MERERIA, ALDRIN CARLOS NIÑO A.

Criminal Procedure, Block A

Viudez vs Court of Appeals

GR 152889

Facts:
A complaint for the alleged murder of Honorato Galvez and his driver was
filed with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor against 5 identified individuals and
3 John Doe. An additional complaint against petitioner Enrique Viudez II was filed
by Estrella Galvez (widow) for the same crime.
The State Prosecutor found probable cause to indict petitioner and others for
the crime of murder and filed two information with the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan,
which then issued warrants of arrest on the same day.
The petitioner filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings and to Suspend the
Implementation of the Warrant of Arrest, Pursuant to Department Circular No. 70
of the DOJ arguing that all the accused in the said criminal cases had filed a timely
petition for review with the Secretary of Justice and, pursuant to Section 9 of
Department Circular No. 70, the implementation of the warrant of arrest against
petitioner should be suspended and/or recalled pending resolution of the said petition
for review; that denial would be prejudicial to the petitioner’s interest.
The RTC denied petitioner’s Motion stating that 1) said warrant had already
been issued for his apprehension, 2) it cannot be recalled in the absence of any
compelling reason, and that 3) jurisdiction over his person had not yet been acquired
by the court until he was arrested, or petitioner surrenders voluntarily. Petitioner
filed a motion for reconsideration of the said Order but was denied.
Petitioner raised it to the CA through a certiorari with prayer for the issuance
of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction which
was granted, then set aside by the CA finding no whimsicality on the part of the
respondent judge. They raised the matter to the Court.
While pending resolution, petitioner filed a Manifestation informing the court
that the Secretary of Justice has sustained his petition for review; that the State
Prosecutor had already filed with the RTC a motion to withdraw the information
against him and his co-accused; hence, the instant petition may already be moot and
academic.
Issue:
Will a pending resolution of a petition for review filed with the Secretary of
Justice concerning a finding of probable cause suspend the proceedings in the trial
court, including the implementation of a warrant of arrest?

Held:
No. It will not suspend the proceedings nor the implementation of the warrant
of arrest. Petitioner believes that the suspension of proceedings in court, as provided
in the said circular, includes the suspension of the implementation of warrants of
arrest issued by the court. This is wrong.
There is a distinction between the preliminary inquiry, which determines
probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest; and the preliminary
investigation proper, which ascertains whether the offender should be held for trial
or be released.
 MERERIA, ALDRIN CARLOS NIÑO A.
Criminal Procedure, Block A

The determination of probable cause for purposes of issuing a warrant of arrest

is made by the judge. The preliminary investigation proper whether there is
reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense charged is the
function of the investigating prosecutor.
The function of the judge to issue a warrant of arrest upon the determination of
probable cause is exclusive.
The consequent implementation of a warrant of arrest cannot be deferred
pending the resolution of a petition for review by the Secretary of Justice as to the
finding of probable cause, a function that is executive in nature. To defer the
implementation of the warrant of arrest would be an encroachment on the exclusive
prerogative of the judge.
Sec. 9 of the DOJ circular says, “The appellant and the trial prosecutor shall
see to it that, pending resolution of the appeal, the proceedings in court are held in
abeyance.”
Nowhere in the said provision does it state that the court must hold the
proceedings in abeyance. The discretion of the court whether to suspend the
proceedings or the implementation of the warrant of arrest, upon the motion of the
appellant or the trial prosecutor, remains unhindered.
Once a complaint or information is filed in court, any disposition of the case
as to its dismissal, or the conviction or acquittal of the accused, rests on the sound
discretion of the said court, as it is the best and sole judge of what to do with the case
before it.
The cases cited by the petitioner pertained to the suspension of the
arraignment pending resolution by the Secretary of Justice of a petition for review
on finding probable cause. Not the arrest warrant.
 MERERIA, ALDRIN CARLOS NIÑO A.
Criminal Procedure, Block A

