THIRD DIVISION CA-G.R. SP No.
60543, which annulled and set aside the March 3, 1999
G.R. No. 152272 March 5, 2012
JUANA COMPLEX I HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., ANDRES C.
BAUTISTA, BRIGIDO DIMACULANGAN, DOLORES P. PRADO, IMELDA
DE LA CRUZ, EDITHA C. DY, FLORENCIA M. MERCADO, LEOVINO C.
DATARIO, AIDA A. ABAYON, NAPOLEON M. DIMAANO, ROSITA G.
ESTIGOY and NELSON A. LOYOLA, Petitioners,
vs.
FIL-ESTATE LAND, INC., FIL ESTATE ECOCENTRUM CORPORATION,
LA PAZ HOUSING AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, WARBIRD
SECURITY AGENCY, ENRIQUE RIVILLA, MICHAEL E. JETHMAL and
MICHAEL ALUNAN, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G. R. No. 152397
FIL-ESTATE LAND, INC., FIL ESTATE ECOCENTRUM CORPORATION,
LA PAZ HOUSING AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, WARBIRD
SECURITY AGENCY, ENRIQUE RIVILLA, MICHAEL E. JETHMAL and
MICHAEL ALUNAN, Petitioners,
vs.
JUANA COMPLEX I HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., ANDRES C.
BAUTISTA, BRIGIDO DIMACULANGAN, DOLORES P. PRADO, IMELDA
DE LA CRUZ, EDITHA C. DY, FLORENCIA M. MERCADO, LEOVINO C.
DATARIO, AIDA A. ABAYON, NAPOLEON M. DIMAANO, ROSITA G.
ESTIGOY and NELSON A. LOYOLA, Respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
Before the Court are two (2) consolidated petitions assailing the July 31, 2001
Decision1 and February 21, 2002 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
Order3 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 25, Biñan, Laguna (RTC), granting
the application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, and upheld
the June 16, 2000 Omnibus Order4 denying the motion to dismiss.
The Facts:
On January 20, 1999, Juana Complex I Homeowners Association,
Inc. (JCHA), together with individual residents of Juana Complex I and other
neighboring subdivisions (collectively referred as JCHA, et. al.), instituted a
complaint5for damages, in its own behalf and as a class suit representing the
regular commuters and motorists of Juana Complex I and neighboring
subdivisions who were deprived of the use of La Paz Road, against Fil-Estate
Land, Inc. (Fil-Estate), Fil-estate Ecocentrum Corporation (FEEC), La Paz
Housing & Development Corporation (La Paz), and Warbird Security Agency
and their respective officers (collectively referred as Fil-Estate, et al.).
The complaint alleged that JCHA, et al. were regular commuters and
motorists who constantly travelled towards the direction of Manila and
Calamba; that they used the entry and exit toll gates of South Luzon
Expressway (SLEX) by passing through right-of-way public road known as La
Paz Road; that they had been using La Paz Road for more than ten (10)
years; that in August 1998, Fil-estate excavated, broke and deliberately
ruined La Paz Road that led to SLEX so JCHA, et al. would not be able to
pass through the said road; that La Paz Road was restored by the residents
to make it passable but Fil-estate excavated the road again; that JCHA
reported the matter to the Municipal Government and the Office of the
Municipal Engineer but the latter failed to repair the road to make it passable
and safe to motorists and pedestrians; that the act of Fil-estate in excavating
La Paz Road caused damage, prejudice, inconvenience, annoyance, and
loss of precious hours to them, to the commuters and motorists because
traffic was re-routed to narrow streets that caused terrible traffic congestion
and hazard; and that its permanent closure would not only prejudice their
right to free and unhampered use of the property but would also cause great
damage and irreparable injury.
Accordingly, JCHA, et al. also prayed for the immediate issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) or a writ of preliminary
injunction (WPI) to enjoin Fil-Estate, et al. from stopping and intimidating
them in their use of La Paz Road.
On February 10, 1999, a TRO was issued ordering Fil-Estate, et al, for a
period of twenty (20) days, to stop preventing, coercing, intimidating or
harassing the commuters and motorists from using the La Paz Road. 6
Subsequently, the RTC conducted several hearings to determine the
propriety of the issuance of a WPI.
7
On February 26, 1999, Fil-Estate, et al. filed a motion to dismiss arguing that
the complaint failed to state a cause of action and that it was improperly filed
as a class suit. On March 5, 1999, JCHA, et al. filed their comment8 on the
motion to dismiss to which respondents filed a reply.9
On March 3, 1999, the RTC issued an Order 10 granting the WPI and required
JCHA, et al. to post a bond.
On March 19, 1999, Fil-Estate, et al. filed a motion for
reconsideration11 arguing, among others, that JCHA, et al. failed to satisfy the
requirements for the issuance of a WPI. On March 23, 1999, JCHA, et al.
filed their opposition to the motion.12
The RTC then issued its June 16, 2000 Omnibus Order, denying both the
motion to dismiss and the motion for reconsideration filed by Fil-Estate, et al.
Not satisfied, Fil-Estate, et al. filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition
before the CA to annul (1) the Order dated March 3, 1999 and (2) the
Omnibus Order dated June 16, 2000. They contended that the complaint
failed to state a cause of action and that it was improperly filed as a class
suit. With regard to the issuance of the WPI, the defendants averred that
JCHA, et al. failed to show that they had a clear and unmistakable right to the
use of La Paz Road; and further claimed that La Paz Road was a torrens
registered private road and there was neither a voluntary nor legal easement
constituted over it.13
On July 31, 2001, the CA rendered the decision partially granting the petition,
the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby partially GRANTED. The Order dated
March 3, 1999 granting the writ of preliminary injunction is hereby
ANNULLED and SET ASIDE but the portion of the Omnibus Order dated
June 16, 2000 denying the motion to dismiss is upheld.
SO ORDERED.14
The CA ruled that the complaint sufficiently stated a cause of action when
JCHA, et al. alleged in their complaint that they had been using La Paz Road
for more than ten (10) years and that their right was violated when Fil-Estate
closed and excavated the road. It sustained the RTC ruling that the complaint
was properly filed as a class suit as it was shown that the case was of
common interest and that the individuals sought to be represented were so
numerous that it was impractical to include all of them as parties. The CA,
however, annulled the WPI for failure of JCHA, et al. to prove their clear and
present right over La Paz Road. The CA ordered the remand of the case to
the RTC for a full-blown trial on the merits.
Hence, these petitions for review.
In G.R. No. 152272, JCHA, et al. come to this Court, raising the following
issues:
(A)
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, IN HOLDING THAT A FULL-
BLOWN TRIAL ON THE MERITS IS REQUIRED TO DETERMINE THE
NATURE OF THE LA PAZ ROAD, HAD DEPARTED FROM THE
ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS AS TO
CALL FOR AN EXERCISE OF THE POWER OF SUPERVISION.
 (B)
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, IN HOLDING THAT THE
PETITIONERS FAILED TO SATISFY THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE
ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION, HAD DECIDED
NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND WITH THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS
OF THE SUPREME COURT.15
In G.R. No. 152397, on the other hand, Fil-Estate, et al. anchor their petition
on the following issues:
I.
The Court of Appeals’ declaration that respondents’ Complaint states
a cause of action is contrary to existing law and jurisprudence.
II.
The Court of Appeals’ pronouncement that respondents’ complaint
was properly filed as a class suit is contrary to existing law and
jurisprudence.
III.
The Court of Appeals’ conclusion that full blown trial on the merits is
required to determine the nature of the La Paz Road is contrary to
existing laws and jurisprudence.16
JCHA, et al. concur with the CA that the complaint sufficiently stated a cause
of action. They, however, disagree with the CA’s pronouncement that a full-
blown trial on the merits was necessary. They claim that during the hearing
on the application of the writ of injunction, they had sufficiently proven that La
Paz Road was a public road and that commuters and motorists of their
neighboring villages had used this road as their means of access to the San
Agustin Church, Colegio De San Agustin and to SLEX in going to Metro
Manila and to Southern Tagalog particularly during the rush hours when
traffic at Carmona Entry/Exit and Susana Heights Entry/Exit was at its worst.
JCHA, et al. argue that La Paz Road has attained the status and character of
a public road or burdened by an apparent easement of public right of way.
They point out that La Paz Road is the widest road in the neighborhood used
by motorists in going to Halang Road and in entering the SLEX-Halang toll
gate and that there is no other road as wide as La Paz Road existing in the
vicinity. For residents of San Pedro, Laguna, the shortest, convenient and
safe route towards SLEX Halang is along Rosario Avenue joining La Paz
Road.
Finally, JCHA, et al. argue that the CA erred when it voided the WPI because
the public nature of La Paz Road had been sufficiently proven and, as
residents of San Pedro and Biñan, Laguna, their right to use La Paz Road is
undeniable.
In their Memorandum,17 Fil-Estate, et al. explain that La Paz Road is included
