Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila

EN BANC

UNION BANK OF THE, G.R. No. 192565

PHILIPPINES and DESI
TOMAS, Present:
Petitioners,
CORONA, C.J.,
CARPIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,*
- versus - ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
PEREZ,
MENDOZA,
SERENO,**
REYES, and
PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent. Promulgated:

February 28, 2012

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

BRION, J.:

We review in this Rule 45 petition, the decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
65, Makati City (RTC-Makati City) in Civil Case No. 09-1038. The petition seeks to reverse and
set aside the RTC-Makati City decision dismissing the petition for certiorari of petitioners Union
Bank of the Philippines (Union Bank) and Desi Tomas (collectively, the petitioners). The RTC
found that the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 63, Makati City (MeTC-Makati City) did not
commit any grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion to quash the information for perjury
filed by Tomas.

The Antecedents

Tomas was charged in court for perjury under Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC)
for making a false narration in a Certificate against Forum Shopping. The Information against her
reads:

That on or about the 13th day of March 2000 in the City of Makati, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make untruthful
statements under oath upon a material matter before a competent person authorized
to administer oath which the law requires to wit: said accused stated in the
Verification/Certification/Affidavit of merit of a complaint for sum of money with
prayer for a writ of replevin docketed as [Civil] Case No. 342-00 of the
Metropolitan Trial Court[,] Pasay City, that the Union Bank of the Philippines has
not commenced any other action or proceeding involving the same issues in another
tribunal or agency, accused knowing well that said material statement was false
thereby making a willful and deliberate assertion of falsehood.[2]

The accusation stemmed from petitioner Union Banks two (2) complaints for sum of
money with prayer for a writ of replevin against the spouses Eddie and Eliza Tamondong and a
John Doe. The first complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 98-0717, was filed before the RTC,
Branch 109, Pasay City on April 13, 1998. The second complaint, docketed as Civil Case No.
342-000, was filed on March 15, 2000 and raffled to the MeTC, Branch 47, Pasay City. Both
complaints showed that Tomas executed and signed the Certification against Forum Shopping.
Accordingly, she was charged of deliberately violating Article 183 of the RPC by falsely declaring
under oath in the Certificate against Forum Shopping in the second complaint that she did not
commence any other action or proceeding involving the same issue in another tribunal or agency.

Tomas filed a Motion to Quash,[3] citing two grounds. First, she argued that the venue was
improperly laid since it is the Pasay City court (where the Certificate against Forum Shopping was
submitted and used) and not the MeTC-Makati City (where the Certificate against Forum
Shopping was subscribed) that has jurisdiction over the perjury case. Second, she argued that the
facts charged do not constitute an offense because: (a) the third element of perjury the willful and
deliberate assertion of falsehood was not alleged with particularity without specifying what the
other action or proceeding commenced involving the same issues in another tribunal or agency;
(b) there was no other action or proceeding pending in another court when the second complaint
was filed; and (c) she was charged with perjury by giving false testimony while the allegations in
the Information make out perjury by making a false affidavit.

The MeTC-Makati City denied the Motion to Quash, ruling that it has jurisdiction over the
case since the Certificate against Forum Shopping was notarized in Makati City.[4] The MeTC-
Makati City also ruled that the allegations in the Information sufficiently charged Tomas with
perjury.[5] The MeTC-Makati City subsequently denied Tomas motion for reconsideration.[6]

The petitioners filed a petition for certiorari before the RTC-Makati City to annul and set
aside the MeTC-Makati City orders on the ground of grave abuse of discretion. The petitioners
anchored their petition on the rulings in United States v. Canet[7] and Ilusorio v. Bildner[8] which
ruled that venue and jurisdiction should be in the place where the false document was presented.

The Assailed RTC Decision

In dismissing the petition for certiorari, the RTC-Makati City held:

[I]nsofar as the petitioners stance is concerned[,] the more recent case of [Sy Tiong
Shiou v. Sy] (GR Nos. 174168 & 179438, March 30, 2009) however, reaffirms what
has been the long standing view on the venue with respect to perjury cases. In this
particular case[,] the high court reiterated the rule that the criminal action shall be
instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or territory where the offense
 was committed, or where any of its essential ingredients occurred. It went on to
declare that since the subject document[,] the execution of which was the subject of
the charge[,] was subscribed and sworn to in Manila[,] then the court of the said
territorial jurisdiction was the proper venue of the criminal action[.]

xxxx

x x x Given the present state of jurisprudence on the matter, it is not amiss to state
that the city court of Makati City has jurisdiction to try and decide the case for
perjury inasmuch as the gist of the complaint itself which constitute[s] the charge
against the petitioner dwells solely on the act of subscribing to a false certification.
On the other hand, the charge against the accused in the case of Ilusorio v. Bildner,
et al., based on the complaint-affidavits therein[,] was not simply the execution of
the questioned documents but rather the introduction of the false evidence through
the subject documents before the court of Makati City.[9] (emphasis ours)

The RTC-Makati City ruled that the MeTC-Makati City did not commit grave abuse of
discretion since the order denying the Motion to Quash was based on jurisprudence later
than Ilusorio. The RTC-Makati City also observed that the facts in Ilusorio are different from the
facts of the present case. Lastly, the RTC-Makati City ruled that the Rule 65 petition was improper
since the petitioners can later appeal the decision in the principal case. The RTC-
Makati City subsequently denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration.[10]

The Petition

The petitioners pray that we reverse the RTC-Makati City decision and quash the Information for
perjury against Tomas. The petitioners contend that the Ilusorio ruling is more applicable to the
present facts than our ruling in Sy Tiong Shiou v. Sy Chim.[11] They argued that the facts
in Ilusorio showed that the filing of the petitions in court containing the false statements was the
essential ingredient that consummated the perjury. In Sy Tiong, the perjurious statements were
made in a General Information Sheet (GIS) that was submitted to the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC).

Interestingly, Solicitor General Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz shared the petitioners view. In
his Manifestation and Motion in lieu of Comment (which we hereby treat as the Comment to the
petition), the Solicitor General also relied on Ilusorio and opined that the lis mota in the crime of
perjury is the deliberate or intentional giving of false evidence in the court where the evidence is
material. The Solicitor General observed that the criminal intent to assert a falsehood under oath
only became manifest before the MeTC-Pasay City.

The Issue

The case presents to us the issue of what the proper venue of perjury under Article 183 of the RPC
should be Makati City, where the Certificate against Forum Shopping was notarized,
or Pasay City, where the Certification was presented to the trial court.

The Courts Ruling

We deny the petition and hold that the MeTC-Makati City is the proper venue and the
proper court to take cognizance of the perjury case against the petitioners.

Venue of Action and Criminal Jurisdiction

Venue is an essential element of jurisdiction in criminal cases. It determines not only the
place where the criminal action is to be instituted, but also the court that has the jurisdiction to try
and hear the case. The reason for this rule is two-fold. First, the jurisdiction of trial courts is limited
to well-defined territories such that a trial court can only hear and try cases involving crimes
committed within its territorial jurisdiction.[12] Second, laying the venue in the locus criminis is
grounded on the necessity and justice of having an accused on trial in the municipality of province
where witnesses and other facilities for his defense are available.[13]

Unlike in civil cases, a finding of improper venue in criminal cases carries

jurisdictional consequences. In determining the venue where the criminal action is to be
instituted and the court which has jurisdiction over it, Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
 (a) Subject to existing laws, the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the
court or municipality or territory where the offense was committed or where
any of its essential ingredients occurred. [emphasis ours]

The above provision should be read in light of Section 10, Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure which states:

Place of commission of the offense. The complaint or information is sufficient if it

can be understood from its allegations that the offense was committed or some of
its essential ingredients occurred at some place within the jurisdiction of the court,
unless the particular place where it was committed constitutes an essential element
of the offense charged or is necessary for its identification.

Both provisions categorically place the venue and jurisdiction over criminal cases not only
in the court where the offense was committed, but also where any of its essential ingredients took
place. In other words, the venue of action and of jurisdiction are deemed sufficiently alleged
where the Information states that the offense was committed or some of its essential ingredients
occurred at a place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court.