People vs Estacio
GR 171655, July 22, 2009

Facts:
Appellant Estacio, Ang and Sumipo were charged with the crime of
kidnapping with murder of Charlie Chua. When the victim arrived at their
rendezvous, appellants boarded the latter’s car. Not long after, Estacio pulled out his
gun and took control of the car; Ang sat beside the victim who’s tied up behind his
back with tape on his mouth; Sumipo was instructed by Estacio to head towards
Bulacan.
Upon reaching a secluded place, Estacio ordered Sumipo to stop the car.
Maritess and Estacio then brought the victim to a grassy place and came back to the
car with bloodied hands. The following day, Estacio demanded ransom from his
mother and reached an agreement of P1,000,000 as advance payment to the
P5,000,000 the former is asking. Six months later, Sumipo surrendered and shortly
followed by Estacio.
Sumipo claimed the Ang was angry with the victim for lending money to her
husband which was used to secretly fly out of the country, and that Estacio was
Jealous of the victim with whom Maritess had a relationship.
Estactio claimed that a quarrel broke out in the car between the victim and
Maritess about a debt to the victim; that he tried to pacify the two, but the victim got
angry at him, prompting him to point a fan knife at his neck; he dragged the victim
away from the car and accidentally stabbed him out of confusion and fear of revenge
from the victim.
Martiess denied having conspired with Estacio; that the victim took issue of
her friendship with Estacio; the three men alighted in Bulacan and returned without
Chua.
The RTC found Estactio and Ang guilty of Kidnapping on the occasion of
which the victim was killed. The Court referred the case to the CA for intermediate
review.
Estacio faulted the RTC for finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt for
the crime and convicting him despite failure of the prosecution to prove the
indispensable elements of detention and lock up.
Ang finds fault in the RTC for discharging Sumipo as State Witness and in
relying on his testimony for the conviction, finding that there was kidnapping with
murder, and not concluding the crime to be plain homicide with Estacio solely
responsible.

Issue:
Did Estacio and Ang commit kidnapping with murder?

Held:
The Court found that the offense of which appellants were convicted was
erroneously designated –special complex crim of kidnapping with murder.
 MERERIA, ALDRIN CARLOS NIÑO A.
Criminal Procedure, Block A

In a special complex crime, the prosecution must prove each of the component
offenses with the same precision that would be necessary if they were made the
subject of separate complaints.
In the case at bar, kidnapping was not sufficiently proven. Although appellants
bound and gagged Chua and transported him to Bulacan against his will, they did
these acts to facilitate his killing, not because they intended to detain or confine him.
As soon as they arrived at the locus criminis, appellants wasted no time in
killing him. That appellants intention from the beginning was to kill the victim is
confirmed by the conversation which Sumipo heard in the car in which Ang said that
a knife would be used to kill him so that it would not create noise.
The subsequent demand for ransom was an afterthought which did not qualify
appellants prior acts as kidnapping
Where the evident purpose of taking the victims was to kill them, and from
the acts of the accused it cannot be inferred that the latter’s purpose was actually to
detain or deprive the victims of their liberty, the subsequent killing of the victims
constitute the crime of murder
No evidence whatsoever to show or from which it can be inferred that from
the outset the appellants intended to exchange his freedom for ransom money. The
demand for ransom appears to have arisen and was consequently made as an
afterthought.
The fact alone that ransom money is demanded would not per se qualify the
act of preventing the liberty of movement of the victim into the crime of kidnapping,
unless the victim is actually restrained or deprived of his liberty for some appreciable
period of time or that such restraint was the basic intent of the accused.
The crime committed was plain Murder. The killing was qualified by
treachery.
 MERERIA, ALDRIN CARLOS NIÑO A.
Criminal Procedure, Block A

