G.R. No.

L-24693 July 31, 1967

ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL AND MOTEL OPERATORS ASSOCIATION,

INC., HOTEL DEL MAR INC. and GO CHIU, petitioners-appellees,
vs.
THE HONORABLE CITY MAYOR OF MANILA, respondent-appellant.
VICTOR ALABANZA, intervenor-appellee.

Panganiban, Abad and Associates Law Office for respondent-appellant.

J. M. Aruego, Tenchavez and Associates for intervenor-appellee.

FERNANDO, J.:

The principal question in this appeal from a judgment of the lower court in an
action for prohibition is whether Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila is
violative of the due process clause. The lower court held that it is and
adjudged it "unconstitutional, and, therefore, null and void." For reasons to
be more specifically set forth, such judgment must be reversed, there being
a failure of the requisite showing to sustain an attack against its validity.

The petition for prohibition against Ordinance No. 4760 was filed on July 5,
1963 by the petitioners, Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators
Association, one of its members, Hotel del Mar Inc., and a certain Go Chiu,
who is "the president and general manager of the second petitioner" against
the respondent Mayor of the City of Manila who was sued in his capacity as
such "charged with the general power and duty to enforce ordinances of the
City of Manila and to give the necessary orders for the faithful execution and
enforcement of such ordinances." (par. 1). It was alleged that the petitioner
non-stock corporation is dedicated to the promotion and protection of the
interest of its eighteen (18) members "operating hotels and motels,
characterized as legitimate businesses duly licensed by both national and
city authorities, regularly paying taxes, employing and giving livelihood to not
less than 2,500 person and representing an investment of more than P3
million."1 (par. 2). It was then alleged that on June 13, 1963, the Municipal
Board of the City of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 4760, approved on June
14, 1963 by the then Vice-Mayor Herminio Astorga, who was at the time
acting as Mayor of the City of Manila. (par. 3).
After which the alleged grievances against the ordinance were set forth in
detail. There was the assertion of its being beyond the powers of the
Municipal Board of the City of Manila to enact insofar as it would regulate
motels, on the ground that in the revised charter of the City of Manila or in
any other law, no reference is made to motels; that Section 1 of the
challenged ordinance is unconstitutional and void for being unreasonable
and violative of due process insofar as it would impose P6,000.00 fee per
annum for first class motels and P4,500.00 for second class motels; that the
provision in the same section which would require the owner, manager,
keeper or duly authorized representative of a hotel, motel, or lodging house
to refrain from entertaining or accepting any guest or customer or letting any
room or other quarter to any person or persons without his filling up the
prescribed form in a lobby open to public view at all times and in his presence,
wherein the surname, given name and middle name, the date of birth, the
address, the occupation, the sex, the nationality, the length of stay and the
number of companions in the room, if any, with the name, relationship, age
and sex would be specified, with data furnished as to his residence certificate
as well as his passport number, if any, coupled with a certification that a
person signing such form has personally filled it up and affixed his signature
in the presence of such owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized
representative, with such registration forms and records kept and bound
together, it also being provided that the premises and facilities of such hotels,
motels and lodging houses would be open for inspection either by the City
Mayor, or the Chief of Police, or their duly authorized representatives is
unconstitutional and void again on due process grounds, not only for being
arbitrary, unreasonable or oppressive but also for being vague, indefinite and
uncertain, and likewise for the alleged invasion of the right to privacy and the
guaranty against self-incrimination; that Section 2 of the challenged
ordinance classifying motels into two classes and requiring the maintenance
of certain minimum facilities in first class motels such as a telephone in each
room, a dining room or, restaurant and laundry similarly offends against the
due process clause for being arbitrary, unreasonable and oppressive, a
conclusion which applies to the portion of the ordinance requiring second
class motels to have a dining room; that the provision of Section 2 of the
challenged ordinance prohibiting a person less than 18 years old from being
accepted in such hotels, motels, lodging houses, tavern or common inn
unless accompanied by parents or a lawful guardian and making it unlawful
for the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative of such
establishments to lease any room or portion thereof more than twice every
24 hours, runs counter to the due process guaranty for lack of certainty and
for its unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive character; and that insofar as
the penalty provided for in Section 4 of the challenged ordinance for a
subsequent conviction would, cause the automatic cancellation of the license
of the offended party, in effect causing the destruction of the business and
loss of its investments, there is once again a transgression of the due process
clause.

There was a plea for the issuance of preliminary injunction and for a final
judgment declaring the above ordinance null and void and unenforceable.
The lower court on July 6, 1963 issued a writ of preliminary injunction
ordering respondent Mayor to refrain from enforcing said Ordinance No. 4760
from and after July 8, 1963.

In the a answer filed on August 3, 1963, there was an admission of the

personal circumstances regarding the respondent Mayor and of the fact that
petitioners are licensed to engage in the hotel or motel business in the City
of Manila, of the provisions of the cited Ordinance but a denial of its alleged
nullity, whether on statutory or constitutional grounds. After setting forth that
the petition did fail to state a cause of action and that the challenged
ordinance bears a reasonable relation, to a proper purpose, which is to curb
immorality, a valid and proper exercise of the police power and that only the
guests or customers not before the court could complain of the alleged
invasion of the right to privacy and the guaranty against self incrimination,
with the assertion that the issuance of the preliminary injunction ex parte was
contrary to law, respondent Mayor prayed for, its dissolution and the
dismissal of the petition.

Instead of evidence being offered by both parties, there was submitted a

stipulation of facts dated September 28, 1964, which reads:

1. That the petitioners Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association,

Inc. and Hotel del Mar Inc. are duly organized and existing under the laws of
the Philippines, both with offices in the City of Manila, while the petitioner Go
Chin is the president and general manager of Hotel del Mar Inc., and the
intervenor Victor Alabanza is a resident of Baguio City, all having the capacity
to sue and be sued;

2. That the respondent Mayor is the duly elected and incumbent City Mayor
and chief executive of the City of Manila charged with the general power and
duty to enforce ordinances of the City of Manila and to give the necessary
orders for the faithful execution and enforcement of such ordinances;

3. That the petitioners are duly licensed to engage in the business of

operating hotels and motels in Malate and Ermita districts in Manila;

4. That on June 13, 1963, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila enacted
Ordinance No. 4760, which was approved on June 14, 1963, by Vice-Mayor
Herminio Astorga, then the acting City Mayor of Manila, in the absence of the
respondent regular City Mayor, amending sections 661, 662, 668-a, 668-b
and 669 of the compilation of the ordinances of the City of Manila besides
inserting therein three new sections. This ordinance is similar to the one
vetoed by the respondent Mayor (Annex A) for the reasons stated in its 4th
Indorsement dated February 15, 1963 (Annex B);

5. That the explanatory note signed by then Councilor Herminio Astorga was
submitted with the proposed ordinance (now Ordinance 4760) to the
Municipal Board, copy of which is attached hereto as Annex C;

6. That the City of Manila derived in 1963 an annual income of P101,904.05

from license fees paid by the 105 hotels and motels (including herein
petitioners) operating in the City of Manila. 1äwphï1.ñët

Thereafter came a memorandum for respondent on January 22, 1965,

wherein stress was laid on the presumption of the validity of the challenged
ordinance, the burden of showing its lack of conformity to the Constitution
resting on the party who assails it, citing not only U.S. v. Salaveria, but
likewise applicable American authorities. Such a memorandum likewise
refuted point by point the arguments advanced by petitioners against its
validity. Then barely two weeks later, on February 4, 1965, the memorandum
for petitioners was filed reiterating in detail what was set forth in the petition,
with citations of what they considered to be applicable American authorities
and praying for a judgment declaring the challenged ordinance "null and void
and unenforceable" and making permanent the writ of preliminary injunction
issued.

After referring to the motels and hotels, which are members of the petitioners
association, and referring to the alleged constitutional questions raised by the
party, the lower court observed: "The only remaining issue here being purely
a question of law, the parties, with the nod of the Court, agreed to file
memoranda and thereafter, to submit the case for decision of the Court." It
does appear obvious then that without any evidence submitted by the parties,
the decision passed upon the alleged infirmity on constitutional grounds of
the challenged ordinance, dismissing as is undoubtedly right and proper the
untenable objection on the alleged lack of authority of the City of Manila to
regulate motels, and came to the conclusion that "the challenged Ordinance
No. 4760 of the City of Manila, would be unconstitutional and, therefore, null
and void." It made permanent the preliminary injunction issued against
respondent Mayor and his agents "to restrain him from enforcing the
ordinance in question." Hence this appeal.

As noted at the outset, the judgment must be reversed. A decent regard for
constitutional doctrines of a fundamental character ought to have
admonished the lower court against such a sweeping condemnation of the
challenged ordinance. Its decision cannot be allowed to stand, consistently
with what has hitherto been the accepted standards of constitutional
adjudication, in both procedural and substantive aspects.

Primarily what calls for a reversal of such a decision is the absence of any
evidence to offset the presumption of validity that attaches to a challenged
statute or ordinance. As was expressed categorically by Justice Malcolm:
"The presumption is all in favor of validity x x x . The action of the elected
representatives of the people cannot be lightly set aside. The councilors
must, in the very nature of things, be familiar with the necessities of their
particular municipality and with all the facts and circumstances which
surround the subject and necessitate action. The local legislative body, by
enacting the ordinance, has in effect given notice that the regulations are
essential to the well being of the people x x x . The Judiciary should not lightly
set aside legislative action when there is not a clear invasion of personal or
property rights under the guise of police regulation.2

It admits of no doubt therefore that there being a presumption of validity, the

necessity for evidence to rebut it is unavoidable, unless the statute or
ordinance is void on its face which is not the case here. The principle has
been nowhere better expressed than in the leading case of O'Gorman &
Young v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co.,3 where the American Supreme Court
through Justice Brandeis tersely and succinctly summed up the matter thus:
The statute here questioned deals with a subject clearly within the scope of
the police power. We are asked to declare it void on the ground that the
specific method of regulation prescribed is unreasonable and hence deprives
the plaintiff of due process of law. As underlying questions of fact may
condition the constitutionality of legislation of this character, the resumption
of constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some factual foundation of
record for overthrowing the statute." No such factual foundation being laid in
the present case, the lower court deciding the matter on the pleadings and
the stipulation of facts, the presumption of validity must prevail and the
judgment against the ordinance set aside.

Nor may petitioners assert with plausibility that on its face the ordinance is
fatally defective as being repugnant to the due process clause of the
Constitution. The mantle of protection associated with the due process
guaranty does not cover petitioners. This particular manifestation of a police
power measure being specifically aimed to safeguard public morals is
immune from such imputation of nullity resting purely on conjecture and
unsupported by anything of substance. To hold otherwise would be to unduly
restrict and narrow the scope of police power which has been properly
characterized as the most essential, insistent and the least limitable of
powers,4 extending as it does "to all the great public needs."5 It would be, to
paraphrase another leading decision, to destroy the very purpose of the state
if it could be deprived or allowed itself to be deprived of its competence to
promote public health, public morals, public safety and the genera
welfare.6 Negatively put, police power is "that inherent and plenary power in
the State which enables it to prohibit all that is hurt full to the comfort, safety,
and welfare of society.7
There is no question but that the challenged ordinance was precisely enacted
to minimize certain practices hurtful to public morals. The explanatory note
of the Councilor Herminio Astorga included as annex to the stipulation of
facts, speaks of the alarming increase in the rate of prostitution, adultery and
fornication in Manila traceable in great part to the existence of motels, which
"provide a necessary atmosphere for clandestine entry, presence and exit"
and thus become the "ideal haven for prostitutes and thrill-seekers." The
challenged ordinance then proposes to check the clandestine harboring of
transients and guests of these establishments by requiring these transients
and guests to fill up a registration form, prepared for the purpose, in a lobby
open to public view at all times, and by introducing several other amendatory
provisions calculated to shatter the privacy that characterizes the registration
of transients and guests." Moreover, the increase in the licensed fees was
intended to discourage "establishments of the kind from operating for
purpose other than legal" and at the same time, to increase "the income of
the city government." It would appear therefore that the stipulation of facts,
far from sustaining any attack against the validity of the ordinance, argues
eloquently for it.

It is a fact worth noting that this Court has invariably stamped with the seal of
its approval, ordinances punishing vagrancy and classifying a pimp or
procurer as a vagrant;8 provide a license tax for and regulating the
maintenance or operation of public dance halls;9 prohibiting
gambling;10 prohibiting jueteng;11 and monte;12 prohibiting playing of
panguingui on days other than Sundays or legal holidays;13 prohibiting the
operation of pinball machines;14 and prohibiting any person from keeping,
conducting or maintaining an opium joint or visiting a place where opium is
smoked or otherwise used,15 all of which are intended to protect public
morals.

On the legislative organs of the government, whether national or local,

primarily rest the exercise of the police power, which, it cannot be too often
emphasized, is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health,
morals, peace, good order, safety and general welfare of the people. In view
of the requirements of due process, equal protection and other applicable
constitutional guaranties however, the exercise of such police power insofar
as it may affect the life, liberty or property of any person is subject to judicial
inquiry. Where such exercise of police power may be considered as either
capricious, whimsical, unjust or unreasonable, a denial of due process or a
violation of any other applicable constitutional guaranty may call for
correction by the courts.

We are thus led to considering the insistent, almost shrill tone, in which the
objection is raised to the question of due process.16 There is no controlling
and precise definition of due process. It furnishes though a standard to which
the governmental action should conform in order that deprivation of life,
liberty or property, in each appropriate case, be valid. What then is the
standard of due process which must exist both as a procedural and a
substantive requisite to free the challenged ordinance, or any governmental
action for that matter, from the imputation of legal infirmity sufficient to spell
its doom? It is responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience to the
dictates of justice. Negatively put, arbitrariness is ruled out and unfairness
avoided. To satisfy the due process requirement, official action, to
paraphrase Cardozo, must not outrun the bounds of reason and result in
sheer oppression. Due process is thus hostile to any official action marred by
lack of reasonableness. Correctly it has been identified as freedom from
arbitrariness. It is the embodiment of the sporting idea of fair play.17 It exacts
fealty "to those strivings for justice" and judges the act of officialdom of
whatever branch "in the light of reason drawn from considerations of fairness
that reflect [democratic] traditions of legal and political thought."18 It is not a
narrow or "technical conception with fixed content unrelated to time, place
and circumstances,"19 decisions based on such a clause requiring a "close
and perceptive inquiry into fundamental principles of our
society."20 Questions of due process are not to be treated narrowly or
pedantically in slavery to form or phrases.21

It would thus be an affront to reason to stigmatize an ordinance enacted

precisely to meet what a municipal lawmaking body considers an evil of
rather serious proportion an arbitrary and capricious exercise of authority. It
would seem that what should be deemed unreasonable and what would
amount to an abdication of the power to govern is inaction in the face of an
admitted deterioration of the state of public morals. To be more specific, the
Municipal Board of the City of Manila felt the need for a remedial measure. It
provided it with the enactment of the challenged ordinance. A strong case
must be found in the records, and, as has been set forth, none is even
attempted here to attach to an ordinance of such character the taint of nullity
for an alleged failure to meet the due process requirement. Nor does it lend
any semblance even of deceptive plausibility to petitioners' indictment of
Ordinance No. 4760 on due process grounds to single out such features as
the increased fees for motels and hotels, the curtailment of the area of
freedom to contract, and, in certain particulars, its alleged vagueness.

Admittedly there was a decided increase of the annual license fees provided
for by the challenged ordinance for hotels and motels, 150% for the former
and over 200% for the latter, first-class motels being required to pay a P6,000
annual fee and second-class motels, P4,500 yearly. It has been the settled
law however, as far back as 1922 that municipal license fees could be
classified into those imposed for regulating occupations or regular
enterprises, for the regulation or restriction of non-useful occupations or
enterprises and for revenue purposes only.22 As was explained more in detail
in the above Cu Unjieng case: (2) Licenses for non-useful occupations are
also incidental to the police power and the right to exact a fee may be implied
from the power to license and regulate, but in fixing amount of the license
fees the municipal corporations are allowed a much wider discretion in this
class of cases than in the former, and aside from applying the well-known
legal principle that municipal ordinances must not be unreasonable,
oppressive, or tyrannical, courts have, as a general rule, declined to interfere
with such discretion. The desirability of imposing restraint upon the number
of persons who might otherwise engage in non-useful enterprises is, of
course, generally an important factor in the determination of the amount of
this kind of license fee. Hence license fees clearly in the nature of privilege
taxes for revenue have frequently been upheld, especially in of licenses for
the sale of liquors. In fact, in the latter cases the fees have rarely been
declared unreasonable.23

Moreover in the equally leading case of Lutz v. Araneta24 this Court affirmed
the doctrine earlier announced by the American Supreme Court that taxation
may be made to implement the state's police power. Only the other day, this
Court had occasion to affirm that the broad taxing authority conferred by the
Local Autonomy Act of 1959 to cities and municipalities is sufficiently plenary
to cover a wide range of subjects with the only limitation that the tax so levied
is for public purposes, just and uniform.25

As a matter of fact, even without reference to the wide latitude enjoyed by

the City of Manila in imposing licenses for revenue, it has been explicitly held
in one case that "much discretion is given to municipal corporations in
determining the amount," here the license fee of the operator of a massage
clinic, even if it were viewed purely as a police power measure.26 The
discussion of this particular matter may fitly close with this pertinent citation
from another decision of significance: "It is urged on behalf of the plaintiffs-
appellees that the enforcement of the ordinance could deprive them of their
lawful occupation and means of livelihood because they can not rent stalls in
the public markets. But it appears that plaintiffs are also dealers in
refrigerated or cold storage meat, the sale of which outside the city markets
under certain conditions is permitted x x x . And surely, the mere fact, that
some individuals in the community may be deprived of their present business
or a particular mode of earning a living cannot prevent the exercise of the
police power. As was said in a case, persons licensed to pursue occupations
which may in the public need and interest be affected by the exercise of the
police power embark in these occupations subject to the disadvantages
which may result from the legal exercise of that power."27

Nor does the restriction on the freedom to contract, insofar as the challenged
ordinance makes it unlawful for the owner, manager, keeper or duly
authorized representative of any hotel, motel, lodging house, tavern,
common inn or the like, to lease or rent room or portion thereof more than
twice every 24 hours, with a proviso that in all cases full payment shall be
charged, call for a different conclusion. Again, such a limitation cannot be
viewed as a transgression against the command of due process. It is neither
unreasonable nor arbitrary. Precisely it was intended to curb the opportunity
for the immoral or illegitimate use to which such premises could be, and,
according to the explanatory note, are being devoted. How could it then be
arbitrary or oppressive when there appears a correspondence between the
undeniable existence of an undesirable situation and the legislative attempt
at correction. Moreover, petitioners cannot be unaware that every regulation
of conduct amounts to curtailment of liberty which as pointed out by Justice
Malcolm cannot be absolute. Thus: "One thought which runs through all
these different conceptions of liberty is plainly apparent. It is this: 'Liberty' as
understood in democracies, is not license; it is 'liberty regulated by law.'
Implied in the term is restraint by law for the good of the individual and for the
greater good of the peace and order of society and the general well-being.
No man can do exactly as he pleases. Every man must renounce unbridled
license. The right of the individual is necessarily subject to reasonable
restraint by general law for the common good x x x The liberty of the citizen
may be restrained in the interest of the public health, or of the public order
and safety, or otherwise within the proper scope of the police power."28

A similar observation was made by Justice Laurel: "Public welfare, then, lies
at the bottom of the enactment of said law, and the state in order to promote
the general welfare may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with
business and occupations. Persons and property may be subjected to all
kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to secure the general comfort,
health, and prosperity of the state x x x To this fundamental aim of our
Government the rights of the individual are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing
without which life is a misery, but liberty should not be made to prevail over
authority because then society will fall into anarchy. Neither should authority
be made to prevail over liberty because then the individual will fall into
slavery. The citizen should achieve the required balance of liberty and
authority in his mind through education and personal discipline, so that there
may be established the resultant equilibrium, which means peace and order
and happiness for all.29

It is noteworthy that the only decision of this Court nullifying legislation

because of undue deprivation of freedom to contract, People v. Pomar,30 no
longer "retains its virtuality as a living principle. The policy of laissez faire has
to some extent given way to the assumption by the government of the right
of intervention even in contractual relations affected with public
interest.31 What may be stressed sufficiently is that if the liberty involved were
freedom of the mind or the person, the standard for the validity of
governmental acts is much more rigorous and exacting, but where the liberty
curtailed affects at the most rights of property, the permissible scope of
regulatory measure is wider.32 How justify then the allegation of a denial of
due process?

Lastly, there is the attempt to impugn the ordinance on another due process
ground by invoking the principles of vagueness or uncertainty. It would
appear from a recital in the petition itself that what seems to be the gravamen
of the alleged grievance is that the provisions are too detailed and specific
rather than vague or uncertain. Petitioners, however, point to the requirement
that a guest should give the name, relationship, age and sex of the
companion or companions as indefinite and uncertain in view of the necessity
for determining whether the companion or companions referred to are those
arriving with the customer or guest at the time of the registry or entering the
room With him at about the same time or coming at any indefinite time later
to join him; a proviso in one of its sections which cast doubt as to whether
the maintenance of a restaurant in a motel is dependent upon the discretion
of its owners or operators; another proviso which from their standpoint would
require a guess as to whether the "full rate of payment" to be charged for
every such lease thereof means a full day's or merely a half-day's rate. It may
be asked, do these allegations suffice to render the ordinance void on its face
for alleged vagueness or uncertainty? To ask the question is to answer it.
From Connally v. General Construction Co.33 to Adderley v. Florida,34 the
principle has been consistently upheld that what makes a statute susceptible
to such a charge is an enactment either forbidding or requiring the doing of
an act that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its
meaning and differ as to its application. Is this the situation before us? A
citation from Justice Holmes would prove illuminating: "We agree to all the
generalities about not supplying criminal laws with what they omit but there
is no canon against using common sense in construing laws as saying what
they obviously mean."35

That is all then that this case presents. As it stands, with all due allowance
for the arguments pressed with such vigor and determination, the attack
against the validity of the challenged ordinance cannot be considered a
success. Far from it. Respect for constitutional law principles so uniformly
held and so uninterruptedly adhered to by this Court compels a reversal of
the appealed decision.

Wherefore, the judgment of the lower court is reversed and the injunction
issued lifted forthwith. With costs.
G.R. No. L-14078 March 7, 1919

RUBI, ET AL. (manguianes), plaintiffs,

vs.
THE PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MINDORO, defendant.

D. R. Williams & Filemon Sotto for plaintiff.

Office of the Solicitor-General Paredes for defendant.

MALCOLM, J.:

In one of the cases which denote a landmark in American Constitutional

History (Worcester vs. Georgia [1832], 6 Pet., 515), Chief Justice Marshall,
the first luminary of American jurisprudence, began his opinion (relating to
the status of an Indian) with words which, with a slight change in phraseology,
can be made to introduce the present opinion — This cause, in every point
of view in which it can be placed, is of the deepest interest. The legislative
power of state, the controlling power of the constitution and laws, the rights if
they have any, the political existence of a people, the personal liberty of a
citizen, are all involved in the subject now to be considered.

To imitate still further the opinion of the Chief Justice, we adopt his outline
and proceed first, to introduce the facts and the issues, next to give a history
of the so called "non-Christians," next to compare the status of the "non-
Christians" with that of the American Indians, and, lastly, to resolve the
constitutional questions presented.

I. INTRODUCTION.

This is an application for habeas corpus in favor of Rubi and other

Manguianes of the Province of Mindoro. It is alleged that the Maguianes are
being illegally deprived of their liberty by the provincial officials of that
province. Rubi and his companions are said to be held on the reservation
established at Tigbao, Mindoro, against their will, and one Dabalos is said to
be held under the custody of the provincial sheriff in the prison at Calapan for
having run away form the reservation.

The return of the Solicitor-General alleges:

1. That on February 1, 1917, the provincial board of Mindoro adopted

resolution No. 25 which is as follows:

The provincial governor, Hon. Juan Morente, Jr., presented the following
resolution:

"Whereas several attempts and schemes have been made for the
advancement of the non-Christian people of Mindoro, which were all a failure,

"Whereas it has been found out and proved that unless some other measure
is taken for the Mangyan work of this province, no successful result will be
obtained toward educating these people.
"Whereas it is deemed necessary to obliged them to live in one place in order
to make a permanent settlement,

"Whereas the provincial governor of any province in which non-Christian

inhabitants are found is authorized, when such a course is deemed
necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct such inhabitants to take
up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be selected by him
and approved by the provincial board.

"Whereas the provincial governor is of the opinion that the sitio of Tigbao on
Lake Naujan is a place most convenient for the Mangyanes to live on, Now,
therefore be it

"Resolved, that under section 2077 of the Administrative Code, 800 hectares
of public land in the sitio of Tigbao on Naujan Lake be selected as a site for
the permanent settlement of Mangyanes in Mindoro subject to the approval
of the Honorable Secretary of the Interior, and

"Resolved further, That Mangyans may only solicit homesteads on this

reservation providing that said homestead applications are previously
recommended by the provincial governor."

2. That said resolution No. 25 (series 1917) of the provincial board of Mindoro
was approved by the Secretary of the Interior of February 21, 1917.

3. That on December 4, 1917, the provincial governor of Mindoro issued

executive order No. 2 which says:

"Whereas the provincial board, by Resolution No. 25, current series, has
selected a site in the sitio of Tigbao on Naujan Lake for the permanent
settlement of Mangyanes in Mindoro.

"Whereas said resolution has been duly approve by the Honorable, the
Secretary of the Interior, on February 21, 1917.

"Now, therefore, I, Juan Morente, jr., provincial governor of Mindoro, pursuant

to the provisions of section 2145 of the revised Administrative Code, do
hereby direct that all the Mangyans in the townships of Naujan and Pola and
the Mangyans east of the Baco River including those in the districts of
Dulangan and Rubi's place in Calapan, to take up their habitation on the site
of Tigbao, Naujan Lake, not later than December 31, 1917.

"Any Mangyan who shall refuse to comply with this order shall upon
conviction be imprisoned not exceed in sixty days, in accordance with section
2759 of the revised Administrative Code."

4. That the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro copied in paragraph

1 and the executive order of the governor of the same province copied in
paragraph 3, were necessary measures for the protection of the Mangyanes
of Mindoro as well as the protection of public forests in which they roam, and
to introduce civilized customs among them.

5. That Rubi and those living in his rancheria have not fixed their dwelling
within the reservation of Tigbao and are liable to be punished in accordance
with section 2759 of Act No. 2711.

6. That the undersigned has not information that Doroteo Dabalos is being
detained by the sheriff of Mindoro but if he is so detained it must be by virtue
of the provisions of articles Nos. 2145 and 2759 of Act No. 2711.

It thus appears that the provincial governor of Mindoro and the provincial
board thereof directed the Manguianes in question to take up their habitation
in Tigbao, a site on the shore of Lake Naujan, selected by the provincial
governor and approved by the provincial board. The action was taken in
accordance with section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917, and was
duly approved by the Secretary of the Interior as required by said action.
Petitioners, however, challenge the validity of this section of the
Administrative Code. This, therefore, becomes the paramount question
which the court is called upon the decide.

Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 reads as follows:

SEC. 2145. Establishment of non-Christina upon sites selected by provincial

governor. — With the prior approval of the Department Head, the provincial
governor of any province in which non-Christian inhabitants are found is
authorized, when such a course is deemed necessary in the interest of law
and order, to direct such inhabitants to take up their habitation on sites on
unoccupied public lands to be selected by him an approved by the provincial
board.

In connection with the above-quoted provisions, there should be noted

section 2759 of the same Code, which read as follows:

SEC. 2759. Refusal of a non-Christian to take up appointed habitation. —

Any non-Christian who shall refuse to comply with the directions lawfully
given by a provincial governor, pursuant to section two thousand one
hundred and forty-five of this Code, to take up habitation upon a site
designated by said governor shall upon conviction be imprisonment for a
period not exceeding sixty days.

The substance of what is now found in said section 2145 is not new to
Philippine law. The genealogical tree of this section, if we may be permitted
to use such terminology, would read: Section 2077, Administrative Code of
1916; section 62, Act No. 1397; section 2 of various special provincial laws,
notably of Act No. 547, specifically relating to the Manguianes; section 69,
Act No. 387.

Section 2145 and its antecedent laws make use of the term "non-Christians."
This word, as will later be disclosed, is also found in varying forms in other
laws of the Philippine Islands. In order to put the phrase in its proper category,
and in order to understand the policy of the Government of the Philippine
Islands with reference to the uncivilized elements of the Islands, it is well first
of all to set down a skeleton history of the attitude assumed by the authorities
towards these "non-Christians," with particular regard for the legislation on
the subject.

II. HISTORY.

A. BEFORE ACQUISITION OF THE PHILIPPINE BY THE UNITED

STATES.

The most important of the laws of the Indies having reference to the subject
at hand are compiled in Book VI, Title III, in the following language.
 LAW I.

The Emperor Charles and the Prince, the governor, at Cigales, on March 21,
1551. Philip II at Toledo, on February 19, 1560. In the forest of Segovia on
September 13, 1565. In the Escorial on November 10, 1568. Ordinance 149
of the poblaciones of 1573. In San Lorenzo, on May 20, 1578,

THAT THE "INDIOS" BE REDUCED INTO "POBLACIONES"

COMMUNITIES).

In order that the indios may be instructed in the Sacred Catholic Faith and
the evangelical law, and in order that they may forget the blunders of their
ancient rites and ceremonies to the end that they may live in harmony and in
a civilized manner, it has always been endeavored, with great care and
special attention, to use all the means most convenient to the attainment of
these purposes. To carry out this work with success, our Council of the Indies
and other religious persons met at various times; the prelates of new Spain
assembled by order of Emperor Charles V of glorious memory in the year
one thousand five hundred and forty-six — all of which meetings were
actuated with a desire to serve God an our Kingdom. At these meetings it
was resolved that indios be made to live in communities, and not to live in
places divided and separated from one another by sierras and mountains,
wherein they are deprived of all spiritual and temporal benefits and wherein
they cannot profit from the aid of our ministers and from that which gives rise
to those human necessities which men are obliged to give one another.
Having realized that convenience of this resolution, our kings, our
predecessors, by different orders, have entrusted and ordered the viceroys,
presidents, and governors to execute with great care and moderation the
concentration of the indios into reducciones; and to deal with their doctrine
with such forbearance and gentleness, without causing inconveniences, so
that those who would not presently settle and who would see the good
treatment and the protection of those already in settlements would, of their
own accord, present themselves, and it is ordained that they be not required
to pay taxes more than what is ordered. Because the above has been
executed in the greater part of our Indies, we hereby order and decree that
the same be complied with in all the remaining parts of the Indies, and
the encomederos shall entreat compliance thereof in the manner and form
prescribed by the laws of this title.

xxx xxx xxx

LAW VIII.

Philip II at the Pardo, on December 1, 1573. Philip III at Madrid, October 10,
1618.

THE "REDUCCTIONES" BE MADE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE

CONDITIONS OF THIS LAW.

The places wherein the pueblos and reducciones shall be formed should
have the facilities of waters. lands, and mountains, ingress and egress,
husbandry and passageway of one league long, wherein the indios can have
their live stock that they may not be mixed with those of the Spaniards.

LAW IX.

Philip II at Toledo, on February 19, 1956.

THAT THE "INDIOS" IN "REDUCCIONES" BE NOT DEPRIVED OF THE

LANDS PREVIOUSLY HELD BY THEM.

With more good-will and promptness, the indios shall be concentrated

in reducciones. Provided they shall not be deprived of the lands and
granaries which they may have in the places left by them. We hereby order
that no change shall be made in this respect, and that they be allowed to
retain the lands held by them previously so that they may cultivate them and
profit therefrom.

xxx xxx xxx

LAW XIII.

THE SAME AS ABOVE.

THAT THE "REDUCCIONES" BE NOT REMOVED WITHOUT ORDER OF

THE KING, VICEROY, OR COURT.
No governor, or magistrate, or alcalde mayor, or any other court, has the right
to alter or to remove thepueblos or the reducciones once constituted and
founded, without our express order or that of the viceroy, president, or the
royal district court, provided, however, that the encomenderos, priests,
or indios request such a change or consent to it by offering or giving
information to that en. And, because these claims are often made for private
interests and not for those of the indios, we hereby order that this law be
always complied with, otherwise the change will be considered fraudulently
obtained. The penalty of one thousand pesos shall be imposed upon the
judge or encomendero who should violate this law.

LAW XV.

Philip III at Madrid, on October 10, 1618.

THAT THERE BE MAYORS AND ALDERMEN IN THE "REDUCTIONES,"

WHO SHALL BE "INDIOS."

We order that in each town and reduccion there be a mayor, who should be
an indio of the same reduccion; if there be more than eighty houses, there
should be two mayors and two aldermen, also indios; and, even if the town
be a big one, there should, nevertheless, be more than two mayors and four
aldermen, If there be less than eighty indios but not less than forty, there
should be not more than one mayor and one alderman, who should annually
elect nine others, in the presence of the priests , as is the practice in town
inhabited by Spaniards and indios.

LAW XXI.

Philip II, in Madrid, On May 2, 1563, and on November 25, 1578. At Tomar,
on May 8, 1581. At Madrid, on January 10, 1589. Philip III, at Todesillas, on
July 12, 1600. Philip IV, at Madrid, on October 1 and December 17, 1646.
For this law and the one following, see Law I, Tit. 4, Book 7.

THAT IN THE TOWNS OF THE "INDIOS," THERE SHALL LIVE NO

SPANIARDS, NEGROES, "MESTIZOS," AND MULATTOES.
We hereby prohibit and forbid Spaniards, negroes, mulattores, or mestizos to
live to live in the reduccionesand towns and towns of the indios, because it
has been found that some Spaniards who deal, trade, live, and associate with
the indios are men of troublesome nature, of dirty ways of living; robbers,
gamblers, and vicious and useless men; and, to avoid the wrongs done them,
the indios would leave their towns and provinces; and the negroes, mestizos,
and mulattoes, besides maltreating them and utilizing their services,
contaminate them with their bad customs, idleness, and also some of their
blunders and vices which may corrupt and pervert the goal which we desire
to reach with regard to their salvation, increase, and tranquillity. We hereby
order the imposition of grave penalties upon the commission of the acts
above-mentioned which should not be tolerated in the towns, and that the
viceroys, presidents, governors, and courts take great care in executing the
law within their powers and avail themselves of the cooperation of the
ministers who are truly honest. As regards the mestizos and Indian and
Chinese half-breeds (zambaigos), who are children of indiasand born among
them, and who are to inherit their houses and haciendas, they all not be
affected by this law, it appearing to be a harsh thing to separate them from
their parents. (Law of the Indies, vol. 2, pp. 228, 229, 230, 231.)

A clear exposition of the purposes of the Spanish government, in its efforts

to improve the condition of the less advanced inhabitants of the Islands by
concentrating them in "reducciones," is found in the Decree of the Governor-
General of the Philippine Islands of January 14, 1881, reading as follows:

It is a legal principle as well as a national right that every inhabitant of a

territory recognized as an integral part of a nation should respect and obey
the laws in force therein; while, on other hand, it is the duty to conscience
and to humanity for all governments to civilize those backward races that
might exist in the nation, and which living in the obscurity of ignorance, lack
of all the nations which enable them to grasp the moral and material
advantages that may be acquired in those towns under the protection and
vigilance afforded them by the same laws.

It is equally highly depressive to our national honor to tolerate any longer the
separation and isolation of the non-Christian races from the social life of the
civilized and Christian towns; to allow any longer the commission of
depredations, precisely in the Island of Luzon wherein is located the seat of
the representative of the Government of the, metropolis.

It is but just to admit the fact that all the governments have occupied
themselves with this most important question, and that much has been
heretofore accomplished with the help and self-denial of the missionary
fathers who have even sacrificed their lives to the end that those degenerate
races might be brought to the principles of Christianity, but the means and
the preaching employed to allure them have been insufficient to complete the
work undertaken. Neither have the punishments imposed been sufficient in
certain cases and in those which have not been guarded against, thus giving
and customs of isolation.

As it is impossible to consent to the continuation of such a lamentable state

of things, taking into account the prestige which the country demands and
the inevitable duty which every government has in enforcing respect and
obedience to the national laws on the part of all who reside within the territory
under its control, I have proceeded in the premises by giving the most careful
study of this serious question which involves important interests for
civilization, from the moral and material as well as the political standpoints.
After hearing the illustrious opinions of all the local authorities, ecclesiastics,
and missionaries of the provinces of Northern Luzon, and also after finding
the unanimous conformity of the meeting held with the Archbishop of Manila,
the Bishops of Jaro and Cebu, and the provincial prelates of the orders of the
Dominicans, Agustinians, Recoletos, Franciscans, and Jesuits as also of the
meeting of the Council of Authorities, held for the object so indicated, I have
arrived at an intimate conviction of the inevitable necessity of proceeding in
a practical manner for the submission of the said pagan and isolated races,
as well as of the manner and the only form of accomplishing such a task.

For the reasons above stated and for the purpose of carrying out these
objects, I hereby promulgate the following:

DECREE.

1. All the indian inhabitants (indios) of the Islands of Luzon are, from this date,
to be governed by the common law, save those exceptions prescribed in this
decree which are bases upon the differences of instructions, of the customs,
and of the necessities of the different pagan races which occupy a part of its
territory.

2. The diverse rules which should be promulgated for each of these races —
which may be divided into three classes; one, which comprises those which
live isolated and roaming about without forming a town nor a home; another,
made up of those subdued pagans who have not as yet entered completely
the social life; and the third, of those mountain and rebellious pagans — shall
be published in their respective dialects, and the officials, priests, and
missionaries of the provinces wherein they are found are hereby entrusted in
the work of having these races learn these rules. These rules shall have
executive character, beginning with the first day of next April, and, as to their
compliance, they must be observed in the manner prescribed below.

3. The provincial authorities in conjunction with the priests shall proceed, from
now on, with all the means which their zeal may suggest to them, to the taking
of the census of the inhabitants of the towns or settlement already subdued,
and shall adopt the necessary regulations for the appointment of local
authorities, if there be none as yet; for the construction of courts and schools,
and for the opening or fixing up of means of communication, endeavoring, as
regards the administrative organization of the said towns or settlements, that
this be finished before the first day of next July, so that at the beginning of
the fiscal year they shall have the same rights and obligations which affect
the remaining towns of the archipelago, with the only exception that in the
first two years they shall not be obliged to render personal services other than
those previously indicated.

4. So long as these subdued towns or settlements are located infertile lands

appropriate for cultivation, the inhabitants thereof shall not be obliged to
move their dwelling-houses; and only in case of absolute necessity shall a
new residence be fixed for them, choosing for this purpose the place most
convenient for them and which prejudices the least their interest; and, in
either of these cases, an effort must be made to establish their homes with
the reach of the sound of the bell.
5. For the protection and defense of these new towns, there shall be
established an armed force composed precisely of native Christian, the
organization and service of which shall be determined in a regulations based
upon that of the abolished Tercios de Policia (division of the Guardia Civil).

6. The authorities shall see to it that the inhabitants of the new towns
understand all the rights and duties affecting them and the liberty which they
have as to where and now they shall till their lands and sell the products
thereof, with the only exception of the tobacco which shall be bought by
the Hacienda at the same price and conditions allowed other producers, and
with the prohibition against these new towns as well as the others from
engaging in commerce of any other transaction with the rebellious indios, the
violation of which shall be punished with deportation.

7. In order to properly carry out this express prohibition, the limits of the
territory of the rebellious indios shall be fixed; and whoever should go beyond
the said limits shall be detained and assigned governmentally wherever
convenient.

8. For the purpose of assisting in the conversion of the pagans into the
fraternity of the Catholic Church, all by this fact along be exempt for eight
years from rendering personal labor.

9. The authorities shall offer in the name of the State to the races not subdued
(aetas and mountains igorrots the following advantages in returns for their
voluntary submission: to live in towns; unity among their families; concession
of good lands and the right to cultivate them in the manner they wish and in
the way them deem most productive; support during a year, and clothes upon
effecting submission; respect for their habits and customs in so far as the
same are not opposed to natural law; freedom to decide of their own accord
as to whether they want to be Christians or not; the establishment of missions
and families of recognized honesty who shall teach, direct, protect, and give
them security and trust them; the purchase or facility of the sale of their
harvests; the exemption from contributions and tributes for ten years and
from the quintas (a kind of tax) for twenty years; and lastly, that those who
are governed by the local authorities as the ones who elect such officials
under the direct charge of the authorities of the province or district.
10. The races indicated in the preceding article, who voluntarily admit the
advantages offered, shall, in return, have the obligation of constituting their
new towns, of constructing their town hall, schools, and country roads which
place them in communication with one another and with the Christians;
provided, the location of these towns be distant from their actual residences,
when the latter do not have the good conditions of location and cultivations,
and provided further the putting of families in a place so selected by them be
authorized in the towns already constituted.

11. The armed force shall proceed to the prosecution and punishment of the
tribes, that, disregarding the peace, protection, and advantages offered them,
continue in their rebellious attitude on the first of next April, committing from
now on the crimes and vexations against the Christian towns; and for the this
purposes, the Captain General's Office shall proceed with the organization of
the divisions of the Army which, in conjunction with the rural guards
(cuadrilleros), shall have to enter the territory of such tribes. On the expiration
of the term, they shall destroy their dwelling-houses, labors, and implements,
and confiscate their products and cattle. Such a punishment shall necessarily
be repeated twice a year, and for this purpose the military headquarters shall
immediately order a detachment of the military staff to study the zones where
such operations shall take place and everything conducive to the successful
accomplishment of the same.

12. The chiefs of provinces, priests, and missioners, local authorities, and
other subordinates to my authorities, local authorities, and other subordinates
to may authority, civil as well as military authorities, shall give the most
effective aid and cooperation to the said forces in all that is within the
attributes and the scope of the authority of each.

13. With respect to the reduccion of the pagan races found in some of the
provinces in the southern part of the Archipelago, which I intend to visit, the
preceding provisions shall conveniently be applied to them.

14. There shall be created, under my presidency as Governor-General, Vice-

Royal Patron, a council or permanent commission which shall attend to and
decide all the questions relative to the application of the foregoing regulations
that may be brought to it for consultations by the chiefs of provinces and
priests and missionaries.

15. The secondary provisions which may be necessary, as a complement to

the foregoing, in brining about due compliance with this decree, shall be
promulgated by the respective official centers within their respective
jurisdictions. (Gaceta de Manila, No. 15) (Diccionario de la Administracion,
vol. 7, pp. 128-134.)

B. AFTER ACQUISITON OF THE PHILIPPINES BY THE UNITED STATES.

Ever since the acquisition of the Philippine Islands by the United States, the
question as to the best method for dealing with the primitive inhabitants has
been a perplexing one.

1. Organic law.

The first order of an organic character after the inauguration of the American
Government in the Philippines was President McKinley's Instructions to the
Commission of April 7, 1900, later expressly approved and ratified by section
1 of the Philippine Bill, the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902. Portions of these
instructions have remained undisturbed by subsequent congressional
legislation. One paragraph of particular interest should here be quoted,
namely:

In dealing with the uncivilized tribes of the Islands, the Commission should
adopt the same course followed by Congress in permitting the tribes of our
North American Indians to maintain their tribal organization and government
and under which many of these tribes are now living in peace and
contentment, surrounded by civilization to which they are unable or unwilling
to conform. Such tribal governments should, however, be subjected to wise
and firm regulation; and, without undue or petty interference, constant and
active effort should be exercised to prevent barbarous practices and
introduce civilized customs.

Next comes the Philippine Bill, the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, in the
nature of an Organic Act for the Philippines. The purpose of section 7 of the
Philippine Bill was to provide for a legislative body and, with this end in view,
to name the prerequisites for the organization of the Philippine Assembly.
The Philippine Legislature, composed of the Philippine Commission and the
Philippine Assembly, was to have jurisdiction over the Christian portion of the
Islands. The Philippine Commission was to retain exclusive jurisdiction of that
part of said Islands inhabited by Moros or other non-Christian tribes.

The latest Act of Congress, nearest to a Constitution for the Philippines, is

the Act of Congress of August 29, 1916, commonly known as the Jones Law.
This transferred the exclusive legislative jurisdiction and authority theretofore
exercised by the Philippine Commission, to the Philippine Legislature (sec.
12). It divided the Philippine Islands into twelve senatorial districts, the twelfth
district to be composed of the Mountain Province, Baguio, Nueva Vizcaya,
and the Department of Mindanao and Sulu. The Governor-General of the
Philippine Islands was authorized to appoint senators and representatives for
the territory which, at the time of the passage of the Jones Law, was not
represented in the Philippine Assembly, that is, for the twelfth district (sec.
16). The law establish a bureau to be known as the "Bureau of non-Christian
Tribes" which shall have general supervision over the public affairs of the
inhabitants which are represented in the Legislature by appointed senators
and representatives( sec. 22).

Philippine organic law may, therefore, be said to recognized a dividing line

between the territory not inhabited by Moros or other non-Christian tribes,
and the territory which Moros or other non-Christian tribes, and the territory
which is inhabited by Moros or other non-Christian tribes.

2. Statute law.

Local governments in the Philippines have been provided for by various acts
of the Philippine Commission and Legislature. The most notable are Acts
Nos. 48 and 49 concerning the Province of Benguet and the Igorots; Act NO.
82, the Municipal Code; ;Act no. 83, the Provincial Government Act; Act No.
183, the Character of the city of Manila; Act No. 7887, providing for the
organization and government of the Moro Province; Act No. 1396, the Special
Provincial Government Act; Act No. 1397, the Township Government Act; Act
No. 1667, relating to the organization of settlements; Act No. 1963, the
Baguio charger; and Act No. 2408, the Organic Act of the Department of
Mindanao and Sulu. The major portion of these laws have been carried
forward into the Administrative Codes of 1916 an d1917.

Of more particular interest are certain special laws concerning the

government of the primitive peoples. Beginning with Act No. 387, sections
68-71, enacted on April 9, 1902, by the United States Philippine Commission,
having reference to the Province of Nueva Vizcaya, Acts Nos. 4111, 422,
445, 500, 547, 548, 549, 550, 579, 753, 855, 1113, 1145, 4568, 1306 were
enacted for the provinces of Abra, Antique, Bataan, Ilocos Norte, Ilocos Sur,
Isabela. Lepanto-Bontoc, Mindoro, Misamis, Nueva Vizcaya, Pangasinan,
Paragua (Palawan), Tarlac, Tayabas, and Zambales. As an example of these
laws, because referring to the Manguianes, we insert Act No. 547:

No. 547. — AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF LOCAL

CIVIL GOVERNMENTS FOR THE MANGUIANES IN THE PROVINCE OF
MINDORO.

By authority of the United States, be it enacted by the Philippine Commission,

that:

SECTION 1. Whereas the Manguianes of the Provinces of Mindoro have not

progressed sufficiently in civilization to make it practicable to bring them
under any form of municipal government, the provincial governor is
authorized, subject to the approval of the Secretary of the Interior, in dealing
with these Manguianes to appoint officers from among them, to fix their
designations and badges of office, and to prescribe their powers and duties:
Provided, That the powers and duties thus prescribed shall not be in excess
of those conferred upon township officers by Act Numbered Three hundred
and eighty-seven entitled "An Act providing for the establishment of local civil
Governments in the townships and settlements of Nueva Vizcaya."

SEC. 2. Subject to the approval of the Secretary of the Interior, the provincial
governor is further authorized, when he deems such a course necessary in
the interest of law and order, to direct such Manguianes to take up their
habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be selected by him and
approved by the provincial board. Manguianes who refuse to comply with
such directions shall upon conviction be imprisonment for a period not
exceeding sixty days.

SEC. 3. The constant aim of the governor shall be to aid the Manguianes of
his province to acquire the knowledge and experience necessary for
successful local popular government, and his supervision and control over
them shall be exercised to this end, an to the end that law and order and
individual freedom shall be maintained.

SEC. 4. When in the opinion of the provincial board of Mindoro any settlement
of Manguianes has advanced sufficiently to make such a course practicable,
it may be organized under the provisions of sections one to sixty-seven,
inclusive, of Act Numbered three hundred and eighty-seven, as a township,
and the geographical limits of such township shall be fixed by the provincial
board.

SEC. 5. The public good requiring the speedy enactment of this bill, the
passage of the same is hereby expedited in accordance with section two of
'An Act prescribing the order of procedure by the Commission in the
enactment of laws,' passed September twenty-sixth, nineteen hundred.

SEC. 6. This Act shall take effect on its passage.

Enacted, December 4, 1902.

All of these special laws, with the exception of Act No. 1306, were repealed
by Act No. 1396 and 1397. The last named Act incorporated and embodied
the provisions in general language. In turn, Act No. 1397 was repealed by
the Administrative Code of 1916. The two Administrative Codes retained the
provisions in questions.

These different laws, if they of the non-Christian inhabitants of the Philippines

and a settled and consistent practice with reference to the methods to be
followed for their advancement.

C. TERMINOLOGY.
The terms made use of by these laws, organic and statutory, are found in
varying forms.

"Uncivilized tribes" is the denomination in President McKinley's instruction to

the Commission.

The most commonly accepted usage has sanctioned the term "non-Christian
tribes." These words are to be found in section 7 of the Philippine Bill and in
section 22 of the Jones Law. They are also to be found in Act No. 253 of the
Philippines Commission, establishing a Bureau of non-Christian Tribes and
in Act No. 2674 of the Philippine Legislature, carried forward into sections
701-705 of the Administrative Code of 1917, reestablishing this Bureau.
Among other laws which contain the phrase, there can be mentioned Acts
Nos. 127, 128, 387, 547, 548, 549, 550, 1397, 1639, and 2551.

"Non-Christian people," "non-Christian inhabitants," and "non-Christian

Filipinos" have been the favorite nomenclature, in lieu of the unpopular word
"tribes," since the coming into being of a Filipinized legislature. These terms
can be found in sections 2076, 2077, 2390, 2394, Administrative Code of
1916; sections 701-705, 2145, 2422, 2426, Administrative Code of 1917; and
in Acts Nos. 2404, 2435, 2444, 2674 of the Philippine Legislatures, as well
as in Act No. 1667 of the Philippine Commission.

The Administrative Code specifically provides that the term "non-Christian"

shall include Mohammedans and pagans. (Sec. 2576, Administrative Code
of 1917; sec. 2561, Administrative Code of 1916, taken from Act No. 2408,
sec. 3.)

D. MEANING OF TERM "NON-CHRISTIAN."

If we were to follow the literal meaning of the word "non-Christian," it would

of course result in giving to it a religious signification. Obviously, Christian
would be those who profess the Christian religion, and non-Christians, would
be those who do not profess the Christian religion. In partial corroboration of
this view, there could also be cited section 2576 of the last Administrative
Code and certain well-known authorities, as Zuñiga, "Estadismo de las Islas
Filipinas," Professor Ferdinand Blumentritt, "Philippine Tribes and
Languages," and Dr. N. M. Saleeby, "The Origin of Malayan Filipinos." (See
Blair & Robertson, "The Philippine Islands," 1493-1898, vol. III, p. 300, note;
Craig-Benitez, "Philippine Progress prior to 1898," vol. I. p. 107.)

Not content with the apparent definition of the word, we shall investigate
further to ascertain what is its true meaning.

In one sense, the word can have a geographical signification. This is plainly
to be seen by the provisions of many laws. Thus, according to the Philippine
Bill, the authority of the Philippine Assembly was recognized in the "territory"
of the Islands not inhabited by Moros or other non-Christian tribes. Again, the
Jones Law confers similar recognition in the authorization of the twelfth
senatorial district for the "territory not now represented in the Philippine
Assembly." The Philippines Legislature has, time and again, adopted acts
making certain other acts applicable to that "part" of the Philippine Islands
inhabited by Moros or other non-Christian tribes.

Section 2145, is found in article XII of the Provincial Law of the Administrative
Code. The first section of this article, preceding section 2145, makes the
provisions of the article applicable only in specially organized provinces. The
specially organized provinces are the Mountain Province, Nueva Vizcaya,
Mindoro, Batanes, and Palawan. These are the provinces to which the
Philippine Legislature has never seen fit to give all the powers of local self-
government. They do not, however, exactly coincide with the portion of the
Philippines which is not granted popular representation. Nevertheless, it is
still a geographical description.

It is well-known that within the specially organized provinces, there live

persons some of who are Christians and some of whom are not Christians.
In fact, the law specifically recognizes this. ( Sec. 2422, Administrative Code
of 1917, etc.)

If the religious conception is not satisfactory, so against the geographical

conception is likewise inadquate. The reason it that the motive of the law
relates not to a particular people, because of their religion, or to a particular
province because of its location, but the whole intent of the law is predicated
n the civilization or lack of civilization of the inhabitants.
At most, "non-Christian" is an awkward and unsatisfactory word. Apologetic
words usually introduce the term. "The so-called non-Christian" is a favorite
expression. The Secretary of the Interior who for so many years had these
people under his jurisdiction, recognizing the difficulty of selecting an exact
designation, speaks of the "backward Philippine peoples, commonly known
as the 'non-Christian tribes."' (See Hearings before the Committee on the
Philippines, United States Senate, Sixty-third Congress, third session on
H.R. 18459, An Act to declare the purpose of the People of the United States
as to the future political status of the Philippine Islands and to provide a more
autonomous government for the Islands, pp. 346, 351; letter of the Secretary
of the Interior of June 30, 1906, circulated by the Executive Secretary.)

The idea that the term "non-Christian" is intended to relate to degree of

civilization, is substantiated by reference to legislative, judicial, and executive
authority.

The legislative intent is borne out by Acts Nos. 48, 253, 387, 1667, and 2674,
and sections 701 et seq, and sections 2422 et seq, of the Administrative
Code of 1917. For instance, Act No. 253 charged the Bureau of non-Christian
tribes to conduct "systematic investigations with reference to non-Christian
tribes . . . with special view to determining the most practicable means for
bringing about their advancement in civilization and material property
prosperity."

As authority of a judicial nature is the decision of the Supreme Court in the

case of United States vs. Tubban [Kalinga] ([1915], 29, Phil., 434). The
question here arose as to the effect of a tribal marriage in connection with
article 423 of the Penal code concerning the husband who surprises his wife
in the act of adultery. In discussing the point, the court makes use of the
following language:

. . . we are not advised of any provision of law which recognizes as legal a

tribal marriage of so-called non-Christians or members of uncivilized tribes,
celebrated within that province without compliance with the requisites
prescribed by General Orders no. 68. . . . We hold also that the fact that the
accused is shown to be a member of an uncivilized tribe, of a low order of
intelligence, uncultured and uneducated, should be taken into consideration
as a second marked extenuating circumstance.

Of much more moment is the uniform construction of execution officials who

have been called upon to interpret and enforce the law. The official who, as
a member of the Philippine Commission, drafted much of the legislation
relating to the so-called Christians and who had these people under his
authority, was the former Secretary of the Interior. Under date of June 30,
1906, this official addressed a letter to all governor of provinces, organized
under the Special Provincial Government Act, a letter which later received
recognition by the Governor-General and was circulated by the Executive
Secretary, reading as follows:

Sir: Within the past few months, the question has arisen as to whether people
who were originally non-Christian but have recently been baptized or who are
children of persons who have been recently baptized are, for the purposes of
Act 1396 and 1397, to be considered Christian or non-Christians.

It has been extremely difficult, in framing legislation for the tribes in these
islands which are not advanced far in civilization, to hit upon any suitable
designation which will fit all cases. The number of individual tribes is so great
that it is almost out of the question to enumerate all of them in an Act. It was
finally decided to adopt the designation 'non-Christians' as the one most
satisfactory, but the real purpose of the Commission was not so much to
legislate for people having any particular religious belief as for those lacking
sufficient advancement so that they could, to their own advantage, be brought
under the Provincial Government Act and the Municipal Code.

The mere act of baptism does not, of course, in itself change the degree of
civilization to which the person baptized has attained at the time the act of
baptism is performed. For practical purposes, therefore, you will give the
member of so-called "wild tribes" of your province the benefit of the doubt
even though they may recently have embraced Christianity.

The determining factor in deciding whether they are to be allowed to remain

under the jurisdiction of regularly organized municipalities or what form of
government shall be afforded to them should be the degree of civilization to
which they have attained and you are requested to govern yourself
accordingly.

I have discussed this matter with the Honorable, the Governor-General, who
concurs in the opinion above expressed and who will have the necessary
instructions given to the governors of the provinces organized under the
Provincial Government Act. (Internal Revenue Manual, p. 214.)

The present Secretary of the Interior, in a memorandum furnished a member

of this court, has the following to say on the subject:

As far as names are concerned the classification is indeed unfortunate, but

while no other better classification has as yet been made the present
classification should be allowed to stand . . . I believe the term carries the
same meaning as the expressed in the letter of the Secretary of the Interior
(of June 30, 1906, herein quoted). It is indicative of the degree of civilization
rather than of religious denomination, for the hold that it is indicative of
religious denomination will make the law invalid as against that Constitutional
guaranty of religious freedom.

Another official who was concerned with the status of the non-Christians, was
the Collector of Internal Revenue. The question arose for ruling relatives to
the cedula taxation of the Manobos and the Aetas. Thereupon, the view of
the Secretary of the Interior was requested on the point, who, by return
indorsement, agreed with the interpretation of the Collector of Internal
Revenue. This Construction of the Collector of Internal Revenue can be
found in circular letter No. 188 of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, dated June
11, 1907, reading as follows (Internal Revenue Manual, p. 214):

The internal revenue law exempts "members of non-Christian tribes" from the
payment of cedula taxes. The Collector of Internal Revenue has interpreted
this provision of law to mean not that persons who profess some form of
Christian worship are alone subject to the cedula tax, and that all other
person are exempt; he has interpreted it to mean that all persons preserving
tribal relations with the so-called non-Christian tribes are exempt from the
cedula tax, and that all others, including Jews, Mohammedans, Confucians,
Buddists, etc., are subject to said tax so long as they live in cities or towns,
or in the country in a civilized condition. In other words, it is not so much a
matter of a man's form of religious worship or profession that decides whether
or not he is subject to the cedula tax; it is more dependent on whether he is
living in a civilized manner or is associated with the mountain tribes, either
as a member thereof or as a recruit. So far, this question has not come up as
to whether a Christian, maintaining his religious belief, but throwing his lot
and living with a non-Christian tribe, would or would not be subject to the
cedula tax. On one occasion a prominent Hebrew of Manila claimed to this
office that he was exempt from the cedula tax, inasmuch as he was not a
Christian. This Office, however, continued to collect cedula taxes from all the
Jews, East Indians, Arabs, Chinamen, etc., residing in Manila. Quite a large
proportion of the cedula taxes paid in this city are paid by men belonging to
the nationalities mentioned. Chinamen, Arabs and other s are quite widely
scattered throughout the Islands, and a condition similar to that which exist
in Manila also exists in most of the large provincial towns. Cedula taxes are
therefore being collected by this Office in all parts of these Islands on the
broad ground that civilized people are subject to such taxes, and non-civilized
people preserving their tribal relations are not subject thereto.

(Sgd.) JNO. S. HORD,

Collector of Internal Revenue.

On September 17, 1910, the Collector of Internal Revenue addressed

circular letter No. 327, approved by the Secretary of Finance and Justice, to
all provincial treasurers. This letter in part reads:

In view of the many questions that have been raised by provincial treasurers
regarding cedula taxes due from members of non-Christian tribes when they
come in from the hills for the purposes of settling down and becoming
members of the body politic of the Philippine Islands, the following
clarification of the laws governing such questions and digest of rulings
thereunder is hereby published for the information of all concerned:

Non-Christian inhabitants of the Philippine Islands are so classed, not by

reason of the fact that they do not profess Christianity, but because of their
uncivilized mode of life and low state of development. All inhabitants of the
Philippine Islands classed as members of non-Christian tribes may be
divided into three classes in so far as the cedula tax law is concerned . . .

Whenever any member of an non-Christian tribe leaves his wild and

uncivilized mode of life, severs whatever tribal relations he may have had
and attaches himself civilized community, belonging a member of the body
politic, he thereby makes himself subject to precisely the same law that
governs the other members of that community and from and after the date
when he so attaches himself to the community the same cedula and other
taxes are due from him as from other members thereof. If he comes in after
the expiration of the delinquency period the same rule should apply to him as
to persons arriving from foreign countries or reaching the age of eighteen
subsequent to the expiration of such period, and a regular class A, D, F, or
H cedula, as the case may be, should be furnished him without penalty and
without requiring him to pay the tax for former years.

In conclusion, it should be borne in mind that the prime factors in determining

whether or not a man is subject to the regular cedula tax is not the
circumstance that he does or does not profess Christianity, nor even his
maintenance of or failure to maintain tribal relations with some of the well
known wild tribes, but his mode of life, degree of advancement in civilization
and connection or lack of connection with some civilized community. For this
reason so called "Remontados" and "Montescos" will be classed by this office
as members of non-Christian tribes in so far as the application of the Internal
Revenue Law is concerned, since, even though they belong to no well
recognized tribe, their mode of life, degree of advancement and so forth are
practically the same as those of the Igorrots and members of other
recognized non-Christina tribes.

Very respectfully,

(Sgd.) ELLIS CROMWELL,

Collector of Internal Revenue,

Approved:
(Sgd.) GREGORIO ARANETA,
Secretary of Finance and Justice.
The two circular above quoted have since been repealed by Bureau of
Internal Revenue Regulations No. 1, promulgated by Venancio Concepcion,
Acting Collector of Internal Revenue, and approved on April 16, 1915, by
Honorable Victorino Mapa, Secretary of Finance and Justice. Section 30 of
the regulations is practically a transcript of Circular Letter No. 327.

The subject has come before the Attorney-General for consideration. The
Chief of Constabulary request the opinion of the Attorney-General as to the
status of a non-Christian who has been baptized by a minister of the Gospel.
The precise questions were these: "Does he remain non-Christian or is he
entitled to the privileges of a Christian? By purchasing intoxicating liquors,
does he commit an infraction of the law and does the person selling same lay
himself liable under the provision of Act No. 1639?" The opinion of Attorney-
General Avanceña, after quoting the same authorities hereinbefore set out,
concludes:

In conformity with the above quoted constructions, it is probable that is

probable that the person in question remains a non-Christian, so that, in
purchasing intoxicating liquors both he and the person selling the same make
themselves liable to prosecution under the provisions of Act No. 1639. At
least, I advise you that these should be the constructions place upon the law
until a court shall hold otherwise.

Solicitor-General Paredes in his brief in this case says:

With respect to the meaning which the phrase non-Christian inhabitants has
in the provisions of the Administrative code which we are studying, we submit
that said phrase does not have its natural meaning which would include all
non-Christian inhabitants of the Islands, whether Filipino or strangers,
civilized or uncivilized, but simply refers to those uncivilized members of the
non-Christian tribes of the Philippines who, living without home or fixed
residence, roam in the mountains, beyond the reach of law and order . . .

The Philippine Commission in denominating in its laws that portion of the

inhabitants of the Philippines which live in tribes as non-Christian tribes, as
distinguished from the common Filipinos which carry on a social and civilized
life, did not intended to establish a distinction based on the religious beliefs
of the individual, but, without dwelling on the difficulties which later would be
occasioned by the phrase, adopted the expression which the Spanish
legislation employed to designate the uncivilized portion of the inhabitants of
the Philippines.

The phrase 'non-Christian inhabitants' used in the provisions of articles 2077

and 2741 of Act No. 2657 (articles 2145 and 2759) should be understood as
equivalent to members of uncivilized tribes of the Philippines, not only
because this is the evident intention of the law, but because to give it its
lateral meaning would make the law null and unconstitutional as making
distinctions base the religion of the individual.

The Official Census of 1903, in the portion written by no less an authority

than De. David P. Barrows, then "Chief of the Bureau of non-Christian
Tribes," divides the population in the Christian or Civilized Tribes, and non-
Christian or Wild Tribes. (Census of the Philippine Islands [1903], vol. 1, pp.
411 et seq). The present Director of the Census, Hon. Ignacio Villamor, writes
that the classification likely to be used in the Census now being taken is:
"Filipinos and Primitive Filipinos." In a Pronouncing Gazetteer and
Geographical Dictionary of the Philippine Islands, prepared in the Bureau of
Insular Affairs, War Department, a sub-division under the title non-Christian
tribes is, "Physical and Political Characteristics of the non-Christian Tribes,"
which sufficiently shows that the terms refers to culture and not to religion.

In resume, therefore, the Legislature and the Judiciary, inferentially, and

different executive officials, specifically, join in the proposition that the term
"non-Christian" refers, not to religious belief, but, in a way , to geographical
area, and, more directly, to natives of the Philippine Islands of a law grade of
civilization, usually living in tribal relationship apart from settled communities.

E. THE MANGUIANES.

The so-called non-Christians are in various state approaching civilization.

The Philippine Census of 1903 divided them into four classes. Of the third
class, are the Manguianes (or Mangyans) of Mindoro.

Of the derivation of the name "Manguian" Dr. T. H. Pardo de Tavera in

his Etimilogia de los nombres de Rozas de Filipinas, says:
In Tagalog, Bicol, and Visaya, Manguian signifies "savage," "mountainer,"
"pagan," "negro." It may be that the use of this word is applicable to a great
number of Filipinos, but nevertheless it has been applied only to certain
inhabitants of Mindoro. Even in primitive times without doubt this name was
given to those of that island who bear it to-day, but its employed in three
Filipino languages shows that the radical ngian had in all these languages a
sense to-day forgotten. In Pampango this ending still exists and signifies
"ancient," from which we can deduce that the name was applied to men
considered to be the ancient inhabitants, and that these men were pushed
back into the interior by the modern invaders, in whose language they were
called the "ancients."

The Manguianes are very low in culture. They have considerable Negrito
blood and have not advanced beyond the Negritos in civilization. They are a
peaceful, timid, primitive, semi-nomadic people. They number approximately
15,000. The manguianes have shown no desire for community life, and, as
indicated in the preamble to Act No. 547, have not progressed sufficiently in
civilization to make it practicable to bring them under any form of municipal
government. (See Census of the Philippine (Islands [1903], vol. I, pp. 22, 23,
460.)

III. COMPARATIVE — THE AMERICAN INDIANS.

Reference was made in the Presidents' instructions to the Commission to the

policy adopted by the United States for the Indian Tribes. The methods
followed by the Government of the Philippines Islands in its dealings with the
so-called non-Christian people is said, on argument, to be practically identical
with that followed by the United States Government in its dealings with the
Indian tribes. Valuable lessons, it is insisted, can be derived by an
investigation of the American-Indian policy.

From the beginning of the United States, and even before, the Indians have
been treated as "in a state of pupilage." The recognized relation between the
Government of the United States and the Indians may be described as that
of guardian and ward. It is for the Congress to determine when and how the
guardianship shall be terminated. The Indians are always subject to the
plenary authority of the United States.
Chief Justice Marshall in his opinion in Worcester vs. Georgia, hereinbefore
mentioned, tells how the Congress passed an Act in 1819 "for promoting
those humane designs of civilizing the neighboring Indians." After quoting the
Act, the opinion goes on — "This act avowedly contemplates the preservation
of the Indian nations as an object sought by the United States, and proposes
to effect this object by civilizing and converting them from hunters into
agriculturists."

A leading case which discusses the status of the Indians is that of the United
States vs. Kagama ([1886], 118 U.S., 375). Reference is herein made to the
clause of the United States Constitution which gives Congress "power to
regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, and
with the Indian tribes." The court then proceeds to indicate a brief history of
the position of the Indians in the United States (a more extended account of
which can be found in Marshall's opinion in Worcester vs. Georgia, supra),
as follows:

The relation of the Indian tribes living within the borders of the United States,
both before and since the Revolution, to the people of the United States, has
always been an anomalous one and of a complex character.

Following the policy of the European Governments in the discovery of

American towards the Indians who were found here, the colonies before the
Revolution and the States and the United States since, have recognized in
the Indians a possessory right to the soil over which they roamed and hunted
and established occasional villages. But they asserted an ultimate title in the
land itself, by which the Indian tribes were forbidden to sell or transfer it to
other nations or peoples without the consent of this paramount authority.
When a tribe wished to dispose of its lands, or any part of it, or the State or
the United States wished to purchase it, a treaty with the tribe was the only
mode in which this could be done. The United States recognized no right in
private persons, or in other nations, to make such a purchase by treaty or
otherwise. With the Indians themselves these relation are equally difficult to
define. They were, and always have been, regarded as having a semi-
independent position when they preserved their tribal relations; not as States,
not as nation not a possessed of the fall attributes of sovereignty, but as a
separate people, with the power of regulating their internal and social
relations, and thus far not brought under the laws of the Union or of the State
within whose limits they resided.

The opinion then continues:

It seems to us that this (effect of the law) is within the competency of

Congress. These Indian tribes are the wards of the nation. The are
communities dependent on the United States. dependent largely for their
daily food. Dependent for their political rights. They owe no allegiance to the
States, and receive from the no protection. Because of the local ill feeling,
the people of the States where they are found are often their deadliest
enemies. From their very weakness and helplessness, so largely due to the
course of dealing of the Federal Government with them and the treaties in
which it has been promised, there arise the duty of protection, and with it the
power. This has always been recognized by the Executive and by Congress,
and by this court, whenever the question has arisen . . . The power of the
General Government over these remnants of race once powerful, now weak
and diminished in numbers, is necessary to their protection, as well as to the
safety of those among whom they dwell. it must exist in that government,
because it never has existed anywhere else, because the theater of its
exercise is within the geographical limits of the United States, because it has
never been denied, and because it alone can enforce its laws on all the tribes.

In the later case of United States vs. Sandoval ([1913], 231 U.S., 28) the
question to be considered was whether the status of the Pueblo Indians and
their lands was such that Congress could prohibit the introduction of
intoxicating liquor into those lands notwithstanding the admission of New
Mexico to statehood. The court looked to the reports of the different
superintendent charged with guarding their interests and founds that these
Indians are dependent upon the fostering care and protection of the
government "like reservation Indians in general." Continuing, the court said
"that during the Spanish dominion, the Indians of the pueblos were treated
as wards requiring special protection, where subjected to restraints and
official supervisions in the alienation of their property." And finally, we not the
following: "Not only does the Constitution expressly authorize Congress to
regulate commerce with the Indians tribes, but long-continued legislative and
executive usage and an unbroken current of judicial decisions have attributed
to the United States as a superior and civilized nation the power and the duty
of exercising a fostering care and protection over all dependent Indian
communities within its borders, whether within its original territory or territory
subsequently acquired, and whether within or without the limits of a state."

With reference to laws affecting the Indians, it has been held that it is not
within the power of the courts to overrule the judgment of Congress. For very
good reason, the subject has always been deemed political in nature, not
subject to the jurisdiction of the judicial department of the government.
(Matter of Heff [1905], 197 U.S., 488; U.S. vs. Celestine [1909], 215 U.S.,
278; U.S. vs. Sandoval, supra; Worcester vs. Georgia, supra;
U.S. vs. Rogers [1846], 4 How., 567; the Cherokee Tobacco [1871], 11 Wall,
616; Roff vs. Burney [1897], 168 U.S., 218; Thomas vs.Gay [1898], 169
U.S.., 264; Lone Wolf vs. Hitchcock[1903], 187 U.S., 553;
Wallace vs. Adams [1907], 204 U.S., 415; Conley vs. Bollinger [1910], 216
U.S., 84; Tiger vs. Western Invest. Co. [1911], 221 U.S., 286; U.S. vs. Lane
[1913], 232 U.S.., 598; Cyr vs. Walker (1911], 29 Okla, 281; 35 L.R.A. [N. S.],
795.) Whenever, therefore, the United States sets apart any public land as
an Indian reservation, it has full authority to pass such laws and authorize
such measures as may be necessary to give to the Indians thereon full
protection in their persons and property. (U.S. vs.Thomas [1894], 151 U.S.,
577.)

All this borne out by long-continued legislative and executive usage, and an
unbroken line of judicial decisions.

The only case which is even remotely in point and which, if followed literally,
might result in the issuance of habeas corpus, is that of United
States vs. Crook ([1879], Fed. Cas. No. 14891). This was a hearing upon
return to a writ of habeas corpus issued against Brigadier General George
Crook at the relation of Standing Bear and other Indians, formerly belonging
to the Ponca Tribe of Indians. The petition alleged in substance that the
relators are Indians who have formerly belonged to the Ponca tribe of Indians,
now located in the Indian Territory; that they had some time previously
withdrawn from the tribe, and completely severed their tribal relations
therewith, and had adopted the general habits of the whites, and were then
endeavoring to maintain themselves by their own exertions, and without aid
or assistance from the general government; that whilst they were thus
engaged, and without being guilty of violating any of the laws of the United
States, they were arrested and restrained of their liberty by order of the
respondent, George Crook. The substance of the return to the writ was that
the relators are individual members of, and connected with, the Ponca tribe
of Indians; that they had fled or escaped form a reservation situated some
place within the limits of the Indian Territory — had departed therefrom
without permission from the Government; and, at the request of the Secretary
of the Interior, the General of the Army had issued an order which required
the respondent to arrest and return the relators to their tribe in the Indian
Territory, and that, pursuant to the said order, he had caused the relators to
be arrested on the Omaha Indian Territory.

The first question was whether an Indian can test the validity of an illegal
imprisonment by habeas corpus. The second question, of much greater
importance, related to the right of the Government to arrest and hold the
relators for a time, for the purpose of being returned to the Indian Territory
from which it was alleged the Indian escaped. In discussing this question, the
court reviewed the policy the Government had adopted in its dealing with the
friendly tribe of Poncase. Then, continuing, the court said: "Laws passed for
the government of the Indian country, and for the purpose of regulating trade
and intercourse with the Indian tribes, confer upon certain officers of the
Government almost unlimited power over the persons who go upon the
reservations without lawful authority . . . Whether such an extensive
discretionary power is wisely vested in the commissioner of Indian affairs or
not , need not be questioned. It is enough to know that the power rightfully
exists, and, where existing, the exercise of the power must be upheld." The
decision concluded as follows:

The reasoning advanced in support of my views, leads me to conclude:

1. that an Indian is a 'person' within the meaning of the laws of the United
States, and has, therefore, the right to sue out a writ of habeas corpus in a
federal court, or before a federal judge, in all cases where he may be confined
or in custody under color of authority of the United States or where he is
restrained of liberty in violation of the constitution or laws of the United States.
2. That General George Crook, the respondent, being commander of the
military department of the Platte, has the custody of the relators, under color
of authority of the United States, and in violation of the laws therefore.

3. That n rightful authority exists for removing by force any of the relators to
the Indian Territory, as the respondent has been directed to do.

4. that the Indians possess the inherent right of expatriation, as well as the
more fortunate white race, and have the inalienable right to "life, liberty, and
the pursuit of happiness," so long as they obey the laws and do not trespass
on forbidden ground. And,

5. Being restrained of liberty under color of authority of the United States, and
in violation of the laws thereof, the relators must be discharged from custody,
and it is so ordered.

As far as the first point is concerned, the decision just quoted could be used
as authority to determine that Rubi, the Manguian petitioner, a Filipino, and
a citizen of the Philippine Islands, is a "person" within the meaning of
the Habeas Corpus Act, and as such, entitled to sue out a writ in the
Philippine courts. (See also In re Race Horse [1895], 70 Fed., 598.) We so
decide.

As to the second point the facts in the Standing Bear case an the Rubi case
are not exactly identical. But even admitting similarity of facts, yet it is known
to all that Indian reservations do exist in the United States, that Indians have
been taken from different parts of the country and placed on these
reservation, without any previous consultation as to their own wishes, and
that, when once so located, they have been made to remain on the
reservation for their own good and for the general good of the country. If any
lesson can be drawn form the Indian policy of the United States, it is that the
determination of this policy is for the legislative and executive branches of
the government and that when once so decided upon, the courts should not
interfere to upset a carefully planned governmental system. Perhaps, just as
may forceful reasons exists for the segregation as existed for the segregation
of the different Indian tribes in the United States.

IV. CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS.

 A. DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER.

The first constitutional objection which confronts us is that the Legislature

could not delegate this power to provincial authorities. In so attempting, it is
contended, the Philippine Legislature has abdicated its authority and avoided
its full responsibility.

That the maxim of Constitutional Law forbidding the delegation of legislative

power should be zealously protected, we agree. An understanding of the rule
will, however, disclose that it has not bee violated in his instance.

The rule has nowhere been better stated than in the early Ohio case decided
by Judge Ranney, and since followed in a multitude of case, namely: "The
true distinction therefore is between the delegation of power to make the law,
which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring
an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in
pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the later no valid objection
can be made." (Cincinnati, W. & Z. R. Co. vs. Comm'rs. Clinton County
[1852], 1 Ohio S.t, 88.) Discretion, as held by Chief Justice Marshall in
Wayman vs. Southard ([1825], 10 Wheat., 1) may be committed by the
Legislature to an executive department or official. The Legislature may make
decisions of executive departments of subordinate official thereof, to whom t
has committed the execution of certain acts, final on questions of fact.
(U.S. vs. Kinkead [1918], 248 Fed., 141.) The growing tendency in the
decision is to give prominence to the "necessity" of the case.

Is not all this exactly what the Legislature has attempted to accomplish by
the enactment of section 21454 of the Administrative Code? Has not the
Legislature merely conferred upon the provincial governor, with the approval
of the provincial board and the Department Head, discretionary authority as
to the execution of the law? Is not this "necessary"?

The case of West vs. Hitchock, ([1906], 205 U.S., 80) was a petition for
mandamus to require the Secretary of the Interior to approve the selection
and taking of one hundred and sixty acres by the relator out of the lands
ceded to the United States by the Wichita and affiliated bands of Indians.
Section 463 of the United States Revised Statutes provided: "The
Commissioner of Indian Affairs shall, under the direction of the Secretary of
the Interior, and agreeably to such regulations as the President may
prescribe, have the management of all Indian affairs, and of all matters
arising out to the Indian relations." Justice Holmes said: "We should hesitate
a good deal, especially in view of the long established practice of the
Department, before saying that this language was not broad enough to
warrant a regulation obviously made for the welfare of the rather helpless
people concerned. The power of Congress is not doubted. The Indians have
been treated as wards of the nation. Some such supervision was necessary,
and has been exercised. In the absence of special provisions naturally it
would be exercised by the Indian Department." (See also as corroborative
authority, it any is needed, Union Bridge Co. vs. U.S. [1907], 204 U.S.., 364,
reviewing the previous decisions of the United States Supreme Court:
U.S. vs. Lane [1914], 232 U.S., 598.)

There is another aspect of the question, which once accepted, is decisive.

An exception to the general rule. sanctioned by immemorial practice, permits
the central legislative body to delegate legislative powers to local authorities.
The Philippine Legislature has here conferred authority upon the Province of
Mindoro, to be exercised by the provincial governor and the provincial board.

Who but the provincial governor and the provincial board, as the official
representatives of the province, are better qualified to judge "when such as
course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and order?" As officials
charged with the administration of the province and the protection of its
inhabitants, who but they are better fitted to select sites which have the
conditions most favorable for improving the people who have the misfortune
of being in a backward state?

Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is not an unlawful delegation

of legislative power by the Philippine Legislature to provincial official and a
department head.

B. RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION

The attorney de officio, for petitioners, in a truly remarkable brief, submitted

on behalf of his unknown clients, says that — "The statute is perfectly clear
and unambiguous. In limpid English, and in words as plain and unequivocal
as language can express, it provides for the segregation of 'non-Christians'
and none other." The inevitable result, them, is that the law "constitutes an
attempt by the Legislature to discriminate between individuals because of
their religious beliefs, and is, consequently, unconstitutional."

Counsel's premise once being conceded, his arguments is answerable — the

Legislature must be understood to mean what it has plainly expressed;
judicial construction is then excluded; religious equality is demanded by the
Organic Law; the statute has violated this constitutional guaranty, and Q. E.
D. is invalid. But, as hereinbefore stated, we do not feel free to discard the
long continued meaning given to a common expression, especially as
classification of inhabitants according to religious belief leads the court to
what it should avoid, the nullification of legislative action. We hold that the
term "non-Christian" refers to natives of the Philippines Islands of a low grade
of civilization, and that section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917, does
not discriminate between individuals an account of religious differences.

C. LIBERTY; DUE PROCESS OF LAW; EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE

LAWS.

The third constitutional argument is grounded on those portions of the

President's instructions of to the Commission, the Philippine Bill, and the
Jones Law, providing "That no law shall be enacted in said Islands which
shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law, or deny to any person therein the equal protection of the laws." This
constitutional limitation is derived from the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution — and these provisions, it has been said "are
universal in their application, to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction,
without regard to any differences of race, of color, or of nationality." (Yick
Wo vs. Hopkins [1886], 118 U.S., 356.) The protection afforded the individual
is then as much for the non-Christian as for the Christian.

The conception of civil liberty has been variously expressed thus:

Every man may claim the fullest liberty to exercise his faculties, compatible
with the possession of like liberty by every other. (Spencer, Social Statistics,
p. 94.)

Liberty is the creature of law, essentially different from that authorized

licentiousness that trespasses on right. That authorized licentiousness that
trespasses on right. It is a legal and a refined idea, the offspring of high
civilization, which the savage never understood, and never can understand.
Liberty exists in proportion to wholesome restraint; the more restraint on
others to keep off from us, the more liberty we have . . . that man is free who
is protected from injury. (II Webster's Works, p. 393.)

Liberty consists in the ability to do what one caught to desire and in not being
forced to do what one ought not do desire. (Montesque, spirit of the Laws.)

Even liberty itself, the greatest of all rights, is no unrestricted license to ac

according to one's own will. It is only freedom from restraint under conditions
essential to the equal enjoyment of the same right by others. (Field, J., in
Crowley vs. Christensen [1890], 137 U.S., 86.)

Liberty does not import "an absolute right in each person to be, at all times
and in all circumstances, wholly freed from restraint. There are manifold
restraints to which every person is necessarily subject for the common good.
On any other basis, organized society could not exist with safety to its
members. Society based on the rule that each one is a law unto himself would
soon be confronted with disorder and anarchy. Real liberty for all could not
exist under the operation of a principle which recognizes the right of each
individual person to use his own, whether in respect of his person or his
property, regardless of the injury that may be done to others . . . There is, of
course, a sphere with which the individual may asserts the supremacy of his
own will, and rightfully dispute the authority of any human government —
especially of any free government existing under a written Constitution — to
interfere with the exercise of that will. But it is equally true that in very well-
ordered society charged with the duty of conserving the safety of its
members, the rights of the individual in respect of his liberty may at times,
under the pressure of great dangers, be subjected to such restraint to be
enforced by reasonable regulations, as the safety of the general public may
demand." (Harlan, J., In Jacobson vs. Massachusetts [1905] 197 U.S., 11.)

Liberty is freedom to do right and never wrong; it is ever guided by reason

and the upright and honorable conscience of the individual. (Apolinario
Mabini.)

Civil Liberty may be said to mean that measure of freedom which may be
enjoyed in a civilized community, consistently with the peaceful enjoyment of
like freedom in others. The right to Liberty guaranteed by the Constitution
includes the right to exist and the right to be free from arbitrary personal
restraint or servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed into mere freedom from
physical restraint of the person of the citizen, but is deemed to embrace the
right of man to enjoy the faculties with which he has been endowed by this
Creator, subject only to such restraints as are necessary for the common
welfare. As enunciated in a long array of authorities including epoch-making
decisions of the United States Supreme Court, Liberty includes the right of
the citizens to be free to use his faculties in all lawful ways; to live an work
where he will; to earn his livelihood by an lawful calling; to pursue any
avocations, an for that purpose. to enter into all contracts which may be
proper, necessary, and essential to his carrying out these purposes to a
successful conclusion. The chief elements of the guaranty are the right to
contract, the right to choose one's employment, the right to labor, and the
right of locomotion.

In general, it may be said that Liberty means the opportunity to do those

things which are ordinarily done by free men. (There can be noted
Cummings vs. Missouri [1866], 4 Wall, 277; Wilkinson vs. Leland [1829], 2
Pet., 627; Williams vs. Fears [1900], 179 U.S., 274; Allgeyer vs. Louisiana
[1896], 165, U.S., 578; State vs. Kreutzberg [1902], 114 Wis., 530. See 6
R.C.L., 258, 261.)

One thought which runs through all these different conceptions of Liberty is
plainly apparent. It is this: "Liberty" as understood in democracies, is not
license; it is "Liberty regulated by law." Implied in the term is restraint by law
for the good of the individual and for the greater good of the peace and order
of society and the general well-being. No man can do exactly as he pleases.
Every man must renounce unbridled license. The right of the individual is
necessarily subject to reasonable restraint by general law for the common
good. Whenever and wherever the natural rights of citizen would, if exercises
without restraint, deprive other citizens of rights which are also and equally
natural, such assumed rights must yield to the regulation of law. The Liberty
of the citizens may be restrained in the interest of the public health, or of the
public order and safety, or otherwise within the proper scope of the police
power. (See Hall vs. Geiger-Jones [1916], 242 U.S., 539; Hardie-Tynes
Manufacturing Co. vs. Cruz [1914], 189 Al., 66.)

None of the rights of the citizen can be taken away except by due process of
law. Daniel Webster, in the course of the argument in the Dartmouth College
Case before the United States Supreme Court, since a classic in forensic
literature, said that the meaning of "due process of law" is, that "every citizen
shall hold his life, liberty, property, an immunities under the protection of the
general rules which govern society." To constitute "due process of law," as
has been often held, a judicial proceeding is not always necessary. In some
instances, even a hearing and notice are not requisite a rule which is
especially true where much must be left to the discretion of the administrative
officers in applying a law to particular cases. (See McGehee, Due Process of
Law, p. 371.) Neither is due process a stationary and blind sentinel of liberty.
"Any legal proceeding enforced by public authority, whether sanctioned by
age and customs, or newly devised in the discretion of the legislative power,
in furtherance of the public good, which regards and preserves these
principles of liberty and justice, must be held to be due process of law."
(Hurtado vs.California [1883], 110, U.S., 516.) "Due process of law" means
simply . . . "first, that there shall be a law prescribed in harmony with the
general powers of the legislative department of the Government; second, that
this law shall be reasonable in its operation; third, that it shall be enforced
according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed; and fourth, that it
shall be applicable alike to all the citizens of the state or to all of a class."
(U.S. vs. Ling Su Fan [1908], 10 Phil., 104, affirmed on appeal to the United
States Supreme Court. 1) "What is due process of law depends on
circumstances. It varies with the subject-matter and necessities of the
situation." (Moyer vs. Peablody [1909], 212 U. S., 82.)
The pledge that no person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws is
not infringed by a statute which is applicable to all of a class. The
classification must have a reasonable basis and cannot be purely arbitrary in
nature.

We break off with the foregoing statement, leaving the logical deductions to
be made later on.

D. SLAVERY AND INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE.

The fourth constitutional contention of petitioner relates to the Thirteen

Amendment to the United States Constitution particularly as found in those
portions of Philippine Organic Law providing "That slavery shall not exist in
said Islands; nor shall involuntary servitude exist except as a punishment for
crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted." It is quite possible
that the Thirteenth Amendment, since reaching to "any place subject to" the
"jurisdiction" of the United States, has force in the Philippine. However this
may be, the Philippine Legislature has, by adoption, with necessary
modifications, of sections 268 to 271 inclusive of the United States Criminal
Code, prescribed the punishment for these crimes. Slavery and involuntary
servitude, together wit their corollary, peonage, all denote "a condition of
enforced, compulsory service of one to another." (Hodges vs. U.S. [1906],
203 U.S., 1.) The term of broadest scope is possibly involuntary servitude. It
has been applied to any servitude in fact involuntary, no matter under what
form such servitude may have been disguised. (Bailey vs. Alabama [1910],
219 U.S., 219.)

So much for an analysis of those constitutional provisions on which

petitioners rely for their freedom. Next must come a description of the police
power under which the State must act if section 2145 is to be held valid.

E. THE POLICE POWER.

Not attempting to phrase a definition of police power, all that it is necessary

to note at this moment is the farreaching scope of the power, that it has
become almost possible to limit its weep, and that among its purposes is the
power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, peace, morals,
education, and good order of the people, and to legislate so as to increase
the industries of the State, develop its resources and add to is wealth and
prosperity. (See Barbier vs. Connolly [1884], 113 U.S., 27.) What we are not
interested in is the right of the government to restrain liberty by the exercise
of the police power.

"The police power of the State," one court has said, . . . "is a power
coextensive with self-protection, and is not inaptly termed the 'law of
overruling necessity.' It may be said to be that inherent and plenary power in
the State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety
and welfare of society." (Lake View vs. Rose Hill Cemetery Co. [1873], 70 Ill.,
191.) Carried onward by the current of legislation, the judiciary rarely attempt
to dam the on rushing power of legislative discretion, provided the purposes
of the law do not go beyond the great principles that mean security for the
public welfare or do not arbitrarily interfere with the right of the individual.

The Government of the Philippine Islands has both on reason and authority
the right to exercise the sovereign police power in the promotion of the
general welfare and the public interest. "There can be not doubt that the
exercise of the police power of the Philippine Government belongs to the
Legislature and that this power is limited only by the Acts of Congress and
those fundamental principles which lie at the foundation of all republican
forms of government." (Churchill and Tait vs. Rafferty [1915], 32 Phil., 580;
U.S. vs. Pompeya [1915], 31 Phil., 245.)

With the foregoing approximation of the applicable basic principles before us,
before finally deciding whether any constitutional provision has indeed been
violated by section 2145 of the Administrative Code, we should endeavor to
ascertain the intention of the Legislature in enacting this section. If legally
possible, such legislative intention should be effectuated.

F. LEGISLATIVE INTENT.

The preamble of the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro which set
apart the Tigbao reservation, it will be remembered, assigned as reasons fort
the action, the following: (1) The failure of former attempts for the
advancement of the non-Christian people of the province; and (2) the only
successfully method for educating the Manguianes was to oblige them to live
in a permanent settlement. The Solicitor-General adds the following; (3) The
protection of the Manguianes; (4) the protection of the public forests in which
they roam; (5) the necessity of introducing civilized customs among the
Manguianes.

The present Secretary of the Interior says of the Tigbao reservation and of
the motives for its selection, the following:

To inform himself of the conditions of those Manguianes who were taken

together to Tigbao, the Secretary of the Interior on June 10 to 13, 1918, made
a trip to the place. There he found that the site selected is a good one; that
creditable progress has been made in the clearing of forests, construction of
buildings, etc., that there appears to be encouraging reaction by the boys to
the work of the school the requirements of which they appear to meet with
enthusiastic interest after the first weeks which are necessarily a somewhat
trying period for children wholly unaccustomed to orderly behaviour and habit
of life. He also gathered the impression that the results obtained during the
period of less than one year since the beginning of the institution definitely
justify its continuance and development.

Of course, there were many who were protesting against that segregation.
Such was naturally to be expected. But the Secretary of the Interior, upon his
return to Manila, made the following statement to the press:

"It is not deemed wise to abandon the present policy over those who prefer
to live a nomadic life and evade the influence of civilization. The Government
will follow its policy to organize them into political communities and to educate
their children with the object of making them useful citizens of this country.
To permit them to live a wayfaring life will ultimately result in a burden to the
state and on account of their ignorance, they will commit crimes and make
depredation, or if not they will be subject to involuntary servitude by those
who may want to abuse them."

The Secretary of the Interior, who is the official charged with the supervision
of all the non-Christian people, has adopted as the polaris of his
administration — "the advancement of the non-Christian elements of our
population to equality and unification with the highly civilized Christian
inhabitants." This is carried on by the adoption of the following measures:

(a) Pursuance of the closer settlement policy whereby people of

seminomadic race are induced to leave their wild habitat and settle in
organized communities.

(b) The extension of the public school system and the system of public health
throughout the regions inhabited by the non-Christian people.

(c) The extention of public works throughout the Mohammedan regions to

facilitate their development and the extention of government control.

(d) Construction of roads and trials between one place and another among
non-Christians, to promote social and commercial intercourse and maintain
amicable relations among them and with the Christian people.

(e) Pursuance of the development of natural economic resources, especially

agriculture.

( f ) The encouragement of immigration into, and of the investment of private

capital in, the fertile regions of Mindanao and Sulu.

The Secretary adds:

To attain the end desired, work of a civilizing influence have been continued
among the non-Christian people. These people are being taught and guided
to improve their living conditions in order that they may fully appreciate the
benefits of civilization. Those of them who are still given to nomadic habits
are being persuaded to abandon their wild habitat and settle in organized
settlements. They are being made to understand that it is the purpose of the
Government to organize them politically into fixed and per manent
communities, thus bringing them under the control of the Government, to aid
them to live and work, protect them from involuntary servitude and abuse,
educate their children, and show them the advantages of leading a civilized
life with their civilized brothers. In short, they are being impressed with the
purposes and objectives of the Government of leading them to economic,
social, and political equality, and unification with the more highly civilized
inhabitants of the country. (See Report of the Department for 1917.)

The fundamental objective of governmental policy is to establish friendly

relations with the so-called non-Christians, and to promote their educational,
agricultural, industrial, and economic development and advancement in
civilization. (Note Acts Nos. 2208, 2404, 2444.) Act No. 2674 in reestablishing
the Bureau of non-Christian Tribes, defines the aim of the Government
towards the non-Christian people in the following unequivocal terms:

It shall be the duty of the Bureau of non-Christian Tribes to continue the work
for advancement and liberty in favor of the region inhabited by non-Christian
Filipinos and foster by all adequate means and in a systematical, rapid, and
complete manner the moral, material, economic, social, and political
development of those regions, always having in view the aim of rendering
permanent the mutual intelligence between, and complete fusion of, all the
Christian and non-Christian elements populating the provinces of the
Archipelago. (Sec. 3.)

May the Manguianes not be considered, as are the Indians in the United
States, proper wards of the Filipino people? By the fostering care of a wise
Government, may not these unfortunates advance in the "habits and arts of
civilization?" Would it be advisable for the courts to intrude upon a plan,
carefully formulated, and apparently working out for the ultimate good of
these people?

In so far as the Manguianes themselves are concerned, the purpose of the

Government is evident. Here, we have on the Island of Mindoro, the
Manguianes, leading a nomadic life, making depredations on their more
fortunate neighbors, uneducated in the ways of civilization, and doing nothing
for the advancement of the Philippine Islands. What the Government wished
to do by bringing than into a reservation was to gather together the children
for educational purposes, and to improve the health and morals — was in
fine, to begin the process of civilization. this method was termed in Spanish
times, "bringing under the bells." The same idea adapted to the existing
situation, has been followed with reference to the Manguianes and other
peoples of the same class, because it required, if they are to be improved,
that they be gathered together. On these few reservations there live under
restraint in some cases, and in other instances voluntarily, a few thousands
of the uncivilized people. Segregation really constitutes protection for the
manguianes.

Theoretically, one may assert that all men are created free and equal.
Practically, we know that the axiom is not precisely accurate. The
Manguianes, for instance, are not free, as civilized men are free, and they
are not the equals of their more fortunate brothers. True, indeed, they are
citizens, with many but not all the rights which citizenship implies. And true,
indeed, they are Filipinos. But just as surely, the Manguianes are citizens of
a low degree of intelligence, and Filipinos who are a drag upon the progress
of the State.

In so far as the relation of the Manguianes to the State is concerned, the

purposes of the Legislature in enacting the law, and of the executive branch
in enforcing it, are again plain. Settlers in Mindoro must have their crops and
persons protected from predatory men, or they will leave the country. It is no
argument to say that such crimes are punished by the Penal Code, because
these penalties are imposed after commission of the offense and not before.
If immigrants are to be encouraged to develop the resources of the great
Islands of Mindoro, and its, as yet, unproductive regions, the Government
must be in a position to guarantee peace and order.

Waste lands do not produce wealth. Waste people do not advance the
interest of the State. Illiteracy and thriftlessness are not conducive to
homogeneity. The State to protect itself from destruction must prod on the
laggard and the sluggard. The great law of overwhelming necessity is all
convincing.

To quote again from the instructive memorandum of the Secretary of the

Interior:

Living a nomadic and a wayfaring life and evading the influence of civilization,
they (the manguianes) are engaged in the works of destruction — burning
and destroying the forests and making illegal caiñgins thereon. Not bringing
any benefit to the State but instead injuring and damaging its interests, what
will ultimately become of these people with the sort of liberty they wish to
preserve and for which they are now fighting in court? They will ultimately
become a heavy burden to the State and on account of their ignorance they
will commit crimes and make depredations, or if not they will be subjected to
involuntary servitude by those who may want to abuse them.

There is no doubt in my mind that this people a right conception of liberty and
does not practice liberty in a rightful way. They understand liberty as the right
to do anything they will — going from one place to another in the mountains,
burning and destroying forests and making illegal caiñgins thereon.

Not knowing what true liberty is and not practising the same rightfully, how
can they allege that they are being deprived thereof without due process of
law?

xxx xxx xxx

But does the Constitutional guaranty that 'no person shall be deprived of his
liberty without due process of law' apply to a class of persons who do not
have a correct idea of what liberty is and do not practise liberty in a rightful
way?

To say that it does will mean to sanction and defend an erroneous idea of
such class of persons as to what liberty is. It will mean, in the case at bar,
that the Government should not adopt any measures looking to the welfare
and advancement of the class of persons in question. It will mean that this
people should be let along in the mountains and in a permanent state of
savagery without even the remotest hope of coming to understand liberty in
its true and noble sense.

In dealing with the backward population, like the Manguianes, the

Government has been placed in the alternative of either letting them alone or
guiding them in the path of civilization. The latter measure was adopted as
the one more in accord with humanity and with national conscience.

xxx xxx xxx

The national legislation on the subject of non-Christian people has tended
more and more towards the education and civilization of such people and
fitting them to be citizens. The progress of those people under the tutelage
of the Government is indeed encouraging and the signs of the times point to
a day which is not far distant when they will become useful citizens. In the
light of what has already been accomplished which has been winning the
gratitude of most of the backward people, shall we give up the noble work
simply because a certain element, believing that their personal interests
would be injured by such a measure has come forward and challenged the
authority of the Government to lead this people in the pat of civilization? Shall
we, after expending sweat, treasure, and even blood only to redeem this
people from the claws of ignorance and superstition, now willingly retire
because there has been erroneously invoked in their favor that Constitutional
guaranty that no person shall be deprived of his liberty without due process
of law? To allow them to successfully invoke that Constitutional guaranty at
this time will leave the Government without recourse to pursue the works of
civilizing them and making them useful citizens. They will thus left in a
permanent state of savagery and become a vulnerable point to attack by
those who doubt, nay challenge, the ability of the nation to deal with our
backward brothers.

The manguianes in question have been directed to live together at Tigbao.

There they are being taught and guided to improve their living conditions.
They are being made to understand that they object of the government is to
organize them politically into fixed and permanent communities. They are
being aided to live and work. Their children are being educated in a school
especially established for them. In short, everything is being done from them
in order that their advancement in civilization and material prosperity may be
assured. Certainly their living together in Tigbao does not make them slaves
or put them in a condition compelled to do services for another. They do not
work for anybody but for themselves. There is, therefore, no involuntary
servitude.

But they are compelled to live there and prohibited from emigrating to some
other places under penalty of imprisonment. Attention in this connection is
invited to the fact that this people, living a nomadic and wayfaring life, do not
have permanent individual property. They move from one place to another
as the conditions of living warrants, and the entire space where they are
roving about is the property of the nation, the greater part being lands of
public domain. Wandering from one place to another on the public lands, why
can not the government adopt a measure to concentrate them in a certain
fixed place on the public lands, instead of permitting them to roam all over
the entire territory? This measure is necessary both in the interest of the
public as owner of the lands about which they are roving and for the proper
accomplishment of the purposes and objectives of the government. For as
people accustomed to nomadic habit, they will always long to return to the
mountains and follow a wayfaring life, and unless a penalty is provinced for,
you can not make them live together and the noble intention of the
Government of organizing them politically will come to naught.

G. APPLICATION AND CONCLUSION.

Our exhaustive study should have left us in a position to answer specific

objections and to reach a general conclusion.

In the first place, it is argued that the citizen has the right, generally speaking,
to go where he pleases. Could be not, however, be kept away from certain
localities ? To furnish an example from the Indian legislation. The early Act
of Congress of 1802 (2 U.S. Stat. at L., p. 141) Indian reservation. Those
citizens certainly did not possess absolute freedom of locomotion. Again the
same law provided for the apprehension of marauding Indians. Without any
doubt, this law and other similar were accepted and followed time and again
without question.

It is said that, if we hold this section to be constitutional, we leave this weak

and defenseless people confined as in a prison at the mercy of unscrupulous
official. What, it is asked, would be the remedy of any oppressed Manguian?
The answer would naturally be that the official into whose hands are given
the enforcement of the law would have little or not motive to oppress these
people; on the contrary, the presumption would all be that they would
endeavor to carry out the purposes of the law intelligently and patriotically. If,
indeed, they did ill-treat any person thus confined, there always exists the
power of removal in the hands of superior officers, and the courts are always
open for a redress of grievances. When, however, only the validity of the law
is generally challenged and no particular case of oppression is called to the
attention of the courts, it would seems that the Judiciary should not
unnecessarily hamper the Government in the accomplishment of its laudable
purpose.

The question is above all one of sociology. How far, consistently with
freedom, may the right and liberties of the individual members of society be
subordinated to the will of the Government? It is a question which has
assailed the very existence of government from the beginning of time. Now
purely an ethical or philosophical subject, nor now to be decided by force, it
has been transferred to the peaceful forum of the Judiciary. In resolving such
an issue, the Judiciary must realize that the very existence of government
renders imperatives a power to restrain the individual to some extent,
dependent, of course, on the necessities of the class attempted to be
benefited. As to the particular degree to which the Legislature and the
Executive can go in interfering with the rights of the citizen, this is, and for a
along time to come will be, impossible for the courts to determine.

The doctrines of laissez faire and of unrestricted freedom of the individual,

as axioms of economics and political theory, are of the past. The modern
period has shown as widespread belief in the amplest possible
demonstration of governmental activity. The courts unfortunately have
sometimes seemed to trial after the other two branches of the government in
this progressive march.

Considered, therefore, purely as an exercise of the police power, the courts

cannot fairly say that the Legislature has exceeded its rightful authority. it is,
indeed, an unusual exercise of that power. But a great malady requires an
equally drastic remedy.

Further, one cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered
without when the degree of civilization of the Manguianes is considered. They
are restrained for their own good and the general good of the Philippines. Nor
can one say that due process of law has not been followed. To go back to
our definition of due process of law and equal protection of the law, there
exists a law ; the law seems to be reasonable; it is enforced according to the
regular methods of procedure prescribed; and it applies alike to all of a class.

As a point which has been left for the end of this decision and which, in case
of doubt, would lead to the determination that section 2145 is valid. it the
attitude which the courts should assume towards the settled policy of the
Government. In a late decision with which we are in full accord,
Gambles vs. Vanderbilt University (200 Southwestern Reporter, 510) the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Tennessee writes:

We can seen objection to the application of public policy as a ratio decidendi.

Every really new question that comes before the courts is, in the last analysis,
determined on that theory, when not determined by differentiation of the
principle of a prior case or line of cases, or by the aid of analogies furnished
by such prior case. In balancing conflicting solutions, that one is perceived to
tip the scales which the court believes will best promote the public welfare in
its probable operation as a general rule or principle. But public policy is not a
thing inflexible. No court is wise enough to forecast its influence in all possible
contingencies. Distinctions must be made from time to time as sound reason
and a true sense of justice may dictate."

Our attempt at giving a brief history of the Philippines with reference to the
so-called non-Christians has been in vain, if we fail to realize that a consistent
governmental policy has been effective in the Philippines from early days to
the present. The idea to unify the people of the Philippines so that they may
approach the highest conception of nationality. If all are to be equal before
the law, all must be approximately equal in intelligence. If the Philippines is
to be a rich and powerful country, Mindoro must be populated, and its fertile
regions must be developed. The public policy of the Government of the
Philippine Islands is shaped with a view to benefit the Filipino people as a
whole. The Manguianes, in order to fulfill this governmental policy, must be
confined for a time, as we have said, for their own good and the good of the
country.

Most cautiously should the power of this court to overrule the judgment of the
Philippine Legislature, a coordinate branch, be exercised. The whole
tendency of the best considered case is toward non-interference on the part
of the courts whenever political ideas are the moving consideration. Justice
Holmes, in one of the aphorisms for which he is justly famous, said that
"constitutional law, like other mortal contrivances, has to take some
chances." (Blinn vs.Nelson [1911], 222 U.S., 1.) If in the final decision of the
many grave questions which this case presents, the courts must take "a
chance," it should be with a view to upholding the law, with a view to the
effectuation of the general governmental policy, and with a view to the court's
performing its duty in no narrow and bigoted sense, but with that broad
conception which will make the courts as progressive and effective a force
as are the other departments of the Government.

We are of the opinion that action pursuant to section 2145 of the

Administrative Code does not deprive a person of his liberty without due
process of law and does not deny to him the equal protection of the laws, and
that confinement in reservations in accordance with said section does not
constitute slavery and involuntary servitude. We are further of the opinion
that section 2145 of the Administrative Code is a legitimate exertion of the
police power, somewhat analogous to the Indian policy of the United States.
Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is constitutional.

Petitioners are not unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of their liberty. Habeas

corpus can, therefore, not issue. This is the true ruling of the court. Costs
shall be taxes against petitioners. So ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Torres and Avanceña, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

CARSON, J., concurring:

I fully concur in the reasoning and the conclusions of Justice Malcolm as set
forth in the prevailing, opinion.

The words "non-Christian' have a clear, definite and well settled signification
when used in the Philippine statute-book as a descriptive adjective, applied
to "tribes," "people," or "inhabitants," dwelling in more or less remote districts
and provinces throughout the Islands.

Justice Malcolm, as I think, correctly finds that these words, as used in this
connection in our statute-book, denote the 'low grace of civilization" of the
individuals included in the class to which they are applied. To this I would add
that the tests for the determination of the fact that an individual or tribes is, or
is not of the "non-Christian" are, and throughout the period of American
occupation always have been, "the mode of life, the degree of advancement
in civilization, and connection or lack of connection with some civilized
community." (Cf. letter of Collector of Internal Revenue dated September 17,
1910, and set out in the principal opinion.)

The legislative and administrative history of the Philippine Islands clearly

discloses that the standard of civilization to which a specific tribe must be
found to have advanced, to justify its removal from the class embraces with
the descriptive term "non-Christian," as that term is used in the Philippine
statute-book, is that degree of civilization which results in a mode of life within
the tribe, such that it is feasible and practicable to extend to, and enforce
upon its membership the general laws and regulations, administrative,
legislative, and judicial, which control the conduct of the admitted civilized
inhabitants of the Islands; a made of life, furthermore, which does not find
expression in tribal customs or practices which tend to brutalize or debauch
the members of the tribe indulging in such customs or practices, or to expose
to loss or peril the lives or property of those who may be brought in contact
with members of the tribe.

So the standard of civilization to which any given number or group of

inhabitants of particular province in these Islands, or any individual member
of such a group, must be found to have advanced, in order to remove such
group or individual from the class embraced within the statutory description
of "non-Christian," is that degree of civilization which would naturally and
normally result in the withdrawal by such persons of permanent allegiance or
adherence to a "non-Christian" tribe, had they at any time adhered to or
maintained allegiance to such a tribe; and which would qualify them whether
they reside within or beyond the habitat of a "non-Christian" tribe, not only to
maintain a mode of life independent of a apart from that maintain by such
tribe, but a mode of life as would not be inimical to the lives or property or
general welfare of the civilized inhabitants of the Islands with whom they are
brought in contact.

The contention that, in this particular case, and without challenging the
validity of the statute, the writ should issue because of the failure to give these
petitioners, as well as the rest of the fifteen thousand Manguianes affected
by the reconcentration order, an opportunity to be heard before any attempt
was made to enforce it, begs the question and is, of course, tantamount to a
contention that there is no authority in law for the issuance of such an order.

If the fifteen thousand manguianes affected by the order complained of had

attained that degree of civilization which would have made it practicable to
serve notice upon, and give an opportunity for a real hearing, to all the
members of the tribe affected by the order, it may well be doubted whether
the provincial board and the Secretary of the Interior would have been
justified in its enforcement By what proceeding known to the law, or to be
specially adopted in a particular case, could the offices of any province
provide for a genuine hearing upon a proposal to issue a reconcentration
order upon a head-hunting tribe in the north of the Island of Luzon; or upon
one of the nomadic tribes whose habitat is in the mountain fastnesses of
Mindanao, and whose individual members have no fixed or known place of
residence, or upon the fifteen thousand Manguianes roaming in the wilds of
Mindoro.

Of course, friendly headmen or chief might and, as a rule, should be

consulted, after the practice in the United States when tribes or groups of
American Indians have been placed upon reservations; but since non-
Christian head men and chiefs in the Philippines have no lawful authority to
bind their acts or their consent, the objection based on lack of a hearing,
would have the same force whether the issuance of a reconcentration order
was or was not preceded by a pow-wow of this kind.

The truth of the mater is that the power to provide for the issuance of such
orders rests upon analogous principles to those upon which the liberty and
freedom or action of children and persons of unsound minds is restrained,
without consulting their wishes, but for their own good and the general
welfare. The power rests upon necessity, that "great master of all things," and
is properly exercised only where certain individuals or groups of individual
are found to be of such a low grade of civilization that their own wishes cannot
be permitted to determine their mode of life or place of residence.

The status of the non-Christian inhabitants of these Islands, and the special
and necessarily paternal attitude assume toward them by the Insular
Government is well illustrated by the following provisions found in the
Administrative Code of 1917:

SEC. 705. Special duties and purposes of Bureau (of non-Christian tribes).
— It shall be the duty of the Bureau of non-Christian tribes to continue the
work for advancement and liberty in favor of the regions inhabited by non-
Christian Filipinos and to foster by all adequate means and in a systematic,
rapid, and completely manner the moral, material, economic, social and
political development of those regions, always having in view the aim of
rendering permanent the mutual intelligence between and complete fusion of
all the Christian and non-Christian elements populating the provinces of the
Archipelago.

SEC. 2116. Township and settlement fund. — There shall be maintained in

the provincial treasuries of the respective specially organized provinces a
special fund to be known as the township and settlement fund, which shall
be available, exclusively, for expenditures for the benefit of the townships
and settlements of the province, and non-Christian inhabitants of the
province, upon approval of the Secretary of the Interior.

As I understand it, the case at bar does not raise any real question as to the
jurisdiction of the courts of these Islands in habeas corpus proceedings, to
review the action of the administrative authorities in the enforcement of
reconcentration orders issued, under authority of section 2145 of the
Administrative Code, against a petitioner challenging the alleged fact that he
is a "non-Christian" as that term is used in the statute. I, therefore, express
no opinion on that question at this time.
JOHNSON, J., dissenting:

I dissent. The petitioners were deprived of their liberty without a hearing. That
fact is not denied. I cannot give my consent to any act which deprives the
humblest citizen of his just liberty without a hearing, whether he be a Christian
or non-Christian. All persons in the Philippine Islands are entitled to a
hearing, at least, before they are deprived of their liberty.

MOIR, J., dissenting:

I dissent.

I realize that a dissenting opinion carries little weight, but may sense of justice
will not permit me to let this decision go on record without expressing may
strong dissent from the opinion of Justice Malcolm, concurred in by a majority
of the court. I shall not attempt to analyze the opinion or to go into the
question in detail. I shall simply state, as briefly as may be, the legal and
human side of the case as it presents itself to my mind.

The facts are that one Rubi and various other Manguianes in the Province of
Mindoro were ordered by the Provincial governor of Mindoro to remove their
residence from their native habitat and to establish themselves on a
reservation at Tigbao in the Province of Mindoro and to remain there, or be
punished by imprisonment if they escaped. This reservation, as appears from
the resolution of the provincial board, extends over an area of 800 hectares
of land, which is approximately 2,000 acres, on which about three hundred
manguianes are confined. One of the Manguianes, Dabalos, escaped from
the reservation and was taken in hand by the provincial sheriff and placed in
prision at Calapan, solely because he escaped from the reservation. The
Manguianes used out a writ of habeas corpus in this court, alleging that they
are deprived of their liberty in violation of law.

The Solicitor-General of the Philippine Islands makes return to the writ copied
in the majority opinion which states that the provincial governor of Mindoro
with the prior approval of his act by the Department Secretary ordered the
placing of the petitioners and others on a reservation.
The manguianes, it is stated on page 694 of the majority opinion, "are very
low in culture. They have considerable Negrito blood and have not advanced
beyond the Negritos in civilization. They are peaceful, timid, primitive,
seminomadic people. They number approximately 15,000 (?). The
manguianes have shown no desire for community life, and, as indicated in
the preamble to Act No. 547, have no progressed sufficiently in civilization to
make it practicable to bring them under any for of municipal government."

It may be well to add that the last P.I. Census (1903) shows that the Island
of Mindoro (not including smaller islands which together make the Province
of Mindoro) has an area of 3,851 square miles and a populations of 28, 361
of which 7, 369 are wild or uncivilized tribes (Manguianes). This appears to
be the total Mangyan population of the province. The total population was
less than seven to the mile (Vol. 2, P.I. Census, pp. 30 and 407).

The Island is fertile, heavily wooded and well watered.

It has no savage population, but it is sparsely settled by Christian Filipinos

along the coast and by Manguianes.

The Manguianes roamed its mountains and valleys, fishing and hunting at
will long before Magallanes [Magellan] anchored his boats in the water of
Cebu. They have made little or no progress in the ways of civilization. "They
are a peaceful, timid, primitive, seminomadic people," whom the Government
of the Philippines Islands would bring under the beneficient influence of
civilization and progress.

The law provides for it in section 2145 of the Administrative Code, and for
those who like Dadalos do not take kindly to the ways provided for civilizing
them section 2759 provides the punishment.

The attorney for the petitioners has raised various constitutional questions,
but only the fundamental one will be considered by me. It is that the sections
of the Administrative Code, 2145 and 2759, quoted in the majority opinion,
are in violation of the first paragraph of section 3 of the Act of Congress of
August 29, 1916, which reads as follows:
That no law shall be enacted in said Islands which shall deprive any person of
life, liberty or property without due process of law, or deny to any person
therein the equal protection of the laws.

It is not necessary to argue that a Mangyan is one of the persons protected

by that provision.

The Attorney-General argues that the treatment provided for the Manguianes
is similar to that accorded the Indians in the United States, and reference is
made all through the court's decision to the decisions of the United States
Supreme Court with reference to the Indians. It is not considered necessary
to go into these cases for the simple reason that all the Indians nations in the
United States were considered as separate nations and all acts taken in
regard to them were the result of separate treaties made by the United States
Government with the Indian nations, and, incompliance with these treaties,
reservations were set apart for them on which they lived and were protected
form intrusion and molestation by white men. Some these reservations were
larger than the Islands of Luzon, and they were not measured in hectares but
in thousands of square miles.

The Manguianes are not a separate state. They have no treaty with the
Government of the Philippine Islands by which they have agreed to live within
a certain district where they are accorded exclusive rights. They are citizens
of the Philippine Islands. Legally they are Filipinos. They are entitled to all
the rights and privileges of any other citizen of this country. And when the
provincial governor of the Province of Mindoro attempted to take them from
their native habitat and to hold them on the little reservation of about 800
hectares, he deprived them of their rights and their liberty without due
process of law, and they were denied the equal protection of the law.

The majority opinion says "they are restrained for their own good and the
general good of the Philippines."

They are to be made to accept the civilization of the more advanced Filipinos
whether they want it or not. They are backward and deficient in culture and
must be moved from their homes, however humble they may be and "bought
under the bells" and made to stay on a reservation.
Are these petitioners charged with any crime? There is no mention in the
return of the Solicitor-General of the Philippine Islands of any crime having
been committed by these "peacefully, timid, primitive, semi-nomadic people."

A memorandum of the Secretary of the Interior of the Philippine Islands is

copied in extenso in the majority opinion, and from it I gather the nature of
their offense which is that —

Living a nomadic and wayfaring life and evading the influence of civilization,
they (the manguianes) are engaged in the works of destruction — burning
and destroying the forests and making illegal caiñgins thereon. No bringing
any benefit to the State but, instead, injuring and damaging its interests, what
will ultimately become of those people with the sort of liberty they wish to
preserve and for which they are not fighting in court? They will ultimately
become a heavy burden to the State and, on account of their ignorance, they
will commit crimes and make depredations, or if not they will be subjected to
involuntary servitude by those who may want to abuse them.

There is no doubt in my mind that this people has not a right conception of
liberty and does not practice liberty in a rightful way. They understand liberty
as the right to do anything they will — going from one place to another in the
mountains, burning and destroying forests and making
illegal caiñgins thereon.

Not knowing what true liberty is and not practising the same rightfully, how
can they are being deprived thereof without due process of law?

xxx xxx xxx

But does the constitutional guaranty that "no person shall be deprived of his
liberty without due process of law" apply to a class of persons who do not
have a correct idea of what liberty is and do not practise liberty in a rightful
way?

To say that it does will mean to sanction and defend an erroneous idea of
such class of persons as to what liberty is. It will mean, in the case at bar,
that the Government should not adopt any measures looking to the welfare
and advancement of the class of persons in question. It will mean that this
people be let alone in the mountains and in a permanent state of savagery
without even the remotest hope of coming to understand liberty in its true and
noble sense.

In dealing with the backward population, like the Manguianes, the

Government has been placed in the alternative of either letting them alone or
guiding them in the path of civilization. The latter measure was adopted as
the one more in accord with humanity and with national conscience.

xxx xxx xxx

The national legislation on the subject of non-Christian people has tended

more and more towards the education and civilization of such people and
fitting them to be citizens.

There appear to be two intimations or charges in this memorandum; one is

that the Manguianes destroy the forest by making a caiñgin. What is a
"caiñgin?" Simply this. These people move their camp or place of abode
frequently and when they do move to a new place, it is necessary to clear the
land in order to plant corn and camotes (sweet potatoes) and they cut down
the smaller trees and burn these around the larger ones, killing them, so that
they can plant their crops. The fires never spread in the tropical undergrowth
of an island like Mindoro, but the trees within the caiñgin are killed and crops
are planted and harvested. This land may be abandoned later on — due to
superstition, to a lack of game in the neighborhood, to poor crops from
exhausted fertility, or to a natural desire to move on.

Granting that the Manguianes do make caiñgins or clear lands in spots and
then abandon them for the more fertile lands, which every man knows to be
just over the hills, we cannot see that they are committing such a great abuse
as to justify incarcerating them on a small tract of land — for incarceration it
is and nothing less.

The second intimation or charge is that "they will become a heavy burden to
the state and on account of their ignorance they will commit crimes and make
depredations, or if not they will be subjected to involuntary servitude by those
who want to abuse them." They have never been a burden to the state and
never will be. They have not committed crimes and, when they do, let the law
punish them." The authorities are anticipating too much from these "peaceful,
timid, primitive, semi-nomadic people." Their history does not demonstrate
that we must expect them to commit crimes and jail them to prevent the
possibility. But the Secretary says "they will be subjected to involuntary
servitude by those want to abuse them." Are they more liable to be subjected
to involuntary servitude when left free to roam their native hills and gain a
livelihood as they have been accustomed to for hundreds of years, than they
will be if closely confined on a narrow reservation from which they may not
escape without facing a term in jail? Is not more likely that they will be glad
to exchange their "freedom" on a small reservation for the great boon of
binding themselves and their children to the more fortunate Christian Filipinos
who will feed them and clothe them in return of their services.?

It think it not only probable but almost a certainty that they will be all be
subjected to involuntary personal servitude if their freedom is limited as it has
been. How will they live? There may be persons who are willing to lend them
money with which to buy food on the promise that they will work for them.
And if they accept the loan and do not work for the lender we have another
law on the statute books, Act No. 2098, into whose noose they run their
necks, and they may be fined not more than two hundred pesos or
imprisonment for not exceeding six months or both, and when the sentence
expires they must again go into debt or starve, and if they do not work will
again go to jail, and this maybe repeated till they are too old to work and are
cast adrift.