Information Charging Perjury

Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, contains the
requirement for a Certificate against Forum Shopping. The Certificate against Forum Shopping
can be made either by a statement under oath in the complaint or initiatory pleading asserting a
claim or relief; it may also be in a sworn certification annexed to the complaint or initiatory
pleading. In both instances, the affiant is required to execute a statement under oath before a duly
commissioned notary public or any competent person authorized to administer oath that: (a) he or
she has not theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any
court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his or her knowledge, no such other
action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete
statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if he or she should thereafter learn that the same or
similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, he or she shall report that fact within five days
therefrom to the court wherein his or her aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed.
In relation to the crime of perjury, the material matter in a Certificate against Forum Shopping is
the truth of the required declarations which is designed to guard against litigants pursuing
simultaneous remedies in different fora.[14]

In this case, Tomas is charged with the crime of perjury under Article 183 of the RPC for
making a false Certificate against Forum Shopping. The elements of perjury under Article 183 are:

(a) That the accused made a statement under oath or executed an

affidavit upon a material matter.

(b) That the statement or affidavit was made before a competent officer,
authorized to receive and administer oath.

(c) That in the statement or affidavit, the accused made a willful and
deliberate assertion of a falsehood.

(d) That the sworn statement or affidavit containing the falsity is required
by law or made for a legal purpose.[15] (emphasis ours)

Where the jurisdiction of the court is being assailed in a criminal case on the ground of
improper venue, the allegations in the complaint and information must be examined together with
Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. On this basis, we find
that the allegations in the Information sufficiently support a finding that the crime of perjury was
committed by Tomas within the territorial jurisdiction of the MeTC-Makati City.

The first element of the crime of perjury, the execution of the subject Certificate against
Forum Shopping was alleged in the Information to have been committed in MakatiCity.
Likewise, the second and fourth elements, requiring the Certificate against Forum Shopping to be
under oath before a notary public, were also sufficiently alleged in the Information to have been
made in Makati City:

That on or about the 13th day of March 2000 in the City of Makati, Metro
Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make
 untruthful statements under oath upon a material matter before a competent person
authorized to administer oath which the law requires to wit: said accused stated in
the Verification/Certification/Affidavit x x x.[16]

We also find that the third element of willful and deliberate falsehood was also sufficiently
alleged to have been committed in Makati City, not Pasay City, as indicated in the last portion of
the Information:

[S]aid accused stated in the Verification/Certification/Affidavit of merit of a

complaint for sum of money with prayer for a writ of replevin docketed as [Civil]
Case No. 342-00 of the Metropolitan Trial Court[,] Pasay City, that the Union Bank
of the Philippines has not commenced any other action or proceeding involving the
same issues in another tribunal or agency, accused knowing well that said material
statement was false thereby making a willful and deliberate assertion of
falsehood.[17] (underscoring ours)

Tomas deliberate and intentional assertion of falsehood was allegedly shown when she
made the false declarations in the Certificate against Forum Shopping before a notary public
in Makati City, despite her knowledge that the material statements she subscribed and swore to
were not true. Thus, Makati City is the proper venue and MeTC-Makati City is the proper court to
try the perjury case against Tomas, pursuant to Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure as all the essential elements constituting the crime of perjury were
committed within the territorial jurisdiction of Makati City, not Pasay City.

Referral to the En Banc

The present case was referred to the En Banc primarily to address the seeming conflict between
the division rulings of the Court in the Ilusorio case that is cited as basis of this petition, and the Sy
Tiong case that was the basis of the assailed RTC-Makati City ruling.

The Cited Ilusorio and Sy Tiong Cases

 The subject matter of the perjury charge in Ilusorio involved false statements contained
in verified petitions filed with the court for the issuance of a new owners duplicate copies of
certificates of title. The verified petitions containing the false statements were subscribed and
sworn to in Pasig City, but were filed in Makati City and Tagaytay City. The question posed was:
which court (Pasig City, Makati City and/or Tagaytay City) had jurisdiction to try and hear the
perjury cases?

We ruled that the venues of the action were in Makati City and Tagaytay City, the places
where the verified petitions were filed. The Court reasoned out that it was only upon filing that the
intent to assert an alleged falsehood became manifest and where the alleged untruthful statement
found relevance or materiality. We cited as jurisprudential authority the case of United States. v.
Caet[18] which ruled:

It is immaterial where the affidavit was subscribed and sworn, so long as it appears
from the information that the defendant, by means of such affidavit, "swore to" and
knowingly submitted false evidence, material to a point at issue in a judicial
proceeding pending in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo Province. The gist of the
offense charged is not the making of the affidavit in Manila, but the intentional
giving of false evidence in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo Province by means
of such affidavit. [emphasis and underscoring deleted]

In Sy Tiong, the perjured statements were made in a GIS which was subscribed and sworn
to in Manila. We ruled that the proper venue for the perjury charges was in Manila where the GIS
was subscribed and sworn to. We held that the perjury was consummated in Manila where the false
statement was made. As supporting jurisprudence, we cited the case of Villanueva v. Secretary of
Justice[19] that, in turn, cited an American case entitled U.S. v. Norris.[20] We ruled
in Villanueva that

Perjury is an obstruction of justice; its perpetration well may affect the

dearest concerns of the parties before a tribunal. Deliberate material falsification
under oath constitutes the crime of perjury, and the crime is complete when a
witness' statement has once been made.

The Crime of Perjury: A Background

 To have a better appreciation of the issue facing the Court, a look at the historical
background of how the crime of perjury (specifically, Article 183 of the RPC) evolved in our
jurisdiction.

The RPC penalizes three forms of false testimonies. The first is false testimony for and against the
defendant in a criminal case (Articles 180 and 181, RPC); the second is false testimony in a civil
case (Article 182, RPC); and the third is false testimony in other cases (Article 183, RPC). Based
on the Information filed, the present case involves the making of an untruthful statement in
an affidavit on a material matter.
These RPC provisions, however, are not really the bases of the rulings cited by the parties
in their respective arguments. The cited Ilusorio ruling, although issued by this Court in 2008,
harked back to the case of Caet which was decided in 1915, i.e., before the present RPC took
effect.[21] Sy Tiong, on the other hand, is a 2009 ruling that cited Villanueva, a 2005 case that in
turn cited United States v. Norris, a 1937 American case. Significantly, unlike Canet, Sy Tiong is
entirely based on rulings rendered after the present RPC took effect.[22]

The perjurious act in Caet consisted of an information charging perjury through

the presentation in court of a motion accompanied by a false sworn affidavit. At the time
the Caet ruling was rendered, the prevailing law on perjury and the rules on prosecution of criminal
offenses were found in Section 3, Act No. 1697 of the Philippine Commission, and in Subsection
4, Section 6 of General Order No. 58[23] for the procedural aspect.

Section 3 of Act No. 1697 reads:

Sec. 3. Any person who, having taken oath before a competent tribunal,
officer, or person, in any case in which a law of the Philippine Islands authorizes
an oath to be administered, that he will testify, declare, depose, or certify truly, or
that any written testimony, declaration, disposition, or certificate by him subscribed
is true, willfully and contrary to such oath states or subscribes any material matter
which he does not believe to be true, is guilty of perjury, and shall be punished by
a fine of not more than two thousand pesos and by imprisonment for not more than
five years; and shall moreover, thereafter be incapable of holding any public office
 or of giving testimony in any court of the Philippine Islands until such time as the
judgment against him is reversed.
This law was copied, with the necessary changes, from Sections 5392[24] and 5393[25] of
the Revised Statutes of the United States.[26] Act No. 1697 was intended to make the mere execution
of a false affidavit punishable in our jurisdiction.[27]

In turn, Subsection 4, Section 6 of General Order No. 58 provided that the venue shall be
the court of the place where the crime was committed.

