Organizational Silence A Barrier To Change and Development in A Plurastic World

Organizational Silence: A Barrier to Change and Development in a Pluralistic World
Author(s): Elizabeth Wolfe Morrison and Frances J. Milliken

Source: The Academy of Management Review, Vol. 25, No. 4 (Oct., 2000), pp. 706-725
Published by: Academy of Management
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4 Academy of Management Review
2000, Vol. 25, No. 4, 706-725.
ORGANIZATIONAL SILENCE: A BARRIER TO

CHANGE AND DEVELOPMENT IN A
PLURALISTIC WORLD
ELIZABETH WOLFE MORRISON

FRANCES J. MILLIKEN
New York University
We argue that there are powerful forces in many organizations that cause widespread
withholding of information about potential problems or issues by employees. We refer
to this collective-level phenomenon as "organizational silence." In our model we
identify contextual variables that create conditions conducive to silence and explore
the collective sensemaking dynamics that can create the shared perception that
speaking up is unwise. We also discuss some of the negative consequences of
systemic silence, especially for organizations' ability to change and develop in the
context of pluralism.
Imagine an organization where the CEO has icy issues. Similarly, Redding (1985) argued that
no clothes. The CEO's lack of clothes is apparent many organizations implicitly convey to em-
to all who set eyes upon him or her. Yet employ- ployees that they should not "rock the boat" by
ees never mention this. Some employees even challenging corporate policies or managerial
compliment and praise the CEO's attire. The prerogatives. Other scholars likewise have
CEO takes pride and comfort in the fact that noted that organizations are generally intoler-
subordinates recognize his or her fine taste in ant of dissent and that employees, thus, are re-
clothing and easily dismisses those few trouble- luctant to speak up about problems (Ewing, 1977;
makers who look at him or her strangely or who Nemeth, 1997; Scott & Hart, 1979; Sprague &
dare to suggest that the CEO's taste in clothing Ruud, 1988).
is anything less than impeccable. Yet, behold, There are also empirical data indicating that
these employees are not blind. Behind the safety employees often feel compelled to remain silent
of closed doors and in veiled whispers, they talk in the face of concerns or problems. It is note-
of their leader's lack of clothing. They all clearly worthy, however, that these data appear in pop-
know that the CEO is naked, but only the foolish ular rather than academic sources, suggesting
or naive dare to speak of it in public. that this topic has not received the rigorous re-
Is this a mere fairy tale? We believe that it is search attention that it deserves. For example,
not and that far too many organizations are in a survey of 845 line managers from diverse
caught in an apparent paradox in which most organizations reported in Industry Week, only 29
employees know the truth about certain issues percent of first-level supervisors thought that
and problems within the organization yet dare their organization encouraged employees to ex-
not speak that truth to their superiors. This prop- press opinions openly (Moskal, 1991). In addi-
osition can be supported from sources going tion, Ryan and Oestreich (1991) conducted inter-
back more than 20 years, although there has views with 260 employees from 22 organizations
been little systematic exploration of why the throughout the United States and found that
situation occurs. Argyris (1977), for example, dis- more than 70 percent indicated that they felt
cussed the idea that there are powerful games afraid to speak up about issues or problems that
and norms that often prevent employees from they encountered at work. The "undiscussables"
saying what they know about technical and pol- identified in that study covered a wide range of
areas, including decision-making procedures,
managerial incompetence, pay inequity, organ-
We thank Peter Balsam, Daniel Beunza, Jane Dutton, Pat
Hewlin, Theresa Lant, Corey Phelps, Debra Shapiro, three
izational inefficiencies, and poor organizational
anonymous reviewers, and special issue editor Bruce Barry performance. The two most common reasons
for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article. that Ryan and Oestreich's (1991) respondents
706
2000 Morrison and Milliken 707
gave for not raising these issues were that they them from speaking up. It is our belief that only
feared there would be negative repercussions by tracing and understanding the causes of or-
for speaking up, and they did not believe that ganizational silence can we begin to build an
speaking up would make a difference. accurate and comprehensive understanding of
The possibility that the dominant choice the barriers to pluralism in organizations.
within many organizations is for employees to Our objective in this article is to explain both
withhold their opinions and concerns about or- the process by which systemic silence develops
ganizational problems-a collective phenome- within many organizations and the forces that
non that we have termed organizational si- both set this process in motion and reinforce it.
lence-is one that we believe deserves serious We regard silence as a collective-level phenom-
research attention. Many scholars have empha- enon; hence, our model focuses on contextual
sized the importance of upward information rather than individual-level variables. By "con-
flow for organizational health (Argyris & Schon, textual" we mean factors that lie outside of the
1978; Deming, 1986; Dutton & Ashford, 1993; Floyd individual actor. Our objective is not to explain
& Wooldridge, 1994; Glauser, 1984; Saunders, why a particular employee will choose to speak
Sheppard, Knight, & Roth, 1992). Scholars also up or not to speak up but, rather, to explain why
have highlighted the importance of multiple the dominant response within many organiza-
and divergent points of view for effective organ- tions is for employees (en masse) to remain si-
izational decision making (e.g., Nemeth, 1997). lent. We also integrate works from several bod-
Thus, it seems paradoxical that so many em- ies of literature to highlight the negative
ployees report feeling that they cannot commu- implications of organizational silence, particu-
nicate upward about issues and problems. It is larly in the context of organizational change
also paradoxical that this seems to be occurring and the quest for greater pluralism.
at a time when management rhetoric focuses on Before elaborating our model, we stress that it
empowerment and more open lines of communi- is important to recognize several theoretical and
cation (e.g., Lawler, 1992; Pfeffer, 1994; Spreitzer, empirical works in which scholars have identi-
1995). Scholars have argued, however, that true fied antecedents to different forms of "speaking
empowerment is not the norm in most or- up" (Ashford, Rothbard, Piderit, & Dutton, 1998;
ganizations (Foegen, 1999; Moskal, 1991; Pfeffer, Miceli & Near, 1992; Withey & Cooper, 1989). Spe-
1994). cifically, in research building upon Hirschman's
As we will highlight, organizational silence is (1970) framework, researchers have proposed
a potentially dangerous impediment to organi- and demonstrated that employees may some-
zational change and development and is likely times "voice" in response to dissatisfaction (e.g.,
to pose a significant obstacle to the develop- Rusbult, Farrell, Rogers, & Mainous, 1988; Saun-
ment of truly pluralistic organizations. A plural- ders et al., 1992; Withey & Cooper, 1989). There
istic organization can be defined as one that has also been research on individual and con-
values and reflects differences among employ- textual variables that may motivate an em-
ees and that allows for the expression of multi- ployee to try to "sell" an issue to top manage-
ple perspectives and opinions (Harquail & Cox, ment (Ashford et al., 1998) or to "blow the
1993). Clearly, if people within an organization whistle" in response to a perceived wrongdoing
feel that they cannot openly express their points (Miceli & Near, 1992). Research has shown that
of view on critical issues, then such pluralism in order for employees to express their concerns,
cannot be attained. Employees may be diverse they must believe that doing so will be both
in terms of their values, beliefs, priorities, and effective and not too personally costly (Ashford
experiences, but because expressed points of et al., 1998; Miceli & Near, 1992; Withey & Coo-
view remain largely monolithic, the organiza- per, 1989).
