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Borlongan vs Pena •

G.R. No. 143591 May 5, 2010TEODORO C. BORLONGAN, JR., CORAZON

LIM, JR., Petitioners, vs. MAGDALENO M. PEÑA andHON. MANUEL Q.
LIMSIACO, JR., as Judge Designate of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities,
Bago City, Respondents
Respondent Pena instituted a civil case for recovery of agent’s compensation
and expenses, damages andattorney’s fees against
Urban Bank and petitioners before the RTC. Petitioners filed a Motion to
dismiss, includingseveral documents as evidence. Atty Pena claims that the
documents were falsified. He subsequently filed hisComplaint -Affidavit with the
City Prosecutor.The prosecutor found probable cause and the Informations
were filed before MTCC. Warrants of arrest wereissued for the petitioners /
Upon the issuance of the warrant of arrest, petitioners immediately postedbail
as they wanted to avoid embarrassment, being then officers of Urban Ban. On
the scheduled date for the
arraignment, despite the petitioners’ refusal to enter a plea, the court a quo
entered a plea of “Not Guilty” for
The accused questioned the validity of the warrant of arrest
. However, the trial court ruled that
posting ofbail constitutes a waiver of any irregularity
in the issuance of a warrant of arrest.
: Can the petitioners still question the validity of the warrant of arrest despite
posting bail?

