UNIVERSITY OF NUEVA CACERES

COLLEGE OF LAW
1ST SEM S/Y 2016-2017

INTRODUCTION TO LAW
CASE DIGEST

PREPARED BY:

JULIUS RANCI AYAO

PRESENTED TO:

ATTY JAKE RUPERT TABORA

RUPERTO A. AMBIL, JR. V COMELEC
G.R. No. 143398.
October 25, 2000

FACTS:

Ruperto A. Ambil, Jr., the petitioner and Jose T. Ramirez, the respondent were
candidates of Eastern Samar for the position of Governor, during the May 11,
1998 elections.

On May 16, 1998, the Provincial Board of Canvassers proclaimed Ruperto A.

Ambil, Jr. as the duly elected Governor for Eastern Samar.

Ramirez led an election protest with the COMELEC, which was

assigned to the First Division Commissioner Guiani prepared and
signed a proposed resolution in the case. Commisioner Desamito
dissented, while Commissioner Tancangco wanted to see both positions first
before giving her decision. On February 15, 2000, Commissioner Guiani
retired and was replaced. On February 24, 2000, petitioner and
respondent received a purported resolution in favour of private respondent
promulgated on February 14, 2000 and signed by Commissioners Guiani,
Desamito, and Tancangco. The First Division later declared that the parties
should ignore the resolution since it was not yet promulgated. The
division later set a date for promulgation of a resolution of the case, and said
that the aggrieved party could then challenge it through a
M o t i o n f o r R econsideration before the Commission en banc or through a
certiorari case be f o r e t h e S u p r e m e C o u r t . T h e p e t i t i o n e r f i l e d t h i s
c a s e t o a n n u l t h e o r d e r f o r t h e promulgation of the resolution and
to direct the First Division to deliberate anew on the case.

ISSUE:

Whether the First Division, in scheduling the promulgation of the resolution in

the case, acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

RULING:

The SC find the petition without merit. The case at bar is an election protest
involving the position of Governor, Eastern Samar.

It is within the original jurisdiction of the Commission on Elections in division.

Admittedly, petitioner did not ask for a reconsideration of the division’s
resolution or final decision.

In like manner, a decision, order or resolution of a division of the COMELEC

must be reviewed by the COMELEC en banc via a motion for reconsideration
before the final en banc decision may be brought to the SC on certiorari. The
pre-requisite filing of a motion for reconsideration is mandatory. Under the
existing Constitutional scheme, a party to an election case within the
jurisdiction of the COMELEC in division cannot dispense with the filing of a
motion for reconsideration of a decision, resolution or final order of the Division
of the Commission on Elections because the case would not reach the
COMELEC en banc without such motion for reconsideration having been filed
and resolved by the Division. The instant case does not fall under any of the
recognized exceptions to the rule in certiorari cases dispensing with a motion
for reconsideration prior to the filing of a petition. In truth, the exceptions do
not apply to election cases where a motion for reconsideration is mandatory by
Constitutional fiat to elevate the case to the COMELEC en banc, whose final
decision is what is reviewable via certiorari before the Supreme Court.

Hence, the petition at bar was dismissed for prematurity. “Failure to exhaust
administrative remedies is fatal to a party's cause of action and a dismissal
based on that ground is tantamount to a dismissal based on lack of cause of
action.”
SALVA V MAKALINTAL
G.R. NO. 132603
September 18, 2000

FACTS:

The petitioners filed with the RTC a class suit against the Sangguniang
Panglalawigan of Batangas, Sangguniang Pambayan of Calaca, Batangas, and
the COMELEC for annulment of Ordinance No. 05 and Resolution No. 345 both
enacted by the Sangguniang Panglalawigan of Batangas, and COMELEC
Resolution No. 2987.

