Union Bank vs People of the Philippines

PRINCIPLE: The proper venue for the criminal action against perjury is the place where the
certificate was notarized
FACTS: Union bank filed two complaints for sum of money with prayer for a writ of replevin
against spouses Eddie and Eliza Tamondong and a John Doe. The first complaint was filed before
the RTC, Branch 109, Pasay City on April 13, 1998. The second complaint was filed on March
15, 2000 and was raffled in the MeTC, Branch 47, Pasay City.
In both cases, Desi Tomas executed and signed the Certification against Forum Shopping. Then,
she was charged of deliberately violating Article 183 of the RPC (perjury) "by falsely declaring
under oath in the Certificate against Forum Shopping in the second complaint that she did not
commence any other action or proceeding involving the same issue in another tribunal or agency".
The Certification was notarized in Makati City but was submitted and used in Pasay City, while
the Information against Union Bank and Tomas was filed in Makati.
Tomas filed a Motion to Quash on the grounds that the venue was improperly laid and that the
facts do not constitute an offense. On the first ground, Tomas argued that since it is the Pasay City
Court where the Certificate was submitted and used, it should have the jurisdiction over the case
against her. The MeTC-Makati City denied the Motion to Quash, ruling that it has jurisdiction over
the case since the Certificate was notarized there and the allegations in the Information sufficiently
charged Tomas with perjury. Her subsequent Motion for Reconsideration was denied.
When the case was elevated to the RTC-Makati City, the petitioners prayed that the ruling of the
MeTC-Makati City be annulled and set aside on the ground of grave abuse of discretion. They also
cited the rulings in US vs. Canet and Ilusorio v. Bildner which state that "venue and jurisdiction
should be in the place where the false document was presented".
The petition, however, was found to have no merit as a recent jurisprudence, Sy Tiong Shiou v.
Sy. In the Sy Tiong Shiou case, the high court ruled that the criminal action shall be instituted and
tried in the court of the municipality where the perjury was committed, or where any of its essential
ingredients occured. The petitioners then filed this petition to the Supreme Court to address the
seeming conflict between the rulings in Illusorio v. Bildner and Sy Tiong Shiou v. Sy.

ISSUE: Whether or not the MeTC Makati is the proper venue to try and decide the case

RULING: MeTC Makati is the proper venue for the criminal action.
The criminal act charged was for the execution of an affidavit that contained a falsity. Art. 183
of the RPC is the applicable provision for this case; and following so, the jurisdiction and venue
should be determined on the basis of this article which penalizes one who makes an affidavit upon
any material matter before a competent person authorized to administer an oath in cases in which
the law so requires. The constitutive act of the offense is the making of an affidavit, so, the criminal
act is consummated when the statement containing a falsity is subscribed and sworn before a duly
authorized person.'
The SC finds the ruling in Sy Tiong as more in accord with Art. 183 of the RPC. The Court
ruled that the crime of perjury committed through the making of a false affidavit under Art. 183
of the RPC is committed at the time the affiant subscribes and swears to his or her affidavit since
it is at that time that all the elements of the crime of perjury are executed. When the crime is
committed through false testimony under oath in a proceeding that is neither criminal nor civil,
venue is at the place where the testimony under oath is given.

If in lieu of or as supplement to the actual testimony made in a proceeding that is neither

criminal nor civil, a written sown statement is submitted, venue may either be at the place where
the sworn statement is submitted or where the oath was taken as the taking of the oath and the
submission are both material ingredients of the crime committed. In all cases, the determination of
venue shall be based on the acts alleged in the Information to be constitutive of the crime
committed.

David vs Marquez
PRINCIPLE: The filing of criminal actions arising from illegal recruitment is before the RTC of
the province or city where the offended party actually resides at the time of the commission of the
offense. Same goes to Estafa arising from such illegal recruitment activities.
FACTS: Respondent Glenda Marquez alleged, among others, that she is a resident of Sampaloc,
Manila and that sometime in March 2005, petitioner approached her in Kidapawan City and
represented that she could recruit her to work abroad. It was further alleged that petitioner
demanded payment of placement fees and other expenses from the respondent for the processing
of the latter's application, to which the respondent heeded. Respondent's application was, however,
denied and worse, the money that she put out therefore was never returned. In her Counter-
Affidavit and Counter Charge, petitioner averred that it was physically impossible for her to have
committed the said acts as she was in Canada at the alleged time of recruitment as evidenced by
the entries in her passport. Petitioner further averred that she was never engaged in the recruitment
business. The petitioner alleged that the amount deposited in her account was not for her but was
just coursed through her to be given to her friend in Canada who was the one processing
respondent's application, as evidenced by a certification to that effect issued by the said friend.
Further, petitioner argued before the Prosecutor that assuming arguendo that the allegations of
recruitment were true, the case should be filed in Kidapawan City and not in Manila.

ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC of Manila has jurisdiction over the cases of illegal recruitment
and estafa

RULING: Yes. The RTC of Manila has jurisdiction over the cases of Illegal Recruitment and
Estafa. The express provision of the law is clear that the filing of criminal actions arising from
illegal recruitment before the RTC of the province or city where the offended party actually resides
at the time of the commission of the offense is allowed. Likewise, with the case of Estafa arising
from such illegal recruitment activities, the outright dismissal thereof due to lack of jurisdiction
was not proper, considering that as per the allegations in the Information, the same was within the
jurisdiction of Manila. During the• preliminary investigation of the cases, respondent even
presented evidence that some of the essential elements of the crime were committed within Manila,
such as the payment of processing and/or placement fees, considering that these were deposited in
certain banks located in Manila.

Lee Pue Liong vs Chua Pue Chin Lee

PRINCIPLE: Where the civil action for recovery of civil liability is instituted in the criminal
action pursuant to Rule 111, the offended party may intervene by counsel in the prosecution of
the offense.
FACTS: Lee Pue Liong aka Paul Lee (petitioner), is the President of Centillion Holdings, Inc.
(CHI), a company affiliated with the CKC Group of Companies (CKC Group. CKC Group is the
subject of intra-corporate disputes between petitioner and his siblings, including Chua Pue Chin
Lee, a majority stockholder and Treasurer of CHI.
On June 15, 1999, Paul Lee on behalf of CHI caused the filing of a petition for the Issuance of a
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) which covers a property owned by CHI. Paul Lee submitted an
Affidavit of Loss stating that said TCT was inadvertently lost or misplaced from his files and he
discovered such loss in May 1999 but it had not been found and is already beyond recovery. Said
title had not been the subject of mortgage or used as collateral for payment of any obligation with
any person. RTC granted the petition and a new TCT has been issued.
Chua Lee, joined by her brother Nixon Lee filed a petition asking for the RTC order that granted
a new TCT to be set aside claiming that Paul Lee knew fully well that Chua Lee was in possession
of the said TCT as she was the corporate treasurer at the time. Chua Lee posits that Paul Lee merely
needs to have another TCT as he was planning to mortgage the same with Planters Development
Bank. RTC recalled and set aside its order.
On May 9, 2000, Chua Lee filed a complaint-affidavit stating among others, that Paul Lee made a
wilful and deliberate assertion of falsehood in his verified petition, affidavit and testimony as he
perfectly knew that she was in possession of the TCT. But through a Supplemental Affidavit, Chua
Lee clarified that she was accusing Pau Lee of PERJURY. The Investigating Prosecutor
recommended dismissal of the case. However, upon review, First Assistant City Prosecutor
dismissed the recommendation of dismissal. Thus, the City Prosecutor filed Information for
perjury
At the trial, Atty. Augusto Macam appeared as counsel for Chua Lee and as private prosecutor
with the consent and under the control and supervision of the public prosecutor. Paul Lee argued
that under Article 183 of the RPC, there is no mention of any private offended party. As such, a
private prosecutor cannot intervene for the prosecution of the case. MeTC denied the motion
stating that "an offended party may intervene in the proceeding, personally or by attorney, in cases
of offenses which cannot be prosecuted except at the instance of the offended party. The only
exception to this rule is when the offended party waives his right.

ISSUE: Whether or not the offended party may intervene in the criminal action
RULING: Yes. Under the Rules, where the civil action for recovery of civil liability is instituted
in the criminal action pursuant to Rule 111, the offended party may intervene by counsel in the
prosecution of the offense. Rule 111(a) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that, "[w]hen
a criminal action is instituted, the civil action arising from the offense charged shall be deemed
instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the
right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action."

Private respondent did not waive the civil action, nor did she reserve the right to institute it
separately, nor institute the civil action for damages arising from the offense charged. Thus,
we find that the private prosecutors can intervene in the trial of the criminal action.
SC:
Petition has no merit.

SECTION 1, RULE 111 RULES OF COURT (read)

SECTION 16, RULE 110 RULES OF COURT (read)

-EVen assuming that not civil liability was alleged or proved in the perjury case, whether public
or private crimes are involved, it is erroneous for the trial court to consider the intervention of
the offended party by counsel as merely a matter of tolerance.
-Thus, whee the privatte prosecution has asserted its right to intervene in the proceedings, that
right must be respected.
The right reserved by the Rules to the offended party is that of intervening for the sole purpose
of enforcing the civil liability born of the criminal act and not of demanding punishment of the
accuses. Such intervention, moreover, is always subject to the direction and control of the public
prosecutor.