:The erstwhile ruling of this Court was that posting of bail constitutes a waiver
of any irregularity in the issuance ofa warrant of arrest, that has
already been superseded by Section 26, Rule 114
of the Revised Rule of CriminalProcedure. The principle that the accused
is precluded from questioning the legality of the arrest after arraignmentis true
only if he voluntarily enters his plea and participates during trial, without
previously invoking his objectionsthereto.Moreover, considering the conduct of
the petitioner after posting her personal bail bond, it canno t be argued thatshe
waived her right to question the finding of probable cause and to assail
the warrant of arrest issued against herby the respondent judge.
There must be clear and convincing proof that the petitioner had an actual
intention torelinquish her right
to question the existence of probable cause. When the only proof of intention
rests on what aparty does, his act should be so manifestly consistent with, and
indicative of, an intent to voluntarily andunequivocally relinquish the particular
right that no other explanation of his conduct is possible. x x x.Herein
petitioners filed the Omnibus Motion to Quash, Recall Warrants of Arrest
and/or For Reinvestigation on thesame day that they posted bail. Their bail
bonds likewise expressly contained a stipulation that they were notwaiving their
right to question the validity of their arrest. On the date of their arraignment,
petitioners refused toenter their plea
due to the fact that the issue on the legality of their arrest is still pending with
the Court. Thus,when the court a quo entered a plea of not guilty for them, there
was no valid waiver of their right to precludethem from raising the same with
the Court of Appeals or this Court. The posting of bail bond was a matter
ofimperative necessity to avert their incarceration; it
should not be deemed as a waiver of their right
to assail theirarrest.
Gabo vs pp. •
On May 14, 2001, around 12:15 a.m., a fire broke out inside the plant of
Sanyoware Plastic ProductsManufacturing Corporation (Sanyoware).
Investigations were conducted by the Philippine 3rd Regional Criminal
Investigationand Detention Group (CIDG) and the Inter Agency Anti-Arson
Task Force (IATF) of the Department of the Interior and LocalGovernment and
the respondent were accused of destructive arson. In support of the accusation,
petitioner submitted the SwornStatements of Richard Madrideo, Jaime Kalaw,
Raymund Dy, Chit Chua, Jennifer Chua Reyes, Shanda Amistad,
SPO1Valeriano Dizon and Inspector Allan N. Barredo, which contains the
following:* That the respondent was threatened to write a sworn statement
against his will wherein if anyone ask about the fire he wouldsay that it did not
break out simultaneously and its cause was a defective wiring.* That a week
before the fire occurred, almost 300 unserviceable molds were transferred to the
burned Sanyoware warehouse. Aday before the fire, expensive finished products
were loaded in delivery trucks and saw the respondent took a rectangular
shapeobject from his vehicle.* That saleable products from the burned
warehouse were transferred to the Sanyo City Warehouse, while unusable
componentsfrom the Sanyo City warehouse were transferred to the burned
warehouse which was ordered to finish on May 12, 2001.*That an employee at
the Accounting Department claimed that the company was indebted to a number
of banks and corporation.Respondent submitted a Counter-Affidavit to refute
the allegations, it states that the ocular inspection wasnot conducted and the
Inter Agency Anti-Arson Task Force (IATF) did not even conducted any
investigation, except in essenceto ask the witnesses of complainant to identify
under oath their sworn statements executed before the complainant and to
askrespondents to submit their sworn statements and later to identify the same
under oath.Respondents filed a Motion to Conduct Hearing to Determine
Probable Cause and to Hold in Abeyance the Issuance of Warrantof Arrest
Pending Determination of Probable Cause.Due to lack of probable cause, the
RTC Dismissed the case which the Court of Appeals affirmed. And it is now a
petition forcertiorari to set aside the previous resolution.Petitioner alleged that
the respondent court lacked or exceeded its jurisdiction or committed grave
abuse of discretion in itsresolution when it applies the equipoise rule in
dismissing the case.
Whether or not respondent court lacked or exceeded its jurisdiction or
committed grave abuse of discretion.
The basis of RTC in dismissing the case is that, the sworn statements submitted
by the petitioner and thesworn statements submitted by the respondents
contained contradictory positions.This court finds that the RTC had in fact
complied with the requirement under the rules of personally evaluatingthe
resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence and that the assailed
Order was arrived at after due consideration ofthe merits thereto. Based on the
statement of Marideo (one of the witnesses), it appears that the fire broke out in
2 places which,presupposes or implies that some sort of incendiary or
inflammable substances ignited to start the fire. However, on theinvestigation
conducted by Bocaue Fire Station, it appears to have ruled out the use of
incendiary or inflammable substancesand was found negative of any flammable
substances. This physical evidence puts the truth of the latter in grave doubt.
AlsoInvestigation conducted point to the faulty wiring as the cause of
origin.Physical evidence is evidence of the highest order. It speaks more
eloquently than a hundred witnesses.The conclusions of the RTC which led to
the dismissal of the information against respondents cannot, in anysense, be
characterized as outrageously wrong or manifestly mistaken, or whimsically or
capriciously arrived at. The worst thatmay perhaps be said of it is that it is fairly
debatable, and may even be possibly erroneous. But they cannot be declared to
havebeen made with grave abuse of discretion.The judge is required to
personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence.
Hemay immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to
establish probable cause. To this Court's mind, theRTC had complied with its
duty of personally evaluating the supporting evidence of the prosecution before
arriving at its decisionof dismissing the case against respondents
Soliven vs makasiar •
Luis Beltran is among the petitioners in this case. He, together with others, was
charged with libel by the then president Corzaon Aquino. Cory herself filed a
complaint-affidavit against him and others. Makasiar averred that Cory cannot
file a complaint affidavit because this would defeat her immunity from suit. He
grounded his contention on the principle that a president cannot be sued.
However, if a president would sue then the president would allow herself to be
placed under the court’s jurisdiction and conversely she would be consenting to
be sued back. Also, considering the functions of a president, the president may
not be able to appear in court to be a witness for herself thus she may be liable
for contempt.
ISSUE: Whether or not such immunity can be invoked by Beltran, a person
other than the president.
HELD: No. The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of
immunity from suit is to assure the exercise of Presidential duties and functions
free from any hindrance or distraction, considering that being the Chief
Executive of the Government is a job that, aside from requiring all of the office -
holder’s time, also demands undivided attention.
But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of
the office and may be invoked only by the holder of the office; not by any other
person in the President’s behalf. Thus, an accused like Beltran et al, in a
criminal case in which the President is the complainant cannot raise the
presidential privilege as a defense to prevent the case from proceeding against
such accused.
Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from
waiving the privilege. Thus, if so minded the President may shed the protection
afforded by the privilege and submit to the court’s jurisdiction. The choice of
whether to exercise the privilege or to waive it is solely the President’s
prerogative. It is a decision that cannot be assumed and imposed by any other
people vs racho •
A confidential agent of the police transacted through cellular phone with
appellant for the purchase of shabu. Appellant called up the agent and informed him
that he was on board a Genesis bus and would arrive in Baler, Aurora. Having alighted
from the bus, appellant was about to board a tricycle when the team of police authorities
approached him and invited him to the police station. As he pulled out his hands from his
pants’ pocket, a white envelope slipped therefrom which, when opened, yielded a small
sachet containing the suspected drug.
Appellant was charged in two separate information, one for violation of Section
5 of ra 9165 for transporting or delivering and the second, of section 11 of the
same law for possessing,dangerous drugs.
Issue: the warrant of arrest was violated.
Won the evidence was admissible in evidence. •
Ruling: NO. Reliable information alone is not sufficient probable
cause to effect a valid warrantless arrest. The SC required the showing of some overt
act indicative of the criminal design.
2 . No . Th i s i s a n i n s t a n c e o f s e i z u r e o f t h e “ f r u i t o f t h e
p o i s o n o u s t r e e ” H e n c e , t h e confiscated item is inadmissible in evidence. the
constitution states that a search and consequent seizure must be carried out with a judicial
warrant; otherwise, it becomes unreasonable and
any evidence obtained therefrom shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any
Said proscription, however, admits of exceptions,namely)
warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest •
search of evidence in ;plain view •
search of a moving vehicle •
consented warrantless search •
customs search •
Stop and frisk •
exigent and emergency circumstances. •