The manguianes have committed no offenses and are charged with none. It
does not appear they were ever consulted about their reconcentration. It does
not appear that they had any hearing or were allowed to make any defense.
It seems they were gathered here and there whenever found by the
authorities of the law and forcibly placed upon the reservation, because they
are "non-Christian," and because the provincial governor ordered it. Let it be
clear there is no discrimination because of religion. The term "non-Christian"
means one who is not a Christian Filipino, but it also means any of the so-
called "wild" or backward tribes of the Philippines. These non-Christian tribes
are Moros, Igorrotes, Bukidnons, Ifugaos, Manguianes and various others,
about one millions souls all together. Some of them, like the Moros,
Tinguianes and Ifugaos, have made great progress in civilization. The have
beautiful fields reclaimed by hard labor — they have herds of cattle and
horses and some few of them are well educated. Some of the non-Christians,
like the Aetas and the Negritos, are very low in the scale of civilization, but
they are one and all "non-Christians," as the term is used and understood in
law and in fact.

All of them, according to the court's opinion under the present law, may be
taken from their homes and herded on a reservation at the instance of the
provincial governor, with the prior approval of the department head. To state
such a monstrous proposition is to show the wickedness and illegality of the
section of the law under which these people are restrained of their liberty. But
it is argued that there is no probability of the department head ever giving his
approval to such a crime, but the fact that he can do it and has done it in the
present case in what makes the law unconstitutional. The arbitrary and
unrestricted power to do harm should be the measure by which a law's
legality is tested and not the probability of doing harm.

It has been said that this is a government of laws and not of men; that there
is no arbitrary body of individuals; that the constitutional principles upon
which our government and its institutions rest do not leave room for the play
and action of purely personal and arbitrary power, but that all in authority are
guided and limited by these provisions which the people have, the through
the organic law, declared shall be the measure and scope of all control
exercised over them. In particular the fourteenth amendment, and especially
the equal protection clause, thereof, forbids that the individual shall be
subjected to any arbitrary exercise of the powers of government; it was
intended to prohibit, and does prohibit, any arbitrary deprivation of life or
liberty, or arbitrary spoliation of property.

As we have seen, a statute which makes a purely arbitrary or unreasonable

classification, or which singles out any particular individuals or class as the
subject of hostile and discriminating legislation, is clearly unconstitutional as
being opposed to the fourteenth amendment and especially to the equal
protection clause thereof. This is a plain case, and requires no further
discussion. (Vol. 4, Encyclopedia of U.S. Supreme Court Reports, p. 366.)
When we consider the nature and the theory of our institutions of
government, the principles upon which they are supposed to rest, and review
the history of their development, we are constrained to conclude that they do
not mean to leave room for the play and action of purely personal and
arbitrary power. Sovereignty itself is, of course, not subject to law, for its is
the author and source of law; but in our system, while sovereign powers are
delegated to the agencies of government, sovereignty itself remains with the
people, by whom and for whom all government exists and acts. And the law
is the definition and limitation of power. It is, indeed, quite true, that there
must always be lodged somewhere, and in some person or body, the
authority of final decision; and, in many cases of mere administration the
responsibility is purely political, no appeal lying except to the ultimate tribunal
of the public judgment, exercised either in the pressure of opinion or by
means of the suffrage. But the fundamental rights to life, liberty, and the
pursuit of happiness, considered as individual possessions, are secured by
those maxims of constitutional law which are the monuments showing the
victorious progress of the race in securing to men the blessings of civilization
under the reign of just and equal laws, so that, in the famous language of
Massachusetts Bill of Rights, the Government of Commonwealth "may be a
government of law and not of men." For the very idea that one man may be
compelled to hold his life, or the means of living, or any material right
essential to the enjoyment of life, at the mere will of another, seems to be
intolerable in any country where freedom prevails, as being the essence of
slavery itself. (Yick Wo vs. Hopkins, 118 U.S., 374.)

It is said that the present law is an old Act being substance Act No. 547 of
the Philippine Commission. But it has never been brought before this court
for determination of its constitutionality. No matter how beneficient the
motives of the lawmakers if the lawmakers if the law tends to deprive any
man of life, liberty, or property without due process law, it is void.

In may opinion the acts complained of which were taken in conformity with
section 2145 of the Administrative Code not only deprive these Manguianes
of their liberty, without due process of law, but will in all probability deprive
them of their life, without due process of law. History teaches that to take a
semi-nomadic tribe from their native fastnesses and to transfer them to the
narrow confines of a reservation is to invite disease an suffering and death.
From my long experience in the Islands, I should say that it would be a crime
of title less magnitude to take the Ifugaos from their mountain homes where
they have reclaimed a wilderness and made it a land of beauty and
fruitfulness and to transfer them to the more fertile, unoccupied, malaria
infested valleys which they look down upon from their fields — than it would
be to order their decapitation en masse.

There can be no denial that the Ifugaos are "non-Christians," or "wild tribes"
and are in exactly the same category as the Manguianes. If the Manguianes
may be so taken from their native habitat and reconcentrated on a
reservation — in effect an open air jail — then so may the Ifugaos, so may
the Tinguianes, who have made more progress than the Ifugaos, and so may
the Moros.

There are "non-Christian" in nearly every province in the Philippine Islands.

All of the thirty-nine governors upon the prior approval of the head of the
department, have the power under this law to take the non-Christian
inhabitants of their different provinces form their homes and put them on a
reservation for "their own good and the general good of the Philippines," and
the court will grant them no relief. These unfortunate citizens of the Philippine
Islands would hold their liberty, and their lives, may be, subject to the
unregulated discretion of the provincial governor.

And who would be safe?

After the reservation is once established might not a provincial governor

decide that some political enemy was a non-Christian, and that he would be
safer on the reservation. No matter what his education and culture, he could
have no trial, he could make no defense, the judge of the court might be in a
distant province and not within reach, and the provincial governor's fiat is
final.

The case of the United States vs. Crook (Federal Cases 14891), cited in the
majority opinion, should be quoted at length. District Judge Dundy said:

During the fifteen years in which I have been engaged in administering the
laws of my country, I have never been called upon to hear or decide a case
that appealed so strongly to my sympathy as the one now under
consideration. On the one side, we have a few of the remnants of a once
numerous and powerful, but now weak, insignificant, unlettered, and
generally despised race; and the other, we have the representative of one of
the most powerful, most enlightened, and most christianized nations of
modern times. On the one side, we have the representatives of this wasted
race coming into this national tribunal of ours, asking for justice and liberty to
enable them to adopt our boasted civilization, and to pursue the arts of peace,
which have made us great and happy as a nation; on the other side, we have
this magnificent, if not magnanimous, government, resisting this application
with the determination of sending these people back to the country which is
to them less desirable perpetual imprisonment in their own native land. But I
think it is creditable to the heart and mind of the brave and distinguished
officer who is made respondent herein to say that he has no sort of sympathy
in the business in which he is forced by his position to bear a part so
conspicuous; and, so far as I am individually concerned, I think it not improper
to say that, if the strongest possible sympathy could give the relators title to
freedom, they would have been restored to liberty the moment the arguments
in their behalf were closed. no examination or further thought would then
have been necessary or expedient. But in a country where liberty is regulated
by law, something more satisfactory and enduring than mere sympathy must
furnish and constitute the rule and basis of judicial action. It follows that this
case must be examined and decided on principles of law, and that unless the
relators are entitled to their discharge under the constitution or laws of the
United States, or some treaty, they must be remanded to the custody of the
officer who caused their arrest, to be returned to the Indian Territory which
they left without the consent of the government.

On the 8th of April, 1879, the relators Standing Bear and twenty-five others,
during the session of the court held at that time of Lincoln, presented their
petition, duly verified, praying for the allowance of a writ of habeas
corpus and their final discharged from custody thereunder.

The petition alleges, in substance, that the relators are Indians who have
formerly belonged to the Ponca tribe of Indians now located in the Indian
Territory; that they had some time previously withdrawn from the tribe, and
completely severed their tribal relations therewith, and had adopted the
general habits of the whites, and were then endeavoring to maintain
themselves by their own exertions, and without aid or assistance from the
general government; that whilst they were thus engaged, and without being
guilty of violating any of the laws of the United States, they were arrested and
restrained of their liberty by order of the respondent, George Crook.

The writ was issued and served on the respondent on the 8th day of April,
and, the distance between the place where the writ was made returnable and
the place where the relators were confined being more than twenty miles, ten
days were alloted in which to make return.

On the 18th of April the writ was returned, and the authority for the arrest and
detention is therein shown. The substance of the return to the writ, and the
additional statement since filed, is that the relators are individual members
of, and connected with, the Ponca Tribe of Indians; that they had fled or
escaped from a reservation situated in some place within the limits of the
indian Territory — had departed therefrom without permission from the
government; and, at the request of the secretary of the interior, the general
of the army had issued an order which required the respondent to arrest and
return the relators to their tribe in the Indian Territory, and that, pursuant to
the said order, he had caused the relators to be arrested on the Omaha
Indian reservation, and that they were in his custody for the purpose of being
returned to the Indian Territory.

It is claimed upon the one side, and denied upon the other, that the relators
had withdrawn and severed, for all time, their connection with the tribe to
which they belonged; and upon this point alone was there any testimony
produced by either party hereto. The other matter stated in the petition and
the return to the writ are conceded to be true; so that the questions to be
determined are purely questions of law.

On the 8th of Mar, 1859, a treaty was made by the United States with the
Ponca tribe of Indians, by which a certain tract of country, north of the
Niobrara river and west of the Missouri, was set apart for the permanent
home of the aid Indians, in which the government agreed to protect them
during their good behaviour. But just when or how, or why, or under what
circumstances, the Indians left their reservation in Dakota and went to the
Indian Territory does not appear.

xxx xxx xxx

A question of much greater importance remains for consideration, which,

when determined, will be decisive of this whole controversy. This relates to
the right of the government to arrest and hold the relators for a time, for the
purpose of being returned to a point in the Indian Territory from which it is
alleged the Indians escaped. I am not vain enough to think that I can do full
justice to a question like the one under consideration. But, as the mater
furnishes so much valuable material for discussion, and so much food for
reflection, I shall try to present it as viewed from my own standpoint, without
reference to consequences or criticisms, which, though not specially invited,
will be sure to follow.

xxx xxx xxx

On the 15th day of August, 1876, congress passed the general Indian
appropriation bill, and in it we find a provision authorizing the secretary of the
interior to use $25,000 for the removal of the Poncas to the Indian Territory,
and providing them a home therein, with consent of the tribe. (19 Sta., 192.)

xxx xxx xxx

The Poncas lived upon their reservation in southern Dakota, and cultivated a
portion of the same, until two or three years ago, when they removed
therefrom, but whether by force or otherwise does not appear. At all event,
we find a portion of them, including the relators, located at some point in the
Indian Territory. There, the testimony seems to show, is where the trouble
commenced. Standing Bear, the principal witness, states that out of five
hundred and eighty-one Indians who went from the reservation in Dakota to
the Indian Territory, one hundred and fifty-eight died within a year or so, and
a great proportion of the others were sick and disabled, caused, in a great
measure, no doubt, from change of climate; and to save himself and the
survivors of his wasted family, and the feeble remnant of his little band of
followers, he determined to leave the Indian Territory and return to his old
home, where, to use his own language, "he might live and die in peace, and
be buried with his fathers." He also stated that he informed the agent of their
final purpose to leave, never to return, and that he and his followers had
finally, fully, and forever severed his and their connection with the Ponca tribe
of Indians, and had resolved to disband as a tribe, or band of Indians, and to
cut loose from the government, go to work, become self-sustaining, and
adopt the habits and customs of a higher civilization. To accomplish what
would seem to be a desirable and laudable purpose, all who were able to do
so went to work to earn a living. The Omaha Indians, who speak the same
language, and with whom many of the Poncas have long continued to
intermarry, gave them employment and ground to cultivate, so as to make
them self-sustaining. And it was when at the Omaha reservation, and when
thus employed, that they were arrested by order of the government, for the
purpose of being taken back to the Indian Territory. They claim to be unable
to see the justice, or reason, or wisdom, or necessity, of removing them by
force from their own native plains and blood relations to a far-off country, in
which they can see little but new-made graves opening for their reception.
The land from which they fled in fear has no attractions for them. The love of
home and native land was strong enough in the minds of these people to
induce them to brave every peril to return and live and die where they had
been reared. The bones of the dead son of Standing Bear were not to repose
in the land they hoped to be leaving forever, but were carefully preserved and
protected and formed a part of what was to them melancholy procession
homeward. Such instances of parental affections, and such love home and
native land, may be heathen in origin, but it seems to that they are not unlike
Christian in principle.

And the court declared that the Indians were illegally held by authority of the
United States and in violation of their right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness, and ordered their release from custody.

This case is very similarly to the case of Standing Bear and others.

I think this Court should declare that section 2145 and 2759 of the
Administrative Code of 1917 are unconstitutional, null and void, and that the
petitioners are illegally restrained of their liberty, and that they have been
denied the equal protection of the law, and order the respondents
immediately to liberate all of the petitioners.
 [G.R. No. 141463. August 6, 2002]

VICTOR ORQUIOLA and HONORATA

ORQUIOLA, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF
APPEALS, HON. VIVENCIO S. BACLIG,
Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch
77, Quezon City, THE SHERIFF OF QUEZON
CITY and HIS/HER DEPUTIES and PURA KALAW
LEDESMA, substituted by TANDANG SORA
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:

This petition for review seeks the reversal of the

decision[1] of the Court of Appeals dated January 28, 1999 in
CA-G.R. SP No. 47422, which dismissed the petition to
prohibit Judge Vivencio Baclig of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 77, from issuing a writ of demolition
against petitioners, and the sheriff and deputy sheriff of the
same court from implementing an alias writ of execution. Also
assailed is the resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals dated
December 29, 1999 which denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration.
 The facts are as follows:
Pura Kalaw Ledesma was the registered owner of Lot 689,
covered by TCT Nos. 111267 and 111266, in Tandang Sora,
Quezon City. This parcel of land was adjacent to certain
portions of Lot 707 of the Piedad Estates, namely, Lot 707-A
and 707-B, registered in the name of Herminigilda Pedro
under TCT Nos. 16951 and 16952, respectively. On October
29, 1964, Herminigilda sold Lot 707-A and 707-B to Mariano
Lising who then registered both lots and Lot 707-C in the
name of M.B. Lising Realty and subdivided them into smaller
lots.
Certain portions of the subdivided lots were sold to third
persons including herein petitioners, spouses Victor and
Honorata Orquiola, who purchased a portion of Lot 707-A-2,
Lot 5, Block 1 of the subdivision plan (LRC), Psd-42965. The
parcel is now #33 Doa Regina St., Regina Village, Tandang
Sora, Quezon City. The other portions were registered in the
name of the heirs of Pedro, heirs of Lising, and other third
persons.
Sometime in 1969, Pura Kalaw Ledesma filed a complaint,
docketed as Civil Case No. Q-12918, with the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City against Herminigilda Pedro and
Mariano Lising for allegedly encroaching upon Lot
689. During the pendency of the action, Tandang Sora
Development Corporation replaced Pura Kalaw Ledesma as
plaintiff by virtue of an assignment of Lot 689 made by
Ledesma in favor of said corporation. Trial continued for three
decades.
 On August 21, 1991, the trial court finally adjudged
defendants Pedro and Lising jointly and severally liable for
encroaching on plaintiffs land and ordered them:
(a) to solidarily pay the plaintiff Tandang Sora Dev. Corp. actual
damages in the amount of P20,000 with interest from date of filing
of the complaint;
(b) to remove all construction, including barbed wires and fences,
illegally constructed by defendants on plaintiffs property at
defendants expense;
(c) to replace the removed concrete monuments removed by
defendants, at their own expense;
(d) to pay attorneys fees in the amount of FIVE THOUSAND
PESOS (P5,000.00) with interest computed from the date of filing
of the complaint;
(e) to relocate the boundaries to conform with the Commissioners
Report, particularly, Annexes A and B thereof, at the expense of
the defendants.[3]
As a result, in February 1998, the Deputy Sheriff of Quezon
City directed petitioners, through an alias writ of execution, to
remove the house they constructed on the land they were
occupying.
On April 2, 1998, petitioners received a Special Order
dated March 30, 1998, from the trial court stating as follows:
Before the Court for resolution is the Ex-Parte Motion For The
Issuance of A Writ of Demolition, filed by plaintiff, through
counsel, praying for the issuance of an Order directing the Deputy
Sheriff to cause the removal and/or demolition of the structures on
the plaintiffs property constructed by defendants and/or the present
occupants. The defendants-heirs of Herminigilda Pedro filed their
comment on the said Motion.
Considering that the decision rendered in the instant case had
become final and executory, the Court, in its Order of November
14, 1997, directed the issuance of an alias writ of execution for the
enforcement of the said decision. However, despite the service of
the said writ to all the defendants and the present occupants of the
subject property, they failed to comply therewith, as per the Partial
Sheriffs Return, dated February 9, 1998, issued by the Deputy
Sheriff of this branch of the Court. Thus, there is now a need to
demolish the structures in order to implement the said decision.
WHEREFORE, the defendants are hereby directed to remove, at
their expense, all constructions, including barbed wires and fences,
which defendants constructed on plaintiffs property, within fifteen
(15) days from notice of this Order; otherwise, this Court will
issue a writ of demolition against them.
SO ORDERED.[4]
To prohibit Judge Vivencio Baclig of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City from issuing a writ of demolition and the
Quezon City sheriff from implementing the alias writ of
execution, petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals a petition
for prohibition with prayer for a restraining order and
preliminary injunction on April 17, 1998.[5] Petitioners alleged
that they bought the subject parcel of land in good faith and
for value, hence, they were parties in interest. Since they were
not impleaded in Civil Case No. Q-12918, the writ of
demolition issued in connection therewith cannot be enforced
against them because to do so would amount to deprivation
of property without due process of law.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition on January 28,
1999. It held that as buyers and successors-in-interest of
Mariano Lising, petitioners were considered privies who
derived their rights from Lising by virtue of the sale and could
be reached by the execution order in Civil Case No. Q-12918.
Thus, for lack of merit, the petition was ordered dismissed.[6]
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence,
this petition, where petitioners aver that:
I.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN

HOLDING THAT THE DECISION IN CIVIL CASE NO. Q-
12918 CAN ALSO BE ENFORCED AGAINST THE
PETITIONERS EVEN IF THEY WERE NOT IMPLEADED AS
PARTIES THERETO.
II.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT

UPHOLDING PETITIONERS TITLE DESPITE THEIR BEING
BUILDER IN GOOD FAITH AND INNOCENT PURCHASER
AND FOR VALUE.
III.

PETITIONERS ARE ENTITLED TO INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

CONSIDERING THAT THEY STAND TO SUFFER GRAVE
AND IRREPARABLE INJURY IF ALIAS WRIT OF
EXECUTION AND THE SPECIAL ORDER ISSUED BY THE
COURT A QUO IN CIVIL CASE NO. Q-12918 FOR THE
DEMOLITION OF ALL THE STRUCTURES ON THE
DISPUTED PROPERTY WERE ENFORCED AGAINST THE
PETITIONERS WHO WERE NOT EVEN GIVEN THEIR DAY
IN COURT.[7]
For our resolution are the following issues: (1) whether
the alias writ of execution may be enforced against
petitioners; and (2) whether petitioners were innocent
purchasers for value and builders in good faith.
On the first issue, petitioners claim that the alias writ of
execution cannot be enforced against them. They argue that
the appellate court erred when it relied heavily on our ruling
in Vda. de Medina vs. Cruz[8] in holding that petitioners are
successors-in-interest of Mariano Lising, and as such, they
can be reached by the order of execution in Civil Case No. Q-
12918 even though they were not impleaded as parties
thereto. Petitioners submit that Medina is not applicable in
this case because the circumstances therein are different
from the circumstances in the present case.
 In Medina, the property in dispute was registered under
Land Registration Act No. 496 in 1916 and Original Certificate
of Title No. 868 was issued in the name of Philippine Realty
Corporation (PRC). In 1949, Benedicta Mangahas and
Francisco Ramos occupied and built houses on the lot without
the PRCs consent. In 1959, PRC sold the lot to Remedios
Magbanua.Mangahas and Ramos opposed and instituted
Civil Case No. C-120 to annul the sale and to compel PRC to
execute a contract of sale in their favor. The trial court
dismissed the complaint and ordered Mangahas and Ramos
to vacate the lot and surrender possession thereof to
Magbanua. The judgment became final and executory. When
Magbanua had paid for the land in full, PRC executed a deed
of absolute sale in her favor and a new title was consequently
issued in her name. Magbanua then sought the execution of
the judgment in Civil Case No. C-120.This was opposed by
petitioner Medina who alleged that she owned the houses and
lot subject of the dispute. She said that she bought the
houses from spouses Ricardo and Eufrocinia de Guzman,
while she purchased the lot from the heirs of the late Don
Mariano San Pedro y Esteban. The latter held the land by
virtue of a Titulo de Composicion Con El Estado Num. 4136,
dated April 29, 1894. In opposing the execution, Medina
argued that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over her,
claiming that she was not a party in Civil Case No. C-120,
thus, she could not be considered as a person claiming under
Ramos and Mangahas.
 When Medina reached this Court, we held that the decision
in Civil Case No. C-120, which had long become final and
executory, could be enforced against petitioner even though
she was not a party thereto. We found that the houses on the
subject lot were formerly owned by Mangahas and Ramos
who sold them to spouses de Guzman, who in turn sold them
to Medina. Under the circumstances, petitioner was privy to
the two judgment debtors Mangahas and Ramos, and thus
Medina could be reached by the order of execution and writ
of demolition issued against the two. As to the lot under
dispute, we sustained Magbanuas ownership over it, she
being the holder of a Torrens title. We declared that a Torrens
title is generally conclusive evidence of ownership of the land
referred to therein, and a strong presumption exists that a
Torrens title was regularly issued and valid. A Torrens title is
incontrovertible against any informacion possessoria, or
other title existing prior to the issuance thereof not annotated
on the Torrens title. Moreover, persons dealing with property
covered by a Torrens certificate of title are not required to go
beyond what appears on its face.
Medina markedly differs from the present case on major
points. First, the petitioner in Medina acquired the right over
the houses and lot subject of the dispute after the original
action was commenced and became final and executory. In
the present case, petitioners acquired the lot before the
commencement of Civil Case No. Q-12918. Second, the right
over the disputed land of the predecessors-in-interest of the
petitioner in Medina was based on a title of doubtful
authenticity, allegedly a Titulo de Composicion Con El
Estado issued by the Spanish Government in favor of one
Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban, while the right over the
land of the predecessors-in-interest of herein petitioners is
based on a fully recognized Torrens title.Third, petitioners in
this case acquired the registered title in their own names,
while the petitioner in Medina merely relied on the title of her
predecessor-in-interest and tax declarations to prove her
alleged ownership of the land.
We must stress that where a case like the present one
involves a sale of a parcel of land under the Torrens system,
the applicable rule is that a person dealing with the registered
property need not go beyond the certificate of title; he can rely
solely on the title and he is charged with notice only of such
burdens and claims as are annotated on the title.[9] It is our
view here that the petitioners, spouses Victor and Honorata
Orquiola, are fully entitled to the legal protection of their lot by
the Torrens system, unlike the petitioner in the Medina case
who merely relied on a mere Titulo de Composicion.
Coming now to the second issue, were petitioners
purchasers in good faith and for value? A buyer in good faith
is one who buys the property of another without notice that
some other person has a right to or interest in such
property. He is a buyer for value if he pays a full and fair price
at the time of the purchase or before he has notice of the claim
or interest of some other person in the property.[10] The
determination of whether one is a buyer in good faith is a
factual issue which generally is outside the province of this
Court to determine in a petition for review. An exception is
when the Court of Appeals failed to take into account certain
relevant facts which, if properly considered, would justify a
different conclusion.[11] The instant case is covered by this
exception to the general rule. As found by the Court of
Appeals and not refuted by private respondent, petitioners
purchased the subject land in 1964 from Mariano Lising.[12]Civil
Case No. Q-12918 was commenced sometime in 1969. The
Court of Appeals overlooked the fact that the purchase of the
land took place prior to the institution of Civil Case No. Q-
12918. In other words, the sale to petitioners was made
before Pura Kalaw Ledesma claimed the lot. Petitioners could
reasonably rely on Mariano Lisings Certificate of Title which
at the time of purchase was still free from any third party
claim. Hence, considering the circumstances of this case, we
conclude that petitioners acquired the land subject of this
dispute in good faith and for value.
The final question now is: could we consider petitioners
builders in good faith? We note that this is the first time that
petitioners have raised this issue. As a general rule, this could
not be done. Fair play, justice, and due process dictate that
parties should not raise for the first time on appeal issues that
they could have raised but never did during trial and even
during proceedings before the Court of
Appeals.[13] Nevertheless, we deem it proper that this issue be
resolved now, to avoid circuitous litigation and further delay in
the disposition of this case. On this score, we find that
petitioners are indeed builders in good faith.
 A builder in good faith is one who builds with the belief that
the land he is building on is his, and is ignorant of any defect
or flaw in his title.[14] As earlier discussed, petitioner spouses
acquired the land in question without knowledge of any defect
in the title of Mariano Lising. Shortly afterwards, they built
their conjugal home on said land. It was only in 1998, when
the sheriff of Quezon City tried to execute the judgment in
Civil Case No. Q-12918, that they had notice of private
respondents adverse claim. The institution of Civil Case No.
Q-12918 cannot serve as notice of such adverse claim to
petitioners since they were not impleaded therein as parties.
As builders in good faith and innocent purchasers for value,
petitioners have rights over the subject property and hence
they are proper parties in interest in any case
thereon.[15]Consequently, private respondents should have
impleaded them in Civil Case No. Q-12918. Since they failed
to do so, petitioners cannot be reached by the decision in said
case. No man shall be affected by any proceeding to which
he is a stranger, and strangers to a case are not bound by
any judgment rendered by the court. In the same manner, a
writ of execution can be issued only against a party and not
against one who did not have his day in court. Only real
parties in interest in an action are bound by the judgment
therein and by writs of execution and demolition issued
pursuant thereto.[16] In our view, the spouses Victor and
Honorata Orquiola have valid and meritorious cause to resist
the demolition of their house on their own titled lot, which is
tantamount to a deprivation of property without due process
of law.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of
the Court of Appeals dated January 28, 1999, and its
resolution dated December 29, 1999, in CA-G.R. SP No.
47422, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondents are
hereby enjoined from enforcing the decision in Civil Case No.
Q-12918 through a writ of execution and order of demolition
issued against petitioners. Costs against private respondent.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 72670 September 12, 1986

SATURNINA GALMAN, REYNALDO GALMAN and JOSE P. BENGZON,

MARY CONCEPCION BAUTISTA, JOAQUIN G. BERNAS; S.J., M.
BELLARMINE BERNAS, O.S.B., FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, SOLITA
COLLAS-MONSOD, SANTIAGO DUMLAO, JR., MARIA FERIA,
MARCELO B. FERNAN, FRANCISCO GARCHITORENA, * ANDREW
GONZALEZ, JOSE C. LAURETA, SALVADOR P. LOPEZ, FELIX K.
MARAMBA, JR., CECILIA MUÑOZ PALMA. JAIME V. ONGPIN, FELIX
PEREZ, JOSE B.L. REYES, JOSE E. ROMERO, JR., RAMON DEL
ROSARIO, JR., RICARDO J. ROMULO, AUGUSTO SANCHEZ,
EMMANUEL V. SORIANO, DAVID SYCIP, ENRIQUE SYQUIA, CRISTINA
TAN, JESUS VARGAS, BERNARDO M. VILLEGAS, VICENTE JAYME,
**, petitioners,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN, FIRST DIVISION (represented by Justice Manuel
Pamaran, Chairman, and Justices Augusto Amores and Bienvenido
Vera Cruz, Members), JUSTICE BERNARDO FERNANDEZ
(Ombudsman) and GEN. FABIAN C. VER, MAJ. GEN. PROSPERO A.
OLIVAS, BRIG. GEN. LUFHER A. CUSTODIO, COL. ARTURO G.
CUSTODIO, COL. VICENTE B. TIGAS, JR., CAPT. FELIPE VALERIO,
CAPT. LLEWELYN KAVINTA, CAPT. ROMEO M. BAUTISTA, 2nd LT.
JESUS CASTRO, SGT. PABLO MARTINEZ, SGT. ARNULFO DE MESA,
SGT. TOMAS FERNANDEZ, SGT. CLARO LAT, SGT. FILOMENO
MIRANDA, SGT. ROLANDO C. DE GUZMAN, SGT. ERNESTO M.
MATEO, SGT. RODOLFO M. DESOLONG, SGT. LEONARDO MOJICA,
SGT. PEPITO TORIO, SGT. ARMANDO DELA CRUZ, SGT. PROSPERO
A. BONA, CIC ROGELIO MORENO, CIC MARIO LAZAGA, AIC
CORDOVA G. ESTELO, AIC ANICETO ACUPIDO and HERMILO
GOSUICO, *** , respondents.

Lupino Lazaro and Arturo M. de Castro for petitioners.

Antonio R. Coronel for respondents Gen. Ver and Col. Tigas, Jr.

Rodolfo U. Jimenez for respondent Brig. Gen. Custodio.

Ramon M. Bernaldo for respondent H. Gosuico.

Romulo Quimbo for respondent B. Vera Cruz.

Norberto J. Quisumbing for respondent P. Olivas.

Felix Solomon for respondent Col. A. Custodio.

Alfonso S. Cruz for B. Fernandez.

Edgardo B. Gayos for M. Pamaran.

RESOLUTION

TEEHANKEE, C.J.:

Last August 21st, our nation marked with solemnity and for the first time in
freedom the third anniversary of the treacherous assassination of foremost
opposition leader former Senator Benigno "Ninoy" Aquino, Jr. imprisoned for
almost eight years since the imposition of martial law in September, 1972 by
then President Ferdinand E. Marcos, he was sentenced to death by firing
squad by a military tribunal for common offenses alleged to have been
committed long before the declaration of martial law and whose jurisdiction
over him as a civilian entitled to trial by judicial process by civil courts he
repudiated. Ninoy pleaded in vain that the military tribunals are admittedly not
courts but mere instruments and subject to the control of the President as
created by him under the General Orders issued by him as Commander-in-
Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and that he had already been
publicly indicted and adjudged guilty by the President of the charges in a
nationwide press conference held on August 24, 1971 when he declared the
evidence against Ninoy "not only strong but overwhelming ." 1 This followed the
Plaza Miranda bombing of August 21, 1971 of the proclamation rally of the opposition Liberal Party candidates
for the November, 1971 elections (when eight persons were killed and practically all of the opposition candidates
headed by Senator Jovito Salonga and many more were seriously injured), and the suspension of the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus under Proclamation No. 889 on August 23, 1971. The massacre was instantly
attributed to the communists but the truth has never been known. But the then President never filed the said
charges against Ninoy in the civil courts.

Ninoy Aquino was nevertheless thereafter allowed in May, 1980 to leave the
country to undergo successful heart surgery. After three years of exile and
despite the regime's refusal to give him a passport, he sought to return home
"to strive for a genuine national reconciliation founded on justice." He was to
be cold-bloodedly killed while under escort away by soldiers from his plane
that had just landed at the Manila International Airport on that fateful day at
past 1 p.m. His brain was smashed by a bullet fired point blank into the back
of his head by a murderous assassin, notwithstanding that the airport was
ringed by airtight security of close to 2,000 soldiers and "from a military
viewpoint, it (was) technically impossible to get inside (such) a cordon." 2 The
military investigators reported within a span of three hours that the man who shot Aquino (whose identity was
then supposed to be unknown and was revealed only days later as Rolando Galman, although he was the
personal friend of accused Col. Arturo Custodio who picked him up from his house on August 17, 1983) was a
communist-hired gunman, and that the military escorts gunned him down in turn. The military later filmed a re-
enactment of the killing scripted according to this version and continuously replayed it on all TV channels as if
it were taken live on the spot. The then President instantly accepted the military version and repeated it in a
nationally televised press conference that he gave late in the evening of August 22, 1983, wherein he said, in
order to induce disbelief that the military had a hand in the killing, that "if the purpose was to eliminate Aquino,
this was not the way to do it."

The national tragedy shocked the conscience of the entire nation and
outraged the free world. The large masses of people who joined in the ten-
day period of national mourning and came out in millions in the largest and
most orderly public turnout for Ninoy's funeral reflected their grief for his
martyrdom and their yearning for the truth, justice and freedom.

The then President was constrained to create a Fact Finding Board to3

investigate "the treacherous and vicious assassination of former Senator Benigno S. Aquino, Jr. on August 21,
1983 [which] has to all Filipinos become a national tragedy and national shame specially because of the early
distortions and exaggerations in both foreign and local media 4 so that all right thinking and honest men desire
to ventilate the truth through fare, independent and dispassionate investigation by prestigious and free
investigators." After two false starts, 5 he finally constituted the Board 6 on October 22, 1983 which held 125
hearing days commencing November 3, 1983 (including 3 hearings in Tokyo and 8 hearings in Los Angeles,
California) and heard the testimonies of 194 witnesses recorded in 20,377 pages of transcripts, until the
submission of their minority and majority reports to the President on October 23 and 24, 1984. This was to mark
another first anywhere in the world wherein the minority report was submitted one day ahead by
the ponente thereof, the chairman, who was received congenially and cordially by the then President who
treated the report as if it were the majority report instead of a minority report of one and forthwith referred it to
respondent Tanodbayan "for final resolution through the legal system" and for trial in the Sandiganbayan which
was better known as a graft court; and the majority report of the four other members was submitted on the
following day to the then President who coldly received them and could scarcely conceal his instant rejection of
their report with the grim statement that "I hope you can live with your conscience with what you have done."

The fact is that both majority and minority reports were one in rejecting the
military version as propounded by the chief investigator, respondent Gen.
Olivas, that Rolando Galman was the NPA-hired assassin, stating that "the
evidence shows [to the contrary] that Rolando Galman had no subversive
affiliations." They were in agreement that "only the soldiers in the staircase
with Sen. Aquino could have shot him;" that Galman, the military's "fall guy"
was "not the assassin of Sen. Aquino and that "the SWAT troopers who
gunned down Galman and the soldiers who escorted Sen. Aquino down the
service stairs, deliberately and in conspiracy with one another, gave a
perjured story to us regarding the alleged shooting by Galman of Sen. Aquino
and the mowing down, in turn, of Galman himself;" in short, that Ninoy's
assassination was the product of a military conspiracy, not a communist plot
The only difference between the two reports is that the majority report found
all the twenty-six private respondents abovenamed in the title of the case
headed by then AFP Chief General Fabian C. Ver involved in the military
conspiracy and therefore "indictable for the premeditated killing of Senator
Benigno S. Aquino, Jr. and Rolando Galman at the MIA on August 21, 1983;"
while the chairman's minority report would exclude nineteen of them and limit
as plotters "the six persons who were on the service stairs while Senator
Aquino was descending" and "General Luther Custodio . . . because the
criminal plot could not have been planned and implemented without his
intervention."

The chairman wrote in her minority report (somewhat prophetically) that "The
epilogue to our work lies in what will transpire in accordance with the action
that the Office of the President may thereafter direct to be taken. "The four-
member majority report (also prophetically) wrote in the epilogue (after
warning the forces who adhere to an alien and intolerable political ideology
against unscrupulously using the report "to discredit our traditionally revered
institutions"), that "the tragedy opened our eyes and for the first time
confirmed our worst fears of what unchecked evil would be capable of doing."
They wrote:

The task of the Board was clear and unequivocal. This task was not only to
determine the facts and circumstances surrounding the death of the late
former Senator. Of greater significance is the awesome responsibility of the
Board to uphold righteousness over evil, justice over injustice, rationality over
irrationality, humaneness over inhumanity. The task was indeed a painful
test, the inevitable result of which will restore our country's honored place
among the sovereign nations of the free world where peace, law and order,
freedom, and justice are a way of life.

More than any other event in contemporary Philippine history, the killing of
the late former Senator Aquino has brought into sharper focus, the ills
pervading Philippine society. It was the concretization of the horror that has
been haunting this country for decades, routinely manifested by the
breakdown of peace and order, economic instability, subversion, graft and
corruption, and an increasing number of abusive elements in what are
otherwise noble institutions in our country-the military and law enforcement
agencies. We are, however, convinced that, by and large, the great majority
of the officers and men of these institutions have remained decent and
honorable, dedicated to their noble mission in the service of our country and
people.

The tragedy opened our eyes and for the first time confirmed our worst fears
of what unchecked evil would be capable of doing. As former Israeli Foreign
Minister Abba Eban observes. "Nobody who has great authority can be
trusted not to go beyond its proper limits." Social apathy, passivity and
indifference and neglect have spawned in secret a dark force that is bent on
destroying the values held sacred by freedom-loving people.

To assert our proper place in the civilized world, it is imperative that public
officials should regard public service as a reflection of human Ideals in which
the highest sense of moral values and integrity are strictly required.

A tragedy like that which happened on August 21, 1983, and the crisis that
followed, would have normally caused the resignation of the Chief of the
Armed Forces in a country where public office is viewed with highest esteem
and respect and where the moral responsibilities of public officials transcend
all other considerations.

It is equally the fact that the then President through all his recorded public
acts and statements from the beginning disdained and rejected his own
Board's above findings and insisted on the military version of Galman being
Ninoy's assassin. In upholding this view that "there is no involvement of
anyone in his government in the assassination," he told David Briscoe (then
AP Manila Bureau Chief in a Radio-TV interview on September 9, 1983 that
"I am convinced that if any member of my government were involved, I would
have known somehow ... Even at a fairly low level, I would have known. I
know how they think. I know what they are thinking of." 7 He told CBS in another
interview in May, 1984 (as his Fact Finding Board was holding its hearings) the following:

CBS: But indeed there has been recent evidence that seems to contradict
earlier reports, namely, the recent evidence seems to indicate that some of
the guards may have been responsible (for shooting Ninoy).

MARCOS: Well, you are of course wrong. What you have been reading are
the newspapers and the newspaper reports have been biased. The evidence
still proves that Galman was the killer. The evidence also shows that there
were intelligence reports connecting the communist party to the killing. 8

In his reply of October 25, 1984 to General Ver's letter of the same date going
on leave of absence upon release of the Board's majority report implicating
him, he wrote that "(W)e are even more aware, general, that the
circumstances under which the board has chosen to implicate you in its
findings are fraught with doubt and great contradictions of opinion and
testimony. And we are deeply disturbed that on the basis of so-called
evidence, you have been so accused by some members of the Board," and
extended "My very best wishes to you and your family for a speedy resolution
of your case," 9 even as he announced that he would return the general to his position as AFP Chief "if
he is acquitted by the Sandiganbayan." In an interview on June 4, 1985 with the Gamma Photo Agency, as
respondent court was hearing the cases, he was quoted as saying that "as will probably be shown, those
witnesses (against the accused) are perjured witnesses." 10

It was against this setting that on November 11, 1985 petitioners Saturnina
Galman and Reynaldo Galman, mother and son, respectively, of the late
Rolando Galman, and twenty-nine (29) other petitioners, composed of three
former Justices of this Court, five incumbent and former university presidents,
a former AFP Chief of Staff, outstanding members of the Philippine Bar and
solid citizens of the community, filed the present action alleging that
respondents Tanodbayan and Sandiganbayan committed serious
irregularities constituting mistrial and resulting in miscarriage of justice and
gross violation of the constitutional rights of the petitioners and the sovereign
people of the Philippines to due process of law. They asserted that the
Tanodbayan did not represent the interest of the people when he failed to
exert genuine and earnest efforts to present vital and important testimonial
and documentary evidence for the prosecution and that the Sandiganbayan
Justices were biased, prejudiced and partial in favor of the accused, and that
their acts "clouded with the gravest doubts the sincerity of government to find
out the truth about the Aquino assassination." Petitioners prayed for the
immediate issuance of a temporary restraining order restraining the
respondent Sandiganbayan from rendering a decision on the merits in the
pending criminal cases which it had scheduled on November 20, 1985 and
that judgment be rendered declaring a mistrial and nullifying the proceedings
before the Sandiganbayan and ordering a re-trial before an impartial tribunal
by an unbiased prosecutor. 10-a

At the hearing on November 18, 1985 of petitioners' prayer for issuance of a

temporary restraining order enjoining respondent court from rendering a
decision in the two criminal cases before it, the Court resolved by nine-to-two
votes 11 to issue the restraining order prayed for. The Court also granted petitioners a five-day period to file
a reply to respondents' separate comments and respondent Tanodbayan a three-day period to submit a copy
of his 84-page memorandum for the prosecution as filed in the Sandiganbayan, the signature page of
which alone had been submitted to the Court as Annex 5 of his comment.

But ten days later on November 28, 1985, the Court by the same nine-to-
two-vote ratio in reverse, 12 resolved to dismiss the petition and to lift the temporary restraining order
issued ten days earlier enjoining the Sandiganbayan from rendering its decision. 13 The same Court majority
denied petitioners' motion for a new 5-day period counted from receipt of respondent Tanodbayan's
memorandum for the prosecution (which apparently was not served on them and which they alleged was "very
material to the question of his partiality, bias and prejudice" within which to file a consolidated reply thereto and
to respondents' separate comments, by an eight-to-three vote, with Justice Gutierrez joining the dissenters. 14

On November 29, 1985, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration,

alleging that the dismissal did not indicate the legal ground for such action
and urging that the case be set for a full hearing on the merits because if the
charge of partiality and bias against the respondents and suppression of vital
evidence by the prosecution are proven, the petitioners would be entitled to
the reliefs demanded: The People are entitled to due process which requires
an impartial tribunal and an unbiased prosecutor. If the State is deprived of a
fair opportunity to prosecute and convict because certain material evidence
is suppressed by the prosecution and the tribunal is not impartial, then the
entire proceedings would be null and void. Petitioners prayed that the
Sandiganbayan be restrained from promulgating their decision as scheduled
anew on December 2, 1985.

On December 5, 1985, the Court required the respondents to comment on

the motion for reconsideration but issued no restraining order. Thus, on
December 2, 1985, as scheduled, respondent Sandiganbayan issued its
decision acquitting all the accused of the crime charged, declaring them
innocent and totally absolving them of any civil liability. This marked another
unusual first in that respondent Sandiganbayan in effect convicted the very
victim Rolando Galman (who was not on trial) as the assassin of Ninoy
contrary to the very information and evidence submitted by the prosecution.
In opposition, respondents submitted that with the Sandiganbayan's verdict
of acquittal, the instant case had become moot and academic. On February
4, 1986, the same Court majority denied petitioners' motion for
reconsideration for lack of merit, with the writer and Justice Abad Santos
maintaining our dissent.

On March 20, 1986, petitioners filed their motion to admit their second motion
for reconsideration attached therewith. The thrust of the second motion for
reconsideration was the startling and theretofore unknown revelations of
Deputy Tanodbayan Manuel Herrera as reported in the March 6, 1986 issue
of the Manila Times entitled "Aquino Trial a Sham," that the then President
had ordered the respondents Sandiganbayan and Tanodbayan Bernardo
Fernandez and the prosecution panel headed by Herrera to whitewash the
criminal cases against the 26 respondents accused and produce a verdict of
acquittal.

On April 3, 1986, the Court granted the motion to admit the second motion
for reconsideration and ordered the respondents to comment thereon. 15
Respondent Tanodbayan Bernardo Fernandez stated in his Manifestation
filed on April 11, 1986 that he had ceased to hold office as Tanodbayan as
of April 8, 1986 when he was replaced by the new Tanodbayan, Raul M.
Gonzales, but reiterating his position in his comment on the petition, he
added "relative to the reported alleged revelations of Deputy Tanodbayan
Manuel Herrera, herein respondent never succumbed to any alleged
attempts to influence his actuations in the premises, having instead
successfully resisted perceived attempts to exert pressure to drop the case
after preliminary investigation, and actually ordered the filing and prosecution
of the two (2) murder cases below against herein private party respondents."
He candidly admitted also in his memorandum: "There is not much that need
be said about the existence of pressure. That there were pressures can
hardly be denied; in fact, it has never been denied." 15-a He submitted that "even as he
vehemently denies insinuations of any direct or indirect complicity or participation in any alleged attempt to
supposedly whitewash the cases below, . . . should this Honorable Court find sufficient cause to justify the
reopening and retrial of the cases below, he would welcome such development so that any wrong that had been
caused may be righted and so that, at the very least the actuations of herein respondent in the premises may
be reviewed and reexamined, confident as he is that the end will show that he had done nothing in the premises
that violated his trust as Tanodbayan (Ombudsman)." New Tanodbayan Raul M. Gonzales in his comment of
April 14, 1986 "interposed no objection to the reopening of the trial of the cases . . . as, in fact, he urged that the
said cases be reopened in order that justice could take its course."

Respondents Justices of the Sandiganbayan First Division in their collective

comment of April 9, 1986 stated that the trial of the criminal cases by them
was valid and regular and decided on the basis of evidence presented and
the law applicable, but manifested that "if it is true that the former
Tanodbayan and the Deputy Tanodbayan, Chief of the Prosecution Panel,
were pressured into suppressing vital evidence which would probably alter
the result of the trial, Answering Respondents would not interpose any
objection to the reopening of those cases, if only to allow justice to take its
course." Respondent Sandiganbayan Justice Bienvenido C. Vera Cruz, in a
separate comment, asserted that he passed no note to anyone; the note
being bandied about is not in his handwriting; he had nothing to do with the
writing of the note or of any note of any kind intended for any lawyer of the
defense or even of the prosecution; and requested for an investigation by this
Court to settle the note passing issue once and for all.

Deputy Tanodbayan Manuel Herrera, in his comment of April 14, 1986

affirmed the allegations in the second motion for reconsideration that he
revealed that the Sandiganbayan Justices and Tanodbayan prosecutors
were ordered by Marcos to whitewash the Aquino-Galman murder case. He
amplified his revelations, as follows:

1. AB INITIO, A. VERDICT OF ACQUITTAL!

Incidents during the preliminary investigation showed ominous signs that the
fate of the criminal case on the death of Ex-Senator Benigno Aquino and
Rolando Galman on August 21, 1983 was doomed to an ignominous end.
Malacanang wanted dismissal-to the extent that a prepared resolution was
sent to the Investigating Panel (composed of the undersigned, Fiscals
Ernesto Bernabe and Leonardo Tamayo) for signature. This, of course, was
resisted by the panel, and a resolution charging all the respondents as
principals was forwarded to the Tanodbayan on January 10, 1985.

2. MALACAÑANG CONFERENCE PLANNED SCENARIO OF TRIAL

At 6:00 p.m. of said date (January 10) Mr. Ferdinand E. Marcos (the former
President) summoned to Malacañang Justice Bernardo Fernandez (the
Tanodbayan), Sandiganbayan Justice Manuel Pamaran (the Presiding
Justice) and an the members of the Panel

Also present at the meeting were Justice Manuel Lazaro (the Coordinator)
and Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos, who left earlier, came back and left again. The
former President had a copy of the panel's signed resolution (charging all
accused as principals), evidently furnished him in advance, and with
prepared notes on the contents thereof.

The former President started by vehemently maintaining that Galman shot

Aquino at the tarmac. Albeit initially the undersigned argued against the
theory, to remain silent was the more discreet posture when the former
President became emotional (he was quite sick then).

During a good part of the conference, the former President talked about
Aquino and the communists, lambasting the Agrava Board, specially the
Legal Panel. Shifting to the military he rumbled on such statements as: "It will
be bloody . . . Gen. Ramos, though close to me, is getting ambitious and poor
Johnny does not know what to do". . . 'our understanding with Gen. Ramos
is that his stint is only temporary, but he is becoming ambitious "the boys
were frantic when they heard that they will be charged in court, and wig be
detained at city jail."

From outright dismissal, the sentiment veered towards a more pragmatic

approach. The former President more or less conceded that for political and
legal reasons all the respondents should be charged in court, Politically, as it
will become evident that the government was serious in pursuing the case
towards its logical conclusion, and thereby ease public demonstrations; on
the other hand, legally, it was perceived that after (not IF) they are acquitted,
double jeopardy would inure. The former President ordered then that the
resolution be revised by categorizing the participation of each respondent.

In the matter of custody of the accused pendente lite the Coordinator was
ordered to get in touch with Gen. Narciso Cabrera, Gen. Vicente Eduardo
and Director Jolly Bugarin to put on record that they had no place in their
respective institutions. The existence of PD No. 1950 (giving custody to
commanding officers of members of AFP charged in court) was never
mentioned.

It was decided that the presiding justice (First Division) would personally
handle the trial, and assurance was made by him that it would be finished in
four to six months, pointing out that, with the recent effectivity of the New
Rules on Criminal Procedure, the trial could be expedited.

Towards the end of the two-hour meeting and after the script had been tacitly
mapped out, the former President uttered: "Mag moro-moro na lang kayo."

The parting words of the former President were: "Thank you for your
cooperation. I know how to reciprocate."

While still in the palace grounds on the way out, the undersigned manifested
his desire to the Tanodbayan to resign from the panel, or even the office.
This, as well as other moves to this effect, had always been refused. Hoping
that with sufficient evidence sincerely and efficiently presented by the
prosecution, all involves in the trial would be conscience-pricked and realize
the futility and injustice of proceeding in accordance with the script, the
undersigned opted to say on.
Herrera further added details on the "implementation of the script," such as
the holding of a "make-believe raffle" within 18 minutes of the filing of the
Informations with the Sandiganbayan at noon of January 23, 1985, while
there were no members of the media; the installation of TV monitors directly
beamed to Malacanang; the installation of a "war room" occupied by the
military; attempts to direct and stifle witnesses for the prosecution; the
suppression of the evidence that could be given by U.S. Airforce men about
the "scrambling" of Ninoy's plane; the suppression of rebuttal witnesses and
the bias and partiality of the Sandiganbayan; its cavalier disregard of his plea
that it "should not decide these cases on the merits without first making a
final ruling on the Motion for Inhibition;" and the Presiding Justice's over-kill
with the declaration that "the Court finds all accused innocent of the crimes
charged in the two informations, and accordingly, they incur neither criminal
nor civil liability," adding that "in the almost twenty years that the undersigned
has been the prosecutor in the sala of the Presiding Justice this is the only
occasion where civil liability is pronounced in a decision of acquittal. " He
"associated himself with the motion for reconsideration and likewise prayed
that the proceedings in the Sandiganbayan and its decision be declared null
and void."

New Solicitor General Sedfrey Ordoñez' comment of April 25, 1986 submitted
that a declaration of mistrial will depend on the veracity of the evidence
supportive of petitioners' claim of suppression of evidence and collusion. He
submitted that this would require reception of evidence by a Court-appointed
or designated commissioner or body of commissioners (as was done in G.R.
No. 71316, Fr. Romano case; and G.R. No. 61016, Morales case; and G.R.
No. 70054, Banco Filipino case); and that if petitioners' claim were
substantiated, a reopening of the double murder case is proper to avoid a
miscarriage of justice since the verdict of acquittal would no longer be a valid
basis for a double jeopardy claim.

Respondents-accused opposed the second motion for reconsideration and

prayed for its denial. Respondent Olivas contended that the proper step for
the government was to file a direct action to annul the judgment of acquittal
and at a regular trial present its evidence of collusion and pressures.
As a whole, all the other respondents raised the issue of double jeopardy,
and invoked that the issues had become moot and academic because of the
rendition of the Sandiganbayan's judgment of acquittal of all respondents-
accused on December 2, 1985, with counsels for respondents Ver and Tigas,
as well as Olivas, further arguing that assuming that the judgment of acquittal
is void for any reason, the remedy is a direct action to annul the judgment
where the burden of proof falls upon the plaintiff to establish by clear,
competent and convincing evidence the cause of the nullity.

After Petitioners had filed their consolidated reply, the Court resolved per its
resolution of June 5, 1986 to appoint a three-member commission composed
of retired Supreme Court Justice Conrado Vasquez, chairman, and retired
Intermediate Appellate Court Justices Milagros German and Eduardo
Caguioa as members, to hear and receive evidence, testimonial and
documentary, of the charges of collusion and pressures and relevant matters,
upon prior notice to all parties, and to submit their findings to this Court for
proper disposition. The Commission conducted hearings on 19 days, starting
on June 16, 1986 and ending on July 16, 1986, On the said last day,
respondents announced in open hearing that they decided to forego the
taking of the projected deposition of former President Marcos, as his
testimony would be merely corroborative of the testimonies of respondents
Justice Pamaran and Tanodbayan Fernandez. On July 31, 1986, it submitted
its extensive 64-page Report 16 wherein it discussed fully the evidence received by it and made a
recapitulation of its findings in capsulized form, as follows:

1. The Office of the Tanodbayan, particularly Justice Fernandez and the

Special Investigating Panel composed of Justice Herrera, Fiscal Bernabe
and Special Prosecutor Tamayo, was originally of the view that all of the
twenty-six (26) respondents named in the Agrava Board majority report
should all be charged as principals of the crime of double murder for the
death of Senator Benigno Aquino and Rolando Galman.

2. When Malacanang learned of the impending filing of the said charge before
the Sandiganbayan, the Special Investigating Panel having already prepared
a draft Resolution recommending such course of action, President Marcos
summoned Justice Fernandez, the tree members of the Special Investigating
Panel, and justice Pamaran to a conference in Malacanang in the early
evening of January 10, 1985.

3. In said conference, President Marcos initially expressed his disagreement

with the recommendation of the Special Investigating Panel and disputed the
findings of the Agrava Board that it was not Galman who shot Benigno
Aquino.

4. Later in the conference, however, President Marcos was convinced of the

advisability of filing the murder charge in court so that, after being acquitted
as planned, the accused may no longer be prosecuted in view of the doctrine
of double jeopardy.

5. Presumably in order to be assured that not all of the accused would be

denied bail during the trial, considering that they would be charged with
capital offenses, President Marcos directed that the several accused be
"categorized" so that some of them would merely be charged as accomplices
and accessories.

6. In addition to said directive, President Marcos ordered that the case be

handled personally by Justice Pamaran who should dispose of it in the
earliest possible time.

7. The instructions given in the Malacanang conference were followed to the

letter; and compliance therewith manifested itself in several specific
instances in the course of the proceedings, such as, the changing of the
resolution of the special investigating panel, the filing of the case with the
Sandiganbayan and its assignment to Justice Pamaran, suppression of some
vital evidence, harassment of witnesses, recantation of witneses who gave
adverse testimony before the Agrava Board, coaching of defense counsels,
the hasty trial, monitoring of proceedings, and even in the very decision
rendered in the case.

8. That that expression of President Marcos' desire as to how he wanted the

Aquino-Galman case to be handled and disposed of constituted sufficient
pressure on those involved in said task to comply with the same in the
subsequent course of the proceedings.
9. That while Justice Pamaran and Justice Fernandez manifested no
revulsion against complying with the Malacañang directive, justice Herrera
played his role with manifestly ambivalent feelings.

10. Sufficient evidence has been ventilated to show a scripted and pre-
determined manner of handling and disposing of the Aquino-Galman murder
case, as stage-managed from Malacañang and performed by
willing dramatis personnae as well as by recalcitrant ones whipped into line
by the omnipresent influence of an authoritarian ruler.

The Commission submitted the following recommendation.

Considering the existence of adequate credible evidence showing that the

prosecution in the Aquino-Galman case and the Justices who tried and
decided the same acted under the compulsion of some pressure which
proved to be beyond their capacity to resist, and which not only prevented
the prosecution to fully ventilate its position and to offer all the evidences
which it could have otherwise presented, but also predetermined the final
outcome of the case, the Commission is of the considered thinking and belief,
subject to the better opinion and judgment of this Honorable Court that the
proceedings in the said case have been vitiated by lack of due process, and
hereby respectfully recommends that the prayer in the petition for a
declaration of a mistrial in Sandiganbayan Cases Nos. 10010 and 10011
entitled "People vs. Luther Custodia et al.," be granted.

The Court per its Resolution of July 31, 1986 furnished all the parties with
copies of the Report and required them to submit their objections thereto. It
thereafter heard the parties and their objections at the hearing of August 26,
1986 and the matter was submitted for the Court's resolution.

The Court adopts and approves the Report and its findings and holds on the
basis thereof and of the evidence received and appreciated by the
Commission and duly supported by the facts of public record and knowledge
set forth above and hereinafter, that the then President (code named
Olympus) had stage-managed in and from Malacanang Palace "a scripted
and pre-determined manner of handling and disposing of the Aquino-Galman
murder case;" and that "the prosecution in the Aquino Galman case and the
Justices who tried and decided the same acted under the compulsion of
some pressure which proved to be beyond their capacity to resist', and which
not only prevented the prosecution to fully ventilate its position and to offer
all the evidences which it could have otherwise presented, but also pre-
determined the final outcome of the case" of total absolution of the twenty-
six respondents accused of all criminal and civil liability.

The Court finds that the Commission's Report (incorporated herein by

reference) and findings and conclusions are duly substantiated by the
evidence and facts of public record. Composed of distinguished members of
proven integrity with a combined total of 141 years of experience in the
practice of law (55 years) and in the prosecutoral and judicial services (86
years in the trial and appellate courts), experts at sifting the chaff from the
grain, 17 the Commission properly appraised the evidences presented and denials made by public
respondents, thus:

The desire of President Marcos to have the Aquino-Galman case disposed

of in a manner suitable to his purposes was quite understandable and was
but to be expected. The case had stirred unprecedented public outcry and
wide international attention. Not invariably, the finger of suspicion pointed to
those then in power who supposedly had the means and the most compelling
motive to eliminate Senator Aquino. A day or so after the assassination,
President Marcos came up with a public statement aired over television that
Senator Aquino was killed not by his military escorts, but by a communist
hired gun. It was, therefore, not a source of wonder that President Marcos
would want the case disposed of in a manner consistent with his announced
theory thereof which, at the same time, would clear his name and his
administration of any suspected guilty participation in the assassination.

The calling of the conference was undoubtedly to accomplish this

purpose. . . .

President Marcos made no bones to conceal his purpose for calling them.
From the start, he expressed irritation and displeasure at the
recommendation of the investigating panel to charge all of the twenty-six (26)
respondents as principals of the crime of double murder. He insisted that it
was Galman who shot Senator Aquino, and that the findings of the Agrava
Board were not supported by evidence that could stand in court. He
discussed and argued with Justice Herrera on this point. Midway in the
course of the discussion, mention was made that the filing of the charge in
court would at least mollify public demands and possibly prevent further
street demonstrations. It was further pointed out that such a procedure would
be a better arrangement because, if the accused are charged in court and
subsequently acquitted, they may claim the benefit of the doctrine of double
jeopardy and thereby avoid another prosecution if some other witnesses shall
appear when President Marcos is no longer in office.

xxx xxx xxx

After an agreement was reached as to filing the case, instead of dismissing

it, but with some of the accused to be charged merely as accomplices or
accessories, and the question of preventive custody of the accused having
thereby received satisfactory solution, President Marcos took up the matter
of who would try the case and how long it would take to be finished.

According to Justice Herrera, President Marcos told Justice Pamaran 'point

blank' to personally handle the case. This was denied by Justice
Pamaran. No similar denial was voiced by Justice Fernandez in the entire
course of his two-day testimony. Justice Pamaran explained that such order
could not have been given inasmuch as it was not yet certain then that the
Sandiganbayan would try the case and, besides, cases therein are assigned
by raffle to a division and not to a particular Justice thereof.

It was preposterous to expect Justice Pamaran to admit having received such

presidential directive. His denial, however, falls to pieces in the light of the
fact that the case was indeed handled by him after being assigned to the
division headed by him. A supposition of mere coincidence is at once
dispelled by the circumstance that he was the only one from the
Sandiganbayan called to the Malacanang conference wherein the said
directive was given. . . .

The giving of such directive to Justice Pamaran may also be inferred from his
admission that he gave President Marcos the possible time frame when
asked as to how long it would take him to finish the case.
The testimony of Justice Herrera that, during the conference, and after an
agreement was reached on filing the case and subsequently acquitting the
accused, President Marcos told them "Okay, mag moro-moro na lamang
kayo;" and that on their way out of the room President Marcos expressed his
thanks to the group and uttered "I know how to reciprocate," did not receive
any denial or contradiction either on the part of justice Fernandez or justice
Pamaran. (No other person present in the conference was presented by the
respondents. Despite an earlier manifestation by the respondents of their
intention to present Fiscal Bernabe and Prosecutor Tamayo, such move was
abandoned without any reason having been given therefor.)

The facts set forth above are all supported by the evidence on record. In the
mind of the Commission, the only conclusion that may be drawn therefrom is
that pressure from Malacanang had indeed been made to bear on both the
court and the prosecution in the handling and disposition of the Aquino-
Galman case. The intensity of this pressure is readily deductible from the
personality of the one who exerted it, his moral and official ascendancy over
those to whom his instructions were directed, the motivation behind such
instructions, and the nature of the government prevailing at that time which
enabled, the then head of state to exercise authoritarian powers. That the
conference called to script or stage-manage the prosecution and trial of the
Aquino-Galman case was considered as something anomalous that should
be kept away from the public eye is shown by the effort to assure its
secrecy.None but those directly involved were caned to attend. The meeting
was held in an inner room of the Palace. Only the First Lady and Presidential
Legal Assistant Justice Lazaro were with the President. The conferees were
told to take the back door in going to the room where the meeting was held,
presumably to escape notice by the visitors in the reception hall waiting to
see the President. Actually, no public mention alas ever made of this
conference until Justice Herrera made his expose some fifteen (15) months
later when the former president was no longer around.

President Marcos undoubtedly realized the importance of the matter he

wanted to take up with the officials he asked to be summoned. He had to do
it personally, and not merely through trusted assistants. The lack of will or
determination on the part of Justice Fernandez and Justice Pamaran to resist
the presidential summons despite their realization of its unwholesome
implications on their handling of the celebrated murder case may be easily
inferred from their unquestioned obedience thereto. No effort to resist was
made, despite the existence of a most valid reason to beg off, on the lame
excuses that they went there out of "curiosity," or "out of respect to the Office
of the President," or that it would be 'unbecoming to refuse a summons from
the President.' Such frame of mind only reveals their susceptibility to
presidential pressure and lack of capacity to resist the same. The very acts
of being summoned to Malacanang and their ready acquiescence thereto
under the circumstances then obtaining, are in themselves pressure
dramatized and exemplified Their abject deference to President Marcos may
likewise be inferred from the admitted fact that, not having been given
seatsduring the two-hour conference (Justice Fernandez said it was not that
long, but did not say how long) in which President Marcos did the talking most
of the time, they listened to him on their feet. Verily, it can be said that any
avowal of independent action or resistance to presidential pressure became
illusory from the very moment they stepped inside Malacanang Palace on
January 10, 1985. 18

The Commission pinpointed the crucial factual issue thus: "the more
significant inquiry is on whether the Sandiganbayan and the Office of the
Tanodbayan actually succumbed to such pressure, as may be gauged by
their subsequent actuations in their respective handling of the case." It duly
concluded that "the pressure exerted by President Marcos in the conference
held on January 10, 1985 pervaded the entire proceedings of the Aquino
Galman [murder] cases" as manifested in several specific incidents and
instances it enumerated in the Report under the heading of "Manifestations
of Pressure and Manipulation."

Suffice it to give hereinbelow brief excerpts:—

1. The changing of the original Herrera panel draft Resolution charging all
the twenty-six accused as principals by conspiracy by categorizing and
charging 17 as principals, Generals Ver and Olivas and 6 others as
accessories and the civilian as accomplice, and recommending bail for the
latter two categories: "The categorization may not be completely justified by
saying that, in the mind of Justice Fernandez, there was no sufficient
evidence to justify that all of the accused be charged as principals. The
majority of the Agrava Board found the existence of conspiracy and
recommended that all of the accused be charged accordingly. Without going
into the merit of such finding, it may hardly be disputed that, in case of doubt,
and in accordance with the standard practice of the prosecution to charge
accused with the most serious possible offense or in the highest category so
as to prevent an incurable injustice in the event that the evidence presented
in the trial will show his guilt of the graver charge, the most logical and
practical course of action should have been, as originally recommended by
the Herrera panel, to charge all the accused as principals. As it turned out,
Justice Fernandez readily opted for categorization which, not surprisingly,
was in consonance with the Malacañang instruction." It is too much to
attribute to coincidence that such unusual categorization came only after the
then President's instruction at Malacanang when Gen. Ver's counsel, Atty.
Coronel, had been asking the same of Tanodbayan Fernandez since
November, 1984; and "Justice Fernandez himself, admit(ted) that, as of that
time, [the Malacanang conference on January 10, 1985], his own view was
in conformity with that of the Special Investigating Panel to charge all of the
twenty-six (26) respondents as principals of the crime of double murder." 19 As
the Commission further noted, "Justice Fernandez never denied the claim of Justice Herrera that the draft
resolution of January 10, 1985 (Exhibit 'B-1') [charging all 26 accused as principals] was to have been the subject
of a press conference on the afternoon of said date which did not go through due to the summons for them to
go to Malacanang in the early evening of said date."20

2. Suppression of vital evidence and harassment of witnesses:" Realizing, no

doubt, that a party's case is as strong as the evidence it can present,
unmistakable and persistent efforts were exerted in behalf of the accused to
weaken the case of the prosecution and thereby assure and justify [the
accused's] eventual scripted acquittal. Unfavorable evidences were sought
to be suppressed, and some were indeed prevented from being ventilated.
Adverse witnesses were harassed, cajoled, perjured or threatened either to
refrain from testifying or to testify in a manner favorable to the defense."

The Report specified the ordeals of the prosecution witnesses:21 Cesar Loterina,
PAL employee, Roberta Masibay, Galman's step-daughter who recanted their testimonies before the Fact
Finding Board and had to be discarded as prosecution witnesses before at the trial.
Witnesses Viesca and Rañas who also testified before the Board "disappeared all of a sudden and could not be
located by the police. The Commission narrated the efforts to stifle Kiyoshi Wakamiya eyewitness who
accompanied Ninoy on his fateful flight on August 21, 1983 and described them as "palpable, if crude and
display(ing) sheer abuse of power." Wakamiya was not even allowed to return to Manila on August 20, 1984 to
participate in the first death anniversary of Ninoy but was deported as an undesirable alien and had to leave on
the next plane for Tokyo. The Board had to go to Tokyo to hear Wakamiya give his testimony before the
Japanese police in accordance with their law and Wakamiya claimed before the Commission that the English
transcription of his testimony, as prepared by an official of the Philippine Embassy in Tokyo, was inaccurate and
did not correctly reflect the testimony he gave "although there was no clear showing of the discrepancy from the
original transcription which was in Nippongo. Upon his arrival at the MIA on August 21, 1985 on invitation of
Justice Herrera to testify at the ongoing trial, "a shot was fired and a soldier was seen running away by media
men who sought to protect Wakamiya from harm by surrounding him." Wakamiya was forced by immigration
officials to leave the country by Saturday (August 24th) notwithstanding Herrera's request to let him stay until
he could testify the following Monday (August 26th). In the case of principal eyewitness Rebecca Quijano, the
Commission reported that

... Undoubtedly in view of the considerable significance of her proposed

testimony and its unfavorable effect on the cause of the defense, the efforts
exerted to suppress the same was as much as, if not more than those in the
case of Wakamiya. ... She recounted that she was in constant fear of her life,
having been hunted by armed men; that their house in Tabaco, Albay was
ransacked, her family harassed by the foreclosure of the mortgage on their
house by the local Rural Bank, and ejected therefrom when she ignored the
request of its manager to talk with her about her proposed testimony; that a
certain William Fariñas offered her plane tickets for a trip abroad; that Mayor
Rudy Fariñas of Laoag City kept on calling her sister in the United States to
warn her not to testify; that, later, Rudy and William Fariñas offered her two
million pesos supposedly coming from Bongbong Marcos, a house and lot in
Baguio, the dropping of her estafa case in Hongkong, and the punishment of
the persons responsible for the death of her father, if she would refrain from
testifying.

It is a matter of record, however, that despite such cajolery and harassments,

or perhaps because of them, Ms. Quijano eventually testified before the
Sandiganbayan. Justice Herrera was told by justice Fernandez of the
displeasure expressed by Olympus at justice Herrera's going out of his way
to make Ms. Quijano to testify, and for his refusal to honor the invitation to
attend the birthday party of the First Lady on May 1, 1985, as on the eve of
Ms. Quijano's testimony on May 2, 1985. The insiduous attempts to tamper
with her testimony, however, did not end with her taking the witness stand.
In the course of her testimony several notes were passed to Atty. Rodolfo
Jimenez, the defense counsel who cross-examined her, one of which
suggested that she be asked more questions about Dean Narvasa who was
suspected of having coached her as to what to declare (Exhibit "D"); and on
another occasion, at a crucial point in her testimony, a power brownout
occurred; which lasted for about twenty minutes, throwing the courtroom into
darkness, and making most of those present to scamper for safety, and Ms.
Quijano to pass over the railing of the rostrum so as to be able to leave the
courtroom. It was verified that the brownout was limited to the building
housing the Sandiganbayan, it not having affected the nearby Manila City
Hall and the Finance Building. Justice Herrera declared that the main
switchboard of the Sandiganbayan electrical system was located beside the
room occupied by Malacañang people who were keeping track of the
proceedings.

Atty. Lupino Lazaro for petitioners further made of record at that August 26th
hearing that the two Olivas sisters, Ana and Catherine (hospitality girls)
disappeared on September 4, 1984, two weeks after Ninoy's assassination.
And the informant, by the name of Evelyn (also a hospitality girl) who jotted
down the number of the car that took them away, also disappeared. On
January 29, 1984, during the proceedings of the Board, Lina Galman, the
common-law wife of Rolando Galman, was kidnapped together with a
neighbor named Rogelio Taruc, They have been missing since then, despite
his attempts to find any of them. According to him, "nobody was looking for
these five persons because they said Marcos was in Power [despite his
appeal to the Minister of National Defense to locate them]. Today, still no one
is looking for these people." And he appealed to the new leadership for its
assistance in learning their fate.

3. The discarding of the affidavits executed by U.S. airmen "While it is true

that the U.S. airmen's proposed testimonies would show an attempt of the
Philippine Air Force to divert the plane to Basa Airfield or some other place,
such showing would not necessarily contravene the theory of the
prosecution, nor the actual fact that Senator Aquino was killed at the Manila
International Airport. Justice Herrera had accurately pointed out that such
attempt of scrambling Aquino's plane merely showed a 'wider range of
conspiracy,' it being possibly just one of two or three other plans designed to
accomplish the same purpose of liquidating Senator Aquino. In any event,
even assuming that the said piece of evidence could go either way, it may
not be successfully contended that it was prudent or wise on the part of the
prosecution to totally discard the said piece of evidence. Despite minor
inconsistencies contained therein, its introduction could have helped the
cause of the prosecution. If it were not so, or that it would even favor the
defense, as averred by Justice Fernandez, the determined effort to suppress
the same would have been totally uncalled for."

4. Nine proposed rebuttal witnesses not presented.

5. The failure to exhaust available remedies against adverse developments:

"When the Supreme Court denied the petition of Justice Fernandez [against
the exclusion of the testimonies given by the military respondents headed by
Gen. Ver before the Fact Finding Board], the latter almost immediately
announced to media that he was not filing a motion for the reconsideration of
said denial for the reason that it would be futile to do so and foolhardy to
expect a favorable action on the same. ... His posture ... is, in the least,
indicative that he was living up to the instruction of finishing the trial of the
case as soon as possible, if not of something else."

6. The assignment of the case to Presiding Justice Pamaran: "Justice

Herrera testified that President Marcos ordered Justice Pamaran point-blank
to handle the case. The pro-forma denial by Justice Pamaran of such
instruction crumbles under the actuality of such directive having been
complied with to the letter. ...

"Justice Pamaran sought to discredit the claim that he was ordered by

President Marcos to handle the case personally by explaining that cases in
the Sandiganbayan are assigned by raffle and not to a particular Justice, but
to a division thereof. The evidence before the Comission on how the case
happened to be assigned to Justice Pamaran evinces a strong indication that
such assignment was not done fairly or regularly.

"There was no evidence at all that the assignment was indeed by virtue of a
regular raffle, except the uncorroborated testimony of Justice
Pamaran. ... Despite an announcement that Justice Escareal would be
presented by the respondents to testify on the contents of his aforesaid
Memorandum, such was not done. No reason was given why Justice Escarel
could not, or would not like to testify. Neither was any one of the officials or
employees of the Sandiganbayan who, according to Justice Pamaran, were
present during the supposed raffle, presented to corroborate the claim of
Justice

xxx xxx xxx

"It is also an admitted fact that the two Informations in the double murder
case were filed by Justice Herrera on January 23, 1985, at 12:02 p.m., and
the members of the Raffle Committee were summoned at 12:20 p.m. or only
18 minutes after the filing of the two Informations. Such speed in the actual
assignment of the case can truly be categorized as unusual, if not
extraordinary, considering that before a case filed may be included in the
raffle, there is need for a certain amount of paper work to be undertaken. If
such preliminary requirements were done in this case within the limited time
available therefor, the charge that the raffle was rushed to avoid the presence
of media people would ring with truth.

What is more intriguing is the fact that although a raffle might have been
actually conducted which resulted in the assignment of the case to the First
Division of the Sandiganbayan, the Commission did not receive any evidence
on how or why it was handled personally by Justice Pamaran who wrote the
decision thereof, and not by any one of the two other members of his
division. . . .

7. The custody of the accused their confinement in a military camp, instead

of in a civilian jail: "When the question of custody came up after the case was
filed in the Sandiganbayan, the latter issued an order directing the
confinement of the accused in the City Jail of Manila. This order was not
carried out in view of the information given by the Warden of the City Jail that
there was no space for the twenty-six accused in said jail. The same
information was given when the custody was proposed to be given to the
National Penitentiary in Muntinglupa and to the National Bureau of
Investigation. At that point, the defense came up with Presidential Decree
No. 1950A which authorizes the custody of the accused military personnel
with their respective Commanding Officers. Justice Herrera claimed that the
said Presidential Decree was not known even to the Tanodbayan Justice
Fernandez who had to call up the then Minister of Justice Estelito Mendoza
to request a copy of the same, and was given such copy only after
sometime. ..."

8. The monitoring of proceedings and developments from Malacañang and

by Malacañang personnel: "There is an uncontradicted evidence that the
progress of the proceedings in the Sandiganbayan as well as the
developments of the case outside the Court had been monitored by
Malacañang presumably for it to know what was happening and to take
remedial measures as may be necessary. Justice Pamaran had candidly
admitted that television cameras "boldly carrying the label of 'Office of the
President of the Philippines' " were installed in the courtroom for that purpose.
There was a room in the Sandiganbayan, mischievously caned 'war room',
wherein military and Malacañang personnel stayed to keep track of the
proceedings." the close monitoring by Malacañang showed its results on
several occasions specified in the Report. Malacañang was immediately
aware of the Japanese witness Wakamiya's presence injustice Herrera's
office on August 21, 1985 and forestalled the giving of his testimony by
having the Japanese Embassy advise Wakamiya to leave the country at
once. Likewise, Col. Balbino Diego, Malacañang intelligence chief, suddenly
appeared at the National Bureau of Investigation office when the "crying
lady" Rebecca Quijano was brought there by NBI agents for interrogation and
therein sought to obtain custody of her. "It is likewise an undisputed fact," the
Commission noted "that several military personnel pretended to be deputy
sheriffs of the Sandiganbayan and attended the trials thereof in the
prescribed deputy sheriffs' uniforms." The Commission's inescapable finding.
" It is abundantly clear that President Marcos did not only give instructions as
to how the case should be handled He saw to it that he would know if his
instructions will be complied with."

9. Partiality of Sandiganbayan betrayed by its decision: "That President

Marcos had wanted all of the twenty-six accused to be acquitted may not be
denied. The disposal of the case in said manner is an integral part of the
scenario which was cleverly designed to accomplish two principal objectives,
seemingly conflicting in themselves, but favorable both to then administration
and to the accused; to wit, [1] the satisfaction of the public clamor for the
suspected killers of Senator Aquino to be charged in court, and [2] the
foreclosure of any possibility that they may again be prosecuted for the same
offense in the event that President Marcos shall no longer be in power.

"In rendering its decision the Sandiganbayan overdid itself in favoring the
presidential directive. Its bias and partiality in favor of the accused was
glaringly obvious. The evidence presented by the prosecution was totally
ignored and disregarded. ... It was deemed not sufficient to simply acquit all
of the twenty-six accused on the standard ground that their guilt had not been
proven beyond reasonable doubt, as was the most logical and appropriate
way of justifying the acquittal in the case, there not being a total absence of
evidence that could show guilt on the part of the accused. The decision had
to pronounce them 'innocent of the crime charged on the two informations,
and accordingly, they incur neither criminal nor civil liability.' It is a rare
phenomenon to see a person accused of a crime to be favored with such
total absolution. ...

Doubt on the soundness of the decision entertained by one of the two justices
who concurred with the majority decision penned by Justice Pamaran
was revealed by Justice Herrera who testified that in October, 1985, when
the decision was being prepared, Justice Agusto Amores told him that he
was of the view that some of the accused should be convicted he having
found difficulty in acquitting all of them; however, he confided to Justice
Herrera that Justice Pamaran made it clear to him and Justice Vera Cruz that
Malacañang had instructions to acquit all of the twenty-six accused (TSN,
July 17, 1986, p. 49). Justice Amores also told Justice Herrera that he would
confirm this statement (which was mentioned in Justice Herrera's comment
to the Second Motion for Reconsideration) if asked about it (TSN, June 19,
1986, pp. 92-93). This testimony Justice Herrera remained unrebutted "
(Emphasis supplied)

The record shows suffocatingly that from beginning to end, the then President
used, or more precisely, misused the overwhelming resources of the
government and his authoritarian powers to corrupt and make a mockery of
the judicial process in the Aquino-Galman murder cases. As graphically
depicted in the Report, supra, and borne out by the happenings (res ipsa
loquitur22) since the resolution prepared by his "Coordinator," Manuel Lazaro, his Presidential Assistant on
Legal Affairs, for the Tanodbayan's dismissal of the cases against all accused was unpalatable (it would summon
the demonstrators back to the streets 23 ) and at any rate was not acceptable to the Herrera prosecution panel,
the unholy scenario for acquittal of all 26 accused after the rigged trial as ordered at the Malacanang conference,
would accomplish the two principal objectives of satisfaction of the public clamor for the suspected killers to be
charged in court and of giving them through their acquittal the legal shield of double jeopardy. 24

Indeed, the secret Malacanang conference at which the authoritarian

President called together the Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan and
Tanodbayan Fernandez and the entire prosecution panel headed by Deputy
Tanodbayan Herrera and told them how to handle and rig (moro-moro) the
trial and the close monitoring of the entire proceedings to assure the pre-
determined ignominious final outcome are without parallel and precedent in
our annals and jurisprudence. To borrow a phrase from Ninoy's April 14, 1975
letter withdrawing his petition for habeas corpus, 25"This is the evil of one-man rule at its
very worst." Our Penal Code penalizes "any executive officer who shall address any order or suggestion to any
judicial authority with respect to any case or business coming within the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of
justice." 26 His obsession for "the boys' " acquittal led to several first which would otherwise be inexplicable:—

1. He turned his back on and repudiated the findings of the very Fact Finding
Board that he himself appointed to investigate the "national tragedy and
national shame" of the "treacherous and vicious assassination of Ninoy
Aquino and "to ventilate the truth through free, independent and
dispassionate investigation by prestigious and free investigators."

2. He cordially received the chairman with her minority report one day ahead
of the four majority members and instantly referred it to respondents "for final
resolution through the legal system" as if it were the majority and controlling
report; and rebuked the four majority members when they presented to him
the next day their report calling for the indictment of all 26 respondents
headed by Gens. Ver and Olivas (instead of the lesser seven under the
chairman's minority report).

3. From the day after the Aquino assassination to the dictated verdict of
acquittal, he totally disregarded the Board's majority and minority findings of
fact and publicly insisted that the military's "fall guy" Rolando Galman was
the killer of Ninoy Aquino and sought futilely to justify the soldiers'
incompetence and gross negligence to provide any security for Ninoy in
contrast to their alacrity in gunning down the alleged assassin Galman and
searing his lips.
4. The Sandiganbayan's decision (Pamaran, J. ponente) in effect convicted
Rolando Galman as Ninoy's assassin notwithstanding that he was not on trial
but the victim according to the very information filed, and evidence to the
contrary submitted, by the Herrera prosecution panel; and

5. Justice Pamaran's ponencia (despite reservations expressed by Justice

Amores who wanted to convict some of the accused) granted all 26 accused
total absolution and pronounced them "innocent of the crimes charged in the
two informations, and accordingly, they incur neither criminal nor civil
liability," notwithstanding the evidence on the basis of which the Fact Finding
Board had unanimously declared the soldiers' version of Galman being
Aquino's killer a "perjured story, given deliberately and in conspiracy with one
another."

The fact of the secret Malacañang conference of January 10, 1985 at which
the authoritarian President discussed with the Presiding Justice of the
Sandiganbayan and the entire prosecution panel the matter of the imminent
filing of the criminal charges against all the twenty-six accused (as admitted
by respondent Justice Fernandez to have been confirmed by him to the then
President's "Coordinator" Manuel Lazaro on the preceding day) is not denied.
It is without precedent. This was illegal under our penal laws, supra. This
illegality vitiated from the very beginning all proceedings in the
Sandiganbayan court headed by the very Presiding Justice who attended. As
the Commission noted: "The very acts of being summoned to Malacañang
and their ready acquiescence thereto under the circumstances then
obtaining, are in themselves pressure dramatized and exemplified. ... Verily,
it can be said that any avowal of independent action or resistance to
presidential pressure became illusory from the very moment they stepped
inside Malacanang Palace on January 10, 1985."

No court whose Presiding Justice has received "orders or suggestions" from

the very President who by an amendatory decree (disclosed only at the
hearing of oral arguments on November 8, 1984 on a petition challenging the
referral of the Aquino-Galman murder cases to the Tanodbayan and
Sandiganbayan instead of to a court martial, as mandatory required by the
known P.D. 1850 at the time providing for exclusive jurisdiction of courts
martial over criminal offenses committed by military men 26-a) made it possible to
refer the cases to the Sandiganbayan, can be an impartial court, which is the very essence of due process of
law. As the writer then wrote, "jurisdiction over cases should be determined by law, and not by preselection of
the Executive, which could be much too easily transformed into a means of predetermining the outcome of
individual cases. 26-b "This criminal collusion as to the handling and treatment of the cases by public respondents
at the secret Malacanang conference (and revealed only after fifteen months by Justice Manuel Herrera)
completely disqualified respondent Sandiganbayan and voided ab initio its verdict. This renders moot and
irrelevant for now the extensive arguments of respondents accused, particularly Generals Ver and Olivas and
those categorized as accessories, that there has been no evidence or witness suppressed against them, that
the erroneous conclusions of Olivas as police investigator do not make him an accessory of the crimes he
investigated and the appraisal and evaluation of the testimonies of the witnesses presented and suppressed.
There will be time and opportunity to present all these arguments and considerations at the remand and retrial
of the cases herein ordered before a neutral and impartial court.

The Supreme Court cannot permit such a sham trial and verdict and travesty
of justice to stand unrectified. The courts of the land under its aegis are courts
of law and justice and equity. They would have no reason to exist if they were
allowed to be used as mere tools of injustice, deception and duplicity to
subvert and suppress the truth, instead of repositories of judicial power
whose judges are sworn and committed to render impartial justice to all alike
who seek the enforcement or protection of a right or the prevention or redress
of a wrong, without fear or favor and removed from the pressures of politics
and prejudice. More so, in the case at bar where the people and the world
are entitled to know the truth, and the integrity of our judicial system is at
stake. In life, as an accused before the military tribunal, Ninoy had pleaded
in vain that as a civilian he was entitled to due process of law and trial in the
regular civil courts before an impartial court with an unbiased prosecutor. In
death, Ninoy, as the victim of the "treacherous and vicious assassination"
and the relatives and sovereign people as the aggrieved parties plead once
more for due process of law and a retrial before an impartial court with an
unbiased prosecutor. The Court is constrained to declare the sham trial a
mock trial the non-trial of the century-and that the pre-determined judgment
of acquittal was unlawful and void ab initio.

1. No double jeopardy.-It is settled doctrine that double jeopardy cannot be

invoked against this Court's setting aside of the trial courts' judgment of
dismissal or acquittal where the prosecution which represents the sovereign
people in criminal cases is denied due process. As the Court stressed in the
1985 case of People vs. Bocar, 27
Where the prosecution is deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and
prove its case its right to due process is thereby violated. 27-a

The cardinal precept is that where there is a violation of basic constitutional

rights, courts are ousted of their jurisdiction. Thus, the violation of the State's
right to due process raises a serious jurisdictional issue (Gumabon vs.
Director of the Bureau of Prisons, L-30026, 37 SCRA 420 [Jan. 30,
1971]which cannot be glossed over or disregarded at will. Where the denial
of the fundamental right of due process is apparent, a decision rendered in
disregard of that right is void for lack of jurisdiction (Aducayen vs. Flores, L-
30370 [May 25, 1973], 51 SCRA 78; Shell Co. vs. Enage, L-30111-12, 49
SCRA 416 [Feb. 27, 1973]). Any judgment or decision rendered
notwithstanding such violation may be regarded as a "lawless thing, which
can be treated as an outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored wherever it exhibits
its head" (Aducayen vs. Flores, supra).

Respondent Judge's dismissal order dated July 7, 1967 being null and void
for lack of jurisdiction, the same does not constitute a proper basis for a claim
of double jeopardy (Serino vs. Zosa, supra).

xxx xxx xxx

Legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid indictment, (b) before a
competent court, (c) after arraignment, (d) a valid plea having been entered;
and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express
consent of the accused (People vs. Ylagan, 58 Phil. 851). The lower court
was not competent as it was ousted of its jurisdiction when it violated the right
of the prosecution to due process.

In effect the first jeopardy was never terminated, and the remand of the
criminal case for further hearing and/or trial before the lower courts amounts
merely to a continuation of the first jeopardy, and does not expose the
accused to a second jeopardy.

More so does the rule against the invoking of double jeopardy hold in the
cases at bar where as we have held, the sham trial was but a mock trial where
the authoritarian president ordered respondents Sandiganbayan and
Tanodbayan to rig the trial and closely monitored the entire proceedings to
assure the pre-determined final outcome of acquittal and total absolution as
innocent of an the respondents-accused. Notwithstanding the laudable
efforts of Justice Herrera which saw him near the end "deactivating" himself
from the case, as it was his belief that its eventual resolution was already a
foregone conclusion, they could not cope with the misuse and abuse of the
overwhelming powers of the authoritarian President to weaken the case of
the prosecution, to suppress its evidence, harass, intimidate and threaten its
witnesses, secure their recantation or prevent them from testifying. Fully
aware of the prosecution's difficulties in locating witnesses and overcoming
their natural fear and reluctance to appear and testify, respondent
Sandiganbayan maintained a "dizzying tempo" of the proceedings and
announced its intention to terminate the proceedings in about 6 months time
or less than a year, pursuant to the scripted scenario. The prosecution
complained of "the Presiding Justice's seemingly hostile attitude towards (it)"
and their being the subject of warnings, reprimand and contempt proceedings
as compared to the nil situation for the defense. Herrera likewise complained
of being "cajoled into producing witnesses and pressed on making
assurances that if given a certain period, they will be able to produce their
witnesses Herrera pleaded for "a reasonable period of preparation of its
evidence" and cited other pending cases before respondent court that were
pending trial for a much longer time where the "dizzying tempo" and "fast
pace" were not maintained by the court. 28 Manifestly, the prosecution and the sovereign
people were denied due process of law with a partial court and biased Tanodbayan under the constant and
pervasive monitoring and pressure exerted by the authoritarian President to assure the carrying out of his
instructions. A dictated, coerced and scripted verdict of acquittal such as that in the case at bar is a void
judgment. In legal contemplation, it is no judgment at all. It neither binds nor bars anyone. Such a judgment is
"a lawless thing which can be treated as an outlaw". It is a terrible and unspeakable affront to the society and
the people. To paraphrase Brandeis: 29 If the authoritarian head of the government becomes the law-breaker,
he breeds contempt for the law, he invites every man to become a law unto himself, he invites anarchy.

Respondents-accused's contention that the Sandiganbayan judgment of

acquittal ends the case which cannot be appealed or re-opened, without
being put in double jeopardy was forcefully disposed of by the Court
in People vs. Court of Appeals, which is fully applicable here, as follows:
"That is the general rule and presupposes a valid judgment. As earlier
pointed out, however, respondent Courts' Resolution of acquittal was a void
judgment for having been issued without jurisdiction. No double jeopardy
attaches, therefore. A void judgment is, in legal effect, no judgment at all By
it no rights are divested. Through it, no rights can be attained. Being
worthless, all proceedings founded upon it are equally worthless. It neither
binds nor bars anyone. All acts performed under it and all claims flowing out
of it are void.

|lang1033 xxx xxx xxx

"Private respondent invoke 'justice for the innocent'. For justice to prevail the
scales must balance. It is not to be dispensed for the accused alone. The
interests of the society, which they have wronged must also be equally
considered. A judgment of conviction is not necessarily a denial of justice. A
verdict of acquittal neither necessarily spells a triumph of justice. To the party
wronged, to the society offended, it could also mean injustice. This is where
the Courts play a vital role. They render justice where justice is due.30

2. Motion to Disqualify/Inhibit should have been resolved Ahead.-The private

prosecutors had filed a motion to disqualify and for inhibition of respondents
Justices of the Sandiganbayan on grounds of manifest bias and partiality to
the defense and arising from then Atty. (now Tanodbayan) Raul M. Gonzales'
charge that Justice Vera-Cruz had been passing coaching notes to defense
counsel. Justice Herrera had joined the motion and pleaded at the hearing of
June 25, 1985 and in the prosecution memorandum that respondent
Sandiganbayan "should not decide the case on the merits without first
making a final ruling on the Motion for Inhibition." Herrera quoted the
exchange between him and the Presiding Justice to show the latter's
"following the script of Malacanang.

PJ PAMARAN

Well the court believes that we should proceed with the trial and then deal
later on with that. After all, the most important thing here is, shall we say, the
decision of the case.

J. HERRERA

I think more important than the decision of the case, Your Honor, is the
capacity of the justices to sit in judgment. That is more important than
anything else.(p. 13 TSN, June 25, 1985) (Emphasis supplied by Herrera). 31
But the Sandiganbayan brushed aside Herrera's pleas and then wrongly
blamed him, in the decision, for supposedly not having joined the petition for
inhibition, contrary to the facts above-stated, as follows:

... the motion for inhibition above referred to related exclusively for the
contempt proceeding. Too, it must be remembered that the prosecution
neither joined that petition, nor did it at any time manifest a desire to file a
similar motion prior to the submission of these cases for decision. To do it
now is not alone out of season but is also a confession of official insouciance
(Page 22, Decision). 32

The action for prohibition was filed in the Court to seek the disqualification of
respondents Justices pursuant to the procedure recognized by the Court in
the 1969 case of Paredes vs. Gopengco 33 since an adverse ruling by respondent court might
result in a verdict of acquittal, leaving the offended party without any remedy nor appeal in view of the double
jeopardy rule, not to mention the overiding and transcendental public interest that would make out a case of
denial of due process to the People if the alleged failure on the part of the Tanodbayan to present the complete
evidence for the prosecution is substantiated. 34

In this case, petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the abrupt dismissal of

their petition and lifting of the temporary restraining order enjoining the
Sandiganbayan from rendering its decision had been taken cognizance of by
the Court which had required the respondents', including the
Sandiganbayan's, comments. Although no restraining order was issued
anew, respondent Sandiganbayan should not have precipitately issued its
decision of total absolution of all the accused pending the final action of this
Court. This is the teaching of Valdez vs. Aquilizan35, Wherein the court in setting aside
the hasty convictions, ruled that "prudence dictated that (respondent judge) refrain from deciding the cases or
at the very least to hold in abeyance the promulgation of his decision pending action by this Court. But prudence
gave way to imprudence; the respondent judge acted precipitately by deciding the cases [hastily without awaiting
this Court's action]. All of the acts of the respondent judge manifest grave abuse of discretion on his part
amounting to lack of jurisdiction which substantively prejudiced the petitioner."

3. Re: Objections of respondents.-The other related objections of

respondents' counsels must be rejected in the face of the Court's declaration
that the trial was a mock trial and that the pre-determined judgment of
acquittal was unlawful and void ab initio.

(a) It follows that there is no need to resort to a direct action to annul the
judgment, instead of the present action which was timely filed initially to
declare a mistrial and to enjoin the rendition of the void judgment. And after
the hasty rendition of such judgment for the declaration of its nullity, following
the presentation of competent proof heard by the Commission and the
Court's findings therefrom that the proceedings were from the beginning
vitiated not only by lack of due process but also by the collusion between the
public respondents (court and Tanodbayan) for the rendition of a pre-
determined verdict of acquitting all the twenty-six respondents-accused.

(b) It is manifest that this does not involve a case of mere irregularities in the
conduct of the proceedings or errors of judgment which do not affect the
integrity or validity of the judgment or verdict.

(c) The contention of one of defense counsel that the State and the sovereign
people are not entitled to due process is clearly erroneous and contrary to
the basic principles and jurisprudence cited hereinabove.

(d) The submittal of respondents-accused that they had not exerted the
pressure applied by the authoritarian president on public respondents and
that no evidence was suppressed against them must be held to be untenable
in the wake of the evil plot now exposed for their preordained wholesale
exoneration.

(e) Respondents' invocation of the writer's opinion in Luzon Brokerage Co.,

Inc. vs. Maritime Bldg. Co., Inc. 36 is inappropriate. The writer therein held that a party should be
entitled to only one Supreme Court and may not speculate on vital changes in the Court's membership for review
of his lost case once more, since public policy and sound practice demand that litigation be put to an end and
no second pro forma motion for reconsideration reiterating the same arguments should be kept pending so long
(for over six (6) years and one (1) month since the denial of the first motion for reconsideration), This opinion
cannot be properly invoked, because here, petitioners' second motion for reconsideration was filed promptly on
March 20, 1986 following the denial under date of February 4th of the first motion for reconsideration and the
same was admitted per the Court's Resolution of April 3, 1986 and is now being resolved within five months of
its filing after the Commission had received the evidence of the parties who were heard by the Court only last
August 26th. The second motion for reconsideration is based on an entirely new material ground which was not
known at the time of the denial of the petition and filing of the first motion for reconsideration, i.e, the secret
Malacañang conference on January 10, 1985 which came to light only fifteen months later in March, 1986 and
showed beyond per adventure (as proved in the Commission hearings) the merits of the petition and that the
authoritarian president had dictated and pre-determined the final outcome of acquittal. Hence, the ten members
of the Court (without any new appointees) unanimously voted to admit the second motion for reconsideration.37

4. With the declaration of nullity of the proceedings, the cases must now be
tried before an impartial court with an unbiased prosecutor.-There has been
the long dark night of authoritarian regime, since the fake ambush in
September, 1972 of then Defense Secretary Juan Ponce Enrile (as now
admitted by Enrile himself was staged to trigger the imposition of martial law
and authoritarian one-man rule, with the padlocking of Congress and the
abolition of the office of the Vice-President.

As recently retired Senior Justice Vicente Abad Santos recalled in his

valedictory to the new members of the Bar last May, "In the past few years,
the judiciary was under heavy attack by an extremely powerful executive.
During this state of judicial siege, lawyers both in and outside the judiciary
perceptively surrendered to the animus of technicality. In the end, morality
was overwhelmed by technicality, so that the latter emerged ugly and naked
in its true manifestation."

Now that the light is emerging, the Supreme Court faces the task of restoring
public faith and confidence in the courts. The Supreme Court enjoys neither
the power of the sword nor of the purse. Its strength lies mainly in public
confidence, based on the truth and moral force of its judgments. This has
been built on its cherished traditions of objectivity and impartiallity integrity
and fairness and unswerving loyalty to the Constitution and the rule of law
which compels acceptance as well by the leadership as by the people. The
lower courts draw their bearings from the Supreme Court. With this Court's
judgment today declaring the nullity of the questioned judgment or acquittal
and directing a new trial, there must be a rejection of the temptation of
becoming instruments of injustice as vigorously as we rejected becoming its
victims. The end of one form of injustice should not become simply the
beginning of another. This simply means that the respondents accused must
now face trial for the crimes charged against them before an impartial court
with an unbiased prosecutor with all due process. What the past regime had
denied the people and the aggrieved parties in the sham trial must now be
assured as much to the accused as to the aggrieved parties. The people will
assuredly have a way of knowing when justice has prevailed as well as when
it has failed.

The notion nurtured under the past regime that those appointed to public
office owe their primary allegiance to the appointing authority and are
accountable to him alone and not to the people or the Constitution must be
discarded. The function of the appointing authority with the mandate of the
people, under our system of government, is to fill the public posts. While the
appointee may acknowledge with gratitude the opportunity thus given of
rendering public service, the appointing authority becomes functus
officio and the primary loyalty of the appointed must be rendered to the
Constitution and the sovereign people in accordance with his sacred oath of
office. To paraphrase the late Chief Justice Earl Warren of the United States
Supreme Court, the Justices and judges must ever realize that they have no
constituency, serve no majority nor minority but serve only the public interest
as they see it in accordance with their oath of office, guided only, the
Constitution and their own conscience and honor.

5. Note of Commendation.- The Court expresses its appreciation with thanks

for the invaluable services rendered by the Commission composed of retired
Supreme Court Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, chairman, and retired Court of
Appeals Justices Milagros German and Eduardo Caguioa as members. In
the pure spirit of public service, they rendered selflessly and without
remuneration thorough competent and dedicated service in discharging their
tasks of hearing and receiving the evidence, evaluating the same and
submitting their Report and findings to the Court within the scheduled period
and greatly easing the Court's burden.

ACCORDINGLY, petitioners' second motion for reconsideration is granted.

The resolutions of November 28, 1985 dismissing the petition and of
February 4, 1986 denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration are hereby
set aside and in lieu thereof, judgment is hereby rendered nullifying the
proceedings in respondent Sandiganbayan and its judgment of acquittal in
Criminal Cases Nos. 10010 and 10011 entitled "People of the Philippines vs.
Gen. Luther Custodia et al." and ordering a re-trial of the said cases which
should be conducted with deliberate dispatch and with careful regard for the
requirements of due process, so that the truth may be finally known and
justice done to an

This resolution is immediately executory. SO ORDERED.

Yap, Cruz, Paras and Feliciano, JJ., concur.

Feria, **** Fernan and Narvasa , ***** JJ., took no part.

Separate Opinions

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:

Consistent with what I had perceived as the need to establish the truth behind
the vicious assassination of the late Senator Benigno Aquino, as expressed
in my dissenting opinion in Galman vs. Pamaran (138 SCRA 294, 379
[1985]), and so that justice may be done, I vote for the re-trial prayed for by
petitioners.

There is reason to believe that some vital evidence had been suppressed by
the prosecution, or that it had disregarded, as immaterial or irrelevant,
evidence which, if presented, could affect the outcome of the case. As it is,
the prosecution failed to fully ventilate its position and to lay out before
respondent Court all the pertinent facts which could have helped that Court
in arriving at a just decision. It had, thus, failed in its task.

A public prosecutor is 'the representative not of an ordinary party to a

controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as
compelling as its obligation to govern at all and whose interest, therefore, in
a criminal prosecution is not that it shag win a case but that justice shall be
done. As such, he is in a peculiar and every definite sense the servant of the
law, the two-fold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence
suffer. [Emphasis supplied] (Suarez vs. Platon, 69 Phil. 556 [1940])

He owes the state, the court and the accused the duty to lay before the court
the pertinent facts at his disposal with methodical and meticulous attention,
clarifying contradictions and filling up gaps and loopholes in his evidence to
the end that the court's mind may not be tortured by doubts, the innocent may
not suffer, and the guilty may not escape unpunished (People vs. Esquivel,
82 PhiL 453 [1948]).
Respondent Court, in showing partiality for the accused from beginning to
end, from the raffle of the subject cases to the promulgation of judgment,
which absolved the accused, en masse, from any and an liability, is equally
culpable for miscarriage of justice. Due process of law, which "requires a
hearing before an impartial and disinterested tribunal" and the right of every
litigant to "nothing less than the cold neutrality of an impartial Judge"
(Gutierrez vs. Santos, 112 Phil. 184 [1961]; Castillo vs. Juan, 62 SCRA 124
[1975]), was violated.

The proceedings below, having been vitiated by lack of due process, to the
detriment of the State and the People, were invalid and the judgment
rendered null and void ab initio. There having been no trial at all in
contemplation of law, there is likewise no judgment on which a plea of double
jeopardy may be based. "To entitle the accused to the plea of former jeopardy
the proceedings must have been valid (State vs. Bartlett, 164 N.W., 757;
State vs. O'Day 185 So. 290). The lack of any fundamental requisite which
would render void the judgment would make ineffective a plea of jeopardy
based on such proceedings (Steen vs. State, 242 S.W. 1047).

The accused, however, argue that double jeopardy attaches for, even
assuming without conceding, that pressure and collusion did take place, they
were not a party to the same; and, for those who were charged only either as
accomplices or accessories, they contend that their alleged offense involved
only a cover-up in the investigation of the crimes so that, whatever pressure
was exerted could only have benefited the principals, consequently, to
subject them to a re-trial is to put them twice in jeopardy.

It is true that where an accused was not a party to the fraud, a conviction
secured fraudulently by the State's officer cannot be avoided by the state
(State vs. Heflin, 96 So. 459, 19 Ala. App. 222). However, that exception is
inapplicable to the cases at bar where both the prosecution and the Trial
Court itself were parties to the fraud and collusion. Nor can it be said that the
accused were not a part thereof. The agreement to file the murder charge in
Court so that, after being acquitted as planned, the accused could no longer
be prosecuted under the doctrine of double jeopardy; the "categorization" of
the accused into principals, accomplices and accessories so that not all of
them would be denied bail during the trial, were fraudulently conceived for
their benefit and for the purpose of protecting them from subsequent
prosecution. It is, thus, no bar to a subsequent prosecution for the same
offense (Coumas vs. Superior Court, 192 P. 2d. 449, 452, 31 C. 2d. 682). "A
verdict of acquittal procured by the accused by fraud and collusion is a nullity
and does not put him in jeopardy; and consequently, it is no bar to a second
trial for the same offense (State vs. Lee, 30A. 1110, 65 Conn. 265,48 Am.
S.R. 202,27 L. RA. 498).

The proceedings below having been fatally flawed by pressure, fraud and
collusion, with the legal consequence that there was no trial and judgment to
speak of, and under the circumstances peculiar only to these cases, I v•te
for a re-trial in the interest of truth and the ends of public justice. As in all
criminal proceedings, however, the accused must be guaranteed a fair,
speedy, and impartial re-trial before an unbiased Tribunal and prosecutor
and, I might add, safeguarded against trial by publicity.

ALAMPAY, J., concurring:

Considering that certain significant facts and circumstances not previously

disclosed to the Court were found by the Commission constituted by this
Court, purposely to inquire and ascertain the veracity of the same, to be duly
established by sufficient evidence and are indicative of "a scripted and pre-
determined manner of handling and disposing of the Aquino-Galman murder
case ...;" and that there exists "adequate credible evidence showing that the
prosecution in the Aquino-Galman case and the Justices who tried and
decided the same acted under the compulsion of some pressure which
proved to be beyond their capacity to resist and which not only prevented the
prosecution to fully ventilate its position and to offer all the evidences it could
have otherwise presented, but also pre-determined the outcome of the
case; ..." I join in granting petitioners' second motion for reconsideration.

In my considered view, the ends of Justice will be best served by allowing

the trial anew of the subject cases in order to ultimately obtain a judgment
that will be removed from any suspicion of attendant irregularities. With the
greatest significance being given by our people to the said cases, which are
evidently of historical importance, I am readily persuaded that it is to our
national interest that all relevant evidence that may be now available be
provided an opportunity to be received and made known so that whatever is
the actual truth can be rightfully ascertained. I, therefore, vote for a
declaration of mistrial and for nullifying the proceedings of the referred
Criminal Cases Nos. 10010 and 10011 before the Sandiganbayan and the
ordering of are trial.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J. concurring:

On November 28, 1985, this Court dismissed the petition for certiorari and
prohibition with preliminary injunction and lifted a Temporary Restraining
Order earlier granted. We are now acting on a motion for reconsideration filed
by the petitioners.

When the Court initially dismissed the petition, I issued a separate concurring
and dissenting opinion. The issues before us were novel and momentous. I
felt that in immediately dismissing the petition, we were denying the
petitioners every reasonable opportunity to prove their allegations of non-
independent and biased conduct of both the prosecution and the trial court. I
stated that the issues of miscarriage of justice and due process arising from
that conduct should be allowed more extended treatment. With then
Associate Justices Claudio Teehankee and Vicente Abad Santos, I,
therefore, dissented from the Court's resolution denying the petitioners'
motions to continue presenting their case.

Since the majority of the Court, however, had decided to resolve the petition
on its merits and the findings of the Vasquez Commission were still for the
future, I concurred in the result of this Court's action on two grounds-(1) the
right of the accused to speedy trial and (2) the presumption in law that judicial
acts are regularly performed and that public officers have discharged their
duties in accordance with law.

The findings of the Vasquez Commission now confirm my initial misgivings

and more than overcome the presumption of regular performance of official
duty upon which I based my concurrence.

What were some of these misgivings now given substance by the

investigation?
Mistrial is usually raised by the accused. In this petition neither the accused
nor the prosecution saw anything wrong in the proceedings. We had the
unusual phenomenon of the relatives of one victim, prominent lawyers and
law professors, and retired Justices assuming the uncommon role of alleging
not only a biased Sandiganbayan but also a Tanodbayan holding back its
own evidence. Instead of allowing the heated passions and emotions
generated by the Aquino assassination to cool off or die down, the accused
insisted on the immediate rendition of a decision.

The Sandiganbayan is usually sober and respectful in its relations with the
Supreme Court. I, therefore, found it strange and unfortunate why, in its
Comment, the Sandiganbayan should question our authority to look into the
exercise of its jurisdiction. There was the further matter of television cameras
during trial, their effect on the witnesses and the judges, and other
mischievous potentialities.

The report of the Vasquez Comission now shows that there was more to
these misgivings and suspicions than appeared in the records at that time.
The Court's opinion penned by the Chief Justice states in detail why the
Sandiganbayan was not an impartial tribunal and the Tanodbayan not an
unbiased prosecutor.

The right against double jeopardy is intended to protect against repeated

litigations and continuous harassment of a person who has already
undergone the agony of prosecution and trial for one and the same offense.
It certainly was never intended to cover a situation where the prosecution
suppresses some of its own evidence, where the accused correctly and
eagerly anticipate a judgment of acquittal, and where the court appears to
have made up its mind even before trial has started.

Under the circumstances found by the Vasquez Commission, there was a

failure of trial tantamount to no trial at all. A "moro-moro" could not possibly
result in a just or valid decision.

I am, however, constrained to write this separate opinion to emphasize a

concern of this Court and of an Filipinos who want genuine justice to be
realized in this case.
In the same way that we deplore the pressures and partiality which led to the
judgment of acquittal we must insure that absolutely no indication of bias,
pre-judgment, or vindictiveness shall taint the retrial of this case. The fairly
strong language used by the Court in its main opinion underscores the gravity
with which it views the travesties of justice in this "trial of the century." At the
same time, nothing expressed in our opinion should be interpreted as the
Supreme Court's making a factual finding, one way or another, about the
perpetrators of the Aquino or the Galman killing. Any statements about the
circumstances of the assassination or about the military version of the killings
are intended solely for one issue whether or not the Sandiganbayan
acquittals should be set aside and a retrial ordered.

Neither our final resolution of this petition, the stature of the persons
involved, pakikisama, utang na loob for an appointment or reappointment, or
any other extraneous matters should color or influence the future course of
this case.

Needless to say, any person who, in the past, may have formally expressed
opinions about the innocence or guilt of the accused should be neither a
prosecutor or judge in any forthcoming trial. It is not enough for the future
proceedings to be fair they should be above any suspicion of partiality, bias,
rancor, or vindictiveness. It would be unfortunate if, in the conduct of further
proceedings in this case, erroneous impressions may arise that a prosecutor
or judge has prejudged the guilt or innocence of any accused. Having just
declared a mistrial, we should not again declare the retrial as another
mistrial, ad infinitum.

For the reasons abovestated, I concur in the decision of the Court to grant
the petitioners' second motion for reconsideration.

Feliciano, J., concurs in his statements in the last three paragraphs (prior to
the dispositive paragraph) of his Separate Concurring Opinion.

Separate Opinions
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:

Consistent with what I had perceived as the need to establish the truth
behind the vicious assassination of the late Senator Benigno Aquino, as
expressed in my dissenting opinion in Galman vs. Pamaran (138 SCRA
294, 379 [1985]), and so that justice may be done, I vote for the re-trial
prayed for by petitioners.

There is reason to believe that some vital evidence had been suppressed
by the prosecution, or that it had disregarded, as immaterial or irrelevant,
evidence which, if presented, could affect the outcome of the case. As it is,
the prosecution failed to fully ventilate its position and to lay out before
respondent Court all the pertinent facts which could have helped that Court
in arriving at a just decision. It had, thus, failed in its task.

A public prosecutor is 'the representative not of an ordinary party to a

controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is
as compelling as its obligation to govern at all and whose interest,
therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shag win a case but that
justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and every definite sense
the servant of the law, the two-fold aim of which is that guilt shall not
escape or innocence suffer. [Emphasis supplied] (Suarez vs. Platon, 69
Phil. 556 [1940])

He owes the state, the court and the accused the duty to lay before the
court the pertinent facts at his disposal with methodical and meticulous
attention, clarifying contradictions and filling up gaps and loopholes in his
evidence to the end that the court's mind may not be tortured by doubts, the
innocent may not suffer, and the guilty may not escape unpunished (People
vs. Esquivel, 82 PhiL 453 [1948]).

Respondent Court, in showing partiality for the accused from beginning to

end, from the raffle of the subject cases to the promulgation of judgment,
which absolved the accused, en masse, from any and an liability, is equally
culpable for miscarriage of justice. Due process of law, which "requires a
hearing before an impartial and disinterested tribunal" and the right of every
litigant to "nothing less than the cold neutrality of an impartial Judge"
(Gutierrez vs. Santos, 112 Phil. 184 [1961]; Castillo vs. Juan, 62 SCRA 124
[1975]), was violated.

The proceedings below, having been vitiated by lack of due process, to the
detriment of the State and the People, were invalid and the judgment
rendered null and void ab initio. There having been no trial at all in
contemplation of law, there is likewise no judgment on which a plea of
double jeopardy may be based. "To entitle the accused to the plea of
former jeopardy the proceedings must have been valid (State vs. Bartlett,
164 N.W., 757; State vs. O'Day 185 So. 290). The lack of any fundamental
requisite which would render void the judgment would make ineffective a
plea of jeopardy based on such proceedings (Steen vs. State, 242 S.W.
1047).

The accused, however, argue that double jeopardy attaches for, even
assuming without conceding, that pressure and collusion did take place,
they were not a party to the same; and, for those who were charged only
either as accomplices or accessories, they contend that their alleged
offense involved only a cover-up in the investigation of the crimes so that,
whatever pressure was exerted could only have benefited the principals,
consequently, to subject them to a re-trial is to put them twice in jeopardy.

It is true that where an accused was not a party to the fraud, a conviction
secured fraudulently by the State's officer cannot be avoided by the state
(State vs. Heflin, 96 So. 459, 19 Ala. App. 222). However, that exception is
inapplicable to the cases at bar where both the prosecution and the Trial
Court itself were parties to the fraud and collusion. Nor can it be said that
the accused were not a part thereof. The agreement to file the murder
charge in Court so that, after being acquitted as planned, the accused could
no longer be prosecuted under the doctrine of double jeopardy; the
"categorization" of the accused into principals, accomplices and
accessories so that not all of them would be denied bail during the trial,
were fraudulently conceived for their benefit and for the purpose of
protecting them from subsequent prosecution. It is, thus, no bar to a
subsequent prosecution for the same offense (Coumas vs. Superior Court,
192 P. 2d. 449, 452, 31 C. 2d. 682). "A verdict of acquittal procured by the
accused by fraud and collusion is a nullity and does not put him in jeopardy;
and consequently, it is no bar to a second trial for the same offense (State
vs. Lee, 30A. 1110, 65 Conn. 265,48 Am. S.R. 202,27 L. RA. 498).

The proceedings below having been fatally flawed by pressure, fraud and
collusion, with the legal consequence that there was no trial and judgment
to speak of, and under the circumstances peculiar only to these cases, I
vote for a re-trial in the interest of truth and the ends of public justice. As in
all criminal proceedings, however, the accused must be guaranteed a fair,
speedy, and impartial re-trial before an unbiased Tribunal and prosecutor
and, I might add, safeguarded against trial by publicity.

ALAMPAY, J., concurring:

Considering that certain significant facts and circumstances not previously

disclosed to the Court were found by the Commission constituted by this
Court, purposely to inquire and ascertain the veracity of the same, to be
duly established by sufficient evidence and are indicative of "a scripted and
pre-determined manner of handling and disposing of the Aquino-Galman
murder case ...;" and that there exists "adequate credible evidence showing
that the prosecution in the Aquino-Galman case and the Justices who tried
and decided the same acted under the compulsion of some pressure which
proved to be beyond their capacity to resist and which not only prevented
the prosecution to fully ventilate its position and to offer all the evidences it
could have otherwise presented, but also pre-determined the outcome of
the case; ..." I join in granting petitioners' second motion for reconsideration.

In my considered view, the ends of Justice will be best served by allowing

the trial anew of the subject cases in order to ultimately obtain a judgment
that will be removed from any suspicion of attendant irregularities. With the
greatest significance being given by our people to the said cases, which are
evidently of historical importance, I am readily persuaded that it is to our
national interest that all relevant evidence that may be now available be
provided an opportunity to be received and made known so that whatever is
the actual truth can be rightfully ascertained. I, therefore, vote for a
declaration of mistrial and for nullifying the proceedings of the referred
Criminal Cases Nos. 10010 and 10011 before the Sandiganbayan and the
ordering of are trial.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J. concurring::

On November 28, 1985, this Court dismissed the petition for certiorari and
prohibition with preliminary injunction and lifted a Temporary Restraining
Order earlier granted. We are now acting on a motion for reconsideration
filed by the petitioners.

When the Court initially dismissed the petition, I issued a separate

concurring and dissenting opinion. The issues before us were novel and
momentous. I felt that in immediately dismissing the petition, we were
denying the petitioners every reasonable opportunity to prove their
allegations of non-independent and biased conduct of both the prosecution
and the trial court. I stated that the issues of miscarriage of justice and due
process arising from that conduct should be allowed more extended
treatment. With then Associate Justices Claudio Teehankee and Vicente
Abad Santos, I, therefore, dissented from the Court's resolution denying the
petitioners' motions to continue presenting their case.

Since the majority of the Court, however, had decided to resolve the petition
on its merits and the findings of the Vasquez Commission were still for the
future, I concurred in the result of this Court's action on two grounds-(1) the
right of the accused to speedy trial and (2) the presumption in law that
judicial acts are regularly performed and that public officers have
discharged their duties in accordance with law.

The findings of the Vasquez Commission now confirm my initial misgivings

and more than overcome the presumption of regular performance of official
duty upon which I based my concurrence.

What were some of these misgivings now given substance by the

investigation?

Mistrial is usually raised by the accused. In this petition neither the accused
nor the prosecution saw anything wrong in the proceedings. We had the
unusual phenomenon of the relatives of one victim, prominent lawyers and
law professors, and retired Justices assuming the uncommon role of
alleging not only a biased Sandiganbayan but also a Tanodbayan holding
back its own evidence. Instead of allowing the heated passions and
emotions generated by the Aquino assassination to cool off or die down, the
accused insisted on the immediate rendition of a decision.

The Sandiganbayan is usually sober and respectful in its relations with the
Supreme Court. I, therefore, found it strange and unfortunate why, in its
Comment, the Sandiganbayan should question our authority to look into the
exercise of its jurisdiction. There was the further matter of television
cameras during trial, their effect on the witnesses and the judges, and other
mischievous potentialities.

The report of the Vasquez Comission now shows that there was more to
these misgivings and suspicions than appeared in the records at that time.
The Court's opinion penned by the Chief Justice states in detail why the
Sandiganbayan was not an impartial tribunal and the Tanodbayan not an
unbiased prosecutor.

The right against double jeopardy is intended to protect against repeated

litigations and continuous harassment of a person who has already
undergone the agony of prosecution and trial for one and the same offense.
It certainly was never intended to cover a situation where the prosecution
suppresses some of its own evidence, where the accused correctly and
eagerly anticipate a judgment of acquittal, and where the court appears to
have made up its mind even before trial has started.

Under the circumstances found by the Vasquez Commission, there was a

failure of trial tantamount to no trial at all. A "moro-moro" could not possibly
result in a just or valid decision.

I am, however, constrained to write this separate opinion to emphasize a

concern of this Court and of an Filipinos who want genuine justice to be
realized in this case.

In the same way that we deplore the pressures and partiality which led to
the judgment of acquittal we must insure that absolutely no indication of
bias, pre-judgment, or vindictiveness shall taint the retrial of this case. The
fairly strong language used by the Court in its main opinion underscores the
gravity with which it views the travesties of justice in this "trial of the
century." At the same time, nothing expressed in our opinion should be
interpreted as the Supreme Court's making a factual finding, one way or
another, about the perpetrators of the Aquino or the Galman killing. Any
statements about the circumstances of the assassination or about the
military version of the killings are intended solely for one issue whether or
not the Sandiganbayan acquittals should be set aside and a retrial ordered.

Neither our final resolution of this petition, the stature of the persons
involved, pakikisama, utang na loob for an appointment or reappointment,
or any other extraneous matters should color or influence the future course
of this case.

Needless to say, any person who, in the past, may have formally expressed
opinions about the innocence or guilt of the accused should be neither a
prosecutor or judge in any forthcoming trial. It is not enough for the future
proceedings to be fair they should be above any suspicion of partiality, bias,
rancor, or vindictiveness. It would be unfortunate if, in the conduct of further
proceedings in this case, erroneous impressions may arise that a
prosecutor or judge has prejudged the guilt or innocence of any accused.
Having just declared a mistrial, we should not again declare the retrial as
another mistrial, ad infinitum.

For the reasons abovestated, I concur in the decision of the Court to grant
the petitioners' second motion for reconsideration.

Feliciano, J., concurs in his statements in the last three paragraphs (prior to
the dispositive paragraph) of his Separate Concurring Opinion.
G.R. No. L-19550 June 19, 1967

HARRY S. STONEHILL, ROBERT P. BROOKS, JOHN J. BROOKS and

KARL BECK, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JOSE W. DIOKNO, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF JUSTICE;
JOSE LUKBAN, in his capacity as Acting Director, National Bureau of
Investigation; SPECIAL PROSECUTORS PEDRO D. CENZON, EFREN I.
PLANA and MANUEL VILLAREAL, JR. and ASST. FISCAL MANASES
G. REYES; JUDGE AMADO ROAN, Municipal Court of Manila; JUDGE
ROMAN CANSINO, Municipal Court of Manila; JUDGE HERMOGENES
CALUAG, Court of First Instance of Rizal-Quezon City Branch, and
JUDGE DAMIAN JIMENEZ, Municipal Court of Quezon
City, respondents.

Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno and Meer, Meer and Meer and
Juan T. David for petitioners.
Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General
Pacifico P. de Castro, Assistant Solicitor General Frine C. Zaballero,
Solicitor Camilo D. Quiason and Solicitor C. Padua for respondents.