tion will not be able to benefit from this diver- We believe that our focus differs from these
sity. Thus, we argue that in order to understand existing bodies of work in three ways. First, re-
how change and development might unfold search on employee voice, issue selling, and
within pluralistic settings, we need to under- whistle-blowing has been focused on an indi-
stand the organizational forces that often sys- vidual employee's decision on whether or not to
tematically cause employees to feel their opin- speak up, whereas our focus is on collective-
ions are not valued and that thereby discourage level dynamics. In addition, existing works (es-
708 Academy of Management Review October
pecially on issue selling and whistle-blowing) employees' collective sensemaking activities.

have focused on explaining why an employee Hence, in the final part of this section we focus
might violate the norm of silence within an or- on this sensemaking process and factors that
ganization and speak up about an issue, rather aid it.
than why such a norm exists in the first place.
Yet, we believe that the forces that motivate a
Managers' Fear of Negative Feedback
sole individual to speak up may be quite differ-
ent from the forces that compel all of the rest to One important factor that we believe facili-
remain silent. Another difference between our tates the creation of a climate of silence in or-
work and research on voice is that the latter has ganizations is top managers' fear of receiving
focused largely on individual-level antecedents negative feedback, especially from subordi-
(e.g., commitment, satisfaction, risk taking), nates. There is strong evidence that people often
whereas our focus is on the impact of factors feel threatened by negative feedback, whether
outside of the individual actor. We believe that this information is about them personally or
when an organization is characterized by si- about a course of action with which they identify
lence, this is less a product of multiple, uncon- (e.g., Carver, Antonio, & Scheier, 1985; Meyer &
nected individual choices and more a product of Starke, 1982; Sachs, 1982; Swann & Read, 1981).
forces within the organization-and forces stem- Therefore, people try to avoid receiving negative
ming from management-that systematically feedback (Ashford & Cummings, 1983), and
reinforce silence. The value of such a perspec- when they do receive it, they may try to ignore
tive is supported by the fact that employee-level the message, dismiss it as inaccurate, or attack
variables have explained relatively little vari- the credibility of the source (Ilgen, Fisher, & Tay-
ance in employee voice (Withey & Cooper, 1989). lor, 1979).
Argyris and Schon (1978) suggest that this fear
of feedback may be especially strong among
THE DEVELOPMENT OF ORGANIZATIONAL
managers. They argue that many managers feel
SILENCE
a strong need to avoid embarrassment, threat,
Figure 1 provides an overview of the organi- and feelings of vulnerability or incompetence.
zational conditions under which organizational Hence, they will tend to avoid any information
silence is most likely to develop. Fundamen- that might suggest weakness or that might raise
tally, we believe that organizational silence is questions about current courses of action. There
an outcome that owes its origins to (1) managers' is empirical evidence that managers will be es-
fear of negative feedback and (2) a set of implicit pecially likely to avoid negative feedback from
beliefs often held by managers. We begin by subordinates. It has been shown that when neg-
explaining these factors, paying particular at- ative feedback comes from below, rather than
tention to the role of managerial beliefs. We from above, it is seen as less accurate and le-
then discuss the conditions under which these gitimate (Ilgen et al., 1979) and as more threat-
beliefs are most likely to be held by senior man- ening to one's power and credibility (Korsgaard,
agement. Next, we discuss how managerial be- Roberson, & Rymph, 1998).
liefs and fear of feedback tend to give rise to
predictable types of organizational structures
Managers' Implicit Beliefs
and policies, as well as to managerial practices,
that impede the upward flow of information. Another important factor that we believe lies
As Figure 1 illustrates, these structures and at the root of organizational silence is a set of
practices contribute to the development of what beliefs that managers often implicitly hold
we call "a climate of silence": widely shared about employees and about the nature of man-
perceptions among employees that speaking up agement. One such belief is that employees are
about problems or issues is futile and/or danger- self-interested and untrustworthy. In recent
ous. When such a climate exists, the dominant works scholars (Ghoshal & Moran, 1996; Pfeffer,
response within an organization will be silence, 1997) have emphasized that an economic para-
rather than voice. However, the likelihood of digm currently dominates within business
such a climate emerging and the strength and schools in the United States and, hence, in the
pervasiveness of that climate will depend on thinking of many managers. This paradigm,
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reminiscent of what McGregor (1960) calls "The- of organizations, which stands in stark contrast
ory X," takes as a starting assumption that indi- to a "pluralistic view," in which dissent is re-
viduals are self-interested and act in ways to garded as normal and conflict as potentially
maximize their individual utilities (Williamson, healthy. The prevalence of the unitary view of
1996). In this paradigm employees are also organizations also has been noted in discus-
viewed as effort averse, and it is argued that sions of group decision making, strategy formu-
they cannot be trusted to act in the best interests lation, and innovation (e.g., Cosier & Schwenk,
of the organization without some form of incen- 1990; Janis, 1982; Nemeth, 1997). Enz and Schwenk
tive or sanction (Ghoshal & Moran, 1996; McGre- (1991) have argued that top managers hold firm to
gor, 1960; Pfeffer, 1997). the belief that agreement is good, despite re-
We propose that when an organization's top- search showing that the expression of multiple
level managers believe employees are self- points of view relates positively to decision qual-
interested and untrustworthy, they will then act ity and to subsequent organizational perfor-
in ways that implicitly and explicitly discourage mance.
upward communication. It is important to note,
however, that such beliefs are generally not con-
Conditions Fostering These Beliefs
scious. In his discussions of organizational
learning, Argyris (1977) highlights that the "the- A question that obviously arises concerns how
ories-in-use" that guide managers' actions dif- pervasive the above beliefs are and the condi-
fer, often in significant ways, from their "es- tions under which they are most prevalent. Al-
poused theories," or what they think drives their though we do not argue that top-level managers
behavior. Redding similarly argues that the be- of all organizations hold these beliefs, the works
liefs underlying managers' actions "usually re- of several scholars indicate that they exist to
main below the surface of consciousness, typi- some extent in almost every organization and
cally unstated, only rarely being dredged up that they characterize many organizations quite
into the light of day" (1985: 250). well (Argyris & Schon, 1978; Enz & Schwenk,
A second unstated belief that we would argue 1991; Ewing, 1977; Pfeffer, 1997; Redding, 1985).