People vs laguio •
Petitioner, People of the Philippines filed this petition for review to nullify and
set aside the resolution of RTC in criminal case, granting private respondent,
Lawrence Wang Demurrer to Evidence and aquitting him of 3 charges filed
against him.
The trial court resolved the case on the basis of its findings that the arrest
preceded the search, and finding no basis to rule in favor of a lawful arrest, it
ruled that the incidental search is likewise unlawful. Any and all pieces of
evidence acquired as a consequence thereof are inadmissible in evidence. Thus,
the trial court dismissed the case for lack of evidence.

Contrary to its position at the trial court, the People, however, now posits that
inasmuch as it has been shown in the present case that the sei zure without
warrant of the regulated drugs and unlicensed firearms in the accused
possession had been validly made upon probable cause and under exigent
circumstances, then the warrantless arrest of the accused must necessarily have
to be regarded as having been made on the occasion of the commission of the
crime in flagrante delicto, and therefore constitutionally and statutorily
permissible and lawful. In effect, the People now contends that the warrantless
search preceded the warrantless arrest. Since the case falls under an exception
to the general rule requiring search warrant prior to a valid search and seizure,
the police officers were justified in requiring the private respondent to open his
BMW cars trunk to see if he was carrying illegal drugs.

Issue: whether there was lawful arrest, search and seizure by the police
operatives in this case despite the absence of a warrant of arrest and/or a search


NO. The facts and circumstances surrounding the present case did not manifest
any suspicious behavior on the part of private respondent Lawrence Wang that
would reasonably invite the attention of the police. He was merely walking from
the Maria Orosa Apartment and was about to enter the parked BMW car when
the police operatives arrested him, frisked and searched his person and
commanded him to open the compartment of the car, which was later on found
to be owned by his friend, David Lee. He was not committing any visible offense
then. Therefore, there can be no valid warrantless arrest in flagrante
delicto under paragraph (a) of Section 5. It is settled that reliable information
alone, absent any overt act indicative of a felonious enterprise in the presence
and within the view of the arresting officers, is not sufficient to constitute
probable cause that would justify an in flagrante delicto arrest.