in the parcels of land covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. T-
120008, T-90321 and T-90607, all registered in the name of La Paz. The
purpose of constructing La Paz Road was to provide a passageway for La
Paz to its intended projects to the south, one of which was the Juana
Complex I. When Juana Complex I was completed, La Paz donated the open
spaces, drainage, canal, and lighting facilities inside the Juana Complex I to
the Municipality of Biñan. The streets within the subdivisions were then
converted to public roads and were opened for use of the general public. The
La Paz Road, not being part of the Juana Complex I, was excluded from the
donation. Subsequently, La Paz became a shareholder of FEEC, a
consortium formed to develop several real properties in Biñan, Laguna,
known as Ecocentrum Project. In exchange for shares of stock, La Paz
contributed some of its real properties to the Municipality of Biñan, including
the properties constituting La Paz Road, to form part of the Ecocentrum
Project.
Fil-Estate, et al. agree with the CA that the annulment of the WPI was proper
since JCHA, et al. failed to prove that they have a clear right over La Paz
Road. Fil-Estate, et al. assert that JCHA, et al. failed to prove the existence of
a right of way or a right to pass over La Paz Road and that the closure of the
said road constituted an injury to such right. According to them, La Paz Road
is a torrens registered private road and there is neither a voluntary nor legal
easement constituted over it. They claim that La Paz Road is a private
property registered under the name of La Paz and the beneficial ownership
thereof was transferred to FEEC when La Paz joined the consortium for the
Ecocentrum Project.
Fil-Estate, et al., however, insist that the complaint did not sufficiently contain
the ultimate facts to show a cause of action. They aver the bare allegation
that one is entitled to something is an allegation of a conclusion which adds
nothing to the pleading.
They likewise argue that the complaint was improperly filed as a class suit for
it failed to show that JCHA, et al. and the commuters and motorists they are
representing have a well-defined community of interest over La Paz Road.
They claim that the excavation of La Paz Road would not necessarily give
rise to a common right or cause of action for JCHA, et al. against them since
each of them has a separate and distinct purpose and each may be affected
differently than the others.
The Court’s Ruling
The issues for the Court’s resolution are: (1) whether or not the complaint
states a cause of action; (2) whether the complaint has been properly filed as
a class suit; and (2) whether or not a WPI is warranted.
Section 2, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court defines a cause of action as an act or
omission by which a party violates the right of another. A complaint states a
cause of action when it contains three (3) essential elements of a cause of
action, namely:
(1) the legal right of the plaintiff,
(2) the correlative obligation of the defendant, and
(3) the act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal
right.18
The question of whether the complaint states a cause of action is determined
by its averments regarding the acts committed by the defendant.19 Thus, it
must contain a concise statement of the ultimate or essential facts
constituting the plaintiff’s cause of action.20 To be taken into account are only
the material allegations in the complaint; extraneous facts and circumstances
or other matters aliunde are not considered.21
The test of sufficiency of facts alleged in the complaint as constituting a
cause of action is whether or not admitting the facts alleged, the court could
render a valid verdict in accordance with the prayer of said
complaint.22 Stated differently, if the allegations in the complaint furnish
sufficient basis by which the complaint can be maintained, the same should
not be dismissed regardless of the defense that may be asserted by the
defendant.23
In the present case, the Court finds the allegations in the complaint sufficient
to establish a cause of action. First,JCHA, et al.’s averments in the complaint
show a demandable right over La Paz Road. These are: (1) their right to use
the road on the basis of their allegation that they had been using the road for
more than 10 years; and (2) an easement of a right of way has been
constituted over the said roads. There is no other road as wide as La Paz
Road existing in the vicinity and it is the shortest, convenient and safe route
towards SLEX Halang that the commuters and motorists may use. Second,
there is an alleged violation of such right committed by Fil-Estate, et al. when
they excavated the road and prevented the commuters and motorists from
using the same. Third, JCHA, et al. consequently suffered injury and that a
valid judgment could have been rendered in accordance with the relief sought
therein.
With respect to the issue that the case was improperly instituted as a class
suit, the Court finds the opposition without merit.
Section 12, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court defines a class suit, as follows:
Sec. 12. Class suit. – When the subject matter of the controversy is one of
common or general interest to many persons so numerous that it is
impracticable to join all as parties, a number of them which the court finds to
be sufficiently numerous and representative as to fully protect the interests of
all concerned may sue or defend for the benefit of all. Any party in interest
shall have the right to intervene to protect his individual interest.
The necessary elements for the maintenance of a class suit are: 1) the
subject matter of controversy is one of common or general interest to many
persons; 2) the parties affected are so numerous that it is impracticable to
bring them all to court; and 3) the parties bringing the class suit are
sufficiently numerous or representative of the class and can fully protect the
interests of all concerned.24
In this case, the suit is clearly one that benefits all commuters and motorists
who use La Paz Road. As succinctly stated by the CA:
The subject matter of the instant case, i.e., the closure and excavation of the
La Paz Road, is initially shown to be of common or general interest to many
persons. The records reveal that numerous individuals have filed
manifestations with the lower court, conveying their intention to join private
respondents in the suit and claiming that they are similarly situated with
private respondents for they were also prejudiced by the acts of petitioners in
closing and excavating the La Paz Road. Moreover, the individuals sought to
be represented by private respondents in the suit are so numerous that it is
impracticable to join them all as parties and be named individually as plaintiffs
in the complaint. These individuals claim to be residents of various barangays
in Biñan, Laguna and other barangays in San Pedro, Laguna.
Anent the issue on the propriety of the WPI, Section 3, Rule 58 of the Rules
of Court lays down the rules for the issuance thereof. Thus:
(a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole
or part of such relief consists in restraining the commission or
continuance of the acts complained of, or in the performance of an act
or acts, either for a limited period or perpetually;
(b) That the commission, continuance or non-performance of the act
or acts complained of during the litigation would probably work
injustice to the applicant; or
(c) That a party, court, or agency or a person is doing, threatening, or
attempting to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act or
acts probably in violation of the rights of the applicant respecting the
subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to render the
judgment ineffectual.
A writ of preliminary injunction is available to prevent a threatened or
continuous irremediable injury to parties before their claims can be thoroughly
studied and adjudicated.25 The requisites for its issuance are: (1) the
existence of a clear and unmistakable right that must be protected; and (2) an
urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.26 For
the writ to issue, the right sought to be protected must be a present right, a
legal right which must be shown to be clear and positive.27 This means that
the persons applying for the writ must show that they have an ostensible right
to the final relief prayed for in their complaint.28
In the case at bench, JCHA, et al. failed to establish a prima facie proof of
violation of their right to justify the issuance of a WPI. Their right to the use of
La Paz Road is disputable since they have no clear legal right therein. As
correctly ruled by the CA:
Here, contrary to the ruling of respondent Judge, private respondents failed to
prove as yet that they have a clear and unmistakable right over the La Paz
Road – which was sought to be protected by the injunctive writ. They merely
anchor their purported right over the La Paz Road on the bare allegation that
they have been using the same as public road right-of-way for more than ten
years. A mere allegation does not meet the standard of proof that would
warrant the issuance of the injunctive writ. Failure to establish the existence
of a clear right which should be judicially protected through the writ of
injunction is a sufficient ground for denying the injunction.
Consequently, the case should be further heard by the RTC so that the
parties can fully prove their respective positions on the issues.1âwphi1