is likely to create conditions conducive to organ- For example, the assumption about employee
izational silence is the belief that management self-interest is likely to be common because it
knows best about most issues of organizational appears to be rooted in the system of manage-
importance. This idea has been noted in several ment education currently entrenched in the
sources. Ewing (1977) highlights it as the over- United States (Pfeffer, 1997). Also, there is evi-
arching philosophy within most modern organi- dence that as people progress upward within an
zations. Glauser (1984) also notes the pervasive- organization, they are less likely to identify with
ness of the belief that managers must direct and subordinates and they come to hold different
control while subordinates must assume the beliefs and values from those below them
role of unquestioning followers. Argyris (1977, (Lieberman, 1956). This decreased ability to
1991) similarly notes that most managers be- identify with subordinates as one climbs the
lieve they must appear to be in unilateral con- organizational hierarchy might make it easier to
trol, and Redding points to the implicit belief make generalizations about employees (e.g.,
among managers that "hired hands should put employees are self-interested). Further, the
up or shut up" (1985: 250). This belief is related to "management knows best" belief may be solid-
the economic view of employees. If employees ified by the need to justify one's progression. It
are self-interested and effort averse, then they may be natural to assume that one must know
are unlikely to know (or care) about what is best best given one's superior position in the organiza-
for the organization. tional hierarchy.
A third unstated belief that we regard as a Despite their widespread nature, however, we
factor in creating a climate conducive to wide- believe that the managerial beliefs and as-
spread silence is the belief that unity, agree- sumptions we have described will be held more
ment, and consensus are signs of organizational strongly in some organizations than in others.
health, whereas disagreement and dissent We expect, for example, that these beliefs will
should be avoided. Burrell and Morgan (1979) be more likely when the top management team
describe this belief as part of the "unitary view" is dominated by individuals with economic or
financial backgrounds than when the group is since such cultures place a premium on har-
more functionally diverse or composed of indi- mony (Hofstede, 1980). Hence, the combination of
viduals with backgrounds in general manage- high power distance and collectivism among
ment. Because the beliefs about employees be- members of the top management team is partic-
ing self-interested and untrustworthy are rooted ularly likely to associate with silence-fostering
in economic models of human behavior, they are beliefs.
more likely to be held by those whose training
Proposition 3: The managerial beliefs
and job experience have been oriented toward
contributing to organizational silence
economics or finance (Pfeffer, 1997), and these
will be more common in organizations
beliefs are likely to be solidified when one's
in which the top management team is
peers hold them as well.
dominated by individuals from high
Further, the more homogeneous the top man-
power distance and collectivistic cul-
agement team is with respect to functional
tures.
training and experience, the more cohesive they
are likely to be and the more threatened they We also expect that the similarity or dissimi-
might be by the idea of dissent (Janis, 1982; Co- larity of the demographic profile (e.g., gender,
sier & Schwenk, 1990). We also predict that the race, ethnicity, age) of the top management
impact of functional background will be inten- team in comparison to that of lower-level em-
sified when the composition of the top manage- ployees might influence the prevalence of si-
ment team is stable over time. The longer top lence-creating beliefs. Research on diversity
managers have been together, the more en- has shown that salient differences often create
trenched their shared assumptions will tend to distrust and fear of the unknown (Cox, 1993).
be and the less likely the members will be to Hence, the greater the demographic dissimilar-
question those assumptions (Wagner, Pfeffer, & ity between top management and others within
O'Reilly, 1984). the organization, the more likely it is that top
management will view employee input with
Proposition 1: The managerial beliefs suspicion.
will be more common in organizations Proposition 4: The managerial beliefs
in which the top management team is contributing to organizational silence
dominated by individuals with eco- will be more common when there is a
nomic or financial backgrounds. high level of dissimilarity (e.g., gender,

race, ethnicity, age) between top man-
Proposition 2: The longer the average agement and lower-level employees.
tenure of top management team mem-
bers, the stronger will be the relation- Organization-level and environmental vari-
ship between top management team ables are also likely to affect the likelihood that
homogeneity with respect to func- silence-fostering beliefs will be held by top

tional background and the set of be- management. For example, we predict that the
liefs contributing to silence. beliefs discussed above will be more common-
and, hence, silence more likely-within organi-
The cultural background of the top manage- zations dependent on predictability, control, and
ment team also may affect the beliefs that its efficiency. When there is heavy strategic em-
members hold about employees. For example, if phasis on control, managers may view negative
the top management team is composed of indi- feedback as more threatening and dissent as
viduals who all come from high power distance more destructive (Bourgeois, 1985; Miceli & Near,
cultures, these managers especially will be 1992). This logic suggests that a context condu-
likely to believe that they know best. In high cive to silence is more likely to emerge not only
power distance cultures, individuals are much in cost-focused organizations but also within
more likely to believe that the boss is right highly competitive environments characterized
merely because he or she is the boss (Hofstede, by a diminishing resource base. Research indi-
1980). Further, unity is apt to be even more cates that within such low-munificence environ-
strongly valued when members of the top man- ments, there are greater demands for control,
agement team are from collectivistic cultures, less openness to dissenting opinions, and often
a belief at the top that unity of views will im- Finally, heavy reliance on contingent workers
prove performance (Bourgeois, 1985; Khand- is likely to foster the managerial belief structure
walla, 1972; Pfeffer & Leblebici, 1973). that we argue contributes to organizational si-
lence. Contingent employees may be viewed by
managers as especially self-interested, ill in-
formed, and, hence, untrustworthy because of
their temporary status within the organization
with a strategic focus on cost control
and because their psychological contract with
and in organizations operating in low-
the organization is more transactional than re-
munificence environments.
lational (Rousseau & Parks, 1993). Sennett (1998),
We also predict that the belief structure con- in fact, argues that one of the consequences of
tributing to organizational silence will be more the increasingly temporary nature of employ-
likely to dominate management thought in more ment contracts is that organizations have be-
mature and stable industries than in newer come more tightly controlled, implying a lack of
and/or volatile industries (e.g., internet, new me- trust in employees.
dia). In order to survive, organizations in high-
velocity environments need to become adept at
considering alternatives and responding to
changes in their environments (Eisenhardt, 1989;
that rely heavily on contingent workers.
Lant, Milliken, & Batra, 1992). Thus, in volatile
environmental contexts, organizations may be
more inclined to value employee ideas, since Organizational Structures, Policies, and
these ideas may be seen as useful in the search Practices
for new strategies (Sprague & Ruud, 1988).