Neither may the warrantless arrest be justified under paragraph (b) of Section 5.
What is clearly established from the testimonies of the arrestin g officers is that
Wang was arrested mainly on the information that he was the employer of
Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio who were previously arrested and charged for
illegal transport of shabu. Teck and Junio did not even categorically identify
Wang to be their source of the shabu they were caught with in flagrante delicto.
Upon the duos declaration that there will be a delivery of shabu on the early
morning of the following day, May 17, which is only a few hours thereafter, and
that Wang may be found in Maria Orosa Apartment along Maria Orosa Street,
the arresting officers conducted surveillance operation in front of said
apartment, hoping to find a person which will match the description of one
Lawrence Wang, the employer of Teck and Junio. These circumstances do not
sufficiently establish the existence of probable cause based on personal
knowledge as required in paragraph (b) of Section 5.

And doubtless, the warrantless arrest does not fall under paragraph (c) of
Section 5.

The inevitable conclusion, as correctly made by the trial court, is that t he

warrantless arrest was illegal. Ipso jure, the warrantless search incidental to the
illegal arrest is likewise unlawful.
Zalameda vs people •

A petition for review on certiorari involving the decision of the Court of Appeals
which affirmed the conviction of the RTC of Makati City against petitioner
The petitioner was charged and found guilty of violating Sections 11 and 12 of
R.A.9165 (The Comprehensive Drug Act of 2002).On September 14, 2003, the
desk officer of Precinct I of Makati City received a phone call from a
concerned citizen reporting an ongoing “pot session” at Brgy. Tejeros, Makati City. Acting
on the
report,the police operatives proceeded to the reported address. Upon reaching
their destination, the policeofficers found a house at about 3 x 6 meters. The
door was slightly open. SPO2 de Guzman peepedinside and saw petitioner
Zalameda and his co- accused Villafor sniffing a smoke. SPO2 signaled the
restof the police operatives and they immediately rushed inside the house.
Accused Villaflor was holding atooter at that point which he threw away. The
Police officers then frisked the two accused according topolic e procedures and
was able to recover the following:-rectangular sachet containing white
crystalline substance-aluminum foils (confirmed later to have traces of shabu)-
pair of scissors-disposable lighter-a bag with plastic zipper-an improvised
tooterPetitioner and co-accused were found guilty of the crime charged before
the RTC of Makati City.On appeal, petitioner alleges that the confiscated items
are inadmissible as evidence againstthem as the arrest, search and seizure were
unlawful. The appellate court ruled against the petitioner,hence this petition for
Whether or not the arrest, search and seizure were unlawful and invalid.
The petition was denied for lack of merit. The conviction of the appellate
court was AFFIRMEDwith modification as to penalties.
Paragraph (a) of Section 5, Rule 113 is commonly known as an in flagrante
delictoarrest. For a warrantless arrest of an accused caught in flagrante delicto
to be valid, two requisites mustconcur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute
an overt act indicating that he has just committed, isactually committing, or is
attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presenceor
within the view of the arresting officer.

P pvs aminnudin •
The PC (Philippine Constabulary) officer received a tip from one of their
informers that the accused was on board a vessel bound for Iloilo City and was
carrying marijuana. He was identified by name. Acting on this tip, they waited
for him in the evening and approached him as he descended from the gangplank
after the informer pointed at him. They detained him and inspected the bag he
was carrying. It was found to contained three kilos of what were later analyzed
as marijuana leaves by the NBI forensic examiner. On the basis of the finding,
the corresponding charge was then filed against Aminnudin.
Issue: Whether or not accused constitutional right against unreasonable serach
and seizure is violated
Ruling: The Supreme Court Held that warrantless arrest allowed under Rule
113 of the rules of court not justified unless the accused was caught in flagrante
or a crime was about to be committed or had just been committed.A vessels and
aircraft are subject to warrantless searches and seizures for violation of the
customs law because these vehicles may be quickly moved out of the locality or
jurisdiction before the warrant can be secured. In the present case, from the
conflicting declarations of the PC witnesses, it is clear that they had at least two
days within which they could have obtained a warrant to arrest and search
Aminnudin who was coming to Iloilo on the M/V Wilcon 9. His name was
known. The vehicle was identified. The date of his arrival was certain. And from
the information they have received, they could have persuaded a judge that there
was a probable cause, indeed, to justify the issuance of a warrant. Yet they did
nothing. The Bill of Rights was ignored altogether because the PC lieutenant
who was the head of the arresting team had determine on his own authority that
a search warrant was not necessary.The evidence of probable cause should be
determined by a judge and not law enforcement agents.ACQUITTED