Due process considerations dictate that the assailed injunctive writ is not a
judgment on the merits but merely an order for the grant of a provisional and
ancillary remedy to preserve the status quo until the merits of the case can be
heard. The hearing on the application for issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction is separate and distinct from the trial on the merits of the main
case. 29 The evidence submitted during the hearing of the incident is not
conclusive or complete for only a "sampling" is needed to give the trial court
an idea of the justification for the preliminary injunction pending the decision
of the case on the merits.30 There are vital facts that have yet to be presented
during the trial which may not be obtained or presented during the hearing on
the application for the injunctive writ.31 Moreover, the quantum of evidence
required for one is different from that for the other.32

WHEREFORE, the petitions are DENIED. Accordingly, the July 31, 2001
Decision and February 21, 2002 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 60543 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

G.R. No. 150134 October 31, 2007
ERNESTO C. DEL ROSARIO and DAVAO TIMBER
CORPORATION, petitioners,
vs.
FAR EAST BANK & TRUST COMPANY1 and PRIVATE DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION OF THE PHILIPPINES,respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch "65" (sic)2 having, by
Decision3 of July 10, 2001, dismissed petitioners' complaint in Civil Case No.
00-540 on the ground of res judicata and splitting of a cause of action, and by
Order of September 24, 20014 denied their motion for reconsideration
thereof, petitioners filed the present petition for review on certiorari.
From the rather lengthy history of the present controversy, a recital of the
following material facts culled from the records is in order.
On May 21, 1974, petitioner Davao Timber Corporation (DATICOR) and
respondent Private Development Corporation of the Philippines (PDCP)
entered into a loan agreement under which PDCP extended to DATICOR a
foreign currency loan of US $265,000 and a peso loan of P2.5 million or a
total amount of approximately P4.4 million, computed at the then prevailing
rate of exchange of the dollar with the peso.
The loan agreement provided, among other things, that DATICOR shall pay:
(1) a service fee of one percent (1%) per annum (later increased to six
percent [6%] per annum) on the outstanding balance of the peso loan; (2) 12
percent (12%) per annum interest on the peso loan; and (3) penalty charges
of two percent (2%) per month in case of default.
The loans were secured by real estate mortgages over six parcels of land –
one situated in Manila (the Otis property) which was registered in the name of
petitioner Ernesto C. Del Rosario, and five in Mati, Davao Oriental – and
chattel mortgages over pieces of machinery and equipment.
Petitioners paid a total of P3 million to PDCP, which the latter applied to
interest, service fees and penalty charges. This left petitioners, by PDCP's
computation, with an outstanding balance on the principal of more than P10
million as of May 15, 1983.
By March 31, 1982, petitioners had filed a complaint against PDCP before the
then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Manila for violation of the Usury Law,
annulment of contract and damages. The case, docketed as Civil Case No.
82-8088, was dismissed by the CFI.
On appeal, the then Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC) set aside the CFI's
dismissal of the complaint and declared void and of no effect the stipulation of
interest in the loan agreement between DATICOR and PDCP.
PDCP appealed the IAC's decision to this Court where it was docketed as
G.R. No. 73198.
In the interim, PDCP assigned a portion of its receivables from petitioners
(the receivables) to its co-respondent Far East Bank and Trust Company
(FEBTC) under a Deed of Assignment dated April 10, 19875 for a
consideration of P5,435,000. The Deed of Assignment was later amended by
two Supplements.6
FEBTC, as assignee of the receivables, and petitioners later executed a
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) dated December 8, 1988 whereby
petitioners agreed to, as they did pay FEBTC7 the amount of P6.4 million as
full settlement of the receivables.
On September 2, 1992, this Court promulgated its Decision in G.R. No.
731988 affirming in toto the decision of the IAC. It determined that after
deducting the P3 million earlier paid by petitioners to PDCP, their remaining
balance on the principal loan was only P1.4 million.
Petitioners thus filed on April 25, 1994 a Complaint9 for sum of money against
PDCP and FEBTC before the RTC of Makati, mainly to recover the excess
payment which they computed to be P5.3 million10 – P4.335 million from
PDCP, and P965,000 from FEBTC. The case, Civil Case No. 94-1610, was
raffled to Branch 132 of the Makati RTC.
On May 31, 1995, Branch 132 of the Makati RTC rendered a decision11 in
Civil Case No. 94-1610 ordering PDCP to pay petitioners the sum of P4.035
million,12 to bear interest at 12% per annum from April 25, 1994 until fully
paid; to execute a release or cancellation of the mortgages on the five parcels
of land in Mati, Davao Oriental and on the pieces of machinery and
equipment and to return the corresponding titles to petitioners; and to pay the
costs of the suit.
As for the complaint of petitioners against respondent FEBTC, the trial court
dismissed it for lack of cause of action, ratiocinating that the MOA between
petitioners and FEBTC was not subject to this Court's Decision in G.R. No.
73198, FEBTC not being a party thereto.
From the trial court's decision, petitioners and respondent PDCP appealed to
the Court of Appeals (CA). The appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No.
50591.
On May 22, 1998, the CA rendered a decision13 in CA-G.R. CV No. 50591,
holding that petitioners' outstanding obligation, which this Court had
determined in G.R. No. 73198 to be P1.4 million, could not be increased or
decreased by any act of the creditor PDCP.
The CA held that when PDCP assigned its receivables, the amount payable
to it by DATICOR was the same amount payable to assignee FEBTC,
irrespective of any stipulation that PDCP and FEBTC might have provided in
the Deed of Assignment, DATICOR not having been a party thereto, hence,
not bound by its terms.
Citing Articles 215414 and 216315 of the Civil Code which embody the
principle of solutio indebiti, the CA held that the party bound to refund the
excess payment of P5 million16 was FEBTC as it received the overpayment;
and that FEBTC could recover from PDCP the amount of P4.035 million
representing its overpayment for the assigned receivables based on the
terms of the Deed of Assignment or on the general principle of equity.
Noting, however, that DATICOR claimed in its complaint only the amount
of P965,000 from FEBTC, the CA held that it could not grant a relief different
from or in excess of that prayed for.
Finally, the CA held that the claim of PDCP against DATICOR for the
payment of P1.4 million had no basis, DATICOR's obligation having already
been paid in full, overpaid in fact, when it paid assignee FEBTC the amount
of P6.4 million.
Accordingly, the CA ordered PDCP to execute a release or cancellation of the
mortgages it was holding over the Mati real properties and the machinery and
equipment, and to return the corresponding certificates of title to petitioners.
And it ordered FEBTC to pay petitioners the amount of P965,000 with legal
interest from the date of the promulgation of its judgment.
FEBTC's motion for reconsideration of the CA Decision was denied, and so
was its subsequent appeal to this Court.
On April 25, 2000, petitioners filed before the RTC of Makati a
Complaint17 against FEBTC to recover the balance of the excess payment
of P4.335 million.18 The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 00-540, the
precursor of the present case and raffled to Branch 143 of the RTC.
In its Answer,19 FEBTC denied responsibility, it submitting that nowhere in the
dispositive portion of the CA Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 50591 was it held
liable to return the whole amount of P5.435 million representing the
consideration for the assignment to it of the receivables, and since petitioners
failed to claim the said whole amount in their original complaint in Civil Case
No. 94-1610 as they were merely claiming the amount of P965,000 from it,
they were barred from claiming it.
FEBTC later filed a Third Party Complaint20 against PDCP praying that the
latter be made to pay the P965,000 and the interests adjudged by the CA in
favor of petitioners, as well as the P4.335 million and interests that petitioners
were claiming from it. It posited that PDCP should be held liable because it
received a consideration of P5.435 million when it assigned the receivables.
Answering21 the Third Party Complaint, PDCP contended that since
petitioners were not seeking the recovery of the amount of P965,000, the
same cannot be recovered via the third party complaint.
PDCP went on to contend that since the final and executory decision in CA-
G.R. CV No. 50591 had held that DATICOR has no cause of action against it
for the refund of any part of the excess payment, FEBTC can no longer re-
litigate the same issue.
Moreover, PDCP contended that it was not privy to the MOA which explicitly
excluded the receivables from the effect of the Supreme Court decision, and
that the amount of P6.4 million paid by petitioners to FEBTC was clearly
intended as consideration for the release and cancellation of the lien on the
Otis property.
Replying,22 FEBTC pointed out that PDCP cannot deny that it benefited from
the assignment of its rights over the receivables from petitioners. It added
that the third party claim being founded on a valid and justified cause,
PDCP's counterclaims lacked factual and legal basis.
Petitioners thereafter filed a Motion for Summary Judgment23 to which
FEBTC filed its opposition.24
By Order of March 5, 2001, the trial court denied the motion for summary
judgment for lack of merit.25