Ordinance No. 05 declared the abolition of Barangay San Rafael and its merger
with Barangay Dacanlao, municipality of Calaca, Batangas and accordingly
instructed the COMELEC to conduct the required plebiscite. Resolution No.
345 affirmed the effectivity of Ordinance No. 05, thereby overriding the veto
exercised by the governor of Batangas. Ordinance No. 05 was vetoed by the
governor of Batangas for being ultra vires, particularly, as it was not shown
that the essential requirements regarding the attestations or certifications of
several government agencies were obtained. The COMELEC promulgated
Resolution No. 2987, providing for the rules and regulations governing the
conduct of the required plebiscite scheduled on February 28, 1998, to decide
the issue of the abolition of barangay San Rafael and its merger with barangay
Dacanlao, Calaca, Batangas.

The trial court denied the petition saying that any petition or action
questioning an act, resolution or decision of the COMELEC must be brought
before the Supreme Court. The petitioners contend that when the COMELEC
exercises its quasi-judicial functions under Section 52 of the Omnibus Election
Code, its acts are subject to the exclusive review by this Court; but when the
COMELEC performs a purely ministerial duty, such act is subject to scrutiny
by the Regional Trial Court. Petitioners submit that the conduct of a plebiscite,
pursuant to Ordinance No. 05 and Resolution No. 345, is not adjudicatory or
quasi-judicial in nature but simply ministerial or administrative in nature and
only in obedience to the aforesaid Ordinance and Resolution.

ISSUE:
Whether or Not the RTC has jurisdiction over the case.

RULING:

The SC ruled that “…What is contemplated by the term final orders, rulings
and decisions of the COMELEC reviewable by certiorari by the Supreme Court
as provided by law are those rendered in actions or proceedings before the
COMELEC and taken cognizance of by the said body in the exercise of its
adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers.

Briefly, COMELEC Resolution No. 2987 which provides for the rules and
regulations governing the conduct of the required plebiscite, was not issued
pursuant to the COMELECs quasi-judicial functions but merely as an incident
of its inherent administrative functions over the conduct of plebiscites, thus,
the said resolution may not be deemed as a final order reviewable by certiorari
by this Court. Any question pertaining to the validity of said resolution may be
well taken in an ordinary civil action before the trial courts.
CAGAS V COMELEC & BAUTISTA
G.R. No. 194139
January 24, 2012

FACTS:

The petitioner and respondent Claude P. Bautista contested the position of

Governor of the Province of Davao del Sur in the May 10, 2010 automated
national and local elections. Results led to the completion by May 14, 2010 of
the canvassing of votes cast for Governor of Davao del Sur, and the petitioner
was proclaimed the winner.

Alleging fraud, anomalies, irregularities, vote-buying and violations of election

laws, rules and resolutions, Bautista filed an electoral protest on May 24, 2010

In his answer submitted on June 22, 2010, the petitioner averred as his special
affirmative defenses that Bautista did not make the requisite cash deposit on
time and that Bautista did not render a detailed specification of the acts or
omissions complained of. COMELEC First Division issued the first assailed
order denying the special affirmative defenses of the petitioner.

The petitioner moved to reconsider on the ground that the order did not
discuss whether the protest specified the alleged irregularities in the conduct of
the elections. He prayed that the matter be certified to the COMELEC en banc.
Bautista countered that the assailed orders, being merely interlocutory, could
not be elevated to the COMELEC en banc pursuant to the ruling in Panlilio v.
COMELEC.

COMELEC First Division issued its second assailed order, denying the
petitioners motion for reconsideration for failing to show that the first order
was contrary to law. Not satisfied, the petitioner commenced this special civil
action directly in this Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in refusing to dismiss
the protest for insufficiency in form and content

RULING:
The Petition was denied. Under the Constitution, SC cannot review a decision
of a COMELEC Division. The governing provision, although it confers on the
Court the power to review any decision, order or ruling of the COMELEC, limits
such power to a final decision or resolution of the COMELEC en banc, and
does not extend to an interlocutory order issued by a Division of the
COMELEC. Otherwise stated, the Court has no power to review on certiorari an
interlocutory order or even a final resolution issued by a Division of the
COMELEC.