Pp vs molina •
Accused were charged and found guilty of violating the Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972 for having in their possession 946.9 grams of marijuana and were
sentenced to death.
NO. Accused-appellants manifested no outward indication that would justify
their arrest. In holding a bag on board a trisikad, accused-appellants could not
be said to be committing, attempting to commit, or have committed a crime.
There was no probable cause in arresting the accused thus making the arrest
illegal. Because the arrest was illegal, so was the search made by the police
officers. This being the case, the evidence is inadmissible and the accused are
found not guilty of the alleged offense.

Malacat vs ca •
Petitioner was arrested for having in his possession a hand grenade after he was
searched by a group of policemen when he was said to be acting suspiciously
when he was hanging around Plaza Miranda with his eyes moving fast together
with other Muslim-looking men. When the policemen approached the group of
men, they scattered in all directions which prompted the police to give chase and
petitioner was then apprehended and a search was made on his person.
He was then convicted under PD 1866 in the lower court. Hence, the present
petition wherein petitioner contended that the lower court erred in holding that
the search made on him and the seizure of the hand grenade from him was an
appropriate incident to his arrest and that it erred in admitting the hand grenade
as evidence since it was admissible because it was a product of an unreasonable
and illegal search.

Issue: WON the search and seizure conducted by the police was valid.

The general rule as regards arrests, searches and seizures is that a warrant is
needed in order to validly effect the same. 31 The Constitutional prohibition
against unreasonable arrests, searches and seizures refers to those effected
without a validly issued warrant, 32 subject to certain exceptions. As regards
valid warrantless arrests, these are found in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of
Court, which reads, in part:
Sec. 5. — Arrest, without warrant; when lawful — A peace officer or a private
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it;
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped . . .
A warrantless arrest under the circumstances contemplated under Section 5(a)
has been denominated as one "in flagrante delicto," while that under Section
5(b) has been described as a "hot pursuit" arrest.
Turning to valid warrantless searches, they are limited to the following: (1)
customs searches; (2) search of moving vehicles; (3) seizure of evidence in plain
view; (4) consent searches; 33 (5) a search incidental to a lawful arrest;34 and (6)
a "stop and frisk.’
At the outset, we note that the trial court confused the concepts of a "stop-and-
frisk" and of a search incidental to a lawful arrest. These two types of
warrantless searches differ in terms of the requisite quantum of proof before
they may be validly effected and in their allowable scope.
In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest determines the
validity of the incidental search, the legality of the arrest is questioned in a large
majority of these cases, e.g., whether an arrest was merely used as a pretext for
conducting a search. 36 In this instance, the law requires that there first be a
lawful arrest before a search can be made — the process cannot be
reversed. 37 At bottom, assuming a valid arrest, the arresting officer may search
the person of the arrestee and the area within which the latter may reach for a
weapon or for evidence to destroy, and seize any money or property found which
was used in the commission of the crime, or the fruit of the crime, or that which
may be used as evidence, or which might furnish the arrestee with the means of
escaping or committing violence.
We now proceed to the justification for and allowable scope of a "stop-and-
frisk" as a "limited protective search of outer clothing for weapons," as laid
down in Terry, thus:
We merely hold today that where a police officer observes unusual conduct
which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal
activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be
armed and presently dangerous, where in the course of investigating this
behavior he identifies himself as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries,
and where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his
reasonable fear for his own or others' safety, he is entitled for the protection of
himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the
outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might
be used to assault him. Such a search is a reasonable search under the Fourth
Amendment . .
Other notable points of Terry are that while probable cause is not required to
conduct a "stop and frisk," it nevertheless holds that mere suspicion or a hunch
will not validate a "stop and frisk." A genuine reason must exist, in light of the
police officer's experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief
that the person detained has weapons concealed about him. Finally, a "stop-
and-frisk" serves a two-fold interest: (1) the general interest of effective crime
prevention and detection, which underlies the recognition that a police officer
may, under appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner, approach
a person for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even without
probable cause; and (2) the more pressing interest of safety and self-
preservation which permit the police officer to take steps to assure himself that
the person with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that could
and fatally be used against the police officer. •
People vs mengote •
The Western Police District received a telephone call from an •
informer that there were three suspicious looking persons at the corner of
Juan Luna and North Bay Boulevard in Tondo, Manila. A surveillance
team of plainclothesmen was forthwith dispatched to the place. The
patrolmen saw two men looking from side to side, one of whom holding
his abdomen. They approached the persons and identified themselves as
policemen, whereupon the two tried to run but unable to escape because
the other lawmen surrounded them. The suspects were then searched. One
of them the accused-appellant was found with a .38 caliber with live
ammunitions in it, while his companion had a fan knife. The weapons
were taken from them and they were turned over to the poli ce
headquarters for investigation. An information was filed before the RTC
convicting the accused of illegal possession of firearm arm. A witness
testified that the weapon was among the articles stolen at his shop, which
he reported to the police including the revolver. For his part, Mengote
made no effort to prove that he owned the fire arm or that he was licensed
to possess it but instead, he claimed that the weapon was planted on him
at the time of his arrest. He was convicted for violation of P.D.1866 a nd
was sentenced to reclusion perpetua. In his appeal he pleads that the
weapon was not admissible as evidence against him because it had been
illegally seized and therefore the fruit of a poisonous tree .