CONCEPCION, C.J.:

Upon application of the officers of the government named on the margin1 —

hereinafter referred to as Respondents-Prosecutors — several judges2 —
hereinafter referred to as Respondents-Judges — issued, on different
dates,3 a total of 42 search warrants against petitioners herein4 and/or the
corporations of which they were officers,5 directed to the any peace officer,
to search the persons above-named and/or the premises of their offices,
warehouses and/or residences, and to seize and take possession of the
following personal property to wit:

Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts,

ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents
and/or papers showing all business transactions including disbursements
receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statements and Bobbins
(cigarette wrappers).

as "the subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of

the offense," or "used or intended to be used as the means of committing the
offense," which is described in the applications adverted to above as
"violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue
(Code) and the Revised Penal Code."
Alleging that the aforementioned search warrants are null and void, as
contravening the Constitution and the Rules of Court — because, inter alia:
(1) they do not describe with particularity the documents, books and things
to be seized; (2) cash money, not mentioned in the warrants, were actually
seized; (3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence against the
aforementioned petitioners in deportation cases filed against them; (4) the
searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner; and (5) the
documents, papers and cash money seized were not delivered to the courts
that issued the warrants, to be disposed of in accordance with law — on
March 20, 1962, said petitioners filed with the Supreme Court this original
action for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and injunction, and prayed that,
pending final disposition of the present case, a writ of preliminary injunction
be issued restraining Respondents-Prosecutors, their agents and /or
representatives from using the effects seized as aforementioned or any
copies thereof, in the deportation cases already adverted to, and that, in due
course, thereafter, decision be rendered quashing the contested search
warrants and declaring the same null and void, and commanding the
respondents, their agents or representatives to return to petitioners herein, in
accordance with Section 3, Rule 67, of the Rules of Court, the documents,
papers, things and cash moneys seized or confiscated under the search
warrants in question.

In their answer, respondents-prosecutors alleged, 6 (1) that the contested

search warrants are valid and have been issued in accordance with law; (2)
that the defects of said warrants, if any, were cured by petitioners' consent;
and (3) that, in any event, the effects seized are admissible in evidence
against herein petitioners, regardless of the alleged illegality of the
aforementioned searches and seizures.

On March 22, 1962, this Court issued the writ of preliminary injunction prayed
for in the petition. However, by resolution dated June 29, 1962, the writ was
partially lifted or dissolved, insofar as the papers, documents and things
seized from the offices of the corporations above mentioned are concerned;
but, the injunction was maintained as regards the papers, documents and
things found and seized in the residences of petitioners herein.7
Thus, the documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority
of the warrants in question may be split into two (2) major groups, namely:
(a) those found and seized in the offices of the aforementioned corporations,
and (b) those found and seized in the residences of petitioners herein.

As regards the first group, we hold that petitioners herein have no cause of
action to assail the legality of the contested warrants and of the seizures
made in pursuance thereof, for the simple reason that said corporations have
their respective personalities, separate and distinct from the personality of
herein petitioners, regardless of the amount of shares of stock or of the
interest of each of them in said corporations, and whatever the offices they
hold therein may be.8 Indeed, it is well settled that the legality of a seizure
can be contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired
thereby,9 and that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely
personal and cannot be availed of by third parties. 10 Consequently,
petitioners herein may not validly object to the use in evidence against them
of the documents, papers and things seized from the offices and premises of
the corporations adverted to above, since the right to object to the admission
of said papers in evidence belongs exclusively to the corporations, to whom
the seized effects belong, and may not be invoked by the corporate officers
in proceedings against them in their individual capacity. 11 Indeed, it has been
held:

. . . that the Government's action in gaining possession of papers belonging

to the corporation did not relate to nor did it affect the personal defendants.
If these papers were unlawfully seized and thereby the constitutional rights
of or any one were invaded, they were the rights of the corporation and not
the rights of the other defendants. Next, it is clear that a question of the
lawfulness of a seizure can be raised only by one whose rights have been
invaded. Certainly, such a seizure, if unlawful, could not affect the
constitutional rights of defendants whose property had not been seized or the
privacy of whose homes had not been disturbed; nor could they claim for
themselves the benefits of the Fourth Amendment, when its violation, if any,
was with reference to the rights of another. Remus vs. United
States (C.C.A.)291 F. 501, 511. It follows, therefore, that the question of the
admissibility of the evidence based on an alleged unlawful search and
seizure does not extend to the personal defendants but
embraces only the corporation whose property was taken. . . . (A
Guckenheimer & Bros. Co. vs. United States, [1925] 3 F. 2d. 786, 789,
Emphasis supplied.)

With respect to the documents, papers and things seized in the residences
of petitioners herein, the aforementioned resolution of June 29, 1962, lifted
the writ of preliminary injunction previously issued by this Court, 12 thereby, in
effect, restraining herein Respondents-Prosecutors from using them in
evidence against petitioners herein.

In connection with said documents, papers and things, two (2) important
questions need be settled, namely: (1) whether the search warrants in
question, and the searches and seizures made under the authority thereof,
are valid or not, and (2) if the answer to the preceding question is in the
negative, whether said documents, papers and things may be used in
evidence against petitioners herein. 1äwphï1.ñët

Petitioners maintain that the aforementioned search warrants are in the

nature of general warrants and that accordingly, the seizures effected upon
the authority there of are null and void. In this connection, the
Constitution 13provides:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated,
and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by
the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

Two points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional mandate,

namely: (1) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be
determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said provision; and (2) that
the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized.

None of these requirements has been complied with in the contested

warrants. Indeed, the same were issued upon applications stating that the
natural and juridical person therein named had committed a "violation of
Central Ban Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and
Revised Penal Code." In other words, no specific offense had been alleged
in said applications. The averments thereof with respect to the offense
committed were abstract. As a consequence, it was impossible for the judges
who issued the warrants to have found the existence of probable cause, for
the same presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the party
against whom it is sought has performed particular acts, or
committed specific omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal laws.
As a matter of fact, the applications involved in this case do not allege any
specific acts performed by herein petitioners. It would be the legal heresy, of
the highest order, to convict anybody of a "violation of Central Bank Laws,
Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal
Code," — as alleged in the aforementioned applications — without reference
to any determinate provision of said laws or

To uphold the validity of the warrants in question would be to wipe out

completely one of the most fundamental rights guaranteed in our
Constitution, for it would place the sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of
communication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims caprice or
passion of peace officers. This is precisely the evil sought to be remedied by
the constitutional provision above quoted — to outlaw the so-called general
warrants. It is not difficult to imagine what would happen, in times of keen
political strife, when the party in power feels that the minority is likely to wrest
it, even though by legal means.

Such is the seriousness of the irregularities committed in connection with the

disputed search warrants, that this Court deemed it fit to amend Section 3 of
Rule 122 of the former Rules of Court 14 by providing in its counterpart, under
the Revised Rules of Court 15 that "a search warrant shall not issue but upon
probable cause in connection with one specific offense." Not satisfied with
this qualification, the Court added thereto a paragraph, directing that "no
search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense."

The grave violation of the Constitution made in the application for the
contested search warrants was compounded by the description therein made
of the effects to be searched for and seized, to wit:
Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, journals, correspondence,
receipts, ledgers, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents
and/or papers showing all business transactions including disbursement
receipts, balance sheets and related profit and loss statements.

Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records
pertaining to all business transactions of petitioners herein, regardless of
whether the transactions were legal or illegal. The warrants sanctioned the
seizure of all records of the petitioners and the aforementioned corporations,
whatever their nature, thus openly contravening the explicit command of our
Bill of Rights — that the things to be seized be particularly described — as
well as tending to defeat its major objective: the elimination
of general warrants.

Relying upon Moncado vs. People's Court (80 Phil. 1), Respondents-
Prosecutors maintain that, even if the searches and seizures under
consideration were unconstitutional, the documents, papers and things thus
seized are admissible in evidence against petitioners herein. Upon mature
deliberation, however, we are unanimously of the opinion that the position
taken in the Moncado case must be abandoned. Said position was in line
with the American common law rule, that the criminal should not be allowed
to go free merely "because the constable has blundered," 16 upon the theory
that the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and
seizures is protected by means other than the exclusion of evidence
unlawfully obtained, 17 such as the common-law action for damages against
the searching officer, against the party who procured the issuance of the
search warrant and against those assisting in the execution of an illegal
search, their criminal punishment, resistance, without liability to an unlawful
seizure, and such other legal remedies as may be provided by other laws.

However, most common law jurisdictions have already given up this

approach and eventually adopted the exclusionary rule, realizing that this
is the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against
unreasonable searches and seizures. In the language of Judge Learned
Hand:
As we understand it, the reason for the exclusion of evidence competent as
such, which has been unlawfully acquired, is that exclusion is the only
practical way of enforcing the constitutional privilege. In earlier times the
action of trespass against the offending official may have been protection
enough; but that is true no longer. Only in case the prosecution which itself
controls the seizing officials, knows that it cannot profit by their wrong will that
wrong be repressed.18

In fact, over thirty (30) years before, the Federal Supreme Court had already
declared:

If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used in
evidence against a citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the 4th
Amendment, declaring his rights to be secure against such searches and
seizures, is of no value, and, so far as those thus placed are concerned,
might as well be stricken from the Constitution. The efforts of the courts and
their officials to bring the guilty to punishment, praiseworthy as they are, are
not to be aided by the sacrifice of those great principles established by years
of endeavor and suffering which have resulted in their embodiment in the
fundamental law of the land.19

This view was, not only reiterated, but, also, broadened in subsequent
decisions on the same Federal Court. 20After reviewing previous decisions
thereon, said Court held, in Mapp vs. Ohio (supra.):

. . . Today we once again examine the Wolf's constitutional documentation of

the right of privacy free from unreasonable state intrusion, and after its dozen
years on our books, are led by it to close the only courtroom door remaining
open to evidence secured by official lawlessness in flagrant abuse of that
basic right, reserved to all persons as a specific guarantee against that very
same unlawful conduct. We hold that all evidence obtained by searches and
seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that same authority,
inadmissible in a State.

Since the Fourth Amendment's right of privacy has been declared

enforceable against the States through the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth, it is enforceable against them by the same sanction of exclusion
as it used against the Federal Government. Were it otherwise, then just as
without the Weeks rule the assurance against unreasonable federal searches
and seizures would be "a form of words," valueless and underserving of
mention in a perpetual charter of inestimable human liberties, so too, without
that rule the freedom from state invasions of privacy would be so ephemeral
and so neatly severed from its conceptual nexus with the freedom from all
brutish means of coercing evidence as not to permit this Court's high regard
as a freedom "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." At the time that the
Court held in Wolf that the amendment was applicable to the States through
the Due Process Clause, the cases of this Court as we have seen, had
steadfastly held that as to federal officers the Fourth Amendment included
the exclusion of the evidence seized in violation of its provisions. Even Wolf
"stoutly adhered" to that proposition. The right to when conceded operatively
enforceable against the States, was not susceptible of destruction by
avulsion of the sanction upon which its protection and enjoyment had always
been deemed dependent under the Boyd, Weeks and Silverthorne Cases.
Therefore, in extending the substantive protections of due process to all
constitutionally unreasonable searches — state or federal — it was logically
and constitutionally necessarily that the exclusion doctrine — an essential
part of the right to privacy — be also insisted upon as an essential ingredient
of the right newly recognized by the Wolf Case. In short, the admission of the
new constitutional Right by Wolf could not tolerate denial of its most important
constitutional privilege, namely, the exclusion of the evidence which an
accused had been forced to give by reason of the unlawful seizure. To hold
otherwise is to grant the right but in reality to withhold its privilege and
enjoyment. Only last year the Court itself recognized that the purpose of the
exclusionary rule to "is to deter — to compel respect for the constitutional
guaranty in the only effectively available way — by removing the incentive to
disregard it" . . . .

The ignoble shortcut to conviction left open to the State tends to destroy the
entire system of constitutional restraints on which the liberties of the people
rest. Having once recognized that the right to privacy embodied in the Fourth
Amendment is enforceable against the States, and that the right to be secure
against rude invasions of privacy by state officers is, therefore constitutional
in origin, we can no longer permit that right to remain an empty promise.
Because it is enforceable in the same manner and to like effect as other basic
rights secured by its Due Process Clause, we can no longer permit it to be
revocable at the whim of any police officer who, in the name of law
enforcement itself, chooses to suspend its enjoyment. Our decision, founded
on reason and truth, gives to the individual no more than that which the
Constitution guarantees him to the police officer no less than that to which
honest law enforcement is entitled, and, to the courts, that judicial integrity
so necessary in the true administration of justice. (emphasis ours.)

Indeed, the non-exclusionary rule is contrary, not only to the letter, but also,
to the spirit of the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches
and seizures. To be sure, if the applicant for a search warrant has competent
evidence to establish probable cause of the commission of a given crime by
the party against whom the warrant is intended, then there is no reason why
the applicant should not comply with the requirements of the fundamental
law. Upon the other hand, if he has no such competent evidence, then it is not
possible for the Judge to find that there is probable cause, and, hence, no
justification for the issuance of the warrant. The only possible explanation
(not justification) for its issuance is the necessity of fishing evidence of the
commission of a crime. But, then, this fishing expedition is indicative of the
absence of evidence to establish a probable cause.

Moreover, the theory that the criminal prosecution of those who secure an
illegal search warrant and/or make unreasonable searches or seizures would
suffice to protect the constitutional guarantee under consideration, overlooks
the fact that violations thereof are, in general, committed By agents of the
party in power, for, certainly, those belonging to the minority could not
possibly abuse a power they do not have. Regardless of the handicap under
which the minority usually — but, understandably — finds itself in prosecuting
agents of the majority, one must not lose sight of the fact that the
psychological and moral effect of the possibility 21 of securing their conviction,
is watered down by the pardoning power of the party for whose benefit the
illegality had been committed.

In their Motion for Reconsideration and Amendment of the Resolution of this

Court dated June 29, 1962, petitioners allege that Rooms Nos. 81 and 91 of
Carmen Apartments, House No. 2008, Dewey Boulevard, House No. 1436,
Colorado Street, and Room No. 304 of the Army-Navy Club, should be
included among the premises considered in said Resolution as residences of
herein petitioners, Harry S. Stonehill, Robert P. Brook, John J. Brooks and
Karl Beck, respectively, and that, furthermore, the records, papers and other
effects seized in the offices of the corporations above referred to include
personal belongings of said petitioners and other effects under their exclusive
possession and control, for the exclusion of which they have a standing under
the latest rulings of the federal courts of federal courts of the United States. 22

We note, however, that petitioners' theory, regarding their alleged possession

of and control over the aforementioned records, papers and effects, and the
alleged "personal" nature thereof, has Been Advanced, not in their petition or
amended petition herein, but in the Motion for Reconsideration and
Amendment of the Resolution of June 29, 1962. In other words, said theory
would appear to be readjustment of that followed in said petitions, to suit the
approach intimated in the Resolution sought to be reconsidered and
amended. Then, too, some of the affidavits or copies of alleged affidavits
attached to said motion for reconsideration, or submitted in support thereof,
contain either inconsistent allegations, or allegations inconsistent with the
theory now advanced by petitioners herein.

Upon the other hand, we are not satisfied that the allegations of said petitions
said motion for reconsideration, and the contents of the aforementioned
affidavits and other papers submitted in support of said motion, have
sufficiently established the facts or conditions contemplated in the cases
relied upon by the petitioners; to warrant application of the views therein
expressed, should we agree thereto. At any rate, we do not deem it
necessary to express our opinion thereon, it being best to leave the matter
open for determination in appropriate cases in the future.

We hold, therefore, that the doctrine adopted in the Moncado case must be,
as it is hereby, abandoned; that the warrants for the search of three (3)
residences of herein petitioners, as specified in the Resolution of June 29,
1962, are null and void; that the searches and seizures therein made are
illegal; that the writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued, in connection
with the documents, papers and other effects thus seized in said residences
of herein petitioners is hereby made permanent; that the writs prayed for are
granted, insofar as the documents, papers and other effects so seized in the
aforementioned residences are concerned; that the aforementioned motion
for Reconsideration and Amendment should be, as it is hereby, denied; and
that the petition herein is dismissed and the writs prayed for denied, as
regards the documents, papers and other effects seized in the twenty-nine
(29) places, offices and other premises enumerated in the same Resolution,
without special pronouncement as to costs.

It is so ordered.

Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar and Sanchez, JJ.,
concur.

CASTRO, J., concurring and dissenting:

From my analysis of the opinion written by Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion

and from the import of the deliberations of the Court on this case, I gather the
following distinct conclusions:

1. All the search warrants served by the National Bureau of Investigation in

this case are general warrants and are therefore proscribed by, and in
violation of, paragraph 3 of section 1 of Article III (Bill of Rights) of the
Constitution;

2. All the searches and seizures conducted under the authority of the said
search warrants were consequently illegal;

3. The non-exclusionary rule enunciated in Moncado vs. People, 80 Phil. 1,

should be, and is declared, abandoned;

4. The search warrants served at the three residences of the petitioners

are expressly declared null and void the searches and seizures therein made
are expressly declared illegal; and the writ of preliminary injunction
heretofore issued against the use of the documents, papers and effect seized
in the said residences is made permanent; and

5. Reasoning that the petitioners have not in their pleadings satisfactorily

demonstrated that they have legal standing to move for the suppression of
the documents, papers and effects seized in the places other than the three
residences adverted to above, the opinion written by the Chief
Justice refrains from expressly declaring as null and void the such warrants
served at such other places and as illegal the searches and seizures made
therein, and leaves "the matter open for determination in appropriate cases
in the future."

It is precisely the position taken by the Chief Justice summarized in the

immediately preceding paragraph (numbered 5) with which I am not in
accord.

I do not share his reluctance or unwillingness to expressly declare, at this

time, the nullity of the search warrants served at places other than the three
residences, and the illegibility of the searches and seizures conducted under
the authority thereof. In my view even the exacerbating passions and
prejudices inordinately generated by the environmental political and moral
developments of this case should not deter this Court from forthrightly laying
down the law not only for this case but as well for future cases and future
generations. All the search warrants, without exception, in this case are
admittedly general, blanket and roving warrants and are therefore admittedly
and indisputably outlawed by the Constitution; and the searches and seizures
made were therefore unlawful. That the petitioners, let us assume in gratia
argumente, have no legal standing to ask for the suppression of the papers,
things and effects seized from places other than their residences, to my mind,
cannot in any manner affect, alter or otherwise modify the intrinsic nullity of
the search warrants and the intrinsic illegality of the searches and seizures
made thereunder. Whether or not the petitioners possess legal standing the
said warrants are void and remain void, and the searches and seizures were
illegal and remain illegal. No inference can be drawn from the words of the
Constitution that "legal standing" or the lack of it is a determinant of the nullity
or validity of a search warrant or of the lawfulness or illegality of a search or
seizure.

On the question of legal standing, I am of the conviction that, upon the

pleadings submitted to this Court the petitioners have the requisite legal
standing to move for the suppression and return of the documents, papers
and effects that were seized from places other than their family residences.
Our constitutional provision on searches and seizures was derived
almost verbatim from the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. In the many years of judicial construction and interpretation of
the said constitutional provision, our courts have invariably regarded as
doctrinal the pronouncement made on the Fourth Amendment by federal
courts, especially the Federal Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit Courts
of Appeals.

The U.S. doctrines and pertinent cases on standing to move for the
suppression or return of documents, papers and effects which are the fruits
of an unlawful search and seizure, may be summarized as follows; (a)
ownership of documents, papers and effects gives "standing;" (b) ownership
and/or control or possession — actual or constructive — of premises
searched gives "standing"; and (c) the "aggrieved person" doctrine where the
search warrant and the sworn application for search warrant are "primarily"
directed solely and exclusively against the "aggrieved person," gives
"standing."

An examination of the search warrants in this case will readily show that,
excepting three, all were directed against the petitioners personally. In some
of them, the petitioners were named personally, followed by the designation,
"the President and/or General Manager" of the particular corporation. The
three warrants excepted named three corporate defendants. But the
"office/house/warehouse/premises" mentioned in the said three warrants
were also the same "office/house/warehouse/premises" declared to be
owned by or under the control of the petitioners in all the other search
warrants directed against the petitioners and/or "the President and/or
General Manager" of the particular corporation. (see pages 5-24 of
Petitioners' Reply of April 2, 1962). The searches and seizures were to be
made, and were actually made, in the "office/house/warehouse/premises"
owned by or under the control of the petitioners.

Ownership of matters seized gives "standing."

Ownership of the properties seized alone entitles the petitioners to bring a

motion to return and suppress, and gives them standing as persons
aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure regardless of their location at
the time of seizure. Jones vs. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 261 (1960)
(narcotics stored in the apartment of a friend of the defendant); Henzel vs.
United States, 296 F. 2d. 650, 652-53 (5th Cir. 1961), (personal and
corporate papers of corporation of which the defendant was
president), United States vs. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951) (narcotics seized in
an apartment not belonging to the defendant); Pielow vs. United States, 8 F.
2d 492, 493 (9th Cir. 1925) (books seized from the defendant's sister but
belonging to the defendant); Cf. Villano vs. United States, 310 F. 2d 680, 683
(10th Cir. 1962) (papers seized in desk neither owned by nor in exclusive
possession of the defendant).

In a very recent case (decided by the U.S. Supreme Court on December 12,
1966), it was held that under the constitutional provision against unlawful
searches and seizures, a person places himself or his property within a
constitutionally protected area, be it his home or his office, his hotel room or
his automobile:

Where the argument falls is in its misapprehension of the fundamental nature

and scope of Fourth Amendment protection. What the Fourth Amendment
protects is the security a man relies upon when he places himself or his
property within a constitutionally protected area, be it his home or his office,
his hotel room or his automobile. There he is protected from unwarranted
governmental intrusion. And when he puts some thing in his filing cabinet, in
his desk drawer, or in his pocket, he has the right to know it will be secure
from an unreasonable search or an unreasonable seizure. So it was that the
Fourth Amendment could not tolerate the warrantless search of the hotel
room in Jeffers, the purloining of the petitioner's private papers in Gouled, or
the surreptitious electronic surveilance in Silverman. Countless other cases
which have come to this Court over the years have involved a myriad of
differing factual contexts in which the protections of the Fourth Amendment
have been appropriately invoked. No doubt, the future will bring countless
others. By nothing we say here do we either foresee or foreclose factual
situations to which the Fourth Amendment may be applicable. (Hoffa vs. U.S.,
87 S. Ct. 408 (December 12, 1966). See also U.S. vs. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48,
72 S. Ct. 93 (November 13, 1951). (Emphasis supplied).

Control of premises searched gives "standing."

Independent of ownership or other personal interest in the records and
documents seized, the petitioners have standing to move for return and
suppression by virtue of their proprietary or leasehold interest in many of the
premises searched. These proprietary and leasehold interests have been
sufficiently set forth in their motion for reconsideration and need not be
recounted here, except to emphasize that the petitioners paid rent, directly
or indirectly, for practically all the premises searched (Room 91, 84 Carmen
Apts; Room 304, Army & Navy Club; Premises 2008, Dewey Boulevard; 1436
Colorado Street); maintained personal offices within the corporate offices
(IBMC, USTC); had made improvements or furnished such offices; or had
paid for the filing cabinets in which the papers were stored (Room 204, Army
& Navy Club); and individually, or through their respective spouses, owned
the controlling stock of the corporations involved. The petitioners' proprietary
interest in most, if not all, of the premises searched therefore independently
gives them standing to move for the return and suppression of the books,
papers and affects seized therefrom.

In Jones vs. United States, supra, the U.S. Supreme Court delineated the
nature and extent of the interest in the searched premises necessary to
maintain a motion to suppress. After reviewing what it considered to be the
unduly technical standard of the then prevailing circuit court decisions, the
Supreme Court said (362 U.S. 266):

We do not lightly depart from this course of decisions by the lower courts. We
are persuaded, however, that it is unnecessarily and ill-advised to import into
the law surrounding the constitutional right to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures subtle distinctions, developed and refined by the
common law in evolving the body of private property law which, more than
almost any other branch of law, has been shaped by distinctions whose
validity is largely historical. Even in the area from which they derive, due
consideration has led to the discarding of those distinctions in the homeland
of the common law. See Occupiers' Liability Act, 1957, 5 and 6 Eliz. 2, c. 31,
carrying out Law Reform Committee, Third Report, Cmd. 9305. Distinctions
such as those between "lessee", "licensee," "invitee," "guest," often only of
gossamer strength, ought not be determinative in fashioning procedures
ultimately referable to constitutional safeguards. See also Chapman vs.
United States, 354 U.S. 610, 616-17 (1961).

It has never been held that a person with requisite interest in the premises
searched must own the property seized in order to have standing in a motion
to return and suppress. In Alioto vs. United States, 216 F. Supp. 48 (1963),
a Bookkeeper for several corporations from whose apartment the corporate
records were seized successfully moved for their return. In United States vs.
Antonelli, Fireworks Co., 53 F. Supp. 870, 873 (W D. N. Y. 1943), the
corporation's president successfully moved for the return and suppression is
to him of both personal and corporate documents seized from his home
during the course of an illegal search:

The lawful possession by Antonelli of documents and property, "either his

own or the corporation's was entitled to protection against unreasonable
search and seizure. Under the circumstances in the case at bar, the search
and seizure were unreasonable and unlawful. The motion for the return of
seized article and the suppression of the evidence so obtained should be
granted. (Emphasis supplied).

Time was when only a person who had property in interest in either the place
searched or the articles seize had the necessary standing to invoke the
protection of the exclusionary rule. But in MacDonald vs. Unite States, 335
U.S. 461 (1948), Justice Robert Jackson joined by Justice Felix Frankfurter,
advanced the view that "even a guest may expect the shelter of the rooftree
he is under against criminal intrusion." This view finally became the official
view of the U.S. Supreme Court and was articulated in United States vs.
Jeffers, 432 U.S 48 (1951). Nine years later, in 1960, in Jones vs. Unite
States, 362 U.S. 257, 267, the U.S. Supreme Court went a step further. Jones
was a mere guest in the apartment unlawfully searched but the Court
nonetheless declared that the exclusionary rule protected him as well. The
concept of "person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure" was
enlarged to include "anyone legitimately on premise where the search
occurs."

Shortly after the U.S. Supreme Court's Jones decision the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the defendant organizer, sole
stockholder and president of a corporation had standing in a mail fraud
prosecution against him to demand the return and suppression of corporate
property. Henzel vs. United States, 296 F 2d 650, 652 (5th Cir. 1961), supra.
The court conclude that the defendant had standing on two independent
grounds: First —he had a sufficient interest in the property seized,
and second — he had an adequate interest in the premises searched (just
like in the case at bar). A postal inspector had unlawfully searched the
corporation' premises and had seized most of the corporation's book and
records. Looking to Jones, the court observed:

Jones clearly tells us, therefore, what is not required qualify one as a "person
aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure." It tells us that appellant should
not have been precluded from objecting to the Postal Inspector's search and
seizure of the corporation's books and records merely because the appellant
did not show ownership or possession of the books and records or a
substantial possessory interest in the invade premises . . . (Henzel vs. United
States, 296 F. 2d at 651). .

Henzel was soon followed by Villano vs. United States, 310 F. 2d 680, 683,
(10th Cir. 1962). In Villano, police officers seized two notebooks from a desk
in the defendant's place of employment; the defendant did not claim
ownership of either; he asserted that several employees (including himself)
used the notebooks. The Court held that the employee had a protected
interest and that there also was an invasion of privacy.
Both Henzel and Villano considered also the fact that the search and seizure
were "directed at" the moving defendant. Henzel vs. United States, 296 F. 2d
at 682; Villano vs. United States, 310 F. 2d at 683.

In a case in which an attorney closed his law office, placed his files in storage
and went to Puerto Rico, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
recognized his standing to move to quash as unreasonable search and
seizure under the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution a grand jury
subpoena duces tecum directed to the custodian of his files. The
Government contended that the petitioner had no standing because the
books and papers were physically in the possession of the custodian, and
because the subpoena was directed against the custodian. The court
rejected the contention, holding that
Schwimmer legally had such possession, control and unrelinquished
personal rights in the books and papers as not to enable the question of
unreasonable search and seizure to be escaped through the mere procedural
device of compelling a third-party naked possessor to produce and deliver
them. Schwimmer vs. United States, 232 F. 2d 855, 861 (8th Cir. 1956).

Aggrieved person doctrine where the search warrant s primarily directed

against said person gives "standing."

The latest United States decision squarely in point is United States vs. Birrell,
242 F. Supp. 191 (1965, U.S.D.C. S.D.N.Y.). The defendant had stored with
an attorney certain files and papers, which attorney, by the name of Dunn,
was not, at the time of the seizing of the records, Birrell's attorney. * Dunn, in
turn, had stored most of the records at his home in the country and on a farm
which, according to Dunn's affidavit, was under his (Dunn's) "control and
management." The papers turned out to be private, personal and business
papers together with corporate books and records of certain unnamed
corporations in which Birrell did not even claim ownership. (All of these type
records were seized in the case at bar). Nevertheless, the search in Birrell
was held invalid by the court which held that even though Birrell did not own
the premises where the records were stored, he had "standing" to move for
the return ofall the papers and properties seized. The court, relying on Jones
vs. U.S., supra; U.S. vs. Antonelli Fireworks Co., 53 F. Supp. 870, Aff'd 155
F. 2d 631: Henzel vs. U.S., supra; and Schwimmer vs. U.S., supra, pointed
out that

It is overwhelmingly established that the searches here in question were

directed solely and exclusively against Birrell. The only person suggested in
the papers as having violated the law was Birrell. The first search warrant
described the records as having been used "in committing a violation of Title
18, United States Code, Section 1341, by the use of the mails by one Lowell
M. Birrell, . . ." The second search warrant was captioned: "United States of
America vs. Lowell M. Birrell. (p. 198)

Possession (actual or constructive), no less than ownership, gives standing

to move to suppress. Such was the rule even before Jones. (p. 199)
If, as thus indicated Birrell had at least constructive possession of the records
stored with Dunn, it matters not whether he had any interest in the premises
searched. See also Jeffers v. United States, 88 U.S. Appl. D.C. 58, 187 F. 2d
498 (1950), affirmed 432 U.S. 48, 72 S. Ct. 93, 96 L. Ed. 459 (1951).

The ruling in the Birrell case was reaffirmed on motion for reargument; the
United States did not appeal from this decision. The factual situation
in Birrell is strikingly similar to the case of the present petitioners; as in Birrell,
many personal and corporate papers were seized from premises not
petitioners' family residences; as in Birrell, the searches were "PRIMARILY
DIRECTED SOLETY AND EXCLUSIVELY" against the petitioners. Still both
types of documents were suppressed in Birrell because of the illegal search.
In the case at bar, the petitioners connection with the premises raided is
much closer than in Birrell.

Thus, the petitioners have full standing to move for the quashing of all the
warrants regardless whether these were directed against residences in the
narrow sense of the word, as long as the documents were personal papers
of the petitioners or (to the extent that they were corporate papers) were held
by them in a personal capacity or under their personal control.

Prescinding a from the foregoing, this Court, at all events, should order the
return to the petitioners all personal and private papers and effects seized,
no matter where these were seized, whether from their residences or
corporate offices or any other place or places. The uncontradicted sworn
statements of the petitioners in their, various pleadings submitted to this
Court indisputably show that amongst the things seized from the corporate
offices and other places were personal and private papers and effects
belonging to the petitioners.

If there should be any categorization of the documents, papers and things

which where the objects of the unlawful searches and seizures, I submit that
the grouping should be: (a) personal or private papers of the petitioners were
they were unlawfully seized, be it their family residences offices, warehouses
and/or premises owned and/or possessed (actually or constructively) by
them as shown in all the search and in the sworn applications filed in securing
the void search warrants and (b) purely corporate papers belonging to
corporations. Under such categorization or grouping, the determination of
which unlawfully seized papers, documents and things
are personal/private of the petitioners or purely corporate papers will have to
be left to the lower courts which issued the void search warrants in ultimately
effecting the suppression and/or return of the said documents.

And as unequivocally indicated by the authorities above cited, the petitioners

likewise have clear legal standing to move for the suppression of purely
corporate papers as "President and/or General Manager" of the corporations
involved as specifically mentioned in the void search warrants.

Finally, I must articulate my persuasion that although the cases cited in my

disquisition were criminal prosecutions, the great clauses of the constitutional
proscription on illegal searches and seizures do not withhold the mantle of
their protection from cases not criminal in origin or nature.

G.R. No. L-12592 March 8, 1918

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
FELIPE BUSTOS, ET AL., defendants-appellants.

Kincaid and Perkins for appellants.

Acting Attorney-General Paredes, for appellee.
MALCOLM, J.:

This appeal presents the specific question of whether or not the defendants
and appellants are guilty of a libel of Roman Punsalan, justice of the peace
of Macabebe and Masantol, Province of Pampanga. The appeal also submits
the larger question of the attitude which the judiciary should take interpreting
and enforcing the Libel Law in connection with the basic prerogatives of
freedom of speech and press, and of assembly and petition. For a better
understanding, the facts in the present appeal are the first narrated in the
order of their occurrence, then certain suggestive aspects relative to the
rights of freedom of speech and press and of assembly and petition are
interpolated, then the facts are tested by these principles, and, finally,
judgment is rendered.

First, the facts. In the latter part of 1915, numerous citizens of the Province
of Pampanga assembled, and prepared and signed a petition to the
Executive Secretary through the law office of Crossfield and O'Brien, and five
individuals signed affidavits, charging Roman Punsalan, justice of the peace
of Macabebe and Masantol, Pampanga, with malfeasance in office and
asking for his removal. Crossfield and O'Brien submitted this petition and
these affidavits with a complaint to the Executive Secretary. The petition
transmitted by these attorneys was signed by thirty-four citizens apparently
of considerable standing, including councilors and property owners (now the
defendants), and contained the statements set out in the information as
libelous. Briefly stated the specific charges against the justice of the peace
were.

1. That Francisca Polintan, desiring to make complaint against Mariano de

los Reyes, visited the justice of the peace, who first told her that he would
draw up complaint for P5; afterwards he said he would take P3 which she
paid; also kept her in the house for four days as a servant and took from her
two chickens and twelve "gandus;"

2. That Valentin Sunga being interested in a case regarding land which was
on trial before the justice of the peace, went to see the justice of the peace
to ascertain the result of the trial, and was told by the justice of the peace that
if he wished to win he must give him P50. Not having this amount, Sunga
gave the justice nothing, and a few days later was informed that he had lost
the case. Returning again to the office of the justice of the peace in order to
appeal, the justice told him that he could still win if he would pay P50;

3. That Leoncio Quiambao, having filed a complaint for assault against four
persons, on the day of the trial the justice called him over to his house, where
he secretly gave him (Quiambao) P30; and the complaint was thereupon
shelved.

The Executive Secretary referred the papers to the judge of first instance for
the Seventh Judicial District requesting investigation, proper action, and
report. The justice of the peace was notified and denied the charges. The
judge of first instance found the first count not proved and counts 2 and 3
established. In view of this result, the judge, the Honorable Percy M. Moir,
was of the opinion "that it must be, and it is hereby, recommended to the
Governor-General that the respondent be removed from his position as
justice of the peace of Macabebe and Masantol, Province of Pampanga, and
it is ordered that the proceedings had in this case be transmitted to the
Executive Secretary."

Later the justice of the peace filled a motion for a new trial; the judge of first
instance granted the motion and reopened the hearing; documents were
introduced, including a letter sent by the municipal president and six
councilors of Masantol, Pampanga, asserting that the justice of the peace
was the victim of prosecution, and that one Agustin Jaime, the auxiliary
justice of the peace, had instituted the charges for personal reasons; and the
judge of first instance ordered a suppression of the charges against Punsalan
and acquitted him the same. Attorneys for complainants thereupon appealed
to the Governor-General, but whether the papers were forwarded to the
Governor-General as requested the record does not disclose.

Criminal action against the petitioners, now become the defendants, was
instituted on October 12, 1916, by virtue of the following information:

That on or about the month of December, 1915, in the municipality of

Macabebe, Pampanga, P. I., the said accused, voluntarily, illegally, and
criminally and with malicious intent to prejudice and defame Mr. Roman
Punsalan Serrano who was at said time and place justice of the peace of
Macabebe and Masantol of this province, wrote, signed, and published a
writing which was false, scandalous, malicious, defamatory, and libelous
against the justice of the peace Mr. Roman Punsalan Serrano, in which
writing appear among other things the following:

That the justice of the peace, Mr. Roman Punsalan Serrano, of this town of
Macabebe, on account of the conduct observed by him heretofore, a conduct
highly improper of the office which he holds, is found to be a public
functionary who is absolutely unfair, eminently immoral and dangerous to the
community, and consequently unworthy of the office.

That this assertion of the undersigned is evidenced in a clear and positive

manner by facts so certain, so serious, and so denigrating which appear in
the affidavits attached hereto, and by other facts no less serious, but which
the undersigned refrain from citing herein for the sake of brevity and in order
not to bother too much the attention of your Honor and due to lack of sufficient
proof to substantiate them.

That should the higher authorities allow the said justice of the peace of this
town to continue in his office, the protection of the rights and interests of its
inhabitants will be illusory and utopic; rights and interest solemnly guaranteed
by the Philippine Bill of Rights, and justice in this town will not be administered
in accordance with law.

That on account of the wrongful discharge of his office and of his bad
conducts as such justice of the peace, previous to this time, some
respectable citizens of this town of Macabebe were compelled to present an
administrative case against the said Roman Punsalan Serrano before the
judge of first instance of Pampanga, in which case there were made against
him various charges which were true and certain and of different characters.

That after the said administrative case was over, the said justice of the peace,
far from charging his bad and despicable conduct, which has roused the
indignation of this town of Macabebe, subsequently performed the acts
abovementioned, as stated in the affidavits herewith attached, as if intending
to mock at the people and to show his mistaken valor and heroism.'
All of this has been written and published by the accused with deliberate
purpose of attacking the virtue, honor, and reputation of the justice of the
peace, Mr. Roman Punsalan Serrano, and thus exposing him to public hatred
contempt, and ridicule. All contrary to law.

It should be noted that the information omits paragraphs of the petition

mentioning the investigation before the judge of first instance, the affidavits
upon which based and concluding words, "To the Executive Secretary,
through the office of Crossfield and O'Brien."

The Honorable Percy M. Moir found all the defendants, with the exception of
Felix Fernandez, Juan S. Alfonso, Restituto Garcia, and Manuel Mallari,
guilty and sentenced each of them to pay a fine of P10 and one thirty-second
part of the costs, or to suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
New attorneys for the defense, coming into the case, after the handing down
of the decision, file on December 16, 1916, a motion for a new trial, the
principal purpose of which was to retire the objection interposed by the then
counsel for the defendants to the admission of Exhibit A consisting of the
entire administrative proceedings. The trial court denied the motion. All the
defendants, except Melecio S. Sabado and Fortunato Macalino appealed
making the following assignments of error:

1. The court erred in overruling the motion of the convicted defendants for a
new trial.

2. The court erred in refusing to permit the defendants to retire the objection
in advertently interposed by their counsel to the admission in evidence of
the expediente administrativo out of which the accusation in this case arose.

3. The court erred in sustaining the objection of the prosecution to the

introduction in evidence by the accused of the affidavits upon which the
petition forming the basis of the libelous charge was based.

4. The court erred in not holding that the alleged libelous statement was
unqualifiedly privileged.
5. The court erred in assuming and impliedly holding that the burden was on
the defendants to show that the alleged libelous statements were true and
free from malice.

6. The court erred in not acquitting the defendants.

7. The evidence adduced fails to show the guilt of the defendants beyond a
reasonable doubt. This is especially true of all the defendants, except Felipe
Bustos, Dionisio Mallari, and Jose T. Reyes.

We have thus far taken it for granted that all the proceedings, administrative
and judicial, were properly before this court. As a matter of fact counsel for
defendants in the lower court made an improvident objection to the admission
of the administrative proceedings on the ground that the signatures were not
identified and that the same was immaterial, which objection was partially
sustained by the trial court. Notwithstanding this curious situation by reason
of which the attorney for the defense attempted to destroy through his
objection the very foundation for the justification of his clients, we shall
continue to consider all the proceedings as before us. Not indicating
specifically the reason for this action, let the following be stated: The
administrative proceedings were repeatedly mentioned during the trial.
These proceedings were the basis of the accusation, the information, the
evidence, and the judgment rendered. The prosecution cannot be
understood without knowledge of anterior action. Nothing more unjust could
be imagined than to pick out certain words which standing by themselves and
unexplained are libelous and then by shutting off all knowledge of facts which
would justify these words, to convict the accused. The records in question
are attached to the rollo, and either on the ground that the attorneys for the
defense retired the objection to the introduction of the administrative
proceedings by the prosecution, or that a new trial should have been had
because under section 42 of the Code of Criminal Procedure "a case may be
reopened on account of errors at law committed at the trial," or because of
the right of this court to call in such records as are sufficiently incorporated
into the complaint and are essential to a determination of the case, or finally,
because of our conceded right to take judicial notice of official action in
administrative cases and of judicial proceedings supplemental to the basis
action, we examine the record as before us, containing not alone the trial for
libel, but the proceedings previous to that trial giving rise to it. To this action,
the Government can not explain for it was the prosecution which tried to
incorporate Exhibit A into the record.

With these facts pleading justification, before testing them by certain

principles which make up the law of libel and slander, we feel warranted in
seizing the opportunity to intrude an introductory and general discussion of
freedom of speech and press and assembly and petition in the Philippine
Islands. We conceive that the time is ripe thus to clear up certain
misapprehensions on the subject and to place these basic rights in their
proper light.

Turning to the pages of history, we state nothing new when we set down that
freedom of speech as cherished in democratic countries was unknown in the
Philippine Islands before 1900. A prime cause for revolt was consequently
ready made. Jose Rizal in "Filipinas Despues de Cien Años" (The Philippines
a Century Hence, pages 62 et seq.) describing "the reforms sine quibus non,"
which the Filipinos insist upon, said: "

The minister, . . . who wants his reforms to be reforms, must begin by

declaring the press in the Philippines free and by instituting Filipinos
delegates.

The Filipino patriots in Spain, through the columns of "La Solidaridad" and by
other means invariably in exposing the wants of the Filipino people
demanded "liberty of the press, of cults, and associations." (See Mabini, La
Revolucion Filipina.) The Malolos Constitution, the work of the Revolutionary
Congress, in its Bill of Rights, zealously guarded freedom of speech and
press and assembly and petition.

Mention is made of the foregoing data only to deduce the proposition that a
reform so sacred to the people of these Islands and won at so dear a cost,
should now be protected and carried forward as one would protect and
preserve the covenant of liberty itself.

Next comes the period of American-Filipino cooperative effort. The

Constitution of the United States and the State constitutions guarantee to the
right of freedom of speech and press and the right of assembly and petition.
We are therefore, not surprised to find President McKinley in that Magna
Charta of Philippine Liberty, the Instructions to the Second Philippine
Commission, of April 7, 1900, laying down the inviolable rule "That no law
shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech or of the press or of the
rights of the people to peaceably assemble and petition the Government for
a redress of grievances."

The Philippine Bill, the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, and the Jones Law,
the Act of Congress of August 29, 1916, in the nature of organic acts for the
Philippines, continued this guaranty. The words quoted are not unfamiliar to
students of Constitutional Law, for they are the counterpart of the first
amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which the American
people demanded before giving their approval to the Constitution.

We mention the foregoing facts only to deduce the position never to be

forgotten for an instant that the guaranties mentioned are part and parcel of
the Organic Law — of the Constitution — of the Philippine Islands.

These paragraphs found in the Philippine Bill of Rights are not threadbare
verbiage. The language carries with all the applicable jurisprudence of great
English and American Constitutional cases. (Kepner vs. U. S. [1904], 195 U.
S., 100; Serra vs. Mortiga [1907], 204 U. S., 470.) And what are these
principles? Volumes would inadequately answer. But included are the
following:

The interest of society and the maintenance of good government demand a

full discussion of public affairs. Completely liberty to comment on the conduct
of public men is a scalpel in the case of free speech. The sharp incision of its
probe relieves the abscesses of officialdom. Men in public life may suffer
under a hostile and an unjust accusation; the wound can be assuaged with
the balm of a clear conscience. A public officer must not be too thin-skinned
with reference to comment upon his official acts. Only thus can the
intelligence and the dignity of the individual be exalted. Of course, criticism
does not authorize defamation. Nevertheless, as the individual is less than
the State, so must expected criticism be born for the common good. Rising
superior to any official or set of officials, to the Chief of Executive, to the
Legislature, to the Judiciary — to any or all the agencies of Government —
public opinion should be the constant source of liberty and democracy. (See
the well considered cases of Wason vs. Walter, 4 L. R. 4 Q. B., 73; Seymour
vs. Butterworth, 3F. and F., 372; The Queen vs. Sir R. Carden, 5 Q. B. D., 1)

The guaranties of a free speech and a free press include the right to criticize
judicial conduct. The administration of the law is a matter of vital public
concern. Whether the law is wisely or badly enforced is, therefore, a fit
subject for proper comment. If the people cannot criticize a justice of the
peace or a judge the same as any other public officer, public opinion will be
effectively muzzled. Attempted terrorization of public opinion on the part of
the judiciary would be tyranny of the basest sort. The sword of Damocles in
the hands of a judge does not hang suspended over the individual who dares
to assert his prerogative as a citizen and to stand up bravely before any
official. On the contrary, it is a duty which every one owes to society or to the
State to assist in the investigation of any alleged misconduct. It is further the
duty of all who know of any official dereliction on the part of a magistrate or
the wrongful act of any public officer to bring the facts to the notice of those
whose duty it is to inquire into and punish them. In the words of Mr. Justice
Gayner, who contributed so largely to the law of libel. "The people are not
obliged to speak of the conduct of their officials in whispers or with bated
breath in a free government, but only in a despotism." (Howarth vs. Barlow
[1906], 113 App. Div., N. Y., 510.)

The right to assemble and petition is the necessary consequence of

republican institutions and the complement of the part of free speech.
Assembly means a right on the part of citizens to meet peaceably for
consultation in respect to public affairs. Petition means that any person or
group of persons can apply, without fear of penalty, to the appropriate branch
or office of the government for a redress of grievances. The persons
assembling and petitioning must, of course, assume responsibility for the
charges made.

Public policy, the welfare of society, and the orderly administration of

government have demanded protection for public opinion. The inevitable and
incontestable result has been the development and adoption of the doctrine
of privilege.
The doctrine of privileged communications rests upon public policy, 'which
looks to the free and unfettered administration of justice, though, as an
incidental result, it may in some instances afford an immunity to the evil-
disposed and malignant slanderer.' (Abbott vs. National Bank of Commerce,
Tacoma [1899], 175 U. S., 409, 411.)

Privilege is classified as either absolute or qualified. With the first, we are not
concerned. As to qualified privilege, it is as the words suggest a prima
facie privilege which may be lost by proof of malice. The rule is thus stated
by Lord Campbell, C. J.

A communication made bona fide upon any subject-matter in which the party
communicating has an interest, or in reference to which has a duty, is
privileged, if made to a person having a corresponding interest or duty,
although it contained criminatory matter which without this privilege would be
slanderous and actionable. (Harrison vs. Bush, 5 E. and B., 344; 1 Jur.[N.
S.], 846; 25 L. J. Q. B., 25; 3 W. R., 474; 85 E. C. L., 344.)

A pertinent illustration of the application of qualified privilege is a complaint

made in good faith and without malice in regard to the character or conduct
of a public official when addressed to an officer or a board having some
interest or duty in the matter. Even when the statements are found to be false,
if there is probable cause for belief in their truthfulness and the charge is
made in good faith, the mantle of privilege may still cover the mistake of the
individual. But the statements must be made under an honest sense of duty;
a self-seeking motive is destructive. Personal injury is not necessary. All
persons have an interest in the pure and efficient administration of justice
and of public affairs. The duty under which a party is privileged is sufficient if
it is social or moral in its nature and this person in good faith believes he is
acting in pursuance thereof although in fact he is mistaken. The privilege is
not defeated by the mere fact that the communication is made in intemperate
terms. A further element of the law of privilege concerns the person to whom
the complaint should be made. The rule is that if a party applies to the wrong
person through some natural and honest mistake as to the respective
functions of various officials such unintentional error will not take the case out
of the privilege.
In the usual case malice can be presumed from defamatory words. Privilege
destroy that presumption. The onus of proving malice then lies on the plaintiff.
The plaintiff must bring home to the defendant the existence of malice as the
true motive of his conduct. Falsehood and the absence of probable cause
will amount to proof of malice. (See White vs. Nicholls [1845], 3 How., 266.)

A privileged communication should not be subjected to microscopic

examination to discover grounds of malice or falsity. Such excessive scrutiny
would defeat the protection which the law throws over privileged
communications. The ultimate test is that of bona fides. (See White vs.
Nicholls [1845], 3 How., 266; Bradley vs. Heath [1831], 12 Pick. [Mass.], 163;
Kent vs. Bongartz [1885], 15 R. I., 72; Street Foundations of Legal Liability,
vol. 1, pp. 308, 309; Newell, Slander and Libel, various citations; 25 Cyc.
pages 385 et seq.)

Having ascertained the attitude which should be assumed relative to the

basic rights of freedom of speech and press and of assembly and petition,
having emphasized the point that our Libel Law as a statute must be
construed with reference to the guaranties of our Organic Law, and having
sketched the doctrine of privilege, we are in a position to test the facts of this
case with these principles.

It is true that the particular words set out in the information, if said of a private
person, might well be considered libelous per se. The charges might also
under certain conceivable conditions convict one of a libel of a government
official. As a general rule words imputing to a judge or a justice of the peace
dishonesty or corruption or incapacity or misconduct touching him in his office
are actionable. But as suggested in the beginning we do not have present a
simple case of direct and vicious accusations published in the press, but of
charges predicated on affidavits made to the proper official and thus
qualifiedly privileged. Express malice has not been proved by the
prosecution. Further, although the charges are probably not true as to the
justice of the peace, they were believed to be true by the petitioners. Good
faith surrounded their action. Probable cause for them to think that
malfeasance or misfeasance in office existed is apparent. The ends and the
motives of these citizens— to secure the removal from office of a person
thought to be venal — were justifiable. In no way did they abuse the privilege.
These respectable citizens did not eagerly seize on a frivolous matter but on
instances which not only seemed to them of a grave character, but which
were sufficient in an investigation by a judge of first instance to convince him
of their seriousness. No undue publicity was given to the petition. The manner
of commenting on the conduct of the justice of the peace was proper. And
finally the charges and the petition were submitted through reputable
attorneys to the proper functionary, the Executive Secretary. In this
connection it is sufficient to note that justices of the peace are appointed by
the Governor-General, that they may be removed by the Governor-General
upon the recommendation of a Judge of First Instance, or on the Governor-
General's own motion, and that at the time this action took place the
Executive Bureau was the office through which the Governor-General acted
in such matter. (See Administrative Code of 1917, secs. 203 and 229, in
connection with the cases of U. S. vs. Galesa [1915], 31 Phil., 365, and of
Harrison vs. Bush, 5 E. and B., 344, holding that where defendant was
subject to removal by the sovereign, a communication to the Secretary of
State was privileged.)

The present facts are further essentially different from those established in
other cases in which private individuals have been convicted of libels of public
officials. Malice, traduction, falsehood, calumny, against the man and not the
officer, have been the causes of the verdict of guilty. (See U. S. vs. Senado
[1909], 14 Phil., 338, 339; U. S. vs. Contreras [1912], 23 Phil., 513; U. S. vs.
Montalvo [1915], 29 Phil., 595.)

The Attorney-General bases his recommendation for confirmation on the

case of the United States vs. Julio Bustos ([1909], 13 Phil., 690). The Julio
Bustos case, the Attorney-General says, is identical with the Felipe Bustos
case, with the exception that there has been more publicity in the present
instance and that the person to whom the charge was made had less
jurisdiction than had the Secretary of Justice in the Julio Bustos case.
Publicity is immaterial if the charge against Punsalan is in fact a privileged
communication. Moreover, in the Julio Bustos case we find wild statements,
with no basis in fact, made against reputable members of the judiciary, "to
persons who could not furnish protection." Malicious and untrue
communications are not privileged. A later case and one more directly in point
to which we invite especial attention is United States vs. Galeza ([1915], 31
Phil., 365). (Note alsoYancey vs. Commonwealth [1909], 122 So. W., 123.)

We find the defendants and appellants entitled to the protection of the rules
concerning qualified privilege, growing out of constitutional guaranties in our
bill of rights. Instead of punishing citizens for an honest endeavor to improve
the public service, we should rather commend them for their good citizenship.
The defendants and appellants are acquitted with the costs de officio. So
ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Johnson, Araullo, Street, and Fisher, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

CARSON, J., concurring:

I concur. I think it proper to observe, however, that in my opinion the Attorney-

General is entirely correct when he says that this case is substantially
identical with the former "Bustos case (The United States vs. Bustos, 13 Phil.
Rep., 690). I believe that a careful reading of our decisions in these cases is
sufficient to demonstrate that fact. The truth is that the doctrine of the
prevailing opinion in the former Bustos case has long since been abandoned
by this court; and in my opinion it would make for the more efficient
administration of the Libel Law in these Islands to say so, in so many words.
(Cf. U. S. vs. Sedano, [1909], 14 Phil. Rep., 338, 339; U. S. vs. Contreras
[1912], 23 Phil. Rep., 513; U. S. vs. Montalvo [1915], 29 Phil. Rep., 595; and
U. S. vs. Galeza [1915], 31 Phil. Rep., 365.)
 [G.R. No. 134504. March 17, 2000]
JOSELITO V. NARCISO, petitioner, vs. FLOR MARIE
STA. ROMANA-CRUZ, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
When the penalty prescribed by law is death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, a hearing must be conducted
by the trial judge before bail can be granted to the accused.
Absent such hearing, the order granting bail is void for
having been issued with grave abuse of discretion. In
parricide, the accused cannot be considered an offended
party just because he was married to the deceased. In the
interest of justice and in view of the peculiar circumstances
of this case, the sister of the victim may be deemed to be an
"offended party"; hence, she has the legal personality to
challenge the void order of the trial court. Jlexj
The Case
We invoke the foregoing principles in rejecting the Petition
for Review on Certiorari before us, assailing the February
26, 1998 Decision[1] and the June 29, 1998 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals (CA),[2] which reversed and set aside the
Order of Executive Judge Pedro T. Santiago of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 101, in Criminal
Case No. Q-91-24179 entitled "People of the Philippines v.
Joselito V. Narciso." S-l-x
The dispositive portion of the challenged CA Decision
reads: Esmmis
"WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby
GRANTED and the order granting bail is annulled
and set aside."[3]
The assailed Resolution, on the other hand, denied
petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. Lexjuris
The full text of the August 3, 1992 RTC Order, which the
Court of Appeals annulled and set aside, reads as follows:
"Accused who is present filed thru counsel a Motion
to Allow Accused Joselito V. Narciso to Post
Bail. Me-sm
"Considering that the Presiding Judge of Branch 83
who is hearing this case is on leave and the Pairing
Judge Honorable Salvador Ceguerra is no longer
within the premises, there being no objection by the
City Prosecutor Candido Rivera to the accused
posting a cashbond of P150,000.00, the
undersigned in his capacity as Executive Judge
hereby approves the same."[4]
The Facts of the Case
The undisputed antecedents of the case were summarized
by the Court of Appeals as follows: Scmis
"1) After conducting a preliminary investigation on
the death of Corazon Sta. Romana-Narciso, wife of
Joselito Narciso, Asst. City Prosecutor Myrna
Dimaranan Vidal of Quezon City recommended and
thereafter filed, the information for parricide against
Joselito Narciso on November 13, 1991, with the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, docketed
therein as Criminal Case No. Q-91-24179. Xsc
"2) Joselito Narciso thereafter asked for a review of
the prosecutors resolution [before] the Department
of Justice (DOJ) which was however denied.
Joselito Narciso moved for reconsideration, which
was still denied by the DOJ.
"3) Failing before DOJ, the accused on February 6,
1992, filed in Criminal Case No. Q-91-24179 an
"Omnibus Motion for Reinvestigation and to Lift the
Warrant of Arrest". The Motion was granted and the
case was set for reinvestigation by another
prosecutor. Esmso
"4) Assistant Prosecutor Lydia A. Navarro, to whom
the case was assigned for reinvestigation, found no
reason to disturb the findings of the previous
prosecutor and recommended the remand of the
case to the court for arraignment and trial.
"5) On August 3, 1992, accused filed an Urgent Ex-
Parte (Ex Abundanti Cautela) to Allow Accused
Joselito Narciso to Post Bail. The Public Prosecutor
registered no objection and said motion was granted
on the same day, allowing accused to post bail
at P150,000.00.
xxxxxxxxx
"6) On August 14, 1992, the private prosecutor
representing private complainant Flor Marie Sta.
Romana-Cruz, a sister of accuseds deceased wife,
filed an "Urgent Motion to Lift Order Allowing
Accused To Post Bail.
"7) Accused objected to the aforesaid urgent motion
by filing a Motion to Expunge 1) Notice of
Appearance of the Private Prosecutor and the 2)
Urgent Motion to Lift Order Allowing Accused to
Post Bail".
"8) Arraignment was conducted on September 14,
1992 and the case was set for hearing on November
9, 16, 23, December 2, 9, 1992, January 6, 13, 20,
27, 1993, February 3, 7, 10 and 24 1993.
"9) On October 15, 1992, private complainant
through counsel filed her opposition to the motion to
expunge [filed by] accused.
"10) On November 3, 1992 private complainant
moved for the postponement of the trials set on
November 9, 16 and 23 and the subsequent
hearings thereon pending the resolution of their
Urgent Motion to Lift Order Allowing Accused To
Post Bail.
"11) On November 9, 1992, the court issued the
first assailed order stating therein to wit:
 ORDER
Counsel for the accused, upon being informed
of the motion for postponement dated
November 3, 1992 filed by the private
complainant, through counsel, offered no
objection to the cancellation of todays trial but
not the trial set on November 16, 23 and
December 2 and 9, 1992 for the reason that the
trial can proceed independently of the pending
Urgent Motion to Lift Order Allowing the
Accused to Post Bail.
WHEREFORE, the trial set for today is hereby
cancelled and re-set on November 16, 1992 at
10:30 oclock in the morning, as previously
scheduled.
SO ORDERED.
"12) On November 16, 1992, the court cancelled the
hearing upon motion of the public prosecutor
because no prosecution witness was available.
"13) [I]n the hearing of November 23, 1992, the
private prosecutor again moved for postponement
because of the pendency of his Motion to Lift Order
Allowing Accused to Post Bail. On the same date,
the court issued the second assailed order which
reads:
 ORDER
On motion of the Asst. City Prosecutor, for the
reason that there is no showing in the record
that the private complainant was duly notified,
hence there is no available witness this
morning, the trial set for today is hereby
cancelled and reset on December 2 and 9, 1992
both at 10:30 oclock in the morning, as
previously scheduled.
Let a subpoena be issued to complainant
Corazon [sic] Sta. Romana-Narciso, the same to
be served personally by the Deputy
Sheriff/Process server of this Court.
The accused is notified of this Order in open
court.
SO ORDERED.
"Not obtaining any resolution on her Motion To Lift
Order Allowing Accused to Post Bail, private
complainant filed this petition [before the CA]."
As earlier mentioned, the Court of Appeals granted private
respondents Petition for Certiorari. Hence, this recourse to
us via Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.[5]
The Issues
Petitioner imputes to the Court of Appeals this alleged
error: Korte
"The Respondent Court of Appeals has erroneously
decided questions of substance, in a manner not in
accord with law, the Rules of Court and applicable
jurisprudence, as exemplified in the decisions of this
Honorable Court, when it reversed and set aside the
order of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
which granted the petitioner his constitutional right
to bail, considering the absence of strong evidence
or proof of his guilt, and more especially when the
public prosecutors, who have direct control of the
proceedings and after assessment of the evidence,
have themselves recommended the grant of bail."[6]
Respondent, on the other hand, poses the following issues:[7]
"A
Whether or not the Respondent Court of Appeals
correctly ruled that the Order of the Regional Trial
Court which granted bail to the petitioner is
substantially and procedurally infirm notwithstanding
the absence of any opposition from the public
prosecutor.
"B
 Whether or not the private respondent has the legal
personality to intervene in the present criminal
case."
To resolve this case, the Court believes that two issues must
be taken up; namely, (1) the validity of the grant of bail and
(2) private respondents standing to file the Petition before
the CA.Court
The Courts Ruling
The Petition is devoid of merit. Esmsc
First Issue: Validity of the Grant of Bail
Section 13, Article III of the Constitution provides: "All
persons, except those charged with offenses punishable
by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall,
before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be
released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The
right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall
not be required." Furthermore, Section 7, Article 114 of the
Rules of Court, as amended, also provides: "No person
charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable
by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, when evidence
of guilt is strong, shall be admitted to bail regardless of the
stage of the criminal prosecution." Rtc spped
Although petitioner was charged with parricide which is
punishable with reclusion perpetua, he argued before the
CA that he was entitled to bail because the evidence of his
guilt was not strong. He contended that the prosecutor's
conformity to his Motion for Bail was tantamount to a finding
that the prosecution evidence against him was not
strong. Calr-ky
The Court of Appeals ruled, however, that there was no
basis for such finding, since no hearing had been conducted
on the application for bail -- summary or otherwise. The
appellate court found that only ten minutes had elapsed
between the filing of the Motion by the accused and the
Order granting bail, a lapse of time that could not be
deemed sufficient for the trial court to receive and evaluate
any evidence. We agree with the CA.
Stressing in Basco v. Rapatalo[8] that the judge had the duty
to determine whether the evidence of guilt was strong, the
Court held: Supreme
"When the grant of bail is discretionary, the
prosecution has the burden of showing that the
evidence of guilt against the accused is strong.
However, the determination of whether or not the
evidence of guilt is strong, being a matter of judicial
discretion, remains with the judge. This discretion by
the very nature of things, may rightly be exercised
only after the evidence is submitted to the court at
the hearing. Since the discretion is directed to the
weight of the evidence and since evidence cannot
properly be weighed if not duly exhibited or
produced before the court, it is obvious that a proper
exercise of judicial discretion requires that the
evidence of guilt be submitted to the court, the
petitioner having the right of cross examination and
to introduce his own evidence in rebuttal.
xxxxxxxxx
"Consequently, in the application for bail of a person
charged with a capital offense punishable by death,
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, a hearing,
whether summary or otherwise in the discretion of
the court, must actually be conducted to determine
whether or not the evidence of guilt against the
accused is strong. A summary hearing means such
brief and speedy method of receiving and
considering the evidence of guilt as is practicable
and consistent with the purpose of hearing which is
merely to determine the weight of evidence for the
purposes of bail. On such hearing, the court does
not sit to try the merits or to enter into any nice
inquiry as to the weight that ought to be allowed to
the evidence for or against the accused, nor will it
speculate on the outcome of the trial or on what
further evidence may be therein offered and
admitted. The course of inquiry may be left to the
discretion of the court which may confine itself to
receiving such evidence as has reference to
substantial matters, avoiding unnecessary
 thoroughness in the examination and cross
examination. If a party is denied the opportunity to
be heard, there would be a violation of procedural
due process." (Emphasis supplied.)
Jurisprudence is replete with decisions compelling judges to
conduct the required hearings in bail applications, in which
the accused stands charged with a capital offense. The
absence of objection from the prosecution is never a basis
for the grant of bail in such cases, for the judge has no right
to presume that the prosecutor knows what he is doing on
account of familiarity with the case. "Said reasoning is
tantamount to ceding to the prosecutor the duty of exercising
judicial discretion to determine whether the guilt of the
accused is strong. Judicial discretion is the domain of the
judge before whom the petition for provisional liberty will be
decided. The mandated duty to exercise discretion has
never been reposed upon the prosecutor."[9]
Imposed in Baylon v. Sison[10] was this mandatory duty to
conduct a hearing despite the prosecution's refusal to
adduce evidence in opposition to the application to grant
and fix bail. We quote below the pertinent portion of the
Decision therein: Sjcj
"The importance of a hearing has been emphasized
in not a few cases wherein the Court ruled that even
if the prosecution refuses to adduce evidence or
fails to interpose an objection to the motion for bail,
it is still mandatory for the court to conduct a hearing
 or ask searching questions from which it may infer
the strength of the evidence of guilt, or the lack of it,
against the accused."
In Gimeno v. Arcueno Sr.,[11] the Court also held:
"The grant of bail is a matter of right except in cases
involving capital offenses when the matter is left to
the sound discretion of the court. That discretion
lies, not in the determination whether or not a
hearing should be held but in the appreciation and
evaluation of the prosecutions evidence of guilt
against the accused. x x x A hearing is plainly
indispensable before a judge can aptly be said to be
in a position to determine whether the evidence for
the prosecution is weak or strong."
And in Concerned Citizens v. Elma,[12] the Court ruled: Chief
"It is true that the weight of the evidence adduced is
addressed to the sound discretion of the court.
However, such discretion may only be
exercised after the hearing called to ascertain the
degree of guilt of the accused for the purpose of
determining whether or not he should be granted
liberty."
Basco v. Rapatalo[13] summarized several cases[14] that
emphasized the mandatory character of a hearing in a
petition for bail in a capital case. It enunciated the following
duties of the trial judge in such petition: Esm
 "(1) Notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the
application for bail or require him to submit his
recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the Rules
of Court as amended;
"(2) Conduct a hearing of the application for bail
regardless of whether or not the prosecution refuses
to present evidence to show that the guilt of the
accused is strong for the purpose of enabling the
court to exercise its sound discretion (Sections 7
and 8, supra);
"(3) Decide whether the evidence of guilt of the
accused is strong based on the summary of
evidence of the prosecution (Baylon v. Sison,
supra);
"(4) If the guilt of the accused is not strong,
discharge the accused upon the approval of the
bailbond. (Section 19, supra). Otherwise, petition
should be denied."
The Court added: "The above-enumerated procedure should
now leave no room for doubt as to the duties of the trial
judge in cases of bail applications. So basic and
fundamental is it to conduct a hearing in connection with the
grant of bail in the proper cases that it would amount to
judicial apostasy for any member of the judiciary to disclaim
knowledge or awareness thereof." Ky-calr
Additionally, the courts grant or refusal of bail must contain a
summary of the evidence for the prosecution, on the basis of
which should be formulated the judge's own conclusion on
whether such evidence is strong enough to indicate the guilt
of the accused. The summary thereof is considered an
aspect of procedural due process for both the prosecution
and the defense; its absence will invalidate the grant or the
denial of the application for bail.[15]
Clearly, the grant of bail by Executive Judge Santiago was
laced with grave abuse of discretion and the Court of
Appeals was correct in reversing him. Ky-le
Second Issue: Respondent's Standing to File the
Petition
Petitioner attacks respondents legal standing to file the
Petition for Certiorari before the appellate court, maintaining
that only the public prosecutor or the solicitor general may
challenge the assailed Order. He invokes People v.
Dacudao,[16] which ruled:
"x x x A private prosecutor in a criminal case has no
authority to act for the People of the Philippines
before this Court. It is the Governments counsel, the
Solicitor General who appears in criminal cases or
incidents before the Supreme Court. At the very
least, the Provincial Fiscal himself, with the
conformity of the Solicitor General, should have
raised the issue (of whether or not the prosecution
 was deprived of procedural due process on account
of the grant of bail to the accused without any
hearing on the motion for bail) before us, instead of
the private prosecutor with the conformity of the
Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Cebu."
He also cites Republic v. Partisala[17] which held as
follows: Sda adsc
"We make it known that only the Solicitor General
can bring or defend actions on behalf of the
Republic of the Philippines. Henceforth actions filed
in the name of the Republic of the Philippines if not
initiated by the Solicitor General will be summarily
dismissed." Missdaa
Citing the "ends of substantial justice," People v.
Calo,[18] however, provided an exception to the above
doctrines in this manner:
"While the rule is, as held by the Court of Appeals,
only the Solicitor General may bring or defend
actions on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines,
or represent the People or the State in criminal
proceedings pending in this Court and the Court of
Appeals (Republic vs. Partisala, 118 SCRA 320
[1982]), the ends of substantial justice would be
better served, and the issues in this action could be
determined in a more just, speedy and inexpensive
manner, by entertaining the petition at bar. As an
offended party in a criminal case, private petitioner
has sufficient personality and a valid grievance
against Judge Adaos order granting bail to the
alleged murderers of his (private petitioners) father.
"In Paredes vs. Gopengco, 29 SCRA 688 (1969),
this Court ruled that the offended parties in criminal
cases have sufficient interest and personality as
"person(s) aggrieved" to file the special civil action
of prohibition and certiorari under Sections 1 and 2
of Rule 65 in line with the underlying spirit of the
liberal construction of the Rules of Court in order to
promote their object, thus:
Furthermore, as offended parties in the pending
criminal case before petitioner judge, it cannot
be gainsaid that respondents have sufficient
interest and personality as person(s) aggrieved
by petitioner judges ruling on his non-
disqualification to file the special civil action
under sections 1 and 2 of Rule 65. Recently, in
line with the underlying spirit of a liberal
construction of the Rules of Court in order to
promote their object, as against the literal
interpretation of Rule 110, section 2, we held,
overruling the implication of an earlier case, that
a widow possesses the right as an offended
party to file a criminal complaint for the murder
of her deceased husband." (Id., p. 699)
The ends of substantial justice indeed require the affirmation
of the appellate courts ruling on this point. Clearly, the
assailed Order of Judge Santiago was issued in grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. A void
order is no order at all.[19] It cannot confer any right or be the
source of any relief. This Court is not merely a court of law; it
is likewise a court of justice. Xlaw
To rule otherwise would leave the private respondent
without any recourse to rectify the public injustice brought
about by the trial court's Order, leaving her with only the
standing to file administrative charges for ignorance of the
law against the judge and the prosecutor. A party cannot be
left without recourse to address a substantive issue in law.
Moreover, we agree with the Office of the Solicitor General
that "it is too late in the day for the petitioner to challenge the
legal personality of private respondent considering that it
was never disputed by [him] during the preliminary
investigation of the case, in his appeal to the Department of
Justice and during the reinvestigation of the case."[20]
Corollary to the question of standing, petitioner submits that
even if the exception were made to apply, private
respondent is not an "offended party" who is granted the
right to challenge the assailed RTC Order. He maintains that
only the compulsory heirs of the deceased, who are the
accused himself and his minor child, may file the instant
action. We disagree. Sclex
It should be remembered that the crime charged against the
private respondent is parricide; hence, the accused cannot
be regarded as an offended party. That would be a
contradiction in terms and an absurdity in fact. Nor can one
expect the minor child to think and to act for himself. Hence,
we rule that in view of the peculiar circumstances of this
case, the sister of the deceased is a proper party-litigant
who is akin to the "offended party," she being a close
relative of the deceased. There is no closer kin who may be
expected to take up the cudgels of justice for the deceased.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed
Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner. Sclaw
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, Purisima, and Gonzaga-Reyes,
JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 85279 July 28, 1989

SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (SSSEA),

DIONISION T. BAYLON, RAMON MODESTO, JUANITO MADURA,
REUBEN ZAMORA, VIRGILIO DE ALDAY, SERGIO ARANETA,
PLACIDO AGUSTIN, VIRGILIO MAGPAYO, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM (SSS), HON.
CEZAR C. PERALEJO, RTC, BRANCH 98, QUEZON CITY, respondents.

Vicente T. Ocampo & Associates for petitioners.

CORTES, J:

Primarily, the issue raised in this petition is whether or not the Regional
Trial Court can enjoin the Social Security System Employees Association
(SSSEA) from striking and order the striking employees to return to work.
Collaterally, it is whether or not employees of the Social Security System
(SSS) have the right to strike.

The antecedents are as follows:

On June 11, 1987, the SSS filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City a complaint for damages with a prayer for a writ of preliminary
injunction against petitioners, alleging that on June 9, 1987, the officers and
members of SSSEA staged an illegal strike and baricaded the entrances to
the SSS Building, preventing non-striking employees from reporting for
work and SSS members from transacting business with the SSS; that the
strike was reported to the Public Sector Labor - Management Council,
which ordered the strikers to return to work; that the strikers refused to
return to work; and that the SSS suffered damages as a result of the strike.
The complaint prayed that a writ of preliminary injunction be issued to
enjoin the strike and that the strikers be ordered to return to work; that the
defendants (petitioners herein) be ordered to pay damages; and that the
strike be declared illegal.

It appears that the SSSEA went on strike after the SSS failed to act on the
union's demands, which included: implementation of the provisions of the
old SSS-SSSEA collective bargaining agreement (CBA) on check-off of
union dues; payment of accrued overtime pay, night differential pay and
holiday pay; conversion of temporary or contractual employees with six (6)
months or more of service into regular and permanent employees and their
entitlement to the same salaries, allowances and benefits given to other
regular employees of the SSS; and payment of the children's allowance of
P30.00, and after the SSS deducted certain amounts from the salaries of
the employees and allegedly committed acts of discrimination and unfair
labor practices [Rollo, pp. 21-241].

The court a quo, on June 11, 1987, issued a temporary restraining order
pending resolution of the application for a writ of preliminary injunction
[Rollo, p. 71.] In the meantime, petitioners filed a motion to dismiss alleging
the trial court's lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter [Rollo, pp. 72-82.]
To this motion, the SSS filed an opposition, reiterating its prayer for the
issuance of a writ of injunction [Rollo, pp. 209-222]. On July 22,1987, in a
four-page order, the court a quo denied the motion to dismiss and
converted the restraining order into an injunction upon posting of a bond,
after finding that the strike was illegal [Rollo, pp. 83- 86]. As petitioners'
motion for the reconsideration of the aforesaid order was also denied on
August 14, 1988 [Rollo, p. 94], petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with preliminary injunction before this Court. Their petition was
docketed as G.R. No. 79577. In a resolution dated October 21, 1987, the
Court, through the Third Division, resolved to refer the case to the Court of
Appeals. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration thereof, but during its
pendency the Court of Appeals on March 9,1988 promulgated its decision
on the referred case [Rollo, pp. 130-137]. Petitioners moved to recall the
Court of Appeals' decision. In the meantime, the Court on June 29,1988
denied the motion for reconsideration in G.R. No. 97577 for being moot and
academic. Petitioners' motion to recall the decision of the Court of Appeals
was also denied in view of this Court's denial of the motion for
reconsideration [Rollo, pp. 141- 143]. Hence, the instant petition to review
the decision of the Court of Appeals [Rollo, pp. 12-37].

Upon motion of the SSS on February 6,1989, the Court issued a temporary
restraining order enjoining the petitioners from staging another strike or
from pursuing the notice of strike they filed with the Department of Labor
and Employment on January 25, 1989 and to maintain the status
quo [Rollo, pp. 151-152].

The Court, taking the comment as answer, and noting the reply and
supplemental reply filed by petitioners, considered the issues joined and the
case submitted for decision.

The position of the petitioners is that the Regional Trial Court had no
jurisdiction to hear the case initiated by the SSS and to issue the restraining
order and the writ of preliminary injunction, as jurisdiction lay with the
Department of Labor and Employment or the National Labor Relations
Commission, since the case involves a labor dispute.

On the other hand, the SSS advances the contrary view, on the ground that
the employees of the SSS are covered by civil service laws and rules and
regulations, not the Labor Code, therefore they do not have the right to
strike. Since neither the DOLE nor the NLRC has jurisdiction over the
dispute, the Regional Trial Court may enjoin the employees from striking.

In dismissing the petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary

injunction filed by petitioners, the Court of Appeals held that since the
employees of the SSS, are government employees, they are not allowed to
strike, and may be enjoined by the Regional Trial Court, which had
jurisdiction over the SSS' complaint for damages, from continuing with their
strike.

Thus, the sequential questions to be resolved by the Court in deciding

whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in finding that the Regional Trial
Court did not act without or in excess of jurisdiction when it took cognizance
of the case and enjoined the strike are as follows:

1. Do the employees of the SSS have the right to strike?

2. Does the Regional Trial Court have jurisdiction to hear the case initiated
by the SSS and to enjoin the strikers from continuing with the strike and to
order them to return to work?

These shall be discussed and resolved seriatim

The 1987 Constitution, in the Article on Social Justice and Human Rights,
provides that the State "shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-
organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful
concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law" [Art.
XIII, Sec. 31].

By itself, this provision would seem to recognize the right of all workers and
employees, including those in the public sector, to strike. But the
Constitution itself fails to expressly confirm this impression, for in the Sub-
Article on the Civil Service Commission, it provides, after defining the scope
of the civil service as "all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and
agencies of the Government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations with original charters," that "[t]he right to self-organization shall
not be denied to government employees" [Art. IX(B), Sec. 2(l) and (50)].
Parenthetically, the Bill of Rights also provides that "[tlhe right of the people,
including those employed in the public and private sectors, to form unions,
associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not
abridged" [Art. III, Sec. 8]. Thus, while there is no question that the
Constitution recognizes the right of government employees to organize, it is
silent as to whether such recognition also includes the right to strike.

Resort to the intent of the framers of the organic law becomes helpful in
understanding the meaning of these provisions. A reading of the
proceedings of the Constitutional Commission that drafted the 1987
Constitution would show that in recognizing the right of government
employees to organize, the commissioners intended to limit the right to the
formation of unions or associations only, without including the right to strike.

Thus, Commissioner Eulogio R. Lerum, one of the sponsors of the provision

that "[tlhe right to self-organization shall not be denied to government
employees" [Art. IX(B), Sec. 2(5)], in answer to the apprehensions
expressed by Commissioner Ambrosio B. Padilla, Vice-President of the
Commission, explained:

MR. LERUM. I think what I will try to say will not take that long. When we
proposed this amendment providing for self-organization of government
employees, it does not mean that because they have the right to organize,
they also have the right to strike. That is a different matter. We are only
talking about organizing, uniting as a union. With regard to the right to
strike, everyone will remember that in the Bill of Rights, there is a provision
that the right to form associations or societies whose purpose is not
contrary to law shall not be abridged. Now then, if the purpose of the state
is to prohibit the strikes coming from employees exercising government
functions, that could be done because the moment that is prohibited, then
the union which will go on strike will be an illegal union. And that provision
is carried in Republic Act 875. In Republic Act 875, workers, including those
from the government-owned and controlled, are allowed to organize but
they are prohibited from striking. So, the fear of our honorable Vice-
President is unfounded. It does not mean that because we approve this
resolution, it carries with it the right to strike. That is a different matter. As a
matter of fact, that subject is now being discussed in the Committee on
Social Justice because we are trying to find a solution to this problem. We
know that this problem exist; that the moment we allow anybody in the
government to strike, then what will happen if the members of the Armed
Forces will go on strike? What will happen to those people trying to protect
us? So that is a matter of discussion in the Committee on Social Justice.
But, I repeat, the right to form an organization does not carry with it the right
to strike. [Record of the Constitutional Commission, vol. 1, p. 569].

It will be recalled that the Industrial Peace Act (R.A. No. 875), which was
repealed by the Labor Code (P.D. 442) in 1974, expressly banned strikes
by employees in the Government, including instrumentalities exercising
governmental functions, but excluding entities entrusted with proprietary
functions:

.Sec. 11. Prohibition Against Strikes in the Government. — The terms and
conditions of employment in the Government, including any political
subdivision or instrumentality thereof, are governed by law and it is
declared to be the policy of this Act that employees therein shall not strike
for the purpose of securing changes or modification in their terms and
conditions of employment. Such employees may belong to any labor
organization which does not impose the obligation to strike or to join in
strike: Provided, however, That this section shall apply only to employees
employed in governmental functions and not those employed in proprietary
functions of the Government including but not limited to governmental
corporations.

No similar provision is found in the Labor Code, although at one time it

recognized the right of employees of government corporations established
under the Corporation Code to organize and bargain collectively and those
in the civil service to "form organizations for purposes not contrary to law"
[Art. 244, before its amendment by B.P. Blg. 70 in 1980], in the same breath
it provided that "[t]he terms and conditions of employment of all government
employees, including employees of government owned and controlled
corporations, shall be governed by the Civil Service Law, rules and
regulations" [now Art. 276]. Understandably, the Labor Code is silent as to
whether or not government employees may strike, for such are excluded
from its coverage [Ibid]. But then the Civil Service Decree [P.D. No. 807], is
equally silent on the matter.

On June 1, 1987, to implement the constitutional guarantee of the right of

government employees to organize, the President issued E.O. No. 180
which provides guidelines for the exercise of the right to organize of
government employees. In Section 14 thereof, it is provided that "[t]he Civil
Service law and rules governing concerted activities and strikes in the
government service shall be observed, subject to any legislation that may
be enacted by Congress." The President was apparently referring to
Memorandum Circular No. 6, s. 1987 of the Civil Service Commission under
date April 21, 1987 which, "prior to the enactment by Congress of
applicable laws concerning strike by government employees ... enjoins
under pain of administrative sanctions, all government officers and
employees from staging strikes, demonstrations, mass leaves, walk-outs
and other forms of mass action which will result in temporary stoppage or
disruption of public service." The air was thus cleared of the confusion. At
present, in the absence of any legislation allowing government employees
to strike, recognizing their right to do so, or regulating the exercise of the
right, they are prohibited from striking, by express provision of
Memorandum Circular No. 6 and as implied in E.O. No. 180. [At this
juncture, it must be stated that the validity of Memorandum Circular No. 6 is
not at issue].

But are employees of the SSS covered by the prohibition against strikes?

The Court is of the considered view that they are. Considering that under
the 1987 Constitution "[t]he civil service embraces all branches,
subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including
government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters" [Art.
IX(B), Sec. .2(l) see also Sec. 1 of E.O. No. 180 where the employees in
the civil service are denominated as "government employees"] and that the
SSS is one such government-controlled corporation with an original charter,
having been created under R.A. No. 1161, its employees are part of the civil
service [NASECO v. NLRC, G.R. Nos. 69870 & 70295, November 24,1988]
and are covered by the Civil Service Commission's memorandum
prohibiting strikes. This being the case, the strike staged by the employees
of the SSS was illegal.

The statement of the Court in Alliance of Government Workers v. Minister of

Labor and Employment [G.R. No. 60403, August 3, 1:983, 124 SCRA 11 is
relevant as it furnishes the rationale for distinguishing between workers in
the private sector and government employees with regard to the right to
strike:

The general rule in the past and up to the present is that 'the terms and
conditions of employment in the Government, including any political
subdivision or instrumentality thereof are governed by law" (Section 11, the
Industrial Peace Act, R.A. No. 875, as amended and Article 277, the Labor
Code, P.D. No. 442, as amended). Since the terms and conditions of
government employment are fixed by law, government workers cannot use
the same weapons employed by workers in the private sector to secure
concessions from their employers. The principle behind labor unionism in
private industry is that industrial peace cannot be secured through
compulsion by law. Relations between private employers and their
employees rest on an essentially voluntary basis. Subject to the minimum
requirements of wage laws and other labor and welfare legislation, the
terms and conditions of employment in the unionized private sector are
settled through the process of collective bargaining. In government
employment, however, it is the legislature and, where properly given
delegated power, the administrative heads of government which fix the
terms and conditions of employment. And this is effected through statutes
or administrative circulars, rules, and regulations, not through collective
bargaining agreements. [At p. 13; Emphasis supplied].

Apropos is the observation of the Acting Commissioner of Civil Service, in

his position paper submitted to the 1971 Constitutional Convention, and
quoted with approval by the Court in Alliance, to wit:

It is the stand, therefore, of this Commission that by reason of the nature of

the public employer and the peculiar character of the public service, it must
necessarily regard the right to strike given to unions in private industry as
not applying to public employees and civil service employees. It has been
stated that the Government, in contrast to the private employer, protects the
interest of all people in the public service, and that accordingly, such
conflicting interests as are present in private labor relations could not exist
in the relations between government and those whom they employ. [At pp.
16-17; also quoted in National Housing Corporation v. Juco, G.R. No.
64313, January 17,1985,134 SCRA 172,178-179].

E.O. No. 180, which provides guidelines for the exercise of the right to
organize of government employees, while clinging to the same philosophy,
has, however, relaxed the rule to allow negotiation where the terms and
conditions of employment involved are not among those fixed by law. Thus:

.SECTION 13. Terms and conditions of employment or improvements

thereof, except those that are fixed by law, may be the subject of
negotiations between duly recognized employees' organizations and
appropriate government authorities.
The same executive order has also provided for the general mechanism for
the settlement of labor disputes in the public sector to wit:

.SECTION 16. The Civil Service and labor laws and procedures, whenever
applicable, shall be followed in the resolution of complaints, grievances and
cases involving government employees. In case any dispute remains
unresolved after exhausting all the available remedies under existing laws
and procedures, the parties may jointly refer the dispute to the [Public
Sector Labor- Management] Council for appropriate action.

Government employees may, therefore, through their unions or

associations, either petition the Congress for the betterment of the terms
and conditions of employment which are within the ambit of legislation or
negotiate with the appropriate government agencies for the improvement of
those which are not fixed by law. If there be any unresolved grievances, the
dispute may be referred to the Public Sector Labor - Management Council
for appropriate action. But employees in the civil service may not resort to
strikes, walk-outs and other temporary work stoppages, like workers in the
private sector, to pressure the Govemment to accede to their demands. As
now provided under Sec. 4, Rule III of the Rules and Regulations to Govern
the Exercise of the Right of Government- Employees to Self- Organization,
which took effect after the instant dispute arose, "[t]he terms and conditions
of employment in the government, including any political subdivision or
instrumentality thereof and government- owned and controlled corporations
with original charters are governed by law and employees therein shall not
strike for the purpose of securing changes thereof."

II

The strike staged by the employees of the SSS belonging to petitioner

union being prohibited by law, an injunction may be issued to restrain it.

It is futile for the petitioners to assert that the subject labor dispute falls
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRC and, hence, the Regional Trial
Court had no jurisdiction to issue a writ of injunction enjoining the
continuance of the strike. The Labor Code itself provides that terms and
conditions of employment of government employees shall be governed by
the Civil Service Law, rules and regulations [Art. 276]. More importantly,
E.O. No. 180 vests the Public Sector Labor - Management Council with
jurisdiction over unresolved labor disputes involving government employees
[Sec. 16]. Clearly, the NLRC has no jurisdiction over the dispute.

This being the case, the Regional Trial Court was not precluded, in the
exercise of its general jurisdiction under B.P. Blg. 129, as amended, from
assuming jurisdiction over the SSS's complaint for damages and issuing the
injunctive writ prayed for therein. Unlike the NLRC, the Public Sector Labor
- Management Council has not been granted by law authority to issue writs
of injunction in labor disputes within its jurisdiction. Thus, since it is the
Council, and not the NLRC, that has jurisdiction over the instant labor
dispute, resort to the general courts of law for the issuance of a writ of
injunction to enjoin the strike is appropriate.

Neither could the court a quo be accused of imprudence or

overzealousness, for in fact it had proceeded with caution. Thus, after
issuing a writ of injunction enjoining the continuance of the strike to prevent
any further disruption of public service, the respondent judge, in the same
order, admonished the parties to refer the unresolved controversies
emanating from their employer- employee relationship to the Public Sector
Labor - Management Council for appropriate action [Rollo, p. 86].

III

In their "Petition/Application for Preliminary and Mandatory Injunction," and

reiterated in their reply and supplemental reply, petitioners allege that the
SSS unlawfully withheld bonuses and benefits due the individual petitioners
and they pray that the Court issue a writ of preliminary prohibitive and
mandatory injunction to restrain the SSS and its agents from withholding
payment thereof and to compel the SSS to pay them. In their supplemental
reply, petitioners annexed an order of the Civil Service Commission, dated
May 5, 1989, which ruled that the officers of the SSSEA who are not
preventively suspended and who are reporting for work pending the
resolution of the administrative cases against them are entitled to their
salaries, year-end bonuses and other fringe benefits and affirmed the
previous order of the Merit Systems Promotion Board.
The matter being extraneous to the issues elevated to this Court, it is Our
view that petitioners' remedy is not to petition this Court to issue an
injunction, but to cause the execution of the aforesaid order, if it has already
become final.

WHEREFORE, no reversible error having been committed by the Court of

Appeals, the instant petition for review is hereby DENIED and the decision
of the appellate court dated March 9, 1988 in CA-G.R. SP No. 13192 is
AFFIRMED. Petitioners' "Petition/Application for Preliminary and Mandatory
Injunction" dated December 13,1988 is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. Nos. 117267-117310. August 22, 1996]

GENEROSO N. SUBAYCO, ALFREDO T. ALCALDE,
and ELEUTERIO O. IBAEZ, petitioners, vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:

The year was 1985, the month, September. The Marcos

government was fast sliding into its sunset days. Yet, it was
again set to celebrate with pomp, September 21, the day it
proclaimed martial law some thirteen (13) years ago. The
people, however, were not in the mood to be joyous. They
planned massive public protests in different parts of the
country. One of the biggest protest rallies was blueprinted as
a Welga ng Bayan at Escalante, Negros Occidental. It ended
in tragedy which will not easily recede in the mist of our
history. Twenty (20) demonstrators were shot dead and
twenty-four (24) others were wounded by the military and
para-military forces of the Marcos government. Of several
persons charged with various counts of murder and frustrated
murder, only three (3) were convicted Generoso N. Subayco,
Alfredo T. Alcalde and Eleuterio O. Ibaez were convicted by
the respondent Sandiganbayan. They now come to this Court
insisting on their innocence and pleading to be set free. We
deny their petition and we warn our military and police
authorities that they cannot shoot people who are exercising
their right to peacefully assemble and petition the government
for redress of grievance.[1]
 As aforestated, twenty (20) demonstrators were killed and
twenty-four (24) others were seriously wounded by gunshots
during the Welga ng Bayan held on September 20, 1985 at
Escalante, Negros Occidental. Twenty (20) counts of Murder
and twenty-four (24) counts of Frustrated Murder[2] were filed
with respondent Sandiganbayan against those allegedly
responsible for the death and injuries of the victims. Charged
were several civilian government officials, personnel from the
Philippine Constabulary and the Integrated National Police,
and from the para-military group Civilian Home Defense
Force (CHDF), namely:
1. Ex-Mayor Braulio P. Lumayno,
2. Ex-Governor Armando C. Gustilo,[3]
3. Danilo Nonoy Jimenez,
4. Capt. Modesto E. Sanson, Jr.,
5. CIC Alfredo T. Alcalde,
6. CIC Eleuterio O. Ibaez,
7. C2C Rufino L. Lerado,
8. C2C Carlos L. Santiago,
9. T/Sgt. Generoso N. Subayco,
10. S/Sgt. Quirino L. Amar,
11. Sgt. Rolando A. Braa,
12. P/Capt. Rafael C. Jugan,
13. P/Pfc. Mariano C. Juarez, Jr.,
14. P/Pfc. Alfonso Birao,
15. P/Pfc. Wilfredo Carreon,
16. P/Pfc. Rogelio Pea,
17. P/Pfc. Iluminado D. Guillen,
18. Pat. Ludovico Cajurao,
19. Pat. Luisito T. Magalona,
 20. Pat. Alex Francisco M. Liguaton,
21. Pat. Porfirio Q. Sypongco,
22. Pat. Prudencio M. Panagsagan,
23. Pat. Danilo P. Antones,
24. Pat. Elmer Sinadjan,
25. Pat. Grant L. Batomalaque,
26. Pat. Lino F. Mercado,
27. F/Cpl. Casimiro Pandongan,
28. Fmn. Gene Legaspina,
29. Fmn. Giomar D. Gale,
30. Fmn. Edwin T. Gustilo,
31. Fmn. Joel B. Rosal,
32. Chdf Teddy Magtubo,
33. Chdf Elias Torias,
34. Chdf Jose Boy Parcon,
35. Chdf Jeremias Villanueva,
36. Chdf Dante P. Diaz,
37. Chdf Amador O. Villa,
38. Chdf Antonio A. Caete,
39. Chdf Jimmy Mayordomo,
40. Chdf Jerry L. Espinosa,
41. Chdf Francisco A. Morante,
42. Chdf Bernie C. Muoz,
43. Chdf Ernesto V. Olaera,
44. Chdf Dione L. Sesbreno, and
45. Chdf Alfredo A. Quinatagcan alias Pidong Bagis.
All of the accused were part of the police-military group which
undertook the dispersal operation during the rally.
Only twenty-eight (28) of the above accused were arrested
and tried as the others remained at large. The twenty-eight
(28) were all members of the Philippine Constabulary and the
Integrated National Police, viz:
1. Modesto Sanson,
2. Alfredo Alcalde,
3. Eleuterio Ibaez,
4. Rufino Lerado,
5. Carlos Santiago,
6. Generoso Subayco,
7. Quirino Amar,
8. Rolando Braa,
9. Rafael Jugan,
10. Mariano Juarez,
11. Alfonso Birao,
12. Wilfredo Carreon
13. Rogelio Pea,
14. Iluminado Guillen,
15. Ludovico Cajurao,
16. Luisito Magalona,
17. Alex Francisco Liguaton,
18. Porfirio Sypongco,
19. Prudencio Panagsagan,
20. Danilo Antones,
21. Elmer Sinadjan,
22. Grant Batomalaque,
23. Casimiro Pandongan,
24. Gene Legaspina,
25. Socrates Jarina,
26. Giomar Gale,
27. Edwin Gustilo, and
28. Joel Rosal.
Upon conclusion of the trial, respondent court acquitted all the
accused except petitioners Alfredo Alcalde, Eleuterio Ibaez
and Generoso Subayco. The dispositive portion of the
Decision held:
WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, the Court finds the evidence
against the following accused to be insufficient to establish their
liability in the instant charges and therefore ACQUITS them in all
the herein cases:
1. Modesto Sanson
2. Rufino Leado
3. Carlos Santiago
4. Quirino Amar
5. Rolando Braa
6. Rafael Jugan
7. Mariano Juarez
8. Alfonso Birao
9. Wilfredo Carreon
10. Rogelio Pea
11. Iluminado Guillen
12. Ludivico Cajurao
13. Luisito Magalona
14. Alex Francisco Liguaton
15. Porfirio Sypongco
16. Prudencio Panagsagan
17. Danilo Antones
18. Elmer Sinadjan
19. Grant Batomalaque
 20. Casimiro Pandongan
21. Gene Legaspina
22. Socrates Jarina
23. Giomar Gale
24. Edwin Gustilo
25. Joel Rosal, and
26. Francisco Morante.
The same evidence, however, has established the guilt beyond
reasonable doubt of the following accused who stood trial:
1. Alfredo Alcalde
2. Eleuterio Ibaez, and
3. Generoso Subayco
and the Court hereby renders judgment CONVICTING them and
imposing upon them the corresponding penalties, to wit:
A. FOR MURDER in the following Criminal Cases:
of Rodolfo Montealto in No. 12063
of Claro Monares in No. 12064
of Edgardo Salili in No. 12065
of William Alegre in No. 12066
of Rovena Franco in No. 12067
of Cesar Tejones in No. 12067
of Juvely Jaravelo in No. 12070
of Rodney Demigilio in No. 12071
of Manuel Tan in No. 12072
of Michael Dayanan in No. 12073
of Maria Luz Mondejar in No. 12074
 of Aniano Ornopia in No. 12076
of Nenita Orot in No. 12077
of Johnny Suarez in No. 12078
of Ronilo Sta. Ana in No. 12080
of Angelina Lape in No. 12081
1) imprisonment for an indeterminate period ranging from a
minimum of seventeen (17) years and one (1)
day of reclusion temporal to a maximum of reclusion
perpetua for EACH of the above sixteen cases;
2) to jointly pay indemnity to the heirs for the death of the above
mentioned victims at P50,000.00 for each victim, or a total of
P800,000.00;
3) to jointly pay moral damages to the heirs of the above
victims at P20,000.00 for each victim of a total of
P320,000.00;

B. FOR FRUSTRATED MURDER for the injuries sustained

under the following Criminal Cases:
No. 12039 by Buenaventura Jaravelo
No. 12041 by Alejandro Bocabal
No. 12042 by Elias Hermogenes
No. 12046 by Luvimin Leones
No. 12047 by Gloven Gabrido
No. 12051 by Henry Sernal
No. 12053 by Virgirita Mabuyao
No. 12059 by Federico Dogomeo
No. 12060 by Wenefreda Loquinario
No. 12062 by Luzviminda Gemola
 1) imprisonment for an indeterminate period ranging from a
minimum of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor to a maximum of fourteen (14) years, ten (10) months
and twenty (20) daysof reclusion temporal for EACH of the
above ten (10) cases;
2) to jointly pay actual damages incurred only by the following
victims, as follows:

Alejandro Bocabal (No. 12040) - P800.00

Luzminda Gemola (No. 12062) - P700.00
or a total of P1,500.00; no other damage having been
actually proven at trial;
3) to jointly pay moral damages to the following victims:
Buenaventura Jaravelo (No.12039) P10,000.00
Alejandro Bocabal (No. 12040) P10,000.00
Elias Hermogenes (No. 12042) P10,000.00
Luvimin Leones (No. 12046) P10,000.00
Gloven Gabrido (No. 12047) P10,000.00
Henry Sernal (No. 12051) P10,000.00
Virginita Mabuyao (No. 12053) P10,000.00
Federico Dogomeo (No. 12059) P15,000.00
Wenefrida Loquinario (No. 12060) P15,000.00
Luzminda Gemola (No. 12062) P10,000.00
or a total of P110,000.00.
C. FOR ATTEMPTED MURDER for the injuries sustained under
the following Criminal Cases:
 No. 12041 of Celso Saburdo
No. 12043 of Eduardo Latosa
No. 12044 of Nelly Artajo
No. 12045 of Renato Tapel
No. 12048 of Joel Quiamco
No. 12049 of Magdalena Hemola
No. 12050 of Lucia Ravanes
No. 12052 of Ernesto Caro
No. 12054 of Renato Saratobias
No. 12055 of Elisa Zarraga
No. 12056 of Julio Iwayan
No. 12057 of Nelson Cabahug
No. 12058 of Felix Almonia
No. 12061 of Abundia Caraat-Petrano
1) imprisonment for an indeterminate period ranging from a
minimum of four (4) years, one (1) month and one (1)
day of prision correccional to a maximum of eight (8) years of
prision mayor for EACH of the above fourteen (14) cases;
2) to jointly pay actual damages incurred by the victims, as
follows:
Celso Saburdo (No. 12041) P800.00
Renato Tapel (No. 12045) P300.00
Joel Quiamco (No. 12048) P15,000.00
Lucia Ravanes (No. 12050) P2,000.00
Renato Saratobias (No. 12054) P2,000.00
Elisa Zarraga (No. 12055) P300.00
Nelson Cahabug (No. 12057) P2,000.00
Abundia Petrano (No. 12061) P200.00
 or a total of P22,600.00
3) to jointly pay moral damages to the victims at P5,000.00 for
each of the victims in the fourteen cases or a total of
P70,000.00.

These three accused, namely, Alfredo Alcalde, Eleuterio Ibaez and

Genoroso Subayco are, however, ACQUITTED in the four murder
cases (No. 12069, No. 12075, No. 12079 and No. 12082 charging
the deaths of Alex Lobatos, Rodolfo Mahinay, Rogelio Magallen,
Jr. and Norberto Locanilao, respectively) for failure of the
prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
LET an alias warrant of arrest issue for the following accused
who, up to this time, had eluded arrest:
1. Ex-Mayor Braulio Lumayno
2. Danilo Nonoy Jimenez
3. Pat. Lino F. Mercado
4. CHDF Teddy G. Magtubo
5. CHDF Elias Torias
6. CHDF Jose Boy Parcon
7. CHDF Jeremias Villanueva
8. CHDF Dante P. Diaz
9. CHDF Amador O. Villa
10. CHDF Antonio A. Caete
11. CHDF Jimmy Mayordomo
12. CHDF Jerry L. Espinosa
13. CHDF Bernie C. Muoz
14. CHDF Ernesto V. Olaera
15. CHDF Dione L. Sebreno, and
 16. CHDF Alfredo M. Quinatagcan alias Pidong
Baguis.
In the meantime, the cases with respect to the above-named
accused who remain at large shall be archived pending their arrest
or voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of this Court.
SO ORDERED.[4]
Petitioners now come before us by way of certiorari raising
the following issues:
1. Whether respondent Sandiganbayan committed serious
error of law in convicting the petitioners based merely on
alleged implied conspiracy to perpetrate the crimes charged
and not on clear, positive and convincing proof of conspiracy;
and
2. Whether respondent Sandiganbayan committed serious
error of law in convicting the petitioners despite that the
quantum of evidence required for a finding of guilt that is
proof beyond reasonable doubt was not satisfied.[5]
The petition must fail.
The undisputed facts are summarized by the respondent
court in its exhaustive Decision, as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
There was a rally held at Escalante, Negros Occidental that started
on September 18, 1985. It was planned to go on until September
21, 1985, the anniversary of the proclamation of martial law by
then President Marcos. This rally was participated in by members
of the Bagong Alyansang Makabayan or BAYAN, the National
Federation of Sugar Workers, the Kristianong Katilingban, the
CYO, the KMU, the League of Filipino Students, and others. It
was spearheaded by the BAYAN whose leader at Escalante was
Rolando Ponseca.
The rally was without permit from the local authorities, although
the plan was not kept secret from them. In fact, this planned
demonstration was taken up at a conference called by the
Provincial Command and attended by the accused Capt. Sanson of
the 334th PC Company stationed at Sagay, among other unit
commanders. At that meeting, the operational guidelines were laid
down on how to deal with the planned demonstration as well as
with contingencies in connection therewith. The local command
headed by Capt. Sanson had met with the leaders of the
projected Welga ng Bayan in order to agree on ground rules for the
conduct of the rally.
The Welga ng Bayan started as scheduled on September 18,
1985. It started with a torch parade that evening. The
demonstrators came to Escalante and stayed, occupying the
national highway in front of the Rural Bank of Escalante and the
other converging point at the market site. By the 20th, the crowd
was at its thickest. Estimates of the attendance therein ranged from
3,000 to 10,000.
At around noontime on that day, there were speeches delivered by
speakers from among the demonstrators using the public address
system on an improvised platform, addressing the crowd
assembled in front of the Rural Bank. The crowd also shouted
anti-Marcos and anti-Military slogans, among others.
Capt. Sanson had been constantly apprised of the activities of the
demonstrators by reports coming from Capt. Rafael Jugan, the
Station Commander of the INP at Escalante. He was informed by
the latter that the rallyists had failed to honor their commitment
not to barricade the entire portion of the national highway so as
not to obstruct traffic. He was likewise informed that the
demonstrators were collecting money from passing motorists and
that the demonstrators were becoming unruly.
Capt. Sanson in turn reported these pieces of information to the
Provincial Command. As he was in charge of the area, Capt.
Sanson took it upon himself to personally talk to Ponseca, when he
believed that his Station Commander had failed to get in touch
with Ponseca, to remind him of his commitment. After Ponseca
had failed to effect a dispersal of the crowd or to open at least half
of the road to allow passage to vehicles, he had prepared a
dispersal operation and had called fire-fighting personnel and
equipment from the towns of Sagay and Escalante, as well as from
the cities of San Carlos and Cadiz. He had also summoned his men
under Capt. Jugan of the Escalante INP, the CHDF headed by Sgt.
Subayco and another team headed by Lt. Supaco.
After a last-ditch effort to peacefully disperse the crowd by
Ponseca through a letter to the demonstrators in front of the Rural
Bank had failed, the dispersal operation by Capt. Sanson
began. Four firetrucks were dispatched to the crowd of
demonstrators, two of them the Cadiz and Escalante firetrucks
towards the demonstrators massed in front of the Rural Bank of
Escalante. These hosed the demonstrators with water but even
after the water from them had been exhausted, the demonstrators
stayed put. Capt. Sanson then ordered the throwing of teargas to
the demonstrators by two of his men, Amar and Mercado. The tear
gas caused the demonstrators to lie face down on the ground; they
persisted in their places rather than disperse. Then, a single shot
rang out followed by successive gunfire from different
directions. As one witness had described it, it was like New Years
Eve (TSN, February 7, 1994, testimony of accused CHDF
Morante). This firing lasted for a few minutes.
Capt. Sanson had been heard by some of the witnesses to have
shouted Stop firing repeatedly and, after some time, the firing had
stopped, but not soon enough for men and women from the
rallyists group who died and others who were wounded as a result
of the gunfire.[6]
It was the thesis of the prosecution that the whole dispersal
operation was an unlawful conspiracy, that the firing at the
crowd was part of the dispersal operation, and that all those
who took part in the dispersal operation should be held liable
for each death and each injury that resulted therefrom.[7]
The accused denied the existence of conspiracy. Subayco
and Ibaez claimed that they merely fired into the air but not
toward the crowd. On his part, Alcalde admitted that he fired
his weapon to prevent the rallyists from climbing the Cadiz
City firetruck.[8]
In its Decision, the respondent court ruled there was no
sufficient evidence to prove general conspiracy of the forty-
five (45) accused as alleged by the prosecution.[9] It then
examined the individual acts of the accused during the
dispersal operation to determine their liability for the death
and injuries of the victims. It found implied conspiracy only on
the part of all the accused who fired at the demonstrators.
Per finding of the respondent Sandiganbayan, the firing
came from the Cadiz City firetruck and the jeep which
witnesses referred to as a weapons carrier. After the rallyists
were hosed with water, the Cadiz City firetruck attempted to
move back, but was trapped by the logs and rocks ostensibly
put by the rallyists under its wheels. The weapons carrier was
then maneuvered behind the Cadiz City firetruck. Thereafter,
teargas canisters were lobbed at the rallyists. Jovy Jaravelo,
a rallyist, picked up one of the canisters and threw it back
where it came from. Hell broke loose. CHDF Alfredo
Quinatagcan (a.k.a. Pidong Bagis) shot Jaravelo. Successive
gunfire followed. Several witnesses saw the CHDF personnel
and the PC men on board the Cadiz City firetruck and the
weapons carrier fire their guns. Some fired into the air while
the others directed their gun shots at the rallyists. When the
dust settled down, twenty (20) of the demonstrators were
dead, twenty-four (24) others were wounded and seventy-
nine (79) empty shells were recovered from the scene of the
crime. They were later traced to four firearms belonging
to CHDF Caete, CHDF Parcon, C2C Lerado
and CIC Ibaez.[10]
The following were identified by witnesses to have fired
their guns: CHDF Alfredo M. Quinatagcan alias Pidong
Bagis, CHDF Elias Torias, CHDF Jimmy
Mayordomo, CHDF Teddy Magtubo, CHDF Jeremias
Villanueva, CHDF Jose Boy Parcon, Roming
Javier, C1C Eleuterio O. Ibaez, T/Sgt. Generoso N.
Subayco, C1C Alfredo Alcalde.[11]
On the basis of the evidence adduced and following its
theory of implied conspiracy, the respondent Court held
petitioners liable for the deaths and injuries of all the
victims.[12] It is this finding of implied conspiracy that petitioners
assail in the petition at bar.
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide
to commit it. It may be deduced from the mode and manner
in which the offense was committed. The concerned acts of
petitioners to achieve the same objective signify
conspiracy.[13] In the case of People vs. Guevarra,[14] we
enunciated the doctrine of implied conspiracy as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
Although there is no well-founded evidence that the appellant and
Romero had conferred and agreed to kill Joselito, their complicity
can be justified by circumstantial evidence, that is, their
community of purpose and their unity of design in the
contemporaneous or simultaneous performance of the act of
assaulting the deceased.
xxx xxx xxx
There can be no question that the appellants act in holding the
victim from behind immediately before the latter was stabbed by
Eduardo constitutes a positive and overt act towards the realization
of a common criminal intent, although the intent may be classified
as instantaneous. The act was impulsively done on the spur of the
moment. It sprang from the turn of events, thereby uniting the
criminal design of the slayer immediately before the commission
of the offense. That is termed as implied conspiracy. The
appellants voluntary and indispensable cooperation was a
concurrence of the criminal act to be executed. Consequently, he is
a co-conspirator by indispensable cooperation, although the
common desire or purpose was never bottled up by previous
undertaking. (italics supplied)
We therefore uphold the respondent court in ruling that the
following circumstances proved the existence of an implied
conspiracy among the petitioners in the cases at bar:
1. After the Escalante firetruck exhausted its supply of water, it
withdrew from the scene.
2. The Cadiz City firetruck took over hosing the crowd. It also
ran out of water, tried to back out but was prevented by the
logs and rocks strewn behind it.
3. The weapons carrier then moved behind the Cadiz City
firetruck.
4. Teargas canisters were thrown into the crowd. Jovy
Jaravelo, a rallyist, picked up one of the canisters and threw
it back to where it came from. At this juncture, CHDF Alfredo
Quinatagcan a.k.a. Pidong Bagis shot Jaravelo. Successive
gunfire followed.
5. The seventy-nine (79) empty shells recovered from the
scene of the crime were traced to four M-16 rifles issued to
 CHDF Caete, CHDF Parcon, C2C Lerado and C1C
Ibaez. Caete and Parcon were on board the weapons carrier
while Lerado and Ibaez were on board the Cadiz City
firetruck.
6. The other personnel who were also on these two vehicles
were also scene to have fired at the crowd.

All these circumstances intersect to show a community of purpose

among the petitioners and their companions, that is, to fire at the
demonstrators. This common purpose was pursued by the
petitioners and their companions who used firepower against the
rallyists. As proved, the plan to disperse the demonstrators did not
include the use of guns, yet, petitioners and their cohorts did. At
the first crack of gunfire coming from CHDF Alfredo Quinatagcan
(a.k.a. Pidong Bagis), petitioners and their companions
commenced firing at the demonstrators, as if on signal. They fired
indiscriminately toward the demonstrators who were then already
lying prone on the ground. There was no imminent danger to their
safety. Not just one or a few shots were fired but several. The
firing lasted a few minutes and cost the lives and limbs of the
demonstrators. We agree with the respondent court that the
collective acts of the petitioners and their companions clearly
show the existence of a common design toward the
accomplishment of a united purpose.[15] They were therefore
properly convicted for all the crimes they were charged with.
The use of bullets to break up an assembly of people
petitioning for redress of grievance cannot but be bewailed. It
is bound to happen again for as long as abuses in government
abound. Precisely to help put a brake on official abuses,
people empowerment was codified in various provisions of
the 1987 Constitution. It is high time to remind our officials
that under our Constitution power does not come from the
barrel of a gun but from the ballots of the people. It is thus
important to know the unexpurgated will of the people for in a
republican government, it is the people who should truly rule.
Consequently, the right of the people to assemble peacefully
and to petition for redress of grievance should not be abridged
by officials momentarily holding the powers of
government. So we expressly held in the early case of US v.
Apurado.[16]
It is rather to be expected that more or less disorder will mark the
public assembly of the people to protest against grievances
whether real or imaginary, because on such occasions feeling it
always brought to a high pitch of excitement, and the greater the
grievance and the more intense the feeling, the less perfect, as a
rule, will be the disciplinary control of the leaders over their
irresponsible followers. But if the prosecution be permitted to
seize upon every instance of such disorderly conduct by individual
members of a crowd as an excuse to characterize the assembly as a
seditious and tumultuous rising against the authorities, then the
right to assemble and to petition for redress of grievances would
become a delusion and a snare and the attempt to exercise it on the
most righteous occasion and in the most peaceable manner would
expose all those who took part therein to the severest and most
unmerited punishment, if the purposes which they sought to attain
did not happen to be pleasing to the prosecuting authorities. If
instances of disorderly conduct occur on such occasions, the guilty
individuals should be sought out and punished therefor, but the
utmost discretion must be exercised in drawing the line between
disorderly and seditious conduct and between an essentially
peaceable assembly and a tumultuous uprising.
The Constitution did not engage in mystical teaching when it
proclaimed in solemn tone that sovereignty resides in the
people and all government authority emanates from them.[17] It
should be clear even to those with intellectual deficits that
when the sovereign people assemble to petition for redress
of grievances, all should listen, especially the
government. For in a democracy, it is the people who count;
those who are deaf to their grievances are ciphers.
Our affirmance of the conviction of the petitioners does not
give complete justice to the victims of the Escalante
massacre, subject of the cases at bar. Until today, sixteen
(16) of the other accused have successfully eluded arrest by
the authorities. Not until they have been arrested and tried will
justice emerge triumphant for justice cannot come in fraction.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Decision of the Sandiganbayan
promulgated October 3, 1994 is affirmed. Let copies of this
Decision be furnished the Secretary of Justice and the
Secretary of Interior and Local Government that they may
undertake the necessary efforts to effectuate the early arrest
of the other accused in the cases at bar. Costs against
petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
 Regalado (Chairman), Romero, Mendoza, and Torres, Jr.,
JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 83988 September 29, 1989

RICARDO C. VALMONTE AND UNION OF LAWYERS AND

ADVOCATES FOR PEOPLE'S RIGHTS (ULAP), petitioners,
vs.
GEN. RENATO DE VILLA AND NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION DISTRICT
COMMAND, respondents.

Ricardo C. Valmonte for himself and his co-petitioners.

PADILLA, J.:

This is a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction and/or temporary

restraining order, seeking the declaration of checkpoints in Valenzuela, Metro
Manila or elsewhere, as unconstitutional and the dismantling and banning of
the same or, in the alternative, to direct the respondents to formulate
guidelines in the implementation of checkpoints, for the protection of the
people.

Petitioner Ricardo C. Valmonte sues in his capacity as citizen of the Republic,

taxpayer, member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), and resident
of Valenzuela, Metro Manila; while petitioner Union of Lawyers and
Advocates for People's Rights (ULAP) sues in its capacity as an association
whose members are all members of the IBP.

The factual background of the case is as follows:

On 20 January 1987, the National Capital Region District Command

(NCRDC) was activated pursuant to Letter of Instruction 02/87 of the
Philippine General Headquarters, AFP, with the mission of conducting
security operations within its area of responsibility and peripheral areas, for
the purpose of establishing an effective territorial defense, maintaining peace
and order, and providing an atmosphere conducive to the social, economic
and political development of the National Capital Region.1 As part of its duty
to maintain peace and order, the NCRDC installed checkpoints in various
parts of Valenzuela, Metro Manila.

Petitioners aver that, because of the installation of said checkpoints, the

residents of Valenzuela are worried of being harassed and of their safety
being placed at the arbitrary, capricious and whimsical disposition of the
military manning the checkpoints, considering that their cars and vehicles are
being subjected to regular searches and check-ups, especially at night or at
dawn, without the benefit of a search warrant and/or court order. Their
alleged fear for their safety increased when, at dawn of 9 July 1988, Benjamin
Parpon, a supply officer of the Municipality of Valenzuela, Bulacan, was
gunned down allegedly in cold blood by the members of the NCRDC manning
the checkpoint along McArthur Highway at Malinta, Valenzuela, for ignoring
and/or refusing to submit himself to the checkpoint and for continuing to
speed off inspire of warning shots fired in the air. Petitioner Valmonte also
claims that, on several occasions, he had gone thru these checkpoints where
he was stopped and his car subjected to search/check-up without a court
order or search warrant.

Petitioners further contend that the said checkpoints give the respondents a
blanket authority to make searches and/or seizures without search warrant
or court order in violation of the Constitution; 2 and, instances have occurred
where a citizen, while not killed, had been harassed.

Petitioners' concern for their safety and apprehension at being harassed by

the military manning the checkpoints are not sufficient grounds to declare the
checkpoints as per se illegal. No proof has been presented before the Court
to show that, in the course of their routine checks, the military indeed
committed specific violations of petitioners' right against unlawful search and
seizure or other rights.

In a case filed by the same petitioner organization, Union of Lawyers and

Advocates for People's Right (ULAP) vs. Integrated National Police, 3 it was
held that individual petitioners who do not allege that any of their rights were
violated are not qualified to bring the action, as real parties in interest.

The constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a

personal right invocable only by those whose rights have been infringed, 4 or
threatened to be infringed. What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable
search and seizure in any particular case is purely a judicial question,
determinable from a consideration of the circumstances involved. 5

Petitioner Valmonte's general allegation to the effect that he had been

stopped and searched without a search warrant by the military manning the
checkpoints, without more, i.e., without stating the details of the incidents
which amount to a violation of his right against unlawful search and seizure,
is not sufficient to enable the Court to determine whether there was a violation
of Valmonte's right against unlawful search and seizure. Not all searches and
seizures are prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not forbidden. A
reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed formula but is to be
resolved according to the facts of each case. 6

Where, for example, the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant
vehicle which is parked on the public fair grounds, 7 or simply looks into a
vehicle, 8 or flashes a light therein, 9 these do not constitute unreasonable
search.

The setting up of the questioned checkpoints in Valenzuela (and probably in

other areas) may be considered as a security measure to enable the NCRDC
to pursue its mission of establishing effective territorial defense and
maintaining peace and order for the benefit of the public. Checkpoints may
also be regarded as measures to thwart plots to destabilize the government,
in the interest of public security. In this connection, the Court may take judicial
notice of the shift to urban centers and their suburbs of the insurgency
movement, so clearly reflected in the increased killings in cities of police and
military men by NPA "sparrow units," not to mention the abundance of
unlicensed firearms and the alarming rise in lawlessness and violence in such
urban centers, not all of which are reported in media, most likely brought
about by deteriorating economic conditions — which all sum up to what one
can rightly consider, at the very least, as abnormal times. Between the
inherent right of the state to protect its existence and promote public welfare
and an individual's right against a warrantless search which is
however reasonably conducted, the former should prevail.

True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of abuse by

the men in uniform, in the same manner that all governmental power is
susceptible of abuse. But, at the cost of occasional inconvenience,
discomfort and even irritation to the citizen, the checkpoints during these
abnormal times, when conducted within reasonable limits, are part of the
price we pay for an orderly society and a peaceful community.

Finally, on 17 July 1988, military and police checkpoints in Metro Manila were
temporarily lifted and a review and refinement of the rules in the conduct of
the police and military manning the checkpoints was ordered by the National
Capital Regional Command Chief and the Metropolitan Police Director. 10
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Feliciano,

Gancayco, Bidin, Cortes, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ.,
concur.

Separate Opinions

CRUZ, J., dissenting:

I dissent. The sweeping statements in the majority opinion are as dangerous

as the checkpoints it would sustain and fraught with serious threats to
individual liberty. The bland declaration that individual rights must yield to the
demands of national security ignores the fact that the Bill of Rights was
intended precisely to limit the authority of the State even if asserted on the
ground of national security. What is worse is that the searches and seizures
are peremptorily pronounced to be reasonable even without proof of probable
cause and much less the required warrant. The improbable excuse is that
they are aimed at 'establishing an effective territorial defense, maintaining
peace and order, and providing an atmosphere conducive to the social,
economic and political development of the National Capital Region." For
these purposes, every individual may be stopped and searched at random
and at any time simply because he excites the suspicion, caprice, hostility or
malice of the officers manning the checkpoints, on pain of arrest or worse,
even being shot to death, if he resists.

I have no quarrel with a policeman flashing a light inside a parked vehicle on

a dark street as a routine measure of security and curiosity. But the case at
bar is different. Military officers are systematically stationed at strategic
checkpoint to actively ferret out suspected criminals by detaining and
searching any individual who in their opinion might impair "the social,
economic and political development of the National Capital Region." It is
incredible that we can sustain such a measure. And we are not even under
martial law.

Unless we are vigilant of our rights, we may find ourselves back to the dark
era of the truncheon and the barbed wire, with the Court itself a captive of its
own complaisance and sitting at the death-bed of liberty.

SARMIENTO, J., dissenting:

I join Justice Isagani Cruz in his dissent, delivered so staightforwardly and

eloquently. I am agreed that the existence alone of checkpoints makes
search done therein, unreasonable and hence, repugnant to the Constitution.

The Charter says that the people enjoy the right of security of person, home,
and effects. (CONST., art. III, sec. 2.) It is also the bedrock — the right of the
people to be left alone — on which the regime of law and constitutionalism
rest. It is not, as the majority would put it, a matter of "occasional
inconveniences, discomfort and even irritation." (Resolution, 4.) To say that
it is, is — so I submit — to trivialize the plain command of the Constitution.

Checkpoints, I further submit, are things of martial rule, and things of the past.
They first saw the light of day by virtue of General Order No. 66
(AUTHORIZING THE CHIEF OF CONSTABULARY TO ESTABLISH
CHECKPOINTS, UPDATE LISTS OF WANTED PERSONS AND CONDUCT
DRAGNET OPERATIONS AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES), a martial law
issuance, as amended by General Order No. 67 (AMENDING AND
AMPLIFYING PARAGRAPH 7 OF GENERAL ORDER NO. 66 DATED
SEPTEMBER 12, 1980), yet another martial law issuance. (See O.G. 4224-
4226; 4226-4227 [Aug., 1983].) They are, so I strongly submit, repressive
measures, the same measures against which we had fought so painstakingly
in our quest for liberty, a quest that ended at EDSA and a quest that
terminated a dictatorship. How soon we forget.

While the right against unreasonable searches and seizures, as my brethren

advance, is a right personal to the aggrieved party, the petitioners, precisely,
have come to Court because they had been, or had felt, aggrieved. I submit
that in that event, the burden is the State's, to demonstrate the
reasonableness of the search. The petitioners, Ricardo Valmonte in
particular, need not, therefore, have illustrated the "details of the incident"
(Resolution, supra, 4) in all their gore and gruesomeness.

In any event, the absence alone of a search warrant, as I have averred,

makes checkpoint searches unreasonable, and by itself, subject to
constitutional challenges. (Supra.) As it is, "checkpoints", have become
"search warrants" unto themselves a roving one at that.

That "[n]ot all searches and seizures are prohibited," the majority points out,
is fine. And so is "a reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed
formula but is to be resolved according to the facts of each case." (Supra)
But the question, exactly, is: Is (are) the search(es) in this case reasonable?
I submit that it (they) is (are) not, for one simple reason: No search warrant
has been issued by a judge.

I likewise do not find this case to be a simple matter of an "officer merely

draw(ing) aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle ... or simply look(ing) (supra)
there, "or flash(ing) a light therein." (Supra) What we have here is Orwell's
Big Brother watching every step we take and every move we make.

As it also is, "checkpoints" are apparently, State policy. The American cases
the majority refers to involve routine checks compelled by "probable cause".
What we have here, however, is not simply a policeman on the beat but
armed men, CAFGU or Alsa Masa, who hold the power of life or death over
the citizenry, who fire with no provocation and without batting an eyelash.
They likewise shoot you simply because they do not like your face. I have
witnessed actual incidents.

Washington said that militia can not be made to dictate the terms for the
nation. He can not be anymore correct here.

"Between the inherent right of the state to protect its existence ... and on
individual's right against a warrantless search, which is reasonably
conducted, "so my brethren go on, the former shall prevail. (Supra) First, this
is the same lie that the hated despot foisted on the Filipino people. It is a
serious mistake to fall for it a second time around. Second, the checkpoint
searches herein are unreasonable: There was no warrant.

A final word. After twenty years of tyranny, the dawn is upon us. The country
is once again the "showcase of democracy" in Asia. But if in many cases, it
has been "paper democracy", let this Court anyway bring to pass its stand,
and make liberty in the land, a living reality.

I vote then, to grant the petition.

Separate Opinions

CRUZ, J., dissenting:

I dissent. The sweeping statements in the majority opinion are as

dangerous as the checkpoints it would sustain and fraught with serious
threats to individual liberty. The bland declaration that individual rights must
yield to the demands of national security ignores the fact that the Bill of
Rights was intended precisely to limit the authority of the State even if
asserted on the ground of national security. What is worse is that the
searches and seizures are peremptorily pronounced to be reasonable even
without proof of probable cause and much less the required warrant. The
improbable excuse is that they are aimed at 'establishing an effective
territorial defense, maintaining peace and order, and providing an
atmosphere conducive to the social, economic and political development of
the National Capital Region." For these purposes, every individual may be
stopped and searched at random and at any time simply because he
excites the suspicion, caprice, hostility or malice of the officers manning the
checkpoints, on pain of arrest or worse, even being shot to death, if he
resists.

I have no quarrel with a policeman flashing a light inside a parked vehicle

on a dark street as a routine measure of security and curiosity. But the case
at bar is different. Military officers are systematically stationed at strategic
checkpoint to actively ferret out suspected criminals by detaining and
searching any individual who in their opinion might impair "the social,
economic and political development of the National Capital Region." It is
incredible that we can sustain such a measure. And we are not even under
martial law.

Unless we are vigilant of our rights, we may find ourselves back to the dark
era of the truncheon and the barbed wire, with the Court itself a captive of
its own complaisance and sitting at the death-bed of liberty.

SARMIENTO, J., dissenting:

I join Justice Isagani Cruz in his dissent, delivered so staightforwardly and

eloquently. I am agreed that the existence alone of checkpoints makes
search done therein, unreasonable and hence, repugnant to the
Constitution.

The Charter says that the people enjoy the right of security of person,
home, and effects. (CONST., art. III, sec. 2.) It is also the bedrock — the
right of the people to be left alone — on which the regime of law and
constitutionalism rest. It is not, as the majority would put it, a matter of
"occasional inconveniences, discomfort and even irritation." (Resolution, 4.)
To say that it is, is — so I submit — to trivialize the plain command of the
Constitution.

Checkpoints, I further submit, are things of martial rule, and things of the
past. They first saw the light of day by virtue of General Order No. 66
(AUTHORIZING THE CHIEF OF CONSTABULARY TO ESTABLISH
CHECKPOINTS, UPDATE LISTS OF WANTED PERSONS AND
CONDUCT DRAGNET OPERATIONS AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES), a
martial law issuance, as amended by General Order No. 67 (AMENDING
AND AMPLIFYING PARAGRAPH 7 OF GENERAL ORDER NO. 66 DATED
SEPTEMBER 12, 1980), yet another martial law issuance. (See O.G. 4224-
4226; 4226-4227 [Aug., 1983].) They are, so I strongly submit, repressive
measures, the same measures against which we had fought so
painstakingly in our quest for liberty, a quest that ended at EDSA and a
quest that terminated a dictatorship. How soon we forget.
While the right against unreasonable searches and seizures, as my
brethren advance, is a right personal to the aggrieved party, the petitioners,
precisely, have come to Court because they had been, or had felt,
aggrieved. I submit that in that event, the burden is the State's, to
demonstrate the reasonableness of the search. The petitioners, Ricardo
Valmonte in particular, need not, therefore, have illustrated the "details of
the incident" (Resolution, supra, 4) in all their gore and gruesomeness.

In any event, the absence alone of a search warrant, as I have averred,

makes checkpoint searches unreasonable, and by itself, subject to
constitutional challenges. (Supra.) As it is, "checkpoints", have become
"search warrants" unto themselves a roving one at that.

That "[n]ot all searches and seizures are prohibited," the majority points out,
is fine. And so is "a reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed
formula but is to be resolved according to the facts of each case." (Supra)
But the question, exactly, is: Is (are) the search(es) in this case
reasonable? I submit that it (they) is (are) not, for one simple reason: No
search warrant has been issued by a judge.

I likewise do not find this case to be a simple matter of an "officer merely

draw(ing) aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle ... or simply look(ing) (supra)
there, "or flash(ing) a light therein." (Supra) What we have here is Orwell's
Big Brother watching every step we take and every move we make.

As it also is, "checkpoints" are apparently, State policy. The American

cases the majority refers to involve routine checks compelled by "probable
cause". What we have here, however, is not simply a policeman on the beat
but armed men, CAFGU or Alsa Masa, who hold the power of life or death
over the citizenry, who fire with no provocation and without batting an
eyelash. They likewise shoot you simply because they do not like your face.
I have witnessed actual incidents.

Washington said that militia can not be made to dictate the terms for the
nation. He can not be anymore correct here.

"Between the inherent right of the state to protect its existence ... and on
individual's right against a warrantless search, which is reasonably
conducted, "so my brethren go on, the former shall prevail. (Supra) First,
this is the same lie that the hated despot foisted on the Filipino people. It is
a serious mistake to fall for it a second time around. Second, the checkpoint
searches herein are unreasonable: There was no warrant.

A final word. After twenty years of tyranny, the dawn is upon us. The
country is once again the "showcase of democracy" in Asia. But if in many
cases, it has been "paper democracy", let this Court anyway bring to pass
its stand, and make liberty in the land, a living reality.

I vote then, to grant the petition.

G.R. No. 80508 January 30, 1990

EDDIE GUAZON, JOSEFINA CABRERA, YOLANDA DACUNES,

VIOLETA SEVILLA, QUERUBIN BILLONES, ESTELITA BILLONES,
GORGONIA MACARAEG, LAUREANA JOAQUIN, CRESTITA LICUP,
SOLIDAD ABURDO, ROSALINA VILLARDA, CONRADA HOBALANE,
ERLINDA RESTORAN, VERIDIAN FLORA, ROSELA CONDE, SOSIMA
COSTO, JOSEFINA ALDIANO, ROSALINA DOMINGO, ARESTIO
YANGA, MILAGROS GONZALES, ESTRELITA ESTARES, BONIFACIA
ANTIVO, PATRIA VALLES, ERLINDA LEE, MELANIO GAROFIL,
ERIBERTO MATEO, FRANCISCO HORTILLANO, ANATALIA PESIMO,
LOSENDO GARBO, VIRGINIA LORESTO, LYDIA ELA, RAFAEL
VILLABRILLE, MA. RECHILDA SABALZA, EDITHA MAAMO, ELENIETA
BANOSA, ALEXANDER LABADO, ANDREW GO, WYNEFREDO REYES,
ROSARIO SESPENE, ROSA MARTIN and JAIME BONGAT, petitioners,
vs.
MAJ. GEN. RENATO DE VILLA, BRIG. GEN. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE,
BRIG. GEN. RAMON MONTANO, BRIG. GEN. ALFREDO LIM, and COL.
JESUS GARCIA, respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction to prohibit the

military and police officers represented by public respondents from
conducting "Areal Target Zonings" or "Saturation Drives" in Metro Manila.

The forty one (41) petitioners state that they are all of legal age, bona
fide residents of Metro Manila and taxpayers and leaders in their respective
communities. They maintain that they have a common or general interest in
the preservation of the rule of law, protection of their human rights and the
reign of peace and order in their communities. They claim to represent "the
citizens of Metro Manila who have similar interests and are so numerous that
it is impracticable to bring them all before this Court."

The public respondents, represented by the Solicitor General, oppose the

petition contending inter alia that petitioners lack standing to file the instant
petition for they are not the proper parties to institute the action.

According to the petitioners, the following "saturation drives" were conducted

in Metro Manila:
1. March 5, 1987 at about 9:30 PM in Tindalo, Kagitingan, and Magdalena
Streets, Tondo, Manila.

2. June l9, 1987 at about l0:00 PM in Mata Street, Panday Pira Extension
and San Sebastian Street, Tondo, Manila.

3. July 20, 1987 at about 8:00 AM in Bangkusay Street, Tondo, Manila.

4. August 11 to l3, 1987 between 11:00 PM and 2:00 AM in six blocks along
Aroma Beach up to Happy Land, Magsaysay Village, Tondo, Manila.

5. August 19, 1987 at 9:00 PM in Herbosa Extension, Quirino Street, and

Pacheco Street, Tondo, Manila.

6. August 28, 1987 at l0:30 PM, in Block 34, Dagat-dagatan Navotas, Metro
Manila.

7. August 30, 1987 at 9:30 PM at Paraiso Extension, Magsaysay Village,

Tondo, Manila.

8. October 12, 1987 at 12:00 midnight in Apelo Cruz Compound, Quezon

City.

9. October 17, 1987 at 11:00 PM in Quirino Street, Tondo, Manila.

10. October 23, 1987 at 2:30 A.M. in Sun Valley Drive, Manila International
Airport, Pasay City.

11. November 1, 1987 at 4:00 A.M. in Cordillera Street, Sta. Mesa, Manila.

12. November 3, 1987 at 5:00 A.M. in Lower Maricaban, Pasay City, Metro
Manila.

According to the petitioners, the "areal target zonings" or saturation drives"

are in critical areas pinpointed by the military and police as places where the
subversives are hiding. The arrests range from seven (7) persons during the
July 20 saturation drive in Bangkusay, Tondo to one thousand five hundred
(1,500) allegedly apprehended on November 3 during the drive at Lower
Maricaban, Pasay City. The petitioners claim that the saturation drives follow
a common pattern of human rights abuses. In all these drives, it is alleged
that the following were committed:

1. Having no specific target house in mind, in the dead of the night or early
morning hours, police and military units without any search warrant or warrant
of arrest cordon an area of more than one residence and sometimes whole
barangay or areas of barangay in Metro Manila. Most of them are in civilian
clothes and without nameplates or identification cards.

2. These raiders rudely rouse residents from their sleep by banging on the
walls and windows of their homes, shouting, kicking their doors open
(destroying some in the process), and then ordering the residents within to
come out of their respective residences.

3. The residents at the point of high-powered guns are herded like cows, the
men are ordered to strip down to their briefs and examined for tattoo marks
and other imagined marks.

4. While the examination of the bodies of the men are being conducted by
the raiders, some of the members of the raiding team force their way into
each and every house within the cordoned off area and then proceed to
conduct search of the said houses without civilian witnesses from the
neighborhood.

5. In many instances, many residents have complained that the raiders

ransack their homes, tossing about the residents' belongings without total
regard for their value. In several instances, walls are destroyed, ceilings are
damaged in the raiders' illegal effort to 'fish' for incriminating evidence.

6. Some victims of these illegal operations have complained with increasing

frequency that their money and valuables have disappeared after the said
operations.

7. All men and some women who respond to these illegal and unwelcome
intrusions are arrested on the spot and hauled off to waiting vehicles that take
them to detention centers where they are interrogated and 'verified.' These
arrests are all conducted without any warrants of arrest duly issued by a
judge, nor under the conditions that will authorize warrantless arrest. Some
hooded men are used to fingerpoint suspected subversives.

8. In some instances, arrested persons are released after the expiration of

the period wherein they can be legally detained without any charge at all. In
other instances, some arrested persons are released without charge after a
few days of arbitrary detention.

9. The raiders almost always brandish their weapons and point them at the
residents during these illegal operations.

10. Many have also reported incidents of on-the-spotbeatings, maulings and

maltreatment.

11. Those who are detained for further 'verification' by the raiders are
subjected to mental and physical torture to extract confessions and tactical
information. (Rollo, pp. 2-4)

The public respondents stress two points in their Comment which was also
adopted as their Memorandum after the petition was given due course.

First, the respondents have legal authority to conduct saturation drives. And
second, they allege that the accusations of the petitioners about a deliberate
disregard for human rights are total lies.

Insofar as the legal basis for saturation drives is concerned, the respondents
cite Article VII, Section 17 of the Constitution which provides:

The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus
and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. (Emphasis
supplied )

They also cite Section 18 of the same Article which provides:

The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the

Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed
forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. ...
There can be no question that under ordinary circumstances, the police
action of the nature described by the petitioners would be illegal and
blantantly violative of the express guarantees of the Bill of Rights. If the
military and the police must conduct concerted campaigns to flush out and
catch criminal elements, such drives must be consistent with the
constitutional and statutory rights of all the people affected by such actions.

There is, of course, nothing in the Constitution which denies the authority of
the Chief Executive, invoked by the Solicitor General, to order police actions
to stop unabated criminality, rising lawlessness, and alarming communist
activities. The Constitution grants to Government the power to seek and
cripple subversive movements which would bring down constituted authority
and substitute a regime where individual liberties are suppressed as a matter
of policy in the name of security of the State. However, all police actions are
governed by the limitations of the Bill of Rights. The Government cannot
adopt the same reprehensible methods of authoritarian systems both of the
right and of the left, the enlargement of whose spheres of influence it is trying
hard to suppress. Our democratic institutions may still be fragile but they are
not in the least bit strengthened through violations of the constitutional
protections which are their distinguishing features.

In Roan v. Gonzales (145 SCRA 687; 690-691 [1986]), the Court stated:

One of the most precious rights of the citizen in a free society is the right to
be left alone in the privacy of his own house. That right has ancient roots,
dating back through the mists of history to the mighty English kings in their
fortresses of power. Even then, the lowly subject had his own castle where
he was monarch of all he surveyed. This was his humble cottage from which
he could bar his sovereign lord and all the forces of the Crown.

That right has endured through the ages albeit only in a few libertarian
regimes. Their number, regrettably, continues to dwindle against the
onslaughts of authoritarianism. We are among the fortunate few, able again
to enjoy this right after the ordeal of the past despotism. We must cherish
and protect it all the more now because it is like a prodigal son returning.
That right is guaranteed in the following provisions of Article IV of the 1973
Constitution:

SEC. 3. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature
and for any purpose shall not be violated, and no search warrant or warrant
of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the
judge, or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses
he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized.

xxx xxx xxx

Only last year, the Court again issued this reminder in 20th Century Fox Film
Corporation v. Court of Appeals (164 SCRA 655; 660- 661 [1988]):

This constitutional right protects a citizen against wanton and unreasonable

invasion of his privacy and liberty as to his person, papers and effects. We
have explained in the case of People vs. Burgos (144 SCRA 1)
citing Villanueva v. Querubin (48 SCRA 345) why the right is so important:

It is deference to one's personality that lies at the core of this right, but it could
be also looked upon as a recognition of a constitutionally protected area,
primarily one's home, but not necessarily thereto confined. (Cf. Hoffa v.
United States, 385 US 293 [1966]) What is sought to be guarded is a man's
prerogative to choose who is allowed entry to his residence. In that haven of
refuge, his individuality can assert itself not only in the choice of who shall be
welcome but likewise in the kind of objects he wants around him. There the
state, however powerful, does not as such have access except under the
circumstances above noted, for in the traditional formulation, his house,
however humble, is his castle. Thus is outlawed any unwarranted intrusion
by government, which is called upon to refrain from any invasion of his
dwelling and to respect the privacies of his life. (Cf. Schmerber v. California,
384 US 757 [1966], Brennan J. and Boyd v. United States, 11 6 630 [1886]).
In the same vein, Landynski in his authoritative work (Search and Seizure
and the Supreme Court [1966]), could fitly characterize constitutional right as
the embodiment of a spiritual concept: the belief that to value the privacy of
home and person and to afford its constitutional protection against the long
reach of government is no less than to value human dignity, and that his
privacy must not be disturbed except in case of overriding social need, and
then only under stringent procedural safeguards. (ibid, p. 74.)

The decision of the United States Supreme Court in Rochin v. California, (342
US 165; 96 L. Ed. 183 [1952]) emphasizes clearly that police actions should
not be characterized by methods that offend a sense of justice. The court
ruled:

Applying these general considerations to the circumstances of the present

case, we are compelled to conclude that the proceedings by which this
conviction was obtained do more than offend some fastidious
squeamishness or private sentimentalism about combatting crime too
energetically. This is conduct that shocks the conscience. Illegally breaking
into the privacy of the petitioner, the struggle to open his mouth and remove
what was there, the forcible extraction of his stomach's contents this course
of proceeding by agents of government to obtain evidence is bound to offend
even hardened sensibilities. They are methods too close to the rack and the
screw to permit of constitutional differentiation.

It is significant that it is not the police action perse which is impermissible and
which should be prohibited. Rather, it is the procedure used or in the words
of the court, methods which "offend even hardened sensibilities."
In Breithaupt v. Abram (352 US 432, 1 L. Ed. 2nd 448 [1957]), the same court
validated the use of evidence, in this case blood samples involuntarily taken
from the petitioner, where there was nothing brutal or offensive in the taking.
The Court stated:

Basically the distinction rests on the fact that there is nothing 'brutal' or
'offensive' in the taking of a sample of blood when done, as in this case, under
the protective eye of a physician. To be sure, the driver here was
unconscious when the blood was taken, but the absence of conscious
consent, without more, does not necessarily render the taking a violation of
a constitutional light; and certainly the rest was administered here would not
be considered offensive by even the most delicate. Furthermore, due process
is not measured by the yardstick of personal reaction or the sphygmogram of
the most sensitive person, but by that whole community sense of 'decency
and fairness that has been woven by common experience into the fabric of
acceptable conduct....

The individual's right to immunity from such invasion of his body was
considered as "far outweighed by the value of its deterrent effect" on the evil
sought to be avoided by the police action.

It is clear, therefore, that the nature of the affirmative relief hinges closely on
the determination of the exact facts surrounding a particular case.

The violations of human rights alleged by the petitioners are serious. If an

orderly procedure ascertains their truth, not only a writ of prohibition but
criminal prosecutions would immediately issue as a matter of course. A
persistent pattern of wholesale and gross abuse of civil liberties, as alleged
in the petition, has no place in civilized society.

On the other hand, according to the respondents, the statements made by

the petitioners are a complete lie.

The Solicitor General argues:

This a complete lie.

Just the contrary, they had been conducted with due regard to human rights.
Not only that, they were intelligently and carefully planned months ahead of
the actual operation. They were executed in coordination with barangay
officials who pleaded with their constituents to submit themselves voluntarily
for character and personal verification. Local and foreign correspondents,
who had joined these operations, witnessed and recorded the events that
transpired relative thereto. (After Operation Reports: November 5, 1987,
Annex 12; November 20, 1987, Annex 13; November 24, 1987, Annex 14).
That is why in all the drives so far conducted, the alleged victims who
numbered thousands had not themselves complained.

In her speech during turn-over rites on January 26, 1987 at Camp Aguinaldo,
President Aquino branded all accusations of deliberate disregard for human
rights as 'total lies'. Here are excerpts from her strongest speech yet in
support of the military:

All accusations of a deliberate disregard for human rights have been shown-
up to be total lies.

...To our soldiers, let me say go out and fight, fight with every assurance that
I will stand by you through thick and thin to share the blame, defend your
actions, mourn the losses and enjoy with you the final victory that I am certain
will be ours.

You and I will see this through together.

I've sworn to defend and uphold the Constitution.

We have wasted enough time answering their barkings for it is still a long way
to lasting peace. . . . The dangers and hardships to our men in the field are
great enough as it is without having them distracted by tills worthless carping
at their backs.

Our counter-insurgency policy remains the same: economic development to

pull out the roots-and military operations to slash the growth — of the
insurgency.

The answer to terror is force — now.

Only feats of arms can buy us the time needed to make our economic and
social initiatives bear fruit. . . Now that the extreme Right has been defeated, I
expect greater vigor in the prosecution of the war against the communist
insurgency, even as we continue to watch our backs against attacks from the
Right. (Philippine Star, January 27, 1988, p. 1, Annex 15; emphasis supplied)

Viewed in the light of President Aquino's observation on the matter, it can be

said that petitioners misrepresent as human rights violations the military and
police's zealous vigilance over the people's right to live in peace and safety.
(Rollo, pp. 36-38)

Herein lies the problem of the Court. We can only guess the truth. Everything
before us consists of allegations. According to the petitioners, more than
3,407 persons were arrested in the saturation drives covered by the petition.
No estimates are given for the drives in Block 34, Dagat-dagatan, Navotas;
Apelo Cruz Compound, Pasig; and Sun Valley Drive near the Manila
International Airport area. Not one of the several thousand persons treated
in the illegal and inhuman manner described by the petitioners appears as a
petitioner or has come before a trial court to present the kind of evidence
admissible in courts of justice. Moreover, there must have been tens of
thousands of nearby residents who were inconvenienced in addition to the
several thousand allegedly arrested. None of those arrested has apparently
been charged and none of those affected has apparently complained.

A particularly intriguing aspect of the Solicitor General's comments is the

statement that local and foreign co-respondents actually joined the saturation
drives and witnessed and recorded the events. In other words, the activities
sought to be completely proscribed were in full view of media. The sight of
hooded men allegedly being used to fingerpoint suspected subversives
would have been good television copy. If true, this was probably effected
away from the ubiquitous eye of the TV cameras or, as the Solicitor General
contends, the allegation is a "complete lie."

The latest attempt to stage a coup d'etat where several thousand members
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines sought to overthrow the present
Government introduces another aspect of the problem and illustrates quite
clearly why those directly affected by human rights violations should be the
ones to institute court actions and why evidence of what actually transpired
should first be developed before petitions are filed with this Court.

Where there is large scale mutiny or actual rebellion, the police or military
may go in force to the combat areas, enter affected residences or buildings,
round up suspected rebels and otherwise quell the mutiny or rebellion without
having to secure search warrants and without violating the Bill of Rights. This
is exactly what happened in the White Plains Subdivision and the commercial
center of Makati during the first week of December, 1989.

The areal target zonings in this petition were intended to flush out
subversives and criminal elements particularly because of the blatant
assassinations of public officers and police officials by elements supposedly
coddled by the communities where the "drives" were conducted.

It is clear from the pleadings of both petitioners and respondents, however,

that there was no rebellion or criminal activity similar to that of the
attempted coup d' etats. There appears to have been no impediment to
securing search warrants or warrants of arrest before any houses were
searched or individuals roused from sleep were arrested. There is no strong
showing that the objectives sought to be attained by the "areal zoning" could
not be achieved even as the rights of squatter and low income families are
fully protected.

Where a violation of human rights specifically guaranteed by the Constitution

is involved, it is the duty of the court to stop the transgression and state where
even the awesome power of the state may not encroach upon the rights of
the individual. It is the duty of the court to take remedial action even in cases
such as the present petition where the petitioners do not complain that they
were victims of the police actions, where no names of any of the thousands
of alleged victims are given, and where the prayer is a general one to stop all
police "saturation drives," as long as the Court is convinced that the event
actually happened.

The Court believes it highly probable that some violations were actually
committed. This is so inspite of the alleged pleas of barangay officials for the
thousands of residents "to submit themselves voluntarily for character and
personal verification." We cannot imagine police actions of the magnitude
described in the petitions and admitted by the respondents, being undertaken
without some undisciplined soldiers and policemen committing certain
abuses. However, the remedy is not to stop all police actions, including the
essential and legitimate ones. We see nothing wrong in police making their
presence visibly felt in troubled areas. Police cannot respond to riots or
violent demonstrations if they do not move in sufficient numbers. A show of
force is sometimes necessary as long as the rights of people are protected
and not violated. A blanket prohibition such as that sought by the petitioners
would limit all police actions to one on one confrontations where search
warrants and warrants of arrests against specific individuals are easily
procured. Anarchy may reign if the military and the police decide to sit down
in their offices because all concerted drives where a show of force is present
are totally prohibited.

The remedy is not an original action for prohibition brought through a

taxpayers' suit. Where not one victim complains and not one violator is
properly charged, the problem is not initially for the Supreme Court. It is
basically one for the executive departments and for trial courts. Well meaning
citizens with only second hand knowledge of the events cannot keep on
indiscriminately tossing problems of the executive, the military, and the police
to the Supreme Court as if we are the repository of all remedies for all evils.
The rules of constitutional litigation have been evolved for an orderly
procedure in the vindication of rights. They should be followed. If our policy
makers sustain the contention of the military and the police that occasional
saturation drives are essential to maintain the stability of government and to
insure peace and order, clear policy guidelines on the behavior of soldiers
and policemen must not only be evolved, they should also be enforced. A
method of pinpointing human rights abuses and identifying violators is
necessary.

The problem is appropriate for the Commission on Human Rights. A high

level conference should bring together the heads of the Department of
Justice, Department of National Defense and the operating heads of affected
agencies and institutions to devise procedures for the prevention of abuses.

Under the circumstances of this taxpayers' suit, there is no erring soldier or

policeman whom we can order prosecuted. In the absence of clear facts
ascertained through an orderly procedure, no permanent relief can be given
at this time. Further investigation of the petitioners' charges and a hard look
by administration officials at the policy implications of the prayed for blanket
prohibition are also warranted.

In the meantime and in the face of a prima facie showing that some abuses
were probably committed and could be committed during future police
actions, we have to temporarily restrain the alleged banging on walls, the
kicking in of doors, the herding of half-naked men to assembly areas for
examination of tattoo marks, the violation of residences even if these are
humble shanties of squatters, and the other alleged acts which are shocking
to the conscience.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby REMANDED to the Regional Trial

Courts of Manila, Malabon, and Pasay City where the petitioners may present
evidence supporting their allegations and where specific erring parties may
be pinpointed and prosecuted.

Copies of this decision are likewise forwarded to the Commission on Human

Rights, the Secretary of Justice, the Secretary of National Defense, and the
Commanding General PC-INP for the drawing up and enforcement of clear
guidelines to govern police actions intended to abate riots and civil
disturbances, flush out criminal elements, and subdue terrorist activities.

In the meantime, the acts violative of human rights alleged by the petitioners
as committed during the police actions are ENJOINED until such time as
permanent rules to govern such actions are promulgated.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco,

Bidin, Cortes, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Griño-Aquino, J., I join JJ. Cruz, Padilla and Sarmiento's dissents.

Separate Opinions

CRUZ, J., dissenting:

Mr. Justice Gutierrez and I are kindred spirits and usually find ourselves
together on the side of liberty. It saddens me that in the case at bar he is on
the side of authority.

This is not to say that liberty and authority are irreconcilable enemies. The
two must in fact co-exist, for only in a well-ordered society can rights be
properly enjoyed. Implicit in that theory, however, is the other imperative: that
the highest function of authority is to insure liberty.
While acknowledging that the military is conducting the saturation drives, the
majority practically blinks them away on mere technicalities. First, there are
no proper parties. Second, there is no proof. Therefore, the petition is
dismissed.

The approach is to me too much simplification. We do not choose to see the

woods for the trees. The brutal fact is staring us in the face but we look the
other way in search of excuses.

The majority says it cannot act against the drives because no one directly
affected has complained. Such silence, if I understand
the ponencia correctly, has in effect purged the drives of all oppressiveness
and washed them clean.

(The reason for the silence is fear. These raids are conducted not in the
enclaves of the rich but in the deprived communities, where the residents
have no power or influence. The parties directly aggrieved are afraid. They
are the little people. They cannot protest lest they provoke retaliation for their
temerity. Their only hope is in this Court, and we should not deny them that
hope.)

The ruling that the petitioners are not proper parties is a specious pretext for
inaction. We have held that technical objections may be brushed aside where
there are constitutional questions that must be met. There are many
decisions applying this doctrine. (Rodriguez v. Gella, 92 Phil. 603; Tolentino
v. Commission on Elections, 41 SCRA 702; Philconsa v. Jimenez, 65 SCRA
479; Edu v. Ericta, 35 SCRA 481; Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, 27
SCRA 835; Lagunsad v. Court of Appeals; 154 SCRA 199; Demetria v. Alba,
148 SCRA 208). Lozada was in fact an aberration.

I believe that where liberty is involved, every person is a proper party even if
he may not be directly injured. Each of us has a duty to protect liberty and
that alone makes him a proper party. It is not only the owner of the burning
house who has the right to call the firemen. Every one has the right
and responsibility to prevent the fire from spreading even if he lives in the
other block.
The majority seems to be willing to just accept the Solicitor General's
assertion that the claimed abuses are "complete lies" and leave it at that. But
a blanket denial is not enough. The evidence is there on media, in the papers
and on radio and television, That kind of evidence cannot be cavalierly
dismissed as "complete lies."

The saturation drive is not unfamiliar to us. It is like the "zona" of the
Japanese Occupation. An area was surrounded by soldiers and all residents
were flushed out of their houses and lined up, to be looked over by a person
with a bag over his head. This man pointed to suspected guerrillas, who were
immediately arrested and eventually if not instantly executed.

To be sure, there are some variations now. The most important difference is
that it is no longer 1943 and the belligerent occupation is over. There is no
more war. It is now 1990, when we are supposed to be under a free Republic
and safeguarded by the Bill of Rights.

Article III, Section 2, clearly provides:

Sec. 2 The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature
and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of
arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally
by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to
be searched and the persons or things to be seized. (Emphasis supplied.)

The provision is intended to protect the individual from official (and officious)
intrusions, no matter how humble his abode and however lowly his station in
life. Against the mighty forces of the government, the person's house is his
castle, his inviolate refuge and exclusive domain where he is the monarch of
all he surveys.

Yet in the dead of night, armed soldiers may knock on one's door and
command him at gunpoint to come out so he and his neighbors, who have
also been rounded up, can all be placed on public examination, as in a slave
market. This is followed by the arrest and detention of those suspected of
villainy, usually on the basis only of the tattoos on their bodies or the
informer's accusing finger.

Where is the search warrant or the warrant of arrest required by the Bill of
Rights? Where is the probable cause that must be determined personally by
the judge, and by no other, to justify the warrant? Where is the examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce to establish the probable cause? Where is the particular description
that must be stated in the warrant, of the places to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized? And where, assuming all these may be
dispensed with, is the admissible exception to the rule?

Saturation drives are not among the accepted instances when a search or an
arrest may be made without warrant. They come under the concept of the
fishing expeditions stigmatized by law and doctrine. At any rate, if the majority
is really introducing the "zona" as another exception to the rule, it must not
equivocate. It must state that intention in forthright language and not in vague
generalizations that concede the wrong but deny the right.

To justify the "zona" on the basis of the recent coup attempt is, in my view,
to becloud the issue. The "zonas" complained of happened before the failed
coup and had nothing whatsoever to do with that disturbance. There was no
"large scale mutiny or actual rebellion' when the saturation drives were
conducted and there were no "combat areas" either in the places where the
violations were committed. The failed coup cannot validate the invalid "zonas'
retroactively.

The ponencia says that "we cannot take judicial notice of the facts and
figures given by the petitioners regarding these saturation drives conducted
by the military and police authorities." Maybe so. But we can and should take
judicial notice of the saturation drives themselves which are not and cannot
be denied by the government.

I urge my brethren to accept the fact that those drives are per
se unconstitutional. I urge them to accept that even without proof of the
hooded figure and the personal indignities and the loss and destruction of
properties and the other excesses allegedly committed, the mere waging of
the saturation drives alone is enough to make this Court react with outraged
concern.

Confronted with this clear case of oppression, we should not simply throw up
our hands and proclaim our helplessness. I submit that this Court should
instead declare categorically and emphatically that these saturation drives
are violative of human rights and individual liberty and so should be
stopped immediately. While they may be allowed in the actual theater of
military operations against the insurgents, the Court should also make it clear
that Metro Manila is not such a battleground.

The danger to our free institutions lies not only in those who openly defy the
authority of the government and violate its laws. The greater menace is in
those who, in the name of democracy, destroy the very things it stands for as
in this case and so undermine democracy itself.

Where liberty is debased into a cruel illusion, all of us are degraded and
diminished. Liberty is indivisible; it belongs to every one. We should realize
that when the bell tolls the death of liberty for one of us, "it tolls for thee" and
for all of us.

PADILLA, J., separate opinion:

This case is another classic instance of state power colliding with individual
rights. That the State, acting through the government and its forces, has the
authority to suppress lawless violence in all its forms cannot be denied. The
exercise of that authority is justified when viewed from the standpoint of the
general welfare, because the State has the elementary and indispensable
duty to insure a peaceful life and existence for its citizens. A government that
loses its capability to insure peace and order for its citizens loses the very
right to remain in power.

But, in the exercise of such authority, i.e., in the choice of the means and
methods to suppress lawless violence, the right of the individual citizen to the
dignity of his person and the sanctity of his home cannot and should not be
violated, unless there is, in a particular case, a clear and present danger of a
substantive evil that the State has a compelling duty to suppress or abate.
Petitioners' vivid description of the "areal target zoning" or "saturation drives"
allegedly conducted by police and military units in Metro Manila, obviously
intended to ferret out criminals or suspected criminals in certain cordoned
areas, while vigorously denied by respondents, deserves an effective and
immediate response from this Court.

I submit that since this Court is not a trier of facts and this case involves
certainty of facts alleged by petitioners and denied by respondents — this
case should be referred to a proper trial court where the petitioners can
present evidence to support and prove the allegations they make of such
brutal and inhuman conduct on the part of military and police units.

More than the military and police checkpoints sustained by this Court as a
general proposition during abnormal times,** and which involve the right of
military and police forces to check on vehicles and pedestrians passing
through certain fixed points for the purpose of apprehending criminals and/or
confiscating prohibited articles like unlicensed firearms, the "areal target
zoning" and "saturation drives", as described in petitioners' allegations, are
actual raids on private homes in selected areas, and are thus positive
assaults against the individual person and his dignity. The individual is, as
described, yanked out of his home, without any arrest warrant, to face
investigation as to his connections with lawless elements. In short, the
sanctity of the home is pulverized by military and police action. Thus, while
the checkpoint is a defensive device, on the part of government, the "areal
target zoning" or "saturation drive" is a direct assault against, an intrusion into
individual rights and liberties.

Respondents, fortunately, have branded petitioners' allegations of such

brutality, as total lies. It is indeed difficult to even contemplate that such
methods reminiscent of a "police state" can exist in a society built on a
republican and constitutional system. Respondents Must be given a chance
to face their accusers and prove that they are indeed fabricating falsehoods.
But the stakes I submit, are too high for this Court, as the guardian of
individual liberties, to avoid a judicial confrontation with the issue.

I vote, therefore, to refer this case (dispensing with normal venue

requirements) to the Executive Judge, RTC of Manila, for him —
1. to receive the evidences of all the parties, in support and in refutation of
the petitioners' allegations;

2. to decide the case expeditiously on the bases of the evidence, subject to

review by this Court;

3. to report to this Court on action taken.

SARMIENTO, J., dissenting:

There is only one question here: Whether or not the police actions (saturation
drives) complained of constitute a valid exercise of police power.

The fact that on twelve occasions between March and November, 1987 the
military conducted the saturation drives in question is a fact open to no
question. The Solicitor General admits that they, the saturation drives, had
been done, except that they had been done "with due regard to human
rights." "Not only that," so he states:

... they were intelligently and carefully planned months ahead of the actual
operation. They were executed in coordination with barangay officials who
pleaded with their constituents to submit themselves voluntarily for character
and personal verification. Local and foreign correspondents, who had joined
these operations, witnessed, and reported the events that transpired relative
thereto. (After Operation Reports: November 5, 1987, Annex 12; November
20, 1987, Annex 13; November 24, 1987, Annex 14). That is why in all the
drives so far conducted, the alleged victims who numbered thousands had
not themselves complained.

The question, then, is purely one of law: Are the saturation drives in question
lawful and legitimate? It is also a question that is nothing novel: No, because
the arrests were not accompanied by a judicial warrant. 1

Therefore, the fact that they had been carefully planned, executed in
coordination with Tondo's barangay officials, and undertaken with due
courtesy and politeness (which I doubt), will not validate them. The lack of a
warrant makes them, per se illegal.
According to the majority, "the remedy is not to stop all police actions,
including the essential and legitimate ones . . . [w]e see nothing wrong in
police making their presence visibly felt in troubled areas . . . " 2 But the
petitioners have not come to court to "stop all police actions" but rather, the
saturation drives, which are, undoubtedly, beyond police power.

That "[a] show of force is sometimes necessary as long as the rights of

people are protected and not violated3 is a contradiction in terms. A "show of
force" (by way of saturation drives) is a violation of human rights because it
is not covered by a judicial warrant.

In all candor, I can not swallow what I find is a complete exaggeration of the
issues:

...A show of force is sometimes necessary as long as the rights of people are
protected and not violated. A blanket prohibition such as that sought by the
1âwphi1

petitioners would limit all police actions to one on one confrontations where
search warrants and warrants of arrests against specific individuals are easily
procured. Anarchy may reign if the military and the police decide to sit down
in their offices because all concerted drives where a show of force is present
are totally prohibited. 4

As a general rule, a peace officer can not act unless he is possessed of the
proper arrest or search warrant. The exception is when a criminal offense is
unfolding before him, in which case, action is justified and necessary. The
majority would have the exception to be simply, the general rule.

The fact of the matter is that we are not here confronted by police officers on
the beat or prowl cars on patrol. What we have and I suppose that everybody
is agreed on it- are lightning raids of homes, arbitrary confiscation of effects,
and summary arrests of persons, the very acts proscribed by the Constitution.
If this is a "show of force", it certainly has no place in a constitutional
democracy.

I find allusions to the last aborted coup d'etat inapt. In that case, our men in
uniform had all the right to act amidst crimes being committed in flagrante.
The instant case is quite different. There are no offenses being committed,
but rather, police officers fishing for evidence of offenses that may have
been committed, As I said, in that event, a court warrant is indispensable.

That "the problem is not initially for the Supreme Court5 is to me, an
abdication of judicial duty. As I indicated, the controversy is purely one of law
the facts being undisputed. Law, needless to say, is the problem of the
Supreme Court, not the Executive.

Worse, it is passing the buck. The petitioners, precisely, have a grievance to

raise, arising from abuses they pinpoint to the lower offices of the Executive
(which presumably has its imprimatur). To make it an executive problem, so
I hold, is to make the Executive judge and jury of its own acts, and hardly, a
neutral arbiter.

I am also taken aback by references to "[w]ell meaning citizens with only

second hand knowledge of the events ... keep[ing] on indiscriminately tossing
problems -of the Executive, the military, and the police to the Supreme Court
as if we are the repository of all remedies for all evils." 6 First, the facts are
not "second-hand", they are undisputed: Ther had been saturation drives.
Second, the petitioners have trooped to the highest court with a legitimate
grievance against the Executive (and military).

The fact that the majority would "remand" the case to the lower courts and
the various echelons of the Executive for investigation is to admit that walls
have indeed been banged, doors kicked in, and half-naked men herded. I do
not see therefore why we can not issue a writ of prohibition as prayed for, in
the midst of these facts.
G.R. No. 115576 August 4, 1994

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF

LEONARDO PAQUINTO AND JESUS CABANGUNAY.

CHAIRMAN SEDFREY A. ORDOÑEZ, COMM. SAMUEL M. SORIANO,

COMM. HESIQUIO R. MALLILLIN, COMM. NARCISO C. MONTEIRO,
COMM. PAULYNN PAREDES-SICAM, THE COMMISSION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS, petitioners,
vs.
DIRECTOR OF PRISONS, respondent.

CRUZ, J.:
Why are Leonardo Paquinto and Jesus Cabangunay still in prison?

These persons are among the civilians who were tried by the military
commissions during the period of martial law. Both were originally
condemned to die by musketry, but their sentence was commuted by the new
Constitution to reclusion perpetua.

Their convictions were subsequently nullified by this Court in the case

of Olaguer v. Military Commission No. 34, 1where we held that the military
tribunals had no jurisdiction to try civilians when the courts of justice were
functioning.

Accordingly, in the case of Cruz v. Ponce Enrile, 2 this Court directed the
Department of Justice to file the corresponding informations in the civil courts
against the petitioners within 180 days from notice of the decision.

No information has so far been filed against Paquinto and Cabangunay, but
they have remained under detention.

On May 27, 1992, Ernesto Abaloc, together with Cabangunay and Paquinto,
wrote to the United Nations Human Rights Committee (UNHRC) complaining
that their continued detention violated their rights under Articles 6, 7, 9, 10,
14, and 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 3

In its decision dated October 14, 1993, the UNHRC declared their
communication as admissible and requested the Republic of the Philippines
to submit a written explanation of their complaint within six months from the
date of transmittal. 4

The Department of Foreign Affairs furnished the Commission on Human

Rights with a copy of the decision. Thereupon, the Commission, through its
Chairman Sedfrey A. Ordoñez wrote the Secretary of Justice of its intention
to sue for the release of the complaints unless criminal charges had already
been filed against them. 5

On June 7, 1994, the Department of Justice informed the Commission that

Abaloc had been released on September 29, 1992, and that Paquinto and
Cabangunay were still detained at the National Penitentiary. There was the
intimation that it would not object to a petition for habeas corpus that the
Commission might choose to file for Paquinto and Cabangunay.6 This
assurance was later confirmed in a letter from the Department dated May 31,
1994.7

The present petition for habeas corpus was filed with this Court on June 13,
1994. The writ was immediately issued, returnable on or before June 22,
1994, on which date a hearing was also scheduled.

At the hearing, Chairman Ordoñez argued for the prisoners and pleaded for
their immediate release in view of the failure of the Department of Justice to
file charges against them within the period specified in the Cruz case. He
stressed that their continued detention despite the nullification of their
convictions was a clear violation of their human rights.

For its part, the Office of the Solicitor General, as counsel for the respondent
Director of Prisons, argued that under our ruling in Tan v. Barrios, 8 the
Olaguer decision could not be retroactively applied to decisions of the military
tribunals that have already become final or to persons who were already
serving their sentence. It suggested that, under the circumstances, the only
recourse of the prisoners was to reiterate and pursue their applications for
executive clemency.

It has been seven years since the Olaguer decision nullifying the convictions
of Paquinto and Cabangunay by the military commissions was promulgated.
It has been six years since our decision in the Cruz case directed the
Secretary of Justice to file the appropriate informations against the civilians
still detained under convictions rendered by the military tribunals. The
prisoners have been confined since 1974. We can only guess at the validity
of their convictions as the records of their cases have allegedly been burned.

The loss of these records is the main reason the Department gives for its
failure to file the corresponding charges against the two detainees before the
civil courts. It is unacceptable, of course. It is not the fault of the prisoners
that the records cannot now be found. If anyone is to be blamed, it surely
cannot be the prisoners, who were not the custodian of those records. It is
illogical and even absurd to suggest that because the government cannot
prosecute them, the prisoners' detention must continue.

The other excuse of the government must also be rejected. During the
hearing, the Office of the Solicitor General contended that the prisoners had
themselves opted to serve their sentences rather than undergo another trial.
Their ultimate objective, so it was maintained, was to secure their release by
applying for executive clemency. To prove this, counsel submitted a letter
from one
Atty. Anselmo B. Mabuti to the Secretary of Justice manifesting that Leonardo
B. Paquinto "chooses to complete the service of his sentence so that the
Board of Pardons and Parole has jurisdiction over his case." 9 No mention
was made of Jesus Cabangunay.

Upon direct questioning from the Court during the hearing, both Paquinto and
Cabangunay disowned Atty. Mabuti as their counsel and said they had never
seen nor talked to him before. Paquinto denied ever having authorized him
to write the letter. Instead, the two prisoners reiterated their plea to be
released on the strength of the Olaguer decision.

The petitioners further contend in their memorandum that a re-examination

of the ruling in Cruz v. Enrile 10 in relation to the case of Tan v. Barrios, 11 is
necessary in view of certain supervening events. These are the failure of the
Department of Justice to file the informations against the prisoners; the
decision of the UNHRC declaring admissible the communication
No. 503/1992 of Abaloc, Paquinto and Cabangunay and thus suggesting the
violation of their liberty as guaranteed under the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights; and the assurance of the Department of Justice that
it would have no objection to the filing of a petition for habeas corpus by the
Commission on behalf of Paquinto and Cabangunay.

The Court stresses that in its en banc resolution dated February 26, 1991, it
declared, citing the Tan case, that "those civilians who were convicted by
military courts and who have been serving (but not yet completed) their
sentences of imprisonment for the past many years" . . . "may be given the
option either to complete the service of their sentence, or be tried anew by
the civil courts. Upon conviction, they should be credited in the service of
their sentence for the full period of their previous imprisonment. Upon
acquittal, they should be set free."

Accordingly, it directed "the Department of Justice to forthwith comply with

the directive in the "Cruz Cases" for the filing of the necessary informations
against them in the courts having jurisdiction over the offenses involved,
without prejudice to said petitioners' exercise of the option granted to them
by this Court's ruling in G.R. Nos. 85481-82, William Tan, et al. v. Hernani T.
Barrios, etc., et al., supra."

The Office of the Solicitor General submitted its memorandum after its
second motion for extension was denied, in view of the necessity to decide
this petition without further delay. 12 The memorandum was admitted just the
same, but we find it adds nothing to the respondent's original arguments.

There is absolutely no question that the prisoners' plea should be heeded.

The government has failed to show that their continued detention is
supported by a valid conviction or by the pendency of charges against them
or by any legitimate cause whatsoever. If no information can be filed against
them because the records have been lost, it is not the prisoners who should
be made to suffer. In the eyes of the law, Paquinto and Cabangunay are not
guilty or appear to be guilty of any crime for which they may be validly held.
Hence, they are entitled to be set free.

Liberty is not a gift of the government but the right of the governed. Every
person is free, save only for the fetters of the law that limit but do not bind
him unless he affronts the rights of others or offends the public welfare.
Liberty is not derived from the sufferance of the government or its
magnanimity or even from the Constitution itself, which merely affirms but
does not grant it. Liberty is a right that inheres in every one of us as a member
of the human family. When a person is deprived of this right, all of us are
diminished and debased for liberty is total and indivisible.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Jesus Cabangunay and Leonardo

Paquinto should not be detained in prison a minute longer. They are ordered
released IMMEDIATELY.
G.R. No. 81567 July 9, 1990

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF

ROBERTO UMIL, ROLANDO DURAL and RENATO VILLANUEVA.
MANOLITA O. UMIL, and NICANOR P. DURAL, FELICITAS V.
SESE, petitioners,
vs.
FIDEL V. RAMOS, MAJ. GEN. RENATO DE VILLA, BRIG. GEN. RAMON
MONTANO, BRIG. GEN. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, respondents.

G.R. Nos. 84581-82 July 9, 1990

AMELIA ROQUE and WILFREDO BUENAOBRA, petitioners,

vs.
GEN. RENATO DE VILLA and GEN. RAMON MONTANO, respondents.

G.R. Nos. 84583-84 July 9, 1990

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF ATTY.

DOMINGO T. ANONUEVO and RAMON CASIPLE. DOMINGO T.
ANONUEVO and RAMON CASIPLE, petitioners,
vs.
HON. FIDEL V. RAMOS, GEN. RENATO S. DE VILLA, COL. EVARISTO
CARINO, LT. COL. REX D. PIAD, T/SGT. CONRADO DE TORRES,
S/SGT. ARNOLD DURIAN, and Commanding Officer, PC-INP Detention
Center, Camp Crame, Quezon City, respondents.

G.R. No. 83162 July 9, 1990

IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF

VICKY A. OCAYA AND DANNY RIVERA. VIRGILIO A.
OCAYA, petitioner,
vs.
BRIG. GEN. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, COL. HERCULES CATALUNA,
COL. NESTOR MARIANO, respondents.

G.R. No. 85727 July 9, 1990

IN THE MATTER OF APPLICATION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF:
DEOGRACIAS ESPIRITU, petitioner,
vs.
BRIG. GEN. ALFREDO S. LIM, COL. RICARDO REYES, respondents.

G.R. No. 86332 July 9, 1990

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF

NARCISO B. NAZARENO. ALFREDO NAZARENO, petitioner,
vs.
THE STATION COMMANDER OF THE MUNTINGLUPA POLICE
STATION, Muntinglupa, Metro Manila, P/SGT. JACINTO MEDINA,
P/SGT. ELADIO TAGLE, P/SGT. LEVI SOLEDAD, and P/SGT. MAURO
AROJADO, respondents.

Efren H. Mercado for petitioners in G.R. No. 81567.

Ricardo C. Valmonte for petitioners in G.R. Nos. 84581-82.

Ramon S. Esguerra, Barbara Anne C. Migallos and Agripino G. Morga for

petitioners in G.R. Nos. 84583-84.

Efren H. Mercado for petitioner in G.R. No. 83162.

Banzuela, Flores, Miralles, Raneses, Sy, Taquio & Association for petitioner
in G.R. No. 85727.

Josefina G. Campbell-Castillo for petitioners in G.R. No. 86332.

The Solicitor General for the respondents.

PER CURIAM:
The are eight (8) petitioners for habeas corpus filed before the Court, which have been consolidated because
of the similarity of issues raised, praying for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus, ordering the respective
respondents to produce the bodies of the persons named therein and to explain why they should not be set at
liberty without further delay.
In their respective Returns, the respondents uniformly assert that the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is not available to the petitioners as they
have been legally arrested and are detained by virtue of valid
informations filed in court against them.

The petitioners counter that their detention is unlawful as their arrests were
made without warrant and, that no preliminary investigation was first
conducted, so that the informations filed against them are null and void.

The Court has carefully reviewed the contentions of the parties in their
respective pleadings, and it finds that the persons detained have not been
illegally arrested nor arbitrarily deprived of their constitutional right to liberty,
and that the circumstances attending these cases do not warrant their
release on habeas corpus.

The arrest of a person without a warrant of arrest or previous complaint is

recognized in law. The occasions or instances when such an arrest may be
effected are clearly spelled out in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court,
as amended, which provides:

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private

person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is

actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed
it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a
penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.

In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested
without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or
jail, and he shall be proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112, Section
7.

An arrest without a warrant of arrest, under Section 5 paragraphs (a) and (b)
of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, as amended, is justified when the person
arrested is caught in flagranti delicto, viz., in the act of committing an offense;
or when an offense has just been committed and the person making the
arrest has personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the person arrested
has committed it. The rationale behind lawful arrests, without warrant, was
stated by this Court in the case of People vs. Kagui Malasugui 1 thus:

To hold that no criminal can, in any case, be arrested and searched for the
evidence and tokens of his crime without a warrant, would be to leave society,
to a large extent, at the mercy of the shrewdest, the most expert, and the
most depraved of criminals, facilitating their escape in many instances.

The record of the instant cases would show that the persons in whose behalf
these petitions for habeas corpus have been filed, had freshly committed or
were actually committing an offense, when apprehended, so that their arrests
without a warrant were clearly justified, and that they are, further, detained
by virtue of valid informations filed against them in court.

A brief narration of the facts and events surrounding each of the eight (8)
petitions is in order.

In G.R. No. 81567 (Umil vs. Ramos), the record shows that, on 1 February
1988, the Regional Intelligence Operations Unit of the Capital Command
(RIOU-CAPCOM) received confidential information about a member of the
NPA Sparrow Unit (liquidation squad) being treated for a gunshot wound at
the St. Agnes Hospital in Roosevelt Avenue, Quezon City. Upon verification,
it was found that the wounded person, who was listed in the hospital records
as Ronnie Javelon, is actually Rolando Dural, a member of the NPA
liquidation squad, responsible for the killing of two (2) CAPCOM soldiers the
day before, or on 31 January 1988, in Macanining Street, Bagong Barrio,
Caloocan City. In view of this verification, Rolando Dural was transferred to
the Regional Medical Services of the CAPCOM, for security reasons. While
confined thereat, or on 4 February 1988, Rolando Dural was positively
identified by eyewitnesses as the gunman who went on top of the hood of the
CAPCOM mobile patrol car, and fired at the two (2) CAPCOM soldiers seated
inside the car identified as T/Sgt. Carlos Pabon and CIC Renato Manligot.

As a consequence of this positive identification, Rolando Dural was referred

to the Caloocan City Fiscal who conducted an inquest and thereafter filed
with the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City an information charging
Rolando Dural alias Ronnie Javelon with the crime of "Double Murder with
Assault Upon Agents of Persons in Authority." The case was docketed
therein as Criminal Case No. C-30112 and no bail was recommended. On 15
February 1988, the information was amended to include, as defendant,
Bernardo Itucal, Jr. who, at the filing of the original information, was still
unidentified.

Meanwhile, on 6 February 1988, a petition for habeas corpus was filed with
this Court on behalf of Roberto Umil, Rolando Dural, and Renato Villanueva.
The Court issued the writ of habeas corpus on 9 February 1988 and the
respondents filed a Return of the Writ on 12 February 1988. Thereafter, the
parties were heard on 15 February 1988.

On 26 February 1988, however, Roberto Umil and Renato Villanueva posted

bail before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City where charges for violation
of the Anti-Subversion Act had been filed against them, and they were
accordingly released. The petition for habeas corpus, insofar as Umil and
Villanueva are concerned, is now moot and academic and is accordingly
dismissed, since the writ of habeas corpus does not lie in favor of an accused
in a criminal case who has been released on bail. 2

As to Rolando Dural, it clearly appears that he was not arrested while in the
act of shooting the two (2) CAPCOM soldiers aforementioned. Nor was he
arrested just after the commission of the said offense for his arrest came a
day after the said shooting incident. Seemingly, his arrest without warrant is
unjustified.

However, Rolando Dural was arrested for being a member of the New
Peoples Army (NPA), an outlawed subversive organization. Subversion
being a continuing offense, the arrest of Rolando Dural without warrant is
justified as it can be said that he was committing an offense when arrested.
The crimes of rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such
crimes, and crimes or offenses committed in furtherance thereof or in
connection therewith constitute direct assaults against the State and are in
the nature of continuing crimes. As stated by the Court in an earlier case:

From the facts as above-narrated, the claim of the petitioners that they were
initially arrested illegally is, therefore, without basis in law and in fact. The
crimes of insurrection or rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to
commit such crimes, and other crimes and offenses committed in the
furtherance, on the occasion thereof, or incident thereto, or in connection
therewith under Presidential Proclamation No. 2045, are all in the nature of
continuing offenses which set them apart from the common offenses, aside
from their essentially involving a massive conspiracy of nationwide
magnitude. Clearly then, the arrest of the herein detainees was well within
the bounds of the law and existing jurisprudence in our jurisdiction.

2. The arrest of persons involved in the rebellion whether as its fighting armed
elements, or for committing non-violent acts but in furtherance of the
rebellion, is more an act of capturing them in the course of an armed conflict,
to quell the rebellion, than for the purpose of immediately prosecuting them
in court for a statutory offense. The arrest, therefore, need not follow the
usual procedure in the prosecution of offenses which requires the
determination by a judge of the existence of probable cause before the
issuance of a judicial warrant of arrest and the granting of bail if the offense
is bailable. Obviously, the absence of a judicial warrant is no legal
impediment to arresting or capturing persons committing overt acts of
violence against government forces, or any other milder acts but equally in
pursuance of the rebellious movement. The arrest or capture is thus impelled
by the exigencies of the situation that involves the very survival of society
and its government and duly constituted authorities. If killing and other acts
of violence against the rebels find justification in the exigencies of armed
hostilities which is of the essence of waging a rebellion or insurrection, most
assuredly so in case of invasion, merely seizing their persons and detaining
them while any of these contingencies continues cannot be less justified. . . . 3
The record, moreover, shows that the criminal case filed against Rolando
Dural and Bernardo Itucal, Jr. for "Double Murder, etc." was tried in the court
below and at the conclusion thereof, or on 17 August 1988, Rolando Dural
and Bernardo Itucal, Jr. were found guilty of the charge and sentenced
accordingly. Rolando Dural is now serving the sentence imposed upon him
by the trial court. Thus, the writ of habeas corpus is no longer available to
him. For, as held in the early case of U.S. vs. Wilson: 4

In this case, whatever may be said about the manner of his arrest, the fact
remains that the defendant was actually in court in the custody of the law on
March 29, when a complaint sufficient in form and substance was read to
him. To this he pleaded not guilty. The trial followed, in which, and in the
judgment of guilty pronounced by the court, we find no error. Whether, if there
were irregularities in bringing him personally before the court, he could have
been released on a writ of habeas corpus or now has a civil action for
damages against the person who arrested him we need not inquire. It is
enough to say that such irregularities are not sufficient to set aside a valid
judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint and after a trial free from error.

II

In G.R. Nos. 84581-82 (Roque vs. De Villa), the arrest of Amelia

Roque and Wilfredo Buenaobra, without warrant, is also justified. When
apprehended at the house of Renato Constantino in Marikina Heights,
Marikina, Metro Manila, Wilfredo Buenaobra admitted that he was an NPA
courier and he had with him letters to Renato Constantino and other
members of the rebel group. Amelia Roque, upon the other hand, was a
member of the National United Front Commission, in charge of finance,
and admitted ownership of subversive documents found in the house of her
sister in Caloocan City. She was also in possession of ammunition and a
fragmentation grenade for which she had no permit or authority to possess.

The record of these two (2) cases shows that on 27 June 1988, one Rogelio
Ramos y Ibanes, a member of the NPA, who had surrendered to the military
authorities, told military agents about the operations of the Communist Party
of the Philippines (CPP) and the New Peoples Army (NPA) in Metro Manila.
He identified some of his former comrades as "Ka Mong", a staff member of
the Communications and Transportation Bureau; "Ka Nelia", a staff member
in charge of finance; "Ka Miller", an NPA courier from Sorsogon and Lopez,
Quezon; "Ka Ted", and "Ka Totoy". He also pointed to a certain house
occupied by Renato Constantino located in the Villaluz Compound, Molave
St., Marikina Heights, Marikina, Metro Manila, which is used as a safehouse
of the National United Front Commission (NUFC) of the CPP-NPA.

In view of these revelations, the Constantino house was placed under military
surveillance and on 12 August 1988, pursuant to a search warrant issued by
Judge Eutropio Migrino of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, a search of the
house was conducted at about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon, by a combined
team of the Criminal Investigation Service, National Capital District (CIS-
NCD) and the Constabulary Security Group (CSG). In the course of the
search, the following articles were found and taken under proper receipt:

a) One (1) Colt M16A1 long rifle with defaced serial number;

b) One (1) Cal. .380 ACT/9mm Model PPK/8 SN: 260577 & 2605778;

c) Two (2) fragmentation hand grenades;

d) Fifty-six (56) live ammunition for Cal. 5.56 mm;

e) Five (5) live ammunition for Cal. .380;

f) One (1) ICOM VHF FM Radio Transciever SN: 14903

g) One (1) Regulated power supply 220V AC;

h) One (1) Antennae (adjustable);

i) One (1) Speaker with cord ALEXAR;

j) Voluminous Subversive documents.

When confronted, Renato Constatino could not produce any permit or

authority to possess the firearms, ammunition, radio and other
communications equipment. Hence, he was brought to the CIS Headquarters
for investigation. When questioned, he refused to give a written statement,
although he admitted that he was a staff member of the executive committee
of the NUFC and a ranking member of the International Department of the
Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP).

At about 8:00 o'clock in the evening of the same day (12 August 1988),
Wilfredo Buenaobra arrived at the house of Renato Constantino in the Villaluz
Compound. When accosted, he readily admitted to the military agents that
he is a regular member of the CPP/NPA and that he went to the place to
deliver letters to "Ka Mong", referring to Renato Constatino, and other
members of the rebel group. On further questioning, he also admitted that he
is known as "Ka Miller" and that he was from Barangay San Pedro, Lopez,
Quezon. Among the items taken from him were the following:

(1) Handwritten letter addressed to "Ka Bing & Co. from A & Co." dated
August 11, 1988;

(2) Handwritten letter addressed to "ROD from VIC (Schell datre)" dated
August 11, 1988;

(3) Handwritten letter addressed to "Suzie" from "Vic", dated August 11,
1988.

Also found Buenaobra's possession was a piece of paper containing a written

but jumbled telephone number of Florida M. Roque, sister of Amelia
Roque alias "Ka Nelia", at 69 Geronimo St., Caloocan City. Acting on the lead
provided as to the whereabouts of Amelia Roque, the military agents went to
the given address the next day (13 August 1988). They arrived at the place
at about 11:00 o'clock in the morning. After identifying themselves as military
agents and after seeking permission to search the place, which was granted,
the military agents conducted a search in the presence of the occupants of
the house and the barangay captain of the place, one Jesus D. Olba.

The military agents found the place to be another safehouse of the

NUFC/CPP. They found ledgers, journals, vouchers, bank deposit books,
folders, computer diskettes, and subversive documents as well as live
ammunition for a .38 SPL Winchester, 11 rounds of live ammunition for a
cal. .45, 19 rounds of live ammunition for an M16 Rifle, and a fragmentation
grenade. As a result, Amelia Roque and the other occupants of the house
were brought to the PC-CIS Headquarters at Camp Crame, Quezon City, for
investigation. Amelia Roque admitted to the investigators that the
voluminous documents belonged to her and that the other occupants of the
house had no knowledge of them. As a result, the said other occupants of
the house were released from custody.

On 15 August 1988, Amelia Roque was brought to the Caloocan City Fiscal
for inquest after which an information charging her with violation of PD 1866
was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City. The case is docketed
therein as Criminal Case No. C-1196. Another information for violation of the
Anti-Subversion Act was filed against Amelia Roque before the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Caloocan City, which is docketed therein as Criminal Case No.
C-150458.

An information for violation of the Anti-Subversion Act was filed

against Wilfredo Buenaobra before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Marikina,
Metro Manila. The case is docketed therein as Criminal Case No. 23715. Bail
was set at P4,000.00.

On 24 August 1988, a petition for habeas corpus was filed before this Court
on behalf of Amelia Roque and Wilfredo Buenaobra. At the hearing of the
case, however, Wilfredo Buenaobra manifested his desire to stay in the PC-
INP Stockade at Camp Crame, Quezon City. According, the petition
for habeas corpus filed on his behalf is now moot and academic. Only the
petition of Amelia Roque remains for resolution.

The contention of respondents that petitioners Roque and Buenaobra are

officers and/or members of the National United Front Commission (NUFC) of
the CPP was not controverted or traversed by said petitioners. The
contention must be deemed admitted. 5 As officers and/or members of the
NUFC-CPP, their arrest, without warrant, was justified for the same reasons
earlier stated vis-a-vis Rolando Dural. The arrest without warrant of Roque
was additionally justified as she was, at the time of apprehension, in
possession of ammunitions without license to possess them.

III
In G.R. Nos. 84583-84 (Anonuevo vs. Ramos), the arrest of Domingo
Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple, without warrant, is also justified under the
rules. Both are admittedly members of the standing committee of the NUFC
and, when apprehended in the house of Renato Constatino, they had a bag
containing subversive materials, and both carried firearms and ammunition
for which they had no license to possess or carry.

The record of these two (2) cases shows that at about 7:30 o'clock in the
evening of 13 August 1988, Domingo T. Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple
arrived at the house of Renato Constatino at Marikina Heights, Marikina,
which was still under surveillance by military agents. The military agents
noticed bulging objects on their waist lines. When frisked, the agents found
them to be loaded guns. Anonuevo and Casiple were asked to show their
permit or license to possess or carry firearms and ammunition, but they could
not produce any. Hence, they were brought to PC Headquarters for
investigation. Found in their possession were the following articles:

a) Voluminous subversive documents

b) One (1) Cal. 7.65 MOD 83 2C Pistol SN: 001412 with one (1) magazine
for Cal. 7.65 containing ten (10) live ammunition of same caliber;

c) One (1) Cal. 7.65 Pietro Barreta SN; A18868 last digit tampered with one
(1) magazine containing five (5) live ammunition of same caliber.

At the PC Stockade, Domingo Anonuevo was identified as "Ka Ted", and

Ramon Casiple as "Ka Totoy" of the CPP, by their comrades who had
previously surrendered to the military.

On 15 August 1988, the record of the investigation and other documentary

evidence were forwarded to the Provincial Fiscal at Pasig, Metro Manila, who
conducted an inquest, after which Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple
were charged with violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 before the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila. The cases are docketed therein
as Criminal Cases Nos. 74386 ad 74387, respectively. No bail was
recommended.
On 24 August 1988, a petition for habeas corpus was filed with this Court on
behalf of Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple, alleging that the said
Anonuevo and Casiple were unlawfully arrested without a warrant and that
the informations filed against them are null and void for having been filed
without prior hearing and preliminary investigation. On 30 August 1988, the
Court issued the writ of habeas corpus, and after the respondents had filed
a Return of the Writ, the parties were heard.

The petitioners' (Anonuevo and Casiple) claim that they were unlawfully
arrested because there was no previous warrant of arrest, is without merit
The record shows that Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple were
carrying unlicensed firearms and ammunition in their person when they were
apprehended.

There is also no merit in the contention that the informations filed against
them are null and void for want of a preliminary investigation. The filing of an
information, without a preliminary investigation having been first conducted,
is sanctioned by the Rules. Sec. 7, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, as
amended, reads:

Sec. 7. When accused lawfully arrested without a warrant. — When a person

is lawfully arrested without a warrant for an offense cognizable by the
Regional Trial Court the complaint or information may be filed by the offended
party, peace officer or fiscal without a preliminary investigation having been
first conducted, on the basis of the affidavit of the offended party or arresting
officer or person.

However, before the filing of such complaint or information, the person

arrested may ask for a preliminary investigation by a proper officer in
accordance with this Rule, but he must sign a waiver of the provisions of
Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, with the assistance of
a lawyer and in case of non-availability of a lawyer, a responsible person of
his choice. Notwithstanding such waiver, he may apply for bail as provided in
the corresponding rule and the investigation must be terminated within fifteen
(15) days from its inception.
If the case has been filed in court without a preliminary investigation having
been first conducted, the accused may within five (5) days from the time he
learns of the filing of the information, ask for a preliminary investigation with
the same right to adduced evidence in his favor in the manner prescribed in
this Rule.

The petitioners Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple, however, refused

to sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended. In the informations filed against them, the prosecutor made
identical certifications, as follows:

This is to certify that the accused has been charged in accordance with Sec.
7, Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, that no preliminary
investigation was conducted because the accused has not made and signed
a waiver of the provisions of Art. 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended; that based on the evidence presented, there is reasonable ground
to believe that the crime has been committed, and that the accused is
probably guilty thereof.

Nor did petitioners ask for a preliminary investigation after the informations
had been filed against them in court. Petitioners cannot now claim that they
have been deprived of their constitutional right to due process.

IV

In G.R. No. 83162 (Ocaya vs. Aguirre), the arrest without warrant, of Vicky
Ocaya is justified under the Rules, since she had with her unlicensed
ammunition when she was arrested. The record of this case shows that on
12 May 1988, agents of the PC Intelligence and Investigation of the Rizal PC-
INP Command, armed with a search warrant issued by Judge Eutropio
Migrino of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila, conducted a
search of a house located at Block 19, Phase II, Marikina Green Heights,
Marikina, Metro Manila, believed to be occupied by Benito Tiamson, head of
the CPP-NPA. In the course of the search, Vicky Ocaya arrived in a car driven
by Danny Rivera. Subversive documents and several rounds of ammunition
for a .45 cal. pistol were found in the car of Vicky Ocaya. As a result, Vicky
Ocaya and Danny Rivera were brought to the PC Headquarters for
investigation. When Vicky Ocaya could not produce any permit or
authorization to possess the ammunition, an information charging her with
violation of PD 1866 was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro
Manila. The case is docketed therein as Criminal Case No. 73447. Danny
Rivera, on the other hand, was released from custody.

On 17 May 1988, a petition for habeas corpus was filed, with this Court on
behalf of Vicky Ocaya and Danny Rivera. It was alleged therein that Vicky
Ocaya was illegally arrested and detained, and denied the right to a
preliminary investigation.

It would appear, however, that Vicky Ocaya was arrested in flagranti

delicto so that her arrest without a warrant is justified. No preliminary
investigation was conducted because she was arrested without a warrant
and she refused to waive the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal
Code, pursuant to Sec. 7, Rule 112 of the Rule of Court, as amended.

The petitioners Vicky Ocaya, Domingo Anonuevo, Ramon Casiple, and

Amelia Roque claim that the firearms, ammunition and subversive
documents alleged to have been found in their possession when they were
arrested, did not belong to them, but were "planted" by the military agents to
justify their illegal arrest.

The petitioners, however, have not introduced any evidence to support their
aforesaid claim. On the other hand, no evil motive or ill-will on the part of the
arresting officers that would cause the said arresting officers in these cases
to accuse the petitioners falsely, has been shown. Besides, the arresting
officers in these cases do not appear to be seekers of glory and bounty
hunters for, as counsel for the petitioners Anonuevo and Casiple say, "there
is absolutely nothing in the evidence submitted during the inquest that
petitioners are on the 'AFP Order of Battle with a reward of P150,000.00 each
on their heads.'" 6 On the other hand, as pointed out by the Solicitor General,
the arrest of the petitioners is not a product of a witch hunt or a fishing
expedition, but the result of an in-depth surveillance of NPA safehouses
pointed to by no less than former comrades of the petitioners in the rebel
movement.

The Solicitor General, in his Consolidated Memorandum, aptly observes:

. . . . To reiterate, the focal point in the case of petitioners Roque, Buenaobra,

Anonuevo and Casiple, was the lawful search and seizure conducted by the
military at the residence of Renato Constantino at Villaluz Compound,
Molave St., Marikina Heights, Marikina, Metro Manila. The raid at
Constantino's residence, was not a witch hunting or fishing expedition on the
part of the military. It was a result of an in-depth military surveillance coupled
with the leads provided by former members of the underground subversive
organizations. That raid produced positive results. to date, nobody has
disputed the fact that the residence of Constantino when raided yielded
communication equipment, firearms and ammunitions, as well as subversive
documents.

The military agents working on the information provided by Constantino that

other members of his group were coming to his place, reasonably conducted
a "stake-out" operation whereby some members of the raiding team were left
behind the place. True enough, barely two hours after the raid and
Constantino's arrest, petitioner Buenaobra arrived at Constantino's
residence. He acted suspiciously and when frisked and searched by the
military authorities, found in his person were letters. They are no ordinary
letters, as even a cursory reading would show. Not only that, Buenaobra
admitted that he is a NPA courier and was there to deliver the letters to
Constantino.

Subsequently, less than twenty four hours after the arrest of Constantino and
Buenaobra, petitioners Anonuevo and Casiple arrived at Constantino's place.
Would it be unreasonable for the military agents to believe that petitioners
Anonuevo and Casiple are among those expected to visit Constantino's
residence considering that Constatino's information was true, in that
Buenaobra did come to that place? Was it unreasonable under the
circumstances, on the part of the military agents, not to frisk and search
anyone who should visit the residence of Constantino, such as petitioners
Anonuevo and Casiple? Must this Honorable Court yield to Anonuevo and
Casiple's flimsy and bare assertion that they went to visit Constantino, who
was to leave for Saudi Arabia on the day they were arrested thereat?

As to petitioner Roque, was it unreasonable for the military authorities to

effect her arrest without warrant considering that it was Buenaobra who
provided the leads on her identity? It cannot be denied that Buenaobra had
connection with Roque. Because the former has the phone number of the
latter. Why the necessity of jumbling Roque's telephone number as written
on a piece of paper taken from Buenaobra's possession? Petitioners Roque
and Buenaobra have not offered any plausible reason so far.

In all the above incidents, respondents maintain that they acted reasonably,
under the time, place and circumstances of the events in question, especially
considering that at the time of petitioner's arrest, incriminatory evidence, i.e,
firearms, ammunitions and/or subversive documents were found in their
possession.

Petitioners, when arrested, were neither taking their snacks nor innocently
visiting a camp, but were arrested in such time, place and circumstances,
from which one can reasonably conclude tat they were up to a sinister plot,
involving utmost secrecy and comprehensive conspiracy.

IV

In. G.R. No. 85727 (Espiritu vs. Lim), the release on habeas corpus of the
petitioner Deogracias Espiritu, who is detained by virtue of an Information for
Violation of Article 142 of the Revised Penal Code (Inciting to Sedition) filed
with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, is similarly not warranted.

The record of the case shows that the said petitioner is the General Secretary
of the Pinagkaisahang Samahan ng Tsuper at Operators Nationwide
(PISTON), an association of drivers and operators of public service vehicles
in the Philippines, organized for their mutual aid and protection.

Petitioner claims that at about 5:00 o'clock in the morning of 23 November

1988, while he was sleeping in his home located at 363 Valencia St., Sta.
Mesa, Manila, he was awakened by his sister Maria Paz Lalic who told him
that a group of persons wanted to hire his jeepney. When he went down to
talk to them, he was immediately put under arrest. When he asked for the
warrant of arrest, the men, headed by Col. Ricardo Reyes, bodily lifted him
and placed him in their owner-type jeepney. He demanded that his sister,
Maria Paz Lalic, be allowed to accompany him, but the men did not accede
to his request and hurriedly sped away.

He was brought to Police Station No. 8 of the Western Police District at

Blumentritt, Manila where he was interrogated and detained. Then, at about
9:00 o'clock of the same morning, he was brought before the respondent Lim
and, there and then, the said respondent ordered his arrest and detention.
He was thereafter brought to the General Assignment Section, Investigation
Division of the Western Police District under Police Capt. Cresenciano A.
Cabasal where he was detained, restrained and deprived of his liberty. 7

The respondents claim however, that the detention of the petitioner is justified
in view of the Information filed against him before the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, docketed therein as Criminal Case No. 88-683-85, charging him with
violation of Art. 142 of the Revised Penal Code (Inciting to Sedition).

The respondents also claim that the petitioner was lawfully arrested without
a judicial warrant of arrest since petitioner when arrested had in fact just
committed an offense in that in the afternoon of 22 November 1988, during a
press conference at the National Press Club.

Deogracias Espiritu through tri-media was heard urging all drivers and
operators to go on nationwide strike on November 23, 1988, to force the
government to give into their demands to lower the prices of spare parts,
commodities, water and the immediate release from detention of the
president of the PISTON (Pinag-isang Samahan ng Tsuper Operators
Nationwide). Further, we heard Deogracias Espiritu taking the place of
PISTON president Medardo Roda and also announced the formation of the
Alliance Drivers Association to go on nationwide strike on November 23,
1988. 8

Policemen waited for petitioner outside the National Pres Club in order to
investigate him, but he gave the lawmen the slip. 9 He was next seen at about
5:00 o'clock that afternoon at a gathering of drivers and symphatizers at the
corner of Magsaysay Blvd. and Valencia Street, Sta. Mesa, Manila where he
was heard to say:

Bukas tuloy ang welga natin, sumagot na ang Cebu at Bicol na kasali sila, at
hindi tayo titigil hanggang hindi binibigay ng gobyerno ni Cory ang gusto
nating pagbaba ng halaga ng spare parts, bilihin at and pagpapalaya sa ating
pinuno na si Ka Roda hanggang sa magkagulo na. 10 (emphasis supplied)

The police finally caught up with the petitioner on 23 November 1988. He was
invited for questioning and brought to police headquarters after which an
Information for violation of Art. 142 of the Revised Penal Code was filed
against him before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. 11

Since the arrest of the petitioner without a warrant was in accordance with
the provisions of Rule 113, Sec. 5(b) of the Rules of Court and that the
petitioner is detained by virtue of a valid information filed with the competent
court, he may not be released on habeas corpus. He may, however be
released upon posting bail as recommended. However, we find the amount
of the recommended bail (P60,000.00) excessive and we reduce it to
P10,000.00 only.

VII

In G.R. No. 86332 (Nazareno vs. Station Commander), we also find no merit
in the submission of Narciso Nazarenothat he was illegally arrested and is
unlawfully detained. The record of this case shows that at about 8:30 o'clock
in the morning of 14 December 1988, one Romulo Bunye II was killed by a
group of men near the corner of T. Molina and Mendiola Streets in Alabang,
Muntinglupa, Metro Manila. One of the suspects in the killing was Ramil
Regal who was arrested by the police on 28 December 1988. Upon
questioning, Regal pointed to Narciso Nazareno as on of his companions in
the killing of the said Romulo Bunye II. In view thereof, the police officers,
without warrant, picked up Narciso Nazareno and brought him to the police
headquarters for questioning. Obviously, the evidence of petitioner's guilt is
strong because on 3 January 1989, an information charging Narciso
Nazareno, Ramil Regala, and two (2) others, with the killing of Romulo Bunye
II was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila. The case
is docketed therein as Criminal Case No. 731.

On 7 January 1989, Narciso Nazareno filed a motion to post bail, but the
motion was denied by the trial court in an order dated 10 January 1989, even
as the motion to post bail, earlier filed by his co-accused, Manuel Laureaga,
was granted by the same trial court.

On 13 January 1989, a petition for habeas corpus was filed with this Court
on behalf of Narciso Nazareno and on 13 January 1989, the Court issued the
writ of habeas corpus, returnable to the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court of Biñan, Laguna, Branch 24, ordering said court to hear the case on
30 January 1989 and thereafter resolve the petition.

At the conclusion of the hearing, or on 1 February 1989, the Presiding Judge

of the Regional Trial Court of Biñan, Laguna issued a resolution denying the
petition for habeas corpus, it appearing that the said Narciso Nazareno is in
the custody of the respondents by reason of an information filed against him
with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila which had taken
cognizance of said case and had, in fact, denied the motion for bail filed by
said Narciso Nazareno (presumably because of the strength of the evidence
against him).

The findings of the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Biñan,
Laguna are based upon the facts and the law. Consequently, we will not
disturb the same. Evidently, the arrest of Nazareno was effected by the police
without warrant pursuant to Sec. 5(b), Rule 113, Rules of Court after he was
positively implicated by his co-accused Ramil Regala in the killing of Romulo
Bunye
II; and after investigation by the police authorities. As held in People
vs. Ancheta: 12

The obligation of an agent of authority to make an arrest by reason of a crime,

does not presuppose as a necessary requisite for the fulfillment thereof, the
indubitable existence of a crime. For the detention to be perfectly legal, it is
sufficient that the agent or person in authority making the arrest has
reasonably sufficient grounds to believe the existence of an act having the
characteristics of a crime and that the same grounds exist to believe that the
person sought to be detained participated therein.

VIII

It is to be noted that, in all the petitions here considered, criminal charges

have been filed in the proper courts against the petitioners. The rule is, that
if a person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer
under process issued by a court judge, and that the court or judge had
jurisdiction to issue the process or make the order, of if such person is
charged before any court, the writ of habeas corpus will not be allowed.
Section 4, Rule 102, Rules of Court, as amended is quite explicit in providing
that:

Sec. 4. When writ is allowed or discharge authorized. — If it appears that the

person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer
under process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order
of a court of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the
process, render the judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be
allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall
not be discharged by reason of any informality or defect in the process,
judgment, or order. Nor shall anything in this rule be held to authorize the
discharge of a person charged with a convicted of an offense in the
Philippines or of a person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment.
(emphasis supplied)

At this point, we refer to petitioner's plea for the Court of re-examine and,
thereafter, abandon its pronouncement in Ilagan vs. Enrile, 13 that a writ
of habeas corpus is no longer available after an information is filed against
the person detained and a warrant of arrest or an order of commitment, is
issued by the court where said information has been filed. 14 The petitioners
claim that the said ruling, which was handed down during the past dictatorial
regime to enforce and strengthen said regime, has no place under the
present democratic dispensation and collides with the basic, fundamental,
and constitutional rights of the people. Petitioners point out that the said
doctrine makes possible the arrest and detention of innocent persons despite
lack of evidence against them, and, most often, it is only after a petition
for habeas corpus is filed before the court that the military authorities file the
criminal information in the courts of law to be able to hide behind the
protective mantle of the said doctrine. This, petitioners assert, stands as an
obstacle to the freedom and liberty of the people and permits lawless and
arbitrary State action.

We find, however, no compelling reason to abandon the said doctrine. It is

based upon express provision of the Rules of Court and the exigencies
served by the law. The fears expressed by the petitioners are not really
unremediable. As the Court sees it, re-examination or reappraisal, with a view
to its abandonment, of the Ilagan case doctrine is not the answer. The answer
and the better practice would be, not to limit the function of the habeas
corpus to a mere inquiry as to whether or not the court which issued the
process, judgment or order of commitment or before whom the detained
person is charged, had jurisdiction or not to issue the process, judgment or
order or to take cognizance of the case, but rather, as the Court itself states
in Morales, Jr. vs. Enrile, 15 "in all petitions for habeas corpus the court must
inquire into every phase and aspect of petitioner's detention-from the moment
petition was taken into custody up to the moment the court passes upon the
merits of the petition;" and "only after such a scrutiny can the court satisfy
itself that the due process clause of our Constitution has in fact been
satisfied." This is exactly what the Court has done in the petitions at bar. This
is what should henceforth be done in all future cases of habeas corpus. In
Short, all cases involving deprivation of individual liberty should be promptly
brought to the courts for their immediate scrutiny and disposition.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED, except that in

G.R. No. 85727 (Espiritu vs. Lim), the bail bond for petitioner's provisional
liberty is hereby ordered reduced from P60,000.00 to P10,000.00. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan C.J., Narvasa, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras,

Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ.,
concur.
 Separate Opinions

CRUZ, J., dissenting and concurring:

I dissent insofar as the ponencia affirms the ruling in Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile

that subversion is a continuing offense, to justify the arrest without warrant of
any person at any time as long as the authorities say he has been placed
under surveillance on suspicion of the offense. That is a dangerous doctrine.
A person may be arrested when he is doing the most innocent acts, as when
he is only washing his hands, or taking his supper, or even when he is
sleeping, on the ground that he is committing the "continuing" offense of
subversion. Libertarians were appalled when that doctrine was imposed
during the Marcos regime. I am alarmed that even now this new Court is
willing to sustain it. I strongly urge my colleagues to discard it altogether as
one of the disgraceful vestiges of the past dictatorship and uphold the rule
guaranteeing the right of the people against unreasonable searches and
seizures. We can do no less if we are really to reject the past oppression and
commit ourselves to the true freedom. Even if it be argued that the military
should be given every support in our fight against subversion, I maintain that
that fight must be waged honorably, in accordance with the Bill of Rights. I
do not believe that in fighting the enemy we must adopt the ways of the
enemy, which are precisely what we are fighting against. I submit that our
more important motivation should be what are we fighting for.

Except for this reservation and appeal, I concur with the decision.

FELICIANO, J., concurring:

I concur in the result reached in each of the eight (8) consolidated Petitions
for Habeas Corpus. At the same time, I have some reservations concerning
certain statements made by the Court in G.R. No. 81567 (Umil, et al. v.
Ramos) (Part I of the Decision) and in G.R. No. 85727 (Espiritu v. Lim) (Part
VI of the Decision).

In G.R. No. 81567 (Umil, et al. v. Ramos), the per curiam opinion states
categorically that: "the crimes of rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal
to commit such crimes, and crimes or offenses committed in furtherance
thereof or in connection therewith constitute direct assaults against the State
and are in the nature of continuing crimes." The majority here relies
upon Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile (121 SCRA 472 [1983]). The majority there
made the same equally broad statement but without any visible effort to
examine the basis, scope and meaning of such a sweeping
statement. Garcia-Padilla did not even identify the specific offenses which it
regarded as "in the nature of continuing offenses which set them apart from
the common offenses" (121 SCRA at 489). It appears to me that in G.R. No.
85727 (Espiritu v. Lim) (Part VI of the Decision), the per curiam opinion has
in effect included the offense of "inciting to sedition" penalized under Article
142 of the Revised Penal Code as a "continuing offense" under the capacious
blanket of the majority opinion in Garcia-Padilla, at least for purposes of
determining the legality of the arrest without a warrant of petitioner
Deogracias Espiritu.

I would respectfully recall to my learned colleagues in the Court that "inciting

to sedition" is defined in Article 142 of the Revised Penal Code in terms of
speech 1 and that consequently it is important constantly do distinguish
between speech which is protected by the constitutional guaranty of freedom
of speech and of the press and speech which may constitutionally be
regarded as violative of Article 142 of the Revised Penal Code. Precisely
because speech which the police authorities might regard as seditious or as
criminal inciting to sedition may well turn out to be only an exercise of a
constitutionally guaranteed freedom, I would submit that we must apply the
concept of "continuing offense" narrowly for purposes of application of
Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Court.

In my view, the very broad statement made about "continuing crimes" in G.R.
No. 81567 (Umil, et al v. Ramos) constitutes dictum, considering that
Rolando Dural and Bernardo Itucal, Jr. had already been tried in the court
below for "double murder, etc." and found guilty of the offense charged,
sentenced accordingly, and at least in the case of Rolando Dural, service of
the sentence imposed upon him by the trial court had already begun.

Similarly, in G.R. No. 85727 (Espiritu v. Lim) the statement that the arrest of
petitioner Espiritu without a warrant was in accordance with the provisions of
Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Court does not appear strictly
necessary, considering that the petitioner had already been charged in a valid
information filed with the competent court, which court had presumably
issued an order for his commitment, and considering further that he is entitled
to bail.

There is thus no obstacle, to my mind, to a careful examination of the doctrine

of "continuing crimes" as applied to such offenses as subversion and inciting
to sedition and possibly other offenses, in some future case where that issue
is raised squarely and is unavoidable.

Cortes, J., concurs.

SARMIENTO, J., dissenting:

I beg to differ from my brethren. I submit that habeas corpus lies in all eight
cases.

G.R. No. 81567

The majority says that Rolando Dural's arrest without a warrant is lawful
under the Rules of Court, which reads:

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private

person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is

actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed
it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a
penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.

In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested
without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or
jail, and he shall be proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112, Section
7. 1

"Rolando Dural," so states the majority, "was arrested for being a member of
the New People's Army (NPA), an outlawed subversive organization," 2 and
that "[s]ubversion being a continuing offense, the arrest of Rolando Dural
without a warrant is justified as it can be said that he was committing an
offense when arrested." 3

As I said, I beg to differ.

First, Rolando Dural was charged with "Double Murder with Assault upon
Agents of Authority." 4 If he had been guilty of subversion — the offense for
which he was supposedly arrested via a warrantless arrest — subversion
was the logical crime with which he should have been charged.

The authorities could not have rightly arrested him for subversion on account
of the slay of the two CAPCOM soldiers, a possible basis for violation of the
Anti-Subversion Act, because as the majority points out, "he was not arrested
while in the act of shooting [them] . . . [n]or was he arrested just after the
commission of the said offense for his arrest came a day after the said
shooting incident." 5

Second, I do not believe that a warrantless (or citizen's) arrest is possible in

case of subversion — in the absence of any overt act that would justify the
authorities to act. "Subversion," as the term is known in law, means
"knowingly, wilfully and by overt acts affiliat[ing] [oneself] with, becom[ing] or
remain[ing] a member of the Communist Party of the Philippines and/or its
successor or of any subversion association as defined in sections two and
three hereof. . . . " 6 Logically, the military could not have known that Dural,
at the time he was taken, was a member of the New People's Army because
he was not performing any over act that he was truly, a rebel. Indeed, it had
to take a "verification"6 before he could be identified as allegedly a member
of the underground army. Under these circumstances, I am hard put to say
that he was committing subversion when he was arrested, assuming that he
was guilty of subversion, for purposes of a warrantless arrest.

"Overt act" is made up of "[e]very act, movement, deed and word of the
[accused]," 7 indicating intent to accomplish a criminal objective. Dural, at the
time he was arrested, was lying in a hospital bed. This is not the overt act
contemplated by law.

Under the Rule above-quoted, the person must have either been
apprehended in flagranti (first paragraph) or after the act, provided that the
peace officer has "personal knowledge" that he, the suspect, is guilty.
(second paragraph.) As I stated, Dural was not caught in the act. Moreover,
what the Regional Intelligence Operations Unit of the Capital Command
(RIOU-CAPCOM) had in its hands was a mere "confidential information." I
do not think that this is the personal knowledge referred to by the second
paragraph. 8 Plainly and simply, it is hearsay.

The rule, furthermore, on warrantless arrest is an exceptional one. By its

language, it may be exercised only in the most urgent cases and when the
guilt of an offender is plain and evident. What I think we have here is purely
and simply, the military taking the law in its hands.

By stamping validity to Rolando Dural's warrantless arrest, I am afraid that

the majority has set a very dangerous precedent. With all due respect, my
brethren has accorded the military a blanket authority to pick up any Juan,
Pedro, and Maria without a warrant for the simple reason that subversion is
supposed to be a continuing offense.

That Rolando Dural was arrested for being a member of the New People's
Army" 9 is furthermore to me, a hasty statement. It has yet to be established
that Dural is indeed a member of the Communist Party's military arm. And
unless proven guilty, he is presumed, and must be presumed most of all by
this Court, to be innocent.

The majority also says that habeas corpus is moot and academic because
Dural has been convicted and is serving sentence. I likewise take exception.
It has been held that: "The writ may be granted upon a judgment already
final." 10

The writ of liberty is a high prerogative writ. 11 Vindication of due process is its
historic office. 12

G.R. Nos. 84581-82

In the case of Wilfredo Buenaobra, the majority avers that he had "manifested
his desire to stay in the PC-INP stockade," 13 for which habeas corpus has
supposedly become moot and academic. I am not convinced that that is
reason enough to dismiss habeas corpus as moot and academic. It is the
duty of this Court, in my opinion, to make sure that Buenaobra has made his
choice freely and voluntarily. Personally, I find it indeed strange why he
should prefer to stay in jail than go scot-free.

There is further no doubt that Buenaobra's petition is one impressed with a

public interest. In one case 14 we denied a motion to withdraw a petition
for habeas corpus in view of its far-reaching importance to the motion, I do
not see how we should act differently, perhaps even insouciantly, here,
especially since it involves persons who think and believe differently from the
rest of us.

Both Buenaobra and Amelia Roque supposedly admitted that they were
ranking officers of the Communist Party of the Philippines. According to the
majority, Buenaobra and Roque are bound by their admissions. 15

That both parties had admitted to be members of the Communist Party of the
Philippines (the National United Front Commission) is a naked contention of
the military. The fact that it has not been controverted, in my view, does not
justify the couple's arrest without warrant. Worse, by relying on the bare word
of the military, this very Court has, to all intents and purposes, condemned
the duo for a crime (subversion and/or illegal possession of firearms) the
bone of contention, precisely, below.

G.R. Nos. 84583-84

I also find the warrantless arrests of Domingo Añonuevo and Ramon Casiple
to be contrary to law. That they are "admittedly members of the standing
committee of the NUFC" 16 and that "subversive materials" 17 and unlicensed
firearms were found in their possession, are, like Buenaobra's and Roque's
cases, barren claims of the military. I also fear that by the majority's strong
language (that Añonuevo and Casiple are admitted NUCF officers) the
majority has pronounced the petitioners guilty, when the lower courts have
yet to sit in judgment. I think we should be the last to preempt the decision of
the trial courts. We would have set to naught the presumption of innocence
accused persons enjoy.

G.R. No. 83162

With respect to the case of Vicky Ocaya, I am afraid that I am inclined towards
the same conclusion. There was basis — at the outset — to say that Ocaya
was probably guilty of illegal possession of firearms. As I have observed, a
warrantless arrest must be predicated upon the existence of a crime being
actually committed or having been committed. What I find here, rather, is
nothing less than a successful fishing expedition conducted by the military
upon an unwary citizen. I am quite distressed to note that this is still possible
under a supposed democracy.

G.R. No. 85727

Deogracias Espiritu was fast asleep in his house when he was placed under
arrest. For the life of me, I can not figure out how one can be picked upon in
one's own home and held moments later without a warrant of arrest.

Espiritu was allegedly guilty of inciting to sedition as a result of a speech

delivered in a press conference at the National Press Club on November 21,
1988. He was, however, arrested the day after, November 22, 1988. Under
these circumstances, it eludes me how an arrest without a warrant could be
justified, either under paragraph (a) or paragraph (b) of the Rule on
warrantless arrests.

The majority avers that since an information had been filed with the court,
Espiritu's detention, is allegedly justifiable. The question is whether or not an
information is an authority to hold a person in custody. Under the Rules, an
information means "an accusation in writing charging a person with an
offense subscribed by the fiscal and filed with the court." 18 It is not, however,
an order to keep one under detention.

G.R. No. 86332

The offense for which Narciso Nazareno is being held — the fatal shooting
of Romulo Bunye II — was committed on December 14, 1988. It was,
however, only on December 28, 1988 that the police collared a suspect,
Ramil Regala, who subsequently pointed to Nazareno as his accomplice. It
also escapes me how Nazareno, under these circumstances, could have
been validly put under arrest without a warrant or the existence of the
circumstance described under either paragraph (a) or (b) of the Rule above-
quoted: The crime had long been committed prior to the arrest.

G.R. Nos. 81567; 84581-82; 84583-84; 83162;

85727 & 86332; Postscripts

The majority has disposed of these cases on the bedrock of what I view as
doctrines that have lost their luster:

1. The teaching of Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile, 19 which held that subversion is a

continuing offense;

2. The ruling in Ilagan v. Enrile. 20

I also find, for reasons to be set forth hereinafter, a glossing over of the
fundamental rights of the petitioners under the Constitution in the authorities'
handling of the petitioners' cases.

I hold that Garcia-Padilla is no longer good law under the present

Constitution. Two reasons persuade me. First, it is repugnant to due process
of law. ("The arrest, therefore, need not follow the usual procedure in the
prosecution of offenses which require the determination by a judge of the
existence of probable cause before the issuance of a judicial warrant of arrest
and the granting of bail if the offense is bailable." 21 Under the 1987
Constitution, not even "[a] state of martial law suspend[s] the operation of
[the Charter]. . ." 22 Second, it leaves the liberty of citizens to the whim of one
man ("On these occasions [the existence of a state of emergency], the
President takes absolute command, for the very life of the Nation and its
government, which, incidentally, includes the courts, is in grave peril. In so
doing, the President is answerable only to his conscience, the people and to
God. For their part, in giving him the supreme mandate as their President,
the people can only trust and pray that, giving him their own loyalty and
without patriotism, the President will not fail them." 23 ) Under the Charter now
prevailing, the Chief Executive shares, to a certain extent, the exercise of
emergency powers, with Congress. 24

As a law advocate under the regime of Marcos, I had challenged the

soundness of Garcia-Padilla. I doubted whether it could stand up under the
aegis of the 1973 Constitution. I still doubt whether it can withstand scrutiny
under the 1987 Constitution.

The majority also fails to point out that six days after Garcia-Padilla was
handed down, the Court promulgated Morales, Jr. v. Enrile, 25 a case that in
my view has significantly whittled down Garcia-Padilla's very esse. In that
case, Mr. Justice Hermogenes Concepcion, Jr. wrote for the majority:

xxx xxx xxx

16. After a person is arrested . . . without a warrant . . . the proper complaint

or information against him must be filed with the courts of justice within the
time prescribed by law. . .

17. Failure of the public officer to do so without any valid reason would
constitute a violation of Art. 125, Revised Penal Code, as amended. And the
person detained would be entitled to be released on a writ of habeas corpus,
unless he is detained under subsisting process issued by a competent
court. 26
I also gather from the records that none of the petitioners had been: (1)
informed of their right to remain silent; and (2) to have competent and
independent counsel. 27

As I said, the majority is denying habeas corpus on self-serving claims of the

military that the petitioners (Dural, Buenaobra, Roque, Añonuevo, and
Casiple) are members of the Communist Party of the Philippines — and that
they have supposedly confessed to be in fact members of the outlawed
organization. The question that has not been answered is whether or not
these supposed confessions are admissible, for purposes of a warrantless
arrest, as evidence of guilt, in the absence of any showing that they were
apprised of their constitutional rights. I am perturbed by the silence of the
majority. I am distressed because as we held in one case, violation of the
Constitution divests the court of jurisdiction and entitles the accused
to habeas corpus. 28

According to the majority, a "re-examination or re-appraisal . . . of

the Ilagan doctrine is not the answer." 29 In my considered opinion, Ilagan
v. Enrile 30 does not rightfully belong in the volumes of Philippine
jurisprudence. In that case, the petitioners, three Davao-based lawyers, were
held by virtue of a simple information ("the petition herein has been rendered
moot and academic by virtue of the filing of an Information against them for
Rebellion . . . and the issuance of a Warrant of Arrest against them" 31 )
without any preliminary investigation (examination) having been previously
conducted (to justify the issuance of a warrant). As I have stated, an
i•t•c-aüsl

information is not a warrant of arrest. The fact that an information exists does
not mean that a warrant will be issued.

Accused persons have the right of preliminary investigation

(examination). 32 It forms part and parcel of due process of law .33

I find the majority's reliance on U.S. v. Wilson, 34 an ancient (1905) decision,

inapt and untenable. In that case, the accused had been served with a
warrant and thereafter taken into custody. The question that faced the Court
was whether or not the warrant was valid, amid the accused's charges that
the judge who issued it did not examine the complainant under oath. We held
that the query was academic, because the accused had already pleaded,
and the case had entered the trial stage.

The cases at bar are not on all fours. Here, no warrant has been issued. I
submit that in that event, the petitioners are entitled to freedom by way of the
writ of liberty.

xxx xxx xxx

The apprehensions in question chronicle in my mind the increasing pattern

of arrests and detention in the country without the sanction of a judicial
decree. Four years ago at "EDSA", and many years before it, although with
much fewer of us, we valiantly challenged a dictator and all the evils his
regime had stood for: repression of civil liberties and trampling on of human
rights. We set up a popular government, restored its honored institutions, and
crafted a democratic constitution that rests on the guideposts of peace and
freedom. I feel that with this Court's ruling, we have frittered away, by a stroke
of the pen, what we had so painstakingly built in four years of democracy,
and almost twenty years of struggle against tyranny.

It also occurs to me that I am interposing what looms as a quixotic outlook of

Philippine law on warrantless arrests and its implications on liberty. It is an
impression that does not surprise me. Quixotic as they may seem, and
modesty aside, my views reflect a strong bias on my part — forged by years
of experience and sharpened by a painful and lonely struggle for freedom
and justice — toward men and women who challenge settled beliefs. If this
dissent can not gain any adherent for now, let it nevertheless go on record
as a plea to posterity and an appeal for tolerance of opinions with which we
not only disagree, but opinions we loathe.

I feel it is my duty to articulate this dissent.

Separate Opinions

CRUZ, J., dissenting and concurring:

I dissent insofar as the ponencia affirms the ruling in Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile
that subversion is a continuing offense, to justify the arrest without warrant of
any person at any time as long as the authorities say he has been placed
under surveillance on suspicion of the offense. That is a dangerous doctrine.
A person may be arrested when he is doing the most innocent acts, as when
he is only washing his hands, or taking his supper, or even when he is
sleeping, on the ground that he is committing the "continuing" offense of
subversion. Libertarians were appalled when that doctrine was imposed
during the Marcos regime. I am alarmed that even now this new Court is
willing to sustain it. I strongly urge my colleagues to discard it altogether as
one of the disgraceful vestiges of the past dictatorship and uphold the rule
guaranteeing the right of the people against unreasonable searches and
seizures. We can do no less if we are really to reject the past oppression and
commit ourselves to the true freedom. Even if it be argued that the military
should be given every support in our fight against subversion, I maintain that
that fight must be waged honorably, in accordance with the Bill of Rights. I
do not believe that in fighting the enemy we must adopt the ways of the
enemy, which are precisely what we are fighting against. I submit that our
more important motivation should be what are we fighting for.

Except for this reservation and appeal, I concur with the decision.

FELICIANO, J., concurring:

I concur in the result reached in each of the eight (8) consolidated Petitions
for Habeas Corpus. At the same time, I have some reservations concerning
certain statements made by the Court in G.R. No. 81567 (Umil, et al. v.
Ramos) (Part I of the Decision) and in G.R. No. 85727 (Espiritu v. Lim) (Part
VI of the Decision).

In G.R. No. 81567 (Umil, et al. v. Ramos), the per curiam opinion states
categorically that: "the crimes of rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal
to commit such crimes, and crimes or offenses committed in furtherance
thereof or in connection therewith constitute direct assaults against the State
and are in the nature of continuing crimes." The majority here relies
upon Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile (121 SCRA 472 [1983]). The majority there
made the same equally broad statement but without any visible effort to
examine the basis, scope and meaning of such a sweeping
statement. Garcia-Padilla did not even identify the specific offenses which it
regarded as "in the nature of continuing offenses which set them apart from
the common offenses" (121 SCRA at 489). It appears to me that in G.R. No.
85727 (Espiritu v. Lim) (Part VI of the Decision), the per curiam opinion has
in effect included the offense of "inciting to sedition" penalized under Article
142 of the Revised Penal Code as a "continuing offense" under the capacious
blanket of the majority opinion in Garcia-Padilla, at least for purposes of
determining the legality of the arrest without a warrant of petitioner
Deogracias Espiritu.

I would respectfully recall to my learned colleagues in the Court that "inciting

to sedition" is defined in Article 142 of the Revised Penal Code in terms of
speech 1 and that consequently it is important constantly do distinguish
between speech which is protected by the constitutional guaranty of freedom
of speech and of the press and speech which may constitutionally be
regarded as violative of Article 142 of the Revised Penal Code. Precisely
because speech which the police authorities might regard as seditious or as
criminal inciting to sedition may well turn out to be only an exercise of a
constitutionally guaranteed freedom, I would submit that we must apply the
concept of "continuing offense" narrowly for purposes of application of
Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Court.

In my view, the very broad statement made about "continuing crimes" in G.R.
No. 81567 (Umil, et al v. Ramos) constitutes dictum, considering that
Rolando Dural and Bernardo Itucal, Jr. had already been tried in the court
below for "double murder, etc." and found guilty of the offense charged,
sentenced accordingly, and at least in the case of Rolando Dural, service of
the sentence imposed upon him by the trial court had already begun.

Similarly, in G.R. No. 85727 (Espiritu v. Lim) the statement that the arrest of
petitioner Espiritu without a warrant was in accordance with the provisions of
Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Court does not appear strictly
necessary, considering that the petitioner had already been charged in a valid
information filed with the competent court, which court had presumably
issued an order for his commitment, and considering further that he is entitled
to bail.

There is thus no obstacle, to my mind, to a careful examination of the doctrine

of "continuing crimes" as applied to such offenses as subversion and inciting
to sedition and possibly other offenses, in some future case where that issue
is raised squarely and is unavoidable.

Cortes, J., concurs.

SARMIENTO, J., dissenting:

I beg to differ from my brethren. I submit that habeas corpus lies in all eight
cases.

G.R. No. 81567

The majority says that Rolando Dural's arrest without a warrant is lawful
under the Rules of Court, which reads:

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private

person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is

actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed
it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a
penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.

In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested
without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or
jail, and he shall be proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112, Section
7. 1

"Rolando Dural," so states the majority, "was arrested for being a member of
the New People's Army (NPA), an outlawed subversive organization," 2 and
that "[s]ubversion being a continuing offense, the arrest of Rolando Dural
without a warrant is justified as it can be said that he was committing an
offense when arrested." 3

As I said, I beg to differ.

First, Rolando Dural was charged with "Double Murder with Assault upon
Agents of Authority." 4 If he had been guilty of subversion — the offense for
which he was supposedly arrested via a warrantless arrest — subversion
was the logical crime with which he should have been charged.

The authorities could not have rightly arrested him for subversion on account
of the slay of the two CAPCOM soldiers, a possible basis for violation of the
Anti-Subversion Act, because as the majority points out, "he was not arrested
while in the act of shooting [them] . . . [n]or was he arrested just after the
commission of the said offense for his arrest came a day after the said
shooting incident." 5

Second, I do not believe that a warrantless (or citizen's) arrest is possible in

case of subversion — in the absence of any overt act that would justify the
authorities to act. "Subversion," as the term is known in law, means
"knowingly, wilfully and by overt acts affiliat[ing] [oneself] with, becom[ing] or
remain[ing] a member of the Communist Party of the Philippines and/or its
successor or of any subversion association as defined in sections two and
three hereof. . . . " 6 Logically, the military could not have known that Dural,
at the time he was taken, was a member of the New People's Army because
he was not performing any over act that he was truly, a rebel. Indeed, it had
to take a "verification"6 before he could be identified as allegedly a member
of the underground army. Under these circumstances, I am hard put to say
that he was committing subversion when he was arrested, assuming that he
was guilty of subversion, for purposes of a warrantless arrest.
"Overt act" is made up of "[e]very act, movement, deed and word of the
[accused]," 7 indicating intent to accomplish a criminal objective. Dural, at the
time he was arrested, was lying in a hospital bed. This is not the overt act
contemplated by law.

Under the Rule above-quoted, the person must have either been
apprehended in flagranti (first paragraph) or after the act, provided that the
peace officer has "personal knowledge" that he, the suspect, is guilty.
(second paragraph.) As I stated, Dural was not caught in the act. Moreover,
what the Regional Intelligence Operations Unit of the Capital Command
(RIOU-CAPCOM) had in its hands was a mere "confidential information." I
do not think that this is the personal knowledge referred to by the second
paragraph. 8 Plainly and simply, it is hearsay.

The rule, furthermore, on warrantless arrest is an exceptional one. By its

language, it may be exercised only in the most urgent cases and when the
guilt of an offender is plain and evident. What I think we have here is purely
and simply, the military taking the law in its hands.

By stamping validity to Rolando Dural's warrantless arrest, I am afraid that

the majority has set a very dangerous precedent. With all due respect, my
brethren has accorded the military a blanket authority to pick up any Juan,
Pedro, and Maria without a warrant for the simple reason that subversion is
supposed to be a continuing offense.

That Rolando Dural was arrested for being a member of the New People's
Army" 9 is furthermore to me, a hasty statement. It has yet to be established
that Dural is indeed a member of the Communist Party's military arm. And
unless proven guilty, he is presumed, and must be presumed most of all by
this Court, to be innocent.

The majority also says that habeas corpus is moot and academic because
Dural has been convicted and is serving sentence. I likewise take exception.
It has been held that: "The writ may be granted upon a judgment already
final." 10

The writ of liberty is a high prerogative writ. 11 Vindication of due process is its
historic office. 12
G.R. Nos. 84581-82

In the case of Wilfredo Buenaobra, the majority avers that he had "manifested
his desire to stay in the PC-INP stockade," 13 for which habeas corpus has
supposedly become moot and academic. I am not convinced that that is
reason enough to dismiss habeas corpus as moot and academic. It is the
duty of this Court, in my opinion, to make sure that Buenaobra has made his
choice freely and voluntarily. Personally, I find it indeed strange why he
should prefer to stay in jail than go scot-free.

There is further no doubt that Buenaobra's petition is one impressed with a

public interest. In one case 14 we denied a motion to withdraw a petition
for habeas corpus in view of its far-reaching importance to the motion, I do
not see how we should act differently, perhaps even insouciantly, here,
especially since it involves persons who think and believe differently from the
rest of us.

Both Buenaobra and Amelia Roque supposedly admitted that they were
ranking officers of the Communist Party of the Philippines. According to the
majority, Buenaobra and Roque are bound by their admissions. 15

That both parties had admitted to be members of the Communist Party of the
Philippines (the National United Front Commission) is a naked contention of
the military. The fact that it has not been controverted, in my view, does not
justify the couple's arrest without warrant. Worse, by relying on the bare word
of the military, this very Court has, to all intents and purposes, condemned
the duo for a crime (subversion and/or illegal possession of firearms) the
bone of contention, precisely, below.

G.R. Nos. 84583-84

I also find the warrantless arrests of Domingo Añonuevo and Ramon Casiple
to be contrary to law. That they are "admittedly members of the standing
committee of the NUFC" 16 and that "subversive materials" 17 and unlicensed
firearms were found in their possession, are, like Buenaobra's and Roque's
cases, barren claims of the military. I also fear that by the majority's strong
language (that Añonuevo and Casiple are admitted NUCF officers) the
majority has pronounced the petitioners guilty, when the lower courts have
yet to sit in judgment. I think we should be the last to preempt the decision of
the trial courts. We would have set to naught the presumption of innocence
accused persons enjoy.

G.R. No. 83162

With respect to the case of Vicky Ocaya, I am afraid that I am inclined towards
the same conclusion. There was basis — at the outset — to say that Ocaya
was probably guilty of illegal possession of firearms. As I have observed, a
warrantless arrest must be predicated upon the existence of a crime being
actually committed or having been committed. What I find here, rather, is
nothing less than a successful fishing expedition conducted by the military
upon an unwary citizen. I am quite distressed to note that this is still possible
under a supposed democracy.

G.R. No. 85727

Deogracias Espiritu was fast asleep in his house when he was placed under
arrest. For the life of me, I can not figure out how one can be picked upon in
one's own home and held moments later without a warrant of arrest.

Espiritu was allegedly guilty of inciting to sedition as a result of a speech

delivered in a press conference at the National Press Club on November 21,
1988. He was, however, arrested the day after, November 22, 1988. Under
these circumstances, it eludes me how an arrest without a warrant could be
justified, either under paragraph (a) or paragraph (b) of the Rule on
warrantless arrests.

The majority avers that since an information had been filed with the court,
Espiritu's detention, is allegedly justifiable. The question is whether or not an
information is an authority to hold a person in custody. Under the Rules, an
information means "an accusation in writing charging a person with an
offense subscribed by the fiscal and filed with the court." 18 It is not, however,
an order to keep one under detention.

G.R. No. 86332

The offense for which Narciso Nazareno is being held — the fatal shooting
of Romulo Bunye II — was committed on December 14, 1988. It was,
however, only on December 28, 1988 that the police collared a suspect,
Ramil Regala, who subsequently pointed to Nazareno as his accomplice. It
also escapes me how Nazareno, under these circumstances, could have
been validly put under arrest without a warrant or the existence of the
circumstance described under either paragraph (a) or (b) of the Rule above-
quoted: The crime had long been committed prior to the arrest.

G.R. Nos. 81567; 84581-82; 84583-84; 83162;

85727 & 86332; Postscripts

The majority has disposed of these cases on the bedrock of what I view as
doctrines that have lost their luster:

1. The teaching of Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile, 19 which held that subversion is a

continuing offense;

2. The ruling in Ilagan v. Enrile. 20

I also find, for reasons to be set forth hereinafter, a glossing over of the
fundamental rights of the petitioners under the Constitution in the authorities'
handling of the petitioners' cases.

I hold that Garcia-Padilla is no longer good law under the present

Constitution. Two reasons persuade me. First, it is repugnant to due process
of law. ("The arrest, therefore, need not follow the usual procedure in the
prosecution of offenses which require the determination by a judge of the
existence of probable cause before the issuance of a judicial warrant of arrest
and the granting of bail if the offense is bailable." 21 Under the 1987
Constitution, not even "[a] state of martial law suspend[s] the operation of
[the Charter]. . ." 22 Second, it leaves the liberty of citizens to the whim of one
man ("On these occasions [the existence of a state of emergency], the
President takes absolute command, for the very life of the Nation and its
government, which, incidentally, includes the courts, is in grave peril. In so
doing, the President is answerable only to his conscience, the people and to
God. For their part, in giving him the supreme mandate as their President,
the people can only trust and pray that, giving him their own loyalty and
without patriotism, the President will not fail them." 23 ) Under the Charter now
prevailing, the Chief Executive shares, to a certain extent, the exercise of
emergency powers, with Congress. 24

As a law advocate under the regime of Marcos, I had challenged the

soundness of Garcia-Padilla. I doubted whether it could stand up under the
aegis of the 1973 Constitution. I still doubt whether it can withstand scrutiny
under the 1987 Constitution.

The majority also fails to point out that six days after Garcia-Padilla was
handed down, the Court promulgated Morales, Jr. v. Enrile, 25 a case that in
my view has significantly whittled down Garcia-Padilla's very esse. In that
case, Mr. Justice Hermogenes Concepcion, Jr. wrote for the majority:

xxx xxx xxx

16. After a person is arrested . . . without a warrant . . . the proper complaint

or information against him must be filed with the courts of justice within the
time prescribed by law. . .

17. Failure of the public officer to do so without any valid reason would
constitute a violation of Art. 125, Revised Penal Code, as amended. And the
person detained would be entitled to be released on a writ of habeas corpus,
unless he is detained under subsisting process issued by a competent
court. 26

I also gather from the records that none of the petitioners had been: (1)
informed of their right to remain silent; and (2) to have competent and
independent counsel. 27

As I said, the majority is denying habeas corpus on self-serving claims of the

military that the petitioners (Dural, Buenaobra, Roque, Añonuevo, and
Casiple) are members of the Communist Party of the Philippines — and that
they have supposedly confessed to be in fact members of the outlawed
organization. The question that has not been answered is whether or not
these supposed confessions are admissible, for purposes of a warrantless
arrest, as evidence of guilt, in the absence of any showing that they were
apprised of their constitutional rights. I am perturbed by the silence of the
majority. I am distressed because as we held in one case, violation of the
Constitution divests the court of jurisdiction and entitles the accused
to habeas corpus. 28

According to the majority, a "re-examination or re-appraisal . . . of

the Ilagan doctrine is not the answer." 29 In my considered opinion, Ilagan
v. Enrile 30 does not rightfully belong in the volumes of Philippine
jurisprudence. In that case, the petitioners, three Davao-based lawyers, were
held by virtue of a simple information ("the petition herein has been rendered
moot and academic by virtue of the filing of an Information against them for
Rebellion . . . and the issuance of a Warrant of Arrest against them" 31 )
without any preliminary investigation (examination) having been previously
conducted (to justify the issuance of a warrant). As I have stated, an
i•t•c-aüsl

information is not a warrant of arrest. The fact that an information exists does
not mean that a warrant will be issued.

Accused persons have the right of preliminary investigation

(examination). 32 It forms part and parcel of due process of law .33

I find the majority's reliance on U.S. v. Wilson, 34 an ancient (1905) decision,

inapt and untenable. In that case, the accused had been served with a
warrant and thereafter taken into custody. The question that faced the Court
was whether or not the warrant was valid, amid the accused's charges that
the judge who issued it did not examine the complainant under oath. We held
that the query was academic, because the accused had already pleaded,
and the case had entered the trial stage.

The cases at bar are not on all fours. Here, no warrant has been issued. I
submit that in that event, the petitioners are entitled to freedom by way of the
writ of liberty.

xxx xxx xxx

The apprehensions in question chronicle in my mind the increasing pattern

of arrests and detention in the country without the sanction of a judicial
decree. Four years ago at "EDSA", and many years before it, although with
much fewer of us, we valiantly challenged a dictator and all the evils his
regime had stood for: repression of civil liberties and trampling on of human
rights. We set up a popular government, restored its honored institutions, and
crafted a democratic constitution that rests on the guideposts of peace and
freedom. I feel that with this Court's ruling, we have frittered away, by a stroke
of the pen, what we had so painstakingly built in four years of democracy,
and almost twenty years of struggle against tyranny.

It also occurs to me that I am interposing what looms as a quixotic outlook of

Philippine law on warrantless arrests and its implications on liberty. It is an
impression that does not surprise me. Quixotic as they may seem, and
modesty aside, my views reflect a strong bias on my part — forged by years
of experience and sharpened by a painful and lonely struggle for freedom
and justice — toward men and women who challenge settled beliefs. If this
dissent can not gain any adherent for now, let it nevertheless go on record
as a plea to posterity and an appeal for tolerance of opinions with which we
not only disagree, but opinions we loathe.

I feel it is my duty to articulate this dissent.

G.R. No. 81567 October 3, 1991

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF

ROBERTO UMIL, ROLANDO DURAL and RENATO VILLANUEVA,
MANOLITA O. UMIL and NICANOR P. DURAL, FELICITAS V.
SESE, petitioners,
vs.
FIDEL V. RAMOS, MAJ. GEN. RENATO DE VILLA, BRIG. GEN. RAMON
MONTANO, BRIG. GEN. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, respondents.

G.R. Nos. 84581-82 October 3, 1991

AMELIA ROQUE and WILFREDO BUENAOBRA, petitioners,

vs.
GEN. RENATO DE VILLA and GEN, RAMON MONTANO, respondents.

G.R. Nos. 84583-84 October 3, 1991

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF ATTY.
DOMINGO T. ANONUEVO and RAMON CASIPLE: DOMINGO T.
ANONUEVO and RAMON CASIPLE, petitioners,
vs.
HON. FIDEL V. RAMOS, GEN. RENATO S. DE VILLA, COL. EVARISTO
CARIÑO, LT. COL. REX D. PIAD, T/SGT. CONRADO DE TORRES,
S/SGT. ARNOLD DURIAN, and Commanding Officer, PC-INP Detention
Center, Camp Crame, Quezon City, respondents.

G.R. No. 83162 October 3, 1991

IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF

VICKY A. OCAYA AND DANNY RIVERA: VIRGILIO A.
OCAYA, petitioners,
vs.
BRIG. GEN. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, COL. HERCULES CATALUNA,
COL. NESTOR MARIANO, respondents.

G.R. No. 85727 October 3, 1991

IN THE MATTER OF APPLICATION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF

DEOGRACIAS ESPIRITU, petitioner,
vs.
BRIG. GEN.ALFREDO S. LIM, COL. RICARDO REYES, respondents.

G.R. No. 86332 October 3, 1991

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF

NARCISO B. NAZARENO: ALFREDO NAZARENO,petitioner,
vs.
THE STATION COMMANDER OF THE MUNTINGLUPA POLICE
STATION, Muntinglupa, Metro Manila, P/SGT. JACINTO MEDINA,
P/SGT. ELADIO TAGLE, P/SGT. LEVI SOLEDAD, and P/SGT. MALTRO
AROJADO,respondents.

Efren H. Mercado for petitioners in G.R. No. 81567 and G. R. No. 83162.

Ricardo C. Valmonte for petitioners in G.R. Nos. 84581-82

Josefina G. Campbell-Castillo for petitioners in G.R. Nos. 84583-84.

Potenciano A. Flores, Jr. for petitioner in G.R. No. 85727.

The Solicitor General for the respondents.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:p

Before the Court are separate motions filed by the petitioners in the above-
entitled petitions, seeking reconsideration of the Court's decision
promulgated on 9 July 1990 (the decision, for brevity) which dismissed the
petitions, with the following dispositive part:

WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED, except that in G.R. No.
85727 (Espiritu vs. Lim), the bail bond for petitioner's provisional liberty is
hereby ordered reduced from P60,000.00 to P10,000.00. No costs.

The Court avails of this opportunity to clarify its ruling a begins with the
statement that the decision did not rule — as many misunderstood it to do —
that mere suspicion that one is Communist Party or New People's Army
member is a valid ground for his arrest without warrant. Moreover, the
decision merely applied long existing laws to the factual situations obtaining
in the several petitions. Among these laws are th outlawing the Communist
Party of the Philippines (CPP) similar organizations and penalizing
membership therein be dealt with shortly). It is elementary, in this connection,
if these laws no longer reflect the thinking or sentiment of the people, it is
Congress as the elected representative of the people — not the Court — that
should repeal, change or modify them.

In their separate motions for reconsideration, petitioners, in sum, maintain:

1. That the assailed decision, in upholding the validity of the questioned

arrests made without warrant, and in relying on the provisions of the Rules of
Court, particularly Section 5 of Rule 113 (Arrest), disregards the fact that such
arrests violated the constitutional rights of the persons arrested;
2. That the doctrine laid down in Garcia vs. Enrile 1 and Ilagan vs. Enrile 2 should be abandoned;

3. That the decision erred in considering the admissions made by the persons arrested as to their membership in the
Communist Party of the Philippines/New People's Army, and their ownership of the unlicensed firearms, ammunitions
and subversive documents found in their possession at the time of arrest, inasmuch as those confessions do not
comply with the requirements on admissibility of extrajudicial admissions;

4. That the assailed decision is based on a misappreciation of facts;

5. That G.R. No. 81567 (the Umil case) should not be deemed moot and academic.

We find no merit in the motions for reconsideration.

The writ of habeas

It can not be overlooked that these are petitions for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus, filed by petitioners under the Rules of Court. 3

corpus exists as a speedy and effective remedy to relieve persons

from unlawful restraint. 4 Therefore, the function of the special proceedings
of habeas corpus is to inquire into the legality of one's detention, 5 so that if detention is
illegal, the detainee may be ordered forthwit released.

In the petitions at bar, to ascertain whether the detention petitioners was illegal or not, the Court before rendering
decision dated 9 July 1990, looked into whether their questioned arrests without warrant were made in accordance
with law. For, if the arrests were made in accordance with law, would follow that the detention resulting from such
arrests also in accordance with law.

There can be no dispute that, as a general rule, no peace officer or person has the power or authority to arrest anyo without a warrant of arrest, except in those cases express authorized

The law expressly allowing arrests witho warrant is found in Section 5,

by law. 6

Rule 113 of the Rules of Court which states the grounds upon which a valid
arrest, without warrant, can be conducted.
In the present cases, the focus is understandably on Section 5, paragraphs
(a) and (b) of the said Rule 113, which read:

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private

person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to he arrested has committed, is

actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrest has committed it;
and

. . . (Emphasis supplied).

The Court's decision of 9 July 1990 rules that the arrest Rolando Dural (G.R.
No. 81567) without warrant is justified it can be said that, within the
contemplation of Section 5 Rule 113, he (Dural) was committing an offense,
when arrested because Dural was arrested for being a member of the New
People's Army, an outlawed organization, where membership
penalized, 7 and for subversion which, like rebellion is, under the doctrine
of Garcia vs. Enrile, 8a continuing offense, thus:

The crimes of insurrection or rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to

commit such crimes, and other crimes and offenses committed in the
furtherance (sic) on the occasion thereof, or incident thereto, or in connection
therewith under Presidential Proclamation No. 2045, are all in the nature of
continuing offenses which set them apart from the common offenses, aside
from their essentially involving a massive conspiracy of nationwide
magnitude. . . .

Given the ideological content of membership in the CPP/NPA which includes

armed struggle for the overthrow of organized government, Dural did not
cease to be, or became less of a subversive, FOR PURPOSES OF ARREST,
simply because he was, at the time of arrest, confined in the St. Agnes
Hospital. Dural was identified as one of several persons who the day before
his arrest, without warrant, at the St. Agnes Hospital, had shot two (2)
CAPCOM policemen in their patrol car. That Dural had shot the two (2)
policemen in Caloocan City as part of his mission as a "sparrow" (NPA
member) did not end there and then. Dural, given another opportunity, would
have shot or would shoot other policemen anywhere as agents or
representatives of organized government. It is in this sense that subversion
like rebellion (or insurrection) is perceived here as a continuing offense.
Unlike other so-called "common" offenses, i.e. adultery, murder, arson, etc.,
which generally end upon their commission, subversion and rebellion are
anchored on an ideological base which compels the repetition of the same
acts of lawlessness and violence until the overriding objective of
overthrowing organized government is attained.

Nor can it be said that Dural's arrest was grounded on mere suspicion by the
arresting officers of his membership in the CPP/NPA. His arrest was based
on "probable cause," as supported by actual facts that will be shown
hereafter.

Viewed from another but related perspective, it may also be said, under the
facts of the Umil case, that the arrest of Dural falls under Section 5,
paragraph (b), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, which requires two (2)
conditions for a valid arrestt without warrant: first, that the person to be
arrested has just committed an offense, and second, that the arresting peace
officer or private person has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the
person to be arrested is the one who committed the offense. Section 5(b),
Rule 113, it will be noted, refers to arrests without warrant, based on
"personal knowledge of facts" acquired by the arresting officer or private
person.

It has been ruled that "personal knowledge of facts," in arrests without

warrant must be based upon probable cause, which means an actual belief
or reasonable grounds of suspicion 9

The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the

A
offense, is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. 10

reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled

with good faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest. 11
These requisites were complied with in the Umil case and in the other cases at bar.

In G.R. No. 81567 (Umil case), military agents, on 1 February 1988, were dispatched to the St. Agnes Hospital, Roosevelt Avenue, Quezon City, to verify a confidential information which
was received by their office, about a "sparrow man" (NPA member) who had been admitted to the said hospital with a gunshot wound; that the information further disclosed that the wounded
man in the said hospital was among the five (5) male "sparrows" who murdered two (2) Capcom mobile patrols the day before, or on 31 January 1988 at about 12:00 o'clock noon, before a
road hump along Macanining St., Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City; that based on the same information, the wounded man's name was listed by the hospital management as "Ronnie Javellon,"
twenty-two (22) years old of Block 10, Lot 4, South City Homes, Biñan, Laguna. 12

Said confidential information received by the arresting officers, to the effect that an NPA member ("sparrow unit") was
being treated for a gunshot wound in the named hospital, is deemed reasonable and with cause as it was based on
actual facts and supported by circumstances sufficient to engender a belief that an NPA member was truly in the said
hospital. The actual facts supported by circumstances are: first — the day before, or on 31 January 1988, two (2)
CAPCOM soldiers were actually killed in Bagong Bario, Caloocan City by five (5) "sparrows" including Dural; second
— a wounded person listed in the hospital records as "Ronnie Javellon" was actually then being treated in St. Agnes
Hospital for a gunshot wound; third — as the records of this case disclosed later, "Ronnie Javellon" and his address
entered in the hospital records were fictitious and the wounded man was in reality Rolando Dural.

In fine, the confidential information received by the arresting officers merited their immediate attention and action and, in fact, it was found to be true. Even the petitioners in their motion for

believe that the confidential information of the arresting officers to

reconsideration, 13

the effect that Dural was then being treated in St. Agnes Hospital was actually
received from the attending doctor and hospital management in compliance
with the directives of the law, 14 and, therefore, came from reliable sources.

As to the condition that "probable cause" must also be coupled with acts done
in good faith by the officers who make the arrest, the Court notes that the
peace officers wno arrested Dural are deemed to have conducted the same
in good faith, considering that law enforcers are presumed to regularly
perform their official duties. The records show that the arresting officers did
not appear to have been ill-motivated in arresting Dural. 15 It is therefore clear
that the arrest, without warrant, of Dural was made in compliance with the
requirements of paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 5, Rule 113.
Parenthetically, it should be mentioned here that a few day after Dural's
arrest, without warrant, an information charging double murder with assault
against agents of persons in authority was filed against Dural in the Regional
Trial Court of Caloocan City (Criminal Case No. C-30112). He was thus
promptly placed under judicial custody (as distinguished fro custody of the
arresting officers). On 31 August 1988, he wa convicted of the crime charged
and sentenced to reclusion perpetua. The judgment of conviction is now on
appeal before this Court in G.R. No. 84921.

As to Amelia Roque and Wilfredo Buenaobra (G.R. Nos. 84581-

82), Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple (G.R. Nos. 84583-84)
and Vicky Ocaya (G.R. No. 83162), their arrests, without warrant, are also
justified. They were searched pursuant to search warrants issued by a court
of law and were found wit unlicensed firearms, explosives and/or ammunition
in their persons. They were, therefore, caught in flagrante delicto which
justified their outright arrests without warrant, under Sec 5(a), Rule 113,
Rules of Court. Parenthetically, it should be mentioned here that a few davs
after their arrests without warrant, informations were filed in court against
said petitioners, thereby placing them within judicial custody and disposition.
Furthermore, Buenaobra mooted his own petition fo habeas corpus by
announcing to this Court during the hearing of these petitions that he had
chosen to remain in detention in the custody of the authorities.

More specifically, the antecedent facts in the "in flagrante" cases are:

1. On 27 June 1988, the military agents received information imparted by a

former NPA about the operations of the CPP and NPA in Metro Manila and
that a certain house occupied by one Renato Constantine, located in the
Villaluz Compound, Molave St., Marikina Heights, Marikina, Metro Manila
was being used as their safehouse; that in view of this information, the said
house was placed under military surveillance and on 12 August
1988, pursuant to a search warrant duly issued by court, a search of the
house was conducted; that when Renato Constantine was then confronted
he could not produce any permit to possess the firearms, ammunitions, radio
and other communications equipment, and he admitted that he was a ranking
member of the CPP. 16
2. In the case of Wilfredo Buenaobra, he arrived at the house of Renato Constantino in the evening of 12 August
1988, and admitted that he was an NPA courier and he had with him letters to Renato Constantine and other members
of the rebel group.

3. On the other hand, the arrest of Amelia Roque was a consequence of the arrest of Buenaobra who had in his possession papers leading to the whereabouts of Roque;17 that, at the
time of her arrest, the military agents found subversive documents and live ammunitions, and she admitted then that the documents belonged to her. 18

4. As regards Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple they were arrested without warrant on 13 August 1988, when they arrived at the said house of Renato Constantine in the evening
of said date; that when the agents frisked them, subversive documents, and loaded guns were found in the latter's possession but failing to show a permit to possess them. 19

5. With regard to Vicky Ocaya, she was arrested, without warrant when she arrived (on 12 May 1988) at the premises ofthe house of one Benito Tiamzon who was believed to be the head
of the CPP/NPA, and whose house was subject of a search warrant duly issued by the court. At the time of her arrest without warrant the agents of the PC-Intelligence and Investigation
found ammunitions and subversive documents in the car of Ocaya. 20

It is to be noted in the above cases (Roque, Buenaobra, Anonuevo, Casiple and Ocaya) that the reason which
compelled the military agents to make the arrests without warrant was the information given to the military authorities
that two (2) safehouses (one occupied by Renato Constantine and the other by Benito Tiamzon) were being used by
the CPP/NPA for their operations, with information as to their exact location and the names of Renato Constantine
and Benito Tiamzon as residents or occupants thereof.

And at the time of the actual arrests, the following circumstances surrounded said arrests (of Roque, Buenaobra,
Anonuevo and Casiple), which confirmed the belief of the military agents that the information they had received was
true and the persons to be arrested were probably guilty of the commission of certain crimes: first: search warrant
was duly issued to effect the search of the Constantine safehouse; second: found in the safehouse was a person
named Renato Constantine, who admitted that he was a ranking member of the CPP, and found in his possession
were unlicensed firearms and communications equipment; third: at the time of their arrests, in their possession were
unlicensed firearms, ammunitions and/or subversive documents, and they admitted ownership thereof as well as their
membership in the CPP/NPA. And then, shortly after their arrests, they were positively identified by their former
comrades in the organization as CPP/NPA members. In view of these circumstances, the corresponding informations
were filed in court against said arrested persons. The records also show that, as in the case of Dural, the arrests
without warrant made by the military agents in the Constantino safehouse and later in the Amelia Roque house, do
not appear to have been ill-motivated or irregularly performed.

With all these facts and circumstances existing before, during and after the arrest of the afore-named persons (Dural,
Buenaobra, Roque, Anonuevo, Casiple and Ocaya), no prudent an can say that it would have been better for the
military agents not to have acted at all and made any arrest. That would have been an unpardonable neglect of official
duty and a cause for disciplinary action against the peace officers involved.

For, one of the duties of law enforcers is to arrest lawbreakers in order to place them in the hands of executive and judicial authorities upon whom devolves the duty to investigate the acts

An arrest is therefore in the nature of

constituting the alleged violation of law and to prosecute and secure the punishment therefor. 21

an administrative measure. The power to arrest without warrant is without

limitation as long as the requirements of Section 5, Rule 113 are met. This
rule is founded on an overwhelming public interest in peace and order in our
communities.

In ascertaining whether the arrest without warrant is conducted in

accordance with the conditions set forth in Section 5, Rule 113, this Court
determines not whether the persons arrested are indeed guilty of committing
the crime for which they were arrested. 22 Not evidence of guilt, but "probable
cause" is the reason that can validly compel the peace officers, in the
performance of their duties and in the interest of public order, to conduct an
arrest without warrant. 23

The courts should not expect of law-enforcers more than what the law requires of them. Under the conditions set forth in Section 5, Rule 113, particularly paragraph (b) thereof, even if the

But if they do not strictly comply

arrested persons are later found to be innocent and acquitted, the arresting officers are not liable. 24

with the said conditions, the arresting officers can be held liable for the crime
of arbitrary detention, 25 for damages under Article 32 of the Civil
Code 26 and/or for other administrative sanctions.

In G.R. No. 85727, Espiritu, on 23 November 1988, was arrested without

warrant, on the basis of the attestation of certain witnesses: that about 5:00
o'clock in the afternoon of 22 November 1988, at the corner of Magsaysay
Boulevard and Velencia St., Sta. Mesa, Manila, Espiritu spoke at a gathering
of drivers and sympathizers, where he said, among other things:
Bukas tuloy ang welga natin . . . hanggang sa magkagulona. 27 (Emphasis supplied)

and that the police authorities were present during the press conference held at the National Press Club (NPC) on 22 November 1988 where Espiritu called for a nationwide strike (of jeepney

Espiritu was arrested without warrant, not for subversion

and bus drivers) on 23 November 1988. 28

or any "continuing offense," but for uttering the above-quoted language

which, in the perception of the arresting officers, was inciting to sedition.

Many persons may differ as to the validity of such perception and regard the
language as falling within free speech guaranteed by the Constitution. But,
then, Espiritu had not lost the right to insist, during the pre-trial or trial on the
merits, that he was just exercising his right to free speech regardless of the
charged atmosphere in which it was uttered. But, the authority of the peace
officers to make the arrest, without warrant, at the time the words were
uttered, or soon thereafter, is still another thing. In the balancing of authority
and freedom, which obviously becomes difficult at times, the Court has, in
this case, tilted the scale in favor of authority but only for purposes of the
arrest(not conviction). Let it be noted that the Court has ordered the bail for
Espiritu's release to be reduced from P60,000.00 to P10,000.00.

Let it also be noted that supervening events have made the Espiritu case
moot and academic. For Espiritu had before arraignment asked the court a
quo for re-investigation, the peace officers did not appear. Because of this
development, the defense asked the court a quo at the resumption of the
hearings to dismiss the case. Case against Espiritu (Criminal Case No. 88-
68385) has been provisionally dismissed and his bail bond cancelled.

In G.R. No. 86332 (Nazareno), the records show that in the morning of 14
December 1988, Romulo Bunye II was killed by a group of men in Alabang,
Muntinlupa, Metro Manila; that at about 5:00 o'clock in the morning of 28
December 1988, Ramil Regala, one of the suspects in the said killing, was
arrested and he pointed to Narciso Nazareno as one of his companions
during the killing of Bunye II; that at 7:20 of the same morning (28 December
1988), the police agents arrested Nazareno, without warrant, for
investigation. 29
Although the killing of Bunye II occurred on 14 December 1988, while Nazareno's arrest without warrant was made
only on 28 December 1988, or 14 days later, the arrest fans under Section 5(b) of Rule 113, since it was only on 28
December 1988 that the police authorities came to know that Nazareno was probably one of those guilty in the killing
of Bunye II and the arrest had to be made promptly, even without warrant, (after the police were alerted) and despite
the lapse of fourteen (14) days to prevent possible flight.

As shown in the decision under consideration, this Court, in upholding the arrest without warrant of Nazareno noted
several facts and events surrounding his arrest and detention, as follows:

. . . on 3 January 1989 (or six (6) days after his arrest without warrant), an information charging Narciso Nazareno,
Ramil Regala and two (2) others, with the killing of Romulo Bunye II was filed wit the Regional Trial Court of Makati,
Metro Manila. The case is dock eted therein as Criminal Case No. 731.

On 7 January 1989, Narciso Nazareno filed a motion to post bail but the motion was denied by the trial court in an
order dated 10 January 1989, even as the motion to post bail, earlier filed by his co-accused, Manuel Laureaga, was
granted by the same trial court.

On 13 January 1989, a petition for habeas corpus was filed with this Court on behalf of Narciso Nazareno and on
13 January 1989, the Court issued the writ of habeas corpus, retumable to the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court of Bifian, Laguna, Branch 24, ordering said court to hear the case on 30 January 1989 and thereafter resolve
the petition.

At the conclusion of the hearing, or on 1 February 1989, the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Biñan,
Laguna issued a resolution denying the petition for habeas corpus, it appearing that the said Narciso Nazareno is in
the custody of the respondents by reason of an information filed against him with the Regional Trial Court of Makati,
Metro Manila which liad taken cognizance of said case and had, in fact, denied the motion for bail filed by said Narciso
Nazareno (presumably because of the strength of the evidence against him).

This Court reiterates that shortly after the arrests of Espiritu and Nazareno, the corresponding informations against
them were filed in court. The arrests of Espiritu and Nazareno were based on probable cause and supported by
factual circumstances. They complied with conditions set forth in Section 5(b) of Rule 113. They were not arbitrary or
whimsical arrests.

Parenthetically, it should be here stated that Nazareno has since been convicted by the court a quo for murder and
sentenced to reclusion perpetua. He has appealed the judgment of conviction to the Court of Appeals where it is
pending as of this date ( CA-G.R. No. still undocketed).
Petitioners contend that the decision of 9 July 1990 ignored the contitution requisiteds for admissibility of an
extrajudicial admission.

that he was an NPA courier. On the other hand,

In the case of Buenaobra (G.R. Nos. 84581-82), he admitted 30

in the case of Amelia Roque, she admitted 31 that the unlicensed firearms,
ammunition and subversive documents found in her possession during her
arrest, belonged to her.

The Court, it is true, took into account the admissions of the arrested persons
of their membership in the CPP/NPA, as well as their ownership of the
unlicensed firearms, ammunitions and documents in their possession. But
again, these admissions, as revealed by the records, strengthen the Court's
perception that truly the grounds upon which the arresting officers based their
arrests without warrant, are supported by probable cause, i.e. that the
persons arrested were probably guilty of the commission of certain offenses,
in compliance with Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. To note these
admissions, on the other hand, is not to rule that the persons arrested are
already guilty of the offenses upon which their warrantless arrests were
predicated. The task of determining the guilt or innocence of persons arrested
without warrant is not proper in a petition for habeas corpus. It pertains to the
trial of the case on the merits.

As to the argument that the doctrines in Garcia vs. Enrile, and Ilagan vs.
Enrile should be abandoned, this Court finds no compelling reason at this
time to disturb the same, particularly ln the light of prevailing conditions where
national security and liability are still directly challenged perhaps with greater
vigor from the communist rebels. What is important is that everv arrest
without warrant be tested as to its legality via habeas corpus proceeding.
This Court. will promptly look into — and all other appropriate courts are
enjoined to do the same — the legality of the arrest without warrant so that if
the conditions under Sec. 5 of Rule 113, Rules of Court, as elucidated in this
Resolution, are not met, then the detainee shall forthwith be ordered
released; but if such conditions are met, then the detainee shall not be made
to languish in his detention but must be promptly tried to the end that he may
be either acquitted or convicted, with the least delay, as warranted by the
evidence.

A Final Word

This Resolution ends as it began, reiterating that mere suspicion of being a

Communist Party member or a subversive is absolutely not a ground for the
arrest without warrant of the suspect. The Court predicated the validity of the
questioned arrests without warrant in these petitions, not on mere
unsubstantiated suspicion, but on compliance with the conditions set forth in
Section 5, Rule 113, Rules of Court, a long existing law, and which, for stress,
are probable cause and good faith of the arresting peace officers, and,
further, on the basis of, as the records show, the actual facts and
circumstances supporting the arrests. More than the allure of popularity or
palatability to some groups, what is important is that the Court be right.

ACCORDINGLY, the motions for reconsideration of the decision dated 9 July

1990, are DENIED. This denial is FINAL.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea

and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

FERNAN, C.J., concurring and dissenting:

After a deep and thorough reexamination of the decision of Julv 9, 1990 and
an exhaustive evaluation of the motions for reconsideration of the said
decision, I am inclined to agree with the, majority's resolution on said motions
for reconsideration except for the legality of the warrantless arrests of
petitioner Deogracias Espiritu for the crime of inciting to sedition and
petitioner Alfredo Nazareno for the crime of murder.
In the words of the resolution, Espiritu "was arrested without warrant, not for
subversion or any 'continuing offense,' but for uttering" the following: "Bukas
tuloy ang welga natin . . . hanggang sa magkagulo na." Apparently, such
statement was, in the perception of the arresting officers, inciting to sedition.
While not conceding the validity of such perception, realizing that it is indeed
possible that Espiritu was merely exercising his right to free speech, the
resolution nonetheless supports the authority of peace officers "only for
purposes of the arrest."

I find this position to be adverse to the very essence of the resolution which
sanctions warrantless arrests provided they are made in accordance with
law. In the first place, Espiritu mav not be considered as having "just
committed" the crime charged. He allegedly first uttered seditious remarks at
the National Press Club in the afternoon of November 12, 1988. The second
allegedly seditious remark aforequoted was made at around 5:00 o'clock in
the same afternoon (Decision, pp. 23-24). Under these circumstances, the
law enforcement agents had time, short though it might seem, to secure a
warrant for his arrest. Espiritu's apprehension may not therefore be
considered as covered by Section 5(b) of Rule 113 which allows warrantless
arrests "when an offense has in fact just been committed."

The same observation applies with greater force in the case of Nazareno who
was arrested 14 days after the commission of the crime imputed to him.

Secondly, warrantless arrests may not be allowed if the arresting officer are
not sure what particular provision of law had beeri violated by the person
arrested. True it is that law en.orcement agents and even prosecutors are not
all adept at the However, errneous perception, not to mention ineptitude
among their ranks, especially if it would result in the violation of any right of
a person, may not be tolerated. That the arrested person has the "right to
insist during the pre-trial or trial on the merits" (Resolution., p. 18) that he was
exercising a right which the arresting officer considered as contrary to law, is
beside the point. No person should be subjected to the ordeal of a trial just
because the law enforcers wrongly perceived his action.

Thirdly, inciting to sedition is not a continuous crime for which the offender
may be arrested without a warrant duly issued by the proper authority. By its
nature, a single act of urging others to commit any of the acts enumerated in
Article 142 of the Revised Penal Code may suffice to hold anyone liable for
inciting to sedition. While the crime is aimed at anarchy and radicalism and
presents largely a question of policy (Espuelas vs. People, 90 Phil, 524
[1951]), it should be remembered that any of the prohibited acts in Article 142
may infringe upon the fundamental freedoms of speech and expression.
There arises, therefore, the necessity of balancing interests; those of the
State as against those of its individual citizen. Here lies the urgency of judicial
intervention before an arrest is made. Added to this is the subjectivity of the
determination of what may incite other people to sedition. Hence, while the
police should act swiftly when a seditious statement has been uttered in view
of the jeopardy it may cause the government, speedy action should consist
not in warrantless arrests but in securing warrants for such arrests.

On the legality of warrantless arrests of violators of the Anti-Subversion Law,

it should be underscored that anyone who undertakes such arrest must see
to it that the alleged violator is knowing member of a subversive organization
as distinguished from a nominal one (People vs. Ferrer, L-32613-14,
December 27, 1972, 48 SCRA 382). Thus, a subversive may be arrested
even if has not committed overt act of overthrowing the government such as
bombing of government offices trie assassination of government officials
provided there is probable cause to believe that he is in the roll of members
of a subversive organization. It devolves upon the accused to prove
membership by force or ciorcion. Certainly, one may not be in such a roll
without undergoing the concious act of enlistment.

It bears repeating theat warrantless arrests are governed by law and subject
to stringent application. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure now requires that an offense "has in fact just been committed.
"connotes immediacy in point of time and excludes cases under the old rule
where an offense 'has in fact been committed' no how long ago. Similarly, the
arrestor must have 'personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the
[arrestee] has committed it' (instead of just 'reasonable ground believe that
the [arrestee] has committed it' under the old rule)." (Dissenting opinion
in Ilagan vs. Enrile, G.R. No. 70748, October 21, 1985, 139 SCRA 349, 408).
I deem it aptherein to recall other Court rulings provide guidelines in effecting
arrests without warrants. In People vs. Burgos (G.R. No. 68955, September
4, 1986,144 SCRA 1), the Court considered as illegal the warrantless arrest
of a subversive not based on the arresting officer's personal knowledge such
subversion and held that any rule on arrests witho warrants must be strictly
construed. We categorically state therein that warrantless arrests should
"clearly fall within the situations when securing a warrant be absurd or is
manifestly unnecessary was provided by the Rules" (144 SCRA at 14).
Moreover. "it is not enough that there is reasonable ground to believe that
the person to be arrested has committed a crime. A crime must in fact or
actually (has just) been committed first. That crime has actually been
committed is an essential precondition. It is not enough to suspect that a
crime may have been committed. The fact of the commission of the offense
must be undisputed. The test of reasonable ground applies only to the identity
of the perpetrator. (Supra, at p. 15).

Earlier, in Morales, Jr. vs. Enrile (G.R. No. 61016, April 26, 1983, 121 SCRA
538), the Court laid out the procedure to be observed the moment a person
is arrested:

At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to
imform him of the reason for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant of
arrest, if any. He shall be informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent
and to counsel, and that any statement he might make could be used against
him. The person shall have the right to communicate with his lawyer, a
relative, or anyone he chooses by the most expedient means — by telephone
if possible — or by letter or messenger. It shall be the responsibility of the
arresting officer to see to it that this is accomplished. No custodial
investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel
engaged by the person arressted, by any person on his behalf, or appointed
by the court upon petition on his behalf, or appointed the court upon the
petition either of the detainee himself or by anyone on his behalf. The right to
counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with
the assistance of counsel. Any statement obtained in violation of the
procedure herein laid down, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or
in part shall be inadmissible evidence. (121 SCRA at 554).
These judicial pronouncements must be observed by everyone concerned:
the military and civilian components of the government tasked with law
enforcement as well as the ordinary citizen who faces a situation wherein
civic duty demands his intervention to preserve peace in the community.

I am not unmindful of the fact that abuses occur in arrests especially of

offenders of crimes with a political or ideological element. Such abuses are
more often than not, triggered by the difficulty in finding evidence that could
stand judicial scrutiny — to pinpoint a subversive, police officers usually have
to make long persistent surveillance. However, for the orderly administration
of government and the maintenance of peace and order in the country, good
faith should be reposed on the officials implementing the law. After all, we
are not wanting in laws to hold any offending peace officer liable both
administratively and criminally for abuses in the performance of their duties.
Victims of abuses should resort to legal remedies to redress their grievances.

If existing laws are inadequate, the policy-determining branches of the

government may be exhorted peacefully by the citizenry to effect positive
changes. This Court, mandated b the Constitution to uphold the law, can only
go as far as inter pruting existing laws and the spirit behind them. Otherwise,
we hail be entering the dangerous ground of judicial legislation.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring and dissenting:

The philosophy adopted in our Constitution is that liberty is an essential

condition for order, It is disturbing whenever the Court leans in the direction
of order instead of liberty in har cases coming before us.

People all over the world are fast accepting the theory that only as a society
encourages freedom and permits dissent can it have lasting security and real
progress, the theory that enhancing order through constraints on freedom is
deceptive because restrictions on liberty corrode the very values Govenment
pretends to promote. I believe we should move with the people of the world
who are fast liberating themselves.

I, therefore, vote for the strict application of Section 5 (a) and (b) of Rule 113
on arrests without warrant, to wit:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is

actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed
it.

xxx xxx xxx

Only in the cases found in the Rule should we allow arrests without warrants.
In case of doubt, the tendency should be to declare the warrantless arrest
illegal.

Insofar as G.R. Nos, 84581-82, G.R. Nos. 84583-84 and G.R. No. 83162
involving Amelia Roque, Wilfredo Buenaobra, Domingo Anonuevo, Ramon
Casiple, and Vicky Ocaya are concerned, the petitioners were arrested after
having been apprehended while in possession of illegal firearms and
ammunitions. They were actually committing a crime when arrested. I concur
in the denial of their motions for reconsideration.

I vote to grant the motion for reconsideration in G.R. No. 85727 where
Deogracias Espiritu was arrested while urging jeepnev and bus drivers to join
a strike of transport workers on the ground that that was inciting to sedition.

This impresses me as Court validation of a clear infringement of an

individual's freedom of speech. "Inciting to sedition" is a term over which the
most learned writers and jurists will differ when applied to actual cases. I
doubt if there are more than a handful of policemen in the whole country who
would know the full dimensions of the fine distinctions which separate the
nation's interest in the liberty to fully anfd freely discuss matters of national
importance on one hand and the application of the clear and present danger
rule as the test when claims of national security and public safety are
asserted, on the other. In fact, the percentage of knowledgeability would go
down further if we consider that "inciting to sedition" requires the ability to
define, among other (1) what kinds of speeches or writings fall lander the
term "inciting" (2) the meaning of rising publicly and tumultously; (3,) when
does a certain effort amount to force, intimidation. or illegal method; (4) what
constitute the five objects or ends of sedition; and (5) what is a scurrilous libel
against the Philippines. If we allow public speakers to be picked up simply
because what they say is irritating or obnoxious to the ears of a peace officer
or critical of government policy and action, we will undermine all
pronouncements of this Court on the need to protect that matrix of all
freedoms, which is freedom of expression. At the very least, a warrant of
arrest after a preliminary examination by a Judge is essential in this type of
offense.

Insofar as G.R. No. 81567 is concemed, I join the other dissenting Justices
in their observations regarding "continuing oftenses." To base warrantless
arrests on the doctrine of continuing offense is to give a license for the illegal
detention of persons on pure suspicion. Rebellion, insurrection, or sedition
are political offenses where the line between overt acts and simple advocacy
or adherence to a belief is extremely thin. If a court has convicted an accused
of rebellion and he is found roaming around, he may be arrested. But until a
person is proved guilty, I fail to see how anybody can jump to a personal
conclusion that the suspect is indeed a rebel and must be picked up on sight
whenever seen. The grant of authority in the majority opinion is too broad. If
warrantless searches are to be validated, it should be Congress and not this
Court which should draw strict and narrow standards. Otherwise, the non-
rebels who are critical, noisy, or obnoxious will be indiscriminately lumped up
with those actually taking up arms against the Government.

The belief of law enforcement authorities, no matter how well grounded on

past events, that the petitioner would probably shoot other policemen whom
he may meet does not validate warrantless arrests. I cannot understand why
the authorities preferred to bide their time, await the petitioner's surfacing
from underground, and pounce on him with no legal authority instead of
securing warrants of arrest for his apprehension. The subsequent conviction
of a person arrested illegally does not the warrantless arrest.

In G.R. No. 86332, Romulo Bunye was killed on December 14, 1988. The
information that Narciso Nazareno was one of the killers came to the attention
of peace officers only on December 28, 1988 or fourteen (14) days later. To
say that the offense "has in fact just been committed" even if 14 days have
lapsed is to stretch Rule 11 3 on warrantless arrests into ridiculous limits. A
warrant of arrest is essential in this case. I vote to grant the motion for
reconsideration.

The subsequent conviction of a person arrested illegally does not reach back
into the past and render legal what was illegal. The violation of the
constitutional right against illegal seizures is not cured by the fact that the
arrested person is indeed guilty of the offense for which he was seized. A
government of laws must abide by its own Constitution.

CONSIDERING THE FOREGOING, I VOTE TO:

(1) DENY the motions for reconsideration in G.R. Nos. 84581-82; G.R. No.
84583-84; and G.R. No. 83162;

(2) GRANT the motion for reconsideration in G.R. No. 85727;

(3) GRANT the motion for reconsideration in G.R. No. 86332;and

(4) GRANT the motion for reconsideration in G.R. No. 81567.

CRUZ, J., Separate Opinion:

I reiterate my concurrence with the ponencia insofar as it dismissed the

petitions of those who were arrested inflagrante, or subsequently posted bail
or chose to remain in the custody of the military, or voluntarily permitted the
search of the house without warrant. I do not think that under the applicable
circumstances the petitioners can validly complain that they are being
unlawfully detained.

But I must again express may dissent to the continued observance of Garcia-
Padilla vs. Enrile, 121 SCRA 472, to justify the warrantless arrest and
detention of the other petitioners on the ground that they were apprehended
for the continuing offenses of rebellion and other allied crimes.

We find in the said decision this partltularly disturbing observation, which was
quoted with approval in the originalponencia:
The arrest of persons involved in the rebellion, whether as its fighting armed
elements, or for committing non-violent acts but in furtherance of the
rebellion, is more an act of capturing them in the course of an armed conflict,
to quell the rebellion, than for the purpose of immediately prosecuting them
in court for a statutory offense. The arrest, therefore, need not follow the
usual procedure in the prosecution of offenses which requires the
determination by a judge of the existence of probable cause before the
issuance of arrest and the granting of bail of the offense is bailable.
Obviously, the absence of a judicial warrant is no legal impediment to
arresting or capturing persons committing overt acts of violence against
govenment forces, or any other milder acts but equally in pursuance of the
rebellious movement. (Emphasis supplied.)

The treatment suggested envisions an actual state of war and is justified only
when a recognition of beuigerency is accorded by the legitimate government
to the rebels, resulting in the application of the laws of war in the regulation
of their relations. The rebels are then considered alien enemies-to be treated
as prisoners of war when captured-and cannot invoke the municipal law of
the legitimate government they have disowned. It is in such a situation that
the processes of the local courts are not observed and the rebels cannot
demand the protection of the Bill of Rights that they are deemed to have
renounced by their defiance of the government.

But as long as that recognition has not yet been extended, the legitimate
govenment must treat the rebels as its citizens, subject to its municipal law
and entitled to all the rights provided thereunder, including and especially
those guaranteed by the Constitution. Principal among these — in our
country — are whose embodied in the Bill of Rights, particularly those
guaranteeing due process, prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures,
allowing bail, and presuming the innocence of the accused. The legitimate
government cannot excuse the suppression of these rights by the
"exigencies" of an armed conflict that at this time remains an intemal matter
governed exclusively by the laws of the Republic of the Philippines.

Treatment of the rebels as if they were foreign invaders — or combatants —

is not justified in the present situation as our government continues to
prosecute them as violators of our own laws. Under the doctrine announced
in Garcia-Padilla, however, all persons suspected as rebels are by such
suspicion alone made subject to summary arrest no different from the
unceremonious capture of an enemy soldier in the course of a battle. The
decision itself says that the arrest "need not follow the usual procedure in the
prosecution of offenses" and "the absence of a judicial warrant is no
impediment" as long as the person arrested is suspected by the authorities
of the "continuing offense" of subversion or rebellion or other related crimes.
International law is thus substituted for municipal law in regulating the
relations of the Republic with its own citizens in a purely domestic matter.

As for the duration of the offenses, the decision contained the following
pronouncement which this Court has also adopted as its own:

. . . The crimes of insurrection or rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal

to commit such crimes, and other crimes and offenses committed in the
furtherance on the occasion thereof, or incident thereto, or in connection
therewith under Presidential Proclamation No. 2045, are all in the nature
of continuing offenseswhich set them apart from the common offenses, aside
front their essentially involving a massive conspiracy of nationwide manitude.
(Emphasis supplied.)

The beginning of the "continuing offense" may be arbitrarily fixed by the

authorities, usually by simply placing the suspect "under surveillance," to lay
the basis for his eventual apprehension. Once so placed, he may at any time
be arrested without warrant on the specious pretext that he is in the process
of committing the "continuing offense," no matter that what he may be
actuallly doing at the time is a perfectly innocent act.

In the case of Dural. the arrest was made while he was engaged in the
passive and innocuous act of undergoing medical treatment. The fiction was
indulged that he was even then, as he lay supine in his sickbed, engaged in
the continuing offense of rebellion against the State. In further justification,
the Court says that the arresting officers acted on "confidential information"
that he was in the hospital, which information "was found to be true." This is
supposed to have validated the determination of the officers that there was
"probable cause" that excused the absence of a warrant.
My own impression is that probable cause must be established precisely
to justify the issuance of a warrant, not to dispense with it; moreover,
probable cause must be determined by the judge issuing the warrant, not the
arresting officer who says it is not necessary.

In the case of Espiritu, the arrest was made while he was actually sleeping,
and for allegedly seditious remarks made by him the day before. The Court
says his case is not covered by the Garcia-Padilla doctrine but approves the
arrest just the same because the remarks were supposed to continue their
effects even to the following day. The offense was considered as having
been just committed (to make it come under Rule 113, Section 5, of the Rules
of Court) despite the considerable time lapse.

It was worse in the case of Nazareno, who was also arrested without warrant,
and no less than fourteen days after the killing. In sustaining this act, the
Court says that it was only on the day of his arrest that he was identified as
one of the probable killers, thus suggesting that the validity of a warrantless
arrest is reckoned not from the time of the commission of an offense but from
the time of the Identification of the suspect.

Section 5 of Rule 113 says that a peace officer may arrest a person without
a warrant if the latter "has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting
to commit an offense" or when an offense "has in fact just been committed."
The requirement of immediacy is obvious from the word "just," which,
according to Webster, means "a very short time ago." The arrest must be
made almost immediately or soon after these acts, not at any time after the
suspicion of the arresting officer begins, no matter how long ago the offense
was committed.

I am also uneasy over the following observations in the present resolution

which I hope will not be the start of another dangerous doctrine:

The Court, it is true, took into account the admissions of the arrested persons
of their membership in the CPP/NPA, as well as their ownership of the
unlicensed firearms, ammunitions and documents in their possession. But
again, these admissions, as revealed by the records, strengthen the Court's
perception that truly the grounds upon wmch the arresting officers based their
arrests without warrant, are supported by probable cause, i.e., that the
persons arrested were probably guilty of the commission of certain offenses,
in compliance with Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.

I can only repeat my own misgivings when I dissented in the recent case
of People vs. Malmstedt, G.R. No. 91107, June 19, 1991, where I noted: "The
conclusion that there was probable cause may have been influenced by the
subsequent discovery that the accused was carrying a prohibited drug. This
is supposed to justify the soldier's suspicion. In other words, it was the fact of
illegal possession that retroactively established the probable cause that
validated the illegal search and seizure. It was the fruit of the poisonous tree
that washed clean the tree itself."

I submit that the affirmation by this Court of the Garcia-Padilla decision to

justify the illegal arrests made in the cases before us is a step back to that
shameful past when individual rights were wantonly and systematically
violated by the Marcos dictatorship. It seems some of us have short
memories of that repressive regime, but I for one am not one to forget so
soon. As the ultimate defender of the Constitution, this Court should not gloss
over the abuses of those who, out of mistaken zeal, would violate individual
liberty in the dubious name of national security. Whatever their ideology and
even if it be hostile to ours, the petitioners are entitled to the protection of the
Bill of Rights, no more and no less than any other person in this country. That
is what democracy is all about.

FELICIANO, J., concurring and dissenting:

I concur in the result reached by the majority in the Resolution disposing of

the Motion for Reconsideration.

At the same time, however, I feel compelled to dissent from certain

statements made by the majority principally concerning the applicability of
the "continuing crimes" doctrine to the problem of arrests without warrants. It
seems clear that these statements are really obiter dicta, since they are quite
unnecessary for sustaining the actual results reached in the majority
Resolution. This was summarily pointed out in my very brief statement
concurring in the result reached in the original Decision of the Court dated 9
July 1990. The subsequent developments in several of the cases here
consolidated, which are carefully detailed in the majority Resolution, make
this even clearer. Nonetheless, the majority Resolution has taken the time
and trouble expressly to reiterate the "continuing crimes" doctrine as
applicable in respect of warrantless arrests. Although the above statements
are obiter, they have been made and, I believe, need to be addressed to
some extent and the inter-relation of the "continuing crimes" doctrine with
constitutional rights explored.

1. We start at the beginning, that is, the constitutional guarantee against

unreasonable seizures of persons. Article III Section 2 of the Constitution
reads:

Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature
and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of
arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally
by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to
be searched and the persons or things to be seized. (Emphais supplied)

Under the above provision, arrests, i.e., the constraint and seizure of the
persons of individual members of society, must, as a general rule, be
preceded by the securing of a warrant of arrest, the rendition of which
complies with the constitutional procedure specified in Article III Section 2.
Arrests made without a warrant issued by a judge after complying with the
constitutional procedure, are prima facie unreasonable seizures of persons
within the meaning of Article III Section 2.

2. There are, however, certain well-recognized exceptions to the norm that

warrantless arrests are unreasonable seizures of persons. Those exceptions
are, in our day, essentially found in Section 5(a) and (b) of Rule 113 of the
Rules of Court. Section 5(a) and (b) mark out the situations where an officer
of the law, or a private person for that matter, may lawfully arrest a person
without previously securing a warrant of arrest. The full text of Section 5, Rule
113 follows:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant, when lawful. — A peace officer or a private
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is

actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed
it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a
penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.

In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested
without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or
jail, and he shall be proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112, Section
7.

3. Before examining the scope and implications of Section 5(a) and (b), it is
important to recall that judicial interpretation and application of Section 5(a)
and (b) must take those provision for what they are: they are exceptions to a
vital constitutional norm enshrined in the Bill of Rights. Exceptions to such a
norm must be strictly construed so as not to render futile and meaningless
the constitutional rule requiring warrants of arrests before the persons of
individuals may be lawfully constrained and seized. The ordinary rule
generally applicable to statutory provisions is that exceptions to such
provisions must not be stretched beyond what the language in which they are
cast fairly warrants, and all doubts should be resolved in favor of the general
provision, rather than the exception. 1This rule must apply with special
exigency and cogency where we deal, not with an ordinary statutory
provision, but with a constitutional guarantee. 2 Exceptions to such a
guarantee must be read with especial care and sensitivity and kept within the
limits of their language so to keep vital and significant the general
constitutional norms warrantless arrests. In Alvarez vs. Court of First
Instance, 3 this Court, stressing that:
II. As the protection of the citizen and the maintenance of his constitutional
rights is one of the highest duties and privileges of the court. these
constitutional guaranties should be given a liberal construction or a strict
construction in favor of the individual, to prevent stealthy encroachment
upon, or gradual depreciation of, the rights secured by them (State vs. Custer
County, 198 Pac., 362; State vs. McDaniel, 231 Pac., 965; 237 Pac., 373).
Since the proceeding is a drastic one, it is the general rule that statutes
authorizing searches and seizures or search warrants must be strictly
construed (Rose vs. St. Clair, 28 Fed. [2d], 189; Leonard vs. U.S., 6 Fed.
[2d], 353; Perry vs. U.S., 14 Fed. [2d], 88; Cofer vs. State, 118 So., 613.
(emphasis supplied)

held that:

. . . All illegal searches and seizures are unreasonable whith lawful ones are
reasonable. 4

In People vs. Burgos, 5 this Court reiterated the above rule in the following terms:

There is no such personal knowledge in this case. Whatever knowledge was

possessed by the arresting officers, it came in its entirety from the information
furnished by Cesar Masamlok. The location of the firearm was given by the
appellant's wife.

At the time of the appellant's arrest, he was not in actual possession of any
firearm or subversive document. Neither was he commit ting any act which
could be described as subversive. He was, in fact plowing his field at the time
of the arrest.

The right of a person to be secure against any unreasonable seizure of his

body and any deprivation of his liberty is a most basic and fundamental one.
The statute or rule which allows exceptions the requirement of warrants of
arrest is strictly construed. Any exception must clearly fall within the situations
when securing a warrant would be absurd or is manifestly unnecessary as
provided by the Rule. We cannot liberally construe the rule on arrests without
warrant or extend its application beyond the cases specifically provided by
law. To do so would infringe upon personal liberty and set back a basic right
so often vilated and so deserving of full protection. 6 (emphasis supplied)

4. Section 5(a) relates to situations where a crime is committed or attempted to be committed in the presence of the arresting officer. The fact of the occurrence of the offense, or of the
attempt to commit an offense, in the presence of the arresting officer, may be seen to be the substitute, under the circumstances, for the securing of a warrant of arrest. In such situation,
there is an obvious need for immediate, even instantaneous, action on the part of the arresting officer to suppress the breach of public order and to prevent further breaches then and there.
Section 5(a) may, moreover, be seen to refer to overt acts constitutive of a crime taking place in the presence of the arresting officer. The term "presence" in this connection is properly

If no overt, recognizably
and restrictively construed to relate to acts taking place within the optical or perhaps auditory perception of the arresting officer. 7

criminal, acts occur which are perceptible through the senses of the arresting
officer, such officer could not, of course, become aware at all that a crime is
being committed or attempted to be committed in his presence. 8It is
elementary that purely mental or psychological phenomena, not externalized
in overt physical acts of a human person, cannot constitute a crime in our
legal system. For a crime to exist in our legal law, it is not enough that mens
rea be shown; there must also be an actus reus. If no such overt acts are
actually taking place in the presence or within the sensor perception of the
arresting officer, there would, in principle, be ample time to go to a magistrate
and ask for a warrant of arrest. There would, in other words, not be that
imperious necessity for instant action to prevent an attempted crime, to
repress the crime being committed, or to capture the doer of the perceive
criminal act, the necessity which serves as the justification in law of
warrantless arrests under Section 5(a).

5. Turning to Section 5 (b), two (2) elements must be coincide before a

warrantless arrest may be sustained under this subsection: 1) the offense
must have "just been committed" when the arresting officer arrived in the
scene; and 2) the officer must have "personal knowledge" of facts indicating
tha the person to be arrested has committed the offense. In somewhat
different terms, the first requirement imports that th effects or corpus of the
offense which has just been committed are still visible: e.g. a person sprawled
on the ground, dead of gunshot wound; or a person staggering around
bleeding profusely from stab wounds. The arresting officer may not ha seen
the actual shooting or stabbing of the victim, and thereto the offense can not
be said to have been committed "in [his] presence." The requirement
of "personal knowledge" on the part of the arresting officer is a requirement
that such knowledge must have been obtained directly from sense
perception the arresting officer. That requirement would exclude informtion
conveyed by another person, no matter what his reputation for, truth and
reliability might be. 9 Thus, where the arresting officer comes upon a person
dead on the street and sees a person running away with a knife from where
the victim is sprawled the ground, he has personal knowledge of facts which
render it highly probable that the person fleeing was the doer of the criminal
deed. The arresting officer must, in other words, perceive through his own
senses some act which directly connects the person to be arrested with the
visible effects or corpus of a crime which has "just been committed."

6. The use of the words "has in fact just been committed" underscores the
requirement that the time interval between the actual commission of the crime
and the arrival of the arresting officer must be brief indeed. In the first place,
the word "just" was fairly recently inserted in Section 5(b) by the 1985 Rules
on Criminal Procedures, no doubt in order to underscore the point here being
made. In the second place, a latitudinarian view of the phrase "has in fact just
been committed" would obviously render pointless the requirement in Section
5(a) that the crime must have been committed "[in] the presence" of the
arresting officer. In G.R. No. 86332, the warrantless arrest of Alfredo
Nazareno 14-days after the occurrence of the killing with which he was
charged along with other persons, cannot by any standard be justified under
Section 5(b). In G.R. No. 81567, Dural was arrested without warrant while
being treated in a hospital the day after the shooting of the policemen in which
he was suspected to have been a participant. While 1-day may be
substantially different from 14-days, still it must be pointed out that at the time
Dural was arrested in the hospital, the killing of the two (2) policemen in
Caloocan City far away from the St. Agnes Hospital in Quezon City could not
reasonably be said to have been just committed. There was no showing, nor
did the Court require it, that the arresting officers had been in "hot pursuit" of
Dural beginning at the scene of the killing and ending the next day in the
hospital.
7. It is worth noting that the requisite of "personal knowledge" on the part of
the arresting officer who is determining "probable cause" right at the scene
of the crime, is in a sense more exacting than the standard imposed by the
Constitution upon the judge who, in the seclusion of his chambers, ascertains
"probable cause" by examining the evidence submitted before him. The
arresting officer must himself have "personal knowledge"; the magistrate
may rely upon the personal knowledge of the witnesses examined by or for
him in issuing a warrant of arrest. In the present Resolution, the majority
begins with noting the requirement of "personal knowledge" in Section 5(b),
but winds up in the next page with a very diluted standard of "reasonable
belief and "good faith" on the part of the arresting officers. The stricter
standard is properly applicable to the officers seizing a person without a
warrant of arrest, for they are acting in derogation of a constitutional right.
That the person unlawfully arrested without a warrant may later turn out to be
guilty of the offense he was suspected of in the first place is, course, quite
beside the point. Even a person secretly guilty some earlier crime is
constitutionally entitled to be secure from warrantless arrest, unless he has
in fact committed physically observable criminal acts in the presence of the
arresting officer or hadjust committed such acts when the arresting officer
burst upon the scene.

8. Examination of the utilization in the majotity Resolution of the doctrine of

"continuing crimes," shows that doctrine is here being used as a substitute
for the requirement under Section 5(a) that the offense "has in fact just been
presence of the arresting officer arrived, but rather because the person to be
arrested is suspected of having committed a crime in the future. The
pertinent portion of the majority Resolution reads:

. . . Dural did not cease to be, or because less of a subversive, FOR

PURPOSE OF ARREST, simply because he was, at the time of arrest,
confined in the St. Agnes Hospital. . . . That Dural had shot the two (2)
policemen in Caloocan City as part of his mission as a "sparrow" (NPA
member) did not end there and then. Dural, given another opportunity, would
have shot or would shoot other policemen anywhere as agents or
representatives of organized government. It is in this sense that subversion
like rebelion (or insurrection) is perceived here as a continuing offense.
Unlike other so-called "common" offenses, i.e., adultery, murder, arson, etc.,
which generally end upon their
commission, subversion and rebellion are anchored on an ideological base
which compels the repetition of the same acts of lawlessness and
violence until the overriding objectives of overthrowing organized
government is attained. (Emphasis supplied)

9. I respectfully submit that an examination of the "continuing crimes" doctrine

as actually found in our case law offers no reasonable basis for such use of
the dotrine. More specifically, that doctrine, in my submission,
does notdispence with the requirement that overt acts recognizably criminal
in character must take place in the presence of the arresting officer, or must
have just been committed when the arresting officer arrived, if the warrantless
arrest it to be lawful. The "continuing crimes" doctrine in our case law
(before rendition of Garcia-Padilla vs. Enrile 10 does not sustain warrantless
arrests of person to be arrested is, as it were, merely resting in between
specific lawless and commit the moment he gets an opportunity to do so.

Our case law shows that the "continuing crimes" doctrine has been used
basically in relation to two (2) problems: the first problem is that of
determination of whether or not a particular offense was committed within the
territorial jurisdiction of the trial court; the second problem is that of
determining whether a single crime or multiple crimes were committed where
the defense of double jeopardy is raised.

10. In respect of the first problem, the gist of our case law is that where some
of the ingredients or elements of an offense taken place within the territorial
jurisdiction of one court and some other ingredients or elements of the same
offense occur in the territory of another court, (e.g., estafa or malversation)
either one of the two courts has jurisdiction to try the offense. Where all of
the essential elements of a crime take place within the territory of one court
but "by reason of he very nature of the offense committed" the violation of the
law is deemed to be "continuing," then the court within whose territorial
jurisdiction the offense continues to be committed, has jurisdiction to try a
person charged with such offense. In the latter case, the offense is deemed
to be continuing because some or all of the elements constituting the offense
occurred within jurisdiction of the second court (e.g., kidnapping and illegal
detention; libel; evasion of service of sentence). The criminal acts are
regarded as repeated or as continuing within the province or city where the
defendant was found and arrested. 11 Clearly, overt acts of the accussed
constituting elements of the crime charged must be shown to have been
committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the court where he is charged.

11. Turning to the second type of problem, the question is normally presented
in terms of whether one crime or multiple crimes were committed by the
accused. Where the series of acts actually alleged and proven to have been
committed by the accused constituted only one and the same crime, the
defense of double jeopardy becomes available where a second information
is filed covering acts later in the series. Upon the other hand, where the acts
of the accused constituted discrete, multiple offenses, each act comprising a
distinct and separate offense, the double jeopardy defense is non-
available. 12 The point worth stressing is that in passing upon the issue
relating to the unity or multiplicity of offense committed, the overt acts of the
accused constitutive either of the single offense or of the plural offenses,
must be shown.

12. My final submission, is that, the doctrine of "continuing crimes," which

has its own legitimate function to serve in our criminal law jurisprudence,
cannot be invoked for weakening and dissolving the constitutional guarantee
against warrantless arrest. Where no overt acts comprising all or some of the
elements of the offense charged are shown to have been committed by the
person arrested without warrant, the "continuing crime" doctrine should not
be used to dress up the pretense that a crime, begun or committed
elsewhere, continued to be committed by the person arrested in the presence
of the arresting officer. The capacity for mischief of such a utilization of the
"continuing crimes" doctrine, is infinitely increased where the crime charged
does not consist of unambiguous criminal acts with a definite beginning and
end in time and space (such as the killing or wounding of a person or
kidnapping and illegal dentention or arson) but rather of such problematic
offenses as membership in or affiliation with or becoming a member of, a
subversive association or organization. For in such cases, the overt
constitutive acts may be morally neutral in themselves, and the unlawfulness
of the acts a function of the aims or objectives of the organization involved.
Note, for instance, the following acts which constitute prima facie evidence
of "membership in any subversive association:" 13

a) Allowing himself to be listed as a member in any book or any of the lists, records, correspondence, or any other
document of the organization;

b) Subjecting himself to the discipline of such association or organization in any form whatsoever;

c) Giving financial contribution to such association or organization in dues, assessments, loans or in any other forms;

xxx xxx xxx

f) Conferring with officers or other members of such association or organization in furtherance of any plan or enterprise
thereof;

xxx xxx xxx

h) Preparing documents, pamphlets, leaflets, books, or any other type of publication to promote the objectives and
purposes of such association or organization;

xxx xxx xxx

k) Participating in any was in the activities, planning action, objectives, or purposes of such association or
organization;

xxx xxx xxx

It may well be, as the majority implies, that the constitutional rule against warrantless arrests and seizures makes the
law enforcement work of police agencies more difficult to carry out. It is not our Court's function, however, and the
Bill of Rights was not designed, to make life easy for police forces but rather to protect the liberties of private
individuals. Our police forces must simply learn to live with the requirements of the Bill of Rights, to enforce the law
by modalities which themselves comply with the fundamental law. Otherwise they are very likely to destroy, whether
through sheer ineptness or excess of zeal, the very freedoms which make our polity worth protecting and saving.

REGALADO, J.: Separate Opinion:

While I have heretofore concurred in the ponencia in the above-entitled cases and I reiterate such concurrence, I
wish to unburden myself of some reservations on the rationale adopted in G.R. No. 86332.
It is posited in this resolution that "(a)lthough the killing of Bunye II occurred on 14 December 1988, while Nazareno's
arrest without warrant was made only on 28 December 1988, or 14 days later, the arrest falls under Section 5(b) of
Rule 113, since it was only on 28 December 1988 that the police authorities came to know that Nazareno was
probably one of those guilty in the killing of Bunye II."

I am afraid that there has been a misapplication of Section 5(b) of Rule 113 which, while authorizing a peace officer
or a private person to effect a warrantless arrest, specifically conditions that grant of authority upon the situation
"(w)hen an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person
to be arrested has committed it."

It is significant that when the corresponding provisions of the 1964 Rules of Court were amended in the 1985 Rules
of Criminal Procedure, the particular revision of paragraph (b) of the aforesaid section consisted in imposing the
requirements that the person making the arrest has personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the arrestee is
responsible for an offense which has just been committed.

Now, according to the resolution, "the records show that in the morning of 14 December 1988, Romulo Bunye II was
killed by a group of men in Alabang, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila; that at about 5 o'clock in the morning of 28 December
1988, Ramil Regala, one of the suspects in the said killing, was arrested and he pointed to Narciso Nazareno as one
of his companions during the killing of Bunye II; that at 7:20 of the same morning (28 December 1988), the police
agents arrested Nazareno, without warrant, for investigation."

Since, clearly, the arresting police agents merely acted upon the information imparted by one of the suspects, Ramil
Regala, the resolution has emasculated the requirement in Section 5(b) that the person making the arrest must have
had personal knowledge of factual indications regarding the complicity or liability of the arrestee for the crime. Yet,
that amendment requiring such personal knowledge must have been designed to obviate the practice in the past of
warrantless arrests being effected on the basis of or supposed reliance upon information obtained from third persons
who merely professed such knowledge or, worse, concocted such reports for variant reasons not necessarily founded
on truth.

Further, and obviously as an added deterrent to the possibility that such arrest without a warrant may result from
imputations based on dubious motives, it is now required that the crime must have just been committed. The recency
contemplated here, in relation to the making of the warrantless arrest, is the time when the crime was in fact
committed, and not the time when the crime was in fact committed, and not the time when the person making the
arrest learned or was informed of such commission. Otherwise, at the risk of resorting to reductio ad absurdum, such
warrantless arrests could be validly made even for a crime committed, say, more than a year ago but of which the
arresting officer received information only today.
The brevity in the interval of time between the commission of the crime and the arrest, as now required by Section
5(b), must have been dictated by the consideration, among others, that by reason of such recency of the criminal
occurrence, the probability of the arresting officer acquiring personal and/or reliable knowledge of such fact and the
identity of the offender is necessarily enhanced, if not assured. The longer the interval, the more attenuated are the
chances of his obtaining such verifiable knowledge. In the case under consideration, the obtention of information of
a crime committed fourteen (14) days earlier necessarily undermines the capacity of the arresting officer to ascertain
the reliability of the information he is acting upon and to acquire personal knowledge thereof after such verification.

It may be granted, as an ad hoc proposition, that the arrest of Nazareno was based on probable cause and it was
not whimsical, at least, in this instance. It is correct to say that prevailing conditions affecting national security and
stability must also be taken into account. However, for the reasons above elucidated, I take exception to the
conclusion that the conditions in Section 5(b) of Rule 113 had been complied with in this case. It is true that the
corresponding information was filed against Nazareno shortly after his arrest but that, precisely, is another cause for
controversy. Definitely, if the rules on arrest are scrupulously observed, there would be no need for the usual
invocation of Ilagan as a curative balm for unwarranted incursions into civil liberties.

SARMIENTO, J.: dissenting:

the majority has not shown why the arrests in

I reiterate my dissent. I submit that in spite of its "clarificatory" resolution, 1

question should after all be sustained.

According to the majority, Rolando Dural (G.R. No. 815667) was validly
arrested without a warrant and that his arrest was sufficient compliance with
the provisions of Section 5, paragraph (b), Rule 113, of the Rules of Court.
According to the majority, he, Dural, was after all committing an offense
(subversion being supposedly a continuing offense) and that the military did
have personal knowledge that he had committed it. "Personal knowledge,"
according to the majority, is supposedly no more than "actual belief or
reasonable grounds . . . of suspicion," and suspicion is supposedly
reasonable:

. . . when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the

suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the
offense, is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently
strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilty of the person to
be arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable
cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers making the
arrest. 2

As I said, I dissent.

is made
First, and as I held, subversion, as an offense punished by Executive Order No. 167, as amended by Executive Order No. 276, in relation to Republic Act No. 1700, 3

up of "overt acts." 4 In People vs. Ferrer 5 this Court defined "overt acts" as
follows:

. . . Indeed, were the Anti-Subversion Act a bill of attainder, it would be totally

unnecessary to charge Communists in court, as the law alone, without more
would suffice to secure their punishment. But the undeniable fact is that their
guilt still has to be judicially established. The Government has yet to prove at
the trial that the accused joined the Party knowingly, willfully and by overt
acts, and that they joined the Party, knowing its subversive character and
with specific intent to further its basic objective, i.e., to overthrow the existing
government by force, deceit, and other illegal means and place the country
under the control and domination of a foreign power.

As Ferrer held, that above "overt acts" constitute the essence of "subversion,"
and as Ferrer has taken pains to explain, the law requires more than mere
membership in a subversive organization to make the accused liable. I
respectfully submit that for purposes of arrest without a warrant, that above
"overt acts" should be visible to the eyes of the police officers (if that is
possible), otherwise the accused can not be said to be committing any
offense within the contemplation of the Rules of Court, to justify police action,
and otherwise, we would have made "subversion" to mean mere
"membership" when, as Ferrer tells us, subversion means more that mere
membership.
I find strained that majority's interpretation of "personal knowledge," as the
majority would interpret it, as no more than "actual belief or reasonable
suspicion," that is, "suspicion . . . based on actual facts . . . [and] founded on
probable cause, coupled with good faith . . . " 6 I submit that personal
knowledge means exactly what it says — that the peace officer is aware that
the accused has committed an offense, in this case, membership in a
subversive organization with intent to further the objectives thereof. It is to be
noted that prior to their amendment, the Rules (then Section 6) spoke of
simple "reasonable ground" — which would have arguably encompassed
"actual belief or suspicion . . . coupled with good faith" referred to by the
majority. Section 5(b) as amended, however, speaks of "personal
knowledge"; I respectfully submit that to give to "personal knowledge" the
same meaning as "reasonable ground" is to make the amendment as useless
exercise.

What, furthermore, we have here was a mere "confidential information" that

a "sparrow man" had been wounded and was recuperating in the hospital,
and that that person was Rolando Dural. Clearly, what we have is second-
hand, indeed, hearsay, information, and needless to say, not personal
knowledge.

I would like to point out that in the case of People vs. Burgos 7 this Court
rejected a similar arrest because of lack of personal knowledge, and, as the
Court held, "[w]hatever knowledge was possessed by the arresting officers
came in its entirety from the information furnished by [another] . . ." 8 I do not
see how We can act differently here.

I do not find the majority's reliance on the case of United States vs.
Santos 9 to be well-taken. Santos involved a prosecution for coercion (against
a peace officer for affecting an arrest without a warrant). Santos, however,
did in fact affirm the illegality of the arrest but absolved the peace officer on
grounds of good faith. Santos did not say that so long as he, the peace officer,
was acting in good faith, as the majority here says that the military was acting
in good faith, the arrest is valid. Quite to the contrary, Santos suggested that
notwithstanding good faith on the part of the police, the arrest is nevertheless
subject to question.
As far as the information leading to the arrest of Dural is concerned, the
majority would quite evidently swallow the version of the military as if in the
first place, there truly was an information, and that it was reliable, and that "it
was found to be true;" 10 and as if, in the second place, the hospital authorities
(the alleged informants) could have legally tipped the military under existing
laws. We have, it should be noted, previously rejected such a species of
information because of the lack of "compulsion for [the informant] to state
truthfully his charges under pain of criminal prosecution." 11 Here, it is worse,
because we do not even know who that informant was.

The majority is apparently unaware that under Executive Order No. 212,
amending Presidential Decree No. 169, hospital establishments are required
to report cases of acts of violence to "government health authorities" — not
to the military.

I am concerned that if the military were truly armed with reliable information
and if it did have personal knowledge to believe that Dural had committed an
offense, there was no reason for the military to ignore the courts, to which
the Constitution after all, gives the authority to issue warrants. As People vs.
Burgos held:

More important, we find no compelling reason for the haste with which the
arresting officers sought to arrest the accused. We fail to see why they failed
to first go through the process of obtaining a warrant of arrest, if indeed they
had reasonable ground to believe that the accused had truly committed a
crime. There is no showing that there was a real apprehension that the
accused was on the verge of flight or escape. Likewise, there is no showing
that the whereabouts of the accused were unknown. 12

I do not likewise see how the petitioners Amelia Roque, Wilfredo Buenaobra, Domingo Anonuevo, Ramon Caspile,
and Vicky Ocaya (G.R. Nos. 84581-82; 83162) could have been lawfully picked up under similar circumstances. As
the majority points out, the military had (again) acted on a mere tip-the military had no personal knowledge (as I
elaborated what personal knowledge means). Second, I do not think that the majority can say that since Amelia
Roque, et al. "were NPA's anyway" (As Roque, et al. allegedly admitted), immediate arrests were "prudent" and
necessary. As I said, that Roque, et al. were admitted "NPA's" is (was) the question before the trial court and
precisely, the subject of controversy. I think it is imprudent for this Court to pass judgment on the guilt of the
petitioners-since after all, and as the majority points out, we are talking simply of the legality of the petitioner's arrests.

More important, that Roque, et al. "were NPA's anyway" is evidently, a mere say-so of the military, and evidently, the
Court is not bound by bare say-so's. Evidently, we can not approve an arrest simply because the military says it is a
valid arrest (the accused being "NPA's anyway")— that would be abdication of judicial duty and when, moreover, the
very basis of the claim rests on dubious "confidential information."

According to the majority, we are speaking of simple arrests; we are not talking of the guilt or innocence of the
accused. I certainly hope not, after the majority referred to Rolando Dural as a "sparrow man" and having Amelia
Roque, et al. admit to being NPA's."

It is to gloss over at any rate, the nature of arrest as a restraining on liberty. It is to me immaterial that the guilt of the
accused still has to be established, since meanwhile, the accused are in fact being deprived of liberty. Arrest to me,
is something to crow about, even if in the opinion of the majority, it is nothing to crow about (a mere "administrative
measure").

I can not, again, accept the validity of the arrests of Deogracia Espiritu or Narciso Nazareno (G.R. Nos. 85727;
86332). Espiritu was supposedly picked up for inciting to sedition, in uttering supposedly, on November 22, 1988, the
following:

Bukas tuloy and welga natin . . . hanggang sa magkagulo na. 13

Espiritu however was arrested on November 23, 1988, a day later-and in no way is "inciting to sedition" a continuing
offense. Obviously, the majority is not saying that it is either, but that:

. . . Many persons may differ as to the validity of such perception and regard the language as falling within free speech guaranteed by the Constitution. But, then, Espiritu has not lost the
right to insist, during the trial on the merits, that he was just exercising his right to free speech regardless of the charged atmosphere in which it was uttered. But, the authority of the peace
officers to make the arrest, without warrant, at the time the words were uttered, or soon thereafter, is still another thing. In the balancing of authority and freedom, which obviously becomes
difficult at times, the Court has, in this case, titled the scale in favor of authority but only for purposes of the arrest (not conviction). Let it be noted that the Court has ordered the bail for
Espiritu's release to be reduced from P60,000.00 to P10,000.00. 14
And obviously, the majority is concerned about whether or not Espiritu's speech was after all, protected speech, but apparently, that is also of no moment, since: (1) that is a matter of

defense; (2) we are talking of mere arrests, and as far as arrests are concerned, "the Court has, in this case, titled in favor of authority," 15 and (3) we have,
anyway, given a reduced bail to the accused.

First, that the accused's statement is in the category of free speech is not
only plain to my mind, it is a question I do not think the majority can rightly
evade in these petitions without shirking the Court's constitutional duty. It is
to my mind plain, because it does not contain enough "fighting words"
recognized to be seditious. 16 Secondly, it is the very question before the
Court—whether or not the statement in question constitutes an offense for
purposes of a warrantless arrest. It is a perfectly legal question to my mind
and I am wondering why we can not answer it.

What the majority has not answered, as I indicated, is that inciting to sedition
is in no way a continuing offense, and as I said, the majority is not apparently
convicted that it is, either. Of course, the majority would anyway force the
issue: "But the authority of the peace officers to make the arrest, without
warrant, at the time the words were uttered, or soon thereafter, is still another
thing." 17 First, Espiritu was picked up the following day, and in no way is "the
following day" "soon thereafter". Second, we would have stretched the
authority of peace officers to make warrantless arrests for acts done days
before. I do not think this is the contemplation of the Rules of Court.

As in the case of Burgos in People vs. Burgos, 18 Espiritu was neither "on the
verge of flight or escape" 19 and there was no impediment for the military to
go through the judicial processes, as there was none in the case of Burgos.

In the case of People vs. Aminnudin, 20 this Court held that unless there "was
a crime about to be committed or had just been committed," and unless there
existed an urgency as where a moving vehicle is involved, instant police
action can not be justified.

"In the balancing of authority and freedom," states the majority, "the Court
has, in this case, titled in favor of authority but only for purposes of the arrest
(not conviction)." 21 It is a strange declaration, first, because it is supported by
no authority (why the Court should "tilt" on the side of Government), and
second, because this Court has leaned, by tradition, on the side of liberty —
as the custodian of the Bill of Rights — even if we were talking of "simple"
arrests.

I do not understand why this Court should "tilt" . . . the scale in favor of
authority . . . in this case," 22 as if to say that normally, this Court would have
tilted the scales the other way. I do not understand why these cases are
apparently, special cases, and apparently, the majority is not telling us
neither. I am wondering why, apart from the fact that these cases involved,
incidentally, people who think differently from the rest of us.

The majority goes on:

Although the killing of Bunye II occurred on 14 December 1988, while

Nazareno's arrest without warrant was made only on 28 December 1988, or
14 days later, the arrest falls under Section 5(b) of Rule 113, since it was only
on 28 December 1988 that the police authorities came to know that Nazareno
was probably one of those guilty in the killing of Bunye II. 23

With all due respect, I do not think that the majority is aware of the serious implications of its pronouncement on
individual rights (and statutory construction in general), and I feel I am appropriately concerned because as a member
of the Court, I am co-responsible for the acts of my colleagues and I am afraid that I may, rightly or wrongly, be in
time made to defend such an indefensible pronouncement.

Section 5(b) of Rule 113 is clear and categorical: the offense must have been "just committed" and the authorities
must have "personal knowledge."

In no way can an offense be said to have been "just committed" fourteen days after it was in fact (allegedly) committed.
In no way can the authorities be said to have "personal knowledge" two weeks thereafter; whatever "personal
knowledge" they have can not possibly be "personal knowledge" of a crime that had "just been committed;" whatever
"personal knowledge" they have is necessarily "personal knowledge" of a crime committed two weeks before.

In no way can Nazareno's arrest be said to be an arrest sanctioned by the exceptional provisions of the Rules.
I am not saying that the military can not act in all cases, and it is sheer ignorance to suppose that I am saying it, (or
worse, that I am "coddling criminals"). I am not saying that a suspected criminal, if he can not be arrested without a
warrant, can not be arrested at all — but that the military should first procure a warrant from a judge before effecting
an arrest. It is not too much to ask of so-called law enforcers.

As it is, the majority has enlarged the authority of peace officers to act, when the Rules have purposely limited it by way of an exception, precisely, to the general rule, mandated by the
Constitution no less, that arrests may be done only through a judicial warrant. As it is, the majority has in fact given the military the broadest discretion to act, a discretion the law denies

— today it is fourteen days, tomorrow, one year, and sooner, a

even judges 24

decade. I submit that a year, a decade, would not be in fact unreasonable,

following the theory of the majority, since the military can claim anytime that
it "found out only later," as the majority did not find it unreasonable for
the Capital Command to claim that it"came to know that Nazareno was
probably one of those guilty in the killing of Bunye II" 25—and none of us can
possibly dispute it.

I would like to stress strongly that we are not talking of a simple

"administrative measure" alone—we are talking of arrests, of depriving
people of liberty—even if we are not yet talking of whether or not people are
guilty. That we are not concerned with guilt or innocence is hardly the point,
I respectfully submit, and it will not minimize the significance of the petitioners'
predicament.

With respect to Wilfredo Buenaobra, I submit that the majority has, as in the
cases of Amelia Roque, et al., ignored the fact that Buenaobra's alleged
"admission" (actually, an uncounselled confession) was precisely, the basis
for Buenaobra's arrest. It is to beg the question, I respectfully submit, to
approve the military's action for the reason that Buenaobra confessed,
because Buenaobra confessed for the reason that the military, precisely,
pounced on him. I am not to be mistaken for prejudging Buenaobra's
innocence (although it is supposed to be presumed) but I can not imagine
that Buenaobra would have voluntarily proclaimed to the military that he was
an NPA courier so that the military could pounce on him.

I respectfully submit that the cases Garcia vs. Padilla 26 and Ilagan vs.
Enrile 27 have been better days. I do not see how this court can continuously
sustain them "where national security and stability are still directly challenged
perhaps with greater vigor from the communist rebels." 28 First and foremost,
and as the majority has conceded, we do not know if we are in fact dealing
with "Communists." The case of Deogracias Espiritu, for one, hardly involves
subversion. Second, "Communism" and "national security" are old hat — the
dictator's own excuses to perpetuate tyranny, and I am genuinely
disappointed that we would still fall for old excuses. Third, Garcia and Ilagan
rested on supposed grounds that can not be possibly justified in a regime
that respects the rule of law — that the Presidential Commitment Order
(PCO) is a valid presidential document (Garcia) and that the filing of an
information cures a defective arrest (Ilagan). Fourth and finally, it is evident
that neither "Communist threat" nor "national security" are valid grounds for
warrantless arrests under Section 5(b) of Rule 113.

I most respectfully submit that Garcia and Ilagan have not only been diluted
by subsequent jurisprudence (e.g., People vs. Burgos, supra), they are relics
of authoritarian rule that can no longer be defended, if they could have been
defended, in Plaza Miranda or before our own peers in the bar.

"What is important," says the majority, "is that every arrest without warrant
be tested as to its legality, via habeas corpus proceedings." 29 I supposed that
goes without saying. But it is also to patronize the petitioners and simply, to
offer a small consolation, when after all, this Court is validating their
continued detention. 30 With all due respect, I submit that it is nothing for which
the public should be elated.

A Final Word

As I began my dissent, in this Resolution and the Decision sought to be

reconsidered, I reiterate one principle: The State has no right to bother
citizens without infringing their right against arbitrary State action. "The right
of the people," states the Constitution, "to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searchers and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable . . . ." 31 "The State,"
the Charter likewise states, "values the dignity of every human person and
guarantees full respect for human rights." 32 The Constitution states the
general rule — the majority would make the exception the rule, and the rule
the exception. With all due respect, this is not what constitutionalism is all
about.

I submit that the "actual facts and circumstances" the majority refers to are,
in the first place, doubtful, the "actual facts and circumstances" being no more
than "confidential information" (manufactured or genuine, we have no way of
telling) and in the second place, any information with which the military (or
police) were armed could no more than be hearsay, not personal,
information. I submit that the "actual facts and circumstances" the majority
insists on can not justify the arrests in question under Section 5(b) of Rule
113, the rule the majority insists is the applicable rule.

Apparently, Section 5(b) is not the applicable rule, as far as Deogracias

Espiritu and Narciso Nazareno are concerned; certainly, it is not the Section
5(b) I know. As I indicated, Espiritu was arrested one day after the act,
allegedly, inciting to sedition; Nazareno was picked up fourteen days after it
(allegedly, murder). Yet, the majority would approve the police's actions
nonetheless because the police supposedly "found out only later." I submit
that the majority has read into Section 5(b) a provision that has not been
written there.

"More than the allure of popularity of palatability to some groups," concludes

the majority, "what is important is that the Court be right." 33

Nobody has suggested in the first place, that Umil was and is a question of popularity or palatability. Umil is a question,
on the contrary, of whether or not the military (or police), in effecting the arrests assailed, had complied with the
requirements of law on warrantless arrests. Umil is a question of whether or not this Court, in approving the military's
actions, is right.

In spite of "EDSA", a climate of fear persists in the country, as incidences of disappearances, torture, hamletting,
bombings, saturation drives, and various human rights violations increase in alarming rates. In its update for October,
1990, the Task Force Detainees of the Philippines found:

An average of 209 arrested for political reasons monthly since 1988, 94% of them illegally;

Four thousand four hundred eight (4,408) political detentions from January, 1989 to September, 1990, 4,419, illegally;
Of those arrested, 535 showed signs of torture; 280 were eventually salvaged, 40, of frustrated salvage, and 109
remained missing after their arrest;

Forty (40) cases of massacres, with 218 killed; 54 cases of frustrated massacre, in which 157 were wounded;

The victims belonged to neighborhood and union organizations;

Since February, 1986, 532 of those illegally arrested were women;

From January to June 1990, 361 children were detained for no apparent reason;

One million ten thousand four hundred nine (1,010,409) have been injured as a consequence of bombing, shellings, and food blockades undertaken by the military since 1988. 34

It is a bleak picture, and I am disturbed that this Court should express very little concern. I am also disappointed that
it is the portrait of the Court I am soon leaving. Nonetheless, I am hopeful that despite my departure, it will not be too
late.

Motions denied.
G.R. No. L-61388 April 20, 1983

IN THE ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS FOR DR.

AURORA PARONG, NORBERTO PORTUGUESE, SABINO PADILLA,
FRANCIS DIVINAGRACIA, IMELDA DE LOS SANTOS, BENJAMIN
PINEDA, ZENAIDA MALLARI, MARIANO SORIANO, TITO TANGUILIG,
LETTY BALLOGAN, BIENVENIDA GARCIA, EUFRONIO ORTIZ. JR.,
JUANITO GRANADA and TOM VASQUEZ. JOSEFINA GARCIA-
PADILLA, petitioner,
vs.
MINISTER JUAN PONCE ENRILE, GEN, FABIAN C. VER, GEN. FIDEL
V. RAMOS, and FIDEL V. RAMOS, and LT. COL. MIGUEL
CORONEL, respondents.

Lorenzo M. Tanada, Jose W. Diokno, Joker P. Arroyo, Efren M Mercado

and Alexander Padilla for petitioner.

The Solicitor General for respondents.

DE CASTRO, J.:

Petition for a writ of habeas corpus and mandamus seeking the following
relief:

WHEREFORE, petitioners pray this Honorable Court:

1. To immediately issue a writ of habeas corpus directing respondents to

appear and produce the bodies of Dr. AURORA PARONG, NORBERTO
PORTUGUESE, SABINO PADILLA, FRANCIS DIVINAGRACIA, IMELDA
DE LOS SANTOS, BENJAMIN PINEDA, ZENAIDA MALLARI, MARIANO
SORIANO, TITO TANGUILIG, LETTY BALLOGAN, BIENVENIDA GARCIA,
EUFRONIO ORTIZ, JR., JUANITO GRANADA and TOM VASQUEZ,
forthwith before this Honorable Court and to make due return of the writ
therewith;

2. To issue, in addition or in the alternative to the writ of habeas corpus, a

writ of mandamus compelling the respondents to disclose the petitioners'
present place of detention and to order the respondents to allow counsel and
relatives to visit and confer with the petitioners;

3. Pending the determination of the legality of their continued detention, to

forthwith release the detainees on bail upon such terms and conditions as
the Court may fix, and after hearing, to order petitioners' immediate release;
and

4. To grant petitioners such other and further relief as may be deemed just
and equitable in the premises.

The records show that nine (9) of the fourteen (14) detainees herein were
arrested on July 6, 1982 at about 1:45 p.m. when three (3) teams of the
PC/INP of Bayombong, Nueva Viscaya led by Lt. Col. Coronel, lst Lt. de
Guzman and lst Lt. Baria, after securing a Search Warrant No. S-82 issued
by Judge Sofronio Sayo of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Viscaya
conducted a raid at the residence of Dra. Aurora Parong. Apprehended
during the said raid were Dra. Aurora Parong, Benjamin Pineda, Sabino
Padilla, Francisco Divinagracia, Zenaida Mallari, Letty Ballogan, Norberto
Portuguese, and Mariano Soriano who were then having a conference in the
dining room of Dra. Parong's residence which had been doing on since 10:00
a.m. of that same day.

The other four (4) detainees herein, namely: Imelda de los Santos, Eufronio
Ortiz, Jr., Juanita Granada, and Bienvenida Garcia, were arrested on the
following day, July 7, 1982 by the same PC teams.

On July 15, 1982, Tom Vasquez was arrested, and his Volkswagen car,
bearing Plate No. DAP 347, was seized by the PC authorities.

The herein fourteen (14) detainees (hereafter referred to sometimes as

petitioners) were all detained at the PC/INP Command Headquarters,
Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya from July 6, 1982 until their transfer on the
morning of August 10, 1982 to an undisclosed place reportedly to Camp
Crame, Quezon City, to Echague, Isabela, and to Tuguegarao, Cagayan.

Hence, this petition for the writ of habeas corpus and mandamus filed by
Josefina Garcia-Padilla, mother of detained petitioner Sabino G. Padilla, Jr.
on August 13, 1982. The mandamus aspect of the instant petition has,
however, become moot and academic, and whereabouts of petitioners
having already become known to petitioner Josefina Garcia-Padilla.

It is alleged in the petition that the arrest of petitioners was patently unlawful
and illegal since it was effected without any warrant of arrest; that the PC/INP
raiding team which made the arrest were only armed with a search warrant
(No. 3-82) issued by Judge Sofronio G. Sayo of the Court of First Instance of
Nueva Viscaya, and nowhere in said warrant was authority given to make
arrests, much less detention; that the search warrant which authorized
respondents to seize "subversive documents, firearms of assorted calibers,
medicine and other subversive paraphernalia" in the house and clinic of Dra.
Aurora Parong was a roving and general warrant and is, therefore, illegal per
se because it does not state specifically the things that are to be seized
(Stonehill vs. Diokno, 20 SCRA 383); that no criminal charges have as of yet
been filed against any of the detainees; that the fourteen (14) detainees were
initially held at the PC/INP Command in Bayombong, Nueva Viscaya from
July 6 up to August 10, 1982, but were subsequently transferred by helicopter
in the morning of August 10, 1982 to a place or safehouse known only to
respondents; that there is no judgment, decree, decision or order from a court
of law which would validate the continued detention of the petitioner; that
while it is true that a purported telegram stating the issuance of a Presidential
Commitment Order (PCO) was shown to the detainees on or about July 11
and 12, 1982, but counsel and the detainees have not yet been given a copy
of such PCO nor notified of its contents, raising a doubt whether such
commitment order has in fact been issued.

It is further alleged that respondents are denying the detainees their

constitutional right to counsel, averring that the detainees were allowed
regular visits by counsel and relatives during their period of detention from
July 6 to August 10, 1982 at the PC/INP Command in Bayombong, Nueva
Viscaya; however, when a certain Major Cristobal and Lt. Marcos (alleged to
be from the Camp Crame Intelligence Units) took full control of the
investigation, counsels were allowed to visit only on weekends; that when the
detainees were transferred on August 10, 1982 to a place known only to
respondents, the detainees' counsels and relatives were not notified, raising
the apprehension that petitioners' constitutional rights to silence, to counsel
and against self- incrimination are being violated; that counsels have tried to
locate if the detainees were taken to Camp Crame or Camp Bago Bantay but
to no avail; that Major Forondo of the PC Command in Nueva Viscaya
informed Mrs. Josefina Padilla that the detainees were transferred to
Tuguegarao, Cagayan, others to Echague, Isabela; that there seems to be a
deliberate and concerted effort by respondents to conceal from counsel and
relatives the detainees' place of detention, raising the apprehension that
respondents are using force, violence, threat, intimidation and other means
which vitiate free will to obtain confession and statements from the detainees
in violation of their constitutional rights.

In the resolution of this Court en banc dated August 17, 1982, the writ of
habeas corpus was issued and respondents were required to make a return
of the writ. Hearing on the petition was set on August 26, 1982.

In the return to the writ filed on August 23, 1982. respondents, through the
Solicitor General, alleged, to wit:
I. AS TO HABEAS CORPUS

1. The detainees mentioned in the petition, with the exception of Tom

Vasquez who was temporarily released on July 17, 1982, after his arrest on
July 15, 1982, are all being detained by virtue of a Presidential Commitment
Order (PCO) issued on July 12, 1982, pursuant to LOI No. 1211 dated March
9, 1982, in relation to Presidential Proclamation No. 2045 dated January 17,
1981. The said PCO was issued by President Ferdinand E. Marcos for
violation of P.D. No. 885. ...

2. The corresponding charges against the said detainees have been filed in
court and before the Acting Provincial Fiscal of Nueva Viscaya where they
are pleading. A warrant of arrest against detainee Dra. Aurora Parong was
issued on August 4, 1982, by the Municipal Court of Bayombong, for illegal
possession of firearm and ammunition. ...

II. AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE ON HABEAS CORPUS

3. The persons named in the above-mentioned Presidential Commitment

Order were arrested and are being detained for offenses with respect to
which under Proclamation No. 2045, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
continues to be suspended, thus:

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President/Prime Minister

of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution,
do hereby revoke Proclamation No. 1081 (Proclaiming a state of Martial Law
in the Philippines) and Proclamation No. 1104 (Declaring the Continuation of
Martial Law) and proclaim the termination of the state of martial law
throughout the Philippines; Provided, that the call to the Armed Forces of the
Philippines to prevent or suppress lawless violence, insurrection, rebellion
and subversion shall continue to be in force and effect; and Provided that in
the two autonomous regions in Mindanao, upon the request of the residents
therein, the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shag
continue; and in all other places the suspension of the privilege of the writ
shall also continue with respect to persons at present detained as well as
others who may hereafter be similarly detained for the crimes of insurrection
or rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposals to commit such crimes, and
for all other crimes and offenses committed by them in furtherance or on the
occasion thereof, or incident thereto, or in connection therewith. (Emphasis
supplied)

The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is unavailing as to them. Courts

cannot inquire into the validity and cause of their arrest and detention.

4. The power of the President in an emergency, such as that which

necessitated the continued suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, to order the detention of persons believed engaged in crimes related
to national security is recognized. (Aquino vs. Enrile, 59 SCRA 83; Luneta,
et al. vs. Special Military Commission, No. 1, et al., 102 SCRA 56).

5. In the instant petition, petitioner Josefina Garcia-Padilla does not appear

to have been authorized by the thirteen (13) other detainees to represent
them in the case at bar."

Accordingly, the petition was duly heard on August 26, 1982. After hearing,
the Court issued the following resolution, to wit:

G.R. No. 61388 (In the Matter of the Petition for the Insurance of the Writ of
Habeas Corpus of Dr. Aurora Parong, Norberto Portuguese, Sabino Padilla,
Francis Divinagracia, Imelda de los Santos, Benjamin Pineda, Zenaida
Mallari, Mariano Soriano, Tito Tanguilig, Letty Ballogan, Bienvenida Garcia,
Eufronio Ortiz, Jr., Juanito Granada and Tom Vasquez; Josefina Garcia-
Padilla vs. Minister Juan Ponce Enrile, Gen. Fabian C. Ver, Gen. Fidel V.
Ramos and Lt. Col. Miguel Coronel.)- The return of the writ of habeas corpus
and answer to the prayer for mandamus filed by the Solicitor General for
respondents in compliance with the resolution of August 17, 1982 is NOTED.

At the hearing of this case this morning, former Senator Jose W. Diokno,
Attorneys Alexander A. Padilla and Efren H. Mercado appeared for petitioner.
Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza and Assistant Solicitor General Ramon
A. Barcelona, appeared for the respondents. All of the detainees, except Tom
Vasquez, who was temporarily released on July 17, 1982, were present in
Court; Dr. Aurora Parong, Norberto Portuguese, Sabino Padilla, Francis
Divinagracia, Imelda de los Santos, Benjamin Pineda, Zenaida Mallari,
Mariano Soriano, Tito Tanguilig, Letty Ballogan, Bienvenida Garcia, Eufronio
Ortiz, Jr. and Juanito Granada. Attorney Alexander A. Padilla argued for the
petitioner. Solicitor General Mendoza argued for the respondents. Former
Senator Diokno argued in the rebuttal. The Court Resolved to require the
Solicitor General to SUBMIT within five (5) days from date the documents
relevant to the issuance of the Presidential Commitment Order. Thereafter,
the case shall be considered SUBMITTED for resolution.

As required, the Solicitor General submitted the documents relevant to the

issuance of the Presidential Commitment Order on August 27, 1982, after
which the case was submitted for resolution.

The fundamental issue here, as in all petitioner for the writ of habeas corpus,
is whether or not petitioners' detention is legal. We have carefully gone over
the claims of the parties in their respective pleadings as well as in the oral
argument during the hearing on August 26, 1982, and We find that petitioners
have not been illegally deprived of their constitutional right to liberty, neither
in the manner of their arrest, nor by their continued detention, and that the
circumstances attendant in the herein case do not warrant their release on a
writ of habeas corpus.

1. At the time of the arrest of the nine (9) of the fourteen (14) detainees herein
on July 6, 1982, records reveal that they were then having conference in the
dining room of Dra. Parong's residence from 10:00 a.m. of that same day.
Prior thereto, all the fourteen (14) detainees were under surveillance as they
were then Identified as members of the Communist Party of the Philippines
(CPP) engaging in subversive activities and using the house of detainee Dra.
Aurora Parong in Bayombong, Nueva Viscaya, as their headquarters. Caught
in flagrante delicto, the nine (9) detainees mentioned scampered towards
different directions leaving in top of their conference table numerous
subversive documents, periodicals, pamphlets, books, correspondence,
stationaries, and other papers, including a plan on how they would infiltrate
the youth and student sector (code-named YORK). Also found were one
(1) .38 cal. revolver with eight (8) live bullets, nineteen (19) rounds of
ammunition for M16 armalite, eighteen thousand six hundred fifty pesos
(P18,650.00) cash believed to be CPP/NPA funds, assorted medicine
packed and ready for distribution, as sizeable quantity of printing
paraphernalia, which were then seized. There is no doubt that circumstances
attendant in the arrest of the herein detainees fall under a situation where
arrest is lawful even without a judicial warrant as specifically provided for
under Section 6(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court and allowed under existing
jurisprudence on the matter. As provided therein, a peace officer or a private
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person when the person to be
arrested has committed or actually committing, or is about to commit an
offense in his presence.

From the facts as above narrated, the claim of the petitioners that they were
initially arrested illegally is, therefore, without basis in law and in fact. The
crimes of insurrection or rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to
commit such crimes, and other crimes and offenses committed in the
furtherance on the occasion thereof, or incident thereto, or in connection
therewith under Presidential Proclamation No. 2045, are all in the nature of
continuing offenses which set them apart from the common offenses, aside
from their essentially involving a massive conspiracy of nationwide
magnitude. Clearly then, the arrest of the herein detainees was well within
the bounds of the law and existing jurisprudence in our jurisdiction.

2. The arrest of persons involved in the rebellion whether as its fighting armed
elements, or for committing non-violent acts but in furtherance of the
rebellion, is more an act of capturing them in the course of an armed conflict,
to quell the rebellion, than for the purpose of immediately prosecuting them
in court for a statutory offense. The arrest, therefore, need not follow the
usual procedure in the prosecution of offenses which requires the
determination by a judge of the existence of probable cause before the
issuance of a judicial warrant of arrest and the granting of bail if the offense
is bailable. Obviously, the absence of a judicial warrant is no legal
impediment to arresting or capturing persons committing overt acts of
violence against government forces, or any other milder acts but equally in
pursuance of the rebellious movement. The arrest or capture is thus impelled
by the exigencies of the situation that involves the very survival of society
and its government and duly constituted authorities. If killing and other acts
of violence against the rebels find justification in the exigencies of armed
hostilities which is of the essence of waging a rebellion or insurrection, most
assuredly so in case of invasion, merely seizing their persons and detaining
them while any of these contingencies continues cannot be less justified. In
the language of Moyer vs. Peabody, 1 cited with approval in Aquino, et al. vs.
Ponce Enrile, 2 the President " shall make the ordinary use of the soldiers to
that end that he may kill persons who resist, and, of course, that he may use
the milder measure of seizing the bodies of those whom he considers to
stand in the way of restoring peace. Such arrests are not necessarily for
punishment, but are by way of precaution, to prevent the exercise of hostile
power."

Thus characterized, the arrest and detention of persons ordered by the

President through the issuance of Presidential Commitment Order PCO is
merely preventive. "When it comes to a decision by the head of the State
upon a matter involving its life, the ordinary rights of individuals must yield to
what he deems the necessities of the moment. Public danger warrants the
substitution of executive process for judicial process." 3 What should be
underscored is that if the greater violation against life itself such as killing,
will not be the subject of judicial inquiry, as it cannot be raised as
transgressing against the due process clause that protects life, liberty and
property, lesser violations against liberty, such as arrest and detention, may
not be insisted upon as reviewable by the courts.

3. Transcendentally important, therefore, is the question of whether the

issuance of a Presidential Commitment Order (PCO) has provided the legal
basis of the detention of herein detainees following their arrest for
Proclamation No. 2045 covered offenses. This question has to be set at rest
promptly and decisively, if We are to break a seemingly continuous flow of
petitions for habeas corpus, as what had been seen lately of such petitioners
being filed in this Court one after the other.

The function of the PCO is to validate, on constitutional ground, the detention

of a person for any of the offenses covered by Proclamation No. 2045 which
continues in force the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus,
if the arrest has been made initially without any warrant, its legal effect is to
render the writ unavailing as a means of judicially inquiring into the legality of
the detention in view of the suspension of the privilege of the writ. The grant
of the power to suspend the said privilege provides the basis for continuing
with perfect legality the detention as long as the invasion or rebellion has not
been repelled or quelled, and the need therefor in the interest of public safety
continues.

The significance of the conferment of this power, constitutionally upon the

President as Commander-in-Chief, is that the exercise thereof is not subject
to judicial inquiry, with a view to determining its legality in the light of the bill
of rights guarantee to individual freedom. This must be so because the
suspension of the privilege is a military measure the necessity of which the
President alone may determine as an incident of his grave responsibility as
the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, of protecting not only public
safety but the very life of the State, the government and duly constituted
authorities. This should be clear beyond doubt in the case of "invasion," along
which "rebellion" or "insurrection" is mentioned by the Constitution, which
contingency does not present a legal question on whether there is a violation
of the right to personal liberty when any member of the invading force is
captured and detained.

The presidential responsibility is one attended with all urgency when so grave
a peril to the life of the Nation besets the country in times of the
aforementioned contingencies. In the discharge of this awesome and sacred
responsibility, the President should be free from interference. The existence
of warlike conditions as are created by invasion, rebellion or insurrection, the
direst of all emergencies that can possibly confront a nation, argues, beyond
dispute, against subjecting his actions in this regard to judicial inquiry or
interference from whatever source. If freedom from judicial review is
conceded in the exercise of his peacetime powers as that of appointment and
of granting pardon, denominated as political powers of the President, it
should incontestably be more so with his wartime power, as it were, to adopt
any measure in dealing with situations calling for military action as in case of
invasion, rebellion or insurrection.

The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is one such
measure. To be effective, the occasion for its application on specific
individuals should be left to the exclusive and sound judgment of the
President, at least while the exigencies of invasion, rebellion or insurrection
persist, and the public safety requires it, a matter, likewise, which should be
left for the sole determination of the President as Commander-in-Chief of the
Nation's armed forces. The need for a unified command in such
contingencies is imperative-even axiomatic-as a basic military concept in the
art of warfare.

4. From the clear language of the Lansang case, 4 "the function of Court is
merely to check — not to supplant — the Executive, or to ascertain merely
whether he has gone beyond the constitutional limits of his jurisdiction, not to
exercise the power vested in him or to determine the wisdom of his act. " If,
however, the constitutional right to bail is granted to the herein petitioners by
the court, through the procedure laid down under Rule 114 of the Rules of
court, what inevitably results is the supplanting of the decision of the
President to detain pursuant to Proclamation No. 2045, of persons who come
under its coverage.

The specific mention in the Constitution of rebellion and insurrection along

with invasion and imminent danger thereof, shows that the terms "rebellion
and insurrection" are used therein in the sense of a state or condition of the
Nation, not in the concept of a statutory offense. What, therefore, should
determine the legality of imposing what is commonly referred to as
"preventive detention" resulting from the suspension of the privilege
of habeas corpus, is the necessity of its adoption as a measure to suppress
or quell the rebellion, or beat off an invasion. The necessity for such measure
as a means of defense for national survival quite clearly transcends in
importance and urgency the claim of those detained to the right to bail to
obtain their freedom. To hold otherwise would defeat the purpose of the
constitutional grant of the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus on the occasions expressly mentioned in the charter. For what indeed
could the purpose be of suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
other than to restrict, at least for the duration of the emergency of invasion or
rebellion, the right to personal liberty, dictated as it is, in the greater interest
of public safety and national security.

So it is that Proclamation No. 2045 mentions not only rebellion or insurrection

as coming within the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus,
but also other offenses, including subversion which is not mentioned in the
Constitution, committed by reason or on the occasion of the rebellion, or in
connection therewith, or in the furtherance thereof. There need be no alarm
over what libertarian jurists fear as violation of the constitutional right to
personal liberty when the President decrees the suspension of the privilege
of habeas corpus. Only those who give cause for it will be subject to
restriction of their liberty, as the necessity therefor arises in the interest of
national defense and survival. The constitutional guarantee of individual
freedom is intact in all its plenitude and sanctity, save only as the Constitution
has envisioned the need for its limitation, and only to a few, in relation to the
entire population, as the Constitution itself permits in case of overwhelming
and imperious necessity.

5. Worthy of profound notice and keen appreciation is the fact that the
authority to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus has been
deliberately vested on the President as the Commander-in-Chief of the
armed forces, together with the related power to call out the armed forces to
suppress lawless violence and impose martial law. 5The choice could not
have been more wise and sound, for no other official may, with equal
capability and fitness, be entrusted with the grave responsibility that goes
with the grant of the authority. The legislature was considered in the
alternative upon which to lodge the power, or to share in its exercise, but the
distilled wisdom of the Constitutional Convention finally made its choice for
the President alone.

As previously noted, "invasion" which is not a statutorily-defined offense and

"imminent danger thereof" as mentioned in the Constitution indicate that
"rebellion and insurrection" are also mentioned therein not in their concept as
statutorily-defined public crimes, but as a state or condition of extreme
emergency resulting from the existence of the aforesaid events. Now, if
captured enemies from the invading force may not be charged with any
statutory offense that would provide the occasion to demand the right to bail,
it is obvious that persons engaged in rebellion or insurrection may not claim
the right to be released on bail when similarly captured or arrested during the
continuance of the aforesaid contingency. They may not even claim the right
to be charged immediately in court, as they may rightfully do so, were they
being charged with an ordinary or common offense. This is so because
according to legal writers or publicists, the suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus "has the sole effect of allowing the executive to defer
the trials of persons charged with certain offenses during the period of
emergency." 6 This clearly means denial of the right to be released on bail on
being charged in court with bailable offenses.

The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus must, indeed,
carry with it the suspension of the right to bail, if the government's campaign
to suppress the rebellion is to be enhanced and rendered effective. If the right
to bail may be demanded during the continuance of the rebellion, and those
arrested, captured and detained in the course thereof will be released, they
would, without the least doubt, rejoin their comrades in the field thereby
jeopardizing the success of government efforts to bring to an end the
invasion, rebellion or insurrection.

Realistically, a person engaged in the rebellion does not, upon being arrested
or captured, cease to be as committed to the cause of the movement.
Through a grand conspiracy, as is of the essence of how rebellion is
committed, involving a great mass of confederates bound together by a
common goal, he remains in a state of continued participation in the criminal
act or design. His heart still beats with the same emotion for the success of
the movement of which he continues to be an ardent adherent and ally. It is
simple logic then to hold that there should be no legal compulsion for a
captured rebel to be charged in court, only to be released on bail, while he
is, realistically and legally, still as much as part and parcel of the movement,
continuing as it is, as those still engaged in carrying on actively to attain their
goal of overthrowing the established regime. Hence, it is easy to perceive
how impressed with absolute verity is the opinion expressed by two
acknowledged authorities on Constitutional law in our country, 7 which We
quote:

... If the return to the writ shows that the person in custody was apprehended
and detained in areas where the privileges of the writ have been suspended
or for the crimes mentioned in the executive proclamation, the court will
suspend further proceedings in the action.

Impeccable as it is, the opinion could not but find a resonant echo as it did in
the recent case of Buscayno vs. Military Commission; 8 decided after
Proclamation No. 2045 was issued, which in terms clear and categorical, held
that the constitutional right to bail is unavailing when the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus is suspended with respect to certain crimes as enumerated
or described in the abovementioned Proclamation.

It is, likewise, all too well-known that when the rebel forces capture
government troopers or kidnap private individuals, they do not accord to them
any of the rights now being demanded by the herein petitioners, particularly
to be set at liberty upon the filing of bail. As a matter of common knowledge,
captives of the rebels or insurgents are not only not given the right to be
released, but also denied trial of any kind. In some instances, they may even
be liquidated unceremoniously. What is then sought by the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is, among others, to put the government
forces on equal fighting terms with the rebels, by authorizing the detention of
their own rebel or dissident captives as the rebellion goes on. In this way, the
advantage the rebellion forces have over those of the government, as when
they resort to guerilla tactics with sophisticated weapons, is, at least,
minimized, thereby enhancing the latter's chances of beating their enemy. It
would, therefore, seem to be ignoring realities in the name of misplaced
magnanimity and compassion, and for the sake of humanity, to grant the
demand for respect of rights supposedly guaranteed by the Constitution by
those who themselves seek to destroy that very same instrument, trampling
over it already as they are still waging war against the government. This stark
actuality gives added force and substance to the rationale of the suspension
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in case of invasion, insurrection,
rebellion, or imminent danger thereof, when public safety requires it.

6. Invoking the Lansang case, 9 however, petitioners would ask this Court to
review the issuance of the PCO against them, intimating that arbitrariness
attended its issuance because, relying on the evidence supposedly available
in the hands of the military, they claim they are not guilty of rebellion. They
also contend that the provisions of LOI No. 1211 have not been complied
with.

The Lansang case went no further than to pronounce the suspension of the
writ of the privilege of habeas corpus on August 21, 1971, valid and
constitutional, on a finding that there was no arbitrariness attendant to the
suspension. It never intended to suggest that for every individual case of
arrest and detention, the writ of habeas corpus is available, even after the
suspension of this privilege, to question the legality of the arrest and
detention on ground of arbitrariness. When a person is charged in court for
an ordinary offense, the law does not authorize the filing of a petition for
habeas corpus based on the ground that there is absolutely no evidence to
hold him for trial, which, in effect, constitutes an allegation of arbitrariness in
the filing of the case against him. The law has afforded him adequate
safeguards against arbitrariness, such as the requirement of determining the
existence of a probable cause by the judge before the issuance of the warrant
of arrest. The finding of such probable cause may not be immediately brought
for review by this Court in a habeas corpus proceeding, on the claim of
arbitrariness. The matter is to be decided on the basis of the evidence, and
this Court is not the proper forum for the review sought, not being a trier of
facts. If such a procedure were allowed, it would be easy to delay and
obstruct the prosecution of an offense by a resort to a petition for habeas
corpus based on arbitrariness, which most accuse, if not all, would be most
inclined, specially when they are out on bail. The petition now before Us is
exactly one of this kind. If granted, the effect is to transfer the jurisdiction of
the trial courts in criminal cases to this Court, which is simply inconceivable.
Moreover, arbitrariness, while so easy to allege, is hard to prove, in the face
of the formidable obstacle built up by the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duty. Unexhilaratingly, this is the revealing experience
of this Court in the Lansang case, where it doubtlessly realized how hardly
possible it is to adduce evidence or proof upon which to show the President
having acted with arbitrariness.

7. The last question relates to the legality of the Presidential Commitment

Order (PCO) issued by the President on July 12, 1982, tested by the
conformity of its issuance to the procedure laid down under LOI 1211,
petitioners insisting that the LOI limits the authority of the President to cause
the arrest and detention of persons engaged in or charged with, the crimes
mentioned in Proclamation No. 2045. They contend that the procedure
prescribed in the LOI not having been observed, the PCO issued thereunder
did not validate the initial illegal arrest of the herein petitioners as wen as their
continued detention.
It must be noted that LOI No. 1211, which provides the guidelines in the arrest
and detention of persons engaged in, or charged with, the crimes mentioned
in Proclamation No. 2045, charged with, the crimes mentioned contemplates
of three situations when an arrest can be made, to wit:

1. The arrest and detention effected by virtue of a warrant issued by a judge;

2. The arrest and detention effected by a military commander or the head of

a law enforcement agency after it is determined that the person or persons
to be arrested would probably escape or commit further acts which would
endanger public order and safety. After the arrest, however, the case shall
be immediately referred to the city or provincial fiscal or to the municipal, city,
circuit, or district judge for preliminary examination or investigation who, if the
evidence warrants, shall file the corresponding charges and, thereafter, we a
warrant of arrest;

3. The military commander or the head of the law enforcement agency may
apply to the President thru the Minister of National Defense, for a Presidential
Commitment Order under the following circumstances:

(a) When resort to judicial process is not possible or expedient without

endangering public order and safety; or

(b) When the release on bail of the person or persons already under arrest by
virtue of a judicial warrant would endanger said public order and safety.

Petitioners appear to place entire reliance on paragraphs 1 and 2 of LOI No.

1211, ignoring paragraph 3 of LOI No. 1211, which provides:

3. The above notwithstanding, the military commander or the head of the law
enforcement agency may apply to the President thru the Minister of National
Defense, for a Presidential Commitment Order covering the person or
persons believed to be participants in the commission of the crimes referred
to in paragraph 1 under the following circumstances:

(a) When resort to judicial process is not possible or expedient without

endangering public order and safety; or
(b) When the release on bail of the person or persons already under arrest
by virtue of a judicial warrant would endanger said public order and safety.

The reliance of petitioners on paragraphs 1 and 2 of LOI 1211 as to the

alleged necessity of judicial warrant before a person may be arrested and
detained is not well-founded. Neither is the contention that paragraph 3 of
LOI 1211 applies only when judicial process is not possible. This is a narrow
and constricted interpretation of LOI 1211 when viewed in its entirety. Even
in instances when a resort to judicial process is possible, where, in the
judgment of the President, a resort thereto would not be expedient because
it would endanger the public order or safety, a PCO is justified. So, too, when
release on bail in the ordinary judicial process will invite the same danger.

By its very nature, and clearly by its language, LOI 1211 is a mere directive
of the President as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines to his subordinates or implementing officers for the ultimate
objective of providing guidelines in the arrest and detention of the persons
covered by Presidential Proclamation No. 2045. The purpose is "to insure
protection to individual liberties without sacrificing the requirements of public
order and safety and the effectiveness of the campaign against those seeking
the forcible overthrow of the government and duty constituted authorities. "
LOI 1211 does not, in any manner, limit the authority of the President to
cause the arrest and detention of persons engaged in, or charged with the
crimes or offenses mentioned in said Proclamation in that he (President)
would subject himself to the superior authority of the judge who, under normal
judicial processes in the prosecution of the common offenses, is the one
authorized to issue a judicial warrant after a preliminary investigation is
conducted with a finding of probable cause. Those who would read such an
intention on the part of the President in issuing LOI 1211 seems to do so in
their view that LOI forms part of the law of the land under the 1976
amendment of the Constitution. 10 They would then contend that a PCO
issued not in compliance with the provisions of the LOI would be an illegality
and of no effect.

To form part of the law of the land, the decree, order or LOI must be issued
by the President in the exercise of his extraordinary power of legislation as
contemplated in Section 6 of the 1976 amendments to the Constitution,
whenever in his judgment, there exists a grave emergency or a threat or
imminence thereof, or whenever the interim Batasan Pambansa or the
regular National Assembly fails or is unable to act adequately on any matter
for any reason that in his judgment requires immediate action. There can be
no pretense, much less a showing, that these conditions prompted the
President to issue LOI 1211. Verily, not all LOI issued by the President should
be dignified into forming part of the law of the land.

In the event then that the judge believes no warrant shall issue, the President,
under Presidential Proclamation No. 2045 and Letter of Instruction No. 1211,
is not bound by such finding, as explicitly provided in paragraph 2 of LOI
1211. That the President avails of the facilities of the judicial machinery, as
is the clear intent of LOI 1211, to aid him in exercising his power to restrain
personal liberty, as dictated by the necessities and exigencies of the
emergency, does not indicate any intention on his part to renounce or to allow
even mere curtailment of his power such that the judicial process will
thereupon take its normal course, under which the detainees or accused
would then be entitled to demand their right of due process, particularly in
relation to their personal liberty. 11 The issuance of the PCO by the President
necessarily constitutes a finding that the conditions he has prescribed in LOI
1211 for the issuance of that PCO have been met, and intends that the
detention would be pursuant to the executive process incident to the
government campaign against the rebels, subversives and dissidents waging
a rebellion or insurrection. The ruling in the Nava vs. Gatmaitan case,* as above
intimated, must have shown him that to prosecute the offense through the judicial process of forthwith instead
of deferring it, would neither be wise nor expedient if he were to deal effectively with the grave emergency at
hand.

What has been said above shows the need of reexamining the Lansang case
with a view to reverting to the ruling of Barcelon vs. Baker, 5 Phil. 87, a 1905
decision, and Montenegro vs. Castaneda, 91 Phil. 882 (1952), that the
President's decision to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
"final and conclusive upon the courts, and all other persons." This well-settled
ruling was diluted in the Lansang case which declared that the "function of
the Court is merely to check — not to supplant — the Executive, or ascertain
merely whether he has gone beyond the constitutional limits of his jurisdiction
not to exercise the power vested in him or to determine the wisdom of his
act." Judicial interference was thus held as permissible, and the test as laid
down therein is not whether the President acted correctly but whether he
acted arbitrarily. This would seem to be pure semanticism, if We consider
that with particular reference to the nature of the actions the President would
take on the occasion of the grave emergency he has to deal with, which, as
clearly indicated in Section 9, Art. VII of the Constitution partakes of military
measures, the judiciary can, with becoming modesty, ill afford to assume the
authority to check or reverse or supplant the presidential actions. On these
occasions, the President takes absolute command, for the very life of the
Nation and its government, which, incidentally, includes the courts, is in grave
peril. In so doing, the President is answerable only to his conscience, the
people and to God. For their part, in giving him the supreme mandate as their
President, the people can only trust and pray that, giving him their own loyalty
with utmost patriotism, the President will not fail them.

In his separate opinion in the Lansang case, then Justice Fernando, now our
learned Chief Justice, went along with the proposition that the decision of the
Executive in the exercise of his power to suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus is his alone, and in his own language, is "ordinarily beyond
the ken of the Courts." This is so, as the Founding Fathers must have felt that
in the particular situations at hand, the Executive and the Judiciary should
maintain a mutually deferential attitude. This is the very essence of the
doctrine of "political question, " as determining the justiciability of a case. The
wisdom of this concept remains well-recognized in advanced constitutional
systems. To erase it from our own system as seems to be what was done in
the Lansang case, may neither be proper nor prudent. A good example could
be given in the exercise of the presidential power of pardon which is beyond
judicial review, specially under the new Constitution where the condition that
it may be granted only after final conviction has been done away with.

True, the Constitution is the law "equally in war and in peace," 12 as Chief
Justice Fernando cited in his brilliant separate opinion in the same Lansang
case. Precisely, it is the Constitution that gives the President specific "military
power" in times of warlike conditions as exist on the occasion of invasion,
insurrection or rebellion. Both power and right are constitutionally granted,
with the difference that the guarantee of the right to liberty is for personal
benefit, while the grant of the presidential power is for public safety. Which of
the two enjoys primacy over the other is all too obvious. For the power is
intended as a limitation of the right, in much the same way as individual
freedom yields to the exercise of the police power of the State in the interest
of general welfare. The difference again is that the power comes into being
during extreme emergencies the exercise of which, for complete
effectiveness for the purpose it was granted should not permit intereference,
while individual freedom is obviously for full enjoyment in time of peace, but
in time of war or grave peril to the nation, should be limited or restricted. In a
true sense then, our Constitution is for both peacetime and in time of war; it
is not that in time of war the Constitution is silenced. The Founding Fathers,
with admirable foresight and vision, inserted provisions therein that come into
play and application in time of war or similar emergencies. So it is that, as
proclaimed by the Constitution, the defense of the State is a prime duty of
government. Compulsory military service may be imposed, certainly a
mandate that derogates on the right to personal liberty. It, therefore, becomes
self-evident that the duty of the judiciary to protect individual rights must yield
to the power of the Executive to protect the State, for if the State perishes,
the Constitution, with the Bill of Rights that guarantees the right to personal
liberty, perishes with it.

In times of war or national emergency, the legislature may surrender a part

of its power of legislation to the President. 13 Would it not be as proper and
wholly acceptable to lay down the principle that during such crises, the
judiciary should be less jealous of its power and more trusting of the
Executive in the exercise of its emergency powers in recognition of the same
necessity? Verily, the existence of the emergencies should be left to
President's sole and unfettered determination. His exercise of the power to
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus on the occasion thereof,
should also be beyond judicial review. Arbitrariness, as a ground for judicial
inquiry of presidential acts and decisions, sounds good in theory but
impractical and unrealistic, considering how well-nigh impossible it is for the
courts to contradict the finding of the President on the existence of the
emergency that gives occasion for the exercise of the power to suspend the
privilege of the writ. For the Court to insist on reviewing Presidential action
on the ground of arbitrariness may only result in a violent collision of two
jealous powers with tragic consequences, by all means to be avoided, in
favor of adhering to the more desirable and long-tested doctrine of "political
question" in reference to the power of judicial review. 14

Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution, as earlier cited, affords further

reason for the reexamination of the Lansang doctrine and reversion to that
of Barcelon vs. Baker and Montenegro vs. Castaneda.

Accordingly, We hold that in times of war and similar emergency as expressly

provided in the Constitution, the President may suspend the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus, which has the effect of allowing the Executive to defer
the prosecution of any of the offenses covered by Proclamation No. 2045,
including, as a necessary consequence, the withholding for the duration of
the suspension of the privilege, of the right to bail. The power could have
been vested in Congress, instead of the President, as it was so vested in the
United States for which reason, when President Lincoln himself exercised the
power in 1861, Chief Justice Taney of the U.S. Supreme Court expressed
the opinion that Congress alone possessed this power under the
Constitutional., 15 Incidentally, it seems unimaginable that the judiciary could
subject the suspension, if decreed through congressional action, to the same
inquiry as our Supreme Court did with the act of the President, in the Lansang
case, to determine if the Congress acted with arbitrariness.

We further hold that under LOI 1211, a Presidential Commitment Order, the
issuance of which is the exclusive prerogative of the President under the
Constitution, may not be declared void by the courts, under the doctrine of
"political question," as has been applied in the Baker and Castaneda cases,
on any ground, let alone its supposed violation of the provision of LOI 1211,
thus diluting, if not abandoning the doctrine of the Lansang case. The
supreme mandate received by the President from the people and his oath to
do justice to every man should be sufficient guarantee, without need of
judicial overseeing, against commission by him of an act of arbitrariness in
the discharge particularly of those duties imposed upon him for the protection
of public safety which in itself includes the protection of life, liberty and
property. This Court is not possessed with the attribute of infallibility that
when it reviews the acts of the President in the exercise of his exclusive
power, for possible fault of arbitrariness, it would not itself go so far as to
commit the self-same fault.

Finally, We hold that upon the issuance of the Presidential Commitment

Order against herein petitioners, their continued detention is rendered valid
and legal, and their right to be released even after the filing of charges against
them in court, to depend on the President, who may order the release of a
detainee or his being placed under house arrest, as he has done in
meritorious cases.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition should be, as it is hereby dismissed.

SO ORDERED.

Guerrero, Plana, Escolin, Vasquez, Relova and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.

Concepcion, Jr. and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur in the result.

Aquino, J., is on leave.

Separate Opinions

FERNANDO, C.J., concurring:

In the result with qualification primarily on the respect that must be accorded
the constitutional right to bail once a case is flied and dissenting as to the
overruling of Lansang v. Garcia:

MAKASIAR, J., concurring:

Concuring in the result and in overruling the Lansang case.

ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring:

In the result and in overruling Lansang. I reserve my right on the question of
bail.

FERNANDO, C.J., concurring:

Concurring in the result with qualification primarily on the respect that must
be accorded the constitutional right to bail once a case is filed and dissenting
as to the overruling of Lansang v. Garcia.

It does not admit of doubt that the question posed in this petition for the writ
of habeas corpus, and in other similar petitions for that matter, is impressed
with significance that calls for the highest degree of care and circumspection.
The result arrived at by the Court is that once a presidential commitment
order is issued, the detention is rendered valid and legal, the right to be
released of the person detained even after the filing of charges being
dependent on the President "who may order the release of a detainee or his
being placed under house arrest, as he has done in meritorious cases." 1 The
exhaustive opinion of the Court penned by Justice de Castro likewise re-
examines the Lansang doctrine 2 which ruled that the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus raises a judicial rather than a political
question and reverts to the principle announced in the earlier cases
of Barcelon v. Baker 3 and Montenegro v. Castañeda, 4 both of which held
that the question raised is political in character.

I concur in the ruling that while as a general rule preventive detention is an

obstacle to judicial inquiry, this Court is empowered where compelling
reasons exist to inquire into the matter. Moreover, the judiciary once a case
has been filed has jurisdiction to act on a petition for bail. I dissent insofar as
the decision overrules Lansang v. Garcia.

1. Petitioners in their application for the writ of liberty assert an infringement

of a right that finds shelter in the fundamental law. This Court, both in normal
times and under emergency conditions, is not susceptible to the accusation
that it has not accorded the most careful study to a plea of such character.
Petitioners were heard and their cases decided. In addition to Lansang,
People v. Ferrer, 5 Aquino Jr. v. Ponce Enrile 6 and Aquino Jr. v. Military
Commission No. 2 7 may be cited. This Tribunal then has not been insensible
to its duty to render fealty to the applicable mandates of the Constitution. That
is to be true to the primordial concept first announced in the landmark
decision of Marbury v. Madison, 8 the opinion being rendered by the
illustrious Chief Justice Marshall, enunciating the principle of judicial review.
Our Constitution is quite clear on the matter. So it was held in Angara v.
Electoral Tribunal, 9 the first case of transcendental importance under the
1935 Charter. It is quite manifest that judicial review is not only a power but
a duty. 10

2. Thus the judiciary can be appealed to and in appropriate cases, annul

executive or legislative acts. For as so often stressed, "the Constitution is not
only law, but a higher law, to which other law must bow." 11 Professor Black
went on to state: "Here, I think, we are laboring the obvious. The superior
status of the Constitution is clearer even than its standing as law. But if it is
of superior status, and if it is law, then it is law of a superior status. Again, the
important thing is not whether some flaw could be found in the logic by which
this was established. The logic of human institutions is a logic of probability.
The important thing is that this concept of the superior status of the
Constitution as law very early became and has since continued to be a
standard part of the way in which the American lawyer and judge and citizen
look at their government." 12 This is not to deny the possibility of judicial
interference with policy formulation, better left to the political branches. It is
an entirely different matter of course where the question is one of liberty.

3. An inquiry into the validity of executive or legislative act has been fitly
characterized as both awesome and delicate. Nonetheless, for the judiciary,
there is no choice. To repeat, it is a duty to be performed. This is so especially
where the writ of habeas corpus has been invoked. It is then incumbent on a
court to pass on the legality of the detention. As I had occasion to state in my
separate opinion in Aquino Jr. vs. Enrile: 13 "This Court has to act then. The
liberty enshrined in the Constitution, for the protection of which habeas
corpus is the appropriate remedy, imposes that obligation. Its task is clear. It
must be performed. That is a trust to which it cannot be recreant. Whenever
the grievance complained of is deprivation of liberty, it is its responsibility to
inquire into the matter and to render the decision appropriate under the
circumstances. Precisely, a habeas corpus petition calls for that
response." 14 It cannot be overemphasized that the writ of habeas corpus, as
a constitutional right, it, for eminent commentators, protean in scope. A
reference to the opinion of the Court in Gumabon v. Director of Bureau of
Prisons 15 may not be amiss. Thus: "The writ imposes on judges the grave
responsibility of ascertaining whether there is any legal justification for a
deprivation of physical freedom. Unless there be such a showing, the
confinement must thereby cease. " 16 It continues: "Rightly then could Chafee
refer to the writ as 'The most important human rights provision' in the
fundamental law. Nor is such praise unique. Cooley spoke of it as 'One of the
principal safeguards to personal liberty.' For Willoughby, it is 'the greatest of
the safeguards erected by the civil law against arbitrary and illegal
imprisonment by whomsoever detention may be exercised or ordered.'
Burdick echoed a similar sentiment, referring to it as 'One of the most
important bulwarks of liberty.' Fraenkel made it unanimous, for to him.
'Without it much else would be of no avail.' Thereby the rule of law is assured.
A full awareness of the potentialities of the writ of habeas corpus in the
defense of liberty coupled with its limitations may be detected in the opinions
of former Chief Justices Arellano, Avancena, Abad Santos, Paras, Bengzon
and [Chief Justice Concepcion]. It fell to Justice Malcolm's lot, however to
emphasize quite a few times the breadth of its amplitude and of its reach."17

4. So it is in the United States. As so well put by Justice Brennan in Fay v.

Noia: 18 "We do well to bear in mind the extraordinary prestige of the Great
Writ, habeas corpus ad subjiciendum, in Anglo-American jurisprudence: 'the
most celebrated writ in English Law,' 3 Blackstone Commentaries 129. It is
'a writ antecedent to statute, and throwing its root deep into the genius of our
common law * * *. It is perhaps the most important writ known to the
constitutional law of England, affording as it does a swift and imperative
remedy in all cases of illegal restraint and confinement. It is of immemorial
antiquity, an instance of its use occurring in the thirty-third year of Edward I.
'Secretary of State for Home Affairs v. O'Brien [1923] AC 603, 609 (HL)
Received into our own law in the colonial period, given explicit recognition in
the Federal Constitution, Art. I, Sec. 9, cl. 2, incorporated in the first grant of
federal court jurisdiction, Act of September 24, 1978, c 20, sec. 14, 1 State
81, 82, habeas corpus was earlier confirmed by Chief Justice John Marshall
to be a 'Great constitutional privilege.' Ex parte Bollman and Swartout (US) 4
Cranch 75, 95, 2L ed 554, 561. Only two Terms ago this Court had occasion
to reaffirm the high place of the writ in our jurisprudence: 'We repeat what
has been so truly said of the federal writ: "there is no higher duty than to
maintain it unimpaired," Bowen v. Johnston, 306 US 19, 26, 83 L ed 455,
461, 59 S Ct 442 (1939), and unsuspended, save only in the cases specified
in our Constitution.' Smith v. Bennett, 365 US 708, 713, 6 1 ed 2d 39, 43, 81
s Ct. 895. " 19

5. To repeat, it is the ruling of this Court that an issuance of a presidential

commitment order imparts validity to a detention the right to be released of
the person detained even after the filing of charges being dependent on the
President who may order such release or his being placed under house
arrest. As I mentioned at the outset, I yield a qualified concurrence. The
power of preventive detention where the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
is suspended has been recognized. 20 The lifting of martial law unfortunately
has not been followed by a restoration of peace and order in certain sections
of the country. In the proclamation lifting martial law, the last paragraph of
the whereas clause spoke of the awareness of the government and the
Filipino people of public safety continuing "to require a degree of capability to
deal adequately with elements who persist in endeavoring to overthrow the
government by violent means and exploiting every opportunity to disrupt [its]
peaceful and productive" efforts. 21Accordingly, in terminating the state of
martial law throughout the Philippines, it was provided: "that the call to the
Armed Forces of the Philippines to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
insurrection, rebellion and subversion shall continue to be in force and effect;
and Provided that in the two autonomous regions in Mindanao, upon the
request of the residents therein, the suspension of the privileges of the writ
of habeas corpus shall continue; and in all other places the suspension of the
privilege of the writ shall also continue with respect to persons at present
detained as well as others who may hereafter be similarly detained for the
crimes of insurrection or rebellion, subversion; conspiracy or proposal to
commit such crimes and for all other crimes and offenses committed by them
in furtherance or on the occasion thereof, or incident thereto, or in connection
therewith; * * *." 22 That is the basis for the preventive detention of petitioners
in this case.
6. The President as commander-in-chief may call out the armed forces to
prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion, insurrection, or rebellion and
in case of invasion, insurrection, or rebellion, or imminent danger thereof,
when the public safety requires it, "may suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus, or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial
law."23 There are thus three alternatives which may be availed to meet a grave
public danger to the security of the state. As pointed out by Chief Justice
Concepcion in Lansang, prior to the suspension of the privilege of the writ in
1971, the armed forces had been called out, but such a move "proved
inadequate to attain the desired result. Of the two (2) other alternatives, the
suspension of the privilege is the least harsh." 24 Even if only the first
alternative were resorted to, the executive could still exercise the power of
preventive detention. Moyer v. Peabody, 25 decided by the American
Supreme Court, the opinion being penned by Justice Holmes, may be cited.
According to the statement of the facts of that case, "it appeared that the
governor had declared a county to be in a state of insurrection, had called
out troops to put down the trouble, and had ordered that the plaintiff should
be arrested as a leader of the outbreak, and should be detained until he could
be discharged with safety, and that then he should be delivered to the civil
authorities, to be dealt with according to law." 26 On those facts the American
Supreme Court held that preventive detention was allowable, the test of its
validity being one of good faith. The state governor then could "make the
ordinary use of the soldiers to that end; that he may kill persons who resist,
and, of course, that he may use the milder measure of seizing the bodies of
those whom he considers to stand in the way of restoring peace. Such arrests
are not necessarily for punishment, but are by way of precaution, to prevent
the exercise of hostile power. So long as such arrests are made in good faith
and in the honest belief that they are needed in order to head the insurrection
off, the governor is the final judge and cannot be subjected to an action after
he is out of office, on the ground that he had not reasonable ground for his
belief." 27 The last paragraph of Justice Holmes opinion was even more
emphatic: "When it comes to a decision by the head of the state upon a
matter involving its life, the ordinary rights of individuals must yield to what
he deems the necessities of the moment. Public danger warrants the
substitution of executive process for judicial process. See Keely v. Sanders,
99 U.S. 441, 446, 25 L. ed. 327, 328. This was admitted with regard to killing
men in the actual clash of arms; and we think it obvious, although it was
disputed, that the same is true of temporary detention to prevent
apprehended harm. As no one would deny that there was immunity for
ordering a company to fire upon a mob in insurrection, and that a state law
authorizing the governor to deprive citizens of life under such circumstances
was consistent with the 14th Amendment, we are of opinion that the same is
true of a law authorizing by implication that was done in this
case." 28 Nonetheless, while preventive detention is a proper measure to cope
with the danger arising from the insurrection or rebellion, it may continue for
such length of time as to make it punitive in character. If such were the case,
I am not prepared to yield concurrence to the view that this Court is devoid
of the power in a habeas corpus proceeding to inquire into the legality of the
detention. As to when such a stage is reached cannot be set forth with
precision. The test would be an appraisal of the environmental facts of each
case. This is not to deny that the presumption must be in favor not only of the
good faith characterizing the presidential action but of the absence of any
arbitrary taint in so ordering preventive detention. It is out of excess of caution
and due to the belief that habeas corpus as a writ of liberty should not be
unnecessarily curtailed that I feel compelled to qualify my concurrence in that
respect.

7. Nor is this all. Once a case is filed, the party detained may avail himself of
the right to bail. If there be such a petition, the court has jurisdiction to grant
or to deny bail in accordance with the constitutional provision. 29 Inasmuch as
the return to the writ filed by the Solicitor General states that a warrant of
arrest against detainee Dra. Aurora Parong was issued on August 4, 1982,
by the Municipal Court of Bayombong, for illegal possession of firearm and
ammunition, then clearly she has a right to invoke such right, notwithstanding
the suspension of the privilege of the writ. So I did argue as counsel
in Hernandez v. Montesa, 30 where a majority of this Court with one vote
lacking to make their conclusion doctrinal agreed with such submission.
There was adherence to such a view in my separate opinions in
Lansang 31 and in Buscayno v. Enrile, 32 I do again and to that extent dissent.

8. It may be worthwhile to touch briefly on the exercise of power of preventive

detention in other jurisdictions. The retired Lord President of the Federal
Court of Malaysia Tun Mohamed Suffian in his work on the Malaysian
constitution, spoke of the emergency powers of the executive, the Yang
Dipertuan Agung in this wise: " If the Yang Dipertuan Agung (acting on
Cabinet advice) is satisfied that a grave emergency exists whereby the
security or economic life of the Federation or any part thereof is threatened,
article 150 empowers him to issue a proclamation of emergency. He has
done so thrice: first, to meet the emergency caused by Indonesian
confrontation, secondly, to meet the emergency caused by the political crisis
arising out of the position of the Chief Minister of Sarawak and, thirdly, to
meet the emergency caused as a result of the violence that erupted on 13th
May, 1969. (The 1948-1960 emergency was proclaimed under pre-
independence law, not under the constitution). If a proclamation of
emergency is issued when Parliament is not sitting, the Yang Dipertuan
Agung must summon Parliament as soon as may be practicable. Until both
Houses of Parliament are sitting, he may promulgate ordinances having the
force of law, if satisfied that immediate action is required." 33 By virtue of such
competence, preventive detention may be ordered. 34 The power of
preventive detention is likewise recognized in India. According to Professor
Jain, in a leading article, it "prevails in many democratic countries and in
some form or other, at one time or other, each democratic country has taken
recourse to preventive detention, especially during the war period." 35 He
mentioned the United States Internal Security Act enacted by its Congress in
1950 for emergency detention "during an emergency of war, invasion or
domestic insurrection of a person about whom there is a reasonable ground
to believe that he would probably engage in acts of sabotage or espionage.
The U.S. Constitution also provides for suspension of habeas corpus during
rebellion or invasion if public safety so requires." 36 He likewise referred to
England, citing Regulation 14B of the Defense of Realm Act Regulations,
1914, during World War I and Regulation 18B of the Defense Regulations
during World War II which according to him led to the celebrated case of
Liversidge v. Anderson. 37 Then he turned to his own country: "In India,
because of unstable law and order situation, preventive detention has been
in vogue since its independence in 1947. After the commencement of the
Constitution, Parliament enacted the Preventive Detention Act, 1950, to lay
down a legal framework for preventive detention on certain grounds. The
present day law for the purpose is the Maintenance of Internal Security Act,
1971. A salient feature of the law of preventive detention in India has been to
confer a very broad discretion on the administrative authority to order
preventive detention of a person in certain circumstances." 38 He spoke of the
relevant constitutional provisions having a bearing on preventive detention:
"A law for preventive detention can be made by Parliament exclusively under
entry 9, List 1, for reasons connected with 'defensee', 'foreign affairs' or the
'security of India.' Further, under entry 3, List 111, Parliament and the State
Legislatures can concurrently make a law for preventive detention for
reasons connected with the " security of a State', maintenance of public
order,' or 'maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community.'
Parliament thus has a wide legislative jurisdiction in the matter as it can enact
a law of preventive detention for reasons connected with all the six heads
mentioned above. The Preventive Detention Act, 1950, and now the
Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971, have been enacted by
Parliament providing for preventive detention for all these six heads." 39 For
him the law of preventive detention in India "has therefore been too much
administrative-ridden and the scope of judicial review has been very much
limited." 40 He made a careful study of the cases on preventive detention in
India. As he pointed out, "the range and magnitude of administrative control
over the individual's personal liberty is very vast, and the range of judicial
control is very restrictive, as the basic question, whether a person should be
detained or not on the facts and circumstances of the case, hes within the
scope of administrative discretion and beyond judicial review." 41Nonetheless,
the Supreme Court of India, as he stressed, "in the interest or maintaining
constitutionalism," has been able to take "a somewhat broad view of its
restricted powers, and has given whatever relief it can to the detained
persons." 42 For me that approach has much to recommend it. This is not to
deny that in the event there is a misapprehension as to the actual facts that
led to the preventive detention, the plea for remedial action should, in the first
instance, be addressed to the President. Very likely, there will be an
affirmative response. Even then, the assurance to a party feeling aggrieved
that there could still be resort to judicial review, even if utilized only in rare
and exceptional cases, may conduce to a deeper sense of loyalty to the
existing constitutional order on the part of the misguided or disaffected
individuals. Hence, to repeat, this qualified concurrence on my part.
9. The opinion of the Court, however, did not stop at dismissing the petition
on the ground that the issuance of a presidential commitment order validates
the preventive detention of petitioners. It went farther by reexamining the
unanimous ruling in Lansang to the effect that the suspension of the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus raises a judicial rather than a political question
and holding that it is no longer authoritative. With due respect, I cannot agree
to such a conclusion. In the first place, there was no need to go that far. For
me, at least, the rationale that this Court must accord deference to a
presidential committment order suffices for the decision of this case. Nor
would I limit my dissent on that ground alone. It is for me, and again I say this
with due respect, deplorable and unjustifiable for this Court to turn its back
on a doctrine that has elicited praise and commendation from eminent
scholars and jurists here and abroad.

10. That is easily understandable. The learned, comprehension and

unanimous Lansang opinion penned by Chief Justice Concepcion concurred
in by all the Justices, 43 to my mind, explains with lucidity and force why the
question is judicial rather than political. Thus: "Indeed, the grant of power to
suspend the privilege is neither absolute nor unqualified. The authority
conferred by the Constitution, both under the Bill of Rights and under the
Executive Department, is limited and conditional. The precept in the Bill of
Rights establishes a general rule, as well as an exception thereto. What is
more, it postulates the former in the negative, evidently to stress its
importance, by providing that '(t)he privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall
not be suspended * * *.' It is only by way of exception that it permits the
suspension of the privilege 'in cases of invasion, insurrection, or rebellion'-
or, under Art. VII of the Constitution, 'imminent danger thereof when the
public safety requires it, in any of which events the same may be suspended
wherever during such period the necessity for such suspension shall exist.'
For from being full and plenary, the authority to suspend the privilege of the
writ is thus circumscribed, confined and restricted, not only by the prescribed
setting or the conditions essential to its existence, but, also, as regards the
time when and the place where it may be exercised. These factors and the
aforementioned setting or conditions mark, establish and define the extent,
the confines and the limits of said power, beyond which it does not exist. And,
like the limitations and restrictions imposed by the Fundamental Law upon
the legislative department, adherence thereto and compliance therewith may,
within proper bounds, be inquired into by courts of justice. Otherwise, the
explicit constitutional provisions thereon would be meaningless. Surely, the
framers of our Constitution could not have intended to engage in such a
wasteful exercise in futility." 44 The then Chief Justice continued: "Much less
may the assumption be indulged in when we bear in mind that our political
system is essentially democratic and republican in character and that the
suspension of the privilege affects the most fundamental element of that
system, namely, individual freedom. Indeed, such freedom includes and
connotes, as well as demands, the right of every single member of our
citizenry to freely discuss and dissent from, as well as criticize and denounce,
the views, the policies and the practices of the government and the party in
power that he deems unwise, improper or inimical to the commonwealth,
regardless of whether his own opinion is objectively correct or not. The
untrammelled enjoyment and exercise of such right- which, under certain
conditions, may be a civic duty of the highest order- is vital to the democratic
system and essential to its successful operation and wholesome growth and
development." 45

11. One of the merits of the ponencia of Chief Justice Concepcion is that it is
infused with a sense of realism. These are his words: "Manifestly, however,
the liberty guaranteed and protected by our Basic Law is one enjoyed and
exercised, not in derogation thereof, but consistently therewith, and, hence,
within the framework of the social order established by the Constitution and
the context of the Rules of Law. Accordingly, when individual freedom is used
to destroy that social order, by means of force and violence, in defiance of
the Rule of Law- such as by rising publicly and taking arms against the
government to overthrow the same, thereby committing the crime of rebellion
there emerges a circumstance that may warrant a limited withdrawal of the
aforementioned guarantee or protection, by suspending the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus, when public safety requires it. Although we must be
forewarned against mistaking mere dissent-no matter how emphatic or
intemperate it may be-fore dissidence amounting to rebellion or insurrection,
the Court cannot hesitate, much less-refuse-when the existence of such
rebellion or insurrection has been fairly established or cannot reasonably be
denied-to uphold the finding of the Executive thereon, without, in effect,
encroaching upon a power vested in him by the Supreme Law of the land
and depriving him, to this extent, of such power, and, therefore, without
violating the Constitution and jeopardizing the very Rule of Law the Court is
called upon to epitomize." 46

12. After which this Court, as set forth in the Lansang opinion, considered
"the precise nature" of its function: "Article VII of the Constitution vests in the
Executive the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
under specified conditions. Pursuant to the principle of separation of powers
underlying our system of government, the Executive is supreme within his
own sphere. However, the separation of powers, under the Constitution, is
not absolute. What is more, it goes hand in hand with the system of checks
and balances, under which the Executive is supreme, as regards the
suspension of the privilege, but only if and when he acts within the sphere
allotted to him by the Basic Law, and the authority to determine whether or
not he has so acted is vested in the Judicial Department, which, in this
respect, is, in turn, constitutionally supreme." 47 Further: "In the exercise of
such authority, the function of the Court is merely to check-not to supplant-
the Executive, or to ascertain merely whether he has gone beyond the
constitutional limits of his jurisdiction, not to exercise the power vested in him
or to determine the wisdom of his act. To be sure, the power of the Court to
determine the validity of the contested proclamation is far from being Identical
to, or even comparable with, its power over ordinary civil or criminal cases
elevated thereto by ordinary appeal from inferior courts, in which cases the
appellate court has all of the powers of the court of origin." 48It is clear the
competence of this Court to pass upon the validity of the suspension of the
privilege of the writ is confined within limits that preclude the assumption of
power that rightfully belongs to the Executive. There would then be, to my
mind, no sufficient Justification to retreat from a position that assures judicial
participation on a matter of momentous consequence. Moreover, to the
extent that such a move has had the benefit of judicial appraisal, and
thereafter approval, to that extent there may be less valid opposition and
hopefully greater understanding of why such a step had to be taken.

13. With Lansang overruled, the doctrine that the suspension of the privilege
of the writ announced in Barcelon v. Baker 49 and Montenegro v.
Castañeda 50 will be revived. This for me is unfortunate. The Montenegro
decision, as I had occasion to state "owed its existence to the compulsion
exerted by Barcelon v. Baker, a 1905 decision. This Court was partly misled
by an undue reliance in the latter case on what it considered to be
authoritative pronouncements from such illustrious American jurists as
Marshall, Story, and Taney. That is to misread what was said by them. This
is most evident in the case of Chief Justice Marshall, whose epochal Marbury
v. Madison was cited. Why that was so is difficult to understand. For it speaks
to the contrary. It was by virtue of this decision that the function of judicial
review owes its origin notwithstanding the absence of any explicit provision
in the American Constitution empowering the courts to do so. Thus: 'It is
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the
law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity
expound and interpret that rule. If two laws conflict with each other, the courts
must decide on the operation of each. So if a law be in opposition to the
constitution; if both the law and the constitution apply to a particular case, so
that the court must either decide that case conformably to the law,
disregarding the constitution; or conformably to the constitution, disregarding
the law; the court must determine which of these conflicting rules governs the
case. This is of the very essence of judicial duty. If, then, the courts are to
regard the constitution, and the constitution is superior to any ordinary act of
the legislature, the constitution, and not such ordinary act, must govern the
case to which they both apply.'" 51 The opinion went on to say: "Nor is the
excerpt from Justice Story, speaking for the United States Supreme Court,
in Martin v. Mott, as made clear in the opinion of the Chief Justice, an
authority directly in point. There, a militiaman had been convicted of failing to
respond to a call, made under the Act of 1795, to serve during the War of
1812. His property was taken to satisfy the judgment. He brought an action
of replevin. The American Constitution empowers its Congress 'to provide for
calling forth the Militia' in certain cases, and Congress did provide that in
those cases the President should have authority to make the call." All that
Justice Story did in construing the statute in the light of the language and
purpose of her Constitution was to recognize the authority of the American
President to decide whether the exigency has arisen. In stating that such
power was exclusive and thus had a conclusive effect, he relied on the
language employed, impressed with such a character. The constitutional
provision on the suspension of the privilege of the writ is, as shown, anything
but that. Chief Justice Taney in Luther v. Borden, likewise had to deal with a
situation involving the calling out of the militia. As a matter of fact, an eminent
commentator speaking of the two above decisions had this apt observation:
"The common element in these opinions would seem to be a genuine judicial
reluctance to speak in a situation where the voice of the Court, even if heard,
could not have any effect. More than this, both Story and Taney seem to
share the suspicion, unusual in them, that under a popular form of
government there are certain questions that the political branches must be
trusted to answer with finality. What was said next is even more pertinent.
Thus: 'It would be dangerous and misleading to push the principles of these
cases too far, especially the doctrine of "political questions" as implied
in Luther v. Borden. Given the opportunity to afford a grievously injured
citizen relief from a palpably unwarranted use of presidential or military
power, especially when the question at issue falls in the penumbra between
the "political" and the "justiciable", the Court will act as if it had never heard
of this doctrine and its underlying assumption that there are some powers
against which the judiciary simply cannot be expected to act as the last line
of defense.' It would thus seem evident that support for the hitherto prevailing
Montenegro ruling was rather frail. Happily, with our decision, it is no longer
capable of the mischief to which it does lend itself of an undue diminution of
judicial power to the prejudice of constitutional rights." 52

14. An opinion of a court, especially this Tribunal, should not ignore the
environmental facts which gave rise to a litigation where the issues arise from
problems inseparable from national security. There is, in addition, the need
to take into consideration the pressure of contemporary events. For as has
so often been stressed, judicial process does not take place in a social void.
The questions before the Court are to be viewed with full awareness of the
consequences attendant to the decision reached. As so tersely expressed by
Justice Tuason in Araneta v. Dinglasan:" 53 "We test a rule by its
results." 54 More often than not especially during times of stress, it is
inescapable that efforts be made to reconcile time-tested principles to
contemporary problems. The judiciary is called upon to do its part. There is
wisdom in these words of Justice Tuason from the same opinion: "The truth
is that under our concept of constitutional government, in times of extreme
perils more than in normal circumstances, 'The various branches, executive,
legislative, and judicial,' given the ability to act, are called upon 'to perform
the duties and discharge the responsibilities committed to them
respectively.'" 55 To repeat, I accord the fullest respect to the mode and
manner in which my brethren performed their duty and discharged their
responsibility in passing upon the transcendental question raised in this
petition. With the basic premise of robust concern for individual rights to
which I have been committed,however, I have no choice except to vote the
way I did, even if for those whose opinions I value conformity with the hitherto
unquestioned verities may at times prove to be less than adequate to meet
the exigencies of the turbulent present.

TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting:

I am constrained to dissent from the all-encompassing scope of the main

opinion of Mr. Justice de Castro which would overturn the landmark doctrine
of Lansang vs. Garcia 1 which upheld the Supreme Court's authority to
inquire into the existence of factual bases for the President's suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in order to determine the
constitutional sufficiency thereof and would revert to the retrogressive and
colonial era ruling of Barcelon vs. Baker 2 and Montenegro vs.
Castañeda 3 that the President's decision to so suspend the privilege of the
writ "is final and conclusive upon the courts and all other persons," and would
further deny the right to bail even after the filing of charges in court to persons
detained under Presidential Commitment Orders.

This case, as in other like cases, focuses on the grievances that persons
detained or charged for the crimes of insurrection, rebellion, subversion,
conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, invariably bring to this Court.
They complain, as petitioners do here, of being arrested without any warrant
of arrest; of being informed of purported telegrams concerning the issuance
of a Presidential Commitment Order PCO authorizing their arrest and
detention, but that they are not given a copy of such PCO nor notified of its
contents, raising doubts whether such PCO has in fact been issued; of being
kept in isolation or transferred to so-called "safehouses" and being denied of
their constitutional right to counsel and to silence; of prolonged detention
without charges; "of a seeming deliberate and concerted effort by
respondents to conceal from counsel and relatives the detainees' place of
detention, raising the apprehension that respondents are using force,
violence, threat, intimidation and other means which vitiate free will to obtain
confessions and statements from the detainees in violation of their
constitutional rights;" and of their counsel and families undergoing great
difficulties in locating or having access to them (main opinion at p. 3).

The State through the Solicitor General on the other hand invariably denies
all such charges and submits affidavits of the arresting officers and detention
custodian that detainees are afforded decent and humane treatment, further
countering that such claims are merely calculated to arouse sympathy and
as propaganda against the Government and its institutions.

In many such cases, however, the Court in issuing the writ of habeas corpus
requiring respondents to make a return of the writ includes a resolution, in
recognition of the detainees' constitutional rights, "to allow counsel for
petitioners to visit and confer with the detainee(s) in an atmosphere of
confidentiality consistent with reasonable security measures which
respondents may impose." 4 In other cases where respondents military
officials have allegedly denied having in their custody the person(s) detained,
the Court has issued its resolution "on the assumption that the detained
person is in the custody of respondents, that there be due observance and
respect of his right to counsel and other constitutional rights by
respondents." 5

Respondents' return through the Solicitor General in the case at bar states
that the detainees are all detained by virtue of a Presidential Commitment
Order issued on July 12, 1982 (several days after their arrest without warrant
on July 6 and 7, 1982) and that corresponding charges against the detainees
were filed in court and before the Acting Provincial Fiscal of Nueva Viscaya
where they are pending. As to the detainee Dr. Aurora Parong, the return
further states that a warrant of arrest was issued against her on August 4,
1982 by the Municipal Court of Bayombong for illegal possession of a firearm
and ammunition. As in all other returns in similar cases, the Solicitor General
asserts "that the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is unavailing as to
them. Courts cannot inquire into the validity and cause of their arrest and
detention" by virtue of the continued suspension, under Presidential
Proclamation No. 2045 (which proclaimed the termination of martial law in
the Philippines), of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the two
autonomous regions in Mindanao and in all other places with respect to
persons detained for suspected involvement in crimes related to national
security.

The main opinion confronts the question of whether the issuance of a

Presidential Commitment Order (PCO) has provided the legal basis of the
detention of herein detainees following their arrest for Proclamation No.
2045-covered offenses," and remarks that "this question has to be set at rest
promptly and decisively, if we are to break a seemingly continuous flow of
petitions for habeas corpus, as what had been seen lately of such petitions
being filed in this Court one after the other.

I. I submit that the resolution of the issues in this case does not call for the
all-encompassing ruling in the main opinion with its sweeping scope that
would reexamine and overturn the benchmark ruling in Lansang. The limited
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the two instances
provided under Presidential Proclamation No. 2045 has not been challenged
in this case. So, what's the point of an advance declaration that all checks
and barriers are down? Lansang recognizes the greatest deference and
respect that is due the President's determination for the necessity of
suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. But Lansang sets at
the same time the constitutional confines and limits of the President's power
to suspend the privilege of the writ and enunciates the constitutional test, not
of the correctness of the President's decision, but that the President's
decision to suspend the privilege not suffer from the constitutional infirmity of
arbitrariness. 6 Thus, after laying the premise "that every case must depend
on its own circumstances," the Court therein thru then Chief Justice Roberto
Concepcion held that:

Indeed, the grant of power to suspend the privilege is neither absolute nor
unqualified. The authority conferred by the Constitution, both under the Bill
of Rights and under the Executive Department, is limited and conditional. The
precept in the Bill of Rights establishes a general rule, as well as an exception
thereto. What is more, it postulates the former in the negative, evidently to
stress its importance, by providing that '(t)he privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus shall not be suspended ....' It is only by way of exception that it permits
the suspension of the privilege 'in cases of invasion, insurrection, or
rebellion'- or, under Art. VII of the Constitution, 'imminent danger thereof '-
'when the public safety requires it, in any of which events the same may be
suspended wherever during such period the necessity for such suspension
shall exist.' Far from being fun and plenary, the authority to suspend the
privilege of the writ is thus circumscribed, confined and restricted, not only by
the prescribed setting or the conditions essential to its existence, but, also,
as regards the time when ? the place where it may be exercised. These
factors and the aforementioned setting or conditions mark, establish and
define the extent, the confines and the limits of said power, beyond which it
does not exist. And, like the limitations and restrictions imposed by the
Fundamental Law upon the legislative department, adherence thereto and
compliance therewith may, within proper bounds, be inquired into by courts
of justice. Otherwise, the explicit constitutional provisions thereon would be
meaningless. Surely, the framers of our Constitution could not have intended
to engage in such a wasteful exercise in futility.

Much less may the assumption be indulged in when we bear in mind that our
political system is essentially democratic and republican in character and that
the suspension of the privilege affects the most fundamental element of that
system. namely, individual freedom. Indeed, such freedom includes and
connotes, as well as demands, the right of every single member of our
citizenry to freely discuss and dissent from, as well as criticize and denounce,
the views, the policies and the practices of the government and the party in
power that he deems unwise, improper or inimical to the commonwealth,
regardless of whether his own opinion is objectively correct or not. The
untrammelled enjoyment and exercise of such right-which, under certain
conditions, may be a civic duty of the highest order is-vital to the democratic
system and essential to its successful operation and wholesome growth and
development.

Manifestly, however, the liberty guaranteed and protected by our Basic Law
is one enjoyed and exercise, not in derogation thereof, but consistently
therewith, and, hence, within the framework of the social order established
by the Constitution and the context of the Rule of Law. Accordingly, when
individual freedom is used to destroy that social order, by means of force and
violence, in defiance of the Rule of Law such as by rising publicly and taking
arms against the government to overthrow the same, thereby committing the
crime of rebellion- there emerges a circumstance that may warrant a limited
withdrawal of the aforementioned guarantee or protection, by suspending the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, when public safety requires it. Although
we must before warned against mistaking mere dissent- no matter how
emphatic or intemperate it may be-for dissidence amounting to rebellion or
insurrection, the Court cannot hesitate, much less refuse- when the existence
of such rebellion or insurrection has been fairly established or cannot
reasonably be denied- to uphold the finding of the Executive thereon, without,
in effect, encroaching upon a power vested in him by the Supreme Law of
the land and depriving him, to this extent, of such power, and, therefore,
without violating the Constitution and jeopardizing the very Rule of Law the
Court is called upon to epitomize. " 7

II. The crucial issue at bar is that adversely decided by the main opinion,
denying petitioners' motion that the Court order their release on bail, on the
ground that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus for
any of the offenses covered by Proclamation No. 2045 "includes, as a
necessary consequence, the withholding for the duration of the suspension
of the privilege of the right to bail" (main opinion, at page 16).

1. I submit that notwithstanding the suspension of the privilege of the writ of

habeas corpus and the issuance on March 9, 1982 of Letter of Instruction
No. 1211 that the Presidential Commitment Order constitutes authority to
keep the subject person under detention "until ordered released by the
President or his duly authorized representative" (which is a mere internal
instruction to certain agencies), the higher and superior mandate of the
Constitution guarantees the right to bail and vests the courts with the
jurisdiction and judicial power to grant bail which may not be removed nor
diminished nor abdicated. We cannot but so hold, if we are to be true to the
fundamental precept that "The Constitution is a law for rulers and for people
equally in war and in peace and covers with the shield of its protection all
classes of men at all times and under all circumstances."
The argument that otherwise the purpose of the suspension of the privilege
would be defeated ignores the overwhelming capability of the State and its
military and police forces to keep suspects under surveillance and the courts'
imposition of reasonable conditions in granting bail, such as periodic reports
to the authorities concerned, and prohibiting their going to certain critical
areas.

2. The most authoritative pronouncement in this regard is of course none

other than the President's himself. In all the metropolitan newspapers of April
20, 1983, the President is reported to have "said that Pimentel has been
charged with rebellion before the regional trial court of Cebu City and is
therefore under the jurisdiction of the civil court and not only under the
jurisdiction of the military by virtue of the PCO." In a telegram in reply to the
appeal of Msgr. Patrick Cronin, Archbishop of Cagayan de Oro and Misamis
Oriental, for lifting of the PCO on Mayor Aquilino Pimentel of Cagayan de Oro
City, the President said that "(T)he disposal of the body of the accused, as
any lawyer will inform you, is now within the powers of the regional trial court
of Cebu City and not within the powers of the President. "

3. This is but in consonance with the majority holding in the leading 1951
cases of Nava vs. Gatmaitan andHernandez vs. Montesa 8 (although it failed
one vote short of the required majority of six affirmative votes at the time) as
expounded by then Chief Justice Ricardo Paras and Associate Justice (later
Chief Justice) Cesar Bengzon and Associate Justices Pedro Tuason, Alex
Reyes and Fernando Jugo that after formal indictment in court by the filing
against them of an information charging rebellion with multiple murder, etc.,
accused persons covered by the proclamation of suspension of the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus are entitled to the right to bail.

4. As stressed by then Chief Justice Ricardo Paras, "(T)he right to bail, along
with the right of an accused to be heard by himself and counsel to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have
a speedy and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have
compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses in his behalf
(Article III, Section 1, Paragraph 17, of the Constitution), tends to aid the
accused to prove his innocence and obtain acquittal. If it be contended that
the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus includes the
suspension of the distinct right to bail or to be provisionally at liberty, it
would a fortiori imply the suspension of all his other rights (even the right to
be tried by a court) that may win for him ultimate acquittal and, hence,
absolute freedom. The latter result is not insisted upon for being patently
untenable. "

Then Chief Justice Paras stressed that "... The privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus and the right to bail guaranteed under the Bill of Rights are separate
and co-equal. If the intention of the framers of the Constitution was that the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus carries or implies the
suspension of the right to bail, they would have very easily provided that all
persons shall before conviction be bailable by sufficient sureties, except
those charged with capital offenses when evidence of guilt is strong and
except when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. As
stated in the case of Ex Parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2, 18 L. ed. 297, the
Constitution limited the suspension to only one great right, leaving the rest to
remain forever inviolable. "

5. It is noteworthy and supportive of the prevailing stand since 1951 that the
other great constitutional rights remain forever inviolable since the
Constitution limited the suspension to only one great right (of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus), that there has been no amendment of the
Constitution to curtail the right to bail in case of such suspension
notwithstanding the numerous constitutional amendments adopted after the
1973 Constitution.

6. The late Justice Pedro Tuason emphasized that "(T)o the plea that the
security of the State would be jeopardized by the release of the defendants
on bail, the answer is that the existence of danger is never a justification for
courts to tamper with the fundamental rights expressly granted by the
Constitution. These rights are immutable, inflexible, yielding to no pressure
of convenience, expediency or the so-called 'judicial statesmanship.' The
Legislature itself cannot infringe them, and no court conscious of its
responsibilities and limitations would do so. If the Bill of Rights are
incompatible with stable government and a menace to the Nation, let the
Constitution be amended, or abolished. It is trite to say that, while the
Constitution stands, the courts of justice as the repository of civil liberty are
bound to protect and maintain undiluted individual rights."

7. And former Chief Justice Cesar Bengzon then made the same forceful plea
echoed these days by men of goodwill that respect for constitutional and
human rights and adherence to the rule of law would help in the fight against
rebellion and movement for national reconciliation, thus: "And in my opinion,
one of the surest means to ease the uprising is a sincere demonstration of
this Government's adherence to the principles of the Constitution together
with an impartial application thereof to all citizens, whether dissidents or not.
Let the rebels have no reason to apprehend that their comrades now under
custody are being railroaded into Muntinglupa, without benefit of those
fundamental privileges which the experience of the ages has deemed
essential for the protection of all persons accused of crime before the tribunal
of justice. Give them the assurance that the judiciary, ever mindful of its
sacred mission, will not, thru faulty or misplaced devotion, uphold any
doubtful claims of governmental power in diminution of individual rights, but
will always cling to the principles uttered long ago by Chief Justice Marshall
that when in doubt as to the construction of the Constitution, 'The Courts will
favor personal liberty.'"

8. The right to bail cannot just be cancelled out summarily because of the
issuance of a PCO In the case at bar, detainee Dr. Aurora Parong is charged
in the municipal court with the crime of illegal possession of firearm, which is
a clearly bailable offense. The charges filed against the other detainees are
likewise for clearly bailable offenses. It is elementary that the right to bail in
non-capital offenses and even in capital offenses where evidence of guilt is
not strong will be generally granted and respected by the courts, "the natural
tendency of the courts (being) towards a fair and liberal appreciation,"
particularly taking into consideration the record and standing of the person
charged and the unlikelihood of his fleeing the court's jurisdiction.

As the Court held in the leading case of Montano vs. Ocampo 9 wherein the
Supreme Court granted bail to Senator Montano who was charged with
multiple murders and frustrated murders:
Brushing aside the charge that the prelimiminary investigation of this case by
the aforesaid Judge was railroaded, the same having been conducted at
midnight, a few hours after the complaint was filed, we are of the opinion that,
upon the evidence adduced in the applicaction for bail in the lower court, as
such evidence is recited lengthily in the present petition and the answer
thereto, and extensively analyzed and discussed in the oral argument, there
is not such clear showing of guilt as would preclude all reasonable probability
of any other conclusion.

Exclusion from bail in capital offenses being an exception to the otherwise

absolute right guaranteed by the constitution, the natural tendency of the
courts has been toward a fair and liberal appreciation, rather than otherwise ,
of the evidence in the determination of the degree of proof and presumption
of guilt necessary to war. rant a deprivation of that right.

Besides, to deny bail it is not enough that the evidence of guilt is strong; it
must also appear that in case of conviction the defendant 's liability would
probably call for a capital punishment. No clear or conclusive showing before
this Court has been made.

In the evaluation of the evidence the probability of flight is one other important
factor to be taken into account. The sole purpose of confining accusedin jail
before conviction, it has been observed, is to assure his presence at the trial.
In other words, if denial of bail is authorized in capital cases, it is only on the
theory that the proof being strong, the dependant would flee, if he has the
opportunity, rather than face the verdict of the jury. Hence the exception to
the fundamental right to be bailed should be applied in direct ratio to the
extent of the probability of evasion of prosecution.

The possibility of escape in this case, bearing in mind the defendant's official
and social standing and his other personal circumstances, seems remote if
not nil."

In the recent case of Sobremonte vs. Enrile, 10 the detainee was released
upon her filing of the recommended P1,000.00 bail bond for the offense of
possession of subversive literature with which she was charged and the
habeas corpus petition, like many others, although dismissed for having
thereby become moot, accomplished the purpose of securing the accused's
release from prolonged detention. The Court had occasion to decry therein
that "all the effort, energy and manhours expended by the parties and their
counsel, including this Court, ... could have been avoided had the officers of
the AVSECOM and the ISAFP responded promptly to the inquiries of
petitioner instead of giving her the 'run-around' by referring her from one
office to another."

9. "The continuous flow of petitions for habeas corpus" filed with this Court
should not be decried nor discouraged. The Court stands as the guarantor of
the constitutional and human rights of all persons within its jurisdiction and
must see to it that the rights are respected and enforced. It is settled in his
jurisdiction that once a deprivation of a constitutional right is shown to exist,
the court that rendered the judgment or before whom the case is pending is
ousted of jurisdiction and habeas corpus is the appropriate remedy to assail
the legality of the detention. 11 So accused persons deprived of the
constitutional right of speedy trial have been set free. 12 And likewise persons
detained indefinitely without charges so much so that the detention becomes
punitive and not merely preventive in character are entitled to regain their
freedom. The spirit and letter of our Constitution negates as contrary to the
basic precepts of human rights and freedom that a person be detained
indefinitely without any charges.

III. The main opinion invokes "a time of war or grave peril to the nation" (at
page 16), oblivious of the Presidents lifting of martial law under Proclamation
No. 2045 on January 17, 1981 and the specific premises therein set forth that

WHEREAS, the Filipino people, having subdued threats to the stability of

government, public order and security, are aware that the time has come to
consolidate the gains attained by the nation under a state of martial law by
assuming their normal political roles and shaping the national destiny within
the framework of civil government and popular democracy:

WHEREAS, the experience gained by the nation under martial law in

subduing threats to the stability of the government, public order and security,
has enabled the Filipino people to rediscover their confidence in their ability
to command the resources of national unity, patriotism, discipline and sense
of common destiny;

WHEREAS, the government and the people are at the same time also aware
that the public safety continues to require a degree of capability to deal
adequately with elements who persist in endeavoring to overthrow the
government by violent means and exploiting every opportunity to disrupt the
peaceful and productive labors of the government; ..."

As to the "self-evident" submittal of the main opinion that "the duty of the
judiciary to protect individual rights must yield to the power of the Executive
to protect the State, for if the State perishes, the Constitution, with the Bill of
Rights that guarantees the right to personal liberty, perishes with it" (at page
16), I can only recall the exhortation of the Holy Father John Paul II in his
address to the Philippine nation on February 17, 1981, thus: "Even in
exceptional situations that may at times arise, one can never justify any
violation of the fundamental dignity of the human person or of the basic rights
that safeguard this dignity. Legitimate concern for the security of a nation, as
demanded by the common good, could lead to the temptation of subjugating
to the State the human being and his or her dignity and rights. Any apparent
conflict between the exigencies of security and of the citizens' basic rights
must be resolved according to the fundamental principle-upheld always by
the Church- that social organization exists only for the service of man and for
the protection of his dignity, and that it cannot claim to serve the common
good when human rights are not safeguaded. People will have faith in the
safeguarding of their security and the promotion of their well-being only to
the extent that they feel truly involved, and supported in their very humanity."

Separate Opinions

FERNANDO, C.J., concurring:

In the result with qualification primarily on the respect that must be
accorded the constitutional right to bail once a case is flied and dissenting
as to the overruling of Lansang v. Garcia:

MAKASIAR, J., concurring:

Concuring in the result and in overruling the Lansang case.

ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring:

In the result and in overruling Lansang. I reserve my right on the question of

bail.

FERNANDO, C.J., concurring:

Concurring in the result with qualification primarily on the respect that must
be accorded the constitutional right to bail once a case is filed and
dissenting as to the overruling of Lansang v. Garcia.

It does not admit of doubt that the question posed in this petition for the writ
of habeas corpus, and in other similar petitions for that matter, is impressed
with significance that calls for the highest degree of care and
circumspection. The result arrived at by the Court is that once a presidential
commitment order is issued, the detention is rendered valid and legal, the
right to be released of the person detained even after the filing of charges
being dependent on the President "who may order the release of a detainee
or his being placed under house arrest, as he has done in meritorious
cases." 1 The exhaustive opinion of the Court penned by Justice de Castro
likewise re-examines the Lansang doctrine 2 which ruled that the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus raises a judicial
rather than a political question and reverts to the principle announced in the
earlier cases of Barcelon v. Baker 3 and Montenegro v. Castañeda, 4 both of
which held that the question raised is political in character.

I concur in the ruling that while as a general rule preventive detention is an

obstacle to judicial inquiry, this Court is empowered where compelling
reasons exist to inquire into the matter. Moreover, the judiciary once a case
has been filed has jurisdiction to act on a petition for bail. I dissent insofar
as the decision overrules Lansang v. Garcia.

1. Petitioners in their application for the writ of liberty assert an infringement

of a right that finds shelter in the fundamental law. This Court, both in
normal times and under emergency conditions, is not susceptible to the
accusation that it has not accorded the most careful study to a plea of such
character. Petitioners were heard and their cases decided. In addition
to Lansang, People v. Ferrer, 5 Aquino Jr. v. Ponce Enrile 6 and Aquino Jr. v.
Military Commission No. 2 7 may be cited. This Tribunal then has not been
insensible to its duty to render fealty to the applicable mandates of the
Constitution. That is to be true to the primordial concept first announced in
the landmark decision of Marbury v. Madison, 8 the opinion being rendered
by the illustrious Chief Justice Marshall, enunciating the principle of judicial
review. Our Constitution is quite clear on the matter. So it was held
in Angara v. Electoral Tribunal, 9 the first case of transcendental importance
under the 1935 Charter. It is quite manifest that judicial review is not only a
power but a duty. 10

2. Thus the judiciary can be appealed to and in appropriate cases, annul

executive or legislative acts. For as so often stressed, "the Constitution is
not only law, but a higher law, to which other law must bow." 11 Professor
Black went on to state: "Here, I think, we are laboring the obvious. The
superior status of the Constitution is clearer even than its standing as law.
But if it is of superior status, and if it is law, then it is law of a superior
status. Again, the important thing is not whether some flaw could be found
in the logic by which this was established. The logic of human institutions is
a logic of probability. The important thing is that this concept of the superior
status of the Constitution as law very early became and has since
continued to be a standard part of the way in which the American lawyer
and judge and citizen look at their government." 12 This is not to deny the
possibility of judicial interference with policy formulation, better left to the
political branches. It is an entirely different matter of course where the
question is one of liberty.

3. An inquiry into the validity of executive or legislative act has been fitly
characterized as both awesome and delicate. Nonetheless, for the judiciary,
there is no choice. To repeat, it is a duty to be performed. This is so
especially where the writ of habeas corpus has been invoked. It is then
incumbent on a court to pass on the legality of the detention. As I had
occasion to state in my separate opinion in Aquino Jr. vs. Enrile: 13 "This
Court has to act then. The liberty enshrined in the Constitution, for the
protection of which habeas corpus is the appropriate remedy, imposes that
obligation. Its task is clear. It must be performed. That is a trust to which it
cannot be recreant. Whenever the grievance complained of is deprivation of
liberty, it is its responsibility to inquire into the matter and to render the
decision appropriate under the circumstances. Precisely, a habeas corpus
petition calls for that response." 14 It cannot be overemphasized that the writ
of habeas corpus, as a constitutional right, it, for eminent commentators,
protean in scope. A reference to the opinion of the Court in Gumabon v.
Director of Bureau of Prisons 15 may not be amiss. Thus: "The writ imposes
on judges the grave responsibility of ascertaining whether there is any legal
justification for a deprivation of physical freedom. Unless there be such a
showing, the confinement must thereby cease. " 16 It continues: "Rightly then
could Chafee refer to the writ as 'The most important human rights
provision' in the fundamental law. Nor is such praise unique. Cooley spoke
of it as 'One of the principal safeguards to personal liberty.' For Willoughby,
it is 'the greatest of the safeguards erected by the civil law against arbitrary
and illegal imprisonment by whomsoever detention may be exercised or
ordered.' Burdick echoed a similar sentiment, referring to it as 'One of the
most important bulwarks of liberty.' Fraenkel made it unanimous, for to him.
'Without it much else would be of no avail.' Thereby the rule of law is
assured. A full awareness of the potentialities of the writ of habeas corpus
in the defense of liberty coupled with its limitations may be detected in the
opinions of former Chief Justices Arellano, Avancena, Abad Santos, Paras,
Bengzon and [Chief Justice Concepcion]. It fell to Justice Malcolm's lot,
however to emphasize quite a few times the breadth of its amplitude and of
its reach."17

4. So it is in the United States. As so well put by Justice Brennan in Fay v.

Noia: 18 "We do well to bear in mind the extraordinary prestige of the Great
Writ, habeas corpus ad subjiciendum, in Anglo-American jurisprudence: 'the
most celebrated writ in English Law,' 3 Blackstone Commentaries 129. It is
'a writ antecedent to statute, and throwing its root deep into the genius of
our common law * * *. It is perhaps the most important writ known to the
constitutional law of England, affording as it does a swift and imperative
remedy in all cases of illegal restraint and confinement. It is of immemorial
antiquity, an instance of its use occurring in the thirty-third year of Edward I.
'Secretary of State for Home Affairs v. O'Brien [1923] AC 603, 609 (HL)
Received into our own law in the colonial period, given explicit recognition
in the Federal Constitution, Art. I, Sec. 9, cl. 2, incorporated in the first grant
of federal court jurisdiction, Act of September 24, 1978, c 20, sec. 14, 1
State 81, 82, habeas corpus was earlier confirmed by Chief Justice John
Marshall to be a 'Great constitutional privilege.' Ex parte Bollman and
Swartout (US) 4 Cranch 75, 95, 2L ed 554, 561. Only two Terms ago this
Court had occasion to reaffirm the high place of the writ in our
jurisprudence: 'We repeat what has been so truly said of the federal writ:
"there is no higher duty than to maintain it unimpaired," Bowen v.
Johnston, 306 US 19, 26, 83 L ed 455, 461, 59 S Ct 442 (1939), and
unsuspended, save only in the cases specified in our Constitution.' Smith v.
Bennett, 365 US 708, 713, 6 1 ed 2d 39, 43, 81 s Ct. 895. " 19

5. To repeat, it is the ruling of this Court that an issuance of a presidential

commitment order imparts validity to a detention the right to be released of
the person detained even after the filing of charges being dependent on the
President who may order such release or his being placed under house
arrest. As I mentioned at the outset, I yield a qualified concurrence. The
power of preventive detention where the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus is suspended has been recognized. 20 The lifting of martial law
unfortunately has not been followed by a restoration of peace and order in
certain sections of the country. In the proclamation lifting martial law, the
last paragraph of the whereas clause spoke of the awareness of the
government and the Filipino people of public safety continuing "to require a
degree of capability to deal adequately with elements who persist in
endeavoring to overthrow the government by violent means and exploiting
every opportunity to disrupt [its] peaceful and productive"
efforts. 21Accordingly, in terminating the state of martial law throughout the
Philippines, it was provided: "that the call to the Armed Forces of the
Philippines to prevent or suppress lawless violence, insurrection, rebellion
and subversion shall continue to be in force and effect; and Provided that in
the two autonomous regions in Mindanao, upon the request of the residents
therein, the suspension of the privileges of the writ of habeas corpus shall
continue; and in all other places the suspension of the privilege of the writ
shall also continue with respect to persons at present detained as well as
others who may hereafter be similarly detained for the crimes of
insurrection or rebellion, subversion; conspiracy or proposal to commit such
crimes and for all other crimes and offenses committed by them in
furtherance or on the occasion thereof, or incident thereto, or in connection
therewith; * * *." 22 That is the basis for the preventive detention of
petitioners in this case.

6. The President as commander-in-chief may call out the armed forces to

prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion, insurrection, or rebellion
and in case of invasion, insurrection, or rebellion, or imminent danger
thereof, when the public safety requires it, "may suspend the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus, or place the Philippines or any part thereof under
martial law."23 There are thus three alternatives which may be availed to
meet a grave public danger to the security of the state. As pointed out by
Chief Justice Concepcion in Lansang, prior to the suspension of the
privilege of the writ in 1971, the armed forces had been called out, but such
a move "proved inadequate to attain the desired result. Of the two (2) other
alternatives, the suspension of the privilege is the least harsh." 24 Even if
only the first alternative were resorted to, the executive could still exercise
the power of preventive detention. Moyer v. Peabody, 25 decided by the
American Supreme Court, the opinion being penned by Justice Holmes,
may be cited. According to the statement of the facts of that case, "it
appeared that the governor had declared a county to be in a state of
insurrection, had called out troops to put down the trouble, and had ordered
that the plaintiff should be arrested as a leader of the outbreak, and should
be detained until he could be discharged with safety, and that then he
should be delivered to the civil authorities, to be dealt with according to
law." 26 On those facts the American Supreme Court held that preventive
detention was allowable, the test of its validity being one of good faith. The
state governor then could "make the ordinary use of the soldiers to that
end; that he may kill persons who resist, and, of course, that he may use
the milder measure of seizing the bodies of those whom he considers to
stand in the way of restoring peace. Such arrests are not necessarily for
punishment, but are by way of precaution, to prevent the exercise of hostile
power. So long as such arrests are made in good faith and in the honest
belief that they are needed in order to head the insurrection off, the
governor is the final judge and cannot be subjected to an action after he is
out of office, on the ground that he had not reasonable ground for his
belief." 27 The last paragraph of Justice Holmes opinion was even more
emphatic: "When it comes to a decision by the head of the state upon a
matter involving its life, the ordinary rights of individuals must yield to what
he deems the necessities of the moment. Public danger warrants the
substitution of executive process for judicial process. See Keely v. Sanders,
99 U.S. 441, 446, 25 L. ed. 327, 328. This was admitted with regard to
killing men in the actual clash of arms; and we think it obvious, although it
was disputed, that the same is true of temporary detention to prevent
apprehended harm. As no one would deny that there was immunity for
ordering a company to fire upon a mob in insurrection, and that a state law
authorizing the governor to deprive citizens of life under such
circumstances was consistent with the 14th Amendment, we are of opinion
that the same is true of a law authorizing by implication that was done in
this case." 28 Nonetheless, while preventive detention is a proper measure to
cope with the danger arising from the insurrection or rebellion, it may
continue for such length of time as to make it punitive in character. If such
were the case, I am not prepared to yield concurrence to the view that this
Court is devoid of the power in a habeas corpus proceeding to inquire into
the legality of the detention. As to when such a stage is reached cannot be
set forth with precision. The test would be an appraisal of the environmental
facts of each case. This is not to deny that the presumption must be in favor
not only of the good faith characterizing the presidential action but of the
absence of any arbitrary taint in so ordering preventive detention. It is out of
excess of caution and due to the belief that habeas corpus as a writ of
liberty should not be unnecessarily curtailed that I feel compelled to qualify
my concurrence in that respect.

7. Nor is this all. Once a case is filed, the party detained may avail himself
of the right to bail. If there be such a petition, the court has jurisdiction to
grant or to deny bail in accordance with the constitutional
provision. 29 Inasmuch as the return to the writ filed by the Solicitor General
states that a warrant of arrest against detainee Dra. Aurora Parong was
issued on August 4, 1982, by the Municipal Court of Bayombong, for illegal
possession of firearm and ammunition, then clearly she has a right to
invoke such right, notwithstanding the suspension of the privilege of the
writ. So I did argue as counsel in Hernandez v. Montesa, 30 where a majority
of this Court with one vote lacking to make their conclusion doctrinal agreed
with such submission. There was adherence to such a view in my separate
opinions in Lansang 31 and in Buscayno v. Enrile, 32 I do again and to that
extent dissent.

8. It may be worthwhile to touch briefly on the exercise of power of

preventive detention in other jurisdictions. The retired Lord President of the
Federal Court of Malaysia Tun Mohamed Suffian in his work on the
Malaysian constitution, spoke of the emergency powers of the executive,
the Yang Dipertuan Agung in this wise: " If the Yang Dipertuan Agung
(acting on Cabinet advice) is satisfied that a grave emergency exists
whereby the security or economic life of the Federation or any part thereof
is threatened, article 150 empowers him to issue a proclamation of
emergency. He has done so thrice: first, to meet the emergency caused by
Indonesian confrontation, secondly, to meet the emergency caused by the
political crisis arising out of the position of the Chief Minister of Sarawak
and, thirdly, to meet the emergency caused as a result of the violence that
erupted on 13th May, 1969. (The 1948-1960 emergency was proclaimed
under pre-independence law, not under the constitution). If a proclamation
of emergency is issued when Parliament is not sitting, the Yang Dipertuan
Agung must summon Parliament as soon as may be practicable. Until both
Houses of Parliament are sitting, he may promulgate ordinances having the
force of law, if satisfied that immediate action is required." 33 By virtue of
such competence, preventive detention may be ordered. 34 The power of
preventive detention is likewise recognized in India. According to Professor
Jain, in a leading article, it "prevails in many democratic countries and in
some form or other, at one time or other, each democratic country has
taken recourse to preventive detention, especially during the war
period." 35 He mentioned the United States Internal Security Act enacted by
its Congress in 1950 for emergency detention "during an emergency of war,
invasion or domestic insurrection of a person about whom there is a
reasonable ground to believe that he would probably engage in acts of
sabotage or espionage. The U.S. Constitution also provides for suspension
of habeas corpus during rebellion or invasion if public safety so
requires." 36 He likewise referred to England, citing Regulation 14B of the
Defense of Realm Act Regulations, 1914, during World War I and
Regulation 18B of the Defense Regulations during World War II which
according to him led to the celebrated case of Liversidge v.
Anderson. 37 Then he turned to his own country: "In India, because of
unstable law and order situation, preventive detention has been in vogue
since its independence in 1947. After the commencement of the
Constitution, Parliament enacted the Preventive Detention Act, 1950, to lay
down a legal framework for preventive detention on certain grounds. The
present day law for the purpose is the Maintenance of Internal Security Act,
1971. A salient feature of the law of preventive detention in India has been
to confer a very broad discretion on the administrative authority to order
preventive detention of a person in certain circumstances." 38 He spoke of
the relevant constitutional provisions having a bearing on preventive
detention: "A law for preventive detention can be made by Parliament
exclusively under entry 9, List 1, for reasons connected with 'defensee',
'foreign affairs' or the 'security of India.' Further, under entry 3, List 111,
Parliament and the State Legislatures can concurrently make a law for
preventive detention for reasons connected with the " security of a State',
maintenance of public order,' or 'maintenance of supplies and services
essential to the community.' Parliament thus has a wide legislative
jurisdiction in the matter as it can enact a law of preventive detention for
reasons connected with all the six heads mentioned above. The Preventive
Detention Act, 1950, and now the Maintenance of Internal Security Act,
1971, have been enacted by Parliament providing for preventive detention
for all these six heads." 39 For him the law of preventive detention in India
"has therefore been too much administrative-ridden and the scope of
judicial review has been very much limited." 40 He made a careful study of
the cases on preventive detention in India. As he pointed out, "the range
and magnitude of administrative control over the individual's personal liberty
is very vast, and the range of judicial control is very restrictive, as the basic
question, whether a person should be detained or not on the facts and
circumstances of the case, hes within the scope of administrative discretion
and beyond judicial review." 41Nonetheless, the Supreme Court of India, as
he stressed, "in the interest or maintaining constitutionalism," has been able
to take "a somewhat broad view of its restricted powers, and has given
whatever relief it can to the detained persons." 42 For me that approach has
much to recommend it. This is not to deny that in the event there is a
misapprehension as to the actual facts that led to the preventive detention,
the plea for remedial action should, in the first instance, be addressed to the
President. Very likely, there will be an affirmative response. Even then, the
assurance to a party feeling aggrieved that there could still be resort to
judicial review, even if utilized only in rare and exceptional cases, may
conduce to a deeper sense of loyalty to the existing constitutional order on
the part of the misguided or disaffected individuals. Hence, to repeat, this
qualified concurrence on my part.

9. The opinion of the Court, however, did not stop at dismissing the petition
on the ground that the issuance of a presidential commitment order
validates the preventive detention of petitioners. It went farther by
reexamining the unanimous ruling in Lansang to the effect that the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus raises a judicial
rather than a political question and holding that it is no longer authoritative.
With due respect, I cannot agree to such a conclusion. In the first place,
there was no need to go that far. For me, at least, the rationale that this
Court must accord deference to a presidential committment order suffices
for the decision of this case. Nor would I limit my dissent on that ground
alone. It is for me, and again I say this with due respect, deplorable and
unjustifiable for this Court to turn its back on a doctrine that has elicited
praise and commendation from eminent scholars and jurists here and
abroad.

10. That is easily understandable. The learned, comprehension and

unanimous Lansang opinion penned by Chief Justice Concepcion
concurred in by all the Justices, 43 to my mind, explains with lucidity and
force why the question is judicial rather than political. Thus: "Indeed, the
grant of power to suspend the privilege is neither absolute nor unqualified.
The authority conferred by the Constitution, both under the Bill of Rights
and under the Executive Department, is limited and conditional. The
precept in the Bill of Rights establishes a general rule, as well as an
exception thereto. What is more, it postulates the former in the negative,
evidently to stress its importance, by providing that '(t)he privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus shall not be suspended * * *.' It is only by way of
exception that it permits the suspension of the privilege 'in cases of
invasion, insurrection, or rebellion'- or, under Art. VII of the Constitution,
'imminent danger thereof when the public safety requires it, in any of which
events the same may be suspended wherever during such period the
necessity for such suspension shall exist.' For from being full and plenary,
the authority to suspend the privilege of the writ is thus circumscribed,
confined and restricted, not only by the prescribed setting or the conditions
essential to its existence, but, also, as regards the time when and the place
where it may be exercised. These factors and the aforementioned setting or
conditions mark, establish and define the extent, the confines and the limits
of said power, beyond which it does not exist. And, like the limitations and
restrictions imposed by the Fundamental Law upon the legislative
department, adherence thereto and compliance therewith may, within
proper bounds, be inquired into by courts of justice. Otherwise, the explicit
constitutional provisions thereon would be meaningless. Surely, the framers
of our Constitution could not have intended to engage in such a wasteful
exercise in futility." 44 The then Chief Justice continued: "Much less may the
assumption be indulged in when we bear in mind that our political system is
essentially democratic and republican in character and that the suspension
of the privilege affects the most fundamental element of that system,
namely, individual freedom. Indeed, such freedom includes and connotes,
as well as demands, the right of every single member of our citizenry to
freely discuss and dissent from, as well as criticize and denounce, the
views, the policies and the practices of the government and the party in
power that he deems unwise, improper or inimical to the commonwealth,
regardless of whether his own opinion is objectively correct or not. The
untrammelled enjoyment and exercise of such right- which, under certain
conditions, may be a civic duty of the highest order- is vital to the
democratic system and essential to its successful operation and wholesome
growth and development." 45
11. One of the merits of the ponencia of Chief Justice Concepcion is that it
is infused with a sense of realism. These are his words: "Manifestly,
however, the liberty guaranteed and protected by our Basic Law is one
enjoyed and exercised, not in derogation thereof, but consistently therewith,
and, hence, within the framework of the social order established by the
Constitution and the context of the Rules of Law. Accordingly, when
individual freedom is used to destroy that social order, by means of force
and violence, in defiance of the Rule of Law- such as by rising publicly and
taking arms against the government to overthrow the same, thereby
committing the crime of rebellion there emerges a circumstance that may
warrant a limited withdrawal of the aforementioned guarantee or protection,
by suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, when public safety
requires it. Although we must be forewarned against mistaking mere
dissent-no matter how emphatic or intemperate it may be-fore dissidence
amounting to rebellion or insurrection, the Court cannot hesitate, much less-
refuse-when the existence of such rebellion or insurrection has been fairly
established or cannot reasonably be denied-to uphold the finding of the
Executive thereon, without, in effect, encroaching upon a power vested in
him by the Supreme Law of the land and depriving him, to this extent, of
such power, and, therefore, without violating the Constitution and
jeopardizing the very Rule of Law the Court is called upon to epitomize." 46

12. After which this Court, as set forth in the Lansang opinion, considered
"the precise nature" of its function: "Article VII of the Constitution vests in
the Executive the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus under specified conditions. Pursuant to the principle of separation of
powers underlying our system of government, the Executive is supreme
within his own sphere. However, the separation of powers, under the
Constitution, is not absolute. What is more, it goes hand in hand with the
system of checks and balances, under which the Executive is supreme, as
regards the suspension of the privilege, but only if and when he acts within
the sphere allotted to him by the Basic Law, and the authority to determine
whether or not he has so acted is vested in the Judicial Department, which,
in this respect, is, in turn, constitutionally supreme." 47 Further: "In the
exercise of such authority, the function of the Court is merely to check-not
to supplant-the Executive, or to ascertain merely whether he has gone
beyond the constitutional limits of his jurisdiction, not to exercise the power
vested in him or to determine the wisdom of his act. To be sure, the power
of the Court to determine the validity of the contested proclamation is far
from being Identical to, or even comparable with, its power over ordinary
civil or criminal cases elevated thereto by ordinary appeal from inferior
courts, in which cases the appellate court has all of the powers of the court
of origin." 48It is clear the competence of this Court to pass upon the validity
of the suspension of the privilege of the writ is confined within limits that
preclude the assumption of power that rightfully belongs to the Executive.
There would then be, to my mind, no sufficient Justification to retreat from a
position that assures judicial participation on a matter of momentous
consequence. Moreover, to the extent that such a move has had the benefit
of judicial appraisal, and thereafter approval, to that extent there may be
less valid opposition and hopefully greater understanding of why such a
step had to be taken.

13. With Lansang overruled, the doctrine that the suspension of the
privilege of the writ announced in Barcelon v. Baker 49 and Montenegro v.
Castañeda 50 will be revived. This for me is unfortunate. The Montenegro
decision, as I had occasion to state "owed its existence to the compulsion
exerted by Barcelon v. Baker, a 1905 decision. This Court was partly misled
by an undue reliance in the latter case on what it considered to be
authoritative pronouncements from such illustrious American jurists as
Marshall, Story, and Taney. That is to misread what was said by them. This
is most evident in the case of Chief Justice Marshall, whose
epochal Marbury v. Madison was cited. Why that was so is difficult to
understand. For it speaks to the contrary. It was by virtue of this decision
that the function of judicial review owes its origin notwithstanding the
absence of any explicit provision in the American Constitution empowering
the courts to do so. Thus: 'It is emphatically the province and duty of the
judicial department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to
particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that rule. If two
laws conflict with each other, the courts must decide on the operation of
each. So if a law be in opposition to the constitution; if both the law and the
constitution apply to a particular case, so that the court must either decide
that case conformably to the law, disregarding the constitution; or
conformably to the constitution, disregarding the law; the court must
determine which of these conflicting rules governs the case. This is of the
very essence of judicial duty. If, then, the courts are to regard the
constitution, and the constitution is superior to any ordinary act of the
legislature, the constitution, and not such ordinary act, must govern the
case to which they both apply.'" 51 The opinion went on to say: "Nor is the
excerpt from Justice Story, speaking for the United States Supreme Court,
in Martin v. Mott, as made clear in the opinion of the Chief Justice, an
authority directly in point. There, a militiaman had been convicted of failing
to respond to a call, made under the Act of 1795, to serve during the War of
1812. His property was taken to satisfy the judgment. He brought an action
of replevin. The American Constitution empowers its Congress 'to provide
for calling forth the Militia' in certain cases, and Congress did provide that in
those cases the President should have authority to make the call." All that
Justice Story did in construing the statute in the light of the language and
purpose of her Constitution was to recognize the authority of the American
President to decide whether the exigency has arisen. In stating that such
power was exclusive and thus had a conclusive effect, he relied on the
language employed, impressed with such a character. The constitutional
provision on the suspension of the privilege of the writ is, as shown,
anything but that. Chief Justice Taney in Luther v. Borden, likewise had to
deal with a situation involving the calling out of the militia. As a matter of
fact, an eminent commentator speaking of the two above decisions had this
apt observation: "The common element in these opinions would seem to be
a genuine judicial reluctance to speak in a situation where the voice of the
Court, even if heard, could not have any effect. More than this, both Story
and Taney seem to share the suspicion, unusual in them, that under a
popular form of government there are certain questions that the political
branches must be trusted to answer with finality. What was said next is
even more pertinent. Thus: 'It would be dangerous and misleading to push
the principles of these cases too far, especially the doctrine of "political
questions" as implied in Luther v. Borden. Given the opportunity to afford a
grievously injured citizen relief from a palpably unwarranted use of
presidential or military power, especially when the question at issue falls in
the penumbra between the "political" and the "justiciable", the Court will act
as if it had never heard of this doctrine and its underlying assumption that
there are some powers against which the judiciary simply cannot be
expected to act as the last line of defense.' It would thus seem evident that
support for the hitherto prevailing Montenegro ruling was rather frail.
Happily, with our decision, it is no longer capable of the mischief to which it
does lend itself of an undue diminution of judicial power to the prejudice of
constitutional rights." 52

14. An opinion of a court, especially this Tribunal, should not ignore the
environmental facts which gave rise to a litigation where the issues arise
from problems inseparable from national security. There is, in addition, the
need to take into consideration the pressure of contemporary events. For as
has so often been stressed, judicial process does not take place in a social
void. The questions before the Court are to be viewed with full awareness
of the consequences attendant to the decision reached. As so tersely
expressed by Justice Tuason in Araneta v. Dinglasan:" 53 "We test a rule by
its results." 54 More often than not especially during times of stress, it is
inescapable that efforts be made to reconcile time-tested principles to
contemporary problems. The judiciary is called upon to do its part. There is
wisdom in these words of Justice Tuason from the same opinion: "The truth
is that under our concept of constitutional government, in times of extreme
perils more than in normal circumstances, 'The various branches,
executive, legislative, and judicial,' given the ability to act, are called upon
'to perform the duties and discharge the responsibilities committed to them
respectively.'" 55 To repeat, I accord the fullest respect to the mode and
manner in which my brethren performed their duty and discharged their
responsibility in passing upon the transcendental question raised in this
petition. With the basic premise of robust concern for individual rights to
which I have been committed,however, I have no choice except to vote the
way I did, even if for those whose opinions I value conformity with the
hitherto unquestioned verities may at times prove to be less than adequate
to meet the exigencies of the turbulent present.

TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting:

I am constrained to dissent from the all-encompassing scope of the main

opinion of Mr. Justice de Castro which would overturn the landmark
doctrine of Lansang vs. Garcia 1 which upheld the Supreme Court's
authority to inquire into the existence of factual bases for the President's
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in order to
determine the constitutional sufficiency thereof and would revert to the
retrogressive and colonial era ruling of Barcelon vs.
Baker 2 and Montenegro vs. Castañeda 3 that the President's decision to so
suspend the privilege of the writ "is final and conclusive upon the courts and
all other persons," and would further deny the right to bail even after the
filing of charges in court to persons detained under Presidential
Commitment Orders.

This case, as in other like cases, focuses on the grievances that persons
detained or charged for the crimes of insurrection, rebellion, subversion,
conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, invariably bring to this Court.
They complain, as petitioners do here, of being arrested without any
warrant of arrest; of being informed of purported telegrams concerning the
issuance of a Presidential Commitment Order PCO authorizing their arrest
and detention, but that they are not given a copy of such PCO nor notified
of its contents, raising doubts whether such PCO has in fact been issued; of
being kept in isolation or transferred to so-called "safehouses" and being
denied of their constitutional right to counsel and to silence; of prolonged
detention without charges; "of a seeming deliberate and concerted effort by
respondents to conceal from counsel and relatives the detainees' place of
detention, raising the apprehension that respondents are using force,
violence, threat, intimidation and other means which vitiate free will to
obtain confessions and statements from the detainees in violation of their
constitutional rights;" and of their counsel and families undergoing great
difficulties in locating or having access to them (main opinion at p. 3).

The State through the Solicitor General on the other hand invariably denies
all such charges and submits affidavits of the arresting officers and
detention custodian that detainees are afforded decent and humane
treatment, further countering that such claims are merely calculated to
arouse sympathy and as propaganda against the Government and its
institutions.

In many such cases, however, the Court in issuing the writ of habeas
corpus requiring respondents to make a return of the writ includes a
resolution, in recognition of the detainees' constitutional rights, "to allow
counsel for petitioners to visit and confer with the detainee(s) in an
atmosphere of confidentiality consistent with reasonable security measures
which respondents may impose." 4 In other cases where respondents
military officials have allegedly denied having in their custody the person(s)
detained, the Court has issued its resolution "on the assumption that the
detained person is in the custody of respondents, that there be due
observance and respect of his right to counsel and other constitutional
rights by respondents." 5

Respondents' return through the Solicitor General in the case at bar states
that the detainees are all detained by virtue of a Presidential Commitment
Order issued on July 12, 1982 (several days after their arrest without
warrant on July 6 and 7, 1982) and that corresponding charges against the
detainees were filed in court and before the Acting Provincial Fiscal of
Nueva Viscaya where they are pending. As to the detainee Dr. Aurora
Parong, the return further states that a warrant of arrest was issued against
her on August 4, 1982 by the Municipal Court of Bayombong for illegal
possession of a firearm and ammunition. As in all other returns in similar
cases, the Solicitor General asserts "that the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus is unavailing as to them. Courts cannot inquire into the validity and
cause of their arrest and detention" by virtue of the continued suspension,
under Presidential Proclamation No. 2045 (which proclaimed the
termination of martial law in the Philippines), of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus in the two autonomous regions in Mindanao and in all other
places with respect to persons detained for suspected involvement in
crimes related to national security.

The main opinion confronts the question of whether the issuance of a

Presidential Commitment Order (PCO) has provided the legal basis of the
detention of herein detainees following their arrest for Proclamation No.
2045-covered offenses," and remarks that "this question has to be set at
rest promptly and decisively, if we are to break a seemingly continuous flow
of petitions for habeas corpus, as what had been seen lately of such
petitions being filed in this Court one after the other.
I. I submit that the resolution of the issues in this case does not call for the
all-encompassing ruling in the main opinion with its sweeping scope that
would reexamine and overturn the benchmark ruling in Lansang. The
limited suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the two
instances provided under Presidential Proclamation No. 2045 has not been
challenged in this case. So, what's the point of an advance declaration that
all checks and barriers are down? Lansang recognizes the greatest
deference and respect that is due the President's determination for the
necessity of suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
But Lansang sets at the same time the constitutional confines and limits of
the President's power to suspend the privilege of the writ and enunciates
the constitutional test, not of the correctness of the President's decision, but
that the President's decision to suspend the privilege not suffer from the
constitutional infirmity of arbitrariness. 6 Thus, after laying the premise "that
every case must depend on its own circumstances," the Court therein thru
then Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion held that:

Indeed, the grant of power to suspend the privilege is neither absolute nor
unqualified. The authority conferred by the Constitution, both under the Bill
of Rights and under the Executive Department, is limited and conditional.
The precept in the Bill of Rights establishes a general rule, as well as an
exception thereto. What is more, it postulates the former in the negative,
evidently to stress its importance, by providing that '(t)he privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus shall not be suspended ....' It is only by way
of exception that it permits the suspension of the privilege 'in cases of
invasion, insurrection, or rebellion'- or, under Art. VII of the Constitution,
'imminent danger thereof '- 'when the public safety requires it, in any of
which events the same may be suspended wherever during such period the
necessity for such suspension shall exist.' Far from being fun and plenary,
the authority to suspend the privilege of the writ is thus circumscribed,
confined and restricted, not only by the prescribed setting or the conditions
essential to its existence, but, also, as regards the time when ? the place
where it may be exercised. These factors and the aforementioned setting or
conditions mark, establish and define the extent, the confines and the limits
of said power, beyond which it does not exist. And, like the limitations and
restrictions imposed by the Fundamental Law upon the legislative
department, adherence thereto and compliance therewith may, within
proper bounds, be inquired into by courts of justice. Otherwise, the explicit
constitutional provisions thereon would be meaningless. Surely, the framers
of our Constitution could not have intended to engage in such a wasteful
exercise in futility.

Much less may the assumption be indulged in when we bear in mind that
our political system is essentially democratic and republican in character
and that the suspension of the privilege affects the most fundamental
element of that system. namely, individual freedom. Indeed, such freedom
includes and connotes, as well as demands, the right of every single
member of our citizenry to freely discuss and dissent from, as well as
criticize and denounce, the views, the policies and the practices of the
government and the party in power that he deems unwise, improper or
inimical to the commonwealth, regardless of whether his own opinion is
objectively correct or not. The untrammelled enjoyment and exercise of
such right-which, under certain conditions, may be a civic duty of the
highest order is-vital to the democratic system and essential to its
successful operation and wholesome growth and development.

Manifestly, however, the liberty guaranteed and protected by our Basic Law
is one enjoyed and exercise, not in derogation thereof, but consistently
therewith, and, hence, within the framework of the social order established
by the Constitution and the context of the Rule of Law. Accordingly, when
individual freedom is used to destroy that social order, by means of
force and violence, in defiance of the Rule of Law such as by rising publicly
and taking arms against the government to overthrow the same, thereby
committing the crime of rebellion- there emerges a circumstance that may
warrant a limited withdrawal of the aforementioned guarantee or protection,
by suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, when public safety
requires it. Although we must before warned against mistaking mere
dissent- no matter how emphatic or intemperate it may be-for dissidence
amounting to rebellion or insurrection, the Court cannot hesitate, much less
refuse- when the existence of such rebellion or insurrection has been fairly
established or cannot reasonably be denied- to uphold the finding of the
Executive thereon, without, in effect, encroaching upon a power vested in
him by the Supreme Law of the land and depriving him, to this extent, of
such power, and, therefore, without violating the Constitution and
jeopardizing the very Rule of Law the Court is called upon to epitomize. " 7

II. The crucial issue at bar is that adversely decided by the main opinion,
denying petitioners' motion that the Court order their release on bail, on the
ground that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus for
any of the offenses covered by Proclamation No. 2045 "includes, as a
necessary consequence, the withholding for the duration of the suspension
of the privilege of the right to bail" (main opinion, at page 16).

1. I submit that notwithstanding the suspension of the privilege of the writ of

habeas corpus and the issuance on March 9, 1982 of Letter of Instruction
No. 1211 that the Presidential Commitment Order constitutes authority to
keep the subject person under detention "until ordered released by the
President or his duly authorized representative" (which is a mere internal
instruction to certain agencies), the higher and superior mandate of the
Constitution guarantees the right to bail and vests the courts with the
jurisdiction and judicial power to grant bail which may not be removed nor
diminished nor abdicated. We cannot but so hold, if we are to be true to the
fundamental precept that "The Constitution is a law for rulers and for people
equally in war and in peace and covers with the shield of its protection all
classes of men at all times and under all circumstances."

The argument that otherwise the purpose of the suspension of the privilege
would be defeated ignores the overwhelming capability of the State and its
military and police forces to keep suspects under surveillance and the
courts' imposition of reasonable conditions in granting bail, such as periodic
reports to the authorities concerned, and prohibiting their going to certain
critical areas.

2. The most authoritative pronouncement in this regard is of course none

other than the President's himself. In all the metropolitan newspapers of
April 20, 1983, the President is reported to have "said that Pimentel has
been charged with rebellion before the regional trial court of Cebu City and
is therefore under the jurisdiction of the civil court and not only under the
jurisdiction of the military by virtue of the PCO." In a telegram in reply to the
appeal of Msgr. Patrick Cronin, Archbishop of Cagayan de Oro and
Misamis Oriental, for lifting of the PCO on Mayor Aquilino Pimentel of
Cagayan de Oro City, the President said that "(T)he disposal of the body of
the accused, as any lawyer will inform you, is now within the powers of the
regional trial court of Cebu City and not within the powers of the President. "

3. This is but in consonance with the majority holding in the leading 1951
cases of Nava vs. Gatmaitan andHernandez vs. Montesa 8 (although it
failed one vote short of the required majority of six affirmative votes at the
time) as expounded by then Chief Justice Ricardo Paras and Associate
Justice (later Chief Justice) Cesar Bengzon and Associate Justices Pedro
Tuason, Alex Reyes and Fernando Jugo that after formal indictment in court
by the filing against them of an information charging rebellion with multiple
murder, etc., accused persons covered by the proclamation of suspension
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus are entitled to the right to bail.

4. As stressed by then Chief Justice Ricardo Paras, "(T)he right to bail,

along with the right of an accused to be heard by himself and counsel to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have
a speedy and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have
compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses in his behalf
(Article III, Section 1, Paragraph 17, of the Constitution), tends to aid the
accused to prove his innocence and obtain acquittal. If it be contended that
the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus includes the
suspension of the distinct right to bail or to be provisionally at liberty, it
would a fortiori imply the suspension of all his other rights (even the right to
be tried by a court) that may win for him ultimate acquittal and, hence,
absolute freedom. The latter result is not insisted upon for being patently
untenable. "

Then Chief Justice Paras stressed that "... The privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus and the right to bail guaranteed under the Bill of Rights are
separate and co-equal. If the intention of the framers of the Constitution
was that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus carries
or implies the suspension of the right to bail, they would have very easily
provided that all persons shall before conviction be bailable by sufficient
sureties, except those charged with capital offenses when evidence of guilt
is strong and except when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended. As stated in the case of Ex Parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2, 18 L. ed.
297, the Constitution limited the suspension to only one great right, leaving
the rest to remain forever inviolable. "

5. It is noteworthy and supportive of the prevailing stand since 1951 that the
other great constitutional rights remain forever inviolable since the
Constitution limited the suspension to only one great right (of the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus), that there has been no amendment of the
Constitution to curtail the right to bail in case of such suspension
notwithstanding the numerous constitutional amendments adopted after the
1973 Constitution.

6. The late Justice Pedro Tuason emphasized that "(T)o the plea that the
security of the State would be jeopardized by the release of the defendants
on bail, the answer is that the existence of danger is never a justification for
courts to tamper with the fundamental rights expressly granted by the
Constitution. These rights are immutable, inflexible, yielding to no pressure
of convenience, expediency or the so-called 'judicial statesmanship.' The
Legislature itself cannot infringe them, and no court conscious of its
responsibilities and limitations would do so. If the Bill of Rights are
incompatible with stable government and a menace to the Nation, let the
Constitution be amended, or abolished. It is trite to say that, while the
Constitution stands, the courts of justice as the repository of civil liberty are
bound to protect and maintain undiluted individual rights."

7. And former Chief Justice Cesar Bengzon then made the same forceful
plea echoed these days by men of goodwill that respect for constitutional
and human rights and adherence to the rule of law would help in the fight
against rebellion and movement for national reconciliation, thus: "And in my
opinion, one of the surest means to ease the uprising is a sincere
demonstration of this Government's adherence to the principles of the
Constitution together with an impartial application thereof to all citizens,
whether dissidents or not. Let the rebels have no reason to apprehend that
their comrades now under custody are being railroaded into Muntinglupa,
without benefit of those fundamental privileges which the experience of the
ages has deemed essential for the protection of all persons accused of
crime before the tribunal of justice. Give them the assurance that the
judiciary, ever mindful of its sacred mission, will not, thru faulty or misplaced
devotion, uphold any doubtful claims of governmental power in diminution
of individual rights, but will always cling to the principles uttered long ago by
Chief Justice Marshall that when in doubt as to the construction of the
Constitution, 'The Courts will favor personal liberty.'"

8. The right to bail cannot just be cancelled out summarily because of the
issuance of a PCO In the case at bar, detainee Dr. Aurora Parong is
charged in the municipal court with the crime of illegal possession of
firearm, which is a clearly bailable offense. The charges filed against the
other detainees are likewise for clearly bailable offenses. It is elementary
that the right to bail in non-capital offenses and even in capital offenses
where evidence of guilt is not strong will be generally granted and
respected by the courts, "the natural tendency of the courts (being) towards
a fair and liberal appreciation," particularly taking into consideration the
record and standing of the person charged and the unlikelihood of his
fleeing the court's jurisdiction.

As the Court held in the leading case of Montano vs. Ocampo 9 wherein the
Supreme Court granted bail to Senator Montano who was charged with
multiple murders and frustrated murders:

Brushing aside the charge that the prelimiminary investigation of this case
by the aforesaid Judge was railroaded, the same having been conducted at
midnight, a few hours after the complaint was filed, we are of the opinion
that, upon the evidence adduced in the applicaction for bail in the lower
court, as such evidence is recited lengthily in the present petition and the
answer thereto, and extensively analyzed and discussed in the oral
argument, there is not such clear showing of guilt as would preclude all
reasonable probability of any other conclusion.

Exclusion from bail in capital offenses being an exception to the otherwise

absolute right guaranteed by the constitution, the natural tendency of the
courts has been toward a fair and liberal appreciation, rather than
otherwise , of the evidence in the determination of the degree of proof and
presumption of guilt necessary to war. rant a deprivation of that right.
Besides, to deny bail it is not enough that the evidence of guilt is strong; it
must also appear that in case of conviction the defendant 's liability would
probably call for a capital punishment. No clear or conclusive showing
before this Court has been made.

In the evaluation of the evidence the probability of flight is one other

important factor to be taken into account. The sole purpose of confining
accusedin jail before conviction, it has been observed, is to assure his
presence at the trial. In other words, if denial of bail is authorized in capital
cases, it is only on the theory that the proof being strong, the dependant
would flee, if he has the opportunity, rather than face the verdict of the jury.
Hence the exception to the fundamental right to be bailed should be applied
in direct ratio to the extent of the probability of evasion of prosecution.

The possibility of escape in this case, bearing in mind the defendant's

official and social standing and his other personal circumstances, seems
remote if not nil."

In the recent case of Sobremonte vs. Enrile, 10 the detainee was released
upon her filing of the recommended P1,000.00 bail bond for the offense of
possession of subversive literature with which she was charged and the
habeas corpus petition, like many others, although dismissed for having
thereby become moot, accomplished the purpose of securing the accused's
release from prolonged detention. The Court had occasion to decry therein
that "all the effort, energy and manhours expended by the parties and their
counsel, including this Court, ... could have been avoided had the officers of
the AVSECOM and the ISAFP responded promptly to the inquiries of
petitioner instead of giving her the 'run-around' by referring her from one
office to another."

9. "The continuous flow of petitions for habeas corpus" filed with this Court
should not be decried nor discouraged. The Court stands as the guarantor
of the constitutional and human rights of all persons within its jurisdiction
and must see to it that the rights are respected and enforced. It is settled in
his jurisdiction that once a deprivation of a constitutional right is shown to
exist, the court that rendered the judgment or before whom the case is
pending is ousted of jurisdiction and habeas corpus is the appropriate
remedy to assail the legality of the detention. 11 So accused persons
deprived of the constitutional right of speedy trial have been set free. 12 And
likewise persons detained indefinitely without charges so much so that the
detention becomes punitive and not merely preventive in character are
entitled to regain their freedom. The spirit and letter of our Constitution
negates as contrary to the basic precepts of human rights and freedom that
a person be detained indefinitely without any charges.

III. The main opinion invokes "a time of war or grave peril to the nation" (at
page 16), oblivious of the Presidents lifting of martial law under
Proclamation No. 2045 on January 17, 1981 and the specific premises
therein set forth that

WHEREAS, the Filipino people, having subdued threats to the stability of

government, public order and security, are aware that the time has come to
consolidate the gains attained by the nation under a state of martial law by
assuming their normal political roles and shaping the national destiny within
the framework of civil government and popular democracy:

WHEREAS, the experience gained by the nation under martial law in

subduing threats to the stability of the government, public order and
security, has enabled the Filipino people to rediscover their confidence in
their ability to command the resources of national unity, patriotism,
discipline and sense of common destiny;

WHEREAS, the government and the people are at the same time also
aware that the public safety continues to require a degree of capability to
deal adequately with elements who persist in endeavoring to overthrow the
government by violent means and exploiting every opportunity to disrupt the
peaceful and productive labors of the government; ..."

As to the "self-evident" submittal of the main opinion that "the duty of the
judiciary to protect individual rights must yield to the power of the Executive
to protect the State, for if the State perishes, the Constitution, with the Bill of
Rights that guarantees the right to personal liberty, perishes with it" (at page
16), I can only recall the exhortation of the Holy Father John Paul II in his
address to the Philippine nation on February 17, 1981, thus: "Even in
exceptional situations that may at times arise, one can never justify any
violation of the fundamental dignity of the human person or of the basic
rights that safeguard this dignity. Legitimate concern for the security of a
nation, as demanded by the common good, could lead to the temptation of
subjugating to the State the human being and his or her dignity and rights.
Any apparent conflict between the exigencies of security and of the citizens'
basic rights must be resolved according to the fundamental principle-upheld
always by the Church- that social organization exists only for the service of
man and for the protection of his dignity, and that it cannot claim to serve
the common good when human rights are not safeguaded. People will have
faith in the safeguarding of their security and the promotion of their well-
being only to the extent that they feel truly involved, and supported in their
very humanity."
G.R. No. L-61016 April 26, 1983

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF

HORACIO R. MORALES, JR., petitioner,
vs.
MINISTER JUAN PONCE ENRILE, GEN. FABIAN C. VER and COL.
GALILEO KINTANAR, respondents.

G.R. No. L-61107 April 26, 1983

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF

ANTONIO C. MONCUPA, JR. ANTONIO C. MONCUPA, JR., petitioner,
vs.
MINISTER JUAN PONCE ENRILE, GEN. FABIAN C. VER and COL.
GALILEO KINTANAR, respondents.

Lorenzo M. Tañada, Augusto Sanchez, Jejomar Binay and Antonio

Quintos for petitioners.

The Solicitor General for respondents.

CONCEPCION, JR., J.:

1. The petitions are without merit and are hereby DISMISSED.

2. Petitioners were arrested on April 21, 1982 at about 9:45 a.m. while
they were riding together in a motor vehicle on Laong-Laan Street,
Quezon City, by elements of Task Force Makabansa of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines. Since their arrest, they have been under
detention. Petitioner Morales filed his petition for habeas corpus with
this Court on July 9, 1982, while petitioner Moncupa filed his on July 19,
1982. On July 20, 1982 petitioners, together with several others, were
charged with rebellion (Art. 134, Revised Penal Code) before the Court
of First Instance of Rizal in Criminal Case No. Q-21091 filed by the City
Fiscal of Quezon City. The trial of the case has yet to be terminated. The
continued detention of petitioners to answer for the offense charged is
therefore legal.

3. Petitioners allege that they were arrested without any warrant of

arrest; that their constitutional rights were violated, among them the
right to counsel, the right to remain silent, the right to a speedy and
public trial, and the right to bail. They also air the charge that they were
subjected to maltreatment and torture; that they did not have the
opportunity to present their defense before the inquest fiscal and
therefore asked this Court to order the reinvestigation of the charges
against them. Acting on such plea, this Court in a resolution en
banc dated July 22, 1982 ordered the City Fiscal of Quezon City to
conduct such reinvestigation and at the same time appointed him "to
act as commissioner of this Court and receive evidence of the charges
made by petitioners before this Court of alleged torture and violation of
their constitutional rights, particularly the right to counsel." On
September 28, 1982, the City Fiscal submitted his report on the
reinvestigation affirming the existence of a prima facie case for
rebellion against petitioners and several others. And on February 8,
1983 he submitted to this Court the transcript of the notes taken at the
reception of the evidence on the charges of petitioners.

4. If petitioners had been arrested in a communist country, they would

have no rights to speak of. However, the Philippines is a republican
state. Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority
emanates from them. 1 We have a Constitution framed by a constitutional
convention and duly ratified by the people. We subscribe to the rule of law.
We believe in human rights and we protect and defend them. Petitioners are
entitled to the full enjoyment of all the rights granted to them by law. And this
Court stands as the guarantor of those rights.

5. Our Constitution provides:

SEC. 20. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Any

person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the
right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right. No
force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free
will shall be used against him. Any confession obtained in violation of this
section shall be inadmissible in evidence. 2

6. After a person is arrested and his custodial investigation begins a

confrontation arises which at best may be termed unequal. The detainee is
brought to an army camp or police headquarters and there questioned and
cross-examined not only by one but as many investigators as may be
necessary to break down his morale. He finds himself in a strange and un
familiar surrounding, and every person he meets he considers hostile to him.
The investigators are well-trained and seasoned in their work. They employ
all the methods and means that experience and study has taught them to
extract the truth, or what may pass for it, out of the detainee. Most detainees
are unlettered and are not aware of their constitutional rights. And even if
they were, the intimidating and coercive presence of the officers of the law in
such an atmosphere overwhelms them into silence. Section 20 of the Bill of
Rights seeks to remedy this imbalance.

7. At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer
to inform him of the reason for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant
of arrest, if any. He shall be informed of his constitutional rights to remain
silent and to counsel, and that any statement he might make could be used
against him. The person arrested shall have the right to communicate with
his lawyer, a relative, or anyone he chooses by the most expedient means-
by telephone if possible or by letter or messenger. It shall be the responsibility
of the arresting officer to see to it that this is accomplished. No custodial
investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel
engaged by the person arrested, by any person on his behalf, or appointed
by the court upon petition either of the detainee himself or by anyone on his
behalf. The right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid
unless made with the assistance of counsel. Any statement obtained in
violation of the procedure herein laid down, whether exculpatory or
inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence.

8. During the period of his detention, he shall have the right to confer with his
counsel at any hour of the day or, in urgent cases, of the night, alone and
privately, in the jail or any other place of custody. 3

Arrest.

9. Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he may be

forthcoming to answer for the commission of an offense.4

10. An arrest may be made with or without a warrant.

SEC. 3. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature
and for any purpose shall not be violated, and no search warrant or warrant
of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the
judge, or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses
he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized. 5

11. Our Constitution clearly defines the persons who may issue a warrant of
arrest and limits them to a "judge, or such other responsible officer as may
be authorized by law." It also lays down in unmistakable terms the procedure
required before a search warrant or warrant of arrest may issue.

12. A Presidential Arrest and Commitment Order is a warrant of arrest issued

by the President of the Philippines. 6Its issuance must therefore comply with
the requirements of the Constitution, in the same manner and to the same
extent, as a warrant of arrest issued by a judge issuance must therefore
comply with the requirements of the Constitution, in the same manner and to
the same extent, as a warrant of arrest by a judge.

13. An arrest may also be made without a warrant.

SEC. 6. Arrest without warrant — When lawful.— A peace officer or a private

person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or

is about to commit an offense in his presence;

(b) When an offense has in fact been committed, and he has reasonable
ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed it;

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a
penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.7

14. Care should be exercised in making an arrest without a warrant. Where

there is no justification for the arrest, the public officer could be criminally
liable for arbitrary detention8 or unlawful arrest 9 or for some other offense.

15. The petitioners claim they were arrested without a warrant. The
Memorandum to the President dated April 21, 1982 from Gen. Fabian C. Ver,
Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, wherein he reported the
arrest of petitioners, the subversive documents seized from them and the
results of the ensuing tactical interrogation, with a recommendation for the
issuance of a Presidential Arrest and Commitment Order, was approved by
the President only on April 23, 1982. Indeed, therefore, petitioners were
arrested without a warrant. However, months before their arrest, petitioners
were already under surveillance on suspicion of committing rebellion. From
the results of the said surveillance, the evidence then at hand, and the
documents seized from them at the time of their arrest, it would appear that
they had committed or were actually committing the offense of rebellion. Their
arrest without a warrant for the said offense is therefore clearly justified.

Procedure after Arrest.

16. After a person is arrested either without a warrant or by virtue of a warrant
of arrest issued by a judge or by virtue of a Presidential Arrest and
Commitment Order, the proper complaint or information against him must be
filed with the courts of justice within the time prescribed by law, to wit:

FURTHER AMENDING ARTICLE 125 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE, AS

AMENDED (PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1404)

WHEREAS, the periods within which arrested persons shall be delivered to

the judicial authorities as provided in Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended, are on occasions inadequate to enable the government to file
within the said periods the criminal information against persons arrested for
certain crimes against national security and public order.

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Republic

of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution,
and in the interest of national security as well as public safety and order, do
hereby decree and order as part of the law of the land the following
amendment to Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended:

SECTION 1. Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, is hereby

further amended to read as follows:

ART. 125. Delay in the delivery of detained persons. -The penalties provided
in the next preceding article shall be imposed upon the public officer or
employee who shall detain any person for some legal ground and shall fail to
deliver such person to the proper judicial authorities within the period of: six
hours, for crimes or offenses punishable by light penalties, or their equivalent;
nine hours, for crimes or offenses punishable by correctional penalties, or
their equivalent; and eighteen hours, for crimes or offenses punishable by
afflictive or capital penalties, or their equivalent; Provided, however, That the
President may, in the interest of national security and public order, authorize
by Executive Order longer periods, which in no case shall exceed 30 days,
or for as long as the conspiracy to commit the crime against national security
and public order continues or is being implemented, for the delivery of
persons arrested for crimes or offenses against public order as defined in
Title III, Book 11 of this Code, namely: Articles 134, 136, 138, 139, 141, 142,
143, 144, 146 and 147, and for acts in violation of Republic Act No. 1700 as
amended by Presidential Decree No. 885, taking into consideration the
gravity of the offense or offenses, the number of persons arrested, the threat
to national security or to public safety and order, and/or the occurrence of a
public calamity or other emergency situation preventing the early
investigation of the cases and the filing of the corresponding information
before the civil courts.

In every case, the person detained shall be informed of the cause of his
detention and shall be allowed, upon his request, to communicate and confer
at any time with his attorney or counsel, and to be visited by his immediate
relatives.

SEC. 2. All acts, executive order, proclamations, Presidential Decrees,

General Orders, Letters of Instruction, rules and regulations, or parts thereof,
inconsistent with the provisions of this decree are hereby repealed or
modified accordingly.

SEC. 3. Transitory provision.-Pending the preparation and promulgation by

the President of the Executive Order referred to in Section 1 hereof, the
detention of persons arrested for any of the abovementioned offenses
against public order shall continue to be governed by the provisions of
General Orders No. 2, dated September 22, 1972 as amended by General
Order Nos. 60 and 62, dated September 24, 1977 and October 22, 1977,
respectively.

SEC 4. This decree shall take effect immediately.

Done in the City of Manila this 9th day of June, in the year of Our Lord,
nineteen hundred and seventy-eight."

17. Failure of the public officer to do so without any valid reason would
constitute a violation of Art. 125, Revised Penal Code, as amended. And the
person detained would be entitled to be released on a writ of habeas
corpus, unless he is detained under subsisting process issued by a
competent court.10

Power of the Courts.

18. The writ of habeas corpus has often been referred to as the great writ of
liberty. It is the most expeditious way of securing the release of one who has
been illegally detained. The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus may be
suspended, but not the writ itself.

19. The Bill of Rights provides:

SECTION 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without

due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of
the laws.

20. In Lansang vs.Garcia, 42 SCRA 448,473,We said:

In our resolution of October 5, 1972, We stated that 'a majority of the court
'had 'tentatively arrived at a consensus that it may inquire in order to satisfy
itself of the existence of the factual bases for the issuance of Presidential
Proclamations Nos. 889 and 889A ... and thus determine the constitutional
sufficiency of such bases in the light of the requirements of Article III, sec. 1,
par. 14, and Article VII, sec. 10, par. 2, of the Philippine Constitution ...' Upon
further deliberation, the members of the Court are now unanimous in the
conviction that it has the authority to inquire into the existence of said factual
bases in order to determine the constitutional sufficiency thereof.

21. We reiterate this doctrine.

22. Furthermore, We hold that under the judicial power of review and by
constitutional mandate, in all petitions for habeas corpus the court must
inquire into every phase and aspect of petitioner's detention from the moment
petitioner was taken into custody up to the moment the court passes upon
the merits of the petition. Only after such a scrutiny can the court satisfy itself
that the due process clause of our Constitution has in fact been satisfied.

23. The submission that a person may be detained indefinitely without any
charges and the courts cannot inquire into the legality of the restraint goes
against the spirit and letter of the Constitution and does violence to the basic
precepts of human rights and a democratic society.

The Right to Bail.

24. Next to life a man loves his freedom. Some men love their freedom even
more than their life.

25. In all criminal prosecutions the accused is presumed innocent. Because

of this presumption and inasmuch as every man has a natural desire to be
free, our Constitution laid down the right to bail in these words:

SEC. 18. All persons, except those charged with capital offenses when
evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient
sureties. Excessive bail shall not be required. 11

26. Although martial law was terminated on January 17, 1981, by virtue of
Proclamation No. 2045 of the President of the Philippines, the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus continues to be suspended in the two autonomous
regions in Mindanao and in all other places with respect to certain offenses,
thus:

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President/Prime Minister

of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution,
do hereby revoke Proclamation No. 1081 (Proclaiming a State of Martial Law
in the Philippines) and Proclamation No. 1104 (Declaring the Continuation of
Martial Law) and proclaim the termination of the state of martial law
throughout the Philippines; Provided, that the call to the Armed Forces of the
Philippines to prevent or suppress lawless violence, insurrection, rebellion
and subversion shall continue to be in force and effect; and Provided that in
the two autonomous regions in Mindanao, upon the request of the residents
therein, the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall
continue; and in all other places the suspension of the privilege of the writ
shall also continue with respect to persons at present detained as well as
others who may hereafter be similarly detained for the crimes of insurrection
or rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and
for all other crimes and offenses committed by them in furtherance of or on
the occasion therefore, or incident thereto, or in connection therewith. ...
(Presidential Proclamation No. 2045).

27. Normally, rebellion being a non-capital offense is bailable. But because

the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus remains suspended "with respect
to persons at present detained as well as other who may hereafter be
similarly detained for the crimes of insurrection or rebellion, subversion,
conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and for all other crimes and
offenses committed by them in furtherance of or on the occasion thereof, or
incident thereto, or in connection therewith," the natural consequence is that
the right to bail for the commission of anyone of the said offenses is also
suspended. To hold otherwise would defeat the very purpose of the
suspension. Therefore, where the offense for which the detainee was
arrested is anyone of the said offenses he has no right to bail even after the
charges are filed in court.

28. The crimes of rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit

such crimes, and crimes or offenses committed in furtherance thereof or in
connection therewith constitute direct attacks on the life of the State.

29. Just as an individual has right to self-defense when his life is endangered,
so does the State. The suspension of the privilege of the writ is to enable the
State to hold in preventive imprisonment pending investigation and trial those
persons who plot against it and commit acts that endanger the State's very
existence. For this measure of self-defense to be effective, the right to bail
must also be deemed suspended with respect to these offenses.

30. However, there is a difference between preventive and punitive

imprisonment. Where the filing of charges in court or the trial of such charges
already filed becomes protracted without any justifiable reason, the detention
becomes punitive in character and the detainee regains his right to freedom.

The Charges of Torture.

31. When petitioners charged in their petitions that they had been tortured
and maltreated, the Court decided to appoint the City Fiscal of Quezon City
to hear the charges and to receive the evidence. Not because We are an
investigating body. Nor are We a trier of facts. But because petitioners'
charges are material and relevant to the petitions before Us.

32. As mentioned earlier, the Court Commissioner submitted the transcript of

the proceedings held before him. We will not pass upon the merits of the
torture charges. However, they should be filed before the body which has
jurisdiction over them as provided for in Presidential Decrees Nos. 1822,
1822-A and 1850.

33. The present form of our government, to all intents and purposes, merged
the executive and legislative branches into one. Members of parliament are
at the same time cabinet ministers. Under the system of checks and balances
ordained by the Constitution, the judiciary serves as the check and balance
to the merged executive and legislative branches. The judiciary is therefore
called upon to express its thoughts on areas outside the traditional and
narrow confines of decision making, with the end in view that together we
may explore the free market of Ideas and arrive at what is best for our country
and our people.

34. Our people cry out for a better life. They want more food in their stomachs,
roofs over their heads, health services for themselves and their families,
education for their children, and other necessities that make life worth living.
They cannot be denied. They want it and they want it now. Timely indeed are
the thrusts of the KKK and the BLISS programs.

35. However, we cannot lead them to a truly better life, unless we achieve
complete peace in our land; and we cannot have complete peace unless we
improve the administration of justice.

36. It was a wise man who once said: "Tell me how a country's poor receive
their justice and I will tell you how stable its government is." 12

37. Whenever we speak of the administration of justice we refer to four

principal areas: the preservation of peace and order which is the primary task
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the National Integrated Police,
both under the Ministry of Defense; the investigation and prosecution of
offenses and the administration of our penal system which are under the
Ministry of Justice; the application and interpretation of laws and the trial and
adjudication of cases which fall under the jurisdiction of the courts; and
appearance as counsel for the government particularly in appealed criminal
cases and as counsel for the Commission on Elections, Securities and
Exchange Commission, and others, which is the responsibility of the Office
of the Solicitor General. In everyone of these areas much can be done to
achieve our ultimate goal-that in this fair land of ours, no man, no matter how
humble, no matter how poor shall thirst for justice.

38. Our machinery of justice should be geared towards helping and protecting
the poor among us. Not knowing their rights, not having the means to pay for
the services of a lawyer, possessing no influence whatsoever, they are
invariably the victims of injustice. The affluent can take care of themselves.
They are better aware of their rights, they have influence, and they can
engage the services of the best counsel. But the poor can only pray to God
and hope to find relief in the system of justice established by their
government.

39. We must open all avenues for complaints and keep them open so that
the grievance procedure may be made more readily available to the masses
of our people. Only by knowing their needs can we give them what they
rightfully deserve.

40. It is undeniable that throughout the length and breadth of our land,
lawlessness and disorder have increased and continue to increase to
undesirable proportions. It is wishful thinking to believe otherwise. An efforts
must be exerted now to reverse the trend. We cannot afford any delay. And
we should begin by bringing to the bar of justice the culprits in particular who
burned and destroyed public property, and attacked, kidnapped and killed
public functionaries. For the questions may validly be asked: If the
government cannot protect public property, how can it protect private
property? If the government cannot guarantee the safety and lives of its
officials, how can it guarantee the safety and lives of private individuals?

41. The investigation and prosecution of cases should be further improved

so that only meritorious cases shall reach the courts, thus contributing to the
unclogging of court dockets. Many criminal cases initiated by complainants
are just harassment suits and should never have been filed in court. In the
process, it is required that all fiscals be appointed in a permanent capacity.
Their security of tenure is the foundation stone of their independence. Our
penal system should be further updated to make more effective the
rehabilitation of criminals. Let us do away with instances of first offenders
who serve sentence in order to be reformed but who come out instead as
hardened criminals.

42. And with the judicial revamp just effected under B.P. 129, the trial and
decision making process has been modified and vastly improved to achieve
better results. But it must be remembered that courts which are not filled are
as good as no courts at all. Therefore, more appointments to the existing
vacancies should be made.

43. One lesson our people have learned-painfully but well-is that politics and
a good administration of justice-like oil and water-do not mix; that when
politics infiltrates the administration of justice, injustice is often the outcome.
In some jurisdictions of the United States, there are sheriffs (peace officers)
and district attorneys (prosecutors) who are elected by the voters and who
run for office as the candidates of a political party. In the Philippines such a
system would never work because in our culture we have values peculiarly
our own-value like "utang na loob", "compadre", "pakikisama", "tayu-tayo",
"bigayan", "bata ko", "amo ko", and the "god- father mentality". Values like
these have derailed and may derail the administration of justice. Political
followers commit abuses in the belief that come what may their political
bosses would shield them from punishment. Can you imagine how criminal
cases would be investigated and prosecuted if fiscals (prosecutors) were
chosen by election? How would our laws be enforced if policemen and
members of the Armed Forces were elected by the people? And yet the
heads of the Ministries of Justice and Defense and the Office of the Solicitor
General are all active politicians.

44. The burdens of office fall heavily on their shoulders. Perhaps it is time we
relieve them of the additional burdens that being politicians entail. Our
Constitution foresaw the need for heads of ministries who are not active
politicians in providing that ". . . . At least a majority of the Members of the
Cabinet who are heads of ministries shall come from the Regional
Representations of the Batasang Pambansa. . . ." 13

45. The campaign against venality in office-malfeasance, misfeasance and

nonfesance should be pursued with renewed vigor. For graft and corruption
are like termites gnawing away the foundation of government. The harm done
is sometimes not realized; or even if realized, under- estimated. In the
process let us remember to stress preventive measures to save public
property from loss.

46. The communist threat remains a nagging problem of government.

Whether Marxist, Maoist, Leninist, aided by the New People's Army, rebels,
radicals, and lawless elements, they all have but one aim-one single purpose-
one defined objective: to bring down by violence the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines and to forcibly seize political power in order that
they may replace our existing political, social, economic, and legal order with
an entirely new one based on communism.

47. Once before, in the early fifties, communists threatened the established
order. They were driven back by the Armed Forces, mainly because of the
support of our people. We must keep, strengthen and solidify the sympathy,
faith, loyalty, and trust in the government of our brothers in the rural areas.
Guns and bullets alone will not do it. We can accomplish this only by giving
them better government. It is a condition sine qua non to achieve success in
the fight against subversion.

48. By and large, the Armed Forces are composed of good and disciplined
men. However, there are those who are not worthy of the uniforms they wear.
Not a few have enriched themselves by abusing the powers of their position.
Some are involved in extortion, smuggling, and kidnapping for ransom. There
are others who maintain gambling, drug rings, and prostitution dens. And still
others have committed robbery, rape, murder, and other offenses. The
campaign to rid the organization of such misfits should be carried out with
missionary zeal. For indeed victims of abuse are often alienated from the
government.

49. The Filipinos are a God-loving and a God-fearing people. We believe in

peace and freedom. We believe in the family and its strong ties. We can
never willingly accept communism and what it stands for.

50. While the government should continue to repel the communists, the
subversives, the rebels, and the lawless with all the means at its command,
it should always be remembered that whatever action is taken must always
be within the framework of our Constitution and our laws.

51. When the judgment of history is written, as leaders of our people, we shall
be asked to account not only for what we did, not only for what we did not do,
but also for what visions we have today of our tomorrow.

52. What will be our answer?

53. WHEREFORE, as aforestated, the petitions should be, as they are

hereby, DISMISSED. With costs against the petitioners.

54. SO ORDERED.

Aquino, J., concurs in the result.

Guerrero, J., I concur in the dismissal of the petitions.

Plana, J., Escolin J., Vasquez, J., concurs in the result.

Relova, J., I concur and will also add my own views in a separate opinion.

Separate Opinions

FERNANDO, C.J., concurring:

concurring in the dismissed of the petitions, expressing conformity with the

reiteration of the doctrine announced in Lansang v. Garcia, and dissenting
on the question of the right to bail which for him may be invoked whenever
allowable under the Constitution:

Let me make clear at the outset that I limit myself to a concurrence in the
dismissal of the petitions, expressing conformity with the reiteration of the
doctrine in Lansang v. Garcia,1 and a dissent on the question of the right to
bail during a period of suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, which for me may be invoked whenever allowable under the
Constitution, a stand I took both as counsel in Hernandez v. Montesa 2 and
thereafter as a member of the Court in Lansang v. Garcia, 3 Buscayno v.
Enrile, 4 and Garcia-Padilla v. Ponce Enrile. 5 This is by no means to indicate
lack of due recognition of the intensity of conviction and lucidity of expression
so evident in the exhaustive opinion of Justice Concepcion Jr. It is merely to
adhere to the norm of limiting myself to an appraisal of the constitutional
rights invoked insofar as they have a bearing on these petitions. 6 Hence this
separate expression of my views.

1. The first paragraph of the decisions of this Court is worded as follows: "The
petitions are without merit and are hereby DISMISSED." 7 I am in full
agreement. The authoritative doctrine followed by this Court in accordance
with well-settled jurisprudence is that the moment it can be shown that the
persons detained are being held in lawful custody by virtue of a judicial
process, then an application of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
cannot succeed.8

2. There is equally to my mind no question about the validity as a legal

proposition of paragraph 4 of the opinion, which speaks of the Philippines
being "a republican state. Sovereignty resides in the people and all
government authority emanates from them. We have a Constitution framed
by a constitutional convention and duly ratified by the people. We subscribe
to the rule of law. We believe in human rights and we protect and defend
them. Petitioners are entitled to the full enjoyment of all the rights granted to
them by law. And this Court stands as the guarantor of those rights." 9 This
Court in normal times as well as under emergency conditions has displayed
fealty to human rights, as protected and safeguarded by the Constitution. It
is a matter of legitimate pride that even under the 1935 Charter, the
Philippines has accorded full recognition not only to the traditional civil and
political rights but to social and economic rights. The autonomy of the human
personality and the assurance of his dignity are a matter of deep public
concern. It is equally a matter of legitimate pride that during the period of
martial law, with fun recognition of the power of the government to maintain
peace and order and preserve its authority, the judiciary, was not recreant to
such a trust. 10 For the entire judiciary, not only this Court, stands as a
guarantor of those rights. It does so when it has to act in a proper case
submitted to it. The political branches are equally, to my mind, guarantors of
human rights; the Batasan Pambansa in the enactment of laws and the
President in their enforcement whether through executive orders
implementing them or the issuance of decrees having the force and effect of
law. In the sense, however, that decisions coming from this Court have not
merely an inter-partes but an erga omnes effect, binding not only the litigants
but also others finding themselves similarly situated, it is quite accurate to
state that "this Court stands as a guarantor of those rights."

3. It is by virtue of the respect for constitutional rights that in the resolutions

of this Court in both applications for the writ, it was made clear that counsel
of petitioners can visit them and confer with them in an atmosphere of
confidentiality consistent with reasonable security measures to be imposed
by respondents. 11 Again, it is by virtue of deference to the Constitution that
in succeeding resolutions, their allegations as to other instances of violation
of their rights were referred for investigation to the City Fiscal of Quezon
City. 12

4. Paragraphs 5 to 19 of the opinion of the Court elaborate further on the

matter. They are notable for the concern shown for constitutional rights, with
full recognition of the power of the state to deal effectively with rebellion or
subversion. I view the matter similarly. The same thought was given
expression in Lansang v. Garcia. 13 In the memorable language of Chief
Justice Concepcion: "Manifestly, however, the liberty guaranteed and
protected by our Basic Law is one enjoyed and exercised, not in derogation
thereof, but consistently therewith, and, hence, within the framework of the
social order established by the Constitution and the context of the Rules of
Law. Accordingly, when individual freedom is used to destroy that social
order, by means of force and violence, in defiance of the Rule of Law-such
as rising publicly and taking arms against the government to overthrow the
same, thereby committing the crime of rebellion there emerges a
circumstance that may warrant a limited withdrawal of the aforementioned
guarantee or protection, by suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, when public safety requires it. Although we must be forewarned
against mistaking mere dissent-no matter how emphatic or intemperate it
may be-for dissidence amounting to rebellion or insurrection, the Court
cannot hesitate, much less refuse-when the existence of such rebellion or
insurrection has been fairly established or cannot reasonably be denied-to
uphold the finding of the Executive thereon, without, in effect, encroaching
upon a power vested in him by the Supreme Law of the land and depriving
him, to this extent, of such power, and, therefore, without violating the
Constitution and jeopardizing the very Rule of Law the Court is called upon
to epitomize." 14

5. In the opinion of Justice Concepcion Jr., paragraph 21 explicitly states:

"We reiterate this doctrine." There is thus a reaffirmance of the ruling in
Lansang cited in paragraph 20 to the effect that the suspension of the
privilege of the writ raises a judicial rather than a political question. I am in
complete agreement. That was the point of my dissent in the recently decided
case of Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile.

6. There is also on my part conformity with the view set forth in paragraph 22
that "in all petitions for habeas corpusthe court must inquire into every phase
and aspect of petitioner's detention-from the moment petitioner was taken
into custody up to the moment the court passes upon the merits of the
petition." 15

7. I am in agreement with the view expressed in paragraph 23 that there can

be no indefinite detention without charges being filed. It must be recognized,
however, that in cases of invasion, rebellion and insurrection, or imminent
danger thereof, the power of preventive detention is recognized by the
Constitution, considering that when public safety requires, the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus may be suspended or martial law, as a last resort,
declared. I had occasion to speak on the matter in my separate opinion
in Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile, where I stated that when the stage of punitive
detention is reached, there can be reliance on the writ of habeas corpus. 16

8. The next five paragraphs deal with the right to bail. Paragraph 24 correctly
noted: "Next to life, man loves his freedom." In the next paragraph reference
is made of the presumption of innocence and then of the constitutional right
to bail, after which it was noted in paragraph 26 that under Presidential
Proclamation No. 2045 lifting martial law, the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus "continues to be suspended in the two autonomous regions in
Mindanao and in all other places with respect to certain offenses," namely
"the crimes of insurrection or rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to
commit such crimes, and for all other crimes and offenses committed by them
in furtherance of or on the occasion thereof, or incident thereto, or in
connection therewith." Paragraph 27 reaches the heart of the matter, the
main opinion laying down the principle that due to the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus remain suspended, "the natural consequence is that the right
to bail for the commission of anyone of the said offenses is also suspended.
To hold otherwise would defeat the very purpose of the suspension.
Therefore, where the offense for which the detainee was arrested is anyone
of the said offenses he has no right to bail even after the charges are filed in
court." Paragraph 28 sets forth the ratio decidendi: "The crimes of rebellion,
subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and crimes or
offenses committed in furtherance thereof or in connection therewith
constitute direct attacks on the life of the State." Then an analogy is made in
the next paragraph in this wise: "Just as an individual has a right to self-
defense when his life is endangered, so does the State. The suspension of
the privilege of the writ is to enable the State to hold in preventive
imprisonment pending investigation and trial those persons who plot against
it and commit acts that endanger the State's very existence. For this measure
of self-defense to be effective, the right to bail must also be deemed
suspended with respect to these offenses." With respect, I dissent. It is not
necessary to repeat what I said right at the beginning of this opinion why I
am unable to agree to the proposition that the suspension of the privilege of
the writ carries with it the suspension of the right to bail. Nor is there need to
quote from my concurring and dissenting opinions both in the Lansang and
the Garcia-Padilla cases. Briefly put, my perception of the matter traces itself
to what was said in the landmark Milligan decision where the American
Supreme Court said that only one great right may be suspended "leaving all
the rest forever inviolable." 17 This is not to ignore the practical consideration
set forth in the opinion of retired Chief Justice Concepcion in Lansang that
militates against my approach. First he aptly summarized it in the words of
Justice Tuason in Henandez, "if and when formal complaint is presented, the
court steps in and the executive steps out." 18 After which came this portion
of the opinion of the then Chief Justice: "From a long-range viewpoint, this
interpretation-of the act of the President in having said formal charges filed
is, We believe, more beneficial to the detainees than that favored by Mr.
Justice Fernando. His view-particularly the theory that the detainees should
be released immediately, without bail, even before the completion of said
preliminary examination and/or investigation-would tend to induce the
Executive to refrain from firing formal charges as long as it may be possible.
Manifestly, We should encourage the early filing of said charges, so that
courts of justice could assume jurisdiction over the detainees and extend to
them effective protection." 19

9. That brings us to paragraph 33 of the main opinion. The characterization

of a "merged executive and legislative branches" does not suffer from the
taint of in accuracy, if viewed from the practical standpoint. Viewed as a
matter of legal theory, I am not prepared to go that far. This Court, in a
unanimous opinion, expressly held: "The adoption of certain aspects of a
parliamentary system in the amended Constitution does not alter its
essentially presidential character." 20 There is therefore no repudiation of the
theory of separation of powers. Through the exercise of vigorous presidential
leadership, however, made manifest in party caucuses, there is attained both
unity of purpose and action. In that sense, it could be asserted with truth that
there is to all intents and purposes fusion of the executive and legislative
branches. Hence the need for the maintenance of the concept of an
independent judiciary. So it was pointed out in Fortun v. Labang. 21

10. One last word. Doctrines have to be assessed in terms of its effect on the
governmental process. The rationale cannot be dissociated from the texture
of the times. They cannot ignore the forces at work which may either solidify
or rent asunder the political community. A crisis situation has a compulsion
all its own. There may then be a conflict between the traditional formulations
and the coercion of events. That may render even more unavoidable the
intrusion of the demands of the hour into the domain of law. Adherence to
what has been all along the accepted basic approach to human rights calls
for fealty. There must be also, however, recognition of a more fluid standard
in the assessment of governmental action to protect the security of the state.
It is my submission, however, that only when there may be grave public
danger should reliance on the high estate accorded constitutional rights be
stigmatized as being in the grip of the suffocating orthodoxies of the law.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring opinion:

I concur in the sharply perceptive and heartfelt main opinion penned by Mr.
Justice Hermogenes Concepcion, Jr. especially in the reminders about rights
of the accused, the cry of our people for material necessities to give them a
better life, and the proper administration of justice. However, I would like to
add some qualifying observations to a few points discussed by the ponente.

I agree, that the issuance of a presidential arrest and commitment order

(PCO) must comply with the requirements of the Constitution. However, until
the issue is placed squarely before us in a more appropriate case, I hesitate
to concur in a categorical statement that a PCO may be equated with a
warrant of arrest issued by a judge under Section 3, Article IV of the
Constitution. An examination of Letters of Instructions Nos. 1125-A and 1211
indicates that the PCO is issued by the President, not as "such other
responsible officers as may be authorized by law" under Section 3 of the Bill
of Rights but as Commander-in-Chief exercising exclusively executive
powers under the Constitution to meet problems of invasion, insurrection, or
rebellion or imminent danger thereof, when the public safety requires it.
Precisely, the letters of instructions call for preliminary examination or
investigation by a judge as the regular procedure. Only when resort to judicial
process is not possible or expedient without endangering public order and
safety and when the release on bail of the person or persons already under
arrest by virtue of a judicial warrant would endanger said public order and
safety may the military commander or the head of the law enforcement
agency apply to the President, through the Minister of National Defense, for
a presidential commitment order. The fact that the stated procedure in the
issuance of a PCO is an exception to and differs from the regular procedure
before a judge for the issuance of a warrant of arrest shows that a PCO may
not be equated completely with a warrant of arrest.

In Qua Chee Gan v. Deportation Board, (9 SCRA 27), the issue was raised
that the President, having been given the power to deport undesirable aliens,
may not be denied power which is essential to carry into effect the
deportation. This Court did not categorically rule that the President himself
may order the arrest of an alien for deportation purposes, but neither did it
rule that he may not do so. The fact is the President has on various
occasions, such as those involving among others, Mr. Harry Stonehill and
some associates and perhaps and Yuyiteng brothers, ordered the arrest of
aliens without having to secure a warrant of arrest from a judge at a time
when under the Constitution only a judge could issue such a warrant. The
commander-in-chief's power in a situation where the writ of habeas corpus
has been suspended or martial law has been proclaimed is certainly broader
and less subject to constitutional restrictions than the power of deportation. I
may also add that the President does not personally examine the
complainant and the witnesses the latter may produce as the multifarious
affairs of state prevent him from doing so. But as in the case of judges relying
on investigations conducted by the fiscal, the President may rely on his
Minister of National Defense or the recommending military commander or the
head of the law enforcement agency to conduct what would be the equivalent
of the judicial examination for probable cause. Of course, the rules in Amarga
v. Abbas, (98 Phil. 739) which impose on the judge issuing the warrant of
arrest the legal duty to first satisfy himself that there is probable cause without
relying completely or ministerially upon the findings of the fiscal, should also
apply and I believe are in fact applied to PCO's.

It also hesitate to give concurrence to an unqualified reiteration of

the Lansang v. Garcia (42 SCRA 448) doctrine on the Court's inquiring into
the existence of factual bases for the suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus or the proclamation of martial law to determine their
constitutional sufficiency. While the Court has not been very receptive lately
to the invocation of the political question doctrine by State lawyers, I believe
that the doctrine does apply in cases where a political department- either the
President or the Batasang Pambansa-exercises powers expressly granted in
an exclusive manner by the Constitution and which are of a clearly political
nature not proper for judicial determination. If the proclamation of martial law
or the suspension of the privilege of the writ is so patently arbitrary and as
Justice Abad Santos says, lacking in popular support, there will always be
constitutional foundation for Supreme Court action to rule against
arbitrariness. However, as a general principle, whenever the President
exercises his powers under the Constitution to meet the supreme dangers of
invasion, insurrection, or rebellion or imminent danger thereof when the
public safety requires it, we should not assume a power, upon the mere filing
of a petition, to render a judicial interpretation of an exclusively
constitutionally granted power of the President. Paraphrasing Coleman v.
Miller (307 US 433, 83 L. Ed. 1385), the question of the sufficiency of factual
bases for the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the proclamation of
martial law would involve an appraisal of a great variety of relevant conditions
involving national security which can hardly be said to be within the
appropriate range of evidence receivable in a court of justice and as to which
it would be an extravagant extension of judicial authority to assert judicial
notice, which after all is what we would be asserting in most cases involving
the exercise of this extraordinary presidential power.

Relova, J., I vote with Mr. Justice Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring in the result:

I concur with paragraph 1 of the Decision, dismissing the petitions filed in

these cases. The term petitioner as used herein shall refer not only to Horacio
R. Morales, Jr,, but will also include Antonio C. Moncupa, Jr. insofar as legal
statements may be applicable to the latter.

Petitioner was detained on April 21, 1982 by the Armed Forces of the
Philippines under a Presidential Commitment Order approved on April 23,
1982. On July 9, 1982, he filed the petition for habeas corpus alleging that he
was being illegally detained by respondents Minister of National Defense,
Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and, specifically, by
Colonel Galileo Kintanar, Commanding Officer of the 15th Military
Intelligence Group. Petitioner's prayer was for the issuance of the Writ
directing respondents "to show the cause of his imprisonment or restraint,
and after hearing, to order his release forthwith." The Court issued the Writ
on July 13,1982.

In a Supplemental Return to the Writ, respondents informed the Court that

petitioner, on July 20, 1982, had been charged with Rebellion in Criminal
Case No. Q-21091 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, and they asked that
the petition for habeas corpus be denied for the reason that "with the
pendency of the case against petitioner before the Court below for trial and
before the City Fiscal for reinvestigation, there is all the more reason to
dismiss the petition.

Under the foregoing facts, it is my opinion that these cases have become
moot. There is no longer any cause of action against respondents who must
be deemed to have lost custody of petitioner (In re Lasam vs. Enrile, 67
SCRA 43 [1975]). I do not agree with the view that petitioner is still not within
the jurisdiction of the Court below. If that were a correct proposition, the Court
below would be without jurisdiction to try the rebellion case. In criminal law,
"the Court must also have jurisdiction over the subject matter, that is,
jurisdiction of the offense, and must have jurisdiction of the person of the
accused" (U.S.-U.S. v. Simon, D.C. Pa., 248, cited in 22 C.J.S. 300). Even if
there has been no warrant of arrest issued by the Court below, the person of
petitioner, who is now being tried, must be deemed as already within its
jurisdiction (Carrington vs. Peterson, 4 Phil. 134 [1905]).

As petitioner is now within the jurisdiction of the Court below, the question in
regards to the suspension of the Writ ofhabeas corpus has become
irrelevant. Considering that the Writ is never issuable to a Court (Nava v.
Gatmaitan, 90 Phil. 172 [1951]), there should be no justification in these
cases to assail whatever has been said or resolved in Lansang v. Garcia, 42
SCRA 448 (1971). That particular matter could have been
raised, procedurally, if petitioner had not been charged with Rebellion before
the Court below. Of course, it would then be for this Court to give or not to
give due course to the question. After all, habeas corpus is a discretionary
Writ (Engels vs. Amrine 155 Kan. 385, 125 P2d 379, cited in 39 Am. Jur. 2d,
269). Or, that would be the occasion for the Court to express its present views
in regards to Lansang-Garcia. The Constitution is a living institution, and its
interpretation and construction lives with changing times and circumstances.

On the other hand, in reference to whether or not petitioner is entitled to bail

in the rebellion case, I believe that the proper procedure should be for
petitioners to apply for bail before the Court below, and after his motion is
granted or denied, the matter can thereafter be elevated to appellate
consideration.
Once prosecuted in Court the position should not be taken that petitioner
cannot be bailed, the right to bail being a fundamental right except for those
charged with capital offenses when evidence of guilt is strong. The
Constitution limited the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus to only one great right leaving the rest to remain forever inviolable (Ex
parte Milligan, 18 U.S. Law ed., 281, 297). The power of the Courts to grant
bail cannot be curtailed if the supremacy of the Judiciary within its own sphere
is to be preserved. (Angara vs. Electoral Commission 63 Phil. 139 [1936];
Fernandez Subido vs. Lacson, 2 SCRA 1054 [1961]).

The reason for the objection to bail poses the same risk should the Court
acquit petitioner. The risk need not be taken by continuing the detention
under the Presidential Commitment Order, for a reasonable period, in the
exercise of executive discretion by way of precaution essential for the public
safety. "Public danger warrants the substitution of executive process for
judicial process" (Moyer vs. Peabody, 53 Law, Ed., US 211-214, p.411).

MAKASIAR, J., concurring and dissenting:

I join Justices De Castro and Abad Santos in their opinion to abandon the
Lansang doctrine and to adhere to the doctrine in the Montenegro and
Barcelon cases that determination by the Chief Executive of the existence of
invasion, rebellion, insurrection or imminent danger thereof and that public
safety requires it, for the suspension of the privilege of writ of habeas corpus
and for the proclamation of martial law, is a political question and therefore
beyond the sphere of judicial inquiry. In addition to the reasons advanced by
Justices De Castro and Abad Santos, it should be stressed that the prime
responsibility for the preservation of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of
the Republic as well as its security, rests on the commander- in-chief and not
on the Judiciary. It is a classical truism that there is no power under the sun
that is not susceptible of abuse. Any abuse or any arbitrary exercise by the
President as commander-in-chief of his constitutional power to proclaim
martial law or to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, can be
repudiated or overruled by the people in the exercise of their sovereign right
of suffrage at the next election, and, pending the holding of the next election,
through their constitutional right of free expression to sway public opinion
against such abuse of power.

To repeat, only the Chief Executive is well-equipped with the intelligence

services as commander-in-chief to secure the desired information as to the
existence of the requirements for the proclamation of martial law or for the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. The Supreme Court
is bereft of such aids. This was clearly demonstrated at the executive session
during one of the hearings in the Lansang case where the lawyers for the
petitioners were present. Counsel for the petitioners had no means of
rebutting the evidence and information gathered by the military organization
presented in said Lansang case before this Court, which had to rely on such
evidence and information submitted by the Armed Forces. It was clearly an
exercise in futility.

II

Corollary to the doctrine in the case of Aquino vs. Enrile (59 SCRA 183),
which was re-affirmed in Gumaua vs. Espino (96 SCRA 402, 412), that the
proclamation of martial law automatically suspends the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus, the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
must necessarily include the suspension of the right to bail for crimes which
are grounds for the suspension of the privilege. This should be the ruling
principle because, as well-stated by Mr. Justice De Castro, to release on bail
persons indicted for rebellion or insurrection would be to nullify the very
purpose of the suspension of the privilege, which is precisely to prevent them
from continuing with the rebellion or insurrection or abetting the same. The
suspension of the privilege is precisely to restore tranquility and prevent the
shedding of blood by our own people, more than just insuring the safety of
public and private properties.

Executive process is as valid as judicial process. In the epigramatic language

of Mr. Justice Holmes:

... when it comes to a decision involving its (state) life, the ordinary rights of
individuals must yield to what he (the President) deems the necessities of the
moment. Public danger warrants the substitution of executive process for
judicial process. (See Kelly vs. Sanders, 99 U.S. 441, 446, 25 L ed. 327,
328). This was admitted with regard to killing men in the actual clash of arms.
And we think it is obvious, although it was disputed, that the same is true to
temporary detention to prevent apprehended harm. (Moyer vs, Peabody, 212
U.S. 77.85. 53 L ed., 411, 417).

ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring and dissenting:

I concur in the result, i.e. in the dismissal of the petitions. This is as far as I
can go because I cannot give my assent to some of the statements made in
the main opinion. My list is not exhaustive but among them are the following:

1. I reject the doctrine laid down in Lansang vs. Garcia, 42 SCRA 448 [1971]
that this Court "has the authority to inquire into the existence of said factual
bases [for the issuance of Proclamations Nos. 889 and 889-A which
suspended the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus] in order to determine
the constitutional sufficiency thereof." (At p. 473.) In other words, this Court,
on the urging of the petitioners, declared that it has the power to determine
whether or not the President acted arbitrarily in suspending the writ. In so
doing, this Court did a complete turnabout from Barcelon vs. Baker, 5 Phil,
87 [1905] and Montenegro vs. Castaneda, 91 Phil. 882 [1952] which
enunciated the doctrine that the President's determination in suspending the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is final and conclusive upon the courts.

I submit that Barcelon and Montenegro laid down the correct doctrine.
The Lansang doctrine is based on naivete; it demonstrates a lack of contact
with reality.

How can this Court determine the factual bases in order that it can ascertain
whether or not the President acted arbitrarily in suspending the writ when, in
the truthful words of Montenegro, "with its very limited machinery [it] cannot
be in better position [than the Executive Branch] to ascertain or evaluate the
conditions prevailing in the Archipelago?" (At p. 887.) The answer is obvious.
It must rely on the Executive Branch which has the appropriate civil and
military machinery for the facts. This was the method which had to be used
in Lansang. This Court relied heavily on classified information supplied by the
military. Accordingly, an incongruous situation obtained. For this Court relied
on the very branch of the government whose act was in question to obtain
the facts. And as should be expected the Executive Branch supplied
information to support its position and this Court was in no situation to
disprove them. It was a case of the defendant judging the suit. After all is said
and done, the attempt by this Court to determine whether or not the President
acted arbitrarily in suspending the writ was a useless and futile exercise.

There is still another reason why this Court should maintain a detached
attitude and refrain from giving the seal of approval to the act of the Executive
Branch. For it is possible that the suspension of the writ lacks popular support
because of one reason or another. But when this Court declares that the
suspension is not arbitrary (because it cannot do otherwise upon the facts
given to it by the Executive Branch) it in effect participates in the decision-
making process. It assumes a task which it is not equipped to handle; it lends
its prestige and credibility to an unpopular act.

Lansang was an empty victory for the petitioners. They won a battle but lost
the war. It could be that this Court also lost something in the process. It raised
expectations which it could not fulfill.

2. I cannot accept the statement in paragraph 27 of the main opinion that

"because the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus remains suspended 'with
respect to persons at present detained as well as others who may hereafter
be similarly detained for the crimes of insurrection or rebellion, subversion,
conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and for all other crimes and
offenses committed by them in furtherance of or on the occasion thereof, or
incident thereto, or in connection therewith', the natural consequence is that
the right to bail for the commission of the said offenses is also suspended."

In the instant case, the petitioners were arrested without warrant on April 21,
1982. However, a Presidential Commitment Order was issued against them
on April 23, 1982 and on July 20, 1982 (after the petitions for the writ of
habeas corpus had been filed) the petitioners were charged with rebellion
before the Court of First Instance of Rizal in Criminal Case No. Q-21091.

Are they entitled to be released on bail if they so apply?

The ponente says that they have no right to bail because "To hold otherwise
would defeat the very purpose of the suspension" of the writ of habeas
corpus. Another reason given to deny bail is Letter of Instructions No. 1211
issued on March 9, 1982, which stipulates that "4. When issued, the
Presidential Commitment Order shall constitute authority to arrest the subject
person or persons and keep him or them under detention until ordered
released by the President or his duly authorized representative.

I submit that the petitioners are entitled to bail as a matter of right if they
should apply for it.

The nature of LOI No. 1211 has been raised. Does it have the force of law or
is it a mere directive to officers named therein, namely: The Minister of
National Defense; The Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines; The
Chief, Philippine Constabulary; The Chief, Criminal Investigation Service;
The Director-General, NISA; The Minister of Justice; The Director, National
Bureau of Investigation; and The Solicitor General. To me the nature of LOI
No. 1211 is irrelevant for the right to bail is guaranteed by a higher law-the
Constitution.

The Constitution guarantees that "All persons, except those charged with
capital offenses when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be
bailable by sufficient sureties. Excessive bail shall not be required. " (Art. IV,
Sec. 18.) The penalty for rebellion is reclusion temporal. Hence rebellion is a
non-capital offense and the petitioners should be granted bail by the court
where their case is pending if they ask for it.

The suspension of the writ of habeas corpus and the fact that they are
covered by a Presidential Commitment Order are of no consequence. Since
the respondents have elected to bring the case of the petitioners to court, the
court acquired complete jurisdiction over them. To say that the court cannot
grant them bail is to diminish the court's jurisdiction.

The eloquent words of Mr. Justice Pedro Tuason are completely relevant:

Under constitutional guarantee bail is a matter of right which no court or judge

could properly refuse in all cases beyond the exceptions specified in the
Constitution. The meaning of this fundamental provision is that a party
accused of any and every bailable offense shall have the inestimable
privilege of giving security for his attendance at court and shall not be
imprisoned. (6 C.J. 893.)

The Constitution will be searched in vain for any provision that abridges this
right. Any argument in support of the contention that the suspension of the
writ of habeas corpus carries with it the suspension of the right to bail is, and
has to be, based on inference. I do not believe that the curtailment of the right
to bail is a normal, legal, or logical outcome of the suspension of the writ. The
error, I am inclined to believe, arises from a confusion of terms and
misapprehension of the principles underlying the suspension of the writ.

The purpose of the suspension of the writ is to enable the executive, as a

precautionary measure, to detain without interference persons suspected of
harboring designs harmful to public safety. (Ex Parte Simmerman, 132 F. 2d,
442, 446.) The Constitution goes no further. (Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wallace 2,
18 Law. Ed. 281, 297.) If this is the purpose, the suspension can contemplate
only cases which, without the suspension, are open to interference; such
cases are arrests and detentions by the executive department. Since the
suspension of the writ is designed to prevent the issuance of this
extraordinary remedy, and since the writ issues from the courts but never to
the courts, it necessarily follows that arrests and detentions by order of the
courts are outside the purview of the constitutional scheme.

As stated, the theory of the prosecution stems from a misconception of the

ends pursued by the suspension of the writ. If it is to have any color of validity,
this theory must assume that the Constitution directs positive action to be
taken, orders arrests and detentions to be made. Unfortunately or fortunately,
the Constitution does not do so. The intent of the Constitution in authorizing
the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus is no other than to given the
authorities a free hand in dealing with persons bent on overthrowing the
Government. The effects of the suspension are negative, not positive;
permissive, not mandatory nor even directory. By the suspension, arrests
and detentions beyond the period allowed under normal circumstances are
tolerated or legalized. The Constitution is not in the least concerned with the
disposition of persons accused of rebellion or insurrection, whether or how
long they should be kept in confinement, or whether they should be set at
large. In the nature of the governmental set-up under the Constitution, their
immediate fate is left to the discretion, within reasonable and legal limits, of
the proper department.

With these distinctions in mind, the query is, on what department of

Government is entrusted the prerogative of deciding what is to be done with
the prisoners charged with or suspected of rebellion or insurrection? The
answser, as I shall endeavor presently to explain, is either the executive or
the Court, depending on who has jurisdiction over them.

All persons detained for investigation by the executive department are under
executive control. It is here where the Constitution tells the courts to keep
their hands off-unless the cause of the detention be for an offense other than
rebellion or insurrection, which is another matter.

By the same token, if and when formal complaint is presented, the court steps
in and the executive steps out. The detention ceases to be an executive and
becomes a judicial concern. Thereupon the corresponding court assumes its
role and the judicial process takes its course to the exclusion of the executive
or the legislative departments. Henceforward, the accused is entitled to
demand all the constitutional safeguards and privileges essential to due
process. 'The Constitution does not say that he shall be tried otherwise than
by the course of common law.' (Ex parte Milligan, ante, 297.) The Bill of
Rights, including the right to bail and the right to a fair trial, are unaffected by
the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. The Constitution 'suspended
one great right and left the rest to remain forever inviolable. (Ex parte Milligan,
ante, 297.) (Nava et al vs. Gatmaitan 90 Phil. 172, 202-205 [1951].)

It should be stated that Chief Justice Ricardo Paras and Justices Cesar
Bengzon, Alex Reyes and Fernando Jugo shared the above opinion of
Justice Tuason. Incumbent Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando expressed the
same opinion in Lansang.

It is also said that the view "if and when a formal complaint is presented, the
court steps in and the executive steps out," will tend to induce the executive
to refrain from filing formal charges as long as it may be possible. (See
opinion of Chief Justice Concepcion in Lansang, op. cit. on p. 494.) The
answer has long been given by this Court in Teehankee vs. Rovira, 75 Phil.
634 (1954) as follows:

This constitutional mandate [on the right to bail] refers to all persons not only
to persons against whom a complaint or information has already been
formally filed. It lays down the rule that all persons shall before conviction be
bailable except those charged with capital offenses when evidence of guilt is
strong. According to this provision, the general rule is that any person, before
being convicted of any criminal offense, shall be bailable, except when he is
charged with a capital offense and the evidence of his guilt is strong, Of
course, only those persons who have been either arrested, detained or
otherwise deprived of their liberty will ever have occasion to seek the benefits
of said provision. But in order that a person can invoke this constitutional
precept, it is not necessary that he should wait until a formal complaint or
information is filed against him. From the moment he is placed under arrest,
detention or restraint by the officers of the law, he can claim this- guarantee
of the Bill of Rights, and this right he retains unless and until he is charged
with a capital offense and evidence of his guilt is strong. Indeed if, as admitted
on all sides, the precept protects those already charged under a formal
complaint or information, there seems to be no legal or just reason for
denying its benefits to one as against whom the proper authorities may even
yet conclude that there exists no sufficient evidence of guilt. To place the
former in a more favored position than the latter would be, to say the least,
anomalous and absurd. If there is a presumption of innocence in favor of one
already formally charged with criminal offense (Constitution, Article III,
Section 1[17], a fortiori, this presumption should be indulged in favor of one
not yet so charged, although already arrested or detained." (At pp. 640-64 1.)

What I have said above about the right of an accused to bail in non-capital
cases applies mutatis mutandis to a person accused of a capital offense if
the evidence of his guilt is not strong to be determined after a hearing as
provided in the Rules of Court: "Sec. 7. Capital offense-Burden of proof. -On
the hearing of an application for admission to bail made by any person in
custody for the commission of a capital offense, the burden of showing that
evidence of guilt is strong is on the prosecution. ..." (Rule 114.)

Addendum to concurring and dissenting opinion:

Long after I had written my separate opinion in the above-entitled cases, the
newspapers reported the arrest of Mayor Aquilino Pimentel of Cagayan de
Oro City on grounds of national security. It was said that the arrest of Mayor
Pimentel was effected pursuant to a Presidential Commitment Order (PCO).

It was also reported that Msgr. Patrick Cronin Archbishop of Cagayan de Oro
City, requested President Ferdinand E. Marcos to lift the PCO because
Pimentel was innocent of any wrong-doing.

The issues dated April 20, 1983, of Bulletin Today, Daily Express and Times
Journal all report that President Marcos denied the request of Archbishop
Cronin because he had no power to release Pimentel who was arrested and
charged before a Regional Trial Court in Cebu City on very strong evidence
that he provided arms, funds, and sanctuary to subversives.

President Marcos is reported to have told Msgr. Cronin

The disposal of the body of the accused, as any lawyer will inform you, is
now within the powers of the regional trial court of Cebu City, and not within
the powers of the President.

It should be recalled the main opinion holds that the petitioners herein cannot
be granted bail by the court where they stand charged with the crime of
rebellion because to hold otherwise would defeat the very purpose of the
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus and also because under LOI No.
1211, the release of persons arrested pursuant to a PCO can be effected
only by order of the President or his duly authorized representative. And it
should be noted that every PCO has the following operative last paragraph:

I, therefore, hereby order the arrest and detention of the abovenamed

persons until the final disposition/termination of their cases unless sooner
ordered released by me or by my duly authorized representative.

And yet in the case of Mayor Pimentel who was arrested by virtue of a PCO,
the President no less said that the power to release Pimentel "as any lawyer
will inform you," is not his but of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City.
I am happy to be counted among the "any lawyer" mentioned by President
Marcos for I believe, as I have stated in my separate opinion, that the
petitioners herein are entitled to bail after they were charged in court with
rebellion because "the court steps in and the executive steps out."

DE CASTRO, J., concurring and dissenting:

I concur in the dismissal of the petition. It is my considered opinion, as I have

set forth in my ponencia in the case for Habeas Corpus-Josefina Garcia,
petitioner, G.R. No. 61388, hereafter referred to as the Parong case, that
when a person is arrested by virtue of a PCO or a PCO is issued after his
arrest effected without warrant or with one issued by court, his detention
becomes one without right to bail, even after charges have been filed against
him in court. This is so because, under the circumstance that the rebellion is
still continuing, perhaps with greater intensity, a captured or arrested rebel,
or one in conspiracy with the rebels by acts in pursuance or in furtherance of
the rebellion, is not arrested and detained with a view to his immediate
prosecution. It is more for the purpose of detaining him as a military measure
to suppress the rebellion. The suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus has the effect of deferring trial for certain specified crimes
during the existence of the emergency, as I stated, citing legal writers and
publicists, 1 in the aforecited case of Parong, et al.

The reason is that a person cannot be prosecuted for a crime the commission
of which has not yet come to an end as in the case of the existing rebellion.
A person who kills another can and should immediately be prosecuted,
because the killing itself constitutes the termination of the commission of the
crime, as is generally true with the common statutory offenses. But a rebel,
even when already captured or arrested and placed under detention, by
reason of conspiracy with the rebels and their co-conspirators who are free,
continues in a state of committing the crime of rebellion which is a continuing
offense. If immediately prosecuted and by virtue thereof, allowed to be
released on bail, the crime of rebellion being bailable, the detainee would
certainly join his comrades in the field to the jeopardy of government efforts
to suppress the rebellion, which is the rationale for the President being
constitutionally empowered to suspend the privilege of habeas corpus in
case of invasion, rebellion or insurrection, even mere imminent danger
thereof, when public safety so requires. The President, however, may order
the filing of charges in court and trial thereof forthwith held, or even release
on bail, as his best judgment will dictate to him. But this is for the President
alone to decide, without interference from the courts, he being in the exercise
of his military power.

It is for this reason that I dissent from the majority opinion insofar as it would
reiterate the doctrine of the Lansang case, being of the view that the earlier
doctrine in the case of Barcelon vs. Baker and Montenegro vs.
Castaneda which was superseded by the Lansang doctrine should be
reverted to, as the more practical and realistic ruling, and more in
consonance with the grant by the Constitution to the President of the power
to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the case of the
contingencies mentioned in the Constitution. Such power could be easily
rendered nugatory if interference by the Supreme Court were allowed as
when it is given the power of judicial review over the exercise of this particular
presidential power. The doctrine of "political question" comes in to make it
improper for the power of judicial review to be exercise by the said Court,
which doctrine renders the exercise of the presidential power referred to non-
justiciable. Justiciability of the controversy is the basic requirement for the
exercise of the power of judicial review.

Moreover, the Lansang doctrine could easily be viewed as discriminatory

against our incumbent President whose proclamation suspending the
privilege of habeas corpus was held subject to judicial review, where similar
proclamations of former Chiefs Executive, Governor General Wright and
President Quirino, were held binding and conclusive upon the courts and all
other persons. If this is so, as it can be safely surmised that the incumbent
President cannot but feel discriminated against with the pronouncement of
the Lansang doctrine, rectification is called for. Needless to state, I am one
with Justice Abad Santos in his vigorous dissent against the reiteration of the
Lansang doctrine as proposed in the majority opinion in the instant case.

In the Parong case (G.R. No. 61388), I stated, inter alia, the following:

In times of war or national emergency, the legislature may surrender a part

of its power of legislation to the President. Would it not be as proper and
wholly acceptable to lay down the principle that during such crises, the
judiciary should be less jealous of its power and more trusting of the
Executive in the exercise of its emergency powers in recognition of the same
necessity? Verily, the existence of the emergencies should be left to
President's sole and unfettered determination. His exercise of the power to
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus on the occasion thereof,
should also be beyond judicial review, Arbitrariness, as a ground for judicial
inquiry of presidential acts and decisions, sounds good in theory but
impractical and unrealistic, considering how well-nigh impossible it is for the
courts to contradict the finding of the President on the existence of the
emergency that gives occasion for the exercise of the power to suspend the
privilege of the writ. For the Court to insist on reviewing Presidential action
on the ground of arbitrariness may only result in a violent collision of two
jealous powers with tragic consequences, by all means to be avoided, in
favor of adhering to the more desirable and long-tested doctrine of "political
question" in reference to the power of judicial review."

Indeed, while the Supreme Court is said to be the Guardian of the

Constitution, not all questions arising therefrom may be brought to it for
judicial review as to whether a constitutional violation has been committed.
The power of the President as the defender of the State has to be granted by
the Constitution, for how else could such power be granted except by the
instrument which is the repository of the sovereign will of the people. But
certainly, the exercise of such power of defending the Nation is not to be
subordinated to that of the Supreme Court acting as Guardian of the
Constitution, for of what use is it to preserve the Constitution if We lose the
Nation?

TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting:

The bench and bar and law scholars and students are in debt to the writer of
the main opinion, Mr. Justice Concepcion, Jr., for his thorough and perceptive
restatement of the constitutional and basic human rights of accused persons
and detainees. The main opinion spotlights the grievances that persons
detained or charged for the crimes of insurrection, rebellion, subversion,
conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes invariably bring to this Court.
They complain, as petitioners do here, of being arrested without any warrant
of arrest; of being kept in isolation and being denied of their constitutional
right to counsel and to silence; of prolonged detention without any charges;
of having been subjected to maltreatment and torture; and of their counsel
and families undergoing great difficulties in locating or having access to them.

The State through the Solicitor General on the other hand invariably denies
all such charges and submits affidavits of the arresting officers and detention
custodian that detainees are afforded decent and humane treatment, further
countering that such claims are merely calculated to arouse sympathy and
as propaganda against the Government and its institutions.

Upon the filing of the petition at bar on July 13, 1982, the Court, in issuing
the writ of habeas corpus, Resolved "to allow counsel for petitioner to visit
and confer with the detainee in an atmosphere of confidentiality, consistent
with reasonable security measures which respondents may impose." At the
hearing held on July 22, 1982, the Court granted petitioner's plea for
reinvestigation of the charges and to "appoint the (Quezon) City Fiscal to act
as Commissioner of the Court and receive evidence of the charges made by
petitioners before this Court of alleged torture and violation of their
constitutional rights, particularly the right to counsel." The City Fiscal in due
time submitted his report on the reinvestigation, affirming the existence of a
prima facie case for rebellion against petitioner. In February this year, he
submitted the voluminous transcript of the proceedings held before him and
the evidence submitted to him without comment or recommendation on
petitioner's charges of alleged torture and violation of constitutional rights.
The "material and relevant" charges have not been taken up nor deliberated
upon by the Court, but apparently will no longer be resolved by the, Court, as
was expected at the time, since the main opinion directs now that "they
should be filed before the body which has jurisdiction over them." 1 On my
part, I believe that the Court should go over the transcript and make some
authoritative pronouncements on the charges at least of violation of
petitioners' right to counsel.

I. The vital problem is to assure the enjoyment of such constitutional and

basic human rights of the persons arrested, detained or charged, be they
mere dissenters, subversives or hardened criminals. As observed in the main
opinion, this is what distinguishes our country as a republican and democratic
state from those arrested in totalitarian states who have no rights to speak
of. This Court stands as the guarantor of the constitutional rights of all
persons within its jurisdiction and must see to it that the rights are respected
and not treated as paper rights.

These are the great rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights (Article IV) of the
Constitution:

The right against unreasonable searches and seizures and arbitrary arrest:

Sec. 3. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature
and for any purpose shall not be violated, and no search warrant or warrant
of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the
judge, or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses
he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized.

The right to due process and equal protection of law:

Sec. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due

process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the
laws.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 17. No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due
process of law.

The right of free association:

Sec. 7. The right to form associations or societies for purposes not contrary
to law shall not be abridged.

Freedom of speech and press and assembly and petition:

Sec. 9. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the
Government for redress of grievances.

The great writ of liberty:

Sec. 15. The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended
except in cases of invasion, insurrection, rebellion, or imminent danger
thereof, when the public safety requires it.

The right to bail:

Sec. 8. All persons, except those charged with capital offenses when
evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient
sureties. Excessive bail shall not be required.

Presumption of innocence and Rights of speedy and impartial trial and

confrontation:

Sec. 19. In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent
until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself
and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial to meet the witnesses face
to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of
witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after
arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused
provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustified.

The right to counsel and silence.

Sec. 20n No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Any

person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the
right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right. No
force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free
will shall be used against him. Any confession obtained in violation of this
section shall be inadmissible in evidence.
The main opinion deals with the scope and extent of these rights and a
number of passages bears emphasis and reiteration, as follows:

The arresting officers, upon making the arrest, must inform the subject of the
reason for the arrest and show him the warrant of arrest, if any. They must
inform him of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel. They
must respect his right to communicate with his lawyer. No custodial
investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of his counsel.
The right to counsel may be waived knowingly and intelligently and for such
reason the waiver should be recognized only if made with the assistance of
counsel. The detainee's right to confer with counsel at any hour of the day,
alone and privately, should be respected.

Care should be exercised in making an arrest without a warrant. Where there

is no justification for the arrest, the public officer could be criminally liable for
arbitrary detention (under Article 124, Revised Penal Code) or unlawful arrest
(under Article 269, Idem) or for some other offense.2

Furthermore, we hold that under the judicial power of review and by

constitutional mandate, in all petitions for habeas corpus the court must
inquire into every phase and aspect of petitioner's detention-from the moment
petitioner was taken into custody up to the moment the court passes upon
the merits of the petition. Only after such a scrutiny can the court satisfy itself
that the due process clause of our Constitution has in fact been satisfied.

The submission that a person may be detained indefinitely without any

charges and the courts cannot inquire into the legality of the restraint goes
against the spirit and letter of the Constitution and is contrary to the basic
precepts of human rights and a democratic society. 3

However, there is a difference between preventive and punitive

imprisonment. Where the filing of charges in court or the trial of such charges
already filed becomes protracted without any justifiable reason, the detention
becomes punitive in character and the detainee regains his right to freedom. 4

II. Respondents' return in these cases, in asserting that "the allegations that
petitioners have been denied their right to counsel are not true. They simply
did not ask for one, " disregards the consistent injunction of the Court and of
the law that the detainees need not bear the burden of asking for counsel but
should be informed of their right to counsel. The return's assertion that
"petitioners also waived the assistance of counsel during the investigation of
their cases" also falls short of the requirement that such waiver be made with
the assistance of counsel to assure the validity thereof.

The late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, in maintaining in his dissenting
opinion in Magtoto vs. Manguera5 that the 1973 constitutional ban on
uncounselled confessions should operate retrospectively to June 15, 1954
when Republic Act 1083 (amending Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code)
was enacted recognizing the right of a detained person to counsel in any
custodial inquest, and not prospectively only as to such confessions obtained
after the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution, stressed anew that it is "the
obligation on the part of any detaining officer to inform the person detained
of his right to counsel before the very inception of custodial inquest." He
enjoined us eloquently that "(I) hold no brief against custodial
interrogation per se. But I do entertain mortal fear that when a detained
person is subjected, without the assistance of counsel, to custodial
interrogation by peace officers, official lawlessness could be the rule and not
the exception. Witness the innumerable cases in the annals of adjudication
where this Court has set at naught and declared inadmissible confessions
obtained from detained persons thru official lawlessness. It is a verity in the
life of our nation that people without influence and without stature in society
have, more often than not, been subjected to brutal and brutalizing third-
degree methods, if not actually framed, by many police agencies in this
country. Instead of blinking our eyes shut to this reality, we must recognize it
for what it is, (and) I am completely conscious of the need for a balancing of
the interests of society with the rights and freedoms of the individual. I have
advocated the balancing-of-interests rule in all situations which call for an
appraisal of the interplay of conflicting interests of consequential dimensions.
But I reject any proposition that would blindly uphold the interests of society
at the sacrifice of the dignity of any human being," and echoed Justice
Douglas' aphorism that the rights of none are safe unless the rights of all are
protected.
In the recent case of Sobremonte vs. Enrile, 6 the Court did not rule on the
therein detailed assertions of maltreatment of the detainee, stating only that
"redress for the alleged violation of Socorro's constitutional rights may be
secured through appropriate civil, criminal or administrative charges." 7 The
case was dismissed for having become moot with the detainee's release from
detention upon her filing the recommended P l,000.00-bail bond. But the
Court decried that "all the effort, energy and manhours expended by the
parties and their counsel, including this Court, ... could have been avoided
had the officers of the AVSECOM and the ISAFP responded promptly to the
inquiries of petitioner instead of giving her the 'run-round' by referring her
from one office to another."

III. I join Mr. Justice Abad Santos' stand that notwithstanding the suspension
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the issuance on March 9,
1982 of Letter of Instruction No. 1211 that the Presidential Commitment
Order (PCO) constitutes authority to keep the subject person under detention
"until ordered released by the President or his duly authorized
representative," the higher and superior mandate of the Constitution
guarantees the right to bail and vests the courts with the jurisdiction and
judicial power to grant bail which may not be removed nor diminished nor
abdicated. We cannot but so hold, if we are to be true to the fundamental
precept that "The Constitution is a law for rulers and for people equally in war
and in peace and covers with the shield of its protection all classes of men at
all times and under all circumstances. "

The argument that otherwise the purpose of the suspension of the privilege
would be defeated ignores the overwhelming capability of the State and its
military and police forces to keep suspects under surveillance and the courts'
imposition of reasonable conditions in granting bail, such as periodic reports
to the authorities concerned, and prohibiting their going to certain critical
areas.

In my dissenting opinion in Buscayno vs. Military Commission, 8 Ireiterated

my adherence to the majority holding in the leading 1951 cases of Nava vs.
Gatmaitan and Hernandez vs. Montesa 9 (although it failed one vote short of
the required majority of six affirmative votes at the time) as expounded by
then Chief Justice Ricardo Paras and Associate Justice (later Chief Justice)
Cesar Bengzon and Associate Justices Pedro Tuason, Alex Reyes and
Fernando Jugo that after formal indictment in court by the filing against them
of an information charging rebellion with multiple murder, etc., accused
persons covered by the proclamation of suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus are entitled to the right to bail. As stressed by then Chief
Justice Ricardo Paras. "(T)he right to bail, along with the right of an accused
to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation against him, to have a speedy and public trial, to meet the
witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the
attendance of witnesses in his behalf (Article III, Section 1, Paragraph 17, of
the Constitution), tends to aid the accused to prove his innocence and obtain
acquittal. If it be contended that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus includes the suspension of the distinct right to bail or to be
provisionally at liberty, it would a fortiori imply the suspension of all his other
rights (even the rights to be tried by a court) that may win for him ultimate
acquittal and, hence, absolute freedom. The latter result is not insisted upon
for being patently untenable, "

Then Chief Justice Paras stressed that "... The privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus and the right to bail guaranteed under the Bill of Rights are separate
and co-equal. If the intention of the framers of the Constitution was that the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus carries or implies the
suspension of the right to bail, they would have very easily provided that all
persons shall before conviction be bailable by sufficient sureties, except
those charged with capital offenses when evidence of guilt is strong and
except when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. As
stated in the case of Ex Parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2, 18 L. ed. 297, the
Constitution limited the suspension to only one great right, leaving the rest to
remain forever inviolable." 10 It is noteworthy and supportive of the prevailing
stand since 1951 that the other great constitutional rights remain forever
inviolable since the Constitution limited the suspension to only one great right
(of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus), that there has been no
amendment of the Constitution to curtail the right to bail in case of such
suspension notwithstanding the numerous constitutional amendments
adopted after the 1973 Constitution.
The late Justice Pedro Tuason emphasized that "(T)o the plea that the
security of the State would be jeopardized by the release of the defendants
on bail, the answer is that the existence of danger is never a justification for
courts to tamper with the fundamental rights expressly granted by the
Constitution. These rights are immutable, inflexible, -yielding to no pressure
of convenience, expediency or the so-called 'judicial statesmanship.' The
Legislature itself cannot infringe them, and no court conscious of its
responsibilities and limitations would do so. If the Bill of Rights are
incompatible with stable government and a menace to the Nation, let the
Constitution be amended, or abolished. It is trite to say that, while the
Constitution stands, the courts of justice as the repository of civil liberty are
bound to protect and maintain undiluted individual rights." 11

And former Chief Justice Cesar Bengzon then made the same forceful plea
echoed these days by men of goodwill that respect for constitutional and
human rights and adherence to the rule of law would help in the fight against
rebellion and movement for national reconciliation, thus: "And in my opinion,
one of the surest means to ease the uprising is a sincere demonstration of
this Government's adherence to the principles of the Constitution together
with an impartial application thereof to all citizens, whether dissidents or not.
Let the rebels have no reason to apprehend that their comrades now under
custody are being railroaded into Muntinglupa, without benefit of those
fundamental privileges which the experience of the ages has deemed
essential for the protection of all persons accused of crime before the tribunal
of justice. Give them the assurance that the judiciary, ever mindful of its
sacred mission, will not, thru faulty or misplaced devotion, uphold any
doubtful claims of Governmental power in diminution of individual rights, but
will always cling to the principles uttered long ago by Chief Justice Marshall
that when in doubt as to the construction of the Constitution, 'the Courts will
favor personal liberty.'" 12

IV. The most authoritative pronouncement in regard to the courts' judicial

power to grant the constitutional right to bail is of course none other than the
President's himself. In all the metropolitan newspapers of April 20, 1983, the
President is reported to have "said that Pimentel has been charged with
rebellion before the regional trial court of Cebu City and is therefore under
the jurisdiction of the civil court and not only under the jurisdiction of the
military by virtue of the PCO " In a telegram in reply to the appeal of Msgr.
Patrick Cronin, Archbishop of Cagayan de Oro and Misamis Oriental, for
lifting of the PCO on Mayor Aquilino Pimentel of Cagayan de Oro City, the
President said that "(T)he disposal of the body of the accused, as any lawyer
will inform you, is now within the powers of the regional trial court of Cebu
City and not within the powers of the President."

The statement of the now Chief Justice in his separate opinion in Gumaua
vs. Espino 13 referring to his earlier concurring and dissenting opinion
in Aquino vs. Military Commission No. 2,14 is most relevant, mutatis mutandis,
thus: " 'Were it not for the above mandate of the Transitory Provisions [Article
XVII, section 3, par. (2), 1973 Constitution], the submission of petitioner as
to a military commission being devoid of jurisdiction over civilians elicits
approval. The controlling principle, to my mind, is that supplied in the opinion
of the United States Supreme Court in Duncan v. Kahanamoku [327 U.S.
304, 322 (1946)], a decision impressed with the greatest relevance inasmuch
as it interpreted the specific section found in the Hawaiian Organic Act, which
was also a feature of the Philippine Autonomy Act, the source of the martial
law provision in the 1935 Constitution.' As was pointed out in the Duncan
opinion penned by Justice Black: 'Courts and their procedural safeguards are
indispensable to our system of government. They were set up by our
founders to protect the liberties they valued. Ex parte Quirin, supra, 317 U.S.
at page 19, 63 S. Ct. at page 6, 87 L. Ed. 3. Our system of government clearly
is the antithesis of total military rule and the founders of this country are not
likely to have contemplated complete military dominance within the limits of
a Territory made part of this country and not recently taken from an enemy.
They were opposed to governments that placed in the hands of one man the
power to make, interpret and enforce the laws. Their philosophy has been
the people's throughout the history. For that reason we have maintained
legislatures chosen by citizens or their representatives and courts and juries
to try those who violate legislative enactments. We have always been
especially concerned about the potential evils of summary criminal trials and
have guarded against them by provisions embodied in the constitution
itself.' ... The phrase 'martial law' as employed in that Act, therefore, while
intended to authorize the military to act vigorously for the maintenance of an
orderly civil government and for the defense of the island against actual or
threatened rebellion or invasion, [it] was not intended to authorize the
supplanting of courts by military courts."

V. The courts, and ultimately the Supreme Court, are therefore called upon
to review all such cases and the accused's right to bail, pending trial and
conviction or acquittal, on a case by case basis. The courts with their
procedural safeguards are then called upon to apply the Constitution and the
Law and to grant bail for clearly bailable (non-capital) offenses and in capital
offenses to determine whether or not evidence of guilt is strong, in
consonance with guidelines laid down by the Supreme Court, as in the
leading case of Montano vs. Ocampo 15(involving Senator Montano who was
charged with multiple murders and frustrated murders), as follows:

Brushing aside the charge that the preliminary investigation of this case by
the aforesaid Judge was railroaded, the same having been conducted at
midnight, a few hours after the complaint was filed, we are of the opinion that,
upon the evidence adduced in the application for bail in the lower court, as
such evidence is recited lengthily in the present petition and the answer
thereto, and extensively analyzed and discussed in the oral argument, there
is not such clear showing of guilt as would preclude all reasonable probability
of any other conclusion.

Exclusion from bail in capital offenses being an exception to the otherwise

absolute right guaranteed by the constitution, the natural tendency of the
courts has been toward a fair and liberal appreciationrather than otherwise,
of the evidence in the determination of the degree of proof and presumption
of guilt necessary to warrant a deprivation of that right.

Besides, to deny bail it is not enough that the evidence of guilt is strong; it
must also appear that in case of conviction the defendant's criminal liability
would probably call for a capital punishment. No clear or conclusive showing
before this Court has been made.

In the evaluation of the evidence the probability of flight is one other important
factor to be taken into account. The sole purpose of confining accused in jail
before conviction, it has been observed, is to assure his presence at the trial.
In other words, if denial of bail is authorized in capital cases, it is only on the
theory that the proof being strong, the defendant would flee, if he has the
opportunity, rather than face the verdict of the jury. Hence, the exception to
the fundamental right to be bailed should be applied in direct ratio to the
extent of the probability of evasion of prosecution.

The possibility of escape in this case, bearing in mind the defendant's official
and social standing and his other personal circumstances, seems remote if
not nil.

As editorially commented in one daily, 16 "(T)he danger, however, lies in the

possibility that such means (PCO's) may not always be employed judiciously.
In issuing a PCO the President in most cases must rely on field reports and
recommendations filed by his subordinates, usually the military and the
intelligence community. No one can totally dismiss the possibility that the
President may be fed with false information in some instances. The
consequences of such an error can only aggravate further the country's
security problems." When such cases occur and executive relief is not
obtained, the courts provide the means of securing redress from erroneous
or wrongful arrests and detentions, and at the very least, as shown from past
experience, serve as the means for bringing the matter to the President's
attention and securing the needed relief.

Separate Opinions

FERNANDO, C.J., concurring:

concurring in the dismissed of the petitions, expressing conformity with the

reiteration of the doctrine announced in Lansang v. Garcia, and dissenting
on the question of the right to bail which for him may be invoked whenever
allowable under the Constitution:

Let me make clear at the outset that I limit myself to a concurrence in the
dismissal of the petitions, expressing conformity with the reiteration of the
doctrine in Lansang v. Garcia,1 and a dissent on the question of the right to
bail during a period of suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, which for me may be invoked whenever allowable under the
Constitution, a stand I took both as counsel in Hernandez v. Montesa 2 and
thereafter as a member of the Court in Lansang v. Garcia, 3 Buscayno v.
Enrile, 4 and Garcia-Padilla v. Ponce Enrile. 5 This is by no means to
indicate lack of due recognition of the intensity of conviction and lucidity of
expression so evident in the exhaustive opinion of Justice Concepcion Jr. It
is merely to adhere to the norm of limiting myself to an appraisal of the
constitutional rights invoked insofar as they have a bearing on these
petitions. 6 Hence this separate expression of my views.

1. The first paragraph of the decisions of this Court is worded as follows:

"The petitions are without merit and are hereby DISMISSED." 7 I am in full
agreement. The authoritative doctrine followed by this Court in accordance
with well-settled jurisprudence is that the moment it can be shown that the
persons detained are being held in lawful custody by virtue of a judicial
process, then an application of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
cannot succeed.8

2. There is equally to my mind no question about the validity as a legal

proposition of paragraph 4 of the opinion, which speaks of the Philippines
being "a republican state. Sovereignty resides in the people and all
government authority emanates from them. We have a Constitution framed
by a constitutional convention and duly ratified by the people. We subscribe
to the rule of law. We believe in human rights and we protect and defend
them. Petitioners are entitled to the full enjoyment of all the rights granted to
them by law. And this Court stands as the guarantor of those rights." 9 This
Court in normal times as well as under emergency conditions has displayed
fealty to human rights, as protected and safeguarded by the Constitution. It
is a matter of legitimate pride that even under the 1935 Charter, the
Philippines has accorded full recognition not only to the traditional civil and
political rights but to social and economic rights. The autonomy of the
human personality and the assurance of his dignity are a matter of deep
public concern. It is equally a matter of legitimate pride that during the
period of martial law, with fun recognition of the power of the government to
maintain peace and order and preserve its authority, the judiciary, was not
recreant to such a trust. 10 For the entire judiciary, not only this Court, stands
as a guarantor of those rights. It does so when it has to act in a proper case
submitted to it. The political branches are equally, to my mind, guarantors of
human rights; the Batasan Pambansa in the enactment of laws and the
President in their enforcement whether through executive orders
implementing them or the issuance of decrees having the force and effect
of law. In the sense, however, that decisions coming from this Court have
not merely an inter-partes but an erga omnes effect, binding not only the
litigants but also others finding themselves similarly situated, it is quite
accurate to state that "this Court stands as a guarantor of those rights."

3. It is by virtue of the respect for constitutional rights that in the resolutions

of this Court in both applications for the writ, it was made clear that counsel
of petitioners can visit them and confer with them in an atmosphere of
confidentiality consistent with reasonable security measures to be imposed
by respondents. 11 Again, it is by virtue of deference to the Constitution that
in succeeding resolutions, their allegations as to other instances of violation
of their rights were referred for investigation to the City Fiscal of Quezon
City. 12

4. Paragraphs 5 to 19 of the opinion of the Court elaborate further on the

matter. They are notable for the concern shown for constitutional rights,
with full recognition of the power of the state to deal effectively with
rebellion or subversion. I view the matter similarly. The same thought was
given expression in Lansang v. Garcia. 13 In the memorable language of
Chief Justice Concepcion: "Manifestly, however, the liberty guaranteed and
protected by our Basic Law is one enjoyed and exercised, not in derogation
thereof, but consistently therewith, and, hence, within the framework of the
social order established by the Constitution and the context of the Rules of
Law. Accordingly, when individual freedom is used to destroy that social
order, by means of force and violence, in defiance of the Rule of Law-such
as rising publicly and taking arms against the government to overthrow the
same, thereby committing the crime of rebellion there emerges a
circumstance that may warrant a limited withdrawal of the aforementioned
guarantee or protection, by suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, when public safety requires it. Although we must be forewarned
against mistaking mere dissent-no matter how emphatic or intemperate it
may be-for dissidence amounting to rebellion or insurrection, the Court
cannot hesitate, much less refuse-when the existence of such rebellion or
insurrection has been fairly established or cannot reasonably be denied-to
uphold the finding of the Executive thereon, without, in effect, encroaching
upon a power vested in him by the Supreme Law of the land and depriving
him, to this extent, of such power, and, therefore, without violating the
Constitution and jeopardizing the very Rule of Law the Court is called upon
to epitomize." 14

5. In the opinion of Justice Concepcion Jr., paragraph 21 explicitly states:

"We reiterate this doctrine." There is thus a reaffirmance of the ruling in
Lansang cited in paragraph 20 to the effect that the suspension of the
privilege of the writ raises a judicial rather than a political question. I am in
complete agreement. That was the point of my dissent in the recently
decided case of Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile.

6. There is also on my part conformity with the view set forth in paragraph
22 that "in all petitions for habeas corpusthe court must inquire into every
phase and aspect of petitioner's detention-from the moment petitioner was
taken into custody up to the moment the court passes upon the merits of
the petition." 15

7. I am in agreement with the view expressed in paragraph 23 that there

can be no indefinite detention without charges being filed. It must be
recognized, however, that in cases of invasion, rebellion and insurrection,
or imminent danger thereof, the power of preventive detention is recognized
by the Constitution, considering that when public safety requires, the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus may be suspended or martial law, as
a last resort, declared. I had occasion to speak on the matter in my
separate opinion in Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile, where I stated that when the
stage of punitive detention is reached, there can be reliance on the writ of
habeas corpus. 16

8. The next five paragraphs deal with the right to bail. Paragraph 24
correctly noted: "Next to life, man loves his freedom." In the next paragraph
reference is made of the presumption of innocence and then of the
constitutional right to bail, after which it was noted in paragraph 26 that
under Presidential Proclamation No. 2045 lifting martial law, the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus "continues to be suspended in the two
autonomous regions in Mindanao and in all other places with respect to
certain offenses," namely "the crimes of insurrection or rebellion,
subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and for all other
crimes and offenses committed by them in furtherance of or on the
occasion thereof, or incident thereto, or in connection therewith." Paragraph
27 reaches the heart of the matter, the main opinion laying down the
principle that due to the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus remain
suspended, "the natural consequence is that the right to bail for the
commission of anyone of the said offenses is also suspended. To hold
otherwise would defeat the very purpose of the suspension. Therefore,
where the offense for which the detainee was arrested is anyone of the said
offenses he has no right to bail even after the charges are filed in court."
Paragraph 28 sets forth the ratio decidendi: "The crimes of rebellion,
subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and crimes or
offenses committed in furtherance thereof or in connection therewith
constitute direct attacks on the life of the State." Then an analogy is made
in the next paragraph in this wise: "Just as an individual has a right to self-
defense when his life is endangered, so does the State. The suspension of
the privilege of the writ is to enable the State to hold in preventive
imprisonment pending investigation and trial those persons who plot against
it and commit acts that endanger the State's very existence. For this
measure of self-defense to be effective, the right to bail must also be
deemed suspended with respect to these offenses." With respect, I dissent.
It is not necessary to repeat what I said right at the beginning of this opinion
why I am unable to agree to the proposition that the suspension of the
privilege of the writ carries with it the suspension of the right to bail. Nor is
there need to quote from my concurring and dissenting opinions both in the
Lansang and the Garcia-Padilla cases. Briefly put, my perception of the
matter traces itself to what was said in the landmark Milligan decision where
the American Supreme Court said that only one great right may be
suspended "leaving all the rest forever inviolable." 17 This is not to ignore the
practical consideration set forth in the opinion of retired Chief Justice
Concepcion in Lansang that militates against my approach. First he aptly
summarized it in the words of Justice Tuason in Henandez, "if and when
formal complaint is presented, the court steps in and the executive steps
out." 18 After which came this portion of the opinion of the then Chief Justice:
"From a long-range viewpoint, this interpretation-of the act of the President
in having said formal charges filed is, We believe, more beneficial to the
detainees than that favored by Mr. Justice Fernando. His view-particularly
the theory that the detainees should be released immediately, without bail,
even before the completion of said preliminary examination and/or
investigation-would tend to induce the Executive to refrain from firing formal
charges as long as it may be possible. Manifestly, We should encourage
the early filing of said charges, so that courts of justice could assume
jurisdiction over the detainees and extend to them effective protection." 19

9. That brings us to paragraph 33 of the main opinion. The characterization

of a "merged executive and legislative branches" does not suffer from the
taint of in accuracy, if viewed from the practical standpoint. Viewed as a
matter of legal theory, I am not prepared to go that far. This Court, in a
unanimous opinion, expressly held: "The adoption of certain aspects of a
parliamentary system in the amended Constitution does not alter its
essentially presidential character." 20 There is therefore no repudiation of the
theory of separation of powers. Through the exercise of vigorous
presidential leadership, however, made manifest in party caucuses, there is
attained both unity of purpose and action. In that sense, it could be asserted
with truth that there is to all intents and purposes fusion of the executive
and legislative branches. Hence the need for the maintenance of the
concept of an independent judiciary. So it was pointed out in Fortun v.
Labang. 21

10. One last word. Doctrines have to be assessed in terms of its effect on
the governmental process. The rationale cannot be dissociated from the
texture of the times. They cannot ignore the forces at work which may either
solidify or rent asunder the political community. A crisis situation has a
compulsion all its own. There may then be a conflict between the traditional
formulations and the coercion of events. That may render even more
unavoidable the intrusion of the demands of the hour into the domain of
law. Adherence to what has been all along the accepted basic approach to
human rights calls for fealty. There must be also, however, recognition of a
more fluid standard in the assessment of governmental action to protect the
security of the state. It is my submission, however, that only when there
may be grave public danger should reliance on the high estate accorded
constitutional rights be stigmatized as being in the grip of the suffocating
orthodoxies of the law.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring opinion:

I concur in the sharply perceptive and heartfelt main opinion penned by Mr.
Justice Hermogenes Concepcion, Jr. especially in the reminders about
rights of the accused, the cry of our people for material necessities to give
them a better life, and the proper administration of justice. However, I would
like to add some qualifying observations to a few points discussed by the
ponente.

I agree, that the issuance of a presidential arrest and commitment order

(PCO) must comply with the requirements of the Constitution. However,
until the issue is placed squarely before us in a more appropriate case, I
hesitate to concur in a categorical statement that a PCO may be equated
with a warrant of arrest issued by a judge under Section 3, Article IV of the
Constitution. An examination of Letters of Instructions Nos. 1125-A and
1211 indicates that the PCO is issued by the President, not as "such other
responsible officers as may be authorized by law" under Section 3 of the Bill
of Rights but as Commander-in-Chief exercising exclusively executive
powers under the Constitution to meet problems of invasion, insurrection, or
rebellion or imminent danger thereof, when the public safety requires it.
Precisely, the letters of instructions call for preliminary examination or
investigation by a judge as the regular procedure. Only when resort to
judicial process is not possible or expedient without endangering public
order and safety and when the release on bail of the person or persons
already under arrest by virtue of a judicial warrant would endanger said
public order and safety may the military commander or the head of the law
enforcement agency apply to the President, through the Minister of National
Defense, for a presidential commitment order. The fact that the stated
procedure in the issuance of a PCO is an exception to and differs from the
regular procedure before a judge for the issuance of a warrant of arrest
shows that a PCO may not be equated completely with a warrant of arrest.

In Qua Chee Gan v. Deportation Board, (9 SCRA 27), the issue was raised
that the President, having been given the power to deport undesirable
aliens, may not be denied power which is essential to carry into effect the
deportation. This Court did not categorically rule that the President himself
may order the arrest of an alien for deportation purposes, but neither did it
rule that he may not do so. The fact is the President has on various
occasions, such as those involving among others, Mr. Harry Stonehill and
some associates and perhaps and Yuyiteng brothers, ordered the arrest of
aliens without having to secure a warrant of arrest from a judge at a time
when under the Constitution only a judge could issue such a warrant. The
commander-in-chief's power in a situation where the writ of habeas corpus
has been suspended or martial law has been proclaimed is certainly
broader and less subject to constitutional restrictions than the power of
deportation. I may also add that the President does not personally examine
the complainant and the witnesses the latter may produce as the
multifarious affairs of state prevent him from doing so. But as in the case of
judges relying on investigations conducted by the fiscal, the President may
rely on his Minister of National Defense or the recommending military
commander or the head of the law enforcement agency to conduct what
would be the equivalent of the judicial examination for probable cause. Of
course, the rules in Amarga v. Abbas, (98 Phil. 739) which impose on the
judge issuing the warrant of arrest the legal duty to first satisfy himself that
there is probable cause without relying completely or ministerially upon the
findings of the fiscal, should also apply and I believe are in fact applied to
PCO's.

It also hesitate to give concurrence to an unqualified reiteration of

the Lansang v. Garcia (42 SCRA 448) doctrine on the Court's inquiring into
the existence of factual bases for the suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus or the proclamation of martial law to determine their
constitutional sufficiency. While the Court has not been very receptive lately
to the invocation of the political question doctrine by State lawyers, I believe
that the doctrine does apply in cases where a political department- either
the President or the Batasang Pambansa-exercises powers expressly
granted in an exclusive manner by the Constitution and which are of a
clearly political nature not proper for judicial determination. If the
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ is
so patently arbitrary and as Justice Abad Santos says, lacking in popular
support, there will always be constitutional foundation for Supreme Court
action to rule against arbitrariness. However, as a general principle,
whenever the President exercises his powers under the Constitution to
meet the supreme dangers of invasion, insurrection, or rebellion or
imminent danger thereof when the public safety requires it, we should not
assume a power, upon the mere filing of a petition, to render a judicial
interpretation of an exclusively constitutionally granted power of the
President. Paraphrasing Coleman v. Miller (307 US 433, 83 L. Ed. 1385),
the question of the sufficiency of factual bases for the suspension of the
privilege of the writ or the proclamation of martial law would involve an
appraisal of a great variety of relevant conditions involving national security
which can hardly be said to be within the appropriate range of evidence
receivable in a court of justice and as to which it would be an extravagant
extension of judicial authority to assert judicial notice, which after all is what
we would be asserting in most cases involving the exercise of this
extraordinary presidential power.

Relova, J., I vote with Mr. Justice Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring in the result:

I concur with paragraph 1 of the Decision, dismissing the petitions filed in

these cases. The term petitioner as used herein shall refer not only to
Horacio R. Morales, Jr,, but will also include Antonio C. Moncupa, Jr.
insofar as legal statements may be applicable to the latter.

Petitioner was detained on April 21, 1982 by the Armed Forces of the
Philippines under a Presidential Commitment Order approved on April 23,
1982. On July 9, 1982, he filed the petition for habeas corpus alleging that
he was being illegally detained by respondents Minister of National
Defense, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and,
specifically, by Colonel Galileo Kintanar, Commanding Officer of the 15th
Military Intelligence Group. Petitioner's prayer was for the issuance of the
Writ directing respondents "to show the cause of his imprisonment or
restraint, and after hearing, to order his release forthwith." The Court issued
the Writ on July 13,1982.

In a Supplemental Return to the Writ, respondents informed the Court that

petitioner, on July 20, 1982, had been charged with Rebellion in Criminal
Case No. Q-21091 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, and they asked
that the petition for habeas corpus be denied for the reason that "with the
pendency of the case against petitioner before the Court below for trial and
before the City Fiscal for reinvestigation, there is all the more reason to
dismiss the petition.

Under the foregoing facts, it is my opinion that these cases have become
moot. There is no longer any cause of action against respondents who must
be deemed to have lost custody of petitioner (In re Lasam vs. Enrile, 67
SCRA 43 [1975]). I do not agree with the view that petitioner is still not
within the jurisdiction of the Court below. If that were a correct proposition,
the Court below would be without jurisdiction to try the rebellion case. In
criminal law, "the Court must also have jurisdiction over the subject matter,
that is, jurisdiction of the offense, and must have jurisdiction of the person
of the accused" (U.S.-U.S. v. Simon, D.C. Pa., 248, cited in 22 C.J.S. 300).
Even if there has been no warrant of arrest issued by the Court below, the
person of petitioner, who is now being tried, must be deemed as already
within its jurisdiction (Carrington vs. Peterson, 4 Phil. 134 [1905]).

As petitioner is now within the jurisdiction of the Court below, the question
in regards to the suspension of the Writ ofhabeas corpus has become
irrelevant. Considering that the Writ is never issuable to a Court (Nava v.
Gatmaitan, 90 Phil. 172 [1951]), there should be no justification in these
cases to assail whatever has been said or resolved in Lansang v. Garcia,
42 SCRA 448 (1971). That particular matter could have been
raised, procedurally, if petitioner had not been charged with Rebellion
before the Court below. Of course, it would then be for this Court to give or
not to give due course to the question. After all, habeas corpus is a
discretionary Writ (Engels vs. Amrine 155 Kan. 385, 125 P2d 379, cited in
39 Am. Jur. 2d, 269). Or, that would be the occasion for the Court to
express its present views in regards to Lansang-Garcia. The Constitution is
a living institution, and its interpretation and construction lives with changing
times and circumstances.

On the other hand, in reference to whether or not petitioner is entitled to bail

in the rebellion case, I believe that the proper procedure should be for
petitioners to apply for bail before the Court below, and after his motion is
granted or denied, the matter can thereafter be elevated to appellate
consideration.

Once prosecuted in Court the position should not be taken that petitioner
cannot be bailed, the right to bail being a fundamental right except for those
charged with capital offenses when evidence of guilt is strong. The
Constitution limited the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus to only one great right leaving the rest to remain forever inviolable
(Ex parte Milligan, 18 U.S. Law ed., 281, 297). The power of the Courts to
grant bail cannot be curtailed if the supremacy of the Judiciary within its
own sphere is to be preserved. (Angara vs. Electoral Commission 63 Phil.
139 [1936]; Fernandez Subido vs. Lacson, 2 SCRA 1054 [1961]).

The reason for the objection to bail poses the same risk should the Court
acquit petitioner. The risk need not be taken by continuing the detention
under the Presidential Commitment Order, for a reasonable period, in the
exercise of executive discretion by way of precaution essential for the public
safety. "Public danger warrants the substitution of executive process for
judicial process" (Moyer vs. Peabody, 53 Law, Ed., US 211-214, p.411).

MAKASIAR, J., concurring and dissenting:

I join Justices De Castro and Abad Santos in their opinion to abandon the
Lansang doctrine and to adhere to the doctrine in the Montenegro and
Barcelon cases that determination by the Chief Executive of the existence
of invasion, rebellion, insurrection or imminent danger thereof and that
public safety requires it, for the suspension of the privilege of writ of habeas
corpus and for the proclamation of martial law, is a political question and
therefore beyond the sphere of judicial inquiry. In addition to the reasons
advanced by Justices De Castro and Abad Santos, it should be stressed
that the prime responsibility for the preservation of the territorial integrity
and sovereignty of the Republic as well as its security, rests on the
commander- in-chief and not on the Judiciary. It is a classical truism that
there is no power under the sun that is not susceptible of abuse. Any abuse
or any arbitrary exercise by the President as commander-in-chief of his
constitutional power to proclaim martial law or to suspend the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus, can be repudiated or overruled by the people in
the exercise of their sovereign right of suffrage at the next election, and,
pending the holding of the next election, through their constitutional right of
free expression to sway public opinion against such abuse of power.

To repeat, only the Chief Executive is well-equipped with the intelligence

services as commander-in-chief to secure the desired information as to the
existence of the requirements for the proclamation of martial law or for the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. The Supreme
Court is bereft of such aids. This was clearly demonstrated at the executive
session during one of the hearings in the Lansang case where the lawyers
for the petitioners were present. Counsel for the petitioners had no means
of rebutting the evidence and information gathered by the military
organization presented in said Lansang case before this Court, which had
to rely on such evidence and information submitted by the Armed Forces. It
was clearly an exercise in futility.

II

Corollary to the doctrine in the case of Aquino vs. Enrile (59 SCRA 183),
which was re-affirmed in Gumaua vs. Espino (96 SCRA 402, 412), that the
proclamation of martial law automatically suspends the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus, the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus must necessarily include the suspension of the right to bail for
crimes which are grounds for the suspension of the privilege. This should
be the ruling principle because, as well-stated by Mr. Justice De Castro, to
release on bail persons indicted for rebellion or insurrection would be to
nullify the very purpose of the suspension of the privilege, which is precisely
to prevent them from continuing with the rebellion or insurrection or abetting
the same. The suspension of the privilege is precisely to restore tranquility
and prevent the shedding of blood by our own people, more than just
insuring the safety of public and private properties.

Executive process is as valid as judicial process. In the epigramatic

language of Mr. Justice Holmes:

... when it comes to a decision involving its (state) life, the ordinary rights of
individuals must yield to what he (the President) deems the necessities of
the moment. Public danger warrants the substitution of executive process
for judicial process. (See Kelly vs. Sanders, 99 U.S. 441, 446, 25 L ed. 327,
328). This was admitted with regard to killing men in the actual clash of
arms. And we think it is obvious, although it was disputed, that the same is
true to temporary detention to prevent apprehended harm. (Moyer vs,
Peabody, 212 U.S. 77.85. 53 L ed., 411, 417).

ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring and dissenting:

I concur in the result, i.e. in the dismissal of the petitions. This is as far as I
can go because I cannot give my assent to some of the statements made in
the main opinion. My list is not exhaustive but among them are the
following:

1. I reject the doctrine laid down in Lansang vs. Garcia, 42 SCRA 448
[1971] that this Court "has the authority to inquire into the existence of said
factual bases [for the issuance of Proclamations Nos. 889 and 889-A which
suspended the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus] in order to determine
the constitutional sufficiency thereof." (At p. 473.) In other words, this Court,
on the urging of the petitioners, declared that it has the power to determine
whether or not the President acted arbitrarily in suspending the writ. In so
doing, this Court did a complete turnabout from Barcelon vs. Baker, 5 Phil,
87 [1905] and Montenegro vs. Castaneda, 91 Phil. 882 [1952] which
enunciated the doctrine that the President's determination in suspending
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is final and conclusive upon the
courts.

I submit that Barcelon and Montenegro laid down the correct doctrine.
The Lansang doctrine is based on naivete; it demonstrates a lack of contact
with reality.
How can this Court determine the factual bases in order that it can
ascertain whether or not the President acted arbitrarily in suspending the
writ when, in the truthful words of Montenegro, "with its very limited
machinery [it] cannot be in better position [than the Executive Branch] to
ascertain or evaluate the conditions prevailing in the Archipelago?" (At p.
887.) The answer is obvious. It must rely on the Executive Branch which
has the appropriate civil and military machinery for the facts. This was the
method which had to be used in Lansang. This Court relied heavily on
classified information supplied by the military. Accordingly, an incongruous
situation obtained. For this Court relied on the very branch of the
government whose act was in question to obtain the facts. And as should
be expected the Executive Branch supplied information to support its
position and this Court was in no situation to disprove them. It was a case
of the defendant judging the suit. After all is said and done, the attempt by
this Court to determine whether or not the President acted arbitrarily in
suspending the writ was a useless and futile exercise.

There is still another reason why this Court should maintain a detached
attitude and refrain from giving the seal of approval to the act of the
Executive Branch. For it is possible that the suspension of the writ lacks
popular support because of one reason or another. But when this Court
declares that the suspension is not arbitrary (because it cannot do
otherwise upon the facts given to it by the Executive Branch) it in effect
participates in the decision-making process. It assumes a task which it is
not equipped to handle; it lends its prestige and credibility to an unpopular
act.

Lansang was an empty victory for the petitioners. They won a battle but lost
the war. It could be that this Court also lost something in the process. It
raised expectations which it could not fulfill.

2. I cannot accept the statement in paragraph 27 of the main opinion that

"because the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus remains suspended
'with respect to persons at present detained as well as others who may
hereafter be similarly detained for the crimes of insurrection or rebellion,
subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and for all other
crimes and offenses committed by them in furtherance of or on the
occasion thereof, or incident thereto, or in connection therewith', the natural
consequence is that the right to bail for the commission of the said offenses
is also suspended."

In the instant case, the petitioners were arrested without warrant on April
21, 1982. However, a Presidential Commitment Order was issued against
them on April 23, 1982 and on July 20, 1982 (after the petitions for the writ
of habeas corpus had been filed) the petitioners were charged with rebellion
before the Court of First Instance of Rizal in Criminal Case No. Q-21091.

Are they entitled to be released on bail if they so apply?

The ponente says that they have no right to bail because "To hold
otherwise would defeat the very purpose of the suspension" of the writ of
habeas corpus. Another reason given to deny bail is Letter of Instructions
No. 1211 issued on March 9, 1982, which stipulates that "4. When issued,
the Presidential Commitment Order shall constitute authority to arrest the
subject person or persons and keep him or them under detention until
ordered released by the President or his duly authorized representative.

I submit that the petitioners are entitled to bail as a matter of right if they
should apply for it.

The nature of LOI No. 1211 has been raised. Does it have the force of law
or is it a mere directive to officers named therein, namely: The Minister of
National Defense; The Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines; The
Chief, Philippine Constabulary; The Chief, Criminal Investigation Service;
The Director-General, NISA; The Minister of Justice; The Director, National
Bureau of Investigation; and The Solicitor General. To me the nature of LOI
No. 1211 is irrelevant for the right to bail is guaranteed by a higher law-the
Constitution.

The Constitution guarantees that "All persons, except those charged with
capital offenses when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be
bailable by sufficient sureties. Excessive bail shall not be required. " (Art. IV,
Sec. 18.) The penalty for rebellion is reclusion temporal. Hence rebellion is
a non-capital offense and the petitioners should be granted bail by the court
where their case is pending if they ask for it.
The suspension of the writ of habeas corpus and the fact that they are
covered by a Presidential Commitment Order are of no consequence. Since
the respondents have elected to bring the case of the petitioners to court,
the court acquired complete jurisdiction over them. To say that the court
cannot grant them bail is to diminish the court's jurisdiction.

The eloquent words of Mr. Justice Pedro Tuason are completely relevant:

Under constitutional guarantee bail is a matter of right which no court or

judge could properly refuse in all cases beyond the exceptions specified in
the Constitution. The meaning of this fundamental provision is that a party
accused of any and every bailable offense shall have the inestimable
privilege of giving security for his attendance at court and shall not be
imprisoned. (6 C.J. 893.)

The Constitution will be searched in vain for any provision that abridges this
right. Any argument in support of the contention that the suspension of the
writ of habeas corpus carries with it the suspension of the right to bail is,
and has to be, based on inference. I do not believe that the curtailment of
the right to bail is a normal, legal, or logical outcome of the suspension of
the writ. The error, I am inclined to believe, arises from a confusion of terms
and misapprehension of the principles underlying the suspension of the
writ.

The purpose of the suspension of the writ is to enable the executive, as a

precautionary measure, to detain without interference persons suspected of
harboring designs harmful to public safety. (Ex Parte Simmerman, 132 F.
2d, 442, 446.) The Constitution goes no further. (Ex parte Milligan, 4
Wallace 2, 18 Law. Ed. 281, 297.) If this is the purpose, the suspension can
contemplate only cases which, without the suspension, are open to
interference; such cases are arrests and detentions by the executive
department. Since the suspension of the writ is designed to prevent the
issuance of this extraordinary remedy, and since the writ issues from the
courts but never to the courts, it necessarily follows that arrests and
detentions by order of the courts are outside the purview of the
constitutional scheme.
As stated, the theory of the prosecution stems from a misconception of the
ends pursued by the suspension of the writ. If it is to have any color of
validity, this theory must assume that the Constitution directs positive action
to be taken, orders arrests and detentions to be made. Unfortunately or
fortunately, the Constitution does not do so. The intent of the Constitution in
authorizing the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus is no other than to
given the authorities a free hand in dealing with persons bent on
overthrowing the Government. The effects of the suspension are negative,
not positive; permissive, not mandatory nor even directory. By the
suspension, arrests and detentions beyond the period allowed under
normal circumstances are tolerated or legalized. The Constitution is not in
the least concerned with the disposition of persons accused of rebellion or
insurrection, whether or how long they should be kept in confinement, or
whether they should be set at large. In the nature of the governmental set-
up under the Constitution, their immediate fate is left to the discretion, within
reasonable and legal limits, of the proper department.

With these distinctions in mind, the query is, on what department of

Government is entrusted the prerogative of deciding what is to be done with
the prisoners charged with or suspected of rebellion or insurrection? The
answser, as I shall endeavor presently to explain, is either the executive or
the Court, depending on who has jurisdiction over them.

All persons detained for investigation by the executive department are

under executive control. It is here where the Constitution tells the courts to
keep their hands off-unless the cause of the detention be for an offense
other than rebellion or insurrection, which is another matter.

By the same token, if and when formal complaint is presented, the court
steps in and the executive steps out. The detention ceases to be an
executive and becomes a judicial concern. Thereupon the corresponding
court assumes its role and the judicial process takes its course to the
exclusion of the executive or the legislative departments. Henceforward, the
accused is entitled to demand all the constitutional safeguards and
privileges essential to due process. 'The Constitution does not say that he
shall be tried otherwise than by the course of common law.' (Ex parte
Milligan, ante, 297.) The Bill of Rights, including the right to bail and the
right to a fair trial, are unaffected by the suspension of the writ of habeas
corpus. The Constitution 'suspended one great right and left the rest to
remain forever inviolable. (Ex parte Milligan, ante, 297.) (Nava et al vs.
Gatmaitan 90 Phil. 172, 202-205 [1951].)

It should be stated that Chief Justice Ricardo Paras and Justices Cesar
Bengzon, Alex Reyes and Fernando Jugo shared the above opinion of
Justice Tuason. Incumbent Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando expressed
the same opinion in Lansang.

It is also said that the view "if and when a formal complaint is presented, the
court steps in and the executive steps out," will tend to induce the executive
to refrain from filing formal charges as long as it may be possible. (See
opinion of Chief Justice Concepcion in Lansang, op. cit. on p. 494.) The
answer has long been given by this Court in Teehankee vs. Rovira, 75 Phil.
634 (1954) as follows:

This constitutional mandate [on the right to bail] refers to all persons not
only to persons against whom a complaint or information has already been
formally filed. It lays down the rule that all persons shall before conviction
be bailable except those charged with capital offenses when evidence of
guilt is strong. According to this provision, the general rule is that any
person, before being convicted of any criminal offense, shall be bailable,
except when he is charged with a capital offense and the evidence of his
guilt is strong, Of course, only those persons who have been either
arrested, detained or otherwise deprived of their liberty will ever have
occasion to seek the benefits of said provision. But in order that a person
can invoke this constitutional precept, it is not necessary that he should wait
until a formal complaint or information is filed against him. From the
moment he is placed under arrest, detention or restraint by the officers of
the law, he can claim this- guarantee of the Bill of Rights, and this right he
retains unless and until he is charged with a capital offense and evidence of
his guilt is strong. Indeed if, as admitted on all sides, the precept protects
those already charged under a formal complaint or information, there
seems to be no legal or just reason for denying its benefits to one as
against whom the proper authorities may even yet conclude that there
exists no sufficient evidence of guilt. To place the former in a more favored
position than the latter would be, to say the least, anomalous and absurd. If
there is a presumption of innocence in favor of one already formally
charged with criminal offense (Constitution, Article III, Section 1[17], a
fortiori, this presumption should be indulged in favor of one not yet so
charged, although already arrested or detained." (At pp. 640-64 1.)

What I have said above about the right of an accused to bail in non-capital
cases applies mutatis mutandis to a person accused of a capital offense if
the evidence of his guilt is not strong to be determined after a hearing as
provided in the Rules of Court: "Sec. 7. Capital offense-Burden of proof. -
On the hearing of an application for admission to bail made by any person
in custody for the commission of a capital offense, the burden of showing
that evidence of guilt is strong is on the prosecution. ..." (Rule 114.)

Addendum to concurring and dissenting opinion:

Long after I had written my separate opinion in the above-entitled cases,

the newspapers reported the arrest of Mayor Aquilino Pimentel of Cagayan
de Oro City on grounds of national security. It was said that the arrest of
Mayor Pimentel was effected pursuant to a Presidential Commitment Order
(PCO).

It was also reported that Msgr. Patrick Cronin Archbishop of Cagayan de

Oro City, requested President Ferdinand E. Marcos to lift the PCO because
Pimentel was innocent of any wrong-doing.

The issues dated April 20, 1983, of Bulletin Today, Daily

Express and Times Journal all report that President Marcos denied the
request of Archbishop Cronin because he had no power to release Pimentel
who was arrested and charged before a Regional Trial Court in Cebu City
on very strong evidence that he provided arms, funds, and sanctuary to
subversives.

President Marcos is reported to have told Msgr. Cronin

The disposal of the body of the accused, as any lawyer will inform you, is
now within the powers of the regional trial court of Cebu City, and not within
the powers of the President.
It should be recalled the main opinion holds that the petitioners herein
cannot be granted bail by the court where they stand charged with the
crime of rebellion because to hold otherwise would defeat the very purpose
of the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus and also because under LOI
No. 1211, the release of persons arrested pursuant to a PCO can be
effected only by order of the President or his duly authorized representative.
And it should be noted that every PCO has the following operative last
paragraph:

I, therefore, hereby order the arrest and detention of the abovenamed

persons until the final disposition/termination of their cases unless sooner
ordered released by me or by my duly authorized representative.

And yet in the case of Mayor Pimentel who was arrested by virtue of a
PCO, the President no less said that the power to release Pimentel "as any
lawyer will inform you," is not his but of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu
City.

I am happy to be counted among the "any lawyer" mentioned by President

Marcos for I believe, as I have stated in my separate opinion, that the
petitioners herein are entitled to bail after they were charged in court with
rebellion because "the court steps in and the executive steps out."

DE CASTRO, J., concurring and dissenting:

I concur in the dismissal of the petition. It is my considered opinion, as I

have set forth in my ponencia in the case for Habeas Corpus-Josefina
Garcia, petitioner, G.R. No. 61388, hereafter referred to as the Parong
case, that when a person is arrested by virtue of a PCO or a PCO is issued
after his arrest effected without warrant or with one issued by court, his
detention becomes one without right to bail, even after charges have been
filed against him in court. This is so because, under the circumstance that
the rebellion is still continuing, perhaps with greater intensity, a captured or
arrested rebel, or one in conspiracy with the rebels by acts in pursuance or
in furtherance of the rebellion, is not arrested and detained with a view to
his immediate prosecution. It is more for the purpose of detaining him as a
military measure to suppress the rebellion. The suspension of the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus has the effect of deferring trial for certain
specified crimes during the existence of the emergency, as I stated, citing
legal writers and publicists, 1 in the aforecited case of Parong, et al.

The reason is that a person cannot be prosecuted for a crime the

commission of which has not yet come to an end as in the case of the
existing rebellion. A person who kills another can and should immediately
be prosecuted, because the killing itself constitutes the termination of the
commission of the crime, as is generally true with the common statutory
offenses. But a rebel, even when already captured or arrested and placed
under detention, by reason of conspiracy with the rebels and their co-
conspirators who are free, continues in a state of committing the crime of
rebellion which is a continuing offense. If immediately prosecuted and by
virtue thereof, allowed to be released on bail, the crime of rebellion being
bailable, the detainee would certainly join his comrades in the field to the
jeopardy of government efforts to suppress the rebellion, which is the
rationale for the President being constitutionally empowered to suspend the
privilege of habeas corpus in case of invasion, rebellion or insurrection,
even mere imminent danger thereof, when public safety so requires. The
President, however, may order the filing of charges in court and trial thereof
forthwith held, or even release on bail, as his best judgment will dictate to
him. But this is for the President alone to decide, without interference from
the courts, he being in the exercise of his military power.

It is for this reason that I dissent from the majority opinion insofar as it
would reiterate the doctrine of the Lansang case, being of the view that the
earlier doctrine in the case of Barcelon vs. Baker and Montenegro vs.
Castaneda which was superseded by the Lansang doctrine should be
reverted to, as the more practical and realistic ruling, and more in
consonance with the grant by the Constitution to the President of the power
to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the case of the
contingencies mentioned in the Constitution. Such power could be easily
rendered nugatory if interference by the Supreme Court were allowed as
when it is given the power of judicial review over the exercise of this
particular presidential power. The doctrine of "political question" comes in to
make it improper for the power of judicial review to be exercise by the said
Court, which doctrine renders the exercise of the presidential power
referred to non-justiciable. Justiciability of the controversy is the basic
requirement for the exercise of the power of judicial review.

Moreover, the Lansang doctrine could easily be viewed as discriminatory

against our incumbent President whose proclamation suspending the
privilege of habeas corpus was held subject to judicial review, where similar
proclamations of former Chiefs Executive, Governor General Wright and
President Quirino, were held binding and conclusive upon the courts and all
other persons. If this is so, as it can be safely surmised that the incumbent
President cannot but feel discriminated against with the pronouncement of
the Lansang doctrine, rectification is called for. Needless to state, I am one
with Justice Abad Santos in his vigorous dissent against the reiteration of
the Lansang doctrine as proposed in the majority opinion in the instant
case.

In the Parong case (G.R. No. 61388), I stated, inter alia, the following:

In times of war or national emergency, the legislature may surrender a part

of its power of legislation to the President. Would it not be as proper and
wholly acceptable to lay down the principle that during such crises, the
judiciary should be less jealous of its power and more trusting •f the
Executive in the exercise of its emergency powers in recognition of the
same necessity? Verily, the existence of the emergencies should be left to
President's sole and unfettered determination. His exercise of the power to
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus on the occasion thereof,
should also be beyond judicial review, Arbitrariness, as a ground for judicial
inquiry of presidential acts and decisions, sounds good in theory but
impractical and unrealistic, considering how well-nigh impossible it is for the
courts to contradict the finding of the President on the existence of the
emergency that gives occasion for the exercise of the power to suspend the
privilege of the writ. For the Court to insist on reviewing Presidential action
on the ground of arbitrariness may only result in a violent collision of two
jealous powers with tragic consequences, by all means to be avoided, in
favor of adhering to the more desirable and long-tested doctrine of "political
question" in reference to the power of judicial review."
Indeed, while the Supreme Court is said to be the Guardian of the
Constitution, not all questions arising therefrom may be brought to it for
judicial review as to whether a constitutional violation has been committed.
The power of the President as the defender of the State has to be granted
by the Constitution, for how else could such power be granted except by the
instrument which is the repository of the sovereign will of the people. But
certainly, the exercise of such power of defending the Nation is not to be
subordinated to that of the Supreme Court acting as Guardian of the
Constitution, for of what use is it to preserve the Constitution if We lose the
Nation?

TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting:

The bench and bar and law scholars and students are in debt to the writer
of the main opinion, Mr. Justice Concepcion, Jr., for his thorough and
perceptive restatement of the constitutional and basic human rights of
accused persons and detainees. The main opinion spotlights the
grievances that persons detained or charged for the crimes of insurrection,
rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes
invariably bring to this Court. They complain, as petitioners do here, of
being arrested without any warrant of arrest; of being kept in isolation and
being denied of their constitutional right to counsel and to silence; of
prolonged detention without any charges; of having been subjected to
maltreatment and torture; and of their counsel and families undergoing
great difficulties in locating or having access to them.

The State through the Solicitor General on the other hand invariably denies
all such charges and submits affidavits of the arresting officers and
detention custodian that detainees are afforded decent and humane
treatment, further countering that such claims are merely calculated to
arouse sympathy and as propaganda against the Government and its
institutions.

Upon the filing of the petition at bar on July 13, 1982, the Court, in issuing
the writ of habeas corpus, Resolved "to allow counsel for petitioner to visit
and confer with the detainee in an atmosphere of confidentiality, consistent
with reasonable security measures which respondents may impose." At the
hearing held on July 22, 1982, the Court granted petitioner's plea for
reinvestigation of the charges and to "appoint the (Quezon) City Fiscal to
act as Commissioner of the Court and receive evidence of the charges
made by petitioners before this Court of alleged torture and violation of their
constitutional rights, particularly the right to counsel." The City Fiscal in due
time submitted his report on the reinvestigation, affirming the existence of a
prima facie case for rebellion against petitioner. In February this year, he
submitted the voluminous transcript of the proceedings held before him and
the evidence submitted to him without comment or recommendation on
petitioner's charges of alleged torture and violation of constitutional rights.
The "material and relevant" charges have not been taken up nor deliberated
upon by the Court, but apparently will no longer be resolved by the, Court,
as was expected at the time, since the main opinion directs now that "they
should be filed before the body which has jurisdiction over them." 1 On my
part, I believe that the Court should go over the transcript and make some
authoritative pronouncements on the charges at least of violation of
petitioners' right to counsel.

I. The vital problem is to assure the enjoyment of such constitutional and

basic human rights of the persons arrested, detained or charged, be they
mere dissenters, subversives or hardened criminals. As observed in the
main opinion, this is what distinguishes our country as a republican and
democratic state from those arrested in totalitarian states who have no
rights to speak of. This Court stands as the guarantor of the constitutional
rights of all persons within its jurisdiction and must see to it that the rights
are respected and not treated as paper rights.

These are the great rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights (Article IV) of the
Constitution:

The right against unreasonable searches and seizures and arbitrary arrest:

Sec. 3. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,

papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose shall not be violated, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined by the judge, or such other responsible officer as may be
authorized by law, after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

The right to due process and equal protection of law:

Sec. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due

process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the
laws.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 17. No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without
due process of law.

The right of free association:

Sec. 7. The right to form associations or societies for purposes not contrary
to law shall not be abridged.

Freedom of speech and press and assembly and petition:

Sec. 9. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, or of the

press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the
Government for redress of grievances.

The great writ of liberty:

Sec. 15. The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended
except in cases of invasion, insurrection, rebellion, or imminent danger
thereof, when the public safety requires it.

The right to bail:

Sec. 8. All persons, except those charged with capital offenses when
evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient
sureties. Excessive bail shall not be required.

Presumption of innocence and Rights of speedy and impartial trial and

confrontation:
Sec. 19. In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed
innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by
himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial to meet
the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the
attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf.
However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence
of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to
appear is unjustified.

The right to counsel and silence.

Sec. 20. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Any

person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the
right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right. No
force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the
free will shall be used against him. Any confession obtained in violation of
this section shall be inadmissible in evidence.

The main opinion deals with the scope and extent of these rights and a
number of passages bears emphasis and reiteration, as follows:

The arresting officers, upon making the arrest, must inform the subject of
the reason for the arrest and show him the warrant of arrest, if any. They
must inform him of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel.
They must respect his right to communicate with his lawyer. No custodial
investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of his counsel.
The right to counsel may be waived knowingly and intelligently and for such
reason the waiver should be recognized only if made with the assistance of
counsel. The detainee's right to confer with counsel at any hour of the day,
alone and privately, should be respected.

Care should be exercised in making an arrest without a warrant. Where

there is no justification for the arrest, the public officer could be criminally
liable for arbitrary detention (under Article 124, Revised Penal Code) or
unlawful arrest (under Article 269, Idem) or for some other offense.2
Furthermore, we hold that under the judicial power of review and by
constitutional mandate, in all petitions for habeas corpus the court must
inquire into every phase and aspect of petitioner's detention-from the
moment petitioner was taken into custody up to the moment the court
passes upon the merits of the petition. Only after such a scrutiny can the
court satisfy itself that the due process clause of our Constitution has in fact
been satisfied.

The submission that a person may be detained indefinitely without any

charges and the courts cannot inquire into the legality of the restraint goes
against the spirit and letter of the Constitution and is contrary to the basic
precepts of human rights and a democratic society. 3

However, there is a difference between preventive and punitive

imprisonment. Where the filing of charges in court or the trial of such
charges already filed becomes protracted without any justifiable reason, the
detention becomes punitive in character and the detainee regains his right
to freedom. 4

II. Respondents' return in these cases, in asserting that "the allegations that
petitioners have been denied their right to counsel are not true. They simply
did not ask for one, " disregards the consistent injunction of the Court and
of the law that the detainees need not bear the burden of asking for counsel
but should be informed of their right to counsel. The return's assertion that
"petitioners also waived the assistance of counsel during the investigation
of their cases" also falls short of the requirement that such waiver be made
with the assistance of counsel to assure the validity thereof.

The late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, in maintaining in his dissenting
opinion in Magtoto vs. Manguera5 that the 1973 constitutional ban on
uncounselled confessions should operate retrospectively to June 15, 1954
when Republic Act 1083 (amending Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code)
was enacted recognizing the right of a detained person to counsel in any
custodial inquest, and not prospectively only as to such confessions
obtained after the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution, stressed anew that it
is "the obligation on the part of any detaining officer to inform the person
detained of his right to counsel before the very inception of custodial
inquest." He enjoined us eloquently that "(I) hold no brief against custodial
interrogation per se. But I do entertain mortal fear that when a detained
person is subjected, without the assistance of counsel, to custodial
interrogation by peace officers, official lawlessness could be the rule and
not the exception. Witness the innumerable cases in the annals of
adjudication where this Court has set at naught and declared inadmissible
confessions obtained from detained persons thru official lawlessness. It is a
verity in the life of our nation that people without influence and without
stature in society have, more often than not, been subjected to brutal and
brutalizing third-degree methods, if not actually framed, by many police
agencies in this country. Instead of blinking our eyes shut to this reality, we
must recognize it for what it is, (and) I am completely conscious of the need
for a balancing of the interests of society with the rights and freedoms of the
individual. I have advocated the balancing-of-interests rule in all situations
which call for an appraisal of the interplay of conflicting interests of
consequential dimensions. But I reject any proposition that would blindly
uphold the interests of society at the sacrifice of the dignity of any human
being," and echoed Justice Douglas' aphorism that the rights of none are
safe unless the rights of all are protected.

In the recent case of Sobremonte vs. Enrile, 6 the Court did not rule on the
therein detailed assertions of maltreatment of the detainee, stating only that
"redress for the alleged violation of Socorro's constitutional rights may be
secured through appropriate civil, criminal or administrative charges." 7 The
case was dismissed for having become moot with the detainee's release
from detention upon her filing the recommended P l,000.00-bail bond. But
the Court decried that "all the effort, energy and manhours expended by the
parties and their counsel, including this Court, ... could have been avoided
had the officers of the AVSECOM and the ISAFP responded promptly to the
inquiries of petitioner instead of giving her the 'run-round' by referring her
from one office to another."

III. I join Mr. Justice Abad Santos' stand that notwithstanding the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the issuance
on March 9, 1982 of Letter of Instruction No. 1211 that the Presidential
Commitment Order (PCO) constitutes authority to keep the subject person
under detention "until ordered released by the President or his duly
authorized representative," the higher and superior mandate of the
Constitution guarantees the right to bail and vests the courts with the
jurisdiction and judicial power to grant bail which may not be removed nor
diminished nor abdicated. We cannot but so hold, if we are to be true to the
fundamental precept that "The Constitution is a law for rulers and for people
equally in war and in peace and covers with the shield of its protection all
classes of men at all times and under all circumstances. "

The argument that otherwise the purpose of the suspension of the privilege
would be defeated ignores the overwhelming capability of the State and its
military and police forces to keep suspects under surveillance and the
courts' imposition of reasonable conditions in granting bail, such as periodic
reports to the authorities concerned, and prohibiting their going to certain
critical areas.

In my dissenting opinion in Buscayno vs. Military Commission, 8 Ireiterated

my adherence to the majority holding in the leading 1951 cases of Nava vs.
Gatmaitan and Hernandez vs. Montesa 9 (although it failed one vote short of
the required majority of six affirmative votes at the time) as expounded by
then Chief Justice Ricardo Paras and Associate Justice (later Chief Justice)
Cesar Bengzon and Associate Justices Pedro Tuason, Alex Reyes and
Fernando Jugo that after formal indictment in court by the filing against
them of an information charging rebellion with multiple murder, etc.,
accused persons covered by the proclamation of suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus are entitled to the right to bail. As
stressed by then Chief Justice Ricardo Paras. "(T)he right to bail, along with
the right of an accused to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed
of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy
and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory
process to secure the attendance of witnesses in his behalf (Article III,
Section 1, Paragraph 17, of the Constitution), tends to aid the accused to
prove his innocence and obtain acquittal. If it be contended that the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus includes the
suspension of the distinct right to bail or to be provisionally at liberty, it
would a fortiori imply the suspension of all his other rights (even the rights
to be tried by a court) that may win for him ultimate acquittal and, hence,
absolute freedom. The latter result is not insisted upon for being patently
untenable, "

Then Chief Justice Paras stressed that "... The privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus and the right to bail guaranteed under the Bill of Rights are
separate and co-equal. If the intention of the framers of the Constitution
was that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus carries
or implies the suspension of the right to bail, they would have very easily
provided that all persons shall before conviction be bailable by sufficient
sureties, except those charged with capital offenses when evidence of guilt
is strong and except when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended. As stated in the case of Ex Parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2, 18 L. ed.
297, the Constitution limited the suspension to only one great right, leaving
the rest to remain forever inviolable." 10 It is noteworthy and supportive of
the prevailing stand since 1951 that the other great constitutional rights
remain forever inviolable since the Constitution limited the suspension to
only one great right (of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus), that there
has been no amendment of the Constitution to curtail the right to bail in
case of such suspension notwithstanding the numerous constitutional
amendments adopted after the 1973 Constitution.

The late Justice Pedro Tuason emphasized that "(T)o the plea that the
security of the State would be jeopardized by the release of the defendants
on bail, the answer is that the existence of danger is never a justification for
courts to tamper with the fundamental rights expressly granted by the
Constitution. These rights are immutable, inflexible, -yielding to no pressure
of convenience, expediency or the so-called 'judicial statesmanship.' The
Legislature itself cannot infringe them, and no court conscious of its
responsibilities and limitations would do so. If the Bill of Rights are
incompatible with stable government and a menace to the Nation, let the
Constitution be amended, or abolished. It is trite to say that, while the
Constitution stands, the courts of justice as the repository of civil liberty are
bound to protect and maintain undiluted individual rights." 11

And former Chief Justice Cesar Bengzon then made the same forceful plea
echoed these days by men of goodwill that respect for constitutional and
human rights and adherence to the rule of law would help in the fight
against rebellion and movement for national reconciliation, thus: "And in my
opinion, one of the surest means to ease the uprising is a sincere
demonstration of this Government's adherence to the principles of the
Constitution together with an impartial application thereof to all citizens,
whether dissidents or not. Let the rebels have no reason to apprehend that
their comrades now under custody are being railroaded into Muntinglupa,
without benefit of those fundamental privileges which the experience of the
ages has deemed essential for the protection of all persons accused of
crime before the tribunal of justice. Give them the assurance that the
judiciary, ever mindful of its sacred mission, will not, thru faulty or misplaced
devotion, uphold any doubtful claims of Governmental power in diminution
of individual rights, but will always cling to the principles uttered long ago by
Chief Justice Marshall that when in doubt as to the construction of the
Constitution, 'the Courts will favor personal liberty.'" 12

IV. The most authoritative pronouncement in regard to the courts' judicial

power to grant the constitutional right to bail is of course none other than
the President's himself. In all the metropolitan newspapers of April 20,
1983, the President is reported to have "said that Pimentel has been
charged with rebellion before the regional trial court of Cebu City and is
therefore under the jurisdiction of the civil court and not only under the
jurisdiction of the military by virtue of the PCO " In a telegram in reply to the
appeal of Msgr. Patrick Cronin, Archbishop of Cagayan de Oro and
Misamis Oriental, for lifting of the PCO on Mayor Aquilino Pimentel of
Cagayan de Oro City, the President said that "(T)he disposal of the body of
the accused, as any lawyer will inform you, is now within the powers of the
regional trial court of Cebu City and not within the powers of the President."

The statement of the now Chief Justice in his separate opinion in Gumaua
vs. Espino 13 referring to his earlier concurring and dissenting opinion
in Aquino vs. Military Commission No. 2,14 is most relevant, mutatis
mutandis, thus: " 'Were it not for the above mandate of the Transitory
Provisions [Article XVII, section 3, par. (2), 1973 Constitution], the
submission of petitioner as to a military commission being devoid of
jurisdiction over civilians elicits approval. The controlling principle, to my
mind, is that supplied in the opinion of the United States Supreme Court
in Duncan v. Kahanamoku [327 U.S. 304, 322 (1946)], a decision
impressed with the greatest relevance inasmuch as it interpreted the
specific section found in the Hawaiian Organic Act, which was also a
feature of the Philippine Autonomy Act, the source of the martial law
provision in the 1935 Constitution.' As was pointed out in the Duncan
opinion penned by Justice Black: 'Courts and their procedural safeguards
are indispensable to our system of government. They were set up by our
founders to protect the liberties they valued. Ex parte Quirin, supra, 317
U.S. at page 19, 63 S. Ct. at page 6, 87 L. Ed. 3. Our system of government
clearly is the antithesis of total military rule and the founders of this country
are not likely to have contemplated complete military dominance within the
limits of a Territory made part of this country and not recently taken from an
enemy. They were opposed to governments that placed in the hands of one
man the power to make, interpret and enforce the laws. Their philosophy
has been the people's throughout the history. For that reason we have
maintained legislatures chosen by citizens or their representatives and
courts and juries to try those who violate legislative enactments. We have
always been especially concerned about the potential evils of summary
criminal trials and have guarded against them by provisions embodied in
the constitution itself.' ... The phrase 'martial law' as employed in that Act,
therefore, while intended to authorize the military to act vigorously for the
maintenance of an orderly civil government and for the defense of the
island against actual or threatened rebellion or invasion, [it] was not
intended to authorize the supplanting of courts by military courts."

V. The courts, and ultimately the Supreme Court, are therefore called upon
to review all such cases and the accused's right to bail, pending trial and
conviction or acquittal, on a case by case basis. The courts with their
procedural safeguards are then called upon to apply the Constitution and
the Law and to grant bail for clearly bailable (non-capital) offenses and in
capital offenses to determine whether or not evidence of guilt is strong, in
consonance with guidelines laid down by the Supreme Court, as in the
leading case of Montano vs. Ocampo 15(involving Senator Montano who was
charged with multiple murders and frustrated murders), as follows:
Brushing aside the charge that the preliminary investigation of this case by
the aforesaid Judge was railroaded, the same having been conducted at
midnight, a few hours after the complaint was filed, we are of the opinion
that, upon the evidence adduced in the application for bail in the lower
court, as such evidence is recited lengthily in the present petition and the
answer thereto, and extensively analyzed and discussed in the oral
argument, there is not such clear showing of guilt as would preclude all
reasonable probability of any other conclusion.

Exclusion from bail in capital offenses being an exception to the otherwise

absolute right guaranteed by the constitution, the natural tendency of the
courts has been toward a fair and liberal appreciationrather than otherwise,
of the evidence in the determination of the degree of proof and presumption
of guilt necessary to warrant a deprivation of that right.

Besides, to deny bail it is not enough that the evidence of guilt is strong; it
must also appear that in case of conviction the defendant's criminal liability
would probably call for a capital punishment. No clear or conclusive
showing before this Court has been made.

In the evaluation of the evidence the probability of flight is one other

important factor to be taken into account. The sole purpose of confining
accused in jail before conviction, it has been observed, is to assure his
presence at the trial. In other words, if denial of bail is authorized in capital
cases, it is only on the theory that the proof being strong, the defendant
would flee, if he has the opportunity, rather than face the verdict of the jury.
Hence, the exception to the fundamental right to be bailed should be
applied in direct ratio to the extent of the probability of evasion of
prosecution.

The possibility of escape in this case, bearing in mind the defendant's

official and social standing and his other personal circumstances, seems
remote if not nil.

As editorially commented in one daily, 16 "(T)he danger, however, lies in the

possibility that such means (PCO's) may not always be employed
judiciously. In issuing a PCO the President in most cases must rely on field
reports and recommendations filed by his subordinates, usually the military
and the intelligence community. No one can totally dismiss the possibility
that the President may be fed with false information in some instances. The
consequences of such an error can only aggravate further the country's
security problems." When such cases occur and executive relief is not
obtained, the courts provide the means of securing redress from erroneous
or wrongful arrests and detentions, and at the very least, as shown from
past experience, serve as the means for bringing the matter to the
President's attention and securing the needed relief.
G.R. No. L-51770 March 20, 1985

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
FRANCISCO GALIT, defendant-appellant.

CONCEPCION, JR., J:

1. The prisoner was arrested for killing the victim oil the occasion of a
robbery. He had been detained and interrogated almost continuously for
five days, to no avail. He consistently maintained his innocence. There was
no evidence to link him to the crime. Obviously, something drastic had to be
done. A confession was absolutely necessary. So the investigating officers
began to maul him and to torture him physically. Still the prisoner insisted
on his innocence. His will had to be broken. A confession must be obtained.
So they continued to maltreat and beat him. 'They covered his face with a
rag and pushed his face into a toilet bowl full of human waste. The prisoner
could not take any more. His body could no longer endure the pain inflicted
on him and the indignities he had to suffer. His will had been broken. He
admitted what the investigating officers wanted him to admit and he signed
the confession they prepared. Later, against his will, he posed for pictures
as directed by his investigators, purporting it to be a reenactment.

2. This incident could have happened in a Russian gulag or in Hitler's

Germany. But no it did not. It happened in the Philippines. In this case
before Us.

3. The Revised Penal Code punishes the maltreatment of prisoners as

follows:

ART. 235. Maltreatment of prisoners. — The penalty of arresto mayor in its

medium period to prision correccional in its minimum period, in addition to
his liability for the physical injuries or damage caused, shall be imposed
upon any public officer or employee who shall over do himself in the
correction or handling of a prisoner or detention prisoner under his charge,
by the imposition of punishments in a cruel and humiliating manner.

If the purpose of the maltreatment is to extort a confession, or to obtain

some information from the prisoner, the offender shall be punished
by prision correccional in its minimum period, temporary special
disqualification and a fine not exceeding 500 pesos, in addition to his
liability for the physical injuries or damage caused.

4. This Court in a long line of decisions over the years, the latest being the
case of People vs. Cabrera, 1 has consistently and strongly condemned the
practice of maltreating prisoners to extort confessions from them as a grave
and unforgivable violation of human rights. But the practice persists.
Fortunately, such instances constitute the exception rather than the general
rule.

5. Before Us for mandatory review is the death sentence imposed upon the
accused Francisco Galit by the Circuit Criminal Court of Pasig, Rizal, in
Crim. Case No. CCC-VII-2589 of said court.

6. The record shows that in the morning of August 23, 1977, Mrs. Natividad
Fernando, a widow, was found dead in the bedroom of her house located at
Barrio Geronimo, Montalban, Rizal, as a result of seven (7) wounds inflicted
upon different parts of her body by a blunt instrument. 2 More than two
weeks thereafter, police authorities of Montalban picked up the herein
accused, Francisco Galit, an ordinary construction worker (pion) living in
Marikina, Rizal, on suspicion of the murder. On the following day, however,
September 8, 1977, the case was referred to the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) for further investigation in view of the alleged limited
facilities of the Montalban police station. Accordingly, the herein accused
was brought to the NBI where he was investigated by a team headed by
NBI Agent Carlos Flores. 3 NBI Agent Flores conducted a preliminary
interview of the suspect who allegedly gave evasive answers to his
questions. 4 But the following day, September 9, 1977, Francisco Galit
voluntarily executed a Salaysay admitting participation in the commission of
the crime. He implicated Juling Dulay and Pabling Dulay as his companions
in the crime. 5 As a result, he was charged with the crime of Robbery with
Homicide, in an information filed before the Circuit Criminal Court of Pasig,
Rizal, committed as follows:

That on or about the 23rd day of August 1977 in the municipality of

Montalban, province of Rizal, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating
together with Juling Doe and Pabling Doe, whose true Identities and
present whereabouts are still unknown and three of them mutually helping
and aiding one another, with intent of gain and by means of force,
intimidation and violence upon the person of one Natividad Fernando while
in her dwelling, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously take,
steal and carry away from the person of said Natividad Fernando, cash
money of an undetermined amount, belonging to said Natividad Fernando,
thereby causing damage and prejudice to the latter in an undetermined
amount; that by reason or on the occasion of said robbery, and for purpose
of enabling them (accused) to take, steal and carry away the said cash
money in pursuance of their conspiracy and for the purpose of insuring the
success of their criminal act, with intent to kill, did, then and there wilfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously attack, assault and stab with a dagger said
Natividad Fernando on the different parts of her body, thereby inflicting
multiple injuries on the head and extremities, which directly caused her
death, and the total amount of the loss is P10,000.00 including valuables
and cash.
Trial was held, and on August 11, 1978, immediately after the accused had
terminated the presentation of his evidence, the trial judge dictated his
decision on the case in open court, finding the accused guilty as charged
and sentencing him to suffer the death penalty; to indemnify the heirs of the
victim in the sum of P110,000.00, and to pay the costs. Hence, the present
recourse.

7. The incriminatory facts of the case, as found by the trial court, are as
follows:

From the evidence adduced in this case, it was gathered that in the early
morning of August 23, 1977, a 70-year old woman named Natividad
Fernando, widow, in the twilight of her life, was robbed and then hacked to
death by the accused and two others in her (victim's) own residence at
Montalban, Rizal.

Prosecution witness Florentino Valentino testified that he heard accused

Francisco Galit and his wife having an argument in connection with the
robbery and killing of the victim, Natividad Fernando. It appears that on
August 18, 1977, accused Galit and two others, namely, Juling Dulay and a
certain "Pabling" accidentally met each other at Marikina, Rizal, and in their
conversation, the three agreed to rob Natividad Fernando; that it was
further agreed among them to enter the premises of the victim's house at
the back yard by climbing over the fence; that once inside the premises,
they will search every room, especially the aparador and filing cabinets,
with the sole aim of looking for cash money and other valuables.

Witness Valentino further testified that on August 22, 1977, at around 6:00
o'clock in the afternoon, accused Francisco Galit and his two companions,
Juling Dulay and Pabling, as per their previous agreement, met at the place
where they formerly saw each other in Mariquina, Rizal; that the three
conspirators took a jeepney for Montalban and upon passing the Montalban
Municipal Building, they stopped and they waited at the side of the road
until the hour of midnight; that at about 12:00 o'clock that night, the three
repaired to the premises of the victim, Natividad Fernando; that they
entered the said premises through the back wall of the house; that while
entering the premises of said house, Juling Dulay saw a bolo, lying near the
piggery compound, which he picked up and used it to destroy the back
portion of the wall of the house; that it was Juling Dulay who first entered
the house through the hole that they made, followed by the accused Galit
and next to him was "Pabling", that it was already early dawn of August 23,
1977 when the three were able to gain entrance into the house of the
victim; as the three could not find anything valuable inside the first room
that they entered, Juling Dulay destroyed the screen of the door of the
victim, Natividad Fernando; that upon entering the room of the victim, the
three accused decided to kill first the victim, Natividad Fernando, before
searching the room for valuables; that Juling Dulay, who was then holding
the bolo, began hacking the victim, who was then sleeping, and accused
Galit heard a moaning sound from the victim; that after the victim was killed,
the three accused began searching the room for valuables; that they helped
each other in opening the iron cabinet inside the room of the victim, where
they found some money; that when the three accused left the room of the
victim, they brought with them some papers and pictures which they threw
outside; that after killing and robbing the victim, the three accused went out
of the premises of the house, using the same way by which they gained
entrance, which was through the back portion of the wall; that the three
accused walked towards the river bank where they divided the loot that they
got from the room of the victim; that their respective shares amount to
P70.00 for each of them; and that after receiving their shares of the loot, the
three accused left and went home.

When witness Florentino Valentino was in his room, which was adjoining
that of accused Francisco Galit, he overheard accused Galit and his wife
quarreling about the intention of accused Galit to leave their residence
immediately; that he further stated that he overheard accused Galit saying
that he and his other two companions robbed and killed Natividad
Fernando.

As a result of the killing, the victim, Natividad Fernando, suffered no less

than seven stab wounds. There was massive cerebral hemorrhage and the
cause of death was due to shock and hemorrhage, as evidenced by the
Medico-Legal Necropsy Report (Exhs. 'C' and 'C-2'), and the pictures taken
of the deceased victim (Exhs. 'E', 'E-1' and 'E-2').
8. The accused, upon the other hand, denied participation in the
commission of the crime. He claimed that he was in his house in Marikina,
Rizal, when the crime was committed in Montalban, Rizal. He also assailed
the admissibility of the extra-judicial confession extracted from him through
torture, force and intimidation as described earlier, and without the benefit
of counsel.

9. After a review of the records, We find that the evidence presented by the
prosecution does not support a conviction. In fact, the findings of the trial
court relative to the acts attributed to the accused are not supported by
competent evidence. The principal prosecution witness, Florentino
Valentino merely testified that he and the accused were living together in
one house in Marikina, Rizal, on August 23, 1977, because the mother of
his wife is the wife of the accused; that when he returned home at about
4:00 o'clock in the morning from the police station of Marikina, Rizal, the
accused and his wife were quarreling (nagtatalo); that he heard that the
accused was leaving the house because he and his companions had
robbed "Aling Nene", the owner of a poultry farm and piggery in Montalban,
Rizal; that the wife of the accused was imploring him not to leave, but the
latter was insistent; that he saw the accused carrying a bag containing
about two handfuls (dakot) of coins which he had taken from Aling Nene;
that upon learning of what the accused had done, he went to the Montalban
police the next day and reported to the police chief about what he had
heard; and that a week later, Montalban policemen went to their house and
arrested the accused. 6

10. This Court, in the case of Morales vs. Ponce Enrile, 7 laid down the
correct procedure for peace officers to follow when making an arrest and in
conducting a custodial investigation, and which We reiterate:

7. At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer
to inform him of the reason for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant
of arrest, if any. He shall be informed of his constitutional rights to remain
silent and to counsel, and that any statement he might make could be used
against him. The person arrested shall have the right to communicate with
his lawyer, a relative, or anyone he chooses by the most expedient means
— by telephone if possible — or by letter or messenger. It shall be the
responsibility of the arresting officer to see to it that this is accomplished.
No custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of
counsel engaged by the person arrested, by any person on his behalf, or
appointed by the court upon petition either of the detainee himself or by
anyone on his behalf. The right to counsel may be waived but the waiver
shall not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel. Any
statement obtained in violation of the procedure herein laid down, whether
exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in
evidence.

11. There were no eyewitnesses, no property recovered from the accused,

no state witnesses, and not even fingerprints of the accused at the scene of
the crime. The only evidence against the accused is his alleged confession.
It behooves Us therefore to give it a close scrutiny. The statement begins
as follows:

I. TANONG: Ipinagbibigay-alam ko sa inyo ang inyong mga karapatan sa ilalim ng Saligang-

Batas ng Pilipinas na kung inyong nanaisin ay maaaring hindi kayo magbigay ng isang
salaysay, na hindi rin kayo maaaring pilitin o saktan at pangakuan upang magbigay ng
naturang salaysay, na anuman ang inyong sasabihin sa pagsisiyasat na ito ay maaaring
laban sa inyo sa anumang usapin na maaaring ilahad sa anumang hukuman o tribunal dito
sa Pilipinas, na sa pagsisiyasat na ito ay maaaring katulungin mo ang isang manananggol at
kung sakaling hindi mo kayang bayaran ang isang manananggol ay maaaring bigyan ka ng
isa ng NBI. Ngayon at alam mo na ang mga ito nakahanda ka bang magbigay ng isang
kusang-loob na salaysay sa pagtatanong na ito?

SAGOT: Opo.

12. Such a long question followed by a monosyllabic answer does not

satisfy the requirements of the law that the accused be informed of his
rights under the Constitution and our laws. Instead there should be several
short and clear questions and every right explained in simple words in a
dialect or language known to the person under investigation. Accused is
from Samar and there is no showing that he understands Tagalog.
Moreover, at the time of his arrest, accused was not permitted to
communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or a friend. In fact, his sisters and
other relatives did not know that he had been brought to the NBI for
investigation and it was only about two weeks after he had executed
the salaysay that his relatives were allowed to visit him. His statement does
not even contain any waiver of right to counsel and yet during the
investigation he was not assisted by one. At the supposed reenactment,
again accused was not assisted by counsel of his choice. These constitute
gross violations of his rights.

13. The alleged confession and the pictures of the supposed re-enactment
are inadmissible as evidence because they were obtained in a manner
contrary to law.

14. Trial courts are cautioned to look carefully into the circumstances
surrounding the taking of any confession, especially where the prisoner
claims having been maltreated into giving one. Where there is any doubt as
to its voluntariness, the same must be rejected in toto.

15. Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Minister of Justice for
whatever action he may deem proper to take against the investigating
officers.

16. WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from should be, as it is hereby,

SET ASIDE, and another one entered ACQUITTING the accused Francisco
Galit of the crime charged. Let him be released from custody immediately
unless held on other charges. With costs de oficio.

17. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-46272 June 13, 1986

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ALBERTO OPIDA y QUIAMBAO and VIRGILIO MARCELO, accused-
appellants.

CRUZ, J.:

This is an automatic review of the Decision of the Circuit Criminal Court,

Seventh Judicial District, imposing the death penalty upon Alberto Opida and
Virgilio Marcelo for the crime of murder.

Unlike the victim in this case, who died from only one stab wound, the
decision under review suffers from several fatal flaws, all equally deadly. It
suffices to discuss only one of them.

Time and again this Court has declared that due process requires no less
than the cold neutrality of an impartial judge. 1 Bolstering this requirement, we
have added that the judge must not only be impartial but must also appear to
be impartial, to give added assurance to the parties that his decision will be
just. 2 The parties are entitled to no less than this, as a minimum guaranty of
due process. This guaranty was not observed in this case.

On July 31, 1976, in Quezon City, several persons ganged up on Fabian

Galvan, stoned and hit him with beer bottles until finally one of them stabbed
him to death. The actual knife-wielder was identified as Mario del
Mundo. 3Nonetheless, Alberto Opida and Virgilio Marcelo were charged with
murder as conspirators and, after trial, sentenced to death. 4

The basis of their conviction by the trial court was the testimony of two
prosecution witnesses, neither of whom positively said that the accused were
at the scene of the crime, their extrajudicial confessions, which were secured
without the assistance of counsel, and corroboration of the alleged
conspiracy under the theory of interlocking confession. 5

What is striking about this case is the way the trial judge conducted his
interrogation of the two accused and their lone witness, Lilian Layug. It was
hardly judicious and certainly far from judicial, at times irrelevant, at Worst
malicious. Reading the transcript, one gathers the impression that the judge
had allied himself with the prosecution to discredit at the outset the credibility
of the witnesses for the defense.

Opida is a police character, admittedly a member of the Commando gang

and with a string of convictions for robbery, theft and vagrancy. 6 It is worth
noting that the judge took special interest in his tattoos, required him to
remove his shirt so they could be examined, and even described them in
detail for the record. 7

Besides belaboring Opida's criminal activities and his tattoos, the judge
asked him if he had "ever been convicted at the National Mental Hospital with
what else but malice and suggested to him that his claim of manhandling by
the police was a lie because investigators leave no mark when they torture a
suspect. 8 This was a point that could have been validly raised by the
prosecution but certainly not by the court. The judge also made it of record
that the witness was gnashing his teeth, was showing signs of hostility, that
he was uneasy and that he was restless. "Now, whom do you want to fool
the judge asked, "the prosecutor, your lawyer, or the court? 9

In the hearing of September 22, 1976, the interrogation of Virgilio Marcelo,

the other accused, was conducted almost wholly by the judge who started
cross-examining the witness even before the defense counsel could ask his
first question, and took over from the prosecution the task of impeaching
Marcelo's credibility.10 The judge asked him about his drug addiction, his
membership in the Commando gang, his tattoos, his parentage, his activities,
his criminal record all when he was supposed to be under direct examination
by his own lawyer. Defense counsel could hardly put in a word edgewise
because the judge kept interrupting to ask his own questions. 11
The questions were not clarificatory but adversary; and when they were not
adversary, they were irrelevant, and sometimes also cruel. At one point, the
judge drew from the witness the statement that his mother was living with
another man; forthwith he suggested that the mother was unfaithful to his
father. 12 We deplore this sadistic treatment of the witness, especially as, for
all his supposed "toughness," he could not answer back. We fail to see what
possible connection the mother's infidelity could have had, by any stretch of
the imagination, with the instant prosecution.

But the judge was to save the best or worst of his spite for the third witness,
Lilian Layug, a waitress in the restaurant where the appellant Opida was
working as a cook. Noting at the outset that she spoke English, he wanted to
know where she had learned it and asked in ill-concealed insinuation if she
had worked in Angeles City or Olongapo or Sangley. 13 Because she was
gesturing nervously, he asked, "Are you a conductor? 14 Of the two accused,
he asked her, "They are very proud of belonging to the Commando gang to
which the witness answered, putting him in his place, "That I do not know,
Your Honor." 15

One cannot but note the mockery in the following questions put by the judge
to the witness, who was probably wondering what the interrogation was all
about

Court

Q You are a very good friend of Alberto Opida?

A Yes, Your Honor.

Q You have known him for years?

A One year only, Your Honor.

Q He always feed you with his favorite menu?

A Yes, Your Honor.

Q He is a very good cook?

A Yes, Your Honor.

Q Because what he could cook, you could not cook?

A I know also how to cook, Your Honor.

Q Answer my question.

A Yes, Your Honor.

Q Whenever you try to cook what he cooked, you could not imitate it, because
he is a good cook?

A Yes, Your Honor.

Q So, your admiration developed because of his cooking?

A Yes, Your Honor.

Q What favorite dish does he cook that you like, as far as you are concerned?

A Adobo, Your Honor.

Q Most often you request him to cook adobo for you?

A Yes, Your Honor.

Q That is precisely one of the reasons why you also admire him?

A That is also a part, Your Honor,

Q Whenever you request him to cook adobo for you, he always

accommodate you?

A Yes, Your Honor.

Q As a matter of fact, the moment that he starts cooking adobo, you could
smell it already?

A Yes, Your Honor,

Q That starts your admiration for him.

A Yes, Your Honor.

Q And in return you reciprocate?

A Yes, Your Honor.

Q What kind of reciprocation do you give to Alberto Opida, whenever you

admire his cooking of adobo for you, cooking just for you?

A None, Your Honor.

Q Whenever he cooks adobo, he was singing?

A Sometimes, Your Honor.

Q What kind of song?

A He is singing a song with intended for Cora, Your Honor.

Q And you were also affected by it?

A No, Your Honor.

Q You mean to say, you are not very fond of emotional songs?

A I am not, because Cora is not minding him, Your Honor.

Q But sometimes he sings in the absence of Cora because, as you said, he

is cooking adobo for you?

A Yes, Your Honor.

Q What does he sings (sic) for you?

A He sings many songs, Your Honor.

Q For example, give the title

A Milagro, Your Honor.

Q He also sings Diyos Lamang Ang Nakakaalam?

A Sometimes, Your Honor.

Q He also sings Kapantay ay Langit?

A Yes, Your Honor.

Q He also sings Sapagkat Tayo'y Tao Lamang?

A I did not hear, Your Honor.

Q But, you said he also sings even in the absence of Cora?

A Yes, Your Honor.

Q You smell adobo while he cooks and sings. So, you developed admiration
also?

A Little only, Your Honor.

Q One way or another you have appreciated him, but the only thing, as you
know, he is related to Cora in the same way?

A Yes, Your Honor.

Q That is why you are testifying in his favor? Because of the smell of adobo
and his songs and it is an admiration. Therefore, there is that tendency to
testify in his favor?

A Yes, Your Honor. 16

On direct examination, Opida challenged his extrajudicial confession,

claiming it had been obtained without observance of the rights available
under Article IV, Section 20 of the Constitution, particularly the right to
counsel. 17Parenthetically, the extrajudicial confession of Marcelo was also
made without assistance of counsel. 18 Opida also testified, under questioning
from his counsel, that he had been repeatedly hit with a "dos por dos" by a
police officer while he was being investigated. 19
We have consistently held that the rights guaranteed during a custodial
investigation are not supposed to be merely communicated to the suspect,
especially if he is unlettered, but must be painstakingly explained to him so
he can understand their nature and significance. Moreover, manhandling of
any sort will vitiate any extrajudicial confession that may be extracted from
him and renders it inadmissible in evidence against him. 20

Those principles were given mere lip service by the judge, who did not bother
to look deeper into the validity of the challenged confessions.

Given the obvious hostility of the judge toward the defense, it was inevitable
that all the protestations of the accused in this respect would be, as they in
fact were, dismissed. And once the confessions were admitted, it was easy
enough to employ them as corroborating evidence of the claimed conspiracy
among the accused.

The accused are admittedly notorious criminals who were probably even
proud of their membership in the Commando gang even as they flaunted their
tattoos as a badge of notoriety. 21 Nevertheless, they were entitled to be
presumed innocent until the contrary was proved and had a right not to be
held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law. 22

The judge disregarded these guarantees and was in fact all too eager to
convict the accused, who had manifestly earned his enmity. When he said at
the conclusion of the trial, "You want me to dictate the decision now?" 23, he
was betraying a pre-judgment long before made and obviously waiting only
to be formalized.

The scales of justice must hang equal and, in fact, should even be tipped in
favor of the accused because of the constitutional presumption of innocence.
Needless to stress, this right is available to every accused, whatever his
present circumstance and no matter how dark and repellent his past. Despite
their sinister connotations in our society, tattoos are at best dubious
adornments only and surely not under our laws indicia of criminality. Of bad
taste perhaps, but not of crime.

In any event, convictions are based not on the mere appearance of the
accused but on his actual commission of crime, to be ascertained with the
pure objectivity of the true judge who must uphold the law for all without favor
or malice and always with justice.

Accused-appellants Opida and Marcelo, who have been imprisoned since

1976, have sent us separate letters pleading for the resolution of their death
sentences one way or the other once and for all. Considering the way they
were tried, we now declare that they should not be detained in jail a minute
longer. While this is not to say that the accused are not guilty, it does mean
that, because their constitutional rights have been violated, their guilt, if it
exists, has not been established beyond reasonable doubt and so cannot be
pronounced. Due process has stayed the uneven hand of the quick
condemnor and must set the defendants free.

WHEREFORE, the conviction of Alberto Opida and Virgilio Marcelo is

reversed and they are hereby ordered released immediately. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Abad Santos, Yap, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Alampay, Gutierrez, Jr. and

Paras, JJ., concur.

Feria and Fernan JJ., are on leave.

Separate Opinions

TEEHANKEE, C.J., concurring:

I concur. I wish to state that some of us are not persuaded at all that the two
herein accused should be held guilty of the single stab wound inflicted on the
victim in what appears to have been a tumultuous affray. I hail the
Court's ratio decidendi that prescinding therefrom, the accused's guilt, if it
exists in reality, cannot be pronounced because of the violation of their basic
constitutional rights of due process and of the constitutional provision
outlawing uncounselled confessions.

In my dissenting opinion in the habeas corpus case of Dr. Aurora

Parong, 1 wrote that "the Court stands as the guarantor of the constitutional
and human rights of all persons within its jurisdiction and must see to it that
the rights are respected and enforced. It is settled in this jurisdiction that once
a deprivation of a constitutional right is shown to exist, the court that rendered
the judgment or before whom the case is pending is ousted of jurisdiction and
habeas corpus is the appropriate remedy to assail the legality of the
detention. 2 So accused persons deprived of the constitutional right of speedy
trial have been set free. 3 And likewise persons detained indefinitely without
charges so much so that the detention becomes punitive and not merely
preventive in character are entitled to regain their freedom. The spirit and
letter of our Constitution negates as contrary to the basic precepts of human
rights and freedom that a person be detained indefinitely without any
charges."

I had stressed in another case that the plain mandate of the constitutional
provision expressly adopted the exclusionary rule as the only practical means
of enforcing the constitutional injunction against uncounselled confessions
obtained in violation of one's constitutional rights by outlawing their admission
in court. The outlawing of such confessions thereby removed the incentive
on the part of military or police officers to disregard such basic constitutional
rights, in the same manner that the exclusionary rule bars admission of
illegally seized evidence. 4

This fundamental rule that the court that rendered the judgment or before
whom the case is pending is ousted of jurisdiction upon showing of
deprivation of a basic constitutional right was eroded during the past
authoritarian regime. I hail its vigorous restatement in the ponencia of Mr.
Justice Isagani A. Cruz.

Separate Opinions
TEEHANKEE, C.J., concurring:

I concur. I wish to state that some of us are not persuaded at all that the two
herein accused should be held guilty of the single stab wound inflicted on
the victim in what appears to have been a tumultuous affray. I hail the
Court's ratio decidendi that prescinding therefrom, the accused's guilt, if it
exists in reality, cannot be pronounced because of the violation of their
basic constitutional rights of due process and of the constitutional provision
outlawing uncounselled confessions.

In my dissenting opinion in the habeas corpus case of Dr. Aurora

Parong, 1 wrote that "the Court stands as the guarantor of the constitutional
and human rights of all persons within its jurisdiction and must see to it that
the rights are respected and enforced. It is settled in this jurisdiction that
once a deprivation of a constitutional right is shown to exist, the court that
rendered the judgment or before whom the case is pending is ousted of
jurisdiction and habeas corpus is the appropriate remedy to assail the
legality of the detention. 2 So accused persons deprived of the constitutional
right of speedy trial have been set free. 3 And likewise persons detained
indefinitely without charges so much so that the detention becomes punitive
and not merely preventive in character are entitled to regain their freedom.
The spirit and letter of our Constitution negates as contrary to the basic
precepts of human rights and freedom that a person be detained indefinitely
without any charges."

I had stressed in another case that the plain mandate of the constitutional
provision expressly adopted the exclusionary rule as the only practical
means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against uncounselled
confessions obtained in violation of one's constitutional rights by outlawing
their admission in court. The outlawing of such confessions thereby
removed the incentive on the part of military or police officers to disregard
such basic constitutional rights, in the same manner that the exclusionary
rule bars admission of illegally seized evidence. 4

This fundamental rule that the court that rendered the judgment or before
whom the case is pending is ousted of jurisdiction upon showing of
deprivation of a basic constitutional right was eroded during the past
authoritarian regime. I hail its vigorous restatement in the ponencia of Mr.
Justice Isagani A. Cruz.

G.R. No. 71381 November 24, 1986

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
CONSTANTINO PECARDAL, accused-appellant.

Renato U. Galimba for accused-appellant.

CRUZ, J.:

The accused-appellant stands convicted of the crime of robbery with

homicide and has been sentenced to life imprisonment. 1 He asks us to reverse the
decision of the trial court because his constitutional rights have been violated.

The victim of the offense was a taxi driver whose body was found in the
luggage compartment of his vehicle in the morning of May 27, 1982. He had
been stabbed twenty three times with a balisong that had later been left on
the dashboard of the car. Apparently, Rogelio Florendo had also been robbed
for no money was found on his person or in the taxicab.

It was two months later when the accused-appellant was picked up by the
police and questioned in connection with the crime. As a result, an
information for the said offense was filed against him and his unidentified co-
accused, who was then at large and so was not tried with him.2

According to the prosecution, Pecardal and his companion boarded the

victim's taxicab at about 1 o'clock in the morning of May 27, 1982, and
thereafter held him up. When he resisted, they stabbed him in different parts
of the body and killed him. They then divested him of his money in the amount
of P200.00, placed his body in the luggage compartment of the car, which
they drove to and abandoned inYakal Street, Project 3, Amihan, Quezon City.
There it was discovered with its grisly occupant that same morning by a
barangay tanod. 3

Presented as prosecution witnesses were the victim's wife, Concepcion

Florendo, who testified on the civil damages; 4 Dr. Gregorio Blanco, who performed the
autopsy on the victim's body; 5 Pat. Teodoro Ybuan, and one of the two policemen who invited" the accused-
appellant for investigation.6

This last witness and Pat. Ernesto Daria declared in a joint affidavit that
Pecardal "when questioned readily admitted his participation in the fatal
stabbing of victim ROGELIO LORENDO after robbing him of his daily
earnings amounting to P200.00; and named EDUARDO AZARCON as his
partner in the commission of the said offense.7

They said they thereafter turned over the accused-appellant to the Quezon
City Police Headquarters, where he signed a statement confessing his guilt.
The statement described in detail how the offense was committed and was
marked as Exhibit "H" at the trial. 8 Significantly, however, it was never specifically offered in
evidence by the prosecution.

The prosecution made much of this confession and argued it could not have
been made except by the actual perpetrator of the crime because of its
detailed narration. Moreover, it had been given by the accused-appellant
voluntarily, after he had been apprised of his constitutional rights. 9

The accused-appellant took the stand in his defense mainly to denounce this
confession. He testified on the physical punishment inflicted on him by the
police investigators that ultimately forced him to sign the statement which he
said had been prepared unilaterally by them. 10 This testimony was not rebutted.

In the decision convicting the accused-appellant, 11 the trial judge relied strongly, if not
almost mainly, on this confession. This is strange because, to repeat, that piece of evidence was never formally
offered by the prosecution or, for that matter even the defense.

This document should never have been considered at all because of Rule
132, Section 35, of the Rules of Court providing as follows:

Sec.35. Offer of evidence. — The court shall consider no evidence which has
not been formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered must
be specified.

According to Moran, "the offer is necessary because it is the duty of a judge

to rest his findings of facts and his judgmentonly and strictly upon the
evidence offered by the parties at the trial." 12

In his demurrer to the evidence, the accused-appellant stressed the failure of

the prosecution to present this confession, 13 but the prosecutor simply said it was part of its
strategy and left it at that. 14

Despite all this, the trial judge referred in his decision to Exhibit "H" as the
confession and considered it sufficient basis for the conviction of the
accused. As a matter of fact, Exhibit" H " was not the confession but the
Police Referral of the case to the City Fiscal of Quezon City dated July 22,
1982. 15
But even assuming that the supposed confession had been formally offered
in evidence, we would have to reject it just the same because it violates
Section 20, Article IV, of the1973 Constitution.

The undisputed evidence is that the confession was obtained without

according to the accused-appellant the right to counsel and after he had been
subjected to physical compulsion and maltreatment.

If there was really an interrogation of the accused, the notification of his

constitutional rights by the investigating officer was perfunctory and pro
forma, intended obviously merely to satisfy the prescribed norms through a
recitation by note of the sacramental advise. 16

Although he was supposedly informed of his right to counsel, he was not told
he could get one if he so desired or that one could be provided him at his
request. It is a matter of record that the interrogation was made in the
absence of counsel de parte or de oficio, and that the waiver of counsel, if
made at all was not made with the assistance of counsel as required. 17

It is true that the original requirement laid down in Morales v. Enrile 18 was not
supported by the majority of eight required by the Constitution. Nonetheless, the doctrine announced therein
was later affirmed in People v. Galit, 19 with fourteen members of the Court voting in favor and only one not
taking part. The same rule was only recently reiterated in the case of People v. Sison, 20 decided last May.

Besides the lack of counsel, there was the violence the accused claimed was
inflicted upon him by the police. According to him, he was undressed, boxed,
kicked, hit in the back with a rattan chair, and electric-shocked. 21 Finally, unable to
bear the punishment any longer, he agreed to sign the prepared confession which he was not allowed to
read.22 The prosecution did not introduce any witness to refute these allegations.

Surely, a confession obtained under these circumstances cannot stand if we

are to obey the mandate of the Constitution, as we must.

It is argued, however, that the accused-appellant orally admitted to Pat.

Ybuan and Pat Daria that he had killed and robbed Florendo. This admission
was made, according to the two policemen in their joint affidavit, after they
apprehended the accused-appellant and started questioning him.
While Pat Ybuan testified that he informed the suspect of his constitutional
rights at the time of his arrest, there is no record that the admission was made
by him in the presence of counsel, or that he had previously waived counsel.

Additionally, even assuming that the accused-appellant was not yet under
custodial investigation at the time and that the requirements of Section 20
were not yet applicable, there is still the question of the credibility of these
two policemen.

One may suppose that in an excess of zeal the peace officers might have
colored their statement to insure the accused-appellant's conviction. In any
event, it is their word against that of the accused-appellant, who disavowed
the admission. 23

When the evidence for the prosecution and the evidence for the accused are
weighed, the scales must be tipped in favor of the latter. This is because of
the constitutional presumption of innocence the accused enjoys as a
counterfoil to the awesome authority of the State that is prosecuting him. 24

The element of doubt, if reasonable as in this case, must operate against the
inference of guilt the prosecution would draw from its evidence. That
evidence,as it happens, consists only of the uncorroborated statement of the
two policemen which, as previously observed, is flawed and therefore
suspect.

The confession which could have corroborated them was not formally offered
by the prosecution. In any case, it is void because it was obtained without the
advice or even the presence of counsel, besides having been vitiated by force
and threats.

The Solicitor General strongly argues that the supposed confession could not
have been made by any one except the perpetrator of the offense because
its commission was described in minute detail. Perhaps so. On the other
hand, it could have been the work of a creative imagination that concocted
all the said details to make a plausible tale against the accused-appellant.
The doubt, which we cannot brush aside, is there.
We note that at the time the accused-appellant was apprehended and
interrogated, he was only seventeen years old. That is a susceptible age.
One can accept how easily a teenager can succumb to the pressure exerted
upon him by hardened investigators experienced in extracting confessions
through the use of methods less than legal. That pressure was in this case
irresistible.

A life has been taken and justice demands that the wrong be redressed. But
the same justice that calls for retribution cannot convict the prisoner at bar
whose guilt has not been proved. Justitia est duplex, viz., severe puniens et
vere praeveniens. Even as this Court must punish, so too must it protect,
Conceivably, the conviction of the accused-appellant could add another
victim in this case.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is REVERSED and the accused-

appellant ACQUITTED, with costs de oficio.It is so ordered.

Yap (Chairman), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera and Feliciano, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 97936 May 29, 1995

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ALEJANDRO LUCERO y CORTEL, accused-appellant.

PUNO, J.:
If the Constitution has any value, it is because it stands up for those who
cannot stand up for themselves. Thus, it protected those under custodial
investigation with the all-important right to counsel. We hold that the right to
counsel cannot be diluted without tampering the scales of justice. For denial
of his right to counsel, we acquit accused-appellant.

Alejandro Lucero, Bienvenido Echavez, Balbino Echavez, Peter Doe,

Richard Doe and John Doe were charged with the crime of robbery with
homicide. The Information against them reads:

That on or about the 7th day of May, 1988, in Quezon City, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping one another ,
did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously rob one DR.
DEMETRIO Z. MADRID, in the manner as follows: on the date and in the
place aforementioned, the said accused, one armed with handgun, pursuant
to their conspiracy blocked the way of the said complainant who was on
board a Mercedez Benz crusing along Road 14 near (the) corner (of)
Mindanao Avenue, Pag-asa, this City, and did then and there, by means of
violence and intimidation against persons, take, rob and carry away his cash
money amounting to P6,600.00; one gold necklace with cross pendant, 7
karat, worth P45,000.00; one (1) gold Rolex watch worth P155,000.00; one
(1) 3 karat gold ring worth P80,000.00; one 2 karat gold ring, domino style,
worth P27,000.00; one (1) solid gold bracelet worth 363,600.00, Philippine
Currency, belonging to said DR. DEMETRIO Z. MADRID, to the damage and
prejudice of the said offended party in the total amount aforementioned; that
on the occasion of the robbery and pursuant to their conspiracy, the above-
named accused, with intent to kill, and taking advantage the(ir) superior
strength, with the use of handgun, shot LORENZO BERNALES y ALERIA, a
driver of the said offended party, thus inflicting upon him serious and mortal
wounds which resulted to the insta(n)taneous death of the said LORENZO
BERNALES y ALERIA, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said
LORENZO BERNALEZ y ALERIA in such amount as may be awarded to
them under the provisions of the Civil Code.

Contrary to law.1
Only the accused Echavez brothers and Alejandro Lucero were
apprehended. The others remained at large.

Trial proceeded only as against the three.

The evidence on record shows that on May 6, 1988, private complainant DR.
DEMETRIO Z. MADRID spent the night at his boarding house, located at #35
Ilocos Norte Street, Bago-Bantay, Quezon City. He wanted to return that
night to his residence at Project 6, Quezon City. However, his driver, Lorenzo
Bernales, advised him not to leave that night for Bernales overheard that the
group of Balbino and Bienvenido Echavez would rob him on his way home.
He heeded the advice.

It was around 7:00 a.m., the next day, that Dr. Madrid again asked his driver
to bring him to his main residence in Project 6, Quezon City. While traversing
Road 14, a gray-reddish car overtook the Mercedes Benz he was riding and
blocked their way. Three (3) men swiftly alighted from the car blocking them
and barged into his Benz. The first grabbed the driver's seat and pushed his
driver to the other side of the seat. The second occupied the right side of his
driver. The third sat beside Dr. Madrid at the back sent and punched him.
Simultaneously, the man at the right side of his driver pulled out his gun and
announced a hold-up.2

The man beside Dr. Madrid divested him of the following: a gold Rolex watch,
studded with diamonds, worth P155,000.00, a three (3) carat diamond ring
worth P80,000.00, another two (2) carat domino-style ring, surrounded with
diamonds worth P27,000.00, a necklace worth P27,000.00, a bracelet worth
P50,000.00, and his wallet containing P6,600.00.3

After driving them around the area for a couple of hours, the malefactors
stopped his car and alighted. The worst came. The man at the right side of
his driver shot the latter at the chest before fleeing. Dr. Madrid and his driver
were rushed by concerned citizens to the Veterans Memorial Hospital. Two
hours later, his driver died of hemorrhage as a result of the gunshot wound
he sustained.4 Dr. Madrid survived.5 He reported the incident to the Quezon
City police. When no action was taken on his case, he filed his complaint with
the Special Operations Group of the Central Intelligence Service (CIS).6
Two months later, the CIS efforts paid-off. On July 23, 1988, the Special
Operations Group headed by Capt. Raul Boac, after a surveillance of the
suspects, interrogated Bienvenido Echavez in Camp Crame. Two days later,
they apprehended Balbino Echavez and Alejandro Lucero. They turned them
over to the Investigation Department of the CIS.7

Pfc. Alberto Pursal was assigned to conduct the investigation of the suspects.
He declared that even before the investigation started, Lucero verbally
admitted his participation in the crime and that he was the one who shot
Bernales, the driver of Dr. Madrid.8

In any event, Pfc. Pursal went thru the motions of investigation. He informed
Lucero of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel. When
Lucero told him that he had no lawyer, Pursal informed that CIS Legal
Department about Lucero's need for a lawyer.9 In due time, Atty. Diosdado
Peralta appeared at the investigator's office at around 9:00 p.m. He identified
himself as the lawyer who was requested to assist Lucero and inquired about
the latter's whereabouts. He was then directed to where Lucero was.

Atty. Peralta conferred with Lucero. He also apprised Lucero of his

constitutional rights. He explained to Lucero that he has the right to remain
silent, that he is not obliged to give any statement to the investigators, and
that even if he has already given a statement, he may refuse to sign it. He
observed no reaction from Lucero. Nonetheless, Atty. Peralta gathered the
impression that Lucero understood his advice.

Thereafter, the CIS investigator began taking down Lucero's

statement. When the investigator started asking the preliminary questions,
Atty. Peralta left to attend the wake of his friend, Capt. Emilio Dacanay, at
Fort Bonifacio. He gave word that in case of need, he could be reached at
his residence.

The next morning, Lucero was accompanied by two (2) CIS agents to Atty.
Peralta's house. The extrajudicial statement of Lucero (Exhibit "C"), was
presented to Atty. Peralta. It was already signed by Lucero. In the presence
of the two (2) CIS agents, Atty. Peralta examined Exhibit "C" and explained
to Lucero its Legal implications. He asked Lucero whether he gave the
statements voluntarily. Lucero replied in the affirmative. Atty. Peralta then
signed Exhibit "C". 10

The three (3) accused denied complicity in the in the crime charged.

Appellant Lucero's defense is alibi. He testified that on May 7, 1988, he was

at his house in Caloocan City. He woke up at 6:30 a.m., stayed at his house
the whole day repairing the upholstery of a customer's chair. He was then
with his cousin Marcelino Seneta and his wife Mylen Lucero. He worked until
5 p.m. that day.

Lucero was apprehended on July 25, 1988, more than two (2) months after
the commission of the crime. He said he was surprised when several
unidentified men accosted him while he was walking towards his house. They
chased him, handcuffed and blindfolded him and pushed him into a jeep. He
was He was blindfolded the whole night and did not know where he was
taken. The men turned out to be police officers. Later, he identified one of the
men to be Capt. Boak, head of the CIS Special Operations Group.

The next day, he learned he was in Camp Crame. He claimed that he was
tortured. He was not informed of the offense for which he was being
investigated. Neither did they reveal the identity of the complainant. A couple
of days lapsed and a CIS agent brought him to a clinic inside Camp Crame.
The doctor saw the contusions on his body. He advised that he be treated.
The CIS agent refused and they left the clinic.

Lucero denied knowing Dr. Madrid, the Echavez brothers and the other
accused in this case. He said he only met Dr. Madrid at the CIS Office during
the police line-up. He was made to line-up four (4) times before Dr. Madrid
finally identified him on the fourth time.

Lucero also claimed he signed the extrajudicial confession (Exhibit

"C") 11 under duress. He denied engaging the services of Atty. Peralta. He
likewise confirmed that Atty. Peralta was not present during his actual
custodial interrogation. 12
After trial, the court a quo acquitted the Echavez brothers for insufficient
evidence. The trial court, however, convicted accused Lucero. The
dispositive portion of the Decision 13 reads:

ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1. The accused brothers BIENVENIDO ECHAVEZ y VALIDA and BALBINO

ECHAVEZ y VALIDA are hereby ACQUITTED for insufficiency of evidence;
and

2. Accused ALEJANDRO LUCERO y CORTEL is hereby found GUILTY

beyond reasonable doubt as principal by direct participation of Robbery with
Homicide. Alejandro Lucero is hereby sentenced to suffer an imprisonment
term of RECLUSION PERPETUA.

On the civil aspect, Alejandro Lucero is hereby ordered a) to pay the heirs of
the deceased victim Lorenzo Bernales y Aleria the sum of P30,000.00 as
actual damages and P50,000.00 as moral damages for the mental anguish
suffered by his family; and b) to pay Dr. Demetrio Z. Madrid the sum of
P363,600.00 representing the cash money, and money value of the jewelries
and wristwatch he lost due to the robbery at bar.

SO ORDERED.14

Hence this appeal by Lucero, raising the following assignments of error:

1. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING MORE WEIGHT TO THE

EVIDENCES (SIC) OF THE PROSECUTION WHICH WERE
INCONSISTENT, NOT CREDIBLE, UNRELIABLE, DOUBTFUL AND
INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT ACCUSED-APPELLANT'S CONVICTION
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

2. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING ACCUSED-

APPELLANT OF THE ALLEGED CRIME OF ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE
INSPITE OF THE FACT THAT CONSPIRACY WAS NOT PROVEN IN THIS
CASE.
3. THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-
APPELLANT OF THE CRIME CHARGED ON THE BASIS OF HIS ALLEGED
EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSION (MADE IN CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION)
WHICH WAS OBTAINED THRU FORCE, VIOLENCE AND WITHOUT THE
PRESENCE OF COUNSEL OF HIS OWN CHOICE OR ENGAGED BY ANY
PERSON ON HIS BEHALF OR APPOINTED BY THE LOWER COURT AND
THEREFORE SUFFERED CONSTITUTIONAL INFIRMITIES.

4 THAT THE LOWER ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT

OF THE CRIME CHARGED INSPITE OF THE FACT THAT THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT WAS NOT POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED WITH CERTITUDE BY
THE PROSECUTION.

5. THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-

APPELLANT OF THE CRIME CHARGED PRIMARILY ON THE BASIS OF
THE WEAKNESS OF HIS DEFENSE OF ALIBI AND NOT ON THE
STRENGTH OF THE PROSECUTION EVIDENCE; AND INSPITE OF THE
LACK OF POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

6. THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-

APPELLANT AND NOT ACQUITTING HIM LIKE HIS CO-ACCUSED AND
ALLEGED CO-CONSPIRATORS [THE ECHAVEZ BROTHERS] OF THE
CRIME CHARGED.

We find the appeal meritorious.

The conviction of appellant rests on two (2) facts: (a) his positive identification
by the complainant, and (b) his extra-judicial confession admitting his
participation in the crime. We find that the evidence proving these facts
cannot stand scrutiny.

Firstly, the credibility of the main prosecution eyewitness, Dr. Demetrio

Madrid who identified appellant, is seriously open to doubt. It stands
unrebutted on the record that appellant had to participate at the police line-
up four (4) times before he was finally identified by Dr. Madrid. There is no
reason for the ambivalence. The robbery took place in broad daylight and the
three malefactors wore no mask. They drove them around for three (3) hours.
Considering these circumstances, there is no reason for Dr. Madrid's failure
to immediately identify appellant.

We are also disconcerted by the vacillating testimony of Dr. Madrid during

the trial. Initially, Dr. Madrid claimed that he could identify only one of the
robbers who staged the hold-up. 15 At another point, Dr. Madrid said he could
identify two of the malefactors. 16 In his affidavit, Dr. Madrid presented he
could identify all three. 17 Appellant's conviction cannot be made to rest on
this nebulous identification by Dr. Madrid.

Secondly, appellant's conviction cannot be based on his extra-judicial

confession.

The 1987 Constitution 18 requires that a person under investigation for the
commission of a crime should be provided with counsel. We have
constitutionalized the right to counsel because of our hostility against the use
of duress and other undue influence in extracting confessions from a suspect.
Force and fraud tarnish confessions and render them inadmissible. 19 We
take pride in constitutionalizing this right to counsel even while other
countries have desisted from elevating this right to a higher pedestal. We
have sustained the inviolability of this precious right with vigor and without
any apology.

The trial court did not display the required sensitivity to appellant's right to
counsel. Indeed, it did not impose a rigorous respect for the right. It was
satisfied that there was "substantial" compliance with the requirements of
right to counsel. This is far from the intent of the Constitution. The records
show that Atty. Peralta's, who was not the counsel of choice of appellant,
arrived at the CIS Office an the second night of appellant's detention. More
exactly, he arrived at the CIS Office at around 9:00 p.m. and talked with
appellant about his rights. Atty. Peralta himself admitted he received no
reaction from appellant although his impression was that appellant
understood him. 20Worse, Atty. Peralta left appellant in the custody of the CIS
agents when his real interrogation started. He said he had to attend the wake
of a friend. His attitude did not speak well of the importance he gave to his
role as counsel to a person under custodial interrogation for the commission
of a very serious offense. It was during his absence that appellant gave an
uncounselled confession. They tried to cure his uncounselled confession for
the next day, appellant was brought by two (2) CIS agents to Atty. Peralta's
house. In the presence of these agents, Atty. Peralta asked appellant if he
understood the statements he gave and if he signed it voluntarily. Appellant,
of course, affirmed the voluntariness of the execution of the confession. Atty.
Peralta was satisfied and the trial court ruled that appellant's right to counsel
was not infringed. We disagree.

We hold that when the Constitution requires the right to counsel, it did not
mean any kind of counsel but effective and vigilant counsel. The
circumstances in the case at bench clearly demonstrate that appellant
received no effective counseling from Atty. Peralta. In People v. De
Guzman, 21 we held that in custodial investigation, the right to counsel
attaches from the moment the investigation starts, i.e., when the investigating
officer starts to ask questions to elicit information and confessions or
admissions from the accused. In this case, at the crucial point when the
interrogation was just starting, Atty. Peralta left appellant to attend the wake
of a friend . At that critical stage, appellant gave his uncounselled extra-
judicial a confession. Surely, such a confession where appellant was
unprotected from mischief cannot convict.

Neither can the trial court convict appellant on the ground that alibi is
inherently a weak defense. Chiseled in our jurisprudence is the rule that
the onus is on the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt. Given the uncertainty of appellant's identification and the
inadmissibility of his uncounselled confession, there is no thread of evidence
to criminally inculpate appellant.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Decision in Criminal Case No. Q-88-201 of the

Regional Trial Court of Quezon City , Branch CIII, convicting appellant
Alejandro Lucero y Cortel of robbery with homicide is hereby REVERSED
AND SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.

[ G.R. No. L-40639, November 23, 1976 ]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIP PINES,
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ISIDRO (BOY)
BUSCATO NESTOR DALUD, DEFENDANTS-
APPELLANTS.

DECISION
ANTONIO, J.:
Appeal by Isidro (Boy) Buscato and Nestor Dalud from
the decision, dated August 22, 1974, of the Court of First
Instance of Cotabato, convicting the said appellants of
the crime of Robbery with Homicide and imposing upon
them the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The dispositive
portion of said decision reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the
Court is convinced beyond the shadow of rea-
sonable doubt that all the accused - jabib Tan,
Nestor Dalud, and Isidro Buscato - are guilty of
the offense of robbery with homicide, defined in
Article 294, paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal
Code, and hereby sentences each of the accused
to suffer a penalty
of RECLUSIONPERPETUA and to pay, jointly
and severally, the heirs of Rodolfo Lim the sum
of P1,400.00, the value of the articles stolen; to
indemnify also the heirs of Rodolfo Lim the sum
of P12,000.00; all without subsidiary
 imprisonment in case of insolvency, as ruled in
the case of People vs. Doria, interpreting Repub-
lic. Act No. 5465, and to pay the costs."
The foregoing is based on the following facts:
At about 8:30 o'clock in the evening of January 12, 1973,
appellants Isidro (Boy) Buscato and Nestor Dalud,
together with one Ricardo Rome, were drinking "tuba"
at the residence of Nestor Dalud located at the
Philippine Trade Center, Sultan Kudarat, Cotabato (now
Maguindanao). After a while, Ricardo Romo excused
himself from them, saying that he has to go home to take
his supper. They told him to come back so that they
could continue their drinking spree. Thereafter,
Ricardo Romo, after eating his supper, proceeded to the
house of Nestor Dalud. On the way, he met Manuel
Largo whom he invited to join them in their drinking
spree. Before reaching the house of Dalud, the two met
a group composed of appellants Isidro Buscato and
Nestor Dalud, together with Jabib Tan and Rodolfo
Lim. All of them proceeded afterwards to the
Samarano's Store where they had a drinking
spree. After they consumed about one (1) gallon of
"tuba" they decided to leave. Ricardo Romo and Manuel
Largo went to the store of Bangoy opposite the
Samarano's Store. Appellants Isidro Buscato and
Nestor Dalud, upon the other hand, walked with Jabib
Tan and Rodolfo Lim towards the direction of the
Philippine Trade Center.
At around 7:00 o'clock the following morning (January
13, 1973), the cadaver of Rodolfo Lim was found at the
river hank by Enrique Tagle, navigator of a tugboat,
"Atlas". The tugboat was then moored at the wharf of
the Philippine Trade Center.
Dr. Eduardo L. Mariano, Assistant Provincial Health
Officer of Cotabato, conducted a post-mortem
examination of the body of the decease. His post-
mortem findings revealed a stab wound in the body of
Rodolfo Lim, 6" long, left lower abdomen, eviscerating,
and a contusion at the left side of the back of the
neck.[1]
On January 16, 1973, the Philippine Constabulary
authorities in Cotabato City investigated the persons
who were reportedly with the deceased Rodolfo Lim the
previous night, namely Isidro Buscato, Nestor Dalud
and Jabib Tan. According to T/Sgt. Francisco Soriano,
he investigated appellant Isidro Buscato who allegedly
readily admitted his participation in the crime as the
one who inflicted the stab wound on Rodolfo
Lim. However, when his investigation was reduced into
writing, Buscato refused to sign the same. In view of
Buscato's refusal, he requested S/Sgt. Jorge Vargas to
conduct a separate investigation of Jabib Tan and
Nestor Dalud.
On the other hand, S/Sgt. Jorge Vargas declared that he
conducted the investigation of Jabib Tan and Nestor
Dalud with the aid of Pat. Julhussein G. Tagadaya, a
policeman of Sultan Kudarat, who acted as
interpreter. Both Jabib Tan and Nestor Dalud allegedly
voluntarily confessed their participation in the slaying
of Rodolfo Lim. Jabib Tan allegedly confessed to him
that he participated in the planning of the killing and
robbing of the victim. Nestor Dalud, on the other hand,
admitted having struck the victim with a piece of
bamboo, while Boy Buscato stabbed the victim with a
Batangas knife and afterwards got the wallet and other
valuables of the victim. They then placed the victim
inside a sack. These confessions were reduced to
writing and subsequently sworn to by Jabib Tan and
Nestor Dalud before the Clerk of Court, Branch I, Court
of First Instance of Cotabato.[2] Nestor Dalud also
purportedly tape-recorded his confession.[3]
On January 18, 1973, Isidro Buscato, Nestor Dalud and
Jabib Tan were brought by the investigators under the
Quirino Bridge in Sultan Kudarat. At that place they
were made to re-enact the slaying of Rodolfo Lim.
Francisco Lim, brother of the deceased, related that in
the afternoon of January 12, 1973, his brother was
intending to collect the account of MINRAPCO due to
the Lim Auto Supply in the amount of
P1,400.00. However, when he examined the remains of
his brother the next day (January 13, 1973), he noticed
that his brother's Rolex watch worth P500.00, a ring
worth P35.00, a gold necklace worth P70.00, as well as
the money which he was supposed to have collected,
were missing.
All of the accused interposed the defense of
alibi. During the hearing, both Nestor Dalud and Jabib
Tan testified that after Rodolfo Lim paid the bill in the
Samarano's Store, they separated ways, Nestor and Boy
Buscato proceeding directly to the house of Nestor,
where they slept, leaving Lim with Jabib Tan. They also
repudiated their extrajudicial confessions alleging that
they were compelled to sign the same by force, violence
and intimidation. Isidro Buscato recounted his
maltreatment by the PC soldiers from January 15 to 18,
1973.
THE TRIAL COURT'S EVALUATION
The trial court, however, was persuaded that the extra-
judicial confessions of Nestor Dalud and Jabib Tan were
voluntarily and freely given by them to the
investigators. Thus, according to the trial court:
"Atty. Muñasque, the Clerk of Court before
(whom) the said confessions were subscribed
and sworn to testified that the said statements
were freely and voluntarily given by the
affiants. Likewise the investigators testified that
the same were freely and voluntarily given by the
affiants and they took the stand in rebuttal just
to deny the allegation of force and
maltreatment.
"Records will show that the affiants who alleged
that they were maltreated have not presented
any medical certificate to show the alleged
injuries they suffered.
"They have not charged any one of those who
allegedly maltreated them in court or before any
authority.
"To show that they were maltreated, the only
evidence they have presented are their own
testimonies and the testimonies of their rela-
tives, in-laws and friends.
"The defense of the three accused is one merely
of denial and alibi. Records will show that the
house of the victim and the place where the
victim's body was found to the place where the
accused were on the night of January 12, 1973 is
just very near.
*** *** ***
"The confessions of accused Nestor Dalud and
Jabib Tan reveal spontaneity of the declarations
by the affiants and are replete with facts which
could only be possibly supplied by the accused.
*** *** ***
"In the case at bar, the defense could not
attribute any reason why the Clerk of Court
before whom the confession was sworn to would
testify the way he did in court and likewise no
motive could be attributed to Sgts. Soriano and
Vargas in preparing or typing a false confession
if such was the case.
*** *** ***
"In the case at bar the Court is convinced that all
the three accused are guilty of the offense as
charged not only by virtue of the confessions of
the two which are interlocking and implicating
accused Boy Buscato who also made an oral
confession but also they all participated in the
re-enactment of the crime and accused Nestor
 Dalud also has a tape recorded statement
admitting his participation in the offense and
the added fact, that when this case was
submitted for decision accused Jabib Tan
escaped from the Provincial Jail, which
convinces the Court that he is really guilty
otherwise why will he escape if he is innocent.
"The Court is convinced that there was also
robbery in the case at bar as there is sufficient
evidence on record that on the very afternoon
previous to the incident, the deceased went to
MINRAPCO to collect some amount and the
following morning when Francisco Lim, brother
of the victim, saw the dead body of his brother,
he saw the watch, necklace and money worth
around P1,400.00 were gone, even his shoes
were gone. There is no question that the
prosecution has proved the crime of robbery
with homicide."[4]
APPELLANTS' ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS

In their briefs, counsels for appellants contend that the

lower court erred:
 (1) In convicting the afore-mentioned appel-
lants on the basis solely of the repudiated "extra-
judicial confessions" of Nestor Dalud and Jabib
Tan; and
(2) In taking into account the alleged escape of
one accused, Jabib Tan, long after the case was
submitted for decision, as a circumstance in con-
victing the appellants.
The basic issue determinative of the merits of the
challenged judgment is the admissibility of the
confessions and their sufficiency to sustain the
conviction.
THE MANIFESTATION OF THE SOLICITOR
GENERAL
The Solicitor General agreed with the appellants and
submitted, in lieu of brief for the appellee, a
manifestation recommending acquittal of appellants
Nestor Dalud and Isidro Buscato. The thrust of the
Solicitor General's contention is that the evidence of the
prosecution does not fulfill the test of moral certainty
and is not sufficient to support their conviction.
Thus, in support of the foregoing, Acting Solicitor
General Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr.[5] made the following
manifestation:
"* * * *** ***
Nestor Dalud's extra-judicial confession, Exhibit 'D'
"The issue to be resolved at this instance
revolves on the evaluation of the extra-judicial
confession of appellant Nestor Dalud and his re-
pudiation of the same at the trial. Will a denial
by appellant of his participation in the commis-
sion of the crime of which he is charged be given
more weight than his confession? Will Nestor
Dalud's defense of alibi be given weight despite
his extra-judicial confession?
*** *** ***
"After a careful and dispassionate analysis of the
testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution
and for the defense, we have come to the
conclusion that Nestor Dalud's attack on the vol-
untary character of the confession finds support
in the evidence on record.
"1. Nestor Dalud's recital of the means and
methods employed by the investigators in
extracting his confession cited specific overt acts
as would preclude any notion that the same are
merely products of his imagination. Moreover,
he enumerated the names of those who had
exerted overbearing pressure on him.
"He testified that on January 13, 1973, he and his
co-accused were arrested and confined in the PC
stockade in Cotabato City (tsn, pp. 79-80, Jan.
14, 1974); that for two days, they were not
allowed to go out of the stockade (tsn, p.
81, ibid); that while they were at the stockade,
the guard on duty would sometime call them
one-by-one, and as soon as they reach the iron
grills, the guard would pull their hands and then
box them (tsn, p. 83, ibid); that on the morning
of January 15, 1973, he and his co-accused were
brought to the Office of the 454th PC Company
(tsn, pp. 90-92, ibid); that he was investigated in
the presence of his two co-accused (tsn, p.
93, ibid); that Sgt. Soriano was writing the
answers given by him (tsn, p. 94, ibid); that at
that time, Sgt. Soriano was drunk and in fact
made Dalud drink the Tanduay liquor he had
with him (tsn, pp. 95-96, ibid); that everytime he
would refuse to answer, Sgt. Soriano would box
him (ibid); that sometimes, Sgt. Soriano would
slap him, (tsn, p. 97, ibid); that Sgt. Soriano was
forcing him to admit that he and his companions
were the ones who killed Rodolfo Lim and when
he refused, he was boxed and pushed by Sgt.
Soriano causing him to fall face flat on the
cement floor (tsn, pp. 3-4, Jan. 14, 1974,
afternoon session); that he became unconscious
as a result thereof.
"The maltreatment which Nestor Dalud had to
undergo on January 15, 1973 was merely a
prelude to more cruel and barbaric
torture. Thus, he testified, to wit:
'Q - In what manner or in what way you
were again maltreated the following
morning of January 16, 1973, up in that
guardhouse?
A - They made me lie down in the spring
bed and tied my both hands and feet to
it. Then, they got a block of ice, the size
of the ice is like this (witness
demonstrated) and placed it on top of my
face. And after that they undressed me
and they even inserted a piece of broom-
stick into the uterus of my penis.
Q - How did they insert a piece of
broomstick into your uretral part of your
organ?
A - When my pants was taken off, and I
could still remember the
man who took off my pants, Juansing
Legaspi. And after my penis was
exposed, one of the soldiers arrived by
the name of Cristy. And then he looked
for a broomstick and he said, 'It is better
that we play with him'. Then he handled
my penis and after that he inserted that
broomstick and when the broomstick
was already inserted into my penis, he
twisted the broomstick inside.
Q - At that time, was Sgt. Soriano also
present?
A - Yes, sir, he stepped on my chest so
that I could not move.
*** *** ***
Q - And how long were you on that
condition of unbearable pain and
sufferings in the hands of your
investigators who were PC soldiers and
are supposed to give you the law and
justice they being officer of the law?
A - Quite a long time, sir, because they
started from 9:00 o'clock up to the time
the siren sounded for 12:00 o'clock
because I could still hear the siren
sounded.
 Q - And that ice which was being
wrapped and placed on top of your head
was made to melt all the way long?
A - Yes, sir, until the block of ice became
small and when this became small
already, Sgt. Soriano lifted it above my
face and let it drip into my forehead.'
(tsn, pp. 19-21, 22-24, ibid).
"Nestor Dalud, at this juncture, got a temporary
reprieve when a soldier named Hicotani, who
happens to be his friend and who chanced to
witness the maltreatment, remarked: 'Why are
you doing this to this person when this person is
a good man?' (tsn, p. 26,ibid). Sgt. Soriano had
an altercation with Hicotani but after they talked
in Ilocano, they seemed to have patched up their
misunderstanding and the latter embraced
Dalud and asked him if he had already eaten
(tsn, pp. 25, 26, 27, 28, ibid). Thereafter,
Hicotani brought Dalud to the canteen and was
given food (tsn, pp. 29-30, ibid).
"At around 10:00 o'clock in the evening of
January 16, 1973, a drunk constable by the name
of Maniano arrived and ordered everybody at
the stockade to rise (tsn, p. 33, ibid). The
inmates, including Nestor Dalud, were ordered
to make fifty push-ups with admonition from
Maniano that anyone who cannot make the
required number of pushups will be made to
urinate and drink his own urine (tsn, p.
33, ibid). A Muslim who was not able to comply
with Maniano's order was correspondingly
meted the penalty (tsn, p. 36, ibid).
"On January 17, 1973, Nestor Dalud was taken
out of the detention cell by Sgt. Vargas and
brought to the office of the 454th PC Company
(tsn, p. 43, ibid). Before he was interrogated,
Dalud was brought to a room by Sgt. Vargas and
the latter was forcing the former to admit his
participation in the slaying of Rodolfo Lim and
when he refused, Dalud was made to stand
behind a wall and was made a 'punching bag'
(tsn, p. 44, ibid). At one instance, while Dalud
was covering his stomach with his hands, Sgt.
Vargas suddenly hit him in his ears with open
palms causing him temporary deafness (tsn, pp.
47-48, ibid). Thereafter, Nestor Dalud was
made to sit near a table and Sgt. Vargas started
his interrogation in English (tsn, pp. 49-
50, ibid). Sgt. Vargas then started typing the
alleged confession, Exhibit 'D', in the presence of
Juan C. Nas, Sgt. Anito and Sgt. Soriano (tsn. pp.
50, 51, 53, ibid). Sgt. Vargas was at the same
time trying to convince Nestor Dalud to become
a state witness in order that the latter can be
exculpated of the charges (tsn, p. 4, Jan. 15,
1974). After Sgt. Vargas had typed the question
and the corresponding answer, he would read
the same to Nestor Dalud and if the latter would
not conform to the answer given, the former
would again maltreat him (tsn, p. 6, January 15,
1974). After Sgt. Vargas had finished preparing
Nestor Dalud's confession, he ordered the latter
to sign it but having refused to do so, Sgt. Vargas
pulled out his pistol, pulled out the magazine
and took out the bullets and inserted the same
between Dalud's fingers (tsn, pp. 37-
38, ibid). Sgt. Vargas then got two
handkerchiefs and tied it around Dalud's fingers
(tsn, p. 39, ibid). Sensing the determination of
his interrogators to have him admit his
participation and accepting the futility of his
resistance, Nestor Dalud capitulated and said, 'It
is up to you, sir' (tsn, p. 40, ibid).
"Nestor Dalud was then brought to the Office of
the Clerk of Court by Sgt. Vargas and another PC
soldier by the name of Legaspi (tsn, pp. 40-
41, ibid). On their way, Sgt. Vargas and Dalud
had the following conversation:
'Q - Now, before you were brought to the
Office of the Clerk of Court, by Sgt.
Vargas and a PC soldier by the name of
Legaspi, what did Sgt. Vargas tell you, if
he told you anything?
A - While we were still walking on the
road towards the Court, Sgt. Vargas told
me 'You just signed this because this is
good for you. This is the only way you
can be released or safe.' But I told him,
'Why should I sign that when all that was
written there is not true'. And Sgt.
Vargas told me, 'It is up to you.'
Q - When Sgt. Vargas told you it is up to
you, what did you understand of that
statement?
A - When he said it is up to you, I
understood that as soon as we returned
to the PC stockade, he would again
subject me to punishment. So that is
why I was afraid.' (tsn, pp. 42-44, ibid;
Italics supplied.)
"Thus, forewarned, Nestor Dalud meekly signed
his confession before the Clerk of Court. He
knew his fate depended upon how much he
cooperated with the authorities.
"Two days after he signed his confession, Nestor
Dalud was made to tape-record his confession by
Sgt. Vargas (tsn, pp. 44-46, ibid). Nestor Dalud
was' reading his answers from a script given to
him by Sgt. Vargas (tsn, pp. 46-
47, ibid). Although Sgt. Vargas denied that
Nestor Dalud was merely reading his answers
from a copy of the written investigation, the
court aquo made the observation 'that the
confession and the tape record dovetail with
each other' (p. 147, July 26, 1973, ibid).
"On the other hand, examination of the tes-
timony of Sgt. Jorge Vargas seems to convey that
Nestor Dalud had no qualms in admitting his
participation in the commission of the crime
(tsn, pp. 10-11, July 25, 1973). Yet, it must be
noted that Nestor Dalud was initially
investigated on January15, 1973 and it was only
on January17, 1973 that he signed his
confession. What turned Nestor Dalud into a
dove when for two days that he was in custodial
interrogation, he refused to admit participation
in the crime? Was it not due to an overpowering
pressure which finally subdued his will?
"Lourdes Dalud, sister of Nestor Dalud, testified
that on January 13, 1973, she went to PC
Headquarters in Cotabato City to visit her
brother but Sgts. Soriano and Vargas refused to
allow her to talk to her brother (tsn, pp. 27-29,
Oct. 18, 1973). The following day, she again
visited her brother and this time she was able to
talk to him (tsn, pp. 33-34, ibid). She noticed
that Nestor Dalud had swellings on the lower
portion of his left eye and on his lower lip (tsn,
p. 35, ibid). Nestor Dalud also confided to her
that his chest was painful and he had difficulty
in breathing and exhibited the swellings on his
left breast (tsn, pp. 36-38, ibid). He also told her
that everytime he was made to confess, bullets
were inserted between his fingers (tsn, p.
38, ibid).
"Ricardo Ocampo, who accompanied Lourdes
Dalud to the PC Headquarters in Cotabato City,
corroborated her testimony, vizaviz, the
external manifestations of violence inflicted on
Nestor Dalud.
"Dick Dalud, father of Nestor Dalud, also
testified that on January 18, 1973, he was arres-
ted by PC authorities and placed in the stockade
at the PC Headquarters in Cotabato City (tsn, pp.
41-42, Oct. 30, 1973). He saw his son sporting a
swollen face and everytime Nestor Dalud would
cough, he (Nestor) would vomit blood (tsn, p.
47, ibid).
"It is true that the said witnesses are related to
Nestor Dalud (Ricardo Ocampo is Nestor
Dalud's brother-in-law) but mere relationship to
the accused does not destroy a witness' credibi-
lity. Their narration of fact bears no positive
indication of exaggeration or falsity. We find in
the records no fact nor circumstance that impels
us to doubt or reject their
testimonies. Moreover, the lower courd did not
make any conclusion concerning their
credibility, hence, there is no reason not to
accept their testimonies at face value.
"The above circumstances notwithstanding, the
lower court still looked upon the confession as
free of infirmity. Clearly, that was error. The
constant course of decisions of this Honorable
Court forbids the admission of any confession
obtained under such circumstances. A con-
viction resting on such proof, and such
proof alone, certainly cannot be allowed to
stand.
"2. The failure of Nestor Dalud to complain to
Clerk of Court Benjamin Muñasque of the
torture he had undergone is not a guarantee of
the voluntary character of his confession. He
was appraised beforehand by Sgt. Jorge Vargas
of the consequence of his failure to sign the
confession before the Clerk of Court. * * *
*** *** ***
"3. The extra-judicial confession suffers from an
additional infirmity in that Nestor Dalud signed
the same upon the representation of Sgt. Jorge
Vargas that he would be utilized as a government
witness. * * *
*** *** ***
"Verily, Nestor Dalud could have signed the
confession to obtain the promised concession.
"4. No less significant is the tape-recorded
confession of Nestor Dalud. It is stated therein
that Isidro Buscato ordered Nestor Dalud to
strike the deceased with bamboo pole but the
latter hesitated because the intended victim was
his boyhood friend (p. 15, Replay of Tape
Record). Isidro Buscato thereafter poked his
knife at Dalud, thus leaving the latter no other
choice but to follow the former's command (pp.
15-16, ibid).
"The picture presented by Nestor Dalud has
clearly in his favor the exempting circumstance
delineated under Article 12 (6) of the Revised
Penal Code which exempts from criminal
liability 'any person who acts under the impulse
of an uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater
injury.' He could have stuck to his confession
and still be acquitted. He need not have
repudiated his confession since it recited facts
which could exculpate him from criminal
liability. This is a further circumtance which
militates against the voluntary character of
Nestor Dalud's confession.
"5. Nestor Dalud's explanation as to why he did
not avail of the services of a doctor to treat him
of injuries resulting from the torture he had
undergone was explained by him, as follows:
'Q - But in spite of all those
maltreatments, you were never able
 to ask or request for the services of a
doctor to treat you?
A - No more, sir, because no one
would come there and if I also
report to the soldiers, I think it will not
be good because it was the soldiers who
apprehended me.' (tsn, p. 42, Jan. 29,
1974)
*** *** ***
Alleged voluntary re-enactment of the crime.
"Heavy emphasis was given by the lower court
on the participation of all the accused in the re-
enactment of the crime. This circumstance
draws its strength or weakness on the issue of
voluntariness of the confession. Thus, in order
that the re-enactment may be given evidentiary
weight, the validity and efficacy of the confession
must first be shown.
"It is to be noted that all the accused were
unanimous in denouncing the re-enactment as
'written, produced and directed' by their
torturers. This is not an empty assertion. They
had already been subjected to cruel and painful
punishments occasioned by their earlier refusal
to admit their participation in the commission of
the crime. In their determined quest to 'solve'
the crime, the authoritites had virtually reduced
all the accused to mere robots, having sapped
their will of strength, by torture.
"T/Sgts. Francisco Soriano and Jorge Vargas
testified, on rebuttal, that they never laid their
hands on any one of the accused, much less, tor-
ture them. However, it is significant to note that
Emilio Buscato, father of Isidro Buscato,
denounced T/Sgt. Francisco Soriano's
maltreatment of his son in a letter-complaint
sent to no less than the President of the
Philippines himself (tsn, p. 35, August 30, 1973;
Exhibit '2', p. 186, Rec.). Sgt. Soriano admitted
that the letter complaint was endorsed to the
454th PC Company to which he belongs (tsn, pp.
44-45, March 5, 1974). Surprisingly, the
investigation was conducted by the unit of which
Sgt. Soriano was the head, with Sgt. Cang, a
member of his team, conducting the
investigation (tsn, pp. 45-48, ibid). Here is,
therefore, a situation where a subordinate was
investigating his superior. Surely, Emilio Bus-
cato cannot expect an impartial investigation of
his complaint. Thus it is that the investigation
 ended with Emilio Buscato executing an
affidavit of desistance (tsn, p. 25, ibid).
Death Certificate of Rodolf Lim
"Both the prosecution and the defense agree in
one thing on this case; that Rodolfo Lim is
dead. Yet, a discussion of this case would not
seem complete without mentioning the death
certificate of Rodolfo Lim which was
accomplished by Dr. Eduardo Mariano.
"Dr. Mariano testified that he conducted a post-
mortem examination of Rodolfo Lim's body near
the river where the same was found (tsn, pp. 6-
7, May 29, 1973). The result of his findings were
handwritten by him and, subsequently, copied
by typewriter when he went back to his office
(tsn, pp. 12-13, ibid). However, it is significant
to note the entries on the handwritten and
typewritten death certificates (Exhibits 'A' and
'B', '1-Buscato', pp. 3, 185, Rec.) do not coincide
and in fact, the trustworthiness thereof is
suspect, if we consider the following circumstan-
ces:
"1. The Certificate of Death, accomplished in Dr.
Mariano's own handwriting, stated that the
cause of death is, to wit: wound, stab, 6", left
lower abdomen eviscerating, abrasions and
contusions, arm and forearm bilateral,
contusion, back of the neck (Exhibit 'B', '1-
Buscato', p. 185, Rec.). All the entries therein
are handwritten except the 'contusion at the
back of the neck which was typewritten. On the
other hand, the typewritten Certificate of Death
did not include 'abrasions and contusions, arm
and forearm bilateral' (Exhibit 'A');
"2. All the entries in the typewritten Certificate
of Death (Exhibit 'A') were made on the same
typewriter except the entry referring to
'contusion, back of the neck', which obviously,
was entered through another typewriter;
"3. The typewritten words 'contusion, back of
neck', as appearing both in Exhibits 'A' and 'B'
appears to have been made through the same
typewriter.
"The explanation of Dr. Mariano on the dis-
crepancies afore-mentioned does not inspire be-
lief. Thus, he testified on cross-examination, as
follows:
'Q - Do you have that original certificate
of death with you now?
A - Yes, I have it here.
Q - In your findings here, there are two
entries, one is stab wound, 6" or 6 inches
and the other is contusion, is that
correct?
A - Correct.
Q - When you made the entry, did you
make it one at the same time?
A - Yes, sir.
Q - It appears that the entry 'Wound
stab, 6" long, left lower abdomen
eviscerating' and the other entry
'contusion, left neck' are not the same in
type, what can you say about this?
A - Probably when I found out that the
typewriter ribbon was not functioning
well, I think I transferred to another
typewriter, I do not exactly remember
now.
Q - And after transferring to the other
typewriter just to type down the
following words 'contusion, left neck',
you went back to the former typewriter to
type down the subsequent entries such as
date 'Jan. 12, 1973' and others as it
 appears to be the same from the above
entries up to 'EDUARDO L. MARIANO,
MD, CPH' which are lightly imprinted
than the words 'Contusion, left neck', can
you explain this?
A - Well, that is right, 'I returned to the
former typewriter when the ribbon was
already fixed.' (tsn, pp. 14-15, May 29,
1973; Italics supplied.)
"It is well to remember that the finding that
there was a contusion on the left neck of the
deceased would be vital in this case as this would
corroborate Nestor Dalud's 'confession' that he
struck the deceased on the neck with a
bamboo. Could it be that the inclusion of this
particular item was a mere afterthought,
considering that in the Certificate of Death
accomplished by Dr. Mariano at the recovery site
of the victim's body, there was no handwritten
entry as regards the contusion on the left
neck? Moreover, the explanation of Dr. Mariano
as to why he had to use two typewriters in
accomplishing Exhibit 'A' taxes credulity. If it is
true that the ribbon of the first typewriter was
not functioning well, then why did he not type
the rest of the entries on the second typewriter
 instead of merely the entry 'contusion, left
neck'?
"As earlier stated, the fact of death of Rodolfo
Lim is uncontested. However, there is serious
doubt as to the existence of contusion on his left
neck.
Oral confession of Isidro Buscato
"The law on evidence does not require that a
confession be in writing. It is sufficient that it be
made in the presence of reliable and disin-
terested witnesses (People vs. de Castro, 89
Phil. 747).
"T/Sgt. Francisco Soriano testified that on the
afternoon of January 16, 1973, he investigated
Isidro Buscato and that the latter admitted to
him that he had stabbed Rodolfo Lim (tsn, p. 15,
July 17, 1973). After he had reduced Buscato's
confession in writing. Soriano asked the latter to
sign the same but Buscato requested to have
time to think it over (tsn, p. 16, ibid). On the
next day, when Buscato was again asked to sign
his confession, he refused to do so (ibid). Except
for Soriano, no other witness was presented to
testify on the substance of Buscato's alleged
confession.
"Admittedly, an accused who had confessed
voluntarily would have no objection to reducing
the confession to writing, to be signed by him,
which, in this case, Isidro Buscato refused to
do. What could have spurred Buscato's decision
not to sign his 'confession'? Or better still, did
Isidro Buscato really make a 'confession'?
"Isidro Buscato denied that he ever made a
confession. In fact, all throughout the investi-
gation and despite the maltreatment he
underwent, he stoutly maintained his
innocence. Like Nestor Dalud, he named names
and recited specific overt acts in his painful
recollection of the methods employed to extract
his confession. Isidro Buscato's testimony,
taken in relation to that of Nestor Dalud, show
that the PC investigators have an impressive
array of third-degree methods in extracting
confessions. Without necessarily implying that
Isidro Buscato was subjected to a lesser degree
of torture than Nestor Dalud, we beg to quote the
more significant portions of his testi-
mony, vizaviz, the inhuman and barbaric
methods employed by the investigators, to wit:
'Q - What did they do to you that morn-
ing?
A - They made me punching bag.
Q - Who were they?
A - Sgt. Soriano, Legaspi,
Abobo and visitation. Those are the only
ones whom I know. There are many
others but I do not know them because
they are civilians.
Q - You said you were made a punching
bag. Will you please tell us how you were
made a punching bag?
A - First, they let me stand and tied me
to a post. And then, they undress me,
took off my pants and my shirt. They
told me if I will confess, they would not
harm me. And because I would not
confess, they started hitting my body and
even kicked my knees with their combat
shoes. By noontime, they stopped and
let me rest. So, they untied me and then
they returned me to the stockade. By one
o'clock in the afternoon, they again took
me out.
*** *** ***
Q - And while you were lying down on a
small bench, what happened?
A - Sgt. Soriano got a towel. He wet this
towel and covered my face with this
towel at the same time they kept on
hitting my body.
Q - You mean you were being hit while
lying down on a bench?
A - Yes, sir, because I would not
confess.
Q - While the wet towel was placed on
your face?
A - Yes, sir, it was pressed against my
nose and I could even hardly breath.'
(tsn, pp. 32-35, January 30, 1974; Italics
supplied).
*** *** ***
Q - What were the maltreatment in-
flicted on you that evening of January 17,
1973?
A - The same, sir. They again let me lie
down on a bench because they were
drinking Tanduay, Sgt. Soriano told me
to confess because if I will not confess
they will pour Tanduay into my
nose. And because I would not
confess, they poured Tanduay into my
nose. And after all the contents of the
Tanduay were consumed, they struck me
on the chest with the bottle.' (tsn, pp. 41-
42, ibid)
*** *** ***
Q - What kind of maltreatment did they
effect on you from 2:30 of January 18 to
one o'clock A.M. of January 19?
A - While they investigated me, I was
sitting and then they let my hand lay on
the table with open palm and made it as
an ash tray. They put cigarretes which
are lighted and put out the lights of the
cigarettes on my palm used as ash tray
and they insisted me to confess but I did
not confess. Some of them hit me with
the butt of the garand at my back.
*** *** ***
Q - Did they inflict any injuries on your
body?
 A - They again inflicted harm on my
body so that I would confess but I said to
them that I cannot confess because I
have not done anything wrong. Because
of that, Visitacion squeezed my testicle
and Sgt. Maniano who is now assigned
in Ilocos Sur poked a piece of wire from
a battery of the telephone and connected
that wiring to my testicle, with electric
current, and then I trembled when I was
electrocuted with the wire of the battery
of the telephone. So, I lost consciousness
because at the same time they kept on
boxing me.
Q - Who were the PC soldiers who were
maltreating you that evening of January
18, 1973, if you know?
A - Sgt. Soriano, Zapanta, Legaspi,
Abobo, Visitacion and others whom I did
not know because they have no
nameplates on their shirts and they were
only wearing military undershirts.' (tsn,
pp. 45-48, ibid).
"Isidro Buscato's testimony on this point finds
corroboration on the letter-complaint sent by
Buscato's father to the President of the Phil-
ippines denouncing the PC investigators for
maltreating his son (Exhibit '2', p. 186, Rec.).
"Clearly, the court aquo erred in giving weight to
the alleged oral confession of Isidro Buscato.
"The following circumstances further puts grave
doubts on Isidro Buscato's participation in the
commission of the crime:
"1. The prosecution's version of the incident, as
established in the repudiated extra-judicial
confession of Nestor Dalud and Jabib Tan
(Exhibits 'C' and 'D', pp. 7-12, Rec.), is that Isidro
Buscato stabbed Rodolfo Lim and after Buscato
had divested the deceased of his money and
watch, Buscato brought the body of the deceased
towards themiddle of the river to be carried away
by the current of the river. After the arrest of
Buscato, two blue denim pants belonging to him
were sent to the National Bureau of
Investigation and upon request of Fiscal Aquiles
Navajos, was examined to determine the
presence of human blood. As per the Biology
Report of the NBI, the examination yielded a
negative result (Exhibit '3', Buscato, p. 187,
Rec.). Considering the wound of the deceased,
 there must have been profused bleeding. Yet,
despite the fact that Buscato allegedly brought
the body of the deceased to the middle of the
river, there was no trace at all of human blood in
Buscato's pants;
"2. The crime was supposed to have been
committed between 10:00 o'clock to 12:00
o'clock in the evening of January 12, 1973. Isidro
Buscato was alleged to have taken the money,
watch and necklace of the deceased. It further
appears that Buscato was apprehended at 9:00
o'clock in the morning of January 13, 1973 (tsn,
p. 21, January 30, 1974). There was, therefore,
no opportunity for Buscato to spend the money
allegedly taken by him from the deceased nor to
dispose of the watch and the necklace. Yet the
crack PC investigators were not able to recover
any of the stolen articles.
Rebuttal testimonies Sgt. Soriano and Vargas do not
destroy appellant's' claim of maltreatment.
"Appellants Nestor Dalud and Isidro Buscato
mentioned by name nine members of the
Philippine Constabulary who maltreated them
with the sole purpose of extracting their
confessions, namely: Sgt. Soriano, Sgt. Vargas,
Juansing, Legaspi, Cristy, Maniano, Abobo,
 Zapanta and Visitacion (tsn, pp. 19-21, 33, Jan.
14, 1974, Dalud; tsn. pp. 45-48, Jan. 30, 1974,
Buscato). However, only Soriano and Vargas
were presented to rebut the testimonies of
herein appellants. They denied the appellants'
allegation of maltreatment.
"Assuming, arguendo, that Soriano and Vargas
did not inflict bodily harm on the appellants,
how about the others? Not only were they not
presented on rebuttal, there is nothing in the tes-
timony of Soriano and Vargas that would
indicate that the said persons were not present
during the interrogation conducted on the
appellants or that there is nobody in their unit
carrying such names. The failure of the
prosecution to present the said persons certainly
lends authenticity to the appellants' claim of
maltreatment.
"Thus, notwithstanding the rebuttal testimony
of Soriano and Vargas, the claim of Nestor Dalud
and Isidro Buscato that they were physically
abused by the afore-mentioned persons still
stand firm. * * *"[6]
Moreover, as indicated by the counsel for the
appellants, the extrajudicial confession of Nestor Dalud
contained statements that are so inherently
improbable that they could not have reflected the
truth. Thus, according to the alleged extrajudicial
confession, after placing the victim in the sack under
the Quirino Bridge, Boy Buscato then pulled the sack
into the middle of the river and left it to float with the
current of the river. Counsel for the appellants,
however, showed that the depth of the Rio Grande
River near the bank during low tide is about two (2)
fathoms. Consequently, it was physically impossible
for a man of the height of Boy Buscato to have waded
into the middle of the river with the body of the
deceased in tow. This is especially true considering
that the Rio Grande River is a very wide navigable river
and that at the bank near the Philippine Trade Center
where the incident was supposed to have happened, is
quite deep since it is used as a berthing place of motor
launches to load and unload their cargoes. Appellants
have likewise shown the improbability that the body of
the deceased could have floated downstream during
the interval of about nine (9) hours for a distance of
about one kilometer, considering that according to
medico-legal authorities, a dead body does not
immediately float because of its natural tendency to
sink under water and it is only after the body
undergoes bacterial decomposition and thus
accumulates gases that it rises to the surface of the
water and floats. It has been observed that "bacterial
decomposition makes its appearance in the first two
days after submersion during the summer
months."[7] There is no medical testimony, however,
to the effect that the body of the deceased was found in
a stage of decomposition or in a bloated condition.
On the basis of the record, We, therefore, find that the
position taken by the Solicitor General is fully
justified. As early as the case of U. S. v. De Leon,[8] this
Court emphasized that Courts "are slow to accept
extrajudicial confessions when they are subsequently
disputed, unless they are corroborated by other
testimony." Here, independent of the afore-mentioned
extrajudicial confessions, there is no other evidence
which would directly link the herein appellants to the
crime. It appears, moreover, that such confessions were
procured by force, violence or threats. They are,
therefore, inadmissible and cannot be used as evidence
to prove the guilt of the appellants.
THE RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION
The constitutional right of a person against self-
incrimination precludes the use of confessions obtained
from him thru force, violence, threat, intimidation or
any other means which vitiate his free will.[9]
The doctrine that one accused of crime cannot be
compelled to testify against himself is predicated upon
principles of humanity and civil liberty. The
maxim Nemo tenetur seipsum accusare had its origin
in the protests against the abuses and manifestly unjust
methods of interrogating accused persons in the
inquisitorial Court of the Star Chamber. It was erected
as an additional barrier for the protection of the people
against the exercise of arbitrary power. As observed in
an early case:[10]
"" * * * While the admissions or confessions of
the prisoner, when voluntarily and freely made,
have always ranked high in the scale of incrimi-
nating evidence, if an accused person be asked to
explain his apparent connection with a crime
under investigation, the case with which the
questions put to him may assume an
inquisitorial character, the temptation to press
the witness unduly, to browbeat him if he be
timid or reluctant, to push him into a corner, and
to entrap him into fatal contradictions, * * *
made the system so odious as to give rise to a
demand for its total abolition. The change in the
English criminal procedure in that particular
seems to be founded upon no statute and no
judicial opinion, but upon a general and silent
 acquiescence of the courts in a popular
demand. But, however adopted, it has become
finally embedded in English as well as
in. American jurisprudence. So deeply did the
iniquities of the ancient system impress them-
selves upon the minds of the American colonists
that the states, with one accord, made a denial of
the right to question an accused person a part of
their fundamental law, so that a maxim which in
England was a mere rule of evidence, became
clothed in this country with the impregnability
of a constitutional amendment.'"[11]
The constitutional foundation underlying the privilege
against self-incrimination "is the respect a government
* * * must accord to the dignity and integrity of its
citizens. To maintain a 'fair state-individual balance',
to require the government 'to shoulder the entire
load,[12] to respect the inviolability of the human
personality, our accusatory system of criminal justice
demands that the government seeking to punish an
individual procure the evidence against him by its own
independent labors, rather than by the cruel, simple
expedient of compelling it from his own mouth."[13]
As explained in U.S. v. Navarro,[14] this provision
against self-incrimination was established on grounds
of "public policy and humanity -- of policy, because if
the party were required to testify, it would place the
witness under the strongest temptation to commit
perjury, and of humanity, because it would prevent the
extorting of confessions by duress."
As noted by the Wickersham Commission in its report
in 1931, "not only does the use of the third degree
involve a flagrant violation of law, but it involves also
the dangers of false confession, and it tends to make
police and prosecutors less zealous in the search for
objective evidence. * * * The third degree brutalizes the
police, hardens the prisoner against society, and lowers
the esteem in which the administration of justice is held
by the public."[15]
THE CRITERIA OF JUDICIAL INQUIRY
The constitutional inquiry is not whether the conduct of
the police officers in obtaining the confession was
shocking, but whether the confession was free and
voluntary; that is, it must not be extracted by any sort of
threats or violence, nor obtained by any direct or
implied promises, nor by the exertion of improper
influence.[16] It has been recognized that "coercion can
be mental as well as physical, and that the blood of the
accused is not the only hallmark of an unconstitutional
inquisition."[17] As stated by Justice Fernando
in People v. Bagasala,[18] any form of coercion
whether physical, mental or emotional renders a
confession inadmissible. "What is essential for its
validity is that it proceeds from the free will of the
person confessing." In other words, the person must not
have been compelled to incriminate himself. As early as
the case of U. S. v. De Los Santos,[19] this Court,
speaking thru Justice Trent, explained the rationale for
the rule rejecting the admissibility of forced confessions,
thus:
"If a confession be free and voluntary - the
deliberate act of the accused with a full
comprehension of its significance, there is no
impediment to its admission as evidence and it
then becomes evidence of a high order; since it
is supported by the presumption -- a very strong
one -- that no person of normal mind will delib-
erate and knowingly confess himself to be the
perpetrator of a crime, especially if it he a serious
crime, unless prompted by truth and
conscience.
"* * * But if the accused shows that the
confession was involuntary, as that term is used
with reference to confessions, the confession
cannot be considered as evidence of the guilt of
the accused. His conviction must depend upon
 other evidence. Involuntary confessions are re-
jected by all courts -- by some on the ground that
a confession so obtained is unreliable; and by
some on the grounds of humanitarian principles
which abhor all forms of torture or unfairness
toward the accused in criminal proceedings. But
either theory arrives at the same goal. Such a
confession is not legal evidence and must be re-
jected. If the accused satisfactorily shows that it
was made involuntarily, the confession stands
discredited in the eyes of the law and is as a thing
which never existed. * * *"
It may be relevant to reiterate here the admonition to
police authorities emphatically expressed by Justice
Fernando, while speaking for the Court, in People v.
Bagasala, supra:
"It is likewise timely to impress anew on police
officials that the imperative requirements of
truth and humanity condemn the utilization of
force and violence to extract confessions from
unwilling victims. Crimes must be punished and
the guilty must not be allowed to escape. A desi-
rable end cannot, however, be attained by
unconstitutional means. There should be less
than full respect for the law if in the process of
 enforcing it lawless methods are employed. * *
*" (at p. 244.)
This right against self-incrimination guaranteed in the
fundamental charter cannot be abridged. "If the
government becomes a lawbreaker", once observed
Justice Brandeis, "it breeds contempt for law; it invites
every man to become a law unto himself; it invites
anarchy. To declare that in the administration of the
criminal law the end justifies the means * * * would
bring terrible retribution."[20]
There is no question that cruel or degrading treatment
to secure confessions from one suspected of a crime
seriously violates his fundamental human rights, the
protection of which is basic in a regime of law and
justice.
We thus conclude that without such extrajudicial
confessions the evidence of the prosecution has failed to
overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence
in favor of the appellants.[21]
ACCORDINGLY , the appealed decision is reversed
and appellants Isidro (Boy) Buscato and Nestor Dalud
are ACQUITTED. No costs.
Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Honorable,
the Secretary of Justice, for the institution of
appropriate action against the persons responsible for
the maltreatment of appellants.
Fernando, (Chairman), Barredo,
Aquino, and Concepcion, Jr., JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-51858 January 31, 1985

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
RICARDO CABRERA and LORETO SIPE, accused. RICARDO
CABRERA, accused whose death sentence is under review.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

Before us for automatic review is the Decision of the then Court of First
Instance of South Cotabato, Branch II, at Koronadal (in Criminal Case No.
537), finding Ricardo Cabrera (the APPELLANT, for brevity) guilty of Murder
with Assault upon an Agent of a Person in Authority and imposing upon him
the penalty of capital punishment. His co-accused, Loreto SIPE, was found
guilty of Direct Assault upon an Agent of a Person in Authority and was
sentenced to "the penalty of PRISION CORRECCIONAL in its medium or 2
years, 4 months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months period (sic);" but after
crediting him with the period of his preventive imprisonment, he was ordered
released by the Trial Court.

The facts upon which conviction rested disclose that in the evening of
September 16, 1972, Patrolmen Victor Poral and Felix Fellores (the latter
hereinafter referred to as the VICTIM, for short) were assigned to keep peace
and order at a dance party in Barrio Guinsangan, Norala, South Cotabato.

At around 11:00 o'clock that evening, an unidentified man approached them

reporting that he was being chased by somebody armed with a gun. Hiding
to the place, they saw accused SIPE holding a .20 gauge "paltik." They each
fired a warning shot in the air and ordered SIPE to drop his firearm. SIPE
refused. Instead, he sought cover in a nearby canal and fired at the VICTIM,
who was hit in his right thigh. The VICTIM fired back hitting SIPE on his left
thigh near the buttocks. While the VICTIM was loading his riffle for the next
shot, APPELLANT, armed with a bladed weapon called pinuti" (Exhibit "B")
rushed from behind and knifed him on the right side of his body killing him on
the spot. APPELLANT then scampered away. The foregoing, in substance,
was the testimony of Patrolman Poral who added that he was unable to fire
at the fleeing APPELLANT as his pistol jammend.

The autopsy findings disclosed a stab wound "over the lateral aspect of the
right chest" of the VICTIM, and a bullet wound on the right thigh. Death was
attributed to severe hemorrhage secondary to the stab wound.
At about 2:00 o'clock in the morning of September 17, 1972, APPELLANT
was arrested by the Chief of Police in the house of Gerardo Maroma where
APPELLANT was staying, located about a kilometer away from the site of the
incident. The bladed weapon used, still stained with blood, was allegedly
found inside said house.

In separate sworn statements given by APPELLANT at the police

headquarters on September 19, 1972 1 and before Municipal Judge
Amandito Araneta on September 21, 1972, 2 he confessed to having stabbed
the VICTIM.

During the trial, however, APPELLANT repudiated his statements alleging

that they were obtained by force and that he admitted his guilt because of the
maltreatment to which he was subjected.

As his alibi, APPELLANT maintained that in the evening in question, he

attended the dance in the barrio with Hector Azucena, Eugenio Valle and two
ladies. Hector Azucena also stayed in the house of Gerardo Maroma for the
harvest season. After the dance, at about 11:00 P.M., he and Hector went
home together and when they were already nearing the house, they heard
gunshots. They paid no heed and just went to sleep. At dawn, policemen
arrived, manhandled the owner, Gerardo Maroma, and thereafter brought
APPELLANT down the house and took him to the municipal building, together
with Maroma and Valle. APPELLANT denied that he was found hiding in the
ceiling and that a bloodied knife was found on his person as the Chief of
Police had testified. When queried why he killed a policeman, APPELLANT
replied that he knew nothing of what they were asking him. At the police
headquarters, however, they forced him to sign a confession threatening to
kill him if he refused.

The Trial Court discredited the defense version and as aforestated, meted
out conviction for both accused.

In this appeal, APPELLANT faults the Trial Court with the following errors: in
holding that he had executed his extrajudicial confession voluntarily; in
concluding that he had been positively Identified by Patrolman Poral; in failing
to appreciate the testimony of Benjamin Maca who pointed to Andresito Sipe
as the real culprit; in not giving weight and credence to his defense of alibi;
and in not acquitting him.

A review of the evidence discloses overriding considerations, which

engender reasonable doubt regarding APPELLANT's culpability.

To prove maltreatment, Dr. Arturo P. Pingoy, before whom APPELLANT was

brought on September 30, 1972 for examination and treatment of the injuries
that he had suffered, testified that he found APPELLANT "weak and
frustrated" with "a generalized kind of wounds appearing from the head to the
lower extremities," 3 some of which had healed, others were healing 4 while
others were infected. The medical certificate that he had issued (Exhibit "4")
particularized the injuries as follows:

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

This is to certify that Mr. Ricardo Cabrera, a 28 years old male, single, had
consulted and been given treatment in this hospital this day 30th of
September — 1972, because of generalized body weakness and pain, and
multiple infected injuries an over the body. The following are the approximate
injuries noted:

Head — infected incised wound (R) parieto occipital region 2 cm. long, ¼ cm.
deep. Healed incised wound posterior aspect of (1) pinna 3 cm. no. 2. Near
healing incised wound posterior to (L) mastoid 3 cm.

Face — punctured wound (L) side of the bridge of the nose, ¼ cm. in
diameter,

Left Upper Extremities — Abrasions: elbow joint posterior aspect 1/3 x ½ cm.
no. 5; forearm lateral aspect 2 cm. no. 2; volar middle finder 3 cm.

Punctured wounds — elbow joint posterior aspect with pus, 1 cm. diameter.
Incised wounds-wrist, medial aspect 4 cm. long, 1/3 cm. deep.

Right Upper Extremities — Abrasions; linear, wrist joint posterior aspect 1 ½

cm.

Incised wound — arm anterior aspect 3 cm. long, ¼ cm. deep.

Left Lower Extremities — Incised wound — thigh lateral aspect, horizontal 11
cm. long, ¼ cm. deep, crossed by vertical wound 14 cm. long, and ¼ cm.
deep.

Anterior aspect, upper 1/3 of leg, 1 ½ cm. Anterior aspect, lower ½ of leg, 1
cm.

Right Lower Extremities — Linear abrasion with hematoma — anterior aspect

of the leg, 1/3 to 1 cm. no. 7.

(SGD.) DR. ARTURO P. PINGOY (Exhibit "4")

The question then arises as to whether the injuries described were inflicted
before or after APPELLANT's confessions were taken. The prosecution
would have us believe that it was after and that the injuries had no bearing to
those confessions. 5 However, no proof has been submitted to substantiate
the same. We are also faced with the following considerations. The crime
was committed on September 16, 1972. APPELLANT was arrested on
September 17, 1972. He executed his confessions on September 19 and 21,
1972, respectively, and he continued to be under police custody from the time
of his arrest until September 30, 1972, the date that he was examined by Dr.
Pingoy. Obviously, the maltreatment occurred within that period and the only
purpose would have been to force APPELLANT to admit guilt against his will.
The objective having been achieved, there would have been no reason for
further maltreatment thereafter. Moreover, as APPELLANT had declared,
when his statement was taken by the Municipal Judge, he (APPELLANT)
complained about the maltreatment he received at the hands of the police;
that the Judge noted his injuries as he was merely in shorts and shirt, and
that the Judge even inquired why he had many wounds but that when he
gave the reason, the Judge merely stated that the police were "bad." 6

True, the Chief of Police and the Municipal Judge, each in his turn, testified
that APPELLANT was in good physical shape when the latter gave his
statements before them. However, their testimonies cannot prevail over the
physical evidence as shown by the medical findings. During the trial,
APPELLANT also exhibited to the Trial Court the scars from the injuries that
he had received.
APPELLANT's confessions having been extracted by force and violence,
they stand discredited in the eyes of the law and cannot be the basis for
sustaining a judgment of conviction. Such a verdict would now rest largely on
Patrolman Poral's Identification of APPELLANT, which, however, we do not
find as indubitable. Said police officer maintained that he witnessed the
stabbing of the VICTIM by APPELLANT. Notwithstanding, in addition to
APPELLANT, the police arrested seven (7) other people, three of whom were
subjected to investigation, and according to them, they were also subjected
to maltreatment. It is likewise strange that Patrolman Poral was not even
listed as one of the witnesses for the prosecution in the criminal complaint
filed before the Municipal Court on September 19, 1972. 7 Surely, in three
days' time, he could have informed the Chief of Police that he was an
eyewitness. It was only on October 16, 1972, at the preliminary investigation
before the Fiscal, or one month after the crime had been committed that he
gave his version of the incident. 8

Furthermore, one Benjamin Maca, who had also attended the dance that
evening and who was apparently also in the scene of the crime, graphically
described how the VICTIM was attacked. He testified that when the VICTIM
was firing his gun at accused Loreto SIPE, Andresito Sipe approached from
behind, went under the VICTIM's right arm and stabbed him as a result of
which the latter went limp. 9 He was certain that it was Andresito Sipe and not
APPELLANT who had stabbed the VICTIM, but explained that since they
both had the same height and build, Patrolman Poral must have mistaken
one for the other, since the latter was not personally acquainted with
APPELLANT. The fact that Benjamin admitted not having informed the police
of what he saw that same evening of the incident would not detract from his
testimony for, as he had explained, the next day the police had made arrests
and he was confident that the "truth will come out."

Indeed, no motive has been attributed to APPELLANT for stabbing the

VICTIM, whereas, it was but natural that Andresito Sipe would go to the aid
of accused SIPE, who was his brother, and at whom the VICTIM was aiming
his firearm at the time the latter was stabbed.

With the foregoing considerations taken into account, we have failed to arrive
at that moral certainty sufficient to convict.
At this juncture, we reiterate the reminder to Judges and Fiscals before whom
declarants are brought for swearing to the truth of their statements to adopt
the practice of having the confessants physically and thoroughly examined
by independent and qualified doctors before administering the oath, even if it
is not requested by the accused. If physicians are not available then they
should themselves examine the bodies of the declarants for signs of possible
violence. This would not only deter attempts to secure confessions through
violence but would also preclude future controversies on whether the
statements were obtained through torture or not, which only delay criminal
trials. 10Then Municipal Judge Amandito Araneta was not only wanting in the
observance of the prescribed practice but was also indifferent to
APPELLANT's plight and should be, as he is hereby, censured.

WHEREFORE, on reasonable doubt, the appealed judgment is hereby

REVERSED, and appellant Ricardo Cabrera is hereby acquitted. Costs de
oficio.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, Actg. C.J., Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Abad Santos, Plana,

Escolin, Relova, Gutierrez, Jr., De la Fuente and Cuevas, JJ., concur.

Aquino, and Alampay, JJ., took no part.

Fernando, CJ., is on leave.

G.R. No. L-26182 May 31, 1971

THE PEOPLE OF PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
TOMAS BAGASALA, JUANITO BAGASALA, ANICETO RONAN,
SALVADOR RONAN and ANICETO REX, defendants, JUANITO
BAGASALA, defendant-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo, Assistant Solicitor
General Antonio G. Ibarra and Solicitor Hector C. Fule for plaintiff-appellee.

Jose Agbulos for defendant-appellant.

FERNANDO, J.:

The plea of appellant Juanito Bagasala for the reversal of his conviction for
the crime of robbery with homicide and serious physical injuries is based on
the insufficiency of the proof to demonstrate his beyond reasonable doubt
as the confession attributed to him was allegedly obtained by means of
torture and the infliction of body injuries and there was not enough
testimonial evidence to justify the finding that he was liable for the crime
committed the information for the above offense was filed against five
accused, but only Tomas Bagasala and Juanito Bagasala were adjudged
guilty.1 An appeal was duly taken to this Court by both of them, but Tomas
Bagasala having escaped from the provincial jail on March 24, 1966, his
appeal was dismissed.2 Juanito Bagasala is thus the sole appellant. As will
hereafter be shown his contention that an extra-judicial confession was
involuntary, having been exorted by force, must by given credence. He is
not, however, entitled to an aquital, as the oral testimony contrary to his
assertion did clearly point him as one of the perpetrators of the offense
charged. The conviction cannot be reversed.

The tragic occurrence took place on June 10, 1961. At about 2:00 o'clock that
morning, Macario Ongkit and his wife, Juliana Reginaldo, were asleep in their
house in Barrio Cadlan, Pili, Camarines Sur. They were awakened by the
barking of their dog. Macario stood up and armed himself with his bolo and
an iron pipe. Proceeding to the sala, he saw five men entering his house
through the doors leading to the veranda as well as the kitchen. 3 In no time
at all, one of them, recognized by him as appellant Juanito Bagasala, wrested
the iron pipe. Another, Tomas Bagasala, in turn sought to take away from
him his bolo. Iron pipe in hand, appellant was heard by Ongkit demanding
from his wife, Juliana Reginaldo, her key, prompting her to exclaim: "Juanita
why are you doing this to us?" This was followed by her plea for help, as she
was beaten up with such weapon.4

Tomas Bagasala in turn succeeded in relieving Ongkit of his bolo and to

use it against the latter, wounding him on the back of his head and thus
causing him to fall to the floor. It was not until almost dawn that morning
that he regained consciousness. His son, It was then attending to his
wounds. He was asked by his father to report what happened to the
authorities. Ongkit was then taken to the provincial hospital in Naga City so
that he could receive medical care. He likewise testified that of the raiding
party of five, he could identify only appellant and Tomas Bagasala. On the
occasion of such robbery, he suffered a loss of one sack of rice valued at
ten pesos.5

With the incident being reported to the Philippine Constabulary at Naga City
on the same morning, two sergeants6and two corporals7 were directed to
investigate the occurrence. Upon their arrival, what greeted them at the
scene of the crime 10:00 o'clock that morning were the lifeless body of the
wife, Juliana Reginaldo, lying flat on the floor the iron pipe and the bolo
stained with blood.8 They were told by the son, Rafael Ongkit, that his father
was in the provincial hospital in Naga City. Proceeding to said place, Ongkit
pointed to appellant and Tomas Bagasala with three other persons who
were responsible for the killing and the robbery.9 Acting on this information,
they brought the two to the hospital where they were readily identified by
Ongkit as the perpetrators. 10 The death of the wife, according to their doctor
who performed the autopsy, was due to the "acute internal and secondary
hemorrhage, because of the multiple wounds on the head and fracture of
the skull." 11

The oral testimony of Macario Ongkit, in the opinion of the lower court, was
"corroborated and strengthened by the [extra-judicial statement] under
oath" of appellant Juanita Bagasala wherein it was admitted that he was
among the group of five persons who went to the house of the Ongkit
spouses precisely for the purpose of taking away the palay stored
therein. 12 There, was thus a rejection of the claim made that such
confession was involuntary. The defense of alibi put up by appellant was
rejected in view of the positive identification. Hence his conviction for the
crime of robbery with homicide and serious physical injuries, being
sentenced to pay the heirs of Juliana Reginaldo the amount of P5,000.00
and to pay Macario Ongkit the amount of P10.00 representing the value of
the palay.

If the conviction of appellant were predicated solely on the confession, he

would be entitled to acquittal, his attack on its voluntary character having
support in the evidence of record. There is, however, sufficient basis for the
finding of guilt as the testimonial evidence is sufficiently wieghty and the
defense of alibi utterly unconvincing.

1. The Constitution in its Bill of Rights explicitly guarantees: "No person shall
be compelled to be a witness against himself." 13 There is thus a safeguard
against the compulsory disclosure of incriminating facts. It does not bar, as
Justice Tuason pointed out, the conviction of an accused "on a voluntary
extrajudicial statement ...."14 Certainly, however, where the confession is
involuntary being due to maltreatment or induced by fear or intimidation, there
is a violation of this constitutional provision. Any form of coercion whether
physical, mental, or emotional thus stamps it with inadmissibility. What is
essential for its validity is that it proceeds from the free will of the person
confessing.

This is the prevailing principle even prior to the Constitution. Both under the
Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Philippine Autonomy Act of 1916 as well as a
statute enacted in 1903, there is the requirement that a confession to be
received as evidence must be shown to be freely and voluntarily made and
not the result of violence intimidation threat, menace, or promise or offer of
reward or leniency. 15 Why it should be thus was explained in an early leading
case: "Involuntary confessions are rejected by all courts — by some on the
ground that a concession so obtained is unreliable and by some on the
grounds of humanitarian principles which abhor all forms of torture or
unfairness toward the accused in criminal proceedings. But either theory
arrives at the same goal. Such a confession is not legal evidence and must
be rejected. If the accused satisfactorily shows that it was made involuntarily,
the confessions stand discredited the eyes of the law and is a thing which
never existed." 16 Such a thought finds expression in an even earlier
decision, United States v. Navarro, 17 promulgated in 1904. Thus: "The
provision that no one is bound to criminate himself is older than the
Government of the United States. At an early day it became a part of the
common law of England. It was established on the grounds of public policy
and humanity — of policy, because if the party were required to testify, it
would place the witness under the strongest temptation to commit the crime
of perjury, and of humanity, because it would prevent the extorting of
confessions by duress." 18

It is no surprise then that where there was ample basis in a habeas corpus
proceeding for petitioner's contention as to the signature on his confessions
in the eight cases where he did plead guilty being due to his desire to avoid
any further torture or maltreatment, this Court, through Justice Perfecto
reached this conclusion: "The facts proved by petitioner convince us that
the sentences rendered in the eight cases in question are null and void and
should not be given any effect." 19 As a result, the release from confinement
of petitioner was ordered. Then, too, in line with this controlling doctrine,
there is this relevant excerpt from an opinion of Justice Labrador: "We
cannot close our ears to the stories of maltreatment used to extort the
confession in question. Courts are not unaware that some officers of the
law resort to illegal and reprehensible tactics to extort confessions, and had
occasions to, express condemnation of such tactics. 20

It is unfortunate that the lower court failed to abide by the authoritative

doctrines that ban the use of involuntary confessions in accordance with the
constitutional provision against self-incrimination which, in the language of
Justice Sanchez, should be "mandatory", being "a valuable and substantive
right." 21 Appellant testified that on June 10, 1961, while he was being
investigated at the constabulary barracks, he was boxed repeatedly in
different parts of the body, at one time made to lie down after being
blindfolded and then water poured on his face. 22 He repeated that before
signing the confession on June 13, 1961, he was likewise subjected to
physical maltreatment, having been boxed many times on the breast and
stomach. 23 His testimony received confirmation from a competent and
neutral source, Dr. Pedro Villafuerte, the city health officer of Naga, who
examined appellant on June 27, 1961 in the provincial jail of Camarines Sur
seventeen days after his being apprehended and taken to the constabulary
barracks. When asked what he found on the person of appellant, this was
his answer: "He has five lesions here. Tenderness of the stomach on the
left; elongated scar, lower third of the forearm; healing wound, circular
shape on the elbow, left side; sensation of deafness and easily
nervous." 24 When questioned as to what could have caused the
tenderness, he replied as follows: "That is trauma. The elongated scar on
the lower third might have been produced by a stick; the healing wound
circular in form, he might have fallen on a hard object and the sensation of
deafness, if you try to hit the two ears with the palm, there is compression
of the ear drum, so that the hearing is interfered with. But this will be
temporary in nature. Easily nervous, because of fear. I examined him in
jail." 25

The above testimony notwithstanding, the lower court could still look upon
such confession as free of any infirmity. Clearly, that was error, as pointed
out by appellant. The constant course of decisions of this honorable
Tribunal, true to the meaning of the self-incrimination clause forbids the
admission of any confession obtained under such circumstances. It would
be to render nugatory a valuable constitutional right if judges of the courts
of first instance display less than full sensitivity to its command. A conviction
resting on such proof, and such proof alone, certainly cannot be allowed to
stand.

It is likewise timely to impress anew on police officials that the imperative

requirements of truth and of humanity condemn the utilization of force and
violence to extract confessions from unwilling victims. Crime must be
punished and the guilty must not be allowed to escape. A desirable end
cannot, however, be attained by unconstitutional means. There should be
less than full respect for the law if in the process of enforcing it lawless
methods are employed. Once again, then, this Court is called upon to
manifest in the strongest language possible its abhorrence for the
employment of force to compel a person to sign a statement acknowledging
guilt. A decent regard for the dignity that attaches to every human being as
such will be satisfied with nothing less.

2. Nonetheless, a reversal is not called for. There is sufficient competent and

credible evidence of record pointing unerringly to the guilt of appellant. His
brief, in two other errors assigned would impute the perpetration of the deed
"to someone else." 26 By that cryptic statement, reference is made to the
testimony of his own thirteen-year-old daughter, Soledad Bagasala, who did,
on the witness stand, declare that on the morning of June 9, 1969 there was
a quarrel between the Ongkit spouses presumably due to the wife having
applied to work as a maid in the household of a certain family in Naga. 27 She
even went so far as to state that she saw the deceased hitting, with a piece
of pipe, the head of her husband, Macario Ongkit, who retaliated by using the
bolo on her. 28 Certainly, it is understandable why the lower court could not be
expected that such an assertion, coming from the daughter, could disprove
what was testified to by Macario Ongkit as to the fatal beating inflicted on his
wife by appellant on the occasion of a robbery.

Nor could appellant's responsibility for the gory occurrence be wiped away
by the simple disclaimer that he was, during the night of June 9, 1961, asleep
in his house, leaving the place only the next morning to harvest Palay. 29His
defense of alibi was sought to be bolstered by still another member of the
family, his wife, who affirmed that on the evening of June 9, 1961 appellant
was sleeping in their house, but likewise admitted that the evidence of the
Ongkit spouses was only about fifty meters away. 30 The lower court did not
accept such a version. It is understandable why. His identification coming
from a neighbor was easily believable. Such an alibi which did not prelude
appellants having taken the time to go with his other co-accused in a house
only fifty meters away during the course of the evening, as not calculated to
impress any court of justice with its truth. As was stressed in Justice Castro's
opinion in People v. Alcantara: 31 "The appellant's main defense in
exculpation is alibi. It must he stressed at the outset that alibi is one of the
weakest defenses that can be resorted to by an accused, especially if there
is direct testimony of an eyewitness duly corroborated by that of another, not
only because it is inherently weak and unreliable but also because of the
case of fabricating evidence of alibi and the difficulty of checking or
rebutting." 32People vs. Estrada 33 was cited in support of such a view. Thus:
"No jurisprudence in criminal case more settled than the rule that alibi is the
weakest of all defense and that the same should be rejected when the identity
of the accused has been sufficiently and positively established by
eyewitnesses to the crime. Such should be the rule, for as a defense, alibi is
easy to concoct, and difficult to disapprove. And for alibi to prosper, it is not
enough to prove that defendant was somewhere else when the crime was
committed, but he must, likewise, demonstrate that it was physically
impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time." 34 Only
last January, such a view was reiterated by the Chief Justice in People v.
Provo 35 in these words: "Needless to say, as one of the weakest defenses
available in criminal cases, the alibi set up by appellant herein cannot offset
the testimony of Benita Mayuyu, who positively identified him as one of those
who seized Matignas Serrano, at Pisok, in the evening of October 9,
1958 ...." 36 In the light of the foregoing, the guilt of the accused having been
demonstrated beyond reasonable doubt, the inadmissibility of the confession
extorted from appellant could not justify a reversal of his conviction. 37

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of December 28, 1965 finding

Juanita Bagasala guilty of the crime of robbery with homicide and serious
physical injuries and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua is affirmed, with the modification that the amount of indemnity to
the heirs of the deceased Juliana Reginaldo should be in the sum of
P12,000.00. Costs against appellant.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Villamor and

Makasiar,, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-49118 August 30, 1988

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
LETICIA CAPITIN y VARGAS, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Citizens Legal Assistance Office for accused-appellant.

CRUZ, J.:
In this prosecution for parricide, the victim is not only the two-month
child who was smothered to death but also the mother who was
convicted of killing her. There is nothing we can do now for the
unfortunate baby, but we can undo the injustice done to the mother who
we feel was not responsible for her act.
Leticia Capitin, the herein accused, was a 22-year old housemaid with an
illegitimate child. In the morning of December 10, 1975, she came down
from her room with her baby in her arms and told her employer, Soledad
Caparas, that the child was no longer breathing. Soledad's first impulse
was to call a doctor but she found this would be useless as the baby was
already dead. She then immediately reported the matter to the barangay
captain who in turn informed the police. That same day, Leticia was
investigated at the Western Police District headquarters, where she
signed an extrajudicial confession. The infant was autopsied. On the basis
of the police findings and after an ex parte preliminary investigation,
Leticia was charged with parricide in the Court of First Instance of
Manila.
Her arraignment was originally scheduled on December 19, 1975, but
had to be postponed when it appeared that she was mentally disturbed
and could not respond to the questions put to her. On January 14, 1976,
taking into account her behavior and her record of mental imbalance as
reported by her counsel de oficio, the trial court ordered her psychiatric
examination. On April 7, 1976, Dr. Florante Reyles of the National Mental
Hospital reported that Leticia was suffering from "schizophrenia
manifested by behavioral abnormalities, withdrawal symptoms, dulling
of the affect, and mental inaccessibility." 1She was consequently, on April
28, 1976, ordered committed to the National Mental Hospital for
treatment and in the meantime the case was suspended and archived.
Two years later, on August 5, 1977, Dr. Reyles, through the Chief of the
said hospital, informed the court that Leticia had sufficiently improved to
stand trial. 2 Accordingly, her arraignment was scheduled again and held
on December 10, 1977. As she said she did not understand the
information, a plea of not guilty was entered for her. Trial then
proceeded (even as she remained confined at the National Mental
Hospital for continued treatment) and she was ultimately found guilty
and sentenced to reclusion perpetua. *
Why she was tried while she was still a patient of the National Mental
Hospital and apparently not yet in full possession of her mental faculties
is one of the oddities of this case. There was really not that much
urgency to continue the proceedings. Significantly, although the trial
judge believed the physician who certified that she was sufficiently
recovered to stand trial, he later disbelieved that same doctor's
testimony that she was a schizophrenic at the time of the commission of
the offense. It is also strange that, although the doctor considered her fit
to defend herself at the trial, he nevertheless recommended her
continued confinement as a mental patient for further treatment.
There is no dispute as to the cause of the child's death as reported by Dr.
Alfredo Singian, chief medical examiner of the Western Police District,
who conducted the autopsy. The baby was suffocated by the covering of
her mouth and nostrils, where purplish contusions were found,
suggesting deliberate force. 3 This would negate the rather feeble theory
offered by the defense that the baby might have accidentally smothered
on her pillow while in a prone position, assuming a 2-month old infant
could already turn by itself.
The second witness for the prosecution was Soledad Caparas, who
related the events of that morning of December 10, 1975, when the child
was killed. On cross-examination, she declared that the accused was
acting queerly even before the tragedy, often tailing to herself and at
times not answering when she was addressed. The witness declared
further that Leticia became neglectful of her chores after the birth of the
child because she had to attend to its care. 4
The third witness for the prosecution was Pat. Manuel Flores, who
investigated Leticia on the same day of the killing and took her written
statement at the police headquarters. He said that no pressure of any
kind was exerted on her, emphasizing that she was accompanied then by
her father and Soledad Caparas, He observed that the accused was
alternately crying and smiling and otherwise appeared abnormal but he
took her statement just the same because her answers appeared to be
intelligent. On cross-examination, he said he had advised her of her
constitutional rights and began the investigation only after she had
expressly waived her right to the assistance of counsel. He did not offer
such assistance to her for free, however, from any of the government
and private legal services available. 5
The defense put the accused-appellant on the stand, obviously to bolster
its claim that she was insane. When asked about the killing of her child,
she consistently maintained she did not know or could not remember
anything about it. Notably, the prosecution did not cross-examine. On
interrogation by the judge, however, she gave responsive and detailed
answers about her life and background, specifying her parents' names,
her date of birth, her previous employments and their duration, the
names and addresses of her former employers, and even the date of her
arrival in Manila. Questioned about her baby, she started crying and
when asked why replied she was thinking of her mother. 6
The more telling evidence in her favor was the testimony of Dr. Florante
Reyles, senior psychiatrist of the National Mental Hospital. Affirming his
previous medical report on his observation of Leticia in the hospital, he
described her as a schizophrenic, which he said meant she had a split
personality that withdrew her from reality and rendered her incapable of
understanding what she was doing. He declared that this condition could
probably date back to about six months or one year before the death of
the child and that the accused was suffering from the affliction when the
tragedy happened. He also said that when she was first admitted to the
National Mental Hospital on January 21, 1978, she was "quite disturbed
and could not answer coherent questions." Asked if the schizophrenic
might have lucid intervals, he said positively that "in schizophrenia, there
is no such thing as a lucid interval." 7
Analyzing the evidence for both parties, Judge Bernardo P. Fernandez
rendered a well-written and erudite decision in which he ably expounded
on the defense of insanity. There was no question to him that it was
Leticia who had smothered the child and that she had both motive and
opportunity. The defense itself had impliedly admitted the killing by
pleading insanity in extenuation. Hence, the burden of proof had shifted
from the prosecution to the defense, making it incumbent now upon the
accused to prove, with definite and convincing evidence, that she was
not in her right mind when she committed the crime. His conclusion was
that she had failed to do so and should therefore be pronounced guilty.
The Court will not affirm.
To begin with, the record clearly shows that the testimony of Dr. Reyles
remained entirely unrebutted by the prosecution. The credentials of the
witness as a psychiatrist knowledgeable in the field of mental alienation
were never challenged and so were deemed accepted by the
prosecution. The duration and manner of her observation and the
conclusion derived therefrom were not contested. The government
presented no witness or documentary evidence to contradict the
expert's finding that the accused was a schizophrenic at the time the
killing was committed and as such was unaware of the nature and
consequences of her deadly act. In fact, the cross- examination of this
witness only strengthened even more his testimony in chief with the
following exchange:
Q. So that it is possible that on the morning of
December 10, 1975, the accused herein was suffering
already from schizophrenia?
A. Yes, sir. 8
The trial judge chose to disregard this evidence, holding it did not
sufficiently show that Leticia was insane at the precise time of the
commission of the offense in 1975. He dismissed the psychiatrist's
findings because they were made one month after the
tragedy, 9 although he himself, in arriving at his own contrary conclusion,
based it inter alia on his examination of the accused made even much
later, at the trial of the case on July 7, 1978. His interrogation of Leticia,
he said, revealed she was completely sane because of her intelligent and
even detailed responses, but he forgets that it was madethree years after
the incident in question and after she had undergone continuous
treatment. Assuming she was already recovered during the trial
(although she remained confined at the National Mental Hospital), this
would not prove at all that she was not insane when the baby was killed
in 1975. At any rate, an appraisal made three years later by the trial
judge cannot be more accurate than one made after a continuous
observation of the accused-appellant which began only one month after
the occurrence of the offense and continued for all of three years. This
examination was made by an expert mental alienist.
Much reliance was also placed on the extrajudicial confession 10 which,
the trial court noted, contained "a coherent and logical account of what
had happened" and was signed by the accused-appellant with a steady
hand. The straightforward answers and the firm signature were added
proof of her sanity at the time the statement was taken, which was on
the same day the baby was killed. 11
The trouble is that the confession was completely inadmissible because it
was taken without observance of the safeguards provided by the Bill of
Rights for the protection of the suspect facing custodial investigation. A
reading of the supposed confession shows there was the usual
mechanical advise of the suspect's rights, including the right to assistance
of counsel, followed by the sacramental query as to whether or not she
was waiving her right to such assistance, followed by the stereotyped
answer so familiar in statements of this nature. As unacceptable as the
question was, the answer thereto was no less so and could not have
been possibly composed by the accused-appellant in her state of mind at
the time and given her limited knowledge of Tagalog. Although she had
lived all her life in Camarines Sur and had come to Manila only six
months earlier, in June of that year, there was this remarkably fluent
exchange between the investigator and Leticia that ran as follows :
Tanong: Ngayon, matapos mong malaman at
maintindihan ang iyong mga karapatan na binanggit
sa itaas, ikaw ba ay nahahanda pa ring magbigay ng
isang malaya at kusang loob na salaysay at sagutin ng
pawang katotohanan ang lahat ng itatanong sa iyo na
hindi ka naman pinipilit,tinatakot o pinangangakuan
ng anumang pabuya?
Sagot: Matapos akong mapagsabihan ng aking mga
karapatan at naintindihan ko ang mga ito ako ngayon
ay nagsasabi na hindi ko na kailangan ang abogado at
ako ay nahahandang sumagot sa anumang itatanong
sa akin at lubusang magbibigay sa inyo ng isang
malaya at kusang loob ng salaysay na hindi ako
tinatakot, pinipilit o pinangangakuan ng anumang
pabuya. **
It is not believable that the organized and ready answer,with all its legal
overtones to boot, could have come from this 22-year old housemaid,
who, on top of her deficiencies in the language (and the law), was
presumably not thinking clearly then (even assuming she was sane)
because she had just killed her child and was under strong emotional
stress.
Under the Galit doctrine 12 as now embodied (and even strengthened) in
Article III, Section 12 (l) of the 1987 Constitution, the written waiver of
the right to counsel must be made with the assistance and in the
presence of counsel. This was not done in the case at bar, as the
statement itself plainly discloses. It is recalled that even before that
doctrine was formally announced, our earlier decisions had already
required that the waiver be made intelligently, after proper notification
of his rights to the suspect, with full understanding by him of the effects
of such waiver. 13 Assuming such valid waiver, we have also insisted that
the confession itself be understandable to the person signing it, both as
to its language and its contents, and must not have been simply prepared
beforehand, details and all for the suspect's signature. 14
If we have outlawed confessions written in advance by the police for
persons of limited intelligence or educational attainment, we see no
reason why a confession signed by a person whose sanity is dubious, as
in the present case, should receive any less disapprobation. Leticia's
intelligence was not only limited but impaired.
As for the motive, the trial court conjectured that Leticia's illicit liaison
with the father of her child led her to kill it and "thereby hopefully
salvage her honor." *** It is the better policy, if we are to make any
conjecture at all, to incline toward the argument of the defense that
Leticia lost her honor as early as when she could no longer conceal her
pregnancy and had since then been injured to her shame; hence, it was
no longer necessary to conceal or redeem it by murdering her innocent
child. Moreover, she appeared to be attached to the baby, for which, in
fact, according to her employer, she neglected her duties as a
housemaid. It should also be added that, if we are to indulge in
presumptions, what we should presume is not that Leticia deliberately
snuffed out her daughter's life, which was an unnatural thing to do, but
that as a mother, like most mothers, she naturally loved the flesh of her
flesh.
Despite Judge Fernandez's scholarly discussion of insanity as a defense,
the Court feels that the accused-appellant has successfully shifted the
burden of proof back to the prosecution, which was thus obligated to
refute the evidence for the defense. In other words, going back to the
normal procedure, it had to prove the defendant's guilt beyond
reasonable doubt and overcome the constitutional presumption of
innocence in her favor. The prosecution has failed to do this. It has not
erased the doubt that Leticia might not really have understood what she
was doing when she smothered the child born of her womb whom she
apparently loved. Against the expert opinion of the psychiatrist who
began examining and observing Leticia days after the incident in
question, it has offered no more than an invalid confession, conclusions
based on her account three years after the child was killed in 1975, and
pure conjectures about her motive for her unnatural act. Surely, these
flimsy premises cannot suffice to support this unfortunate woman's
conviction. No wonder that even the brief for the appellee was obviously
half-hearted, substantially only a repetition and reproduction of the
findings of the trial court, and with hardly a word in support of the
decision. 15
What prompted Leticia to kill the helpless child is a mystery the Court will
not attempt to fathom. It is enough to know, as the evidence reveals,
that the hands that choked the victim were not moved by an evil mind.
When this case was calendared for deliberation, the Court inquired
about the present whereabouts of the accused-appellant and was
informed that she remained confined at the National Mental Hospital
since her commitment on January 21, 1976 until her discharge therefrom
in 1984, for transfer to the Women's Correctional Institute. The prisoner
is reported to be sickly and will probably be taken back to the National
Mental Hospital for further treatment.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is REVERSED and the accused-
appellant is ACQUITTED by reason of insanity. Let the prisoner be
released from the Women's Correctional Institute and recommitted to
the National Mental Hospital, there to remain until it is duly certified that
she is completely cured or is otherwise fit to be discharged.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
Gancayco, J., is on leave.
G.R. No. 95028 May 15, 1995

PEOPLE OF THE. PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
MARLO COMPIL Y LITABAN, accused-appellant.

BELLOSILLO, J.:

On the belief that the case for the prosecution depends in the main on his
own extrajudicial confession which he claims is inadmissible, accused Marlo
Compil y Litaban filed a demurrer to evidence instead of presenting evidence
in his behalf. The trial court however denied his demurrer, admitted his
extrajudicial confession, and found him guilty of robbery with homicide. Now
before us, he maintains that his extrajudicial confession was extracted
without the assistance of counsel, thus constitutionally flawed.
As submitted by the prosecution, on 23 October 1987, just before midnight,
robbers struck on MJ Furnitures located along Tomas Mapua Street, Sta.
Cruz, Manila, which doubled as the dwelling of its proprietors, the spouses
Manuel and Mary Jay. The intruders made their way into the furniture shop
through the window grills they detached on the second floor where the
bedroom of the Jays was located. Two (2) of the robbers forthwith herded the
two (2) maids of the owners into the bathroom.

Manuel Jay was not yet home. He was to come from their other furniture
store, the Best Wood Furniture, along Tomas Pinpin Street, also in Sta. Cruz.
His wife Mary had earlier retired to their bedroom. Sensing however that
something unusual was going on outside, Mary opened the door to peek.
Suddenly, a man placed his arms around her neck while another poked
a balisong at her nape. She was pushed back into the bedroom and ordered
to open the drawers where she kept money. A third man ransacked the
bedroom. They then tied her hands behind her back, stuffed her mouth with
a towel, and took off with some P35,000.00 in cash and pieces of jewelry
worth P30,000.00.

Afterwards, Mary who was gagged in the bedroom, and one of the
housemaids herded into the bathroom, heard Manuel agonizing amid a
commotion in the ground floor. After noticing that the two (2) men guarding
them had already left, the helpers, Jenelyn Valle and Virginia Ngoho, dashed
out of the bathroom and proceeded to the bedroom of their employers. Upon
seeing Mary, the two (2) maids untied her hands and took out the towel from
her mouth. They then rushed to the ground floor where they saw Manuel
sprawled on the floor among the pieces of furniture which were in disarray.
He succumbed to thirteen (13) stab wounds.

In the investigation that followed, Jessie Bartolome, a furniture worker in MJ

Furnitures, told operatives of the Western Police District (WPD) that just
before the incident that evening, while with his girlfriend Linda Hermoso
inside an owner-type jeep parked near MJ Furnitures, he saw his co-workers
Marlo Compil, Baltazar Mabini and Jose Jacale go to the back of the furniture
shop. Linda then confirmed the information of Bartolome to the police
investigators who also learned that the trio who were all from Samar failed to
report for work the day after the incident, and that Baltazar Mabini was
planning to go to Tayabas, Quezon, to be the baptismal godfather of his
sister's child.

Thus on 27 October 1987, WPD agents together with Tomas Jay, brother of
the deceased, and Jenelyn Valle went to the parish church of Tayabas,
Quezon, to look for Baltazar Mabini and his companions. From the records
of the parish they were able to confirm that suspect Baltazar Mabini stood as
godfather in the baptism of the child of his sister Mamerta and Rey Lopez.
Immediately they proceeded to the house of Lopez who informed them that
Baltazar Mabini and his companions already left the day before, except
Compil who stayed behind and still planning to leave.

After being positively identified by Jenelyn Valle as one of the workers of the
Jay spouses, accused Marlo Compil who was lying on a couch was
immediately frisked and placed under arrest. According to Jenelyn, Compil
turned pale, became speechless and was trembling. However after regaining
his composure and upon being interrogated, Compil readily admitted his guilt
and pointed to the arresting officers the perpetrators of the heist from a
picture of the baptism of the child of Mabini's sister. Compil was then brought
to the Tayabas Police Station where he was further investigated. On their
way back to Manila, he was again questioned. He confessed that shortly
before midnight on 23 October 1987 he was with the group that robbed MJ
Furnitures. He divulged to the police officers who his companions were and
his participation as a lookout for which he received P1,000.00. He did not go
inside the furniture shop since he would be recognized. Only those who were
not known to their employers went inside. Compil said that his cohorts
stabbed Manuel Jay to death. He also narrated that after the robbery, they
all met in Bangkal, Makati, in the house of one Pablo Pakit, a brother of his
co-conspirator Rogelio Pakit, where they shared the loot and drank beer until
four-thirty in the morning. Then they all left for Quezon and agreed that from
there they would all go home to their respective provinces.

From Tayabas, Quezon, the arresting team together with accused Compil
proceeded to the house of Pablo Pakit who confirmed that his younger
brother Rogelio, with some six (6) others including Compil, went to his house
past midnight on 23 October 1987 and divided among themselves the money
and jewelry which, as he picked up from their conversation, was taken from
Sta. Cruz, Manila. They drank beer until past four o'clock the next morning.

On 28 October 1987, the day following his arrest, accused Compil after
conferring with CLAO lawyer Melencio Claroz and in the presence of his
sister Leticia Compil, brother Orville Compil and brother-in-law Virgilio
Jacala, executed a sworn statement before Cpl. Patricio Balanay of the WPD
admitting his participation in the heist as a lookout. He named the six (6) other
perpetrators of the crime as Jose Jacale, Baltazar Mabini, Amancio Alvos,
Rogelio Pakit, a certain "Erning" and one "Lando," and asserted that he was
merely forced to join the group by Jose Jacale and Baltazar Mabini who were
the masterminds: According to Compil, he was earlier hired by Mabini to work
for MJ Furnitures where he was the foreman.

Meanwhile WPD agents had gathered other leads and conducted follow-up
operations in Manila, Parañaque and Bulacan but failed to apprehend the
cohorts of Compil.

On 12 November 1987 an Information for robbery with homicide was filed

against Marlo Compil. Assisted by a counsel de oficio he entered a plea of
"Not Guilty" when arraigned. After the prosecution had rested, the accused
represented by counsel de parte instead of adducing evidence filed a
demurrer to evidence.

On 2 June 1988 the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Br. 49,1 denied the
demurrer, found the accused guilty of robbery with homicide, and sentenced
him to reclusion perpetua.

In his 75-page appellant's brief, accused Compil claims that "(he) was not
apprised of his constitutional rights (to remain silent and seek the assistance
of counsel) before the police officers started interrogating him from the time
of his arrest at the house of Rey Lopez, then at the Tayabas Police Station,
and while on their way to Manila . . . . (he) was made to confess and declare
statements that can be used against him in any proceeding."2 And, the
belated arrival of counsel from the CLAO prior to the actual execution of the
written extrajudicial confession did not cure the constitutional infirmity since
the police investigators had already extracted incriminatory statements from
him the day before, which extracted statements formed part of his alleged
confession. He then concludes that "[w]ithout the admission of (his) oral . . .
and . . . written extrajudicial (confessions) . . . (he) cannot be convicted
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with homicide based on the
testimonies of other witnesses"3 which are replete with "serious and glaring
inconsistencies and contradictions."4

In People v. Rous,5 the Third Division of this Court held that an extrajudicial
confession may be admitted in evidence even if obtained without the
assistance of counsel provided that it was read and fully explained to
confessant by counsel before it was signed. However we adopt our view in Gamboa v.
Cruz 6 where the Court En Banc ruled that "[t]he right to counsel attaches upon the start of an investigation, i.e.,
when the investigating officer starts to ask questions to elicit information and/or confessions or admissions from
respondent/accused. At such point or stage, the person being interrogated must be assisted by counsel to avoid
the pernicious practice of extorting forced or coerced admissions or confessions from the lips of the person
undergoing interrogation for the commission of the offense." We maintained this rule in the fairly recent cases
of People v. Macam 7 and People v. Bandula 8 where we further reiterated the procedure —

. . . At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer
to inform him of the reason for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant
of arrest, if any. He shall be informed of his constitutional rights to remain
silent and to counsel, and that any statement he might make could be used
against him. The person arrested shall have the right to communicate with
his lawyer, a relative, or anyone he chooses by the most expedient means
— by telephone if possible — or by letter or messenger. It shall be the
responsibility of the arresting officer to see to it that this is accomplished. No
custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of
counsel engaged by the person arrested, by any person on his behalf, or
appointed by the court upon petition either of the detainee himself or by
anyone on his behalf . . . Any statement obtained in violation of the procedure
herein laid down, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall
be in admissible in evidence.

In the case at bench, it is evident that accused-appellant was immediately

subjected to an interrogation upon his arrest in the house of Rey Lopez in
Tayabas, Quezon. He was then brought to the Tayabas Police Station where
he was further questioned. And while on their way to Manila, the arresting
agents again elicited incriminating information. In all three instances, he
confessed to the commission of the crime and admitted his participation
therein. In all those instances, he was not assisted by counsel.

The belated arrival of the CLAO lawyer the following day even if prior to the
actual signing of the uncounseled confession does not cure the defect for the
investigators were already able to extract incriminatory statements from
accused-appellant. The operative act, it has been stressed, is when the
police investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but
has begun to focus on a particular suspect who has been taken into custody
by the police to carry out a process of interrogation that lends itself to eliciting
incriminatory statements, and not the signing by the suspect of his supposed
extrajudicial confession. Thus in People v. de Jesus 9 we said that admissions obtained during
custodial interrogations without the benefit of counsel although later reduced to writing and signed in the
presence of counsel are still flawed under the Constitution.

What is more, it is highly improbable for CLAO lawyer Melencio Claroz to

have fully explained to the accused who did not even finish Grade One, in
less than ten (10) minutes as borne by the records, the latter's constitutional
rights and the consequences of subscribing to an extrajudicial confession.

While the extrajudicial confession of accused-appellant is so convincing that

it mentions details which could not have been merely concocted, and jibes
with the other pieces of evidence uncovered by the investigators, still we
cannot admit it in evidence because of its implicit constitutional infirmity.
Nevertheless, we find other sufficient factual circumstances to prove his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.

We give credence to the testimonies of prosecution witnesses Linda

Hermoso, Pablo Pakit and Jenelyn Valle. We believe that Linda Hermoso
saw the accused and Mabini in the vicinity of MJ Furnitures just before the
commission of the crime. While Hermoso may have contradicted herself on
some minor incidents, she was straightforward on this specific instance —

FISCAL FORMOSO (re-direct):

Q. You said that you saw Marlo and Puti (Baltazar Mabini) together with
Jessie when you were inside the jeep, is it not?
WITNESS HERMOSO:

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Was this before you went to sleep?

A. Yes, sir. 10

Time and again it has been said that minor inconsistencies do not impair the
credibility of witnesses, more so with witness Hermoso who only reached
Grade Two and who as the trial court noted had difficulty understanding the
questions being propounded to her. In fine, in the absence of evidence to
show any reason why prosecution witnesses should falsely testify, it is fair to
conclude that no improper motive exists and that their testimony is worthy of
full faith and credit.

We have repeatedly ruled that the guilt of the accused may be established
through circumstantial evidence provided that: (1) there is more than one
circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proved;
and, (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce
conviction beyond reasonable doubt. 11 And there can be a conviction based
on circumstantial evidence when the circumstances proven form an
unbroken chain which leads to a fair and reasonable conclusion pinpointing
the accused as the perpetrator of the crime. 12

In the instant case, the prosecution was able to prove the guilt of the accused
through the following circumstances: First, accused Marlo Compil and
Baltazar Mabini who are both from Samar worked in MJ Furnitures in Sta.
Cruz, Manila, and were familiar with the floor plan of the shop. Second, on
the night of the incident, they were seen in front of MJ Furnitures. Third, they
were seen going to the rear of the furniture store. Fourth, robbers forcibly
entered MJ Furnitures through the back window on the second floor. Fifth,
some two (2) hours after the commission of the crime, at around two o'clock
the following morning, they were in a house in Bangkal, Makati, dividing
between themselves and their five (5) other companions the money and
jewelry taken from Sta. Cruz, Manila. Sixth, they all failed to show up for work
the following day. Seventh, accuses Compil turned ashen, was trembling and
speechless when apprehended in Tayabas, Quezon, for a crime committed
in Manila. Certainly these circumstances as gleaned from the factual findings
of the trial court form an unbroken chain which leads to a fair and reasonable
conclusion pointing to the accused as one of the perpetrators of the
crime.13 Hence even disregarding accused-appellant's oral and written
confessions, as we do, still the prosecution was able to show that he was a
co-conspirator in the robbery with homicide.

While it may be true that the arrest, search and seizure were made without
the benefit of a warrant, accused-appellant is now estopped from questioning
this defect after failing to move for the quashing of the information before the
trial court. Thus any irregularity attendant to his arrest was cured when he
voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the trial court by entering a
plea of "not guilty" and by participating in the trial. 14

The argument of accused-appellant that the trial court should have convicted
the arresting police officers of arbitrary detention, if not delay in the delivery
of detained persons, is misplaced. Suffice it to say that the law enforcers who
arrested him are not being charged and prosecuted in the case at bench.

Likewise devoid of merit is the contention of accused-appellant that granting

that he had participated in the commission of the crime, he should be
considered only as an accomplice. Disregarding his extrajudicial confession
and by reason of his failure to adduce evidence in his behalf, the Court is left
with no other recourse but to consider only the evidence of the prosecution
which shows that the perpetrators of the crime acted in concert. For, direct
proof is not essential to prove conspiracy 15 which may be inferred from the
acts of the accused during and after the commission of the crime which point
to a joint purpose, concert of action and community of interest. 16 Thus
circumstantial evidence is sufficient to prove conspiracy. 17 And where
conspiracy exists, the act of one is the act of all, and each is to be held in the
same degree of liability as the others. 18

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court appealed from is

AFFIRMED insofar as it finds accused-appellant MARLO COMPIL y
LITABAN guilty beyond reasonable doubt of robbery with homicide.
Consequently, he is sentenced to reclusion perpetua with all the accessory
penalties provided by law.
Accused-appellant is also directed to indemnify the heirs of the deceased
Manuel Jay in the amount of P50,000.00, plus P35,000.00 as actual
damages. He is further directed to return to Mary Jay the jewelry worth
P30,000.00, and if he can no longer return the jewelry, to pay its value.

Costs against accused-appellant.

SO ORDERED.

Padilla, Davide, Jr. and Quiason, JJ., concur.

Kapunan, J., is on leave.