Ching vs Nicdao
GR. 141181, April 27, 1987

Facts:
Petitioner Ching instituted criminal complaints for eleven counts of violation
of BP 22 in the MTC. His common law spouse Nuguid also filed fourteen complaints
for violation of BP 22. Both against respondent Nicdao. At her arraignment,
respondent Nicdao entered the plea of not guilty to all the charges.
Petitioner Ching averred that blank, signed, and undated checks were issued
to him by respondent Nicdao as security for the loans that Nicdao obtained from him
which began some time in October 1995. After multiple failed attempts of collecting
the amassed debt of respondent Nicdao, petitioner Ching deposited the checks that
she issued to him. These were dishonored for being DAIF—drawn against
insufficient fund. Petitioner Ching, together with Emma Nuguid, wrote a demand
letter to respondent Nicdao which, however, went unheeded.
Petitioner Ching admitted that he was the one who wrote the date on those
checks when respondent Nicdao refused to pay him. With respect to the
P20,000,000.00 check, petitioner Ching explained that he wrote the date and amount
thereon when, upon his estimation, the money that he regularly lent to respondent
Nicdao beginning October 1995 reached the said sum. He maintained the 11 checks
were for the loan transactions with respondent Nicdao.
Respondent Nicdao stated that she only dealt with Nuguid. She vehemently
denied the allegation that she had borrowed money from both petitioner Ching and
Nuguid in the total amount of P22,950,000.00. Respondent Nicdao admitted,
however, that she had obtained a loan from Nuguid but only for P2,100,000.00 and
the same was already fully paid.
As proof of such payment, she presented a Planters Bank demand draft dated
August 13, 1996 in the amount of P1,200,000.00. The annotation at the back of the
said demand draft showed that it was endorsed and negotiated to the account of
petitioner Ching. She presented and identified several cigarette wrappers at the back
of which appeared computations. She explained that Nuguid went to the grocery
store every day to collect interest payments.
The MTC rendered judgment convicting respondent with 11 counts of
violation of BP 22, and a month later, the other 14 complaints filed by Nuguid. The
CA reversed and acquitted respondent Nicdao which, on even date, became final and
executory.
Issue:
Is the petitioner entitled to appeal the civil aspect of the case within the
reglementary period?
Has the acquittal of respondent Nicdao effectively extinguished her civil
liability?
Held:
Yes. the petitioner may appeal the civil aspect of the case notwithstanding
respondent Nicdaos acquittal by the CA and within the reglementary period.
It is axiomatic that every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly
liable. The civil action is generally impliedly instituted with the criminal action
 MERERIA, ALDRIN CARLOS NIÑO A.
Criminal Procedure, Block A

according Rule 111, Sec. 1 of the Revised Rules of Court. Section 2b provides that
“Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless
the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from
which the civil might arise did not exist”.
The civil liability is not extinguished by acquittal: (a) where the acquittal is
based on reasonable doubt; (b) where the court expressly declares that the liability
of the accused is not criminal but only civil in nature; and (c) where the civil liability
is not derived from or based on the criminal act of which the accused is acquitted.
Yes. The Court ruled that there’s simply no basis to hold respondent Nicdao
civilly liable to petitioner Ching.
First, the CAs acquittal of respondent Nicdao is not merely based on
reasonable doubt. Rather, it is based on the finding that she did not commit the act
penalized under BP 22. The CA found that the P20,000,000.00 check was a stolen
check which was never issued nor delivered by respondent Nicdao to petitioner
Ching. petitioner Ching did not acquire any right or interest over it and cannot assert
any cause of action founded on said check, and that respondent Nicdao has no
obligation to make good the stolen check and cannot, therefore, be held liable for
violation of B.P. Blg. 22.
Second, in acquitting respondent Nicdao, the CA did not adjudge her to be
civilly liable to petitioner Ching. In fact, the CA explicitly stated that she had already
fully paid her obligations
Third, while petitioner Ching attempts to show that respondent Nicdao’s
liability was based from her loan obligations, and not upon the criminal act, Ching
miserably failed to prove by preponderant evidence the existence of unpaid loan
obligations. The Court holds that the existence of respondent Nicdao’s civil liability
to petitioner Ching in the amount of P20,950,000.00 representing her unpaid
obligations to the latter has not been sufficiently established by preponderant
evidence.
It is a basic rule in evidence that the burden of proof lies on the party who
makes the allegations. The proof lies upon him who affirms, not upon him who
denies; since, by the nature of things, he who denies a fact cannot produce any proof.