Issue: Whether or not the warrantless search and arrest was illegal.

Held: An evidence obtained as a result of an illegal search and seizure

inadmissible in any proceeding for any purpose as provided by Art. III sec
32 of the Constitution. Rule 113 sec.5 of the Rules of Court, provides
arrest without warrant lawful when: (a) the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense,
(b) when the offense in fact has just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of the facts indicating the person arrested has committed it and
(c) the person to be arrested has escaped from a penal establishment or a
place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his
case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.

These requirements have not been established in the case at bar. At the
time of the arrest in question, the accused appellant was merely looking
from side to side and holding his abdomen, according to the arresting
officers themselves. There was apparently no offense that has just been
committed or was being actually committed or at least being attempt by
Mengote in their presence. Moreover a person may not be stopped and
frisked in a broad daylight or on a busy street on unexplained suspicion .

Judgment is reversed and set aside. Accused-appellant is acquitted.

People vs tangliben •
Facts: Patrolmen Silverio and Romeo Punzalan were •
conducting surveillance at the San Fernando Victory Liner Terminal. At
around 9:30pm they noticed a person, Medel Tangliben, carrying a
traveling bag who acted suspiciously. They confronted him, inspected his
bag, and there they found marijuana leaves. The accused was then taken
to the Police Headquarters for further investigations. The TC found
Tangliben guilty of violating sec.4 art. 2 of the RA 6425 or the Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972.

Issue: Whether or Not there was an unlawful search due to lack of search

Held: No. Rule 113 sec. 5 provides the a peace officer or a private person
may w/o a warrant arrest a person when in his presence the person to be
arrested has committed, is committing, or is attempting to commit an

In the present case, the accused was found to have been committing
possession of marijuana and can be therefore searched lawfully even
without a search warrant. Another reason is that this case poses urgency
on the part of the arresting police officers. It was found out that an
informer pointed to the accused telling the policemen that the accused was
carrying marijuana. The police officers had to act quickly and there was
not enough time to secure a search warrant.