The mode by which a decision, order or ruling of the COMELEC en banc may
be elevated to the Supreme Court is by the special civil action of certiorari.
A motion for reconsideration is a plain and adequate remedy provided by law.
Failure to abide by this procedural requirement constitutes a ground for
dismissal of the petition.
In like manner, a decision, order or resolution of a division of the COMELEC
must be reviewed by the COMELEC en banc via a motion for reconsideration
before the final en banc decision may be brought to the Supreme Court on
certiorari. The pre-requisite filing of a motion for reconsideration is mandatory.

There is no question, therefore, that the Court has no jurisdiction to take

cognizance of the petition for certiorari assailing the denial by the COMELEC
First Division of the special affirmative defenses of the petitioner. The proper
remedy is for the petitioner to wait for the COMELEC First Division to first
decide the protest on its merits, and if the result should aggrieve him, to appeal
the denial of his special affirmative defenses to the COMELEC en banc along
with the other errors committed by the Division upon the merits.
 DIOCESE OF BACOLOD V COMELEC

SUPRA. ART 2 SEC 26

FACTS:

On February 21, 2013, petitioners posted two tarpaulins within a private

compound housing the San Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod. Each tarpaulin
was approximately six feet by ten feet (6X10) in size. They were posted on the
front walls of the cathedral within public view. The first tarpaulin contains the
message “IBASURA RH Law” referring to the Reproductive Health Law of 2012
or Republic Act No. 10354. The second tarpaulin is the subject of the present
case. This tarpaulin contains the heading “Conscience Vote” and
lists candidates as either “(Anti-RH) Team Buhay” with a check mark, or “(Pro-
RH) Team Patay” with an “X” mark. The electoral candidates were classified
according to their vote on the adoption of Republic Act No. 10354, otherwise
known as the RH Law. Those who voted for the passing of the law were
classified by petitioners as comprising “Team Patay,” while those who voted
against it form “Team Buhay.”

Respondents conceded that the tarpaulin was neither sponsored nor paid for
by any candidate. Petitioners also conceded that the tarpaulin contains names
ofcandidates for the 2013 elections, but not of politicians who helped in the
passage of the RH Law but were not candidates for that election.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the petitioners violated the principle of exhaustion of

administrative remedies as the case was not brought first before the COMELEC
EnBanc or any if its divisions.
2. Whether or not COMELEC may regulate expressions made by private citizens.
3. Whether or not the assailed notice and letter for the removal of the tarpaulin
violated petitioners’ fundamental right to freedom of expression.

RULING:

1. No. The Court held that the argument on exhaustion of administrative

remedies is not proper in this case. Despite the alleged non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies, it is clear that the controversy is already ripe for
adjudication. Ripeness is the “prerequisite that something had by then been
accomplished or performed by either branch or in this case, organ of
government before a court may come into the picture.”
Petitioners’ exercise of their right to speech, given the message and their
medium, had understandable relevance especially during the elections.
COMELEC’s letter threatening the filing of the election offense against
petitioners is already an actionable infringement of this right. The impending
threat of criminal litigation is enough to curtail petitioners’ speech.

In the context of this case, exhaustion of their administrative remedies as

COMELEC suggested in their pleadings prolongs the violation of their freedom
of speech.

2. No. Respondents cite the Constitution, laws, and jurisprudence to support

their position that they had the power to regulate the tarpaulin. However, the
Court held that all of these provisions pertain to candidates and political
parties. Petitioners are notcandidates. Neither do they belong to any political
party. COMELEC does not have the authority to regulate the enjoyment of the
preferred right to freedom of expression exercised by a non-candidate in this
case.

