimo as regards the properties that were acquired through their joint efforts during their cohabitation.

Section 6, 74 Rule 78 of the Rules of Court states that letters of administration may be granted to the surviving
spouse of the decedent. However, Section 2, Rule 79 thereof also provides in part:

SEC. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. – A petition for letters of administration must be filed by
an interested person and must show, as far as known to the petitioner: x x x.

An "interested person" has been defined as one who would be benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or one who
has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor. The interest must be material and direct, and not merely indirect or
contingent. 75

In the instant case, respondent would qualify as an interested person who has a direct interest in the estate of
Felicisimo by virtue of their cohabitation, the existence of which was not denied by petitioners. If she proves the
validity of the divorce and Felicisimo’s capacity to remarry, but fails to prove that her marriage with him was
validly performed under the laws of the U.S.A., then she may be considered as a co-owner under Article 144 76 of
the Civil Code. This provision governs the property relations between parties who live together as husband and wife
without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void from the beginning. It provides that the property acquired
by either or both of them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on
co-ownership. In a co-ownership, it is not necessary that the property be acquired through their joint labor, efforts
and industry. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their
joint efforts. Hence, the portions belonging to the co-owners shall be presumed equal, unless the contrary is
proven. 77

Meanwhile, if respondent fails to prove the validity of both the divorce and the marriage, the applicable provision
would be Article 148 of the Family Code which has filled the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code by expressly
regulating the property relations of couples living together as husband and wife but are incapacitated to
marry. 78 In Saguid v. Court of Appeals, 79 we held that even if the cohabitation or the acquisition of property
occurred before the Family Code took effect, Article 148 governs. 80 The Court described the property regime under
this provision as follows:
The regime of limited co-ownership of property governing the union of parties who are not legally capacitated to
marry each other, but who nonetheless live together as husband and wife, applies to properties acquired during said
cohabitation in proportion to their respective contributions. Co-ownership will only be up to the extent of the proven
actual contribution of money, property or industry. Absent proof of the extent thereof, their contributions and
corresponding shares shall be presumed to be equal.

xxxx

In the cases of Agapay v. Palang, and Tumlos v. Fernandez, which involved the issue of co-ownership of properties
acquired by the parties to a bigamous marriage and an adulterous relationship, respectively, we ruled that proof of
actual contribution in the acquisition of the property is essential. x x x

As in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the party who, as determined by the pleadings or the nature of
the case, asserts an affirmative issue. Contentions must be proved by competent evidence and reliance must be had
on the strength of the party’s own evidence and not upon the weakness of the opponent’s defense. x x x 81

In view of the foregoing, we find that respondent’s legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of
administration may arise from her status as the surviving wife of Felicisimo or as his co-owner under Article 144 of
the Civil Code or Article 148 of the Family Code.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals reinstating and affirming the
February 28, 1994 Order of the Regional Trial Court which denied petitioners’ motion to dismiss and its October 24,
1994 Order which dismissed petitioners’ motion for reconsideration is AFFIRMED. Let this case be REMANDED
to the trial court for further proceedings.

SO ORDERED.