People vs maspil •
By the virtue of the report coming from the informants, •
that two persons would be transporting a large quantity of marijuana,
Police officers set up a check point in Benguet to monitor, inspect and
scrutinize vehicles bound for baguio city . after hours of waitng, a
jeepney was flagged down in the check point and the informers
identified the two. When inspected the jeepney, there were sacks and
cans inside it, when opened, the sacks and cans were filled with
marijuana leaves. The two were placed under arrest.
Issue: was the arrest valid •
Held:yes. The court again made a distinction between •
maspil and aminnudin case. In the latter, the officers were aware of the
identity of the accused, his plans and the vessel that he would be taking.
Further, the officers have ample of time to obtain warrant but failed to
do so. In the former, the officers had no exact description of the vehicle
of the accused and no idea as to what the vehicle would exactly arrive.
The court explained that the jeepney on the road is not the •
same as the passenger boat route and at the time of arrival of which
are more less certain and which ordinarily cannot deviate or alter its
course or select another destination.
Pp vs agojo •
FACTS:AGOJO was arrested via a buy - b ust operation, who
was subsequently convicted by the trial court and was sentencedto suffer the penalty
of death. On the other hand, AGOJOassails his arrest by giving
his own version of the story, which was eventually rendered as "self-serving"
version of the story.

ISSUE:Whether or not the ARREST of AGOJO is proper even thoughthe


HELD: YES. In this case, appellant points to the arrest not being in
flagrantedelicto, the existence of discrepancies in the serial numbers of the buy-
bustmoney and a prior attempt to frame him up as proofs of thef r am e -
up. However, the fact that the arrest was not
i n f l a g r a n t e d e l i c t o i s o f n o c o n s e q u e n c e . Th e a r r e s t w a s
validly executed pursuant to Section 5, paragraph (b) of Rule 113 of the
Rules of Court, which states:Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. —
Apeace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to
bea r r e s t e d h a s c om m it t e d , i s a c t u a l l y c om m it t i n g , o r i s attempting
to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has in fact been committed and he
has personal knowledge
of f a c t s i n d i c a t i n g t h a t t h e p e r s o n t o b e a r r e s t e d h a s
committed it; and, (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped
from penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily
confined w h i l e h i s c a s e i s p e n d i n g , o r h a s e s c a p e d w h i l e b e i n g
transferred from one confinement to another. The second instance of lawful
warrantless arrest covered by
paragraph(b) cited above necessitates two stringent requirements before
a warrantless arrest can be effected: (1) an offense has just been committed;
and (2) the person making the arrest has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it. A review of the
records shows that both requirements were met in this case.
Abelita vs doria •
Judge Abelita III filed a complaint for Damages against P/Supt. Doria and
SPO3 Ramirez. Petitioner alleged that while he andhis family are on their way
home, these two officers requested them to proceed to the Provincial PNP
Headquarters at Camp BoniSerrano, Masbate, Masbate. He was forcibly taken
and was searched without warrant. A shotgun was found in his possession and
hewas arrested. Petitioner was charged with illegal possession of firearms and
frustrated murder. The trial court found that petitionerwas at the scene of the
shooting incident in Barangay Nursery. The trial court ruled that the police
officers who conducted the searchwere of the belief, based on reasonable
grounds, that petitioner was involved in the incident and that the firearm used in
commission of the offense was in his possession. The trial court ruled that
petitioner’s warrantless arrest and the warrantl
ess seizure ofthe firearms were valid and legal,
thus, rejecting petitioner’s claim for frame up.


Whether the warrantless arrest and warrantless search and seizure were illegal
under Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules onCriminal Procedure;

No.For the warrantless arrest under this Rule to be valid, two requisites must
concur: (1) the offender has just committed anoffense; and (2) the arresting
peace officer or private person has personal knowledge of facts indicating that
the person to be arrestedhas committed it.Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules
on Criminal Procedure does not require the arresting officers to personally
witness thecommission of the offense with their own eyes. In this case, P/Supt.
Doria received a report about the alleg ed shooting incident. SPO3Ramirez
investigated the report and learned from witnesses that petitioner was
involved in the incident. They were able to track downpetitioner, but when
invited to the police headquarters to shed light on the incident, petitioner
initially agreed then sped up his vehicle,prompting the police authorities to give
Petitioner’s act of trying to get away, coupled with the incident report which they
investigated, is enough to raise a reasonable suspicion on the part of the police
authorities as to the existence of probable cause.The seizure of the firearms was
justified under the plain view doctrine. The plain view doctrine applies when the
followingrequisites concur: (1) the law enforcement officer in search of the
evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a positionfrom which
he can view a particular area; (2) the discovery of the evidence in plain view is
inadvertent; and (3) it is immediatelyapparent to the officer that the item he
observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to
seizure.The police authorities were in the area because that was where they
caught up with petitioner after the chase. They saw the firearmsinside the
vehicle when petitioner opened the door. Since a shooting in cident just took
place and it was reported that petitioner was