3. Yes. The Court held that every citizen’s expression with political
consequences enjoys a high degree of protection.

Moreover, the respondent’s argument that the tarpaulin is election

propaganda, being petitioners’ way of endorsing candidates who voted against
the RH Law and rejecting those who voted for it, holds no water.

The Court held that while the tarpaulin may influence the success or failure of
the named candidates and political parties, this does not necessarily mean it is
election propaganda. The tarpaulin was not paid for or posted “in return for
consideration” by any candidate, political party, or party-list group.

By interpreting the law, it is clear that personal opinions are not included,
while sponsored messages are covered.
GUALBERTO DELA LLANA V THE CHAIR PERSON, COA

GR NO. 180989

FEBRUARY 7, 2012

FACTS:

The petitioner, Gualberto Dela Llana, wrote to the Commission on Audit

regarding the recommendation of the Senate Committee on Agriculture and
Food that the Department of Agriculture set up an internal pre-audit service.
The COA replied to Dela Llana informing him of the prior issuance of Circular
No. 89-299 which provides that whenever the circumstances warrant the COA
may reinstitute pre-audit or adopt such other control measures as necessary
and appropriate to protect the funds and property of an agency.

Dela Llana filed a petition for certiorari alleging that the pre-audit duty on the
part of the COA cannot be lifted by a mere circular, considering that the pre-
audit is a constitutional mandate enshrined in Section 2 of Article 9 (D) of the
constitution.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or Not the petition for certiorari filed by Dela Llana is proper
2. Whether or not it is the constitutional duty of COA to conduct a pre-
audit before the consummation of government transaction

RULING:

1. The petition for certiorari filed by Dela Llana is not proper. While it is
true that decisions and orders of the COA are reviewable by the Court via
a petition for certiorari, this does not refer to decisions and orders which
were rendered by the COA in its quasi-judicial capacity.

Nonetheless, the court has in the past seen fit to step in and resolve
petitions despite their being the subject of an improper remedy, in view
of the public importance of the issues raised therein. In this case, Dela
Llana averred that the conduct of pre-audit by the COA could have
prevented the occurrence of the numerous alleged irregularities in the
government transactions that involved substantial amounts of public
money. This is serious allegation of a grave deficiency in observing a
constitutional duty if proven correct. The court can use its authority to
 set aside errors of practice or technicalities of procedure, including the
aforementioned technical defects of the petition, and resolve the merits of
case with such serious allegations on constitutional breach

2. The COA has no constitutional duty to conduct pre-audit. Dela Llana

claimed that the constitutional duty of the COA includes the duty to
conduct pre-audit. A pre-audit is an examination of financial
transactions before their consumption or payment. it could, among
others, identify government agency transactions that are suspicious on
their face prior to their implementation and prior to the disbursement
funds.

Dela Llana’s allegations find no support in the section 2 of article 9 (D) of

the constitution. There is nothing in the said provision that requires the
COA to conduct a pre-audit of all government transactions and for all
government agencies.

Hence, the conduct of a pre-audit is not mandatory duty that the Court
may compel the COA to perform. This discretion on its part is in line with
the constitutional pronouncement that the COA has the exclusive
authority to define the scope of its audit and examination. When the
language of the law is clear and explicit, there is no room for
interpretation, only application. Neither can the scope of the provision be
unduly enlarged by the court.
MARIA LAARNI CAYETANO V COMELE & DANTE TINGA

G.R. No. 193846

April 12, 2011

FACTS:

In the automated national and local elections held on May 10, 2010, Petitioner
Cayetano and Respondent Tinga were candidates for the position of Mayor of
Taguig City. Cayetano was proclaimed the winner thereof, receiving a total of
Ninety-Five Thousand Eight Hundred Sixty-Five (95,865) votes as against the
Ninety-Three Thousand Four Hundred Forty-Five (93,445) votes received by
private respondent. Consequently, Tinga filed an Election Protest against
Cayetano before the COMELEC which listed election frauds and irregularities
allegedly committed by Cayeteno resulting to the latter’s win as Mayor of
Taguig City and claiming that that he is the actual winner of the mayoralty
elections in Taguig City.