In the prior section we discussed some im-
Proposition 6: The managerial beliefs plicit beliefs that we believe set into motion the
contributing to organizational silence forces that create organizational silence. In this
will be more common in organizations section we discuss how these beliefs (together
operating in mature and stable indus- with managers' fear of feedback) tend to give
tries. rise to structures, policies, and managerial be-
haviors that, in turn, create an environment in
High vertical differentiation is also likely to
which employees feel uncomfortable speaking
reinforce silence-creating beliefs. We expect
up about certain issues. The idea that manag-
that within tall organizational structures, top
ers' beliefs and assumptions affect their behav-
managers will be less likely to interact with,
ior and choices, and that these then affect em-
relate to, and, hence, trust lower-level employ-
ployees, is not a new one. Forty years ago
ees (Blau & Scott, 1962; Glauser, 1984). In addi-
McGregor (1960) noted that managerial beliefs
tion, firms that bring in top managers from the
can have a powerful impact on how managers
outside, instead of promoting from within, may
treat employees and, consequently, on how em-
be more likely to create a gap between top man-
ployees behave (see also Argyris, 1977; Creed &
agement and the rest of the organization. This
Miles, 1996; Ghoshal & Moran, 1996; Pfeffer,
gap will increase the likelihood that top manag-
1997). He argued, for example, that when man-
ers will view employees as untrustworthy or un-
agers assume that employees dislike work and
predictable and themselves as best equipped to
cannot be trusted to do a good job, they will
understand and address organizational prob-
institute control mechanisms to prevent shirk-
lems.
ing. Employees, realizing that management
Proposition 7: The managerial beliefs does not trust them, become resentful and may
contributing to organizational silence seek to find loopholes in the systems-a re-
will be more common in organizations sponse that reinforces managers' initial beliefs.
with many hierarchical levels and in In this section we propose that when the un-
organizations that hire senior-level spoken yet dominant ideology within an organi-
managers from the outside, rather zation is that (1) employees are self-interested,
than promote from within. (2) management knows best, and (3) disagree-
ment is bad, then management will erect struc- making and will be less likely to have
tures and policies that either do not facilitate or formal upward feedback mechanisms.
that discourage upward information flow. This
When managers believe that employees are
tendency will be reinforced by managers' desire
self-interested, opportunistic, and not well in-
to avoid any threatening information or feed-
formed, and that agreement is preferable to dis-
back. Two common structural features of organi-
agreement, they also will tend to enact these
zations dominated by these beliefs will be high
beliefs in their day-to-day behavior toward em-
centralization of decision making and lack of
ployees. For example, if employees were to ex-
formal upward feedback mechanisms.
press concerns about a proposed organizational
If the dominant belief in an organization is
change, management would be apt to assume
that employees are opportunistic and not knowl-
that the employees were resisting the change
edgeable about what's best for the organization,
because it was personally threatening to them
then it is reasonable for managers not to involve
or because they did not understand it (Kanter,
them in decision-making processes (Hall, 1982).
1984)-not because they were truly concerned
Decentralized decision making, as well as other
that the change might be bad for the organiza-
participative forms of management, will be seen
tion. The managers will be likely to either reject
by managers as not worth the time and effort they
or discount opinions and feedback from employ-
require (McGregor, 1960). Excluding employees
ees, particularly when those opinions differ from
from decision making is also a way to avoid dis-
their own views (Ilgen et al., 1979). Management
sent and negative feedback and, thus, will also may also convey, consciously or unconsciously,
stem from the belief that disagreement is bad and annoyance or even hostility toward messengers
from fear of feedback. Although there may be the of unwanted news (Rosen & Tesser, 1970).
appearance of participative decision making (e.g., Finally, managers who hold these beliefs are
task forces, committees), we expect true decision- unlikely to engage in much informal feedback
making authority to reside at the top. In fact, we seeking from subordinates. Why seek feedback
believe that despite discussions of organizations from those who are self-interested and ill in-
becoming more decentralized, the implicit belief formed (Vancouver & Morrison, 1995)? And why
structure that dominates many organizations seek feedback from subordinates if one wishes
gives rise to structures that are often quite central- to avoid disagreement and negative information
ized in reality (Foegen, 1999; Sennett, 1998). (Ashford & Cummings, 1983)? When managers
The belief structure that we believe domi- do seek feedback, they will tend to approach
nates many organizations is also likely to be those who are likely to share their perspective
associated with a lack of mechanisms for solic- and who are, thus, unlikely to provide negative
iting employee feedback after decisions are feedback. This will not be intentional but will
made. Procedures such as systematic surveying simply reflect the tendency of people to interact
or polling will be unlikely, because there will be with those whom they perceive to be similar to
a tendency to believe that little of value will be themselves (Byrne, 1971; McPherson & Smith-
learned from them and because negative up- Lovin, 1987) and the tendency to prefer confirma-
ward feedback will be seen as a challenge to tory feedback (Swann & Read, 1981).
management's control. This dynamic may be a
Proposition 10: To the extent that the
form of the threat-rigidity effect described by
implicit belief structure of top man-
Staw, Sandelands, and Dutton (1981), whereby
agement is that employees are self-
management tries to protect itself from a per-
interested, management knows best,
ceived threat by closing itself off from input.
and dissent is undesirable, managers
within that organization will be more
Proposition 9: To the extent that the
likely to reject or react negatively to
implicit belief structure of top man-
input from subordinates and less
agement is that employees are self-
likely to informally solicit feedback
interested, management knows best,
from subordinates.
and dissent is undesirable, the organi-
zation will be more likely to have cen- It is important to point out that the various
tralized (nonparticipatory) decision managerial practices contributing to silence
may operate at multiple organizational levels. tional silence, it is necessary to understand the
Only top management has the authority to im- development of what we term a climate of si-
pose the company-wide structures and policies lence. It is also necessary to understand the
that contribute to organizational silence (e.g., collective sensemaking process (Weick, 1995)
centralization). However, managers at all levels through which this climate emerges.
may exhibit the day-to-day practices that im- The term organizational climate refers to
pede upward communication (negative re- shared and enduring perceptions of psycholog-
sponses to employee input, lack of feedback ically important aspects of a particular work
seeking). This means that employees will re- environment (Ashforth, 1985; Schneider & Reich-
ceive cues about the safety of speaking up both ers, 1983). Researchers have emphasized that
from the top as well as from their more immedi- work settings have numerous climates, each
ate supervisors (Ashford et al., 1998). pertaining to a particular type of activity
We expect that in most cases, when cues from (Schneider & Reichers, 1983). For example, schol-
the top indicate that the organization is not open ars have assessed organizations' climates for
to employee input, the attitudes of senior man- customer service (Schneider, 1990), innovation
agement will trickle down and affect the behav- (Scott & Bruce, 1994), and informality (Andersson
ior of middle managers (Floyd & Wooldridge, & Pearson, 1999). In addition, Miceli and Near
1994) and that they, too, will send cues to those (1992) have highlighted the importance of a sup-
below them that voice is not welcome. Even mid- portive climate for whistle-blowing, although
dle managers who do not really share the im- they do not elaborate much on the factors that
plicit beliefs of top managers may end up en- might create such a climate. Researchers have
couraging silence. Recognizing that top also emphasized that climate can be a more
management does not like disagreement or neg- powerful determinant of behavior than individ-
ative feedback, middle managers may filter out ual needs or motivational states (Schneider &
certain information from their subordinates be- Reichers, 1983).