involved in the incident, it was apparent to the police officers that the firearms
may be evidence of a crime, hence they were justified inseizing the firearms.

Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling in the plain view of an officer who
has a right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may
be presented as evidence.
The plain view doctrine applies when the following requisites concur:
(1) the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification
for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular area; (2)
the discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent; and (3) it
isimmediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence
of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure.

In Abelita III vs. Doria, the Supreme Court stated that the police officers
were justified in seizing the firearms because the police authorities were in the
area because that was where they caught up with petitioner after the chase. They
saw the firearms inside the vehicle when petitioner opened the door. Since a
shooting incident just took place and it was reported that petitioner was involved
in the incident, it was apparent to the police officers that the firearms may be
evidence of a crime. Hence, they were justified in seizing the firearms(ABELITA
III vs. DORIA, G.R. No. 170672, August 14, 2009, First Division, Carpio, J.).
Relative thereto, it bears emphasis that the “plain view doctrine” may not
be used to launch unbridled searches and indiscriminate seizures or to extend a
general exploratory search made solely to find evidence of defendant’s guilt.
The doctrine is usually applied where a police officer is not searching for
evidence against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an
incriminating object. (VALEROSO vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No.
164815, September 3, 2009, Third Divisio, Nachura, J.).

As the Supreme Court enunciated in People v. Cubcubin, Jr. (413 Phil

249 (2001), and and People v. Leangsiri, 322 Phil. 226 (1996):

“What the “plain view” cases have in common is that the police officer
in each of them had a prior justification for an intrusion in the course of
which[,] he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the
accused. The doctrine serves to supplement the prior justification – whether it be
a warrant for another object, hot pursuit, search incident to lawful arrest, or
some other legitimate reason for being present unconnected with a search
directed against the accused – and permits the warrantless seizure. Of course,
the extension of the original justification is legitimate only where it is
immediately apparent to the police that they have evidence before them; the
“plain view” doctrine may not be used to extend a general exploratory search
from one object to another until something incriminating at last
emerges”(People v. Cubcubin, Jr. (413 Phil 249 (2001), and and People v.
Leangsiri, 322 Phil. 226 (1996) cited in VALEROSO vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
G.R. No. 164815, September 3, 2009, Third Division, Nachura, J.).
People vs gerente •
The Valenzuela Police Station received a report about a mauling incident. Upon
learning at the hospital that the victim died on arrival a nd being informed of the
cause of death, the policemen proceeded to the crime scene where they found a
piece of wood with blood stains, a hollow block and two roaches of marijuana.
After being told by the eyewitness the identity of one of the three assaila nts, the
policemen went to appellant’s house where they introduced themselves, and
apprehended him and confiscated dried marijuana leaves.
Whether or not the search of appellant’s person and the seizure of the
marijuana leaves in his possession were valid.
YES. The policemen arrested appellant only some three (3) hours after he and
his companions had killed the victim. They saw the victim dead in the hospital
and when they inspected the scene of the crime, they found the instruments of
death. The eyewitness reported the happening to the policemen and pinpointed
her neighbor, the appellant, as one of the killers. Under those circumstances,
since the policemen had personal knowledge of the violent death of the victim
and of facts indicating that appellant and two others had killed him, they could
lawfully arrest him without a warrant. If they had postponed his arrest until they
could obtain a warrant, he would have fled the law as his two companions did.
The search conducted on appellant’s person was likewise lawful because it was
made as an incident to a valid arrest.
Appealed decision is AFFIRMED with modification.