On July 10, 2001, the trial court issued the assailed Decision dismissing
petitioners' complaint on the ground of res judicata and splitting of cause of
action. It recalled that petitioners had filed Civil Case No. 94-1610 to recover
the alleged overpayment both from PDCP and FEBTC and to secure the
cancellation and release of their mortgages on real properties, machinery and
equipment; that when said case was appealed, the CA, in its Decision,
ordered PDCP to release and cancel the mortgages and FEBTC to
pay P965,000 with interest, which Decision became final and executory on
November 23, 1999; and that a Notice of Satisfaction of Judgment between
petitioners and FEBTC was in fact submitted on August 8, 2000, hence, the
issue between them was finally settled under the doctrine of res judicata.
The trial court moreover noted that the MOA between petitioners and FEBTC
clearly stated that the "pending litigation before the Supreme Court of the
Philippines with respect to the Loan exclusive of the Receivablesassigned to
FEBTC shall prevail up to the extent not covered by this Agreement." That
statement in the MOA, the trial court ruled, categorically made only the loan
subject to this Court's Decision in G.R. No. 73198, hence, it was with the
parties' full knowledge and consent that petitioners agreed to pay P6.4 million
to FEBTC as consideration for the settlement. The parties cannot thus be
allowed to welsh on their contractual obligations, the trial court concluded.
Respecting the third party claim of FEBTC, the trial court held that FEBTC's
payment of the amount of P1,224,906.67 (P965,000 plus interest) to
petitioners was in compliance with the final judgment of the CA, hence, it
could not entertain such claim because the Complaint filed by petitioners
merely sought to recover from FEBTC the alleged overpayment of P4.335
million and attorney's fees of P200,000.
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration26 of the July 10, 2001 decision of the
trial court was denied by Order of September 24, 2001.
Hence, the present petition.
In their Memorandum,27 petitioners proffer that, aside from the issue of
whether their complaint is dismissible on the ground of res judicata and
splitting of cause of action, the issues of 1) whether FEBTC can be held liable
for the balance of the overpayment of P4.335 million plus interest which
petitioners previously claimed against PDCP in Civil Case No. 94-1610, and
2) whether PDCP can interpose as defense the provision in the Deed of
Assignment and the MOA that the assignment of the receivables shall not be
affected by this Court's Decision in G.R. No. 73198, be considered.
Stripped of the verbiage, the only issue for this Court's consideration is the
propriety of the dismissal of Civil Case No. 00-540 upon the grounds stated
by the trial court. This should be so because a Rule 45 petition, like the one
at bar, can raise only questions of law (and that justifies petitioners' elevation
of the case from the trial court directly to this Court) which must be distinctly
set forth.28
The petition is bereft of merit.
Section 47 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, on the doctrine of res judicata,
reads:
Sec. 47. Effect of judgments or final orders. — The effect of a
judgment or final order rendered by a court of the Philippines, having
jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or final order, may be as
follows:
xxxx
(b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with respect to the
matter directly adjudged or as to any other matter that could have
been raised in relation thereto, conclusive between the parties and
their successors in interest by title subsequent to the commencement
of the action or special proceeding, litigating for the same thing and
under the same title and in the same capacity; and
(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors
in interest, that only is deemed to have been adjudged in a former
judgment or final order which appears upon its face to have been so
adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily included therein or
necessary thereto. (Underscoring supplied)
The above-quoted provision lays down two main rules. Section 49(b)
enunciates the first rule of res judicata known as "bar by prior judgment" or
"estoppel by judgment," which states that the judgment or decree of a court of
competent jurisdiction on the merits concludes the parties and their privies to
the litigation and constitutes a bar to a new action or suit involving the same
cause of action either before the same or any other tribunal.29
Stated otherwise, "bar by former judgment" makes the judgment rendered in
the first case an absolute bar to the subsequent action since that judgment is
conclusive not only as to the matters offered and received to sustain it but
also as to any other matter which might have been offered for that purpose
and which could have been adjudged therein. 30 It is in this concept that the
term res judicata is more commonly and generally used as a ground for a
motion to dismiss in civil cases.31
The second rule of res judicata embodied in Section 47(c), Rule 39 is
"conclusiveness of judgment." This rule provides that any right, fact, or matter
in issue directly adjudicated or necessarily involved in the determination of an
action before a competent court in which a judgment or decree is rendered on
the merits is conclusively settled by the judgment therein and cannot again be
litigated between the parties and their privies whether or not the claim or
demand, purpose, or subject matter of the two suits is the same.32 It refers to
a situation where the judgment in the prior action operates as an estoppel
only as to the matters actually determined or which were necessarily included
therein.33
The case at bar satisfies the four essential requisites of "bar by prior
judgment," viz:
(a) finality of the former judgment;
(b) the court which rendered it had jurisdiction over the subject matter
and the parties;
 (c) it must be a judgment on the merits; and
(d) there must be, between the first and second actions, identity of
parties, subject matter and causes of action.34
There is no doubt that the judgment on appeal relative to Civil Case No. 94-
1610 (that rendered in CA-G.R. CV No. 50591) was a final judgment. Not
only did it dispose of the case on the merits; it also became executory as a
consequence of the denial of FEBTC's motion for reconsideration and
appeal.35
Neither is there room to doubt that the judgment in Civil Case No. 94-1610
was on the merits for it determined the rights and liabilities of the parties.36 To
recall, it was ruled that: (1) DATICOR overpaid by P5.3 million; (2) FEBTC
was bound to refund the excess payment but because DATICOR's claim
against FEBTC was only P965,000, the court could only grant so much as the
relief prayed for; and (3) PDCP has no further claim against DATICOR
because its obligation had already been paid in full.
Right or wrong, that judgment bars another case based upon the same cause
of action.37
As to the requisite of identity of parties, subject matter and causes of action, it
cannot be gainsaid that the first case, Civil Case No. 94-1610, was brought
by petitioners to recover an alleged overpayment of P5.3 million –P965,000
from FEBTC and P4.335 million from PDCP.
On the other hand, Civil Case No. 00-540, filed by the same petitioners, was
for the recovery of P4.335 million which is admittedly part of the P5.3 million
earlier sought to be recovered in Civil Case No. 94-1610. This time, the
action was brought solely against FEBTC which in turn impleaded PDCP as a
third party defendant.
In determining whether causes of action are identical to warrant the
application of the rule of res judicata, the test is to ascertain whether the
same evidence which is necessary to sustain the second action would suffice
to authorize a recovery in the first even in cases in which the forms or nature
of the two actions are different.38 Simply stated, if the same facts or evidence
would sustain both, the two actions are considered the same within the rule
that the judgment in the former is a bar to the subsequent action.
It bears remembering that a cause of action is the delict or the wrongful act or
omission committed by the defendant in violation of the primary rights of the
plaintiff.39
In the two cases, petitioners imputed to FEBTC the same alleged wrongful
act of mistakenly receiving and refusing to return an amount in excess of
what was due it in violation of their right to a refund. The same facts and
evidence presented in the first case, Civil Case No. 94-1610, were the very
same facts and evidence that petitioners presented in Civil Case No. 00-540.
Thus, the same Deed of Assignment between PDCP and FEBTC, the first
and second supplements to the Deed, the MOA between petitioners and
FEBTC, and this Court's Decision in G.R. No. 73198 were submitted in Civil
Case No. 00-540.
Notably, the same facts were also pleaded by the parties in support of their
allegations for, and defenses against, the recovery of the P4.335 million.
Petitioners, of course, plead the CA Decision as basis for their subsequent
claim for the remainder of their overpayment. It is well established, however,
that a party cannot, by varying the form of action or adopting a different
method of presenting his case, or by pleading justifiable circumstances as
herein petitioners are doing, escape the operation of the principle that one
and the same cause of action shall not be twice litigated.40
In fact, authorities tend to widen rather than restrict the doctrine of res
judicata on the ground that public as well as private interest demands the
ending of suits by requiring the parties to sue once and for all in the same
case all the special proceedings and remedies to which they are entitled.41
This Court finds well-taken then the pronouncement of the court a quo that to
allow the re-litigation of an issue that was finally settled as between
petitioners and FEBTC in the prior case is to allow the splitting of a cause of
action, a ground for dismissal under Section 4 of Rule 2 of the Rules of Court
reading:

SEC. 4. Splitting of a single cause of action; effect of. – If two or more

suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause of action, the filing
of one or a judgment upon the merits in any one is available as a
ground for the dismissal of the others. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

This rule proscribes a party from dividing a single or indivisible cause of

action into several parts or claims and instituting two or more actions based
on it.42 Because the plaintiff cannot divide the grounds for recovery, he is
mandated to set forth in his first action every ground for relief which he claims
to exist and upon which he relies; he cannot be permitted to rely upon them
by piecemeal in successive actions to recover for the same wrong or injury.43

Clearly then, the judgment in Civil Case No. 94-1610 operated as a bar to
Civil Case No. 00-540, following the above-quoted Section 4, Rule 2 of the
Rules of Court.

A final word. Petitioners are sternly reminded that both the rules on res
judicata and splitting of causes of action are based on the salutary public
policy against unnecessary multiplicity of suits – interest reipublicae ut sit finis
litium.44Re-litigation of matters already settled by a court's final judgment
merely burdens the courts and the taxpayers, creates uneasiness and
confusion, and wastes valuable time and energy that could be devoted to
worthier cases.45

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the RTC,

Branch 143, Makati dismissing petitioners' complaint in Civil Case No. 00-540
is AFFIRMED.

Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.
 [G.R. No. 123555. January 22, 1999]
PROGRESSIVE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, INC., petitioner, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and WESTIN SEAFOOD MARKET,
INC., respondents.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
May the lessee which instituted before the Metropolitan Trial Court an action for
forcible entry with damages against its lessor file a separate suit with the Regional
Trial Court against the same lessor for moral and exemplary damages plus actual and
compensatory damages based on the same forcible entry?
On grounds of litis pendencia and forum-shopping, petitioner invokes
established jurisprudence that a party cannot by varying the form of action or
adopting a different method of presenting his case evade the principle that the same
cause of action shall not be litigated twice between the same parties or their
privies.[1] Petitioner therefore prays for reversal of the decision of the Court of
Appeals dated 27 May 1995, as well as its Resolution dated 17 January 1996 denying
reconsideration, which upheld the denial by the Regional Trial Court of petitioner's
motion to dismiss private respondent's damage suit.
The antecedents: On 27 May 1991 petitioner leased to private respondent
Westin Seafood Market, Inc., a parcel of land with a commercial building thereon
located at Araneta Center, Cubao, Quezon City, for a period of nine (9) years and
three (3) months, i.e., from 2 January 1989 to 30 April 1998, with a monthly rental of
approximately P600,000.00. The contract contained, among others, the following
pertinent terms and conditions:
EFFECT OF VIOLATIONS
25. LESSEE hereby agrees that all the provisions contained in this Contract shall be
deemed as conditions, as well as covenants, and that this Contract shall be
automatically terminated and cancelled without resorting to court action should
LESSEE violate any or all said conditions, including the payment of Rent, CUSA and
other charges indicated in the FLP when due within the time herein stipulated and in
any such cases, LESSEE hereby irrevocably appoints LESSOR, its authorized agents,
employees and/or representatives as his duly authorized attorney-in-fact, even after
the termination, expiration or cancellationof this Contract, with full power and
authority to open, enter, repossess, secure, enclose, fence and otherwise take full and
complete physical possession and control of the leased premises and its contents
without resorting to court action and/or to summarily disconnect electrical and/or
water services thereof, and that LESSEE hereby irrevocably empowers LESSOR, his
authorized agents, employees and/or representatives to take inventory and possession
of whatever equipment, furniture, articles, merchandise, appliances, etc., found
therein belonging to LESSEE, consignors and/or to any other persons and to place
the same in LESSORs warehouse or any other place at LESSORs discretion for
safekeeping; charging LESSEE the corresponding storage fees therefor; that in case
LESSEE fails to claim said equipment, furniture, articles, merchandise, appliances,
etc. from storage and simultaneously liquidate any liability with LESSOR within
seven (7) days from date of said transfer to LESSORs warehouse, LESSOR is
likewise hereby expressly authorized and empowered by LESSEE to dispose of said
property/properties in a public sale through a Notary Public of
LESSORs choice and to apply the proceeds thereof to whatever liability
and/or indebtedness LESSEE may have to LESSOR plus reasonable expenses for the
same, including storage fees, and the balance, if any, shall be turned over to
LESSEE; that LESSEE hereby expressly agrees that any or all acts performed by
LESSOR, his authorized agents, employees and/or representatives under the
provisions of this Section may not be the subject of any petition for a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction or Mandatory Injunction in court, and that LESSOR and/or
his authorized agents, employees, and/or representatives shall be free from any civil
and/or criminal liability or responsibility whatsoever therefor.
TERMINATION OF LEASE
26. Upon the automatic termination of this lease contract, as the case may be,
LESSEE shall immediately vacate and redeliver physical possession of the leased
premises, including the keys appertaining thereto, to LESSOR in good, clean and
sanitary condition, reasonable wear and tear excepted, devoid of all occupants,
equipment, furniture, articles, merchandise, etc., belonging to LESSEE or to any
other person except those belonging to LESSOR; that should LESSEE fail to comply
with this provision, LESSOR is hereby given the same rights and power to proceed
against LESSEE as expressly granted in the immediately preceding section.
Private respondent failed to pay rentals despite several demands by
petitioner. As of 19 October 1992 the arrearages amounted
to P8,608,284.66. Admittedly, non-payment of rentals constituted breach of their
contract; thus, pursuant to the express authority granted petitioner under the above-
quoted Secs. 25 and 26 of the lease agreement, petitioner on 31 October 1992
repossessed the leased premises, inventoried the movable properties found within and
owned by private respondent and scheduled public auction for the sale of the
movables on 19 August 1993 with notice to private respondent.
On 26 November 1992 private respondent filed with the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Quezon City a complaint against petitioner for forcible entry with damages
and a prayer for a temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction.[2] The case was raffled to Branch 40 presided over by Judge
Guillermo L. Loja Jr. who issued a temporary restraining order enjoining petitioner
from selling private respondents properties at a public auction.
On 9 December 1992 Judge Loja inhibited himself from trying the case and
directed its transfer to Branch 34 presided over by Judge Joselito SD Generoso. Soon
after, petitioner filed an urgent motion for the inhibition of Judge Generoso and the
immediate reraffle of the case arguing that the summary transfer of the case to Judge
Generoso was irregular as it was not done by raffle.
The motion was granted and the case went to Branch 36 presided over by Judge
Francisco D. Villanueva. Thereafter, on 22 December 1992, at the continuation of the
hearing on the issuance of a writ preliminary mandatory injunction, the parties
agreed, among others, on the following: (a) private respondent would deposit with
the Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank in the name of theMetropolitan Trial
Court, Branch 36, the amount of P8,000,000.00 to guarantee the payment of its back
rentals; (b) petitioner would defer the sale of the personal properties of the Westin
Seafood Market, Inc., until a final settlement of the case had been arrived at; (c)
petitioner shall allow private respondent to retrieve all the perishable goods from
inside the leased premises like frozen meat, vegetables and fish, all properly
receipted for; (d) petitioner shall allow three (3) maintenance personnel of private
respondent to enter the premises at reasonable working hours to maintain the
restaurant equipment; and (e) the parties shall negotiate for the restoration of the
premises to private respondent, and if no settlement be arrived at on or before
January 8, 1993, the hearing on the merits of the case shall proceed and the
disposition of the amount deposited representing the rental arrearages shall be left to
the discretion of the court.
This agreement was incorporated in the order of the court dated 22 December
1992[3] which in effect terminated for all intents and purposes the incident on the
issuance of a preliminary writ of injunction.
Private respondent did not comply with its undertaking to deposit with the
designated bank the amount representing its back rentals. Instead, with the forcible
entry case still pending with the MeTC, private respondent instituted on 9 June 1993
another action for damages against petitioner with the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City. The case was raffled to Branch 101 presided over by Judge Pedro T.
Santiago.[4]
Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the damage suit on the ground of litis
pendencia and forum shopping. On 2 July 1993, instead of ruling on the motion,
Judge Santiago issued an order archiving the case pending the outcome of the
forcible entry case being heard at the MeTC for the reason that "the damages is (sic)
principally anchored on whether or not the defendants (petitioner herein) have
committed forcible entry."[5] On 2 August 1993 petitioner moved for reconsideration
of the order and reiterated its motion to dismiss the suit for damages.
Before petitioner's motion to dismiss could be resolved,
private respondent filed with the RTC on 18 August 1993 an amended complaint for
damages. On 14 September 1993 it also filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for the
Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and Motion for the Grant of a
Preliminary Prohibitory and Preliminary Mandatory Injunction. On the very same
day, Judge Santiago issued an order (a) denying petitioner's motion to dismiss, (b)
admitting private respondent's amended complaint, and (c) granting private
respondent's application for a temporary restraining order against petitioner.
Thus, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a special civil action
for certiorari and prohibition on the ground that Judge Santiago acted in excess of his
jurisdiction and/or committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction in admitting the amended complaint of private respondent and issuing a
restraining order against petitioner; in allowing private respondent to engage in forum
shopping; and, taking cognizance of the action for damages despite lack of
jurisdiction.[6]
But the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition due to the failure of petitioner to
file a motion for reconsideration of Judge Santiago's order of 14 September 1993
which, it explained, was a prerequisite to the institution of a petition
for certiorari and prohibition. It also found that the elements of litis pendencia were
lacking to justify the dismissal of the action for damages with the RTC because
despite the pendency of the forcible entry case with the MeTC the only damages
recoverable thereat were those caused by the loss of the use and occupation of the
property and not the kind of damages being claimed before the RTC which had no
direct relation to loss of material possession. It clarified that since the damages
prayed for in the amended complaint with the RTC were those caused by the alleged
high-handed manner with which petitioner reacquired possession of the leased
premises and the sale of private respondents movables found therein, the RTC and
not the MeTC had jurisdiction over the action of damages.[7]
Petitioner, aggrieved by the decision of the appellate court, filed the instant
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court alleging that it
erred in (a) finding that petitioner failed to avail of its plain, speedy and adequate
remedy of a prior motion for reconsideration with the RTC; (b) ruling that the trial
judge did not act with grave abuse of discretion in taking cognizance of the action for