fore conveying that information upward. Subor- We define a climate of silence as one charac-
dinates may conclude from this behavior that terized by two shared beliefs: (1) speaking up
the supervisor is not responsive to complaints. about problems in the organization is not worth
In other words, we expect that in most cases the effort, and (2) voicing one's opinions and
consistent cues will come from middle and up- concerns is dangerous. This perspective mirrors
per management. work at the individual level of analysis, which
In some cases, however, employees may re- indicates that employees are least likely to en-
ceive cues that voice is unwelcome only from gage in activities such as issue selling and
their more immediate supervisor (Saunders et whistle-blowing when they judge the efficacy of
al., 1992). If a divisional manager discourages speaking up as low and the costs of doing so as
and reacts in a hostile way to upward commu- high (Ashford et al., 1998 Miceli & Near, 1992;
nication, employees within that division will Saunders et al., 1992; Withey & Cooper, 1989). In
tend to collectively withhold their opinions, re- contrast to work at the individual level, how-
gardless of organization-wide policies or prac- ever, we focus on how these judgments emerge
tices. Hence, there may be widespread silence at a collective level and how they affect aggre-
at the divisional level that does not characterize gate-level voice behavior.
the larger organization. In an effort to reconcile divergent views of
climate formation, Schneider and Reichers (1983)
proposed an interactionist perspective. In this
The Creation of Shared Perceptions via
perspective it is argued that climate originates
Collective Sensemaking
from a process of collective sensemaking,
To this point we have discussed the forces whereby employees together try to derive mean-
that lead many organizations to erect structures ing about their workplace: its demands, con-
and enact practices that impede the upward straints, and outcome contingencies (Weick,
flow of information-particularly information 1995). The interactionist view of climate forma-
that indicates problems. To fully understand tion builds upon a school of thought known as
how these structures and practices lead to wide- "symbolic interactionism" (Blumer, 1969). Ac-
spread withholding of information, or organiza- cording to this school of thought, meaning is not
a given" but arises from interactions among extent that members of a social unit have oppor-
people (Ashforth, 1985). It is through social inter- tunities to interact and communicate with one
actions that employees share their perceptions another (Erickson, 1988; Ibarra & Andrews, 1993;
and experiences and derive a common under- Meyer, 1994). The more frequent and intense the
standing of the meaning of various aspects of contact and communication, the more likely it is
their work context (Schneider & Reichers, 1983). that "social contagion"-a spreading of at-
Because individuals have a strong need to eval- titudes and perceptions from one person to an-
uate their beliefs and perceptions (Festinger, other-will occur (Erickson, 1988; Rice & Aydin,
1954), they compare them with those of others. 1991). Social network research has indicated
Through this process people "triangulate on a that the following variables facilitate contact
single set of perceptions and meanings" (Ash- and communication and, hence, the develop-
forth, 1985: 839). This perspective is similar to the ment of common perceptions: similarity, stabil-
notion that reality within organizations is so- ity, workflow interdependence, and informal so-
cially constructed (Berger & Luckmann, 1967). cial networks that are dense and composed of
Building upon these related schools of strong ties. Thus, assuming there are structural
thought, we argue that a climate of silence is and managerial factors conducive to organiza-
rooted not only in objective features of the work- tional silence in place (e.g., centralized decision
place but also in social interactions that contrib- making, lack of upward feedback mechanisms,
ute to a subjective process of sensemaking. The defensive reactions to employee input), we ex-
structural features and managerial practices pect that similarity, stability, workflow inter-
discussed in the prior section are critical, of dependence, and the strength and density of
course, and can be viewed as providing the raw social network ties among mid- to lower-level
material for silence to develop. When organiza- employees will increase the likelihood of a
tional decision making is highly centralized and strong climate of silence developing.
there are few channels for upward communica- It has been found that individuals are most
tion, a collective interpretation that is likely to comfortable and prefer to interact with those
emerge is that managers do not think employee whom they perceive to be similar to themselves
opinions are important (Ashford et al., 1998). (Byrne, 1971; Ibarra, 1992). Individuals also pre-
When managers respond to employees' opin- fer similar others as referents for validating
ions with resistance or denial, employees are their beliefs and perceptions (Festinger, 1954).
most likely to converge on an interpretation that Hence, given an organizational context with few
speaking up is risky or not worth the effort mechanisms for employee voice, there will be a
(Saunders et al., 1992). The more widespread greater likelihood of a climate of silence emerg-
these structures and managerial behaviors, the ing when there is a high degree of similarity
more vivid and salient they will be and the more between employees. Similarity between direct
likely they will be to foster shared perceptions coworkers will facilitate social contagion at the
that speaking up is not welcome. However, the workgroup or departmental level, while bases of
likelihood that these structures and actions will similarity between individuals working in dif-
lead to a climate of silence will be greater when ferent areas will foster information sharing and
the context provides opportunities for employees social contagion from one area to another.
to form common perceptions. As shown in Figure Shared perceptions are also more likely to de-
1, we propose that a process of collective sense- velop within organizations with relatively stable
making moderates the relationship between or- membership, since stability implies more oppor-
ganizational structures and managerial practices tunities for employees to interact and share their
on the one hand and climate on the other. Hence, perceptions and a greater likelihood of shared
to understand how a climate of silence develops perceptions enduring over time.
within an organization, it is necessary to under- Workflow interdependence is another vari-
stand this sensemaking process and the factors able that will contribute to the collective sense-
that make it more likely to occur. making process, which, in the presence of cer-
The literature on symbolic interactionism, as tain structural features, may give rise to a
well as the social network literature, indicates climate of silence. When employees within a
that common perceptions and attitudes are most workgroup must coordinate their activities,
likely to develop and become reinforced to the there is greater necessity for communication
and, thus, a greater opportunity for them to dependence, and the strength and
share their perceptions and experiences (Meyer, density of the informal social net-
1994). Further, when employees must coordinate works connecting those employees.