As applied and interpreted by the Court in Caet, perjury was committed by the act
of representing a false document in a judicial proceeding.[28] The venue of action was held by the
Court to be at the place where the false document was presented since the presentation was the act
that consummated the crime.
The annotation of Justices Aquino and Grio-Aquino in their textbook on the
RPC[29] interestingly explains the history of the perjury provisions of the present RPC and traces
as well the linkage between Act No. 1697 and the present Code. To quote these authors:[30]

Art. 180 was taken from art. 318 of the Old Penal Code and art. 154 of Del
Pans Proposed Correctional Code, while art. 181 was taken from art. 319 of the old
Penal Code and Art. 157 of Del Pans Proposed Correctional Code. Said arts. 318
and 319, together with art. 321 of the old Penal Code, were impliedly repealed by
Act 1697, the Perjury Law, passed on August 23, 1907, which in turn was expressly
repealed by the Administrative Code of 1916, Act 2657. In view of the express
repeal of Act 1697, arts. 318 and 321 of the old Penal Code were deemed
revived. However, Act 2718 expressly revived secs. 3 and 4 of the Perjury
Law. Art. 367 of the Revised Penal Code repealed Act Nos. 1697 and 2718.

It should be noted that perjury under Acts 1697 and 2718 includes false
testimony, whereas, under the Revised Penal Code, false testimony includes
perjury. Our law on false testimony is of Spanish origin, but our law on perjury (art.
183 taken from sec. 3 of Act 1697) is derived from American statutes. The
provisions of the old Penal Code on false testimony embrace perjury committed in
court or in some contentious proceeding, while perjury as defined in Act 1697
includes the making of a false affidavit. The provisions of the Revised Penal Code
on false testimony are more severe and strict than those of Act 1697 on perjury.
[italics ours]
 With this background, it can be appreciated that Article 183 of the RPC which provides:

The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its
minimum period shall be imposed upon any person, who knowingly makes
untruthful statements and not being included in the provisions of the next preceding
articles, shall testify under oath, or make an affidavit, upon any material matter
before a competent person authorized to administer an oath in cases in which the
law so requires. [emphasis supplied; emphases ours]

in fact refers to either of two punishable acts (1) falsely testifying under oath in a proceeding other
than a criminal or civil case; and (2) making a false affidavit before a person authorized to
administer an oath on any material matter where the law requires an oath.

As above discussed, Sy Tiong decided under Article 183 of the RPC essentially involved
perjured statements made in a GIS that was subscribed and sworn to in Manila and submitted to
the SEC in Mandaluyong City. Thus, the case involved the making of an affidavit, not an actual
testimony in a proceeding that is neither criminal nor civil. From this perspective, the situs of the
oath, i.e., the place where the oath was taken, is the place where the offense was committed. By
implication, the proper venue would have been the City of Mandaluyong the site of the SEC had
the charge involved an actual testimony made before the SEC.

In contrast, Caet involved the presentation in court of a motion supported and

accompanied by an affidavit that contained a falsity. With Section 3 of Act No. 1697 as basis, the
issue related to the submission of the affidavit in a judicial proceeding. This came at a time when
Act No. 1697 was the perjury law, and made no distinction between judicial and other proceedings,
and at the same time separately penalized the making of false statements under oath (unlike the
present RPC which separately deals with false testimony in criminal, civil and other proceedings,
while at the same time also penalizing the making of false affidavits). Understandably, the venue
should be the place where the submission was made to the court or the situs of the court; it could
not have been the place where the affidavit was sworn to simply because this was not the offense
charged in the Information.
 The case of Ilusorio cited the Caet case as its authority, in a situation where the sworn
petitions filed in court for the issuance of duplicate certificates of title (that were allegedly lost)
were the cited sworn statements to support the charge of perjury for the falsities stated in the sworn
petitions. The Court ruled that the proper venue should be the Cities of Makati and Tagaytay
because it was in the courts of these cities where the intent to assert an alleged falsehood became
manifest and where the alleged untruthful statement finds relevance or materiality in deciding the
issue of whether new owners duplicate copies of the [Certificate of Condominium Title] and
[Transfer Certificates of Title] may issue.[31] To the Court, whether the perjurious statements
contained in the four petitions were subscribed and sworn in Pasig is immaterial, the gist of the
offense of perjury being the intentional giving of false statement,[32] citing Caet as authority for its
statement.

The statement in Ilusorio may have partly led to the present confusion on venue because
of its very categorical tenor in pointing to the considerations to be made in the determination of
venue; it leaves the impression that the place where the oath was taken is not at all a material
consideration, forgetting that Article 183 of the RPC clearly speaks of two situations while Article
182 of the RPC likewise applies to false testimony in civil cases.

The Ilusorio statement would have made perfect sense had the basis for the charge been
Article 182 of the RPC, on the assumption that the petition itself constitutes a false testimony in a
civil case. The Caet ruling would then have been completely applicable as the sworn statement is
used in a civil case, although no such distinction was made under Caet because the applicable law
at the time (Act No. 1697) did not make any distinction.

If Article 183 of the RPC were to be used, as what in fact appears in the Ilusorio ruling,
then only that portion of the article, referring to the making of an affidavit, would have been
applicable as the other portion refers to false testimony in other proceedings which a judicial
petition for the issuance of a new owners duplicate copy of a Certificate of Condominium Title is
not because it is a civil proceeding in court. As a perjury based on the making of a false affidavit,
what assumes materiality is the site where the oath was taken as this is the place where the oath
was made, in this case, Pasig City.

Procedurally, the rule on venue of criminal cases has been subject to various changes from
the time General Order No. 58 was replaced by Rules 106 to 122 of the Rules of Court on July 1,
1940. Section 14, Rule 106 of the Rules of Court provided for the rule on venue of criminal actions
and it expressly included, as proper venue, the place where any one of the essential ingredients of
the crime took place. This change was followed by the passage of the 1964 Rules of Criminal
Procedure,[33] the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure,[34] and the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure which all adopted the 1940 Rules of Criminal Procedures expanded venue of criminal
actions. Thus, the venue of criminal cases is not only in the place where the offense was committed,
but also where any of its essential ingredients took place.

In the present case, the Certification against Forum Shopping was made integral parts of
two complaints for sum of money with prayer for a writ of replevin against the respondent spouses
Eddie Tamondong and Eliza B. Tamondong, who, in turn, filed a complaint-affidavit against
Tomas for violation of Article 183 of the RPC. As alleged in the Information that followed, the
criminal act charged was for the execution by Tomas of an affidavit that contained a falsity.

Under the circumstances, Article 183 of the RPC is indeed the applicable provision; thus,
jurisdiction and venue should be determined on the basis of this article which penalizes one who
make[s] an affidavit, upon any material matter before a competent person authorized to administer
an oath in cases in which the law so requires. The constitutive act of the offense is the making of
an affidavit; thus, the criminal act is consummated when the statement containing a falsity is
subscribed and sworn before a duly authorized person.

Based on these considerations, we hold that our ruling in Sy Tiong is more in accord with
Article 183 of the RPC and Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure. To reiterate for the guidance of the Bar and the Bench, the crime of perjury
committed through the making of a false affidavit under Article 183 of the RPC is committed at
the time the affiant subscribes and swears to his or her affidavit since it is at that time that all the
elements of the crime of perjury are executed. When the crime is committed through false
testimony under oath in a proceeding that is neither criminal nor civil, venue is at the place where
the testimony under oath is given. If in lieu of or as supplement to the actual testimony made in a
proceeding that is neither criminal nor civil, a written sworn statement is submitted, venue may
either be at the place where the sworn statement is submitted or where the oath was taken as the
taking of the oath and the submission are both material ingredients of the crime committed. In all
cases, determination of venue shall be based on the acts alleged in the Information to be
constitutive of the crime committed.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DENY the petition for lack of

merit. Costs against the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 209859, June 05, 2017 ]

EILEEN P. DAVID, PETITIONER, VS. GLENDA S. MARQUEZ, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

TIJAM, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] under Rule 45, assailing the Decision[2] dated May
29, 2013 and Resolution[3] dated November 6, 2013 of the Court of Appears (CA) in CA-G.R. SP
No. 124839, reinstating the criminal cases of Illegal Recruitment and Estafa ag inst Petitioner
Eileen David.