damages and injunction despite the pendency of the forcible entry case with the
MeTC; and, (c) ruling that private respondent did not commit forum shopping since
the causes of action before the RTC and MeTC were not identical with each other.
There is merit in the petition. While generally a motion for reconsideration must
first be filed before resorting to certiorari in order to give the lower court an
opportunity to correct the errors imputed to it[8] this rule admits of exceptions
and is not intended to be applied without considering the circumstances of the
case.[9] The filing of the motion for reconsideration before availing of the remedy
of certiorariis not sine qua non when the issue raised is one purely of
law,[10] or where the error is patent or the disputed order is void,[11] or the questions
raised on certiorari are the same as those already squarely presented to and passed
upon by the lower court.
In its motion for dismissal of the action for damages with the RTC petitioner
raised the ground that another action for forcible entry was pending at the MeTC
between the same parties involving the same matter and cause of action. Outrightly
rejected by the RTC, the same issue was elevated by petitioner on certiorari before
the Court of Appeals. Clearly, under the prevailing circumstance, any motion for
reconsideration of the trial court would have been a pointless exercise.[12]
We now turn to the issue of whether an action for damages filed with the
Regional Trial Court by the lessee against the lessor should be dismissed on the
ground of pendency of another action for forcible entry and damages earlier filed by
the same lessee against the same lessor before the Metropolitan Trial Court.
Section 1 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides that any person deprived of
the possession of any land or building by force, indimidation, threat, strategy or
stealth, or against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully
withheld, may bring an action in the proper Municipal Trial Court against the person
or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession, together with damages
and costs. The mandate under this rule is categorical: that all cases for forcible entry
or unlawful detainer shall be filed before the Municipal Trial Court which shall
include not only the plea for restoration of possession but also all claims for damages
and costs arising therefrom. Otherwise expressed, no claim for damages arising out
of forcible entry or unlawful detainer may be filed separately and independently of
the claim for restoration of possession.
This is consistent with the principle laid down in Sec. 1, par. (e), of Rule 16 of
the Rules of Court which states that the pendency of another action between the same
parties for the same cause is a ground for dismissal of an action. Res
adjudicata requires that there must be between the action sought to be dismissed and
the other action the following elements: (a) identity of parties or at least such as
representing the same interest in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief
prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and, (c) the identity in the two
(2) preceding particulars should be such that any judgment which may be rendered on
the other action will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res
adjudicata in the action under consideration.[13]
It is likewise basic under Sec. 3 of Rule 2 of the Revised Rules of Court, as
amended, that a party may not institute more than one suit for a single cause of
action. Under Sec. 4 of the same Rule, if two or more suits are instituted on the basis
of the same cause of action, the filing of one or a judgment upon the merits in any
one is available as a ground for the dismissal of the other or others. "Cause of action"
is defined by Sec. 2 of Rule 2 as the act of omission by which a party violates a right
of another.[14] These premises obtaining, there is no question at all that private
respondent's cause of action in the forcible entry case and in the suit for damages is
the alleged illegal retaking of possession of the leased premises by the lessor,
petitioner herein, from which all legal reliefs arise. Simply stated, the restoration of
possession and demand for actual damages in the case before the MeTC and the
demand for damages with the RTC both arise from the same cause of action, i.e., the
forcible entry by petitioner into the leased premises.
A comparative study of the two (2) complaints filed by private respondent
against petitioner before the two (2) trial courts shows that not only are the elements
of res adjudicata present, at least insofar as the claim for actual and compensatory
damages is concerned, but also that the claim for damages - moral and exemplary in
addition to actual and compensatory - constitutes splitting a single cause of
action.Since this runs counter to the rule against multiplicity of suits, the dismissal of
the second action becomes imperative.
The complaint for forcible entry contains the following pertinent allegations -
2.01 On 02 January 1989, plaintiff entered into a contract of lease with defendant
PDC over a property designated as Ground Floor, Seafood Market (hereinafter
Subject Premises) situated at the corner of EDSA corner MacArthur Street, Araneta
Center, Cubao, Quezon City, for a period of ten (10) years from 02 January 1989 to
30 April 1998.
2.02 Immediately after having acquired actual physical possession of the Subject
Premises, plaintiff established and now operates thereon the now famous Seafood
Market Restaurant. Since then, plaintiff had been in actual, continuous, and peaceful
physical possession of the Subject Premises until 31 October 1992.
xxxx
3.02 Plaintiff, being the lessee of the Subject Premises, is entitled to the peaceful
occupation and enjoyment of the Subject Premises to the exclusion of all others,
including defendants herein.
3.03 Defendants resort to strong arms tactics to forcibly wrest possession of the
Subject Premises from plaintiff and maintain possession thereof through the use of
force, threat, strategy and intimidation by the use of superior number of men and
arms amounts to the taking of the law into their own hands.
3.04 Thus, defendants act of unlawfully evicting out plaintiff from the Subject
Premises it is leasing from defendant PDC and depriving
it of possession thereof through the use of force, threat, strategy and intimidation
should be condemned and declared illegal for being contrary to public order and
policy.
3.05 Consequently, defendants should be enjoined from continuing with their illegal
acts and be ordered to vacate the Subject Premises and restore possession thereof,
together with its contents, to plaintiff.
xxxx
4.07 Considering that defendants act of forcibly grabbing possession of the Subject
Premises from plaintiff is illegal and null and void, defendant should be adjudged
liable to plaintiff for all the aforedescribed damages which plaintiff incurred as a
result thereof.
The amended complaint for damages filed by private respondent alleges
basically the same factual circumstances and issues as bases for the relief prayed for,
to wit:
4. On May 28, 1991, plaintiff and defendant PDC entered into a Contract of Lease for
a period of ten years or from January 2, 1989 up to April 30, 1998 over a property
designated as Ground Floor, Seafood Market (hereinafter referred to as Subject
Premises) situated at the corner of EDSA corner McArthur Street, Araneta Center,
Cubao, Quezon City. A copy of the lease contract is attached hereto as Annex A.
5. Immediately thereafter, plaintiff took over actual physical possession of Subject
Premises, and established thereon the now famous Seafood Market Restaurant.
xxxx
7. On October 31, 1992 at around 8:30 p.m., defendant PDC, without the benefit of
any writ of possession or any lawful court order and with the aid of approximately
forty (40) armed security guards and policemen under the supervision of defendant
Tejam, forcibly entered the subject premises through force, intimidation, threats and
stealth and relying on brute force and in a thunderboltish manner and against
plaintiffs will, unceremoniously drew away all of plaintiffs men out of the
subject premises, thereby depriving herein plaintiff of its actual, physical and natural
possession of the subject premises. The illegal, high-handed manner and gestapo like
take-over by defendants of subject premises is more particularly described as follows:
xxx
8. To date, defendants continue to illegally possess and hold the Subject Premises,
including all the multi-million improvements, fixtures and equipment therein owned
by plaintiff, all to the damage and prejudice of plaintiff. The actuations of defendants
constitute an unlawful appropriation, seizure and taking of property against the will
and consent of plaintiff. Worse, defendants are threatening to sell at public auction
and without the consent of plaintiff and without lawful authority, the multi-million
fixtures and equipment of plaintiff and at prices way below the market value
thereof. Plaintiff hereby attaches as Annex B the letter from defendants dated August
6, 1993 addressed to plaintiff, informing the latter that the former intends to sell at an
auction on August 19, 1993 at 2:00 p.m. properties of the plaintiff presently in
defendants possession.
xxxx
12. Defendants unlawful takeover of the premises constitutes a violation of its
obligation under Art. 1654 of the New Civil Code requiring the lessor to maintain the
lessee in peaceful and adequate enjoyment of the lease for the entire duration of the
contract. Hence, plaintiff has filed the present suit for the recovery of damages under
Art. 1659 of the New Civil Code x x x x
Restated in its bare essentials, the forcible entry case has one cause of action,
namely, the alleged unlawful entry by petitioner into the leased premises out of
which three (3) reliefs (denominated by private respondent as its causes of action)
arose: (a) the restoration by the lessor (petitioner herein) of the possession of the
leased premises to the lessee; (b) the claim for actual damages due to the losses
suffered by private respondent such as the deterioration of perishable foodstuffs
stored inside the premises and the deprivation of the use of the premises causing loss
of expected profits; and, (c) the claim for attorney's fees and costs of suit.
On the other hand, the complaint for damages prays for a monetary award
consisting of (a) moral damages of P500,000.00 and exemplary damages of
another P500,000.00; (b) actual damages of P20,000,000.00 and compensatory
damages of P1,000,000.00 representing unrealized profits; and, (c) P200,000.00 for
attorney's fees and costs, all based on the alleged forcible takeover of the leased
premises by petitioner. Since actual and compensatory damages were already
prayed for in the forcible entry case before the MeTC, it is obvious that this cannot be
relitigated in the damage suit before the RTC by reason of res adjudicata.
The other claims for moral and exemplary damages cannot also succeed
considering that these sprung from the main incident being heard before the
MeTC. Jurisprudence is unequivocal that when a single delict or wrong is committed
- like the unlawful taking or detention of the property of another - there is but one
single cause of action regardless of the number of rights that may have been violated,
and all such rights should be alleged in a single complaint as constituting one single
cause of action.[15] In a forcible entry case, the real issue is the physical possession of
the real property. The question of damages is merely secondary or incidental, so
much so that the amount thereof does not affect the jurisdiction of the court. In other
words, the unlawful act of a deforciant in taking possession of a piece of land by
means of force and intimidation against the rights of the party actually in possession
thereof is a delict or wrong, or a cause of action that gives rise to two (2) remedies,
namely, the recovery of possession and recovery of damages arising from the loss of
possession, but only to one action. For obvious reasons, both remedies cannot be the
subject of two (2) separate and independent actions, one for recovery of possession
only, and the other, for the recovery of damages. That would inevitably lead to what
is termed in law as splitting up a cause of action.[16] In David v. de la Cruz[17] we
observed –
Herein tenants have but one cause of action against their landlord, their illegal
ejectment or removal from their landholdings, which cause of action however entitles
them to two (2) claims or remedies - for reinstatement and damages. As both claims
arise from the same cause of action, they should be alleged in a single complaint.
 A claim cannot be divided in such a way that a part of the amount of damages
may be recovered in one case and the rest, in another.[18] In Bachrach v.