their activities across workgroups or areas (e.g.,
cross-functional teams), there is greater oppor-
Distortions in the Sensemaking Process
tunity for information to be exchanged and for
perceptions to be shared between workgroups. In the above discussion we elaborated on the
Hence, as employees attempt to make sense of collective sensemaking process that can impact
such structural features as top-down decision the emergence of a climate of silence. An addi-
making and closed feedback channels, they will tional point worth highlighting is that this sense-
be more likely to converge on and reinforce the making process has a strong tendency to give
interpretation that the organization is hostile to rise to biased and often inaccurate perceptions
their input when their work necessitates regular as employees share and collectively interpret
communication, coordination, and teamwork. their observations and experiences (Ashforth,
In addition to formal structural arrangements, 1985). Employees make sense of managerial ac-
employees are also linked to one another via tions based on limited and often distorted infor-
informal social networks. Ibarra and Andrews mation. Much of this information is secondhand,
(1993) highlight that informal network links are because people prefer to learn vicariously about
critical channels through which organization- the types of behaviors that are dangerous rather
ally relevant beliefs and attitudes are commu- than risk finding out firsthand. It is far safer, for
nicated. A social network is composed of strong example, to believe a colleague who says that
ties when the linkages within that network rep- speaking up will earn one the reputation of be-
resent frequent and intense contact (Granovet- ing a "troublemaker" than it is to test the system
ter, 1973). Because strong ties imply more inter- and risk losing one's accumulated credibility.
action and communication, they imply more Indeed, research indicates that individuals of-
opportunity for collective sensemaking and a ten give more credence to what others seem to
greater likelihood that employees will develop believe than what they themselves perceive to
shared perceptions about the efficacy and risk be true (Nemeth, 1997). So even if one's personal
of speaking up. Network density is also likely to experience suggests that voice is welcomed, if
facilitate collective sensemaking. A dense net- others seem to regard the organization as unre-
work is one with few missing linkages, implying ceptive to voice, then the individual will tend to
that a given individual is likely to receive infor- adopt this view as well. Further, others within
mation from many different sources yet largely the organization choosing to remain silent about
the same information from these different issues and problems will reinforce the percep-
sources (Burt, 1992). The intense and consistent tion that speaking up is taboo. This is illustrated
communication that occurs within a dense so- by the feedback loop in Figure 1.
cial network suggests that more collective sense- The process of collective sensemaking is also
making will take place. likely to give rise to exaggerated perceptions of
the riskiness and futility of speaking up. Salient
Proposition 11: Centralized decision
events often appear to have a larger causal im-
making, lack of upward feedback
pact than they actually do (Kiesler & Sproull,
mechanisms, managerial resistance
1982). Thus, if a member of the organization
to employee input, and lack of down-
voices dissent and soon thereafter fails to re-
ward feedback seeking will be more
ceive an expected promotion, some employees
likely to lead to a climate of silence to
may reach the conclusion that the promotion
the extent that mid- to lower-level em-
was lost because this person expressed an un-
ployees directly interact and commu-
popular opinion. As this information passes
nicate among themselves.
through the grapevine, there may soon arise the
Proposition 12: The amount of interac- widespread perception that those who express
tion and communication among mid- negative views are punished. Similarly, if a few
to lower-level employees will be pos- employees offer input on a particular policy
itively related to social similarity, change and that input is ignored, they may con-
workforce stability, workflow inter- clude that all input is ignored, even if this is not
the case. As these employees convey their inter- lence by affecting the perceptions and beliefs of
pretation to coworkers, the latter, too, may come lower-level employees. Research has shown
to believe that voice is not worth the effort, even that the common experience of being different
though they lack any firsthand evidence to sup- from those in positions of power leads to some
port this belief. predictable reactions on the part of those at
Shared beliefs about speaking up being de- lower levels in the hierarchy (Ely, 1994). When a
valued or dangerous are likely to become not large number of employees see that people like
only exaggerated but also overgeneralized. That themselves are underrepresented at the top,
is, silence may at first center on certain issues, they may be more likely to conclude that the
but eventually it may spread far beyond those organization does not value the input of people
issues, and employees may stop sending any like themselves. This conclusion, in turn, may
information up the hierarchy. Greenberger and foster the belief that it is even more risky for
Strasser's (1991) work supports this assertion. them to honestly voice their opinions than it is
They suggest that when people perceive a loss for employees who are more similar to those at
of control in one situation (e.g., a suggestion that the top.
they make is ignored), this may carry over and Kanter speculates that people who perceive
affect their behavior in other situations. Ash- themselves as having little or no opportunity for
forth similarly notes this tendency to overgener- advancement will be "less likely to protest di-
alize, remarking how "a workgroup may come to rectly or seek change" and more likely to "chan-
agree that a seemingly positive overture from nel grievances into griping and output restric-
their supervisor has an ulterior motive and tions rather than direct action" (1977: 247). Our
eventually develop the belief that any overture argument is also consistent with the social net-
from any member of management is suspect" work literature, which has shown that individu-
(1985: 840). Such overgeneralized beliefs will als are more likely to have similar perceptions
also be resistant to change, because individuals and attitudes when they hold comparable posi-
develop a common stake in their perpetuation tions within the organization or view the or-
(Woodman & King, 1978). ganization from a similar vantage point (Meyer,
A naive manager, were he or she aware of 1994; Rice & Aydin, 1991). The "comparable posi-
employees' exaggerated and overgeneralized tion" in this case is one of exclusion.
perceptions about speaking up, might dismiss
Proposition 13: A climate of silence
them as inaccurate. It is well known, however,
will be more likely when there is a
that perceptions, regardless of whether they are
high degree of demographic dissimi-
accurate, have a strong impact on subsequent
larity between top managers and em-
attitudes and behavior, and the impact of per-
ployees below the level of top man-
ceptions and beliefs is especially strong when
agement.
they are widely shared and supported by social
information from peers (Salancik & Pfeffer, 1978).
IMPLICATIONS OF SILENCE FOR
The outspoken individual in the example cited
ORGANIZATIONS
above might have lost the promotion for reasons
unrelated to the prior expression of dissent. Yet, Thus far, we have presented a model of how
as long as employees perceive the two events as silence unfolds within organizations and have
related, their shared perception that speaking identified factors that increase the likelihood it
up is dangerous will be reinforced, and they will will develop. In this section we briefly turn our
be more likely to remain silent themselves. attention to the organizational implications of
silence. Our objective is not to provide an ex-
haustive discussion but, rather, to integrate ex-
Direct Effects of Demographic Dissimilarity
isting research in a way that highlights some of
Demographic dissimilarity between top man- the ways in which silence might affect critical
agers and lower-level employees was a factor organizational processes and outcomes. We
that we hypothesized would increase the likeli- also note how variables such as diversity and
hood of management holding beliefs that con- demographic dissimilarity might make these
tribute to silence. This variable is also likely negative effects more severe. Figure 2 provides
to contribute more directly to a climate of si- an overview of these ideas.
U2~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
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U2 >~~~~~~~~~
M ~ ~ ~ 0 U2 o
~~~-4 0 u ~ ~ ~ 0 0
Q)
00 ~~~~~~~~~~0
U ~~~~~U
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U- 0
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oQU
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Effects on Organizational Decision Making and Schon, 1978; Deming, 1986; March, 1991). Silence
Change Processes implies that an organization will lack the capac-
ity for what Argyris (1977) calls "double-looped
One significant effect of organizational si-
learning," which entails a questioning and mod-
lence relates to organizational decision making
ification of underlying policies and goals.
and change, as highlighted in the top portion of
To make matters worse, top managers may
Figure 2. Extensive research on group decision
not recognize that they are lacking important
making has shown that decision quality is en-
information and may interpret silence as signal-
hanced when multiple perspectives and alter-
ing consensus and success. Even if managers
natives are considered (see Shaw, 1981). Simi-
directly ask employees for feedback, employees
larly, research on strategy formulation has
may be careful to filter out negative information.
shown that the existence of multiple and con-
As a result, the internal feedback that manage-
flicting viewpoints within top management
ment receives may reflect what employees think
teams has a positive effect on both the quality of
management wants to hear, rather than accu-
organizational decision making and company
rate or reliable reactions (Zand, 1972).
performance (Bourgeois, 1985; Enz & Schwenk,
In a recent study Bies and Tripp (1999) found
1991). Further, it has been argued that innova-
evidence that fear of repercussions does indeed
tion requires a context in which employees feel
cause employees to distort the information they
free to deviate-to offer totally novel perspec-
provide to their bosses; these authors make the
tives or ideas or to question current beliefs and
following observation: "Bosses, based on their
practices (Nemeth, 1997). Together, these re-
search streams suggest that organizational si- observations of the employees' 'loyal' and obe-
lence will compromise the effectiveness of or- dient behavior, made inferences that led to a
ganizational decision making and change false consciousness and a false consensus as to
processes by restricting the variance in informa- the level of affection or disaffection with their
tional input available to decision makers. In leadership" (1999: 17). If a manager uses such
addition, without minority viewpoints there is distorted feedback as a basis for deciding
less likely to be the type of critical analysis whether to take further action, the organization
necessary for effective decision making, which runs the risk of drifting farther and farther off
may also compromise organizational change target (Argyris, 1977; Miller, 1972).
processes (Nemeth, 1985; Nemeth & Wachter, These dynamics are apt to be particularly
1983; Shaw, 1981). problematic in organizations in which the es-
Of course, we are not claiming that unlimited poused goal is to become more pluralistic. Plu-
employee input is desirable. Too much input ralism implies tolerance of multiple and often
might overload decision-making processes and conflicting viewpoints. Yet, when the system re-
impede timely and effective decision making inforces silence, the diverse viewpoints, opin-
(Glauser, 1984). What we do claim though is that ions, preferences, and goals that may exist
most organizations suffer from too little em- within the organization are not likely to be given
ployee voice, particularly around problems or voice and, hence, will not enter into the pro-
decisions that employees perceive to be unwise cesses by which the organization establishes
(Argyris, 1977; Ryan & Oestreich, 1991; Scott & objectives, decides on appropriate courses of
Hart, 1979). When this is the case, the quality of action, and attempts to learn from experience. A
decision making and change initiatives is likely proposition that we would offer, in fact, is that
to be lessened. the negative effects of silence on organizational
Another way in which organizational silence decision making and change processes will be
is likely to compromise effective organizational intensified as the level of diversity within the
change and development is by blocking nega- organization increases. We would also propose
tive feedback and, hence, an organization's abil- that organizational silence will be most detri-
ity to detect and correct errors (Miller, 1972). mental within rapidly changing environments.
Without negative feedback, errors tend to per- Within such environments it is virtually impos-
sist and may even intensify, because corrective sible for those at the top to have all of the infor-
actions are not taken when needed (Agyris & mation they need (Duncan & Weiss, 1979).
Effects on Employee Cognitions, Attitudes, and 1993; Wortman & Brehm, 1975). Research on pro-
Behavior cedural justice indicates that an important way
in which employees gain a sense of control over
If you experience fear every day, it drags you
down and you become cowardly. their environment is by expressing their opin-
ions and preferences (Lind & Tyler, 1988). This
After my suggestions were ignored, the quality of
work further indicates that employees' need for
my work was still there, but I wasn't.
(Ryan & Oestreich, 1991: 7) control is unmet when they are denied the op-
portunity to voice (Lind & Tyler, 1988). Hence, we
The tendency of organizations to discourage can expect that when employees are surrounded
employee opinions and feedback is not only by social cues that discourage speaking up, they
likely to compromise organizational decision will feel they lack sufficient control over their
making and change but is also likely to elicit work environment.
undesirable reactions from employees. Drawing Evidence exists that a felt lack of control has
from a variety of literature, we propose that several detrimental effects, including reduced
three destructive outcomes of organizational si- motivation, dissatisfaction, stress-related ail-
lence will be employees who feel they are not ments, physical and psychological withdrawal,
valued, employees who perceive they lack con- and even sabotage or other forms of deviance
trol, and employees who experience cognitive (see Greenberger & Strasser, 1986; Parker, 1993).
dissonance. As shown in Figure 2, these three Outcomes such as sabotage may reflect "reac-
outcomes are likely to lead to a variety of sec- tance" or an attempt to regain control (Brehm,
ond-order outcomes that, in the aggregate, may 1966). If employees feel that they cannot exert
undermine organizational effectiveness. control through voice or other constructive
Employees' feelings of not being valued. Re- means, they might try to demonstrate control in
search on procedural justice has consistently ways that are more destructive for the organiza-
shown that employees evaluate decision proce- tion (Ashforth & Lee, 1990; Folkman & Lazarus,
dures more favorably when those procedures 1980; Greenberger & Strasser, 1986). Conversely,
allow for employee input, even when this input outcomes such as stress and withdrawal might
does not have much impact on decision out- reflect a learned helplessness response (Selig-
comes (Bies & Shapiro, 1988; Lind, Lissak, & Con- man, 1975). It is worth noting that these various
lon, 1983; Tyler, Rasinski, & Spodick, 1985). Ac- responses may serve to validate managers' ini-
cording to Lind and Tyler's (1988) group value tial assumptions that created a climate of si-
model, procedures that allow for employee voice lence in the first place. Employees are apt to
are viewed positively, at least in part, because appear as either hostile opponents who cannot
they signal that employees are valued members be trusted or as apathetic observers who are
of the organization. The model also suggests unwilling to contribute much beyond what they
that employees feel unvalued when they per- are required to contribute. In essence, manag-
ceive that they and others cannot openly ex- ers' beliefs may become self-fulfilling (McGre-
press their viewpoints. Eisenberger, Fasolo, and gor, 1960; Pfeffer, 1997).