The Procedural and Factual Antecedents

In a Sinumpaang Salaysay filed before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila, Respondent
Glenda Marquez alleged, among others, that she is a resident of Sampaloc, Manila and that
sometime in March 2005, petitioner approached her in Kidapawan City and represented that she
could recruit her to work abroad.[4] It was further alleged that petitioner demanded payment of
placement fees and other expenses from the respondent for the processing of the latter's
application, to which the respondent heeded.[5] Respondent's application was, however, denied
and worse, the money that she put out therefor was never returned.[6]

In her Counter-Affidavit and Counter Charge, petitioner averred that it was physically
impossible for her to have committed the said acts as she was in Canada at the alleged time of
recruitment as evidenced by the entries in her passport.[7] Petitioner further averred that she was
never engaged in the recruitment business.[8] The petitioner alleged that the amount deposited in
her account was not for her but was just coursed through her to be given to her friend in Canada
who was the one processing respondent's application, as evidenced by a certification to that
effect issued by the said friend.[9] Further, petitioner argued before the Prosecutor that
assuming arguendo that the allegations of recruitment were true, the case should be filed in
Kidapawan City and not in Manila.[10]

On December 9, 2008, two separate Informations were filed against petitioner for Illegal
Recruitment and Estafa, respectively. The accusatory portions thereof read as follows:

Criminal Case No. 08-265539

The undersigned accuses EILEEN DAVID of a violation of Article 38 (a), P.D. No. 1412,
amending certain provision of Book I, P.D. No. 442, otherwise known as the New Labor Code of
the Philippines, in relation to Article 13 (b) and (c) of said code, as further amended by P.D. Nos.
1693, 1920, and 2018 and as further amended by Sec. 6 (a), (1) and (m) of Republic Act 8042,
committed as follows:

That sometime in the month of March, 2005, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused
representing herself to have the capacity to contract, enlist and transport Filipino workers
overseas, particularly in Canada, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, for a fee, recruit and
promise employment/job placement to GLENDA S. MARQUEZ without first having secured the
required license from the Department of Labor and Employment as required by law, and charged
or accepted directly or indirectly from said complainant the amount of Php152,670.00 as
placement/processing fee in consideration for her overseas employment, which amount is in
excess of or greater than that specified in the schedule of allowable fees prescribed by the POEA,
and without valid reasons failed to actually deploy her and continuously fail to reimburse
expenses incurred by her in connection with her documentation and processing for purposes of
her deployment.

Contrary to law.[11]

Criminal Case No. 08-265540

The undersigned accuses EILEEN P. DAVID of the crime of Estafa, Art. 315 par. 2 (a) of the
Revised Penal Code, committed as follows:

That on or about and during the period comprised between March 8, 2005 and April 20, 2007,
inclusive, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously defraud GLENDA S. MARQUEZ in the following manner, to wit:
the said accused, by means of false manifestations and fraudulent representations which she
made to said GLENDA S. MARQUEZ prior to and even simultaneous with the commission of
the fraud, to the effect that she had the power and capacity to recruit and employ said GLENDA
S. MARQUEZ for overseas employment in Canada as Live-in Caregiver, and could facilitate the
processing of the pertinent papers if given the necessary amount to meet the requirements
thereof, induced and succeeded in inducing the said GLENDA S. MARQUEZ to give and
deliver, as in fact she gave and delivered to said accused the total amount of Php152,670.00, on
the strength of said manifestations and representations, said accused well knowing that the same
were false and fraudulent and were made solely to obtain, as in fact, she did obtain the said
amount of Php152,670.00, which amount once in her possession, with intent to defraud,
misappropriated, misapplied, and converted to her own personal use and benefit, to the damage
and prejudice of said GLENDA S. MARQUEZ in the aforesaid amount of Php152,670.00,
Philippine Currency.

Contrary to law.[12]

The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

On December 11, 2008, warrants of arrest were issued against the petitioner.

On April 15, 2009, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information[13] in Criminal Case No.
08-265540, arguing that she was deprived of her right to seek reconsideration or reinvestigation
of the public prosecutor's resolution as she was not furnished a copy thereof.[14]Also, petitioner
argued that the. City Prosecutor of Manila had no jurisdiction over the case as the alleged crime
was committed in Kidapawan City.

In an Order[15] dated May 13, 2011 in Criminal Case No. 08-265540, the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Manila, Branch 55, denied petitioner's Motion to Quash, ruling that the ground relied
upon by the petitioner in the said motion is not one of those enumerated under Section 3[16], Rule
117 of the Rules of Court for quashing a complaint or information.[17] As to the jurisdictional
issue, the RTC ruled that it has jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case, citing Section 9 of
Republic Act No. 8042[18] (RA 8042), which explicitly states that:

A criminal action arising from illegal recruitment as defined herein shall be filed with the
Regional Trial Court of the province or city where the offense was committed or where the
offended party actually resides at the time of the commission of the
offense xxx. (underscoring supplied for emphasis)[19]
Since complainant is a resident of Manila, the RTC ruled that the second ground interposed by
the petitioner is devoid of merit.[20] Thus:

In view of the foregoing, the Motion to Quash is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.[21]

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration[22] of the said Order alleging that she just found out
that there were two Informations filed against her, one for Illegal Recruitment in Criminal Case
No. 08-265539[23] and another for Estafa[24] in Criminal Case No. 08-265540. Petitioner
maintained that the alleged crimes were committed in Kidapawan City, not in Manila as alleged
in the Informations. Petitioner further alleged that there is no showing that respondent is an
actual resident of Manila but as per her Reply-Affidavit, Manila is merely her postal
address.[25] Hence, petitioner again raised a jurisdictional issue in the said motion.[26]

In an Order[27] dated January 26, 2012, this time in Criminal Cases Nos. 08-265539-40, the RTC
reconsidered its May 13, 2011 Order, finding that it had no jurisdiction to try the cases since the
crimes of Illegal Recruitment and Estafa were not committed in its territory but in Kidapawan
City, thus:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the instant Motion for Reconsideration is hereby
GRANTED. The Order of this Court dated May 13, 2011 is hereby RECONSIDERED and SET
ASIDE.

This case is ordered returned to the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court for
proper disposition.

SO ORDERED.[28]

On the same date, the RTC also issued an Order[29] recalling the warrants of arrest issued against
the petitioner, thus:

Considering that this Court has no territorial jurisdiction over the above-entitled cases, the Order
of this Court dated December 11, 2008, pertaining to the issuance of Warrants of Arrest against
herein accused is hereby cancelled (and) set aside.

WHEREFORE, let the Warrants of Arrest issued in these cases be ordered RECALLED AND
SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.[30]

Respondent, through the public prosecutor, then filed a Motion for Reconsideration[31] of the said
Order, averring that while it appears in the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
(POEA) pro-forma complaint affidavit that the alleged recruitment activities took place in
Kidapawan City, it also appears in her Reply-Affidavit, that she deposited certain amounts in
several banks in Manila for the name and account of petitioner as payments for employment
processing and placement fees.[32] Thus, part of the essential elements of Illegal Recruitment and
Estafa took place in Manila.[33] Section 9 of RA 8042, above-quoted, which states that an illegal
recruitment case may also be filed with the RTC of the province or city where the offended party
actually resides at the time of the commission of the crime, was likewise invoked in the said
motion.[34] Respondent averred that the records show that at the time of the incident up to the
present, she resides in Sampaloc, Manila.[35]

Petitioner filed an Opposition[36] to the said motion. Respondent, through the public prosecutor,
filed a Comment[37] thereon and a Reply[38] was then filed by the petitioner.

In an Order[39] dated March 16, 2012, the RTC denied respondent's motion for reconsideration,
ruling that as stated in respondent's Sinumpaang Salaysay, the essential elements of Illegal
Recruitment and Estafa took place in Kidapawan City and not in Manila. The allegation that
several deposits for the payment of the placement fees were made in Manila is of no moment,
according to the RTC, considering that the main transaction actually took place in Kidapawan
City, which is the basis for determining the jurisdiction of the court. Thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Motion for Reconsideration filed by the
Prosecution is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The Orders of the Court both dated January 26,
2012 still stand.

SO ORDERED.[40]

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Undaunted, respondent filed a Petition for Certiorari before the CA.

In its assailed Decision, the CA discussed, first, the issue of respondent's legal personality to file
the said petition and second, the RTC's jurisdiction over the case.[41]

On the first issue, the CA ruled that while it is only the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
that may represent the People or the State in criminal proceedings before this Court or the CA,
the private offended party retains the right to bring a special civil action for certiorari in his/her
own name in criminal proceedings before the courts of law.[42] The CA cited Section 1, Rule 122,
which provides that the right to appeal from a final judgment or order in a criminal case is
granted to any party except when the accused is placed thereby in double jeopardy.[43] It also
cited this Court's ruling that the word party in the said provision must be understood to mean not
only the government and the accused, but also other persons who may be affected by the
judgment rendered in the criminal proceeding.[44] The private complainant, having an interest in
the civil aspect of the case, thus, may file such action in his/her name to question the decision or
action of the respondent court on jurisdictional grounds.[45] In line with this, the CA also ruled
that there is no double jeopardy in this case as the charges were dismissed upon motion of the
petitioner-accused.[46]

As to the issue on jurisdiction, the CA ruled that the RTC has jurisdiction over the cases of
Illegal Recruitment and Estafa, citing Section 9 of RA 8042, which provides that a criminal
action arising from illegal recruitment may be filed in the place where the offended party
actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense.[47] According to the CA, it was
established that herein respondent was residing in Sampaloc, Manila at the time of the
commission of the crimes.[48] Therefore, the two (2) Informations herein were correctly filed
with the RTC of Manila, pursuant to Section 9 of RA 8042.[49] The CA disposed, thus:

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED. The assailed Order dated January 26,
2012 and Resolution dated March 16, 2012 of the RTC, Manila, in Criminal Case No. 08-265539
for estafa and Criminal Case No. 08-265540 for illegal recruitment respectively,
are NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. The cases are REINSTATED and REMANDED to the
court of origin for appropriate proceedings.

SO ORDERED.[50]

Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied by the CA in its Resolution dated November
6, 2013, thus:

WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.[51]

Hence, this Petition.

Petitioner argues that the CA committed a reversible error and grave abuse of discretion in
declaring that the respondent had the legal personality to assail the dismissal of the criminal
cases as respondent is not the proper party to do so.[52] Petitioner argues that the OSG is the
appellate counsel of the People of the Philippines in all criminal cases and as such, the appeal in
the criminal aspect should be taken solely by the State and the private complainant is limited
only to the appeal of the civil aspect.[53] According to the petitioner, respondent's action before
the CA does not concern the civil aspect of the case but the validity of the RTC's Orders.[54]

On the jurisdictional issue, the petitioner maintains that the RTC of Manila has no jurisdiction
over the cases as the alleged acts constituting the crimes charged were committed in Kidapawan
City and not in Manila.[55]

For her part, respondent argues that the argument as regards her legal personality in filing
the petition for certiorari before the CA reveals that petitioner misunderstood the difference
between an appeal and a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court.[56] In fact, respondent agrees with the petitioner that only the State, through the OSG, may
file an appeal in a criminal case.[57] As an appeal is not available for a private complainant in a
criminal case, an independent action through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, therefore, is
available to the said aggrieved party.[58]

Anent the jurisdictional issue, respondent again invokes Section 9 of RA 8042 which allows the
filing of an action arising from illegal recruitment with the RTC of the complainant's
residence.[59] The respondent further argues that as regards the charge of Estafa, considering that
the same arose from the illegal recruitment activities, the said provision allows the filing thereof
with the court of the same place where the Illegal Recruitment case was filed.[60] Besides,
according to the respondent, since one of the essential elements of Estafa, i.e., damage or
prejudice to the offended party, took place in Manila, as the offended party resides in Manila, the
RTC of Manila has jurisdiction over the Estafa case.[61]

Issues

1) Does the RTC of Manila have jurisdiction over the cases of Illegal Recruitment and Estafa?

2) Does the respondent, on her own, have legal personality to file the petition for
certiorari before the CA?

The Court's Ruling

The issues shall be discussed ad seriatim.

The RTC of Manila has jurisdiction over the

cases of Illegal Recruitment and Estafa

Indeed, venue in criminal cases is an essential element of jurisdiction.[62] As explained by this

Court in the case of Foz, Jr. v. People:[63]
It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal cases, the offense
should have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients took place within the
territorial jurisdiction of the court. Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory where
the court has jurisdiction to take cognizance or to try the offense allegedly committed therein by
the accused. Thus it cannot take jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense allegedly
committed outside of that limited territory. Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over a
criminal case is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information. And once it
is so shown, the court may validly take cognizance of the case. However, if the evidence
adduced during the trial show that the offense was committed somewhere else, the court
should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction.[64] (emphasis ours)

Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:

SEC. 15. Place where action is to be instituted. - a) Subject to existing laws, the criminal action
shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or territory where the offense was
committed or where any of its essential ingredients occurred. (emphasis ours)

At the risk of being repetitive, Sec. 9 of RA 8042, however, fixed an alternative venue from that
provided in Section 15(a) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, i.e., a criminal action arising from
illegal recruitment may also be filed where the offended party actually resides at the time of the
commission of the offense and that the court where the criminal action is first filed shall acquire
jurisdiction to the exclusion of other courts.[65]

Despite the clear provision of the law, the RTC of Manila declared that it has no jurisdiction to
try the cases as the illegal Recruitment and Estafa were not committed in its territory but in
Kidapawan City.[66]

We are, thus, one with the CA in finding that the RTC of Manila committed grave abuse of
discretion and in fact, a palpable error, in ordering the quashal of the Informations. The express
provision of the law is clear that the filing of criminal actions arising from illegal recruitment
before the RTC of the province or city where the offended party actually resides at the time of
the commission of the offense is allowed. It goes without saying that the dismissal of the case on
a wrong ground, indeed, deprived the prosecution, as well as the respondent as complainant, of
their day in court.

It has been found by both the RTC and the CA that the respondent resides in Manila; hence, the
filing of the case before the RTC of Manila was proper. Thus, the trial court should have taken
cognizance of the case, and if it will eventually be shown during trial that the offense was
committed somewhere else, then the court should dismiss the action for want of
jurisdiction.[67] As a matter of fact, the RTC is not unaware of the above-cited provision which
allows the filing of the said case before the RTC of the city where the offended party resides at
the time of the commission of the offense; hence, it originally denied petitioner's Motion to
Quash. This Court is, thus, baffled by the fact that the RTC reversed itself upon the petitioner's
motion for reconsideration on the same ground that it previously invalidated.

Likewise, with the case of Estafa arising from such illegal recruitment activities, the outright
dismissal thereof due to lack of jurisdiction was not proper, considering that as per the
allegations in the Information, the same was within the jurisdiction of Manila. During the
preliminary investigation of the cases, respondent even presented evidence that some of the
essential elements of the crime were committed within Manila, such as the payment of
processing and/or placement fees, considering that these were deposited in certain banks located
in Manila.[68] Thus, it bears stressing that the trial court should have proceeded to take
cognizance of the case, and if during the trial it was proven that the offense was committed
somewhere else, that is the time that the trial court should dismiss the case for want of
jurisdiction.[69]

Undoubtedly, such erroneous outright dismissal of the case is a nullity for want of due process.
The prosecution and the respondent as the private offended party were not given the opportunity
to present and prosecute their case. Indeed, the prosecution and the private offended party are as
much entitled to due process as the accused in a criminal case.[70]

The respondent has the legal personality

to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.

This procedural issue is not novel. There is no question that, generally, the prosecution cannot
appeal or bring error proceedings from a judgment rendered in favor of the defendant in a
criminal case due to the final and executory nature of a judgment of acquittal and the
constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy.[71] Despite acquittal, however, the offended
party or the accused may appeal, but only with respect to the civil aspect of the decision.[72]

This Court has also entertained petitions for certiorari questioning the acquittal of the accused
in, or the dismissal of, criminal cases upon clear showing that the lower court, in acquitting the
accused, committed not merely errors of judgment but also grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction or a denial of due process, thus rendering the assailed judgment
void.[73] When the order of dismissal is annulled or set aside by an appellate court in an original
special civil action via certiorari, the right of the accused against double jeopardy is not
violated.[74]

In as early as the 1989 case of People v. Santiago,[75] this Court has ruled that a private offended
party can file a special civil action for certiorari questioning the trial court's order acquitting the
accused or dismissing the case, viz.:

In such special civil action for certiorari filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, wherein it is
alleged that the trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction or on other jurisdictional grounds, the rules state that the petition may be filed by the
person aggrieved. In such case, the aggrieved parties are the State and the private offended party
or complainant. The complainant has an interest in the civil aspect of the case so he/she may file
such special civil action questioning the decision or action of the respondent court on
jurisdictional grounds. In so doing, complainant should not bring the action in the name of
the People of Philippines. The action may be prosecuted in the name of said
complainant. (emphasis supplied)

Moreover, there have been occasions when this Court has allowed the offended party to pursue
the criminal action on his/her own behalf, as when there is a denial of due process as in this
case.[76] Indeed, the right of offended parties to appeal or question an order of the trial court
which deprives them of due process has always been recognized, the only limitation being that
they cannot appeal any adverse ruling if to do so would place the accused in double jeopardy.[77]

At this juncture, We also uphold the CA's finding that double jeopardy does not exist in this case.
Inasmuch as the dismissal of the charges by the RTC was done without regard to due process of
law, the same is null and void.[78] It is as if there was no acquittal or dismissal of the case at all,
and the same cannot constitute a claim for double jeopardy.[79]

Also, it is elementary that double jeopardy attaches only when the following elements concur:
(1) the accused is charged under a complaint or information sufficient in form and substance to
sustain their conviction; (2) the court has jurisdiction; (3) the accused has been arraigned and has
pleaded; and (4) he/she is convicted or acquitted, or the case is dismissed without his/her
consent.[80] Thus, as found by the CA, double jeopardy does not attach in this case as the
dismissal was granted upon motion of the petitioner. To be sure, no fundamental right of the
petitioner was violated in the filing of the petition for certiorari before the CA by the respondent,
as well as the grant thereof by the CA.

In fine, the dismissal of the cases below was patently erroneous and as such, invalid for lack of
fundamental requisite, that is, due process[81]. For this reason, this Court finds the recourse of the
respondent to the CA proper despite it being brought on her own and not through the OSG.

Besides, such technicality cannot prevail over the more fundamental matter, which is the
violation of the right to due process resulting from the RTC's patent error. Nothing is more
settled than the principle that rules of procedure are meant to be tools to facilitate a fair and
orderly conduct of proceedings.[82] Strict adherence thereto must not get in the way of achieving
substantial justice.[83] As long as their purpose is sufficiently met and no violation of due process
and fair play takes place, the rules should be liberally construed.[84] Liberal construction of the
rules is the controlling principle to effect substantial justice.[85] The relaxation or suspension of
procedural rules, or the exemption of a case from their operation, is warranted when compelling
reasons or when the purpose of justice requires it.[86] Thus, litigations should, as much as
possible, be decided on their merits and not on sheer technicalities.[87]

In all, since it is established that the RTC of Manila has jurisdiction over the Illegal Recruitment
and Estafa cases, and there being no violation of the double jeopardy doctrine, the prosecution of
the case may still resume in the trial court as held by the CA.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision dated May
29, 2013 and Resolution dated November 6, 2013 of the Court of Appeals are
hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Bersamin, Reyes, and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 181658

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

Before this Court is a petition[1] for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended, seeking the reversal of the May 31, 2007 Decision[2] and the January 31,
2008 Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 81510. The CA affirmed the
Orders[4] dated August 15, 2003 and November 5, 2003 of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC)
of Manila denying (a) the Omnibus Motion[5] for the exclusion of a private prosecutor in the two
criminal cases for perjury pending before the MeTC, and (b) the Motion for Reconsideration[6] of
the said order denying the Omnibus Motion, respectively.

The facts follow:

Petitioner Lee Pue Liong, a.k.a. Paul Lee, is the President of Centillion Holdings, Inc. (CHI), a
company affiliated with the CKC Group of Companies (CKC Group) which includes the pioneer
company Clothman Knitting Corporation (CKC). The CKC Group is the subject of intra-
corporate disputes between petitioner and his siblings, including herein respondent Chua Pue
Chin Lee, a majority stockholder and Treasurer of CHI.

On July 19, 1999, petitioner's siblings including respondent and some unidentified persons took
over and barricaded themselves inside the premises of a factory owned by CKC. Petitioner and
other factory employees were unable to enter the factory premises. This incident led to the filing
of Criminal Case Nos. 971-V-99, 55503 to 55505 against Nixon Lee and 972-V-99 against
Nixon Lee, Andy Lee, Chua Kipsi a.k.a. Jensen Chua and respondent, which are now pending in
different courts in Valenzuela City.[7]

On June 14, 1999, petitioner on behalf of CHI (as per the Secretary's Certificate[8] issued by
Virginia Lee on even date) caused the filing of a verified Petition[9] for the Issuance of an
Owner's Duplicate Copy of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 232238[10] which covers a
property owned by CHI. The case was docketed as LRC Record No. 4004 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 4. Petitioner submitted before the said court an Affidavit of
Loss[11] stating that: (1) by virtue of his position as President of CHI, he had in his custody and
possession the owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. 232238 issued by the Register of Deeds for
Manila; (2) that said owner's copy of TCT No. 232238 was inadvertently lost or misplaced from
his files and he discovered such loss in May 1999; (3) he exerted diligent efforts in locating the
said title but it had not been found and is already beyond recovery; and (4) said title had not been
the subject of mortgage or used as collateral for the payment of any obligation with any person,
credit or banking institution. Petitioner likewise testified in support of the foregoing averments
during an ex-parte proceeding. In its Order[12] dated September 17, 1999, the RTC granted the
petition and directed the Register of Deeds of Manila to issue a new Owner's Duplicate Copy of
TCT No. 232238 in lieu of the lost one.

Respondent, joined by her brother Nixon Lee, filed an Omnibus Motion praying, among others,
that the September 17, 1999 Order be set aside claiming that petitioner knew fully well that
respondent was in possession of the said Owner's Duplicate Copy, the latter being the Corporate
Treasurer and custodian of vital documents of CHI. Respondent added that petitioner merely
needs to have another copy of the title because he planned to mortgage the same with the
Planters Development Bank. Respondent even produced the Owner's Duplicate Copy of TCT
No. 232238 in open court. Thus, on November 12, 1999, the RTC recalled and set aside its
September 17, 1999 Order.[13]

In a Complaint-Affidavit[14] dated May 9, 2000 filed before the City Prosecutor of Manila,
respondent alleged the following:

1. I am a stockholder, Board Member, and duly elected treasurer of Centillion Holdings, Inc.
(CHI), which corporation is duly organized and existing under Philippine laws.

2. As duly elected treasurer of CHI, I was tasked with the custody and safekeeping of all vital
financial documents including bank accounts, securities, and land titles.

3. Among the land titles in my custody was the Owner's Duplicate copy of Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 232238 registered in the name of CHI.

4. On June 14, 1999, Lee Pue Liong, a.k.a. Paul Lee, filed a VERIFIED PETITION for the
issuance of a new owner's duplicate copy of the aforementioned certificate claiming under oath
that said duplicate copy was in his custody but was lost.

xxxx

5. Paul Lee likewise executed an affidavit of loss stating the same fact of loss, which affidavit he
used and presented as exhibit "D".

xxxx

6. On August 18, 1999, Paul Lee testified under oath that TCT No. 232238 was inadvertently lost
and misplaced from his files.

xxxx

7. Paul Lee made a willful and deliberate assertion of falsehood in his verified petition, affidavit
and testimony, as he perfectly knew that I was in possession of the owner's duplicate copy of TCT
No. 232238.

8. I and my brother Nixon Lee opposed the petition of Paul Lee and even produced in open court
the owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. 232238.

Such fact was contained in the Order of Branch 4, RTC, Manila, dated November 12, 1999, x x
x.

9. I and Paul Lee are involved in an intra-corporate dispute, which dispute is now pending with
the SEC.

10. Paul Lee needed to have a new owner's duplicate of the aforementioned TCT so that he could
mortgage the property covered thereby with the Planters Development Bank, even without my
knowledge and consent as well as the consent and knowledge of my brother Nixon Lee who is
likewise a shareholder, board member and officer of CHI.

11. If not for the timely discovery of the petition of Paul Lee, with his perjurious
misrepresentation, a new owner's duplicate could have been issued.

x x x x[15] (Italics supplied.)

On June 7, 2000, respondent executed a Supplemental Affidavit[16] to clarify that she was
accusing petitioner of perjury allegedly committed on the following occasions: (1) by declaring
in the VERIFICATION the veracity of the contents in his petition filed with the RTC of Manila
concerning his claim that TCT No. 232238 was in his possession but was lost; (2) by declaring
under oath in his affidavit of loss that said TCT was lost; and (3) by testifying under oath that the
said TCT was inadvertently lost from his files.

The Investigating Prosecutor recommended the dismissal of the case. However, in the Review
Resolution[17] dated December 1, 2000 issued by First Assistant City Prosecutor Eufrosino A.
Sulla, the recommendation to dismiss the case was set aside. Thereafter, said City Prosecutor
filed the Informations[18] docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 352270-71 CR for perjury, punishable
under Article 183[19] of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, against petitioner before the MeTC
of Manila, Branch 28.

At the trial, Atty. Augusto M. Macam appeared as counsel for respondent and as private
prosecutor with the consent and under the control and supervision of the public prosecutor. After
the prosecution's presentation of its first witness in the person of Atty. Ronaldo Viesca, Jr.,[20] a
lawyer from the Land Registration Authority, petitioner's counsel moved in open court that
respondent and her lawyer in this case should be excluded from participating in the case since
perjury is a public offense. Said motion was vehemently opposed by Atty. Macam.[21] In its
Order[22] dated May 7, 2003, the MeTC gave both the defense and the prosecution the
opportunity to submit their motion and comment respectively as regards the issue raised by
petitioner's counsel.

Complying with the MeTC's directive, petitioner filed the aforementioned Omnibus
Motion[23] asserting that in the crime of perjury punishable under Article 183 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, there is no mention of any private offended party. As such, a private
prosecutor cannot intervene for the prosecution in this case. Petitioner argued that perjury is a
crime against public interest as provided under Section 2, Chapter 2, Title IV, Book 2 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended, where the offended party is the State alone. Petitioner
posited that there being no allegation of damage to private interests, a private prosecutor is not
needed. On the other hand, the Prosecution filed its Opposition[24] to petitioner's Omnibus
Motion.

The MeTC denied the Omnibus Motion in the Order[25] dated August 15, 2003, as follows:

[W]hile criminal actions, as a rule, are prosecuted under the direction and control of the public
prosecutor, however, an offended party may intervene in the proceeding, personally or by
attorney, especially in cases of offenses which cannot be prosecuted except at the instance of the
offended party. The only exception to this rule is when the offended party waives his right to
[file the] civil action or expressly reserves his right to institute it after the termination of the case,
in which case he loses his right to intervene upon the theory that he is deemed to have lost his
interest in its prosecution. And, in any event, whenever an offended party intervenes in the
prosecution of a criminal action, his intervention must always be subject to the direction and
control of the public prosecutor. (Lim Tek Goan vs. Yatco, 94 Phil. 197).

Apparently, the law makes no distinction between cases that are public in nature and those that
can only be prosecuted at the instance of the offended party. In either case, the law gives to the
offended party the right to intervene, personally or by counsel, and he is deprived of such right
only when he waives the civil action or reserves his right to institute one. Such is not the
situation in this case. The case at bar involves a public crime and the private prosecution has
asserted its right to intervene in the proceedings, subject to the direction and control of the public
prosecutor.[26]
The MeTC also denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration.[27]

Petitioner sought relief from the CA via a petition[28] for certiorari with a prayer for the issuance
of a writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order. Petitioner prayed, among
others, for the CA to enjoin the MeTC and respondent from enforcing the MeTC Orders dated
August 15, 2003 and November 5, 2003, and likewise to enjoin the MeTC and respondent from
further allowing the private prosecutor to participate in the proceedings below while the instant
case is pending.

By Decision[29] dated May 31, 2007, the CA ruled in favor of respondent, holding that the
presence of the private prosecutor who was under the control and supervision of the public
prosecutor during the criminal proceedings of the two perjury cases is not proscribed by the
rules. The CA ratiocinated that respondent is no stranger to the perjury cases as she is the private
complainant therein, hence, an aggrieved party.[30] Reiterating the MeTC's invocation of our
ruling in Lim Tek Goan v. Yatco[31] as cited by former Supreme Court Associate Justice Florenz
D. Regalado in his Remedial Law Compendium,[32] the CA ruled that "the offended party, who
has neither reserved, waived, nor instituted the civil action may intervene, and such right to
intervene exists even when no civil liability is involved."[33]
Without passing upon the merits of the perjury cases, the CA declared that respondent's property
rights and interests as the treasurer and a stockholder of CHI were disturbed and/or threatened by
the alleged acts of petitioner. Further, the CA opined that petitioner's right to a fair trial is not
violated because the presence of the private prosecutor in these cases does not exclude the
presence of the public prosecutor who remains to have the prosecuting authority, subjecting the
private prosecutor to his control and supervision.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration[34] but the CA denied it under Resolution[35] dated
January 31, 2008.

Hence, this petition raising the following issues:

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE

ERROR WHEN IT UPHELD THE RESOLUTION OF THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL
COURT THAT THERE IS A PRIVATE OFFENDED PARTY IN THE CRIME OF PERJURY,
A CRIME AGAINST PUBLIC INTEREST; AND

II

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT

UPHELD THE RESOLUTIONS OF THE LOWER COURT WHICH IN TURN UPHELD THE
RIGHT OF RESPONDENT, AN ALLEGED STOCKHOLDER OF CHI, TO INTERVENE IN
THE CRIMINAL CASE FOR PERJURY AS PRIVATE COMPLAINANT ON BEHALF OF
THE CORPORATION WITHOUT ITS AUTHORITY.[36]
Petitioner claims that the crime of perjury, a crime against public interest, does not offend any
private party but is a crime which only offends the public interest in the fair and orderly
administration of laws. He opines that perjury is a felony where no civil liability arises on the
part of the offender because there are no damages to be compensated and that there is no private
person injured by the crime.

Petitioner argues that the CA's invocation of our pronouncement in Lim Tek Goan, cited by
Justice Regalado in his book, is inaccurate since the private offended party must have a civil
interest in the criminal case in order to intervene through a private prosecutor. Dissecting Lim
Tek Goan, petitioner points out that said case involved the crime of grave threats where Lim Tek
Goan himself was one of the offended parties. Thus, even if the crime of grave threats did not
have any civil liability to be satisfied, petitioner claims that Lim Tek Goan, as a matter of right,
may still intervene because he was one of the offended parties.

Petitioner submits that the MeTC erred in allowing the private prosecutor to represent respondent
in this case despite the fact that the latter was not the offended party and did not suffer any
damage as she herself did not allege nor claim in her Complaint-Affidavit and Supplemental
Affidavit that she or CHI suffered any damage that may be satisfied through
restitution,[37] reparation for the damage caused[38] and indemnification for consequential
damages.[39] Lastly, petitioner asserts that respondent is not the proper offended party that may
intervene in this case as she was not authorized by CHI. Thus, he prayed, among others, that
Atty. Macam or any private prosecutor for that matter be excluded from the prosecution of the
criminal cases, and that all proceedings undertaken wherein Atty. Macam intervened be set aside
and that the same be taken anew by the public prosecutor alone.[40]

On the other hand, respondent counters that the presence and intervention of the private
prosecutor in the perjury cases are not prohibited by the rules, stressing that she is, in fact, an
aggrieved party, being a stockholder, an officer and the treasurer of CHI and the private
complainant. Thus, she submits that pursuant to our ruling in Lim Tek Goan she has the right to
intervene even if no civil liability exists in this case.[41]

The petition has no merit.

Generally, the basis of civil liability arising from crime is the fundamental postulate of our law
that "[e]very person criminally liable x x x is also civilly liable."[42] Underlying this legal
principle is the traditional theory that when a person commits a crime, he offends two entities,
namely (1) the society in which he lives in or the political entity, called the State, whose law he
has violated; and (2) the individual member of that society whose person, right, honor, chastity
or property was actually or directly injured or damaged by the same punishable act or
omission.[43]

Section 1, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, provides:

SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. (a) When a criminal action is instituted, the
civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed
instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves
the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.

x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
For the recovery of civil liability in the criminal action, the appearance of a private prosecutor is
allowed under Section 16 of Rule 110:

SEC. 16. Intervention of the offended party in criminal action. Where the civil action for
recovery of civil liability is instituted in the criminal action pursuant to Rule 111, the offended
party may intervene by counsel in the prosecution of the offense. (Emphasis supplied.)
Section 12, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, defines an
offended party as "the person against whom or against whose property the offense was
committed." In Garcia v. Court of Appeals,[44] this Court rejected petitioner's theory that it is
only the State which is the offended party in public offenses like bigamy. We explained that
from the language of Section 12, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court, it is reasonable to assume that
the offended party in the commission of a crime, public or private, is the party to whom the
offender is civilly liable, and therefore the private individual to whom the offender is civilly
liable is the offended party.
In Ramiscal, Jr. v. Hon. Sandiganbayan,[45] we also held that

Under Section 16, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the offended party
may also be a private individual whose person, right, house, liberty or property
was actually or directly injured by the same punishable act or omission of the accused, or
that corporate entity which is damaged or injured by the delictual acts complained of. Such
party must be one who has a legal right; a substantial interest in the subject matter of the action
as will entitle him to recourse under the substantive law, to recourse if the evidence is sufficient
or that he has the legal right to the demand and the accused will be protected by the satisfaction
of his civil liabilities. Such interest must not be a mere expectancy, subordinate or
inconsequential. The interest of the party must be personal; and not one based on a desire to
vindicate the constitutional right of some third and unrelated party.[46] (Emphasis supplied.)
In this case, the statement of petitioner regarding his custody of TCT No. 232238 covering CHI's
property and its loss through inadvertence, if found to be perjured is, without doubt, injurious to
respondent's personal credibility and reputation insofar as her faithful performance of the duties
and responsibilities of a Board Member and Treasurer of CHI. The potential injury to the
corporation itself is likewise undeniable as the court-ordered issuance of a new owner's duplicate
of TCT No. 232238 was only averted by respondent's timely discovery of the case filed by
petitioner in the RTC.

Even assuming that no civil liability was alleged or proved in the perjury case being tried in the
MeTC, this Court declared in the early case of Lim Tek Goan v. Yatco,[47] cited by both MeTC
and CA, that whether public or private crimes are involved, it is erroneous for the trial court to
consider the intervention of the offended party by counsel as merely a matter of tolerance. Thus,
where the private prosecution has asserted its right to intervene in the proceedings, that right
must be respected. The right reserved by the Rules to the offended party is that of intervening for
the sole purpose of enforcing the civil liability born of the criminal act and not of demanding
punishment of the accused. Such intervention, moreover, is always subject to the direction and
control of the public prosecutor.[48]

In Chua v. Court of Appeals,[49] as a result of the complaint-affidavit filed by private respondent

who is also the corporation's Treasurer, four counts of falsification of public documents (Minutes
of Annual Stockholder's Meeting) was instituted by the City Prosecutor against petitioner and his
wife. After private respondent's testimony was heard during the trial, petitioner moved to exclude
her counsels as private prosecutors on the ground that she failed to allege and prove any civil
liability in the case. The MeTC granted the motion and ordered the exclusion of said private
prosecutors. On certiorari to the RTC, said court reversed the MeTC and ordered the latter to
allow the private prosecutors in the prosecution of the civil aspect of the criminal case. Petitioner
filed a petition for certiorari in the CA which dismissed his petition and affirmed the assailed
RTC ruling.

When the case was elevated to this Court, we sustained the CA in allowing the private
prosecutors to actively participate in the trial of the criminal case. Thus:

Petitioner cites the case of Tan, Jr. v. Gallardo, holding that where from the nature of the offense
or where the law defining and punishing the offense charged does not provide for an indemnity,
the offended party may not intervene in the prosecution of the offense.

Petitioner's contention lacks merit. Generally, the basis of civil liability arising from crime is the
fundamental postulate that every man criminally liable is also civilly liable. When a person
commits a crime he offends two entities namely (1) the society in which he lives in or the
political entity called the State whose law he has violated; and (2) the individual member of the
society whose person, right, honor, chastity or property has been actually or directly injured or
damaged by the same punishable act or omission. An act or omission is felonious because it is
punishable by law, it gives rise to civil liability not so much because it is a crime but
because it caused damage to another. Additionally, what gives rise to the civil liability is really
the obligation and the moral duty of everyone to repair or make whole the damage caused to
another by reason of his own act or omission, whether done intentionally or negligently. The
indemnity which a person is sentenced to pay forms an integral part of the penalty imposed by
law for the commission of the crime. The civil action involves the civil liability arising from the
offense charged which includes restitution, reparation of the damage caused, and indemnification
for consequential damages.

Under the Rules, where the civil action for recovery of civil liability is instituted in the criminal
action pursuant to Rule 111, the offended party may intervene by counsel in the prosecution of
the offense. Rule 111(a) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that, "[w]hen a criminal
action is instituted, the civil action arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted
with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to
institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action."

Private respondent did not waive the civil action, nor did she reserve the right to institute it
separately, nor institute the civil action for damages arising from the offense charged. Thus,
we find that the private prosecutors can intervene in the trial of the criminal action.

Petitioner avers, however, that respondent's testimony in the inferior court did not establish nor
prove any damages personally sustained by her as a result of petitioner's alleged acts of
falsification. Petitioner adds that since no personal damages were proven therein, then the
participation of her counsel as private prosecutors, who were supposed to pursue the civil
aspect of a criminal case, is not necessary and is without basis.

When the civil action is instituted with the criminal action, evidence should be taken of the
damages claimed and the court should determine who are the persons entitled to such indemnity.
The civil liability arising from the crime may be determined in the criminal proceedings if the
offended party does not waive to have it adjudged or does not reserve the right to institute a
separate civil action against the defendant. Accordingly, if there is no waiver or reservation of
civil liability, evidence should be allowed to establish the extent of injuries suffered.

In the case before us, there was neither a waiver nor a reservation made; nor did the offended
party institute a separate civil action. It follows that evidence should be allowed in the criminal
proceedings to establish the civil liability arising from the offense committed, and the
private offended party has the right to intervene through the private
prosecutors.[50](Emphasis supplied; citations omitted.)
In the light of the foregoing, we hold that the CA did not err in holding that the MeTC committed
no grave abuse of discretion when it denied petitioner's motion to exclude Atty. Macam as
private prosecutor in Crim. Case Nos. 352270-71 CR.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The Decision dated May 31,
2007 and the Resolution dated January 31, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
81510 are hereby AFFIRMED and UPHELD.

With costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Sereno C.J., (Chairperson), Brion,* Bersamin, and Reyes, JJ., concur.