Icarangal[19] we explained that the rule was aimed at preventing repeated litigations
between the same parties in regard to the same subject of the controversy and to
protect the defendant from unnecessary vexation. Nemo debet bis vexari pro una et
eadem causa.
What then is the effect of the dismissal of the other action? Since the rule is that
all such rights should be alleged in a single complaint, it goes without
saying that those not therein included cannot be the subject of subsequent complaints
for they are barred forever.[20] If a suit is brought for a part of a claim, a judgment
obtained in that action precludes the plaintiff from bringing a second action for the
residue of the claim, notwithstanding that the second form of action is not identical
with the first or different grounds for relief are set for the second suit. This principle
not only embraces what was actually determined, but also extends to every matter
which the parties might have litigated in the case.[21] This is why the legal basis upon
which private respondent anchored its second claim for damages, i.e., Art. 1659 in
relation to Art. 1654 of the Civil Code,[22] not otherwise raised and cited by private
respondent in the forcible entry case, cannot be used as justification for the second
suit for damages. We note, not without some degree of displeasure, that by filing a
second suit for damages, private respondent was not only able to press a claim for
moral and exemplary damages which by its failure to allege the same in its suit
before the MeTC foreclosed its right to sue on it, but it was also able to obtain from
the RTC, by way of another temporary restraining order, a second reprieve from an
impending public auction sale of its movables which it could not anymore secure
from the MeTC before which the matter of the issuance of a preliminary writ of
injunction was already closed.
The foregoing discussions provide sufficient basis to petitioner's charge that
private respondent and its counsel in the trial courts
committed forum shopping. In Crisostomo v. Securities and Exchange
Commission[23] we ruled –
There is forum-shopping whenever, as a result of an adverse opinion in one
forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion (other than by appeal or certiorari) in
another. The principle applies x x x with respect to suits filed in the courts x x x in
connection with litigations commenced in the court x x x in anticipation of an
unfavorable x x x ruling and a favorable case where the court in which the second
suit was brought, has no jurisdiction.
This Court likewise elucidated in New Pangasinan Review, Inc. v. National Labor
Relations Commission[24] that there is forum shopping when the actions involve the
same transactions, the same essential facts and circumstances. The reason behind the
proscription of forum shopping is obvious. This unnecessarily burdens
our courts with heavy caseloads, unduly taxes the manpower and financial resources
of the judiciary and trifles with and mocks our judicial processes, thereby adversely
affecting the efficient administration of justice. This condemnable conduct has
prompted the Court to issue circulars[25]ordering among others that a violation thereof
shall be cause for the dismissal of the case or cases without prejudice to the taking of
appropriate action against the counsel or party concerned.
The records ineluctably show that the complaint lodged by private respondent
with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City contained no certification of non-forum
shopping. When petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the case raising among others the
ground of forum shopping it pointed out the absence of the required
certification. The amended complaint, as well as the second and third amended
complaints, attempted to rectify the error by invariably stating that there was no other
action pending between the parties involving the same causes of action although
there was actually a forcible entry case pending before the MTC of Quezon City. By
its admission of a pending forcible entry case, it is obvious that private respondent
was indulging in forum shopping. While private respondent conveniently failed to
inform the RTC that it had likewise sought damages in the MTC on the basis of the
same forcible entry, the fact remains that it precisely did so, which stratagem was
being duplicated in the second case.This is a compelling reason to dismiss the second
case.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The questioned Decision of the
Court of Appeals dated 27 September 1995 and the Order of the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City dated 24 September 1993 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City is directed to dismiss Civil Case No. Q-93-
16409, "Westin Seafood Market, Inc. v. Progressive Development Corporation, et
al.," and the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City to proceed with the proper
disposition of Civil Case No. 6589, "Westin Seafood Market, Inc. v. Progressive
Development Corporation, et al.," with dispatch considering the summary nature of
the case. Treble costs against private respondent.
G.R. No. L-41423 February 23, 1989
LUIS JOSEPH, petitioner
vs.
HON. CRISPIN V. BAUTISTA, PATROCINIO PEREZ, ANTONIO SIOSON,
JACINTO PAGARIGAN, ALBERTO CARDENO and LAZARO
VILLANUEVA, respondents.
Jose M. Castillo for petitioner.
Arturo Z. Sioson for private respondent, Patrocinio Perez.
Cipriano B. Farrales for private respondents except P. Perez.
REGALAD0, J.:
Petitioner prays in this appeal by certiorari for the annulment and setting
aside of the order, dated July 8, 1975, dismissing petitioner's complaint, as
well as the order, dated August 22, 1975, denying his motion for
reconsideration of said dismissal, both issued by respondent Judge Crispin V.
Bautista of the former Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Branch III.
Petitioner herein is the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 50-V-73 entitled "Luis
Joseph vs. Patrocinio Perez, Domingo Villa y de Jesus, Rosario Vargas,
Antonio Sioson, Lazaro Villanueva and Jacinto Pagarigan", filed before the
Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Branch III, and presided over by
respondent Judge Crispin V. Bautista; while private respondents Patrocinio
Perez, Antonio Sioson, Jacinto Pagarigan and Lazaro Villanueva are four of
the defendants in said case. Defendant Domingo Villa y de Jesus did not
answer either the original or the amended complaint, while defendant Rosario
Vargas could not be served with summons; and respondent Alberto Cardeno
is included herein as he was impleaded by defendant Patrocinio Perez, one
of respondents herein, in her cross-claim.
The generative facts of this case, as culled from the written submission of the
parties, are as follows:
Respondent Patrocinio Perez is the owner of a cargo truck with Plate No. 25-
2 YT Phil. '73 for conveying cargoes and passengers for a consideration from
Dagupan City to Manila. On January 12, 1973, said cargo truck driven by
defendant Domingo Villa was on its way to Valenzuela, Bulacan from
Pangasinan. Petitioner, with a cargo of livestock, boarded the cargo truck at
Dagupan City after paying the sum of P 9.00 as one way fare to Valenzuela,
Bulacan. While said cargo truck was negotiating the National Highway
proceeding towards Manila, defendant Domingo Villa tried to overtake a
tricycle likewise proceeding in the same direction. At about the same time, a
pick-up truck with Plate No. 45-95 B, supposedly owned by respondents
Antonio Sioson and Jacinto Pagarigan, then driven by respondent Lazaro
Villanueva, tried to overtake the cargo truck which was then in the process of
overtaking the tricycle, thereby forcing the cargo truck to veer towards the
shoulder of the road and to ram a mango tree. As a result, petitioner
sustained a bone fracture in one of his legs. 1
The following proceedings thereafter took place: 2
Petitioner filed a complaint for damages against respondent Patrocinio Perez,
as owner of the cargo truck, based on a breach of contract of carriage and
against respondents Antonio Sioson and Lazaro Villanueva, as owner and
driver, respectively, of the pick-up truck, based on quasi-delict.
Respondent Sioson filed his answer alleging that he is not and never was an
owner of the pick-up truck and neither would he acquire ownership thereof in
the future.
On September 24, 1973, petitioner, with prior leave of court, filed his
amended complaint impleading respondents Jacinto Pagarigan and a certain
Rosario Vargas as additional alternative defendants. Petitioner apparently
could not ascertain who the real owner of said cargo truck was, whether
respondents Patrocinio Perez or Rosario Vargas, and who was the real
owner of said pick-up truck, whether respondents Antonio Sioson or Jacinto
Pagarigan.
Respondent Perez filed her amended answer with crossclaim against her co-
defendants for indemnity and subrogation in the event she is ordered to pay
petitioner's claim, and therein impleaded cross-defendant Alberto Cardeno as
additional alternative defendant.
On September 27, 1974, respondents Lazaro Villanueva, Alberto Cardeno,
Antonio Sioson and Jacinto Pagarigan, thru their insurer, Insurance
Corporation of the Philippines, paid petitioner's claim for injuries sustained in
the amount of P 1,300.00. By reason thereof, petitioner executed a release of
claim releasing from liability the following parties, viz: Insurance Corporation
of the Philippines, Alberto Cardeno, Lazaro Villanueva, Antonio Sioson and
Jacinto Pagarigan.
On December 2, 1974, respondents Lazaro Villanueva, Alberto Cardeno and
their insurer, the Insurance Corporation of the Philippines, paid respondent
Patrocinio Perez' claim for damages to her cargo truck in the amount of P
7,420.61.
Consequently, respondents Sioson, Pagarigan, Cardeno and Villanueva filed
a "Motion to Exonerate and Exclude Defs/ Cross defs. Alberto Cardeno,
Lazaro Villanueva, Antonio Sioson and Jacinto Pagarigan on the Instant
Case", alleging that respondents Cardeno and Villanueva already paid P
7,420.61 by way of damages to respondent Perez, and alleging further that
respondents Cardeno, Villanueva, Sioson and Pagarigan paid P 1,300.00 to
petitioner by way of amicable settlement.
Thereafter, respondent Perez filed her "Opposition to Cross-defs.' motion
dated Dec. 2, 1974 and Counter Motion" to dismiss. The so-called counter
motion to dismiss was premised on the fact that the release of claim executed
by petitioner in favor of the other respondents inured to the benefit of
respondent Perez, considering that all the respondents are solidarity liable to
herein petitioner.
On July 8, 1975, respondent judge issued the questioned order dismissing
the case, and a motion for the reconsideration thereof was denied. Hence,
this appeal, petitioner contending that respondent judge erred in declaring
that the release of claim executed by petitioner in favor of respondents
Sioson, Villanueva and Pagarigan inured to the benefit of respondent Perez;
ergo, it likewise erred in dismissing the case.
We find the present recourse devoid of merit.
The argument that there are two causes of action embodied in petitioner's
complaint, hence the judgment on the compromise agreement under the
cause of action based on quasi-delict is not a bar to the cause of action for
breach of contract of carriage, is untenable.
A cause of action is understood to be the delict or wrongful act or omission
committed by the defendant in violation of the primary rights of the
plaintiff. 3 It is true that a single act or omission can be violative of various
rights at the same time, as when the act constitutes juridically a violation of
several separate and distinct legal obligations. However where there is only
one delict or wrong, there is but a single cause of action regardless of the
number of rights that may have been violated belonging to one person. 4
The singleness of a cause of action lies in the singleness of the- delict or
wrong violating the rights of one person. Nevertheless, if only one injury
resulted from several wrongful acts, only one cause of action arises. 5 In the
case at bar, there is no question that the petitioner sustained a single injury
on his person. That vested in him a single cause of action, albeit with the
correlative rights of action against the different respondents through the
appropriate remedies allowed by law.
The trial court was, therefore, correct in holding that there was only one
cause of action involved although the bases of recovery invoked by petitioner
against the defendants therein were not necessarily Identical since the
respondents were not identically circumstanced. However, a recovery by the
petitioner under one remedy necessarily bars recovery under the other. This,
in essence, is the rationale for the proscription in our law against double
recovery for the same act or omission which, obviously, stems from the
fundamental rule against unjust enrichment.