Cayetano filed her Answer with Counter-Protest and Counterclaim and raised,
among others, the affirmative defense of insufficiency in form and content of
the Election Protest and prayed for the immediate dismissal thereof. The
COMELEC then issued the assailed Preliminary Conference Order finding the
protest filed by Tinga and the counter-protest filed by Cayetano to be sufficient
in form and substance thereby denying Cayetano’s affirmative defense of
insufficiency in form and substance of the protest filed by Tinga.

Cayetano filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Preliminary Conference

Order relative to the denial of her affirmative defenses and Tinga filed a
Comment and Opposition thereto. Consequently, the COMELEC issued the
second assailed Order denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration, hence,
the Petition raising the issue on whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in refusing to dismiss
the protest of private respondent for insufficiency in form and content.

While Tinga refuted the allegations of Cayetano and countered that the petition
failed to demonstrate grave abuse of discretion, he, raised the procedural
infirmity in the instant petition, that is the power of the Court to review
decisions of the COMELEC under Section 3, Article IX-C of the Constitution,
pursuant to the leading case of Repol v. COMELEC.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review an order or final
resolution of a division of the COMELEC?

RULING:

NO. The final order of the COMELEC (Second Division) denying the affirmative
defenses of petitioner cannot be questioned before the Court even via a petition
for certiorari. A motion to reconsider a decision, resolution, order, or ruling of a
COMELEC Division shall be elevated to the COMELEC En Banc as stated
Section 3, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution. However, a motion to
reconsider an interlocutory order of a COMELEC Division shall be resolved by
the division which issued the interlocutory order, except when all the members
of the division decide to refer the matter to the COMELEC En Banc.

Plainly, the Court has no jurisdiction to review an order, whether final or

interlocutory, even a final resolution of a division of the COMELEC. Stated
otherwise, the Court can only review via certiorari a FINAL decision, order, or
ruling of the COMELEC en banc in accordance with Section 7, Article IX-A of
the Constitution.

As stated in Soriano, “the general rule is that a decision or an order of a

COMELEC Division cannot be elevated directly to this Court through a special
civil action for certiorari.” True, the aforestated rule admits of exceptions as
when the issuance of the assailed interlocutory order is a patent nullity
because of the absence of jurisdiction to issue the same or where the
commission of grave abuse of discretion is apparent on its face. Unfortunately
for petitioner, none of the circumstances permitting an exception to the rule
occurs in this instance.
ABS-CBN V COMELEC

323 SCRA 811

JANUARY 28, 2000

FACTS:

COMELEC released a resolution which approved the issuance of a restraining

order against ABS-CBN to conduct exit survey. It acted upon reports that the
network plans to conduct a TV-radio coverage of the elections and make an exit
survey of the votes cast for President and Vice-President and broadcast the
results immediately.

Supreme Court Issued a Temporary Restraining Order against the resolution of

COMELEC and the esit polls were actually conducted and reported by media.

ABS-CBN argues that holding exit polls and nationwide reporting of results are
valid exercises of the freedoms of speech and of the press. COMELEC
committed GAD when it issued such resolution. COMELEC on the other hand
argues that the conduct of exit polls might confuse the voters and unduly
influence them.

ISSUE:

Whether or not COMELEC in the exercise of its powers can ban exit polls.

