CONCEPT OF EVENTS

Lasam vs Smith
G.R. No. L-1949, February 2, 1924
Ostrand, J.

Facts:

The defendant was the owner of a public garage in the town of San
Fernando, La Union, and engaged in the business of carrying passengers
for hire from one point to another in the Province of La Union and the
surrounding provinces. Defendant undertook to convey the plaintiffs from
San Fernando to Currimao, Ilocos Norte, in a Ford automobile.

On leaving San Fernando, the automobile was operated by a licensed

chauffeur, but after having reached the town of San Juan, the chauffeur
allowed his assistant, Bueno, to drive the car. Bueno held no driver’s license,
but had some experience in driving.The car functioned well until after the
crossing of the Abra River in Tagudin, when, according to the testimony of
the witnesses for the plaintiffs, defects developed in the steering gear so as
to make accurate steering impossible, and after zigzagging for a distance of
about half kilometer, the car left the road and went down a steep
embankment. The automobile was overturned and the plaintiffs pinned down
under it. Mr. Lasam escaped with a few contusions and a dislocated rib, but
his wife, Joaquina, received serious injuries, among which was a compound
fracture of one of the bones in her left wrist. She also suffered nervous
breakdown from which she has not fully recovered at the time of trial. 7.

The complaint was filed about a year and a half after and alleges that the
accident was due to defects in the automobile as well as to the incompetence
and negligence of the chauffeur.The trial court held, however, that the cause
of action rests on the defendant’s breach of the
contract of carriage and that, consequently, articles 1101-1107 of the Civil
Code, and not article 1903, are applicable. The court further found that the
breach of contract was not due to fortuitous events and that, therefore the
defendant was liable in damages.
Issue:

1. Is the trial court correct in its findings that the breach of contract was
not due to a fortuitous event?

Ruling:

Yes. It is sufficient to reiterate that the source of the defendant’s legal liability
is the contract of carriage; that by entering into that contract he bound himself
to carry the plaintiffs safely and securely to their destination; and that having
failed to do so he is liable in damages unless he shows that the failure to
fulfill his obligation was due to causes mentioned in article 1105 of the Civil
Code, which reads:

“No one shall be liable for events which could not be foreseen or which, even
if foreseen, were inevitable, with the exception of the cases in which the law
expressly provides otherwise and those in which the obligation itself imposes
such liability.”

As will be seen, some extraordinary circumstances independent of the will of

the obligor, or of his employees, is an essential element of a caso fortuito. In
the present case, this element is lacking. It is not suggested that the accident
in question was due to an act of God or to adverse road conditions which
could have been foreseen. As far as the record shows, the accident was
caused either by defects in the automobile or else through the negligence of
its driver. That is not a caso fortuito.

Republic of the Philippines vs Luzon Stevedoring Corporation

G.R. No. L-21749 , September 29, 1967
Reyes, J.B.L., J

Facts

In the early afternoon of August 17, 1960, barge L- 1892, owned by the
Luzon StevedoringCorporation was being towed down the Pasig River by
two tugboats when the barge rammedagainst one of the wooden piles of
the Nagtahan bailey bridge, smashing the posts and causingthe bridge to
list. The river, at the time, was swollen and the current swift, on account of
theheavy downpour in Manila and the surrounding provinces on August 15
and 16, 1960. The Republic of the Philippines sued Luzon Stevedoring for
actual and consequential damagecaused by its employees, amounting to
P200,000.Defendant Corporation disclaimed liability on the grounds that it
had exercised due diligence inthe selection and supervision of its
employees that the damages to the bridge were caused byforce majeure,
that plaintiff has no capacity to sue, and that the Nagtahan bailey bridge is
anobstruction to navigation.4.

After due trial, the court rendered judgment on June 11, 1963, holding the
defendant liable forthe damage caused by its employees and ordering it to
pay plaintiff the actual cost of the repairof the Nagtahan bailey bridge which
amounted to P192,561.72, with legal interest from the dateof the filing of
the complaint.

Issue

1. Was the collision of appellant's barge with the supports or piers of the
Nagtahan bridge causedby fortuitous event or force majeure?

Ruling

1 .No. Considering that the Nagtahan bridge was an immovable and

stationary object and uncontrovertedly provided with adequate openings for
the passage of water craft, including barges like of appellant's, it was
undeniable that the unusual event that the barge, exclusively controlled by
appellant, rammed the bridge supports raises a presumption of negligence
on the part of appellant or its employees manning the barge or the tugs that
towed it.

2. For in the ordinary course of events, such a thing will not happen if
proper care is used. In Anglo American Jurisprudence, the inference arises
by what is known as the "res ipsa loquitur" rule.The appellant strongly
stressed the precautions taken by it on the day in question: that it assigned
two of its most powerful tugboats to tow down river its barge L- 1892; that it
assigned to the task the more competent and experienced among its
patrons, had the towlines, engine sand equipment double-checked and
inspected' that it instructed its patrons to take extra precautions; and
concludes that it had done all it was called to do, and that the accident,
therefore, should be held due to force majeure or fortuitous event.