There is no question that the respondents herein are solidarily liable to

petitioner. On the evidence presented in the court below, the trial court found
them to be so liable. It is undisputed that petitioner, in his amended
complaint, prayed that the trial court hold respondents jointly and severally
liable. Furthermore, the allegations in the amended complaint clearly
impleaded respondents as solidary debtors. We cannot accept the vacuous
contention of petitioner that said allegations are intended to apply only in the
event that execution be issued in his favor. There is nothing in law or
jurisprudence which would countenance such a procedure.

The respondents having been found to be solidarity liable to petitioner, the full
payment made by some of the solidary debtors and their subsequent release
from any and all liability to petitioner inevitably resulted in the extinguishment
and release from liability of the other solidary debtors, including herein
respondent Patrocinio Perez.

The claim that there was an agreement entered into between the parties
during the pre-trial conference that, after such payment made by the other
respondents, the case shall proceed as against respondent Perez is both
incredible and unsubstantiated. There is nothing in the records to show,
either by way of a pre-trial order, minutes or a transcript of the notes of the
alleged pre-trial hearing, that there was indeed such as agreement.

WHEREFORE, the challenged orders of the respondent judge are hereby

AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-66620 September 24, 1986
REMEDIO V. FLORES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. JUDGE HEILIA S. MALLARE-PHILLIPPS, IGNACIO BINONGCAL &
FERNANDO CALION, respondents.
Lucio A. Dixon for respondent F. Calion.
FERIA, J.:
The Court rules that the application of the totality rule under Section 33(l) of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 and Section 11 of the Interim Rules is subject to
the requirements for the permissive joinder of parties under Section 6 of Rule
3 which provides as follows:
Permissive joinder of parties.-All persons in whom or against
whom any right to relief in respect to or arising out of the same
transaction or series of transactions is alleged to exist,
whether jointly, severally, or in the alternative, may, except as
otherwise provided in these rules, join as plaintiffs or be joined
as defendants in one complaint, where any question of law or
fact common to all such plaintiffs or to all such defendants may
arise in the action; but the court may make such orders as
may be just to prevent any plaintiff or defendant from being
embarrassed or put to expense in connection with any
proceedings in which he may have no interest.
Petitioner has appealed by certiorari from the order of Judge Heilia S.
Mallare-Phillipps of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City and Benguet
Province which dismissed his complaint for lack of jurisdiction. Petitioner did
not attach to his petition a copy of his complaint in the erroneous belief that
the entire original record of the case shall be transmitted to this Court
pursuant to the second paragraph of Section 39 of BP129. This provision
applies only to ordinary appeals from the regional trial court to the Court of
Appeals (Section 20 of the Interim Rules). Appeals to this Court by petition for
review on certiorari are governed by Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (Section
25 of the Interim Rules).
However, the order appealed from states that the first cause of action alleged
in the complaint was against respondent Ignacio Binongcal for refusing to pay
the amount of P11,643.00 representing cost of truck tires which he purchased
on credit from petitioner on various occasions from August to October, 1981;
and the second cause of action was against respondent Fernando Calion for
allegedly refusing to pay the amount of P10,212.00 representing cost of truck
tires which he purchased on credit from petitioner on several occasions from
March, 1981 to January, 1982.
On December 15, 1983, counsel for respondent Binongcal filed a Motion to
Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction since the amount of the demand
against said respondent was only P11,643.00, and under Section 19(8) of
BP129 the regional trial court shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction if
the amount of the demand is more than twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00).
It was further averred in said motion that although another person, Fernando
Calion, was allegedly indebted to petitioner in the amount of P10,212.00, his
obligation was separate and distinct from that of the other respondent. At the
hearing of said Motion to Dismiss, counsel for respondent Calion joined in
moving for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
Counsel for petitioner opposed the Motion to Dismiss. As above stated, the
trial court dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction.
Petitioner maintains that the lower court has jurisdiction over the case
following the "novel" totality rule introduced in Section 33(l) of BP129 and
Section 11 of the Interim Rules.
The pertinent portion of Section 33(l) of BP129 reads as follows:
... Provided,That where there are several claims or causes of
action between the same or different parties, embodied in the
same complaint, the amount of the demand shall be the totality
 of the claims in all the causes of action, irrespective of whether
the causes of action arose out of the same or different
transactions. ...
Section 11 of the Interim Rules provides thus:
Application of the totality rule.-In actions where the jurisdiction
of the court is dependent on the amount involved, the test of
jurisdiction shall be the aggregate sum of all the money
demands, exclusive only of interest and costs, irrespective of
whether or not the separate claims are owned by or due to
different parties. If any demand is for damages in a civil action,
the amount thereof must be specifically alleged.
Petitioner compares the above-quoted provisions with the pertinent portion of
the former rule under Section 88 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 as amended
which reads as follows:
... Where there are several claims or causes of action between
the same parties embodied in the same complaint, the amount
of the demand shall be the totality of the demand in all the
causes of action, irrespective of whether the causes of action
arose out of the same or different transactions; but where the
claims or causes of action joined in a single complaint are
separately owned by or due to different parties, each separate
claim shall furnish the jurisdictional test. ...
and argues that with the deletion of the proviso in the former rule, the totality
rule was reduced to clarity and brevity and the jurisdictional test is the totality
of the claims in all, not in each, of the causes of action, irrespective of
whether the causes of action arose out of the same or different transactions.
This argument is partly correct. There is no difference between the former
and present rules in cases where a plaintiff sues a defendant on two or more
separate causes of action. In such cases, the amount of the demand shall be
the totality of the claims in all the causes of action irrespective of whether the
causes of action arose out of the same or different transactions. If the total
demand exceeds twenty thousand pesos, then the regional trial court has
jurisdiction. Needless to state, if the causes of action are separate and
independent, their joinder in one complaint is permissive and not mandatory,
and any cause of action where the amount of the demand is twenty thousand
pesos or less may be the subject of a separate complaint filed with a
metropolitan or municipal trial court.
On the other hand, there is a difference between the former and present rules
in cases where two or more plaintiffs having separate causes of action
against a defendant join in a single complaint. Under the former rule, "where
the claims or causes of action joined in a single complaint are separately
owned by or due to different parties, each separate claim shall furnish the
jurisdictional test" (Section 88 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 as
amended, supra). This was based on the ruling in the case of Vda. de
Rosario vs. Justice of the Peace, 99 Phil. 693. As worded, the former rule
applied only to cases of permissive joinder of parties plaintiff. However, it was
also applicable to cases of permissive joinder of parties defendant, as may be
deduced from the ruling in the case of Brillo vs. Buklatan, thus:
Furthermore, the first cause of action is composed of separate
claims against several defendants of different amounts each of
which is not more than P2,000 and falls under the jurisdiction
of the justice of the peace court under section 88 of Republic
Act No, 296. The several claims do not seem to arise from the
same transaction or series of transactions and there seem to
be no questions of law or of fact common to all the defendants
as may warrant their joinder under Rule 3, section 6.
Therefore, if new complaints are to be filed in the name of the
real party in interest they should be filed in the justice of the
peace court. (87 Phil. 519, 520, reiterated in Gacula vs.
Martinez, 88 Phil. 142, 146)
Under the present law, the totality rule is applied also to cases where two or
more plaintiffs having separate causes of action against a defendant join in a
single complaint, as well as to cases where a plaintiff has separate causes of
action against two or more defendants joined in a single complaint. However, parties, the amount demanded in each complaint shall furnish the
the causes of action in favor of the two or more plaintiffs or against the two or jurisdictional test.
more defendants should arise out of the same transaction or series of
transactions and there should be a common question of law or fact, as In the case at bar, the lower court correctly held that the jurisdictional test is
provided in Section 6 of Rule 3. subject to the rules on joinder of parties pursuant to Section 5 of Rule 2 and
Section 6 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court and that, after a careful scrutiny of
The difference between the former and present rules in cases of permissive the complaint, it appears that there is a misjoinder of parties for the reason
joinder of parties may be illustrated by the two cases which were cited in the that the claims against respondents Binongcal and Calion are separate and
case of Vda. de Rosario vs. Justice of the Peace (supra) as exceptions to the distinct and neither of which falls within its jurisdiction.
totality rule. In the case of Soriano y Cia vs. Jose (86 Phil. 523), where
twenty-nine dismissed employees joined in a complaint against the defendant WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is affirmed, without pronouncement
to collect their respective claims, each of which was within the jurisdiction of as to costs.
the municipal court although the total exceeded the jurisdictional amount, this
Court held that under the law then the municipal court had jurisdiction. In said SO ORDERED.
case, although the plaintiffs' demands were separate, distinct and
independent of one another, their joint suit was authorized under Section 6 of
Rule 3 and each separate claim furnished the jurisdictional test. In the case of
International Colleges, Inc. vs. Argonza (90 Phil. 470), where twenty-five
dismissed teachers jointly sued the defendant for unpaid salaries, this Court
also held that the municipal court had jurisdiction because the amount of
each claim was within, although the total exceeded, its jurisdiction and it was
a case of permissive joinder of parties plaintiff under Section 6 of Rule 3.

Under the present law, the two cases above cited (assuming they do not fall
under the Labor Code) would be under the jurisdiction of the regional trial
court. Similarly, in the abovecited cases of Brillo vs. Buklatan and Gacula vs.
Martinez (supra), if the separate claims against the several defendants arose
out of the same transaction or series of transactions and there is a common
question of law or fact, they would now be under the jurisdiction of the
regional trial court.

In other words, in cases of permissive joinder of parties, whether as plaintiffs

or as defendants, under Section 6 of Rule 3, the total of all the claims shall
now furnish the jurisdictional test. Needless to state also, if instead of joining
or being joined in one complaint separate actions are filed by or against the