RULING:

No. The measure is overbroad and unnecessarily restricts fundamental rights

of speech and of press. Exit polls do not constitute clear and present danger of
destroying the credibility and integrity of the electoral process. The Comelec
justifies its assailed Resolution as having been issued pursuant to its
constitutional mandate to ensure a free, orderly, honest, credible and peaceful
election. It contends that "an exit poll has the tendency to sow confusion
considering the randomness of selecting interviewees, which further make[s]
the exit poll highly unreliable. The probability that the results of such exit poll
may not be in harmony with the official count made by the Comelec is ever
present. In other words, the exit poll has a clear and present danger of
destroying the credibility and integrity of the electoral process." Such
arguments are purely speculative and clearly untenable. First, by the very
nature of a survey, the interviewees or participants are selected at random, so
that the results will as much as possible be representative or reflective of the
general sentiment or view of the community or group polled. Second, the
survey result is not meant to replace or be at par with the official Comelec
count. It consists merely of the opinion of the polling group as to who the
electorate in general has probably voted for, based on the limited data gathered
from polled individuals. Finally, not at stake here are the credibility and the
integrity of the elections, which are exercises that are separate and
independent from the exit polls. If at all, the outcome of one can only be
indicative of the other.
ROBERTO REBLORA V ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES

GR NO 195842

JUNE 18, 2013

FACTS:

Petitioner is a retired Captain of the Philippine Navy born on May 22, 1944.
Prior to entering military service, he rendered civilian government service as a
Barrio Development Worker at the Department of the Interior and Local
Government (DILG) from 6 January 1969 to 20 July 1974. He entered military
service as a Probationary Ensign in the Philippine Navy and was called to active
duty effective August 26, 1974.

On 1996, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) officially confirmed the
incorporation of petitioner’s civilian government service at the DILG with his
length of active service in the military pursuant to Section 3 of Presidential
Decree (PD) No. 1638,9 as amended by PD No. 1650.

On 2003, at the age of 59 and after a total of thirty-four (34) years of active
service, the petitioner was compulsorily retired from the military. He was, at
that time, already ranked as a Commander in the Philippine Navy.Petitioner
chose to avail of the monthly retirement pay with the option to receive in
advance and in lump sum an amount equivalent to three (3) yearsworth thereof
for the first three years after his retirement.

The AFP granted petitioner’s claim of retirement benefits and immediately paid
the latter the sum of P722,297.16 as advance lump, however, the AFP did not
include petitioner’s civilian government service at the DILG. The AFP only
considered petitioner’s actual military service i.e., covering the period between
May 21, 1973 up to May 22, 2003 or a period of only thirty (30) years.

Petitioner disagreed and insisted that the computation of his retirement benefit
should include the period of his civilian government service at the DILG
immediately before he entered military service
for a total of four (4) years and five (5) months. It is argued that the
computation of the AFP does not reflect the true length of his military service of
thirty-four (34) years and that it is, in fact, a full four (4) years short. Petitioner
thus claims that he is entitled to P135, 991.81 in additional retirement benefit.

After an unsuccessful bid to obtain a favorable legal opinion from the AFP
Judge Advocate General, the petitioner requested assistance from the COA for
the collection of his claimed additional retirement benefit. The COA rendered a
Decision denying petitioner’s claim. COA agreed with the petitioner that his
civilian service at the DILG should and ought to be included as part of his
active service in the military for purposes of computing his retirement benefits
under PD No. 1638. However, since his civilian service should be included as
part of his active service in the military, the COA opined that petitioner should
also have been considered as compulsorily retired on 22 May 2000 and not on
22 May 2003.

The COA explained that as of 22 May 2000, petitioner has already reached the
age of fifty-six (56) with a total of thirty-one (31) years in active service,
inclusive of his four years in the DILG, which fulfilled the conditions for
compulsory retirement under Section 5(a) of PD No. 1638, as amended. Verily,
the COA found that, applying the provisions of PD No. 1638 as amended,
petitioner was not actually underpaid but was rather overpaid his retirement
benefit in the amount of P77,807.16.

The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the COA remained
steadfast on their resolution. Aggrieved, petitioner questioned the Decision and
Resolution of the COA via the present Rule 45 petition before the Supreme
Court.