3. These very precautions, however, completely destroyed the appellant's

defense. For caso fortuito or force majeure (which in law are identical in
so far as they exempt an obligor from liability) by definition, are
extraordinary events not foreseeable or avoidable, "events thatcould not be
foreseen, or which, though foreseen, were inevitable " (Art. 1174, Civ.
Code of the Philippines). It was, therefore, not enough that the event
should not have been foreseen oranticipated, as was commonly believed
but it must be one impossible to foresee or to avoid. The mere difficulty to
foresee the happening was not impossibility to foresee the same. The very
measures adopted by appellant prove that the possibility of danger was not
only foreseeable, but actually foreseen, and was not caso fortuito.

Candida Virata vs Victorio Ochoa

G.R. No. L-46179 January 31, 1978
Fernandez, J.

FACTS:

In September 1975, Borilla was driving a jeep when he hit Arsenio Virata
thereby causing the latter’s death. The heirs of Virata sued Borilla through
an action for homicide through reckless imprudence in the CFI of Rizal.
Virata’s lawyer reserved their right to file a separate civil action the he later
withdrew said motion. But in June 1976, pending the criminal case, the
Viratas again reserved their right to file a separate civil action. Borilla was
eventually acquitted as it was ruled that what happened was a mere
accident. The heirs of Virata then sued Borilla and Ochoa (the owner of the
jeep and employer of Borilla) for damages based on quasi delict. Ochoa
assailed the civil suit alleging that Borilla was already acquitted and that the
Virata’s were merely trying to recover damages twice. The lower court
agreed with Ochoa and dismissed the civil suit.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the heirs of Virata may file a separate civil suit.

HELD:
 Yes. It is settled that in negligence cases the aggrieved parties may choose
between an action under the Revised Penal Code or of quasi-delict under
Article 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. What is prohibited by Article
2177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines is to recover twice for the same
negligent act. Therefore, under the proposed Article 2177, acquittal from an
accusation of criminal negligence, whether on reasonable doubt or not, shall
not be a bar to a subsequent civil action, not for civil liability arising from
criminal negligence, but for damages due to a quasi-delict or ‘culpa
aquiliana’. But said article forestalls a double recovery.

Ong vs. Metropolitan Water District

G.R. No. L-7664. 29 August 1958
Baustista, Angelo J.

Facts:

Plaintiff spouses seek to recover from defendant, damages, funeral

expenses and attorney’s fees for the death of their son, Dominador Ong, in
one of the swimming pools of the latter. After trial, the CFI dismissed the
complaint for it found the action of the plaintiffs-appellants untenable.

Issues:

(1) WON plaintiffs have clearly established the fault/negligence of the

defendants so as to make it liable for the damages sought; (2) WON the
Doctrine of Last Clear Chance applies in the case at bench.

Ruling:

Judgment affirmed.

(1) The person/s claiming damages has/have the burden of proving that the
damages is caused by the fault/negligence of the person from whom the
damages is claimed. Plaintiffs failed to overcome the burden. Defendant
employed 6 well-trained lifeguards, male nurse, sanitary inspector and
security guards to avoid danger to the lives of their patrons. The swimming
pools are provided with ring buoy, tag roof and towing line. Also,
conspicuously displayed in the pool area the rules and regulations for pool
use. In that, it appears that defendant has taken all the necessary
precautions to avoid/prevent danger/accidents which may cause injury to or
even death of its patrons.
(2) The Doctrine of last Clear Chance means that, “a person who has the
last clear chance to avoid the accident, notwithstanding the negligent acts
of his opponent, is considered in law solely responsible for the
consequences of the accident.” Since minor Ong has went to the big
swimming pool w/o any companion in violation of the rules and regulations
of the defendant as regards the use of pools, and it appearing that the
lifeguard responded to the call for help as soon as his attention was called
to it, applying all efforts into play in order to bring minor Ong back to life, it
is clear that there is no room for the application of the Doctrine to impute
liability to appellee. Minor Ong’s fault/negligence is the proximate and only
cause of his death.

Barredo vs Garcia and Almario

G.R. No. L-48006 , July 8, 1942
Bocobo, J.

FACTS:
At about 1:30am on May 3, 1936, Fontanilla’s taxi collided with a “kalesa”
thereby killing the 16 year old Faustino Garcia. Faustino’s parents filed a
criminal suit against Fontanilla and reserved their right to file a separate civil
suit. Fontanilla was eventually convicted. After the criminal suit, Garcia filed
a civil suit against Barredo – the owner of the taxi (employer of Fontanilla).
The suit was based on Article 1903 of the civil code (negligence of employers
in the selection of their employees). Barredo assailed the suit arguing that
his liability is only subsidiary and that the separate civil suit should have been
filed against Fontanilla primarily and not him.

ISSUE: Whether or not Barredo is just subsidiarily liable.

HELD:

No. He is primarily liable under Article 1903 which is a separate civil action
against negligent employers. Garcia is well within his rights in suing Barredo.
He reserved his right to file a separate civil action and this is more
expeditious because by the time of the SC judgment Fontanilla is already
serving his sentence and has no property. It was also proven that Barredo is
negligent in hiring his employees because it was shown that Fontanilla had
had multiple traffic infractions already before he hired him – something he
failed to overcome during hearing. Had Garcia not reserved his right to file a
separate civil action, Barredo would have only been subsidiarily liable.
Further, Barredo is not being sued for damages arising from a criminal act
(his driver’s negligence) but rather for his own negligence in selecting his
employee (Article 1903).