Davis-LaMastro's (1990) work indicates that Employees' cognitive dissonance. Organiza-
these feelings will affect organizational commit- tional silence is also likely to give rise to cogni-
ment and trust. If employees feel their organiza- tive dissonance: an aversive state that arises
tion does not value them, they will be less likely when there is a discrepancy between one's
to value, identify with, or trust the organization. beliefs and one's behavior (Festinger, 1957). In-
Outcomes that may follow from diminished dividuals experiencing dissonance are typically
commitment and trust are lower internal moti- motivated to try to restore consistency by chang-
vation and satisfaction, psychological with- ing either their beliefs or their behavior. Yet, in
drawal, and even turnover (Mathieu & Zajac, the context of organizational silence, it may be
1990). very difficult for employees to reduce dissonance.
Employees' perceived lack of control. There is Consider a salesperson who is confronted
evidence from several sources that individuals daily with evidence that customers are not sat-
have a strong need for control over their imme- isfied with a particular product. This salesper-
diate environment and over decisions that affect son may have a very difficult time believing
them (see Greenberger & Strasser, 1986; Parker, management's pronouncements that the product
is great. But the other option for reducing disso- derstanding of the complex dynamics within
nance-speaking up about the product's flaws- many organizational systems that maintain and
may be highly risky. reinforce silence instead.
In cases such as this, when neither beliefs nor Our model indicates that when top manage-
behaviors can be easily changed, the individual ment adheres to the assumptions that foster si-
may exist in a state of prolonged dissonance, lence, it may be especially difficult for the or-
which is likely to give rise to anxiety and stress ganization to respond appropriately to the
(Parker, 1993; Pennebaker, 1985). The ability to diversity of values, beliefs, and characteristics
vent to trusted colleagues might reduce but will that increasingly characterize the workforce.
not eliminate the dissonance, since there will be The more these differences "pull" the organiza-
a stark contrast between what one expresses tion in divergent directions, the more the or-
behind closed doors and what one expresses (or ganization will "push" against or resist these
fails to express) in public (Bies & Tripp, 1999; forces. This tendency will not be conscious but
Morris & Feldman, 1996). will be driven by the implicit set of assumptions
The above dynamics are particularly trou- that govern the organization. If employees are
bling, because they may disproportionately af- self-interested and dissent bad, then different
fect those who differ from the majority and who viewpoints are a threat to be suppressed.
therefore are most likely to have different per- A troubling aspect of the dynamics that create
spectives. Not only will such employees feel and maintain silence is that they are hidden
greater pressure to remain silent (as discussed), from view. It is like the tale of the emperor's new
but they also may be more likely to experience clothes. Everyone understands that it is risky to
the negative effects of silence. In other words, speak the truth, but this fact itself is "undiscuss-
we predict that the relationship between silence able," and few people know what to do to bring
and the three psychological outcomes will be about change. Although the hidden dynamics
moderated by demographic dissimilarity (see that create silence can create many problems
Figure 2). If this prediction is true, it may be an for the organization, the reasons for these out-
important factor contributing to systemic, yet comes are unlikely to be understood. Manage-
unintentional, discrimination in organizations. ment may see that employees are not engaged
but may assume that it is because they are self-
interested and opportunistic. In addition, within
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
organizations plagued by silence, problems
In the call for papers for this special issue of may accumulate to the point that they can no
the Academy of Management Review, it is ar- longer be hidden from the view of important
gued that "if the expression of opposition is not stakeholders, such as owners or creditors. At
welcomed in organizations, then new theories this point, these constituencies may conclude
and models that allow for the existence and that the organization suffers from "poor man-
even the encouragement of divergent view- agement," and top managers may lose their
points and expressions are needed." Yet this jobs.
may not be so simple. We have argued that Another troubling issue is the possibility of
there are powerful forces operating in organiza- employees implicitly being blamed for their ten-
tions that can make employees feel that speak- dency to remain silent in the face of organiza-
ing up about issues and problems is futile or, tional problems. If the powerful systemic forces
worse yet, dangerous. We see the silence that that create organizational silence are not recog-
results as a critical barrier to organizational nized, there is the danger of holding employees
change and development, as well as a signifi- accountable for something that really stems
cant demoralizing force. Our focus, thus, has not from the actions of managers. We as researchers
been on how change and development occur (or may even be guilty of this, particularly when we
should occur) in pluralistic settings but on why rely on models of voice that emphasize individ-
organizational change often fails to capitalize ual-level determinants. Just as Whitener, Brodt,
on or reflect pluralism. Capitalizing on plural- Korsgaard, and Werner (1998) argue that it is
ism requires creating systems that enable em- managers' responsibility to create trust within
ployees to voice. Effectively creating systems their institutions, we argue that it is the respon-
that encourage voice, however, requires an un- sibility of management to break down (or never
erect) the conditions that sustain silence within "knowing" that they should encourage upward
many organizations, and it is the role of re- communication, organizations' dominant ten-
searchers to help them understand how to do dency may be just the opposite-namely, to cre-
this. ate a climate of silence. We have tried to explain
We believe, however, that the behavioral cy- why true pluralism, for most organizations, re-
cles that maintain organizational silence will be mains elusive. And we have tried to explain why
extremely hard to break. One reason is that change and development in the context of plu-
these cycles are not subject to direct observation ralism require not just alternative models and
or discussion. Another is that once people start theories but also a recognition of the forces that
distrusting a system, it is extremely hard to re- may make it difficult, and even impossible in
store their faith (Zand, 1972). Even if managers some contexts, to apply those models and theo-
eventually realize that they need accurate inter- ries.
nal feedback and try to elicit it, employees will
tend to be cynical about this change (Reichers,
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Elizabeth Wolfe Morrison is an associate professor of management and organization-

al behavior at the Leonard N. Stern School of Business, New York University. She
received her Ph.D. in organizational behavior from Northwestern University. Her
research interests include employee initiative and proactivity, extrarole behavior,
newcomer adjustment, and psychological contract violation.
Frances J. Milliken is an associate professor of management and organizational

behavior at the Leonard N. Stern School of Business, New York University. Her re-
search focuses on how individuals and teams perceive and interpret events and
trends in the organization and in its environment. She is also interested in the effects
of diversity on groups and organizations, as well as in the ways in which individuals'
behavior is shaped by the organizational context within which they function.

Organizational Silence A Barrier To Change and Development in A Plurastic World

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Organizational Silence: A Barrier to Change and Development in a Pluralistic World

Author(s): Elizabeth Wolfe Morrison and Frances J. Milliken

ORGANIZATIONAL SILENCE: A BARRIER TO

ELIZABETH WOLFE MORRISON

pecially on issue selling and whistle-blowing) employees' collective sensemaking activities.

1.4 M .1-4 >4

nomic or financial backgrounds. high level of dissimilarity (e.g., gender,

homogeneity with respect to func- silence-fostering beliefs will be held by top

Relations, 47: 1013-1036. declining job satisfaction. Academy of Management

Elizabeth Wolfe Morrison is an associate professor of management and organization-

Frances J. Milliken is an associate professor of management and organizational

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