ISSUE:
1. WON the COA’s decision/judgment be reviewed by Supreme Court via
Rule 45.
2. WON COA’s computation of retirement benefit is correct?

HELD:

1. The Court dismissed the instant petition on account of it being the wrong
remedy. Decisions and resolutions of the COA are reviewable by Supreme
Court, not via an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45, as is the present
petition, but thru a special civil action of certiorari under Rule 64 in
relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Section 2 of Rule 64, which
implements the mandate of Section 7 of Article IX-A of the
Constitution,19 is clear on this:
Section 2. Mode of Review.—A judgment or final order or resolution of the
Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit may be brought
by the aggrieved party to the Supreme Court on certiorari under Rule 65,
except as hereinafter provided.

The Constitution and the Rules of Court precisely limits the permissible
scope of inquiry in such cases only to errors of jurisdiction or grave
abuse of discretion. Hence, unless tainted with grave abuse of discretion,
 simple errors of judgment committed by the COA cannot be reviewed by
Supreme Court.

2. The Court finds that the computation of COA is the one that is supported
by PD No. 1638. Sections 5 and 7 of PD No. 1638, as amended, identifies
the instances of compulsory retirement in the military service:
Section 5 (a). Upon attaining fifty-six (56) years of age or upon
accumulation of thirty (30) years of satisfactory active service, whichever
is later, an officer or enlisted man shall be compulsorily retired; Provided,
That such officer or enlisted-man who shall have attained fifty-six (56)
years of age with at least twenty (20) years of active service shall be
allowed to complete thirty (30) years of service but not beyond his
sixtieth (60th) birthday;xxxx

This Court discerns that the COA was correct in holding that petitioner
should be considered as compulsorily retired on May 2000 for purposes
of computing his retirement benefits under the same law. COA correctly
held that for purposes of computing his retirement benefits under PD No
1638, as amended, petitioner should have been considered compulsorily
retired as of 22 May 2000 per Section 5(a) of the same law.20 This is so
because it was on 22 May 2000 that petitioner reached the age of fifty-six
(56) after a total of thirty-one (31) years in active service—fulfilling
thereby the conditions for compulsory retirement under the said
section.21 In coming up with such a conclusion, COA most certainly
reckoned the beginning of petitioner’s active service in the military from
his stint as civilian worker at the DILG.

The inclusion of petitioner’s civilian government service at the DILG in

the computation of his length of active service in the military, on the
other hand, is only but proper in light of Section 3 of PD No. 1638, as
amended.
SEVILLA V COMELEC

GR NO. 203833

MARCH 19, 2013

FACTS:

Mamerto Sevilla and Renato So were opponents in the 2010 Barangay

Elections for Punong Barangay of Barangay Sucat, Muntinlupa City. After the
voting, the Board of Election Tellers proclaimed Mamerto as winner, which
Renato contested thru an election protest filed before the Metropolitan Trial
Court. The latter dismissed the election protest of Mamerto after the recount.
Instead of filing a notice of appeal, Renato filed a motion for reconsideration,
which the MeTC denied, ruling it was a prohibited pleading under Sec. 1, Rule
6 of A.M. No 07-04-15-SC. Renato then filed a petition for certiorari with the
Comelec which the latter’s Second Division granted, ruling that MeTC’s
decision amounts to an oppressive exercise of judicial authority. The Comelec
En Banc, voting 3-3, affirmed the Second Division’s ruling. Mamerto thus filed
a petition for review on certiorari of the En Banc decision. Mamerto asserts
that Renato resorted to a wrong remedy hence the Comelec should not have
entertained the petition for certiorari. He also asserts that the dismissal of the
election protest was proper. In his Comment, Renato asserts that the petition
was filed prematurely since the En Banc decision was not a majority decision
since the Chairman had yet to be appointed by the President when the decision
was rendered. Since it was not a majority decision, it should be remanded to
the Comelec for rehearing by a full and complete Commission.

ISSUE: