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The Information Revolution, Security, and International Relations: (IR) Relevant Theory?

Author(s): Johan Eriksson and Giampiero Giacomello


Source: International Political Science Review / Revue internationale de science politique,
Vol. 27, No. 3 (Jul., 2006), pp. 221-244
Published by: Sage Publications, Ltd.
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20445053
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International Political Science Review (2006), Vol 27, No. 3, 221-244

I PSR I RS P

The Information Revolution, Security, and


International Relations: (IR)relevant Theory

JOHAN ERIKSSON AND GIAMPIERO GIACOMELLO

ABSTRACT. The purpose of this article is twofold: to analyze the impact of


the information revolution on security and to clarify what existing inter
national relations theory can say about this challenge. These pertinent
questions are initially addressed by a critical review of past research. This
review shows that the concern for security issues is largely confined to a
specialist literature on information warfare and cyber-security, while
neither the general literature on information society nor security studies
pay any serious attention to information-technology-related security
issues. The specialist literature is mostly policy oriented, and only very
rarely informed by theory, whether from the international relations
discipline or any other field. In this article, three general international
relations "schools" (realism, liberalism, and constructivism) are scruti
nized with regard to what they can say about security in the digital age. It
is argued that the liberal focus on pluralism, interdependence, and
globalization, the constructivist emphasis on language, symbols, and
images (including "virtuality"), and some elements of realist strategic
studies (on information warfare) contribute to an understanding of
digital-age security. Finally, it is suggested that pragmatism might help to
bridge the gap between theory and practice, and overcome the dualistic,
contending nature of international relations theories.
Keywords: * Information technology * International relations * Practice
* Security * Theory

Social scientists and experts on technology generally agree that states and so
the world over are becoming, for better or worse, increasingly depend
information technologies. The development and interconnectedness of inf
tion and communications technologies (ICTs) such as the Internet, email, s
television, and mobile phones are diffusing globally at an impressive speed
Internet is undoubtedly the most striking example. From only a hand

DOI: 10.1177/0192512106064462 C 2006 International Political Science Association


SAGE Publications (London, Thousand Oaks, CA and New Delhi)

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222 International Political Science Review 27 (3)

websites in the early 1990s, the Internet grew to contain several million websites at
the turn of the millennium. Moreover, the costs of producing, using, and
communicating information have constantly decreased, making ICTs available to
an increasing number of people all over the world (Choucri, 2000: 248-52; Nye,
2003: 215-6, 2004a, 2004b). There is still a significant "digital gap," dividing the
haves from the have-nots in terms of access and usage, a long-standing and well
documented problem both within and between societies (Choucri, 2000;
Hammond, 2001; Norris, 2001). Notwithstanding persistent inequalities, the
image is clear: the shrinking costs of ICTs have made them widespread and
decentralized, reaching far beyond the political and economic elites of western
societies.
These observations apparently mark the limit of consensus among informed
observers. The lack of consensus is particularly apparent when the basic question
of the present article is addressed: what are the implications of the information
revolution for national and international security? Some would argue that the
state is still the main player in the field, maintaining (although adapting) its role
as the supreme provider of security, even in cyberspace (Fountain, 2001). Others
claim that the emergence of "virtual states" and network economies imply a
decline of interstate violence, and hence that security generally plays a signifi
cantly lesser role than in previous times. This truly optimistic perspective "sketches
a future with an ever-widening zone of international peace" (Rosecrance, 1999:
24). Still others hold that the information revolution has greatly increased the
significance of firms, interest organizations, social movements, transnational net
works, and individuals. In this vein, these non-state actors may be challengers to, as
well as providers of, security (Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 2001; Castells, 1998: 376;
Henry and Peartree, 1998; Nye, 2003, 2004a, 2004b). The general observation in
this perspective, however, is that the information revolution makes security an
increasingly important concern in all sectors of society.
In 1962, Arnold Wolfers wrote that national security is the absence of threat to a
society's core values. If modern, economically developed countries are
increasingly becoming "information societies," then, following Wolfers' argument,
threats to information can be seen as threats to the core of these societies. The
challenge of the information revolution for security and the state still remains
unexplored, however, both in terms of policy and substantive issues. We argue
that, in general, past research on this topic has been idiosyncratic and policy
oriented, with little or no effort made to apply or develop theory. In particular,
very few attempts have been made to apply international relations (IR) theory in
analyzing the information revolution, an exercise which seems warranted both for
the understanding of the impact of the information revolution on security and for
the development of IR theory.' With this article, we intend to take a step toward
filling this gap.
For most of its post-Second-World-War existence, the discipline of IR was quite
content with itself. The development of IR theory strongly emphasized parsimony
and universality, at the expense of empirical applicability (Wight, 2002). It can be
argued that empirical applicability requires a greater degree of complexity and
contextually contingent thinking than has been provided by the dominant and
more parsimonious IR theories (George and Bennet, 2005). However, whether
theories such as Kenneth Waltz's neorealism or Keohane and Nye's theory of
complex interdependence actually gave an accurate understanding of real-world
politics (that is, external validity) was considered either irrelevant or secondary to

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ERIKSSON/GIACOMELLO: The Information Revolution 223

claims of internal validity (Keohane and Nye, 1977: vi; Waltz, 1979: 6-7; Wight,
2002).
The first major sign of discomfort with this inward-looking obsession with
theoretical consistency came with the end of the cold war (Allan and Goldmann,
1995; Lebow and Risse-Kappen, 1995). The end of the cold war resulted in a major
crisis not only for neorealism (reputedly, the most successful of IR theories), which
had failed to predict and explain that turn of events, but also for IR in general. But
although much has been written about the cold war's end and the associated need
for redefining IR theory, particularly for increasing its external validity, surpris
ingly little has been written about the information revolution and what challenges
this implies for IR theory.
We begin by reviewing three bodies of literature of ostensible relevance for
understanding the impact of the information revolution for security: general
theory and research on the emergence of the information society; the specific
literature on information operations and cyber-security; and, lastly, security
studies, a growing subfield of IR. Subsequently, three main IR perspectives are
discussed in terms of what they nominally have to say about security in the digital
age: realism, liberalism, and constructivism.

Past Research on the Digital Age and Security


When reviewing past research on the impact of the information revolution on
security, the first observation is that the three bodies of literature which purport to
have something to say about this have apparently not been informed by each
other, although they deal with overlapping themes. Theory and research on the
emergence of the global information society say very little about security, and,
when they do, the focus lies primarily on the security of firms and markets rather
than the security of states and societies. There is also a specific literature on war
and terror in the digital age, which typically comes in the form of idiosyncratic
policy analyses, but which does not communicate with the more general theory
and research, and is very weak in terms of theoretical application and
development.

The Digital-Age Literature and its Silence on the Security Issue


It is difficult to ascertain when the expression "information society" first appeared.
In the early 1990s, many observers and journalists in the USA began to write and
talk about the "information highway," especially after US President Bill Clinton's
White House began popularizing the term. Almost accidentally (The Economist,
2002), the Internet became the icon of the digital age, and particularly of
"cyberspace," a term coined by novelist William Gibson (1984).
Marxist sociologist Manuel Castells has been among the first and most influ
ential prophets of the digital age. As early as the late 1980s, he noted that
information had become the major primary resource of material productivity in
the newly emerging "knowledge economy" (Castells, 1989). Crucial services such
as banking, air travel, water or energy distribution relied more and more on
information technology (IT) to function. It was only a matter of time before
information, in the 1990s, would become an indispensable cornerstone for
modern, advanced societies. Castells (1996, 1997, 1998, 2000) dedicated a whole
trilogy to the dawn of a global network society, pointing to the loss of sovereignty

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224 International Political Science Review 27 (3)

by nation-states and the emergence of alternative identities and communities.


From Castells' perspective, transnational organized crime will become the greatest
potential threat to global security.
Castells' view of the effect of changing information technologies is consistent
with the work of IR scholars such as Hamid Mowlana. The study of the security
dimension in Castells as well as in Mowlana, however, is limited to the impact of
ICTs on organized crime (Castells, 1997, 1998, 2000), military strategic communi
cations, and the use of information as "propaganda" (Mowlana, 1997). Mowlana's
work is empirically insightful, but weak in linking the information revolution to IR
theory.
Political scientists have for a considerable time identified the ability to control
information flows as a function necessary to preserve national sovereignty and
boost national security (Agnew and Corbrige, 1995; Anderson, 1995; Krasner,
1995). States have, however, faced multiple obstacles in this endeavor, as the
development and availability of communication means have been a double-edged
sword. In the past, one-to-many communication systems (that is, radio and
television) allowed national governments to reach out to an entire citizenry with
their own message, often with nationalistic rhetoric. Increasingly in recent years,
however, professional media organizations (such as the BBC or CNN), human
rights organizations, and individuals have all learned to take advantage of the
same systems to distribute nongovernmental information, counterclaims, inde
pendent reports, and so on. This international flow of messages and images has
grown at an extraordinarily rapid rate, thus saturating the capabilities of a state to
monitor closely what information goes in and what goes out of its territory.
Moreover, this traffic flows through increasingly integrated worldwide communi
cation systems, which are no longer dominated by national bodies (Camilleri and
Falk, 1992).
As early as the 1970s, the new information technologies were thought to be
likely to increase the vulnerability of states. A report to the Swedish government,
the Tengelin Report (Tengelin, 1981), emphasized the main risks of a networked
society (including dependence on foreign vendors and the threat of hackers'
raids). Currently, most governments are well aware that, through the Internet,
individuals and groups from all over the world can communicate information over
which a single government has little or no control. This information may affect the
attitude of their citizenry vis-a-vis the political and economic structures of their
countries. This is not a new phenomenon, since nation-states have had a similar
experience with radio and television broadcasting. What is different is the
magnitude of information and the multiple entry points that have further
exhausted the capabilities of states and their resources to block the penetration of
that information.
There are two factors that are peculiar to the global information society and are
significant for appreciation of how ICTs have changed the concept of security. The
first factor is the centrality of machines that communicate with each other and the
psychological effects that this centrality implies. More than other machines in the
past, the development of computers has resulted in optimistic visions of technical
solutions to societal problems, or "technological fixes," as well as in feelings of fear
(Volti, 1995). Movies such as 2001: A Space Odyssey, War Games, The Terminator, and
The Matrix are all sagas that depict "evil" computers taking over the world and are
symptomatic of a culturally broad-based and profound fear of technological
development. If the idea of depending on machines can be unnerving, knowing

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ERIKSSON/GIACOMELLO: The Information Revolution 225

that our well-being and safety is trusted to computers that may be required to
make vital decisions is hard to bear. Thus, the psychological dimension of network
society matters considerably.
The most famous computer network, the Internet, has a distinctive character
istic: it is at the same time an infrastructure (that is, the actual computer network)
and a communications medium.2 On the same wires and with the same protocol,
packets transport bytes that represent radically different information: an email to
a friend, details on one's flight itinerary, online multiplayer gaming, statistics on a
municipality's water consumption, or credit card numbers. With the exception of
the last, which, like virtually all financial transactions, would be encrypted, most
other communications are available in public, that is, anyone using the medium
could read them.
When computer networks were proprietary, for example linking together a
bank with its subsidiaries or US strategic command with nuclear missile silos, they
were so expensive that only a very few organizations or institutions could afford
them. Furthermore, they used protocols that authorized only their legitimate users
to be in each network. Today, the Internet has opened up countless communi
cation channels, reduced the cost of networking, and allowed human rights
dissidents to spread their message. The Internet was designed to maximize
simplicity of communication, not security of communication. The price for this
has been the increasing opportunity for criminals or wrongdoers to exploit the
vulnerabilities of the network for their own ends.

The Atheoretical Literature on Information Operations and Cyber-Terrorism


Whether hype or reality, cyber-threats have achieved an indisputable salience in
post-cold-war security thinking, particularly among analysts and makers of defense
and security policy. Critical infrastructure protection, information warfare, infor
mation operations,' information assurance, cyber-terrorism, Revolution in Military
Affairs (RMA) , and similar buzzwords are common currency in policy documents,
defense bills, and security doctrines of the early 21st century. While conventional
forces and military budgets have been generally downsized following the end of
the cold war, the new emphasis on information security and cyber-threats are a
noteworthy exception. In North America, Europe, Russia, China, and other parts
of the world, governments are setting up new units and employing personnel for
monitoring, analyzing, and countering the perceived risks and threats of the
global network society.
The conception of cyber-threats has grown out of the fear of increased
vulnerability and loss of control that presumably is the result of moving from an
industrial to an information society (Alberts, 1996a, 1996b; Alberts and Papp,
1997; Henry and Peartree, 1998; O'Day, 2004). Without the development of global
computer networks and communications, cyber-threats would be difficult to
imagine except as science fiction. Notions of cyber-threats have originated in both
the private and public sphere, among military as well as civilian actors. In the
business community and within the police, cyber-crime has become a particularly
salient threat image. Within the military-bureaucratic establishment, perceived
threats have been framed as information warfare, information operations, cyber
terrorism, and cyber-war. Among computer scientists, technicians, and network
operators, threat images are usually much narrower, with an emphasis on
computer network attacks, exploits, and disruptions (implying an adversary) and

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226 International Political Science Review 27 (3)

on structural vulnerabilities such as software conflicts and other bugs which can
lead to systems crashes (for example, the Year 2000 or 'Y2K" computer bug).
Images of cyber-threats typically involve a very broad range of adversaries and
targets, including both state and non-state actors (Campen et al., 1996; Erbschloe,
2001; Furnell, 2002; Henry and Peartree, 1998; Herd, 2000; Khalilzad et al., 1999;
O'Day, 2004; Polikanov, 2001; Schwartau, 1996; Yourdon, 2002). States are still
typically seen as the single most important type of potential enemy, able to
neutralize effectively the critical infrastructures of another country (for example,
by shutting down telecommunications), but non-state actors are gaining attention
as well.
A study by the National Research Council argues that "Tomorrow's terrorist
may be able to do more with a keyboard than with a bomb" (Bendrath, 2001;
Denning, 2001a: 282).5 Former US Homeland Security Director Tom Ridge
(2002) observed that "Terrorists can sit at one computer connected to one
network and can create world havoc - [they] don't necessarily need bombs or
explosives to cripple a sector of the economy, or shutdown a power grid." Such
rhetorical dramatization is characteristic of the entire discourse on information
security and cyber-threats. The common view is that as societies and governments
are becoming more reliable with respect to information technology, they are also
becoming more vulnerable to all sorts of cyber-threats.
The most cataclysmic dramatization in the literature is that of an "electronic
Pearl Harbor" (Bendrath, 2001; Everard, 2000; Forno, 2002; O'Day, 2004;
Schwartau, 1997; Smith, 1998).6 According to the "electronic Pearl Harbor"
scenario, phone systems could collapse, subway cars suddenly stop, and the money
of thousands of people become inaccessible as banks and automatic teller
machines stop functioning. In such an apocalyptic vision, overall critical infra
structures would be disrupted to the point that society and government would lose
the ability to function normally. The evocative image of an "electronic Pearl
Harbor" was immediately adopted in the US media and in certain circles of policy
makers (Bendrath, 2003). Former Deputy Defense Minister John Hamre argued
that "We're facing the possibility of an electronic Pearl Harbor ... There is going
to be an electronic attack on this country some time in the future" (CNN, 1997).
Some commentators have argued that the "electronic Pearl Harbor" scenario is
highly unlikely, and is more about fear-mongering than sober analysis. For
example, Denning (2001b) argues that cyber-terrorism, defined as digital attacks
causing physical destruction and human deaths, is extremely unlikely.7 Few, if any,
cyber-attacks could be characterized as acts of terrorism. Even the US Naval War
College, in cooperation with the Gartner Group, concluded that an "electronic
Pearl Harbor," although theoretically possible, was highly unlikely: "There are far
simpler and less costly ways to attack critical infrastructure, from hoax phone calls
to truck bombs and hijacked airliners" (The Economist, 2002: 19).
Information operations are seen not merely as a means of improving or
complementing physical attack, but as a means of replacing physical destruction
with electronic (Denning, 1999; Harshberger and Ochmanek, 1999: 12; O'Day,
2004). Denial-of-service attacks and the defacing of web pages certainly can have
material consequences. For firms operating with online transactions, the result
can be huge financial losses.8 Nevertheless, the major impact is symbolic and the
main effect is humiliation. To a large degree, cyber-attacks are attacks with and
against symbols and images. Net-defacing, in particular, is a means for attacking
symbols, something which is being done on an everyday basis by "hacktivists" on

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ERIKSSON/GIACOMELLO: The Information Revolution 227

both sides of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the China-Taiwan conflict, and the
Protestant-Catholic conflict in Northern Ireland.9
Most observers focus on the transnational and network-based character of
cyber-threats (Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 1999, 2001; Deibert and Stein, 2003; Henry
and Peartree, 1998; Keohane and Nye, 1998; O'Day, 2004; Pfaltzgraff and Shultz,
1997). ? Adversaries are typically seen as operating in loosely organized networks
consisting of relatively independent nodes of individuals, groups, organizations, or
even states, capable of quickly assembling and dispersing, even long before an
attack has been discovered. In particular, network actors capable of using such
means can resort to "asymmetric warfare" (Applegate, 2001; Arquilla and
Ronfeldt, 2001; De Borchgrave et al., 2000; Erbschloe, 2001; Herd, 2000; O'Day,
2004; Sofear and Goodman, 2001). Although they might be incapable of engaging
states in a conventional military conflict, they can inflict serious damage by
attacking and exploiting the vulnerabilities of information systems by resorting to
cyber-attacks (Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 1999, 2001; Cordesman, 2002).
The widely acknowledged framing of cyber-threats implies that boundaries are
dissolved between the international and the domestic, between civil and military
spheres, between the private and public, and between peace and war. If taken
seriously, this framing suggests that not only the security of information systems
is challenged, but also, and more fundamentally, the sovereignty of states
(Everard, 2000; Fountain, 2001; Giacomello, 2005; Giacomello and Mendez, 2001;
Rosecrance, 1999). Cyber-threats challenge primarily internal sovereignty (effec
tive control of the national territory and of the people living within it), but not
necessarily external sovereignty (the formal recognition of independence by other
states) (compare Philpott, 2001). At stake are not only the tangible and intangible
values of information, but also the ability of governments to control the course of
events.
In conclusion, while there is a growing body of specialized literature dealing
with the manifold aspects of digital-age security, there is also an alarmist tendency
in this literature. Furthermore, this literature is policy oriented and hardly ever
involves the application or development of theory.

Silence on the Information Revolution in Security Studies


A major issue in theoretically oriented security studies (a growing subfield of IR) is
the very meaning of the essentially contested concept of security. Two contending
positions can be discerned - those of traditionalists and those of wideners.
Traditionalists hail typically from the realist camp and practice state-centric and
military-oriented "strategic studies" (Ayoob, 1997; Walt, 1994). They maintain that
despite the emergence of ethnic and religious insurgence, global terrorism, trans
national crime, and global warming, there is no need to broaden the definition of
security. Allegedly for the sake of conceptual clarity and theoretical parsimony
(Ayoob, 1997; Goldmann, 1999), and arguably because of their underlying ideo
logical priorities, traditionalists continue to approach security from the viewpoint
of the nation-state and interstate war.
Wideners (who represent a mix of liberals and critical theorists) claim that the
security concept should be broadened to encompass "new" threats and challenges,
spanning political, societal, economic, and environmental sectors (Buzan, 1991;
Buzan et al., 1998; Deibert, 1997; Muiller, 2002; Stern, 1999). In addition, wideners
incorporate a range of "new" actors in their analyses, notably nongovernmental

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228 International Political Science Review 27 (3)

organizations (NGOs), social movements, terrorist organizations, private firms,


and individuals. The focus on the individual has spawned interest in "human
security," which also has had an impact on United Nations policy.
Rather surprisingly in light of their broadened perspective, the wideners have
only very rarely addressed the information revolution and its impact on security.
Their expanded security concepts typically cover economic, ecological, political,
and cultural issues, but seldom address the emergence of the Internet and other
elements of the information revolution.
Some traditionalists have addressed the development of information technol
ogy, but only with regard to the technological improvement of military capabilities
(Lonsdale, 1999). Material capabilities have always played a crucial role in a state
centric and military-oriented perspective on national security (compare Knox and
Murray, 2001; Van Creveld, 1991). Intelligence gathering and psychological
warfare (which are part of information operations) are also "material" capabilities
and have always been important elements of warfare. Likewise, technological
revolutions have always interested the military, from the invention of machine
guns and airplanes to the development of radar and satellites. "Electronic warfare"
has been an established concept and practice within the military for several
decades. But for most traditionalists (and realists imprimis), information technol
ogies are merely a new fancy add-on (compare Biddle, 2004; Everard, 2000: 109;
Lonsdale, 1999).
Regardless of the theoretical perspective advocated, there is obviously a gap to
be filled in security studies: to address the impact of the information revolution
for the general understanding of security in the contemporary world, as well as for
explaining variation in security relations and policies across the world.

International Relations Theory and Security in the Digital Age


Realism, liberalism, and constructivism stand out as the main theoretical perspec
tives in contemporary IR. Although overlaps, linkages, and internal varieties are
matters of discussion, they are generally perceived and portrayed as separate
perspectives. Asking what each of these perspectives can nominally say about
security in the digital age will clarify the potential relevance of each perspective,
and may serve as a source of inspiration for further theory building and empirical
research.

Realism
The core assumptions of realism are: (1) the state is the primary unit of analysis;
(2) the state acts in a rational way to satisfy its national interests; and (3) power
and security are the core values of the state. In all versions of realism, the
worldview is essentially pessimistic. Anarchy (absence of central government)
characterizes the international system, which forces states to act out of their
national self-interest (survival). Anarchical conditions tragically lead to the
"security dilemma." Power, measured primarily in terms of military capabilities
and the associated striving for security, is the main driving force in world politics
(Gilpin, 1986; Morgenthau, 1993; Schmidt, 2002).
Kenneth Waltz attempted to turn realism into a scientific, systemic theory of
international politics, with foreign and security policy beyond its scope. In so
doing, he provided a universal and parsimonious explanation of how world

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ERIKSSON/GIACOMELLO: The Information Revolution 229

politics functions, but at the cost of downplaying the real-world relevance of his
theory (Waltz, 1979: 5-7). Mearsheimer, however, endeavors in his most recent
book, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (2001), to fill the gap left by Waltz by laying
the groundwork for a neorealist theory that is not only logically consistent, but
also applicable to the study of foreign and security policy.
In principle, realists do not see a need to revise their theories for under
standing security in the digital age. The state is still seen as the main and
sometimes only important actor. Moreover, a narrow (military) definition of
security is maintained, thus denying that non-state actors may exercise any degree
of (military) power. Realists would presumably tackle the challenge of the
information revolution in much the same way as they have tackled previous
challenges of transnationalization, complex interdependence, and globalization.
These trends are seen as epiphenomena, which may very well affect the policies
and domestic structures of states, but which do not undermine the anarchic
system of international politics, and thus do not affect the primacy of the state as
the supreme political unit.
Realists might consider IT-related security threats to be largely an economic
issue, not necessarily affecting the security of states and not in themselves security
threats. Indeed, there are some realists, or realist-inspired theorists, who generally
defend a narrow, military definition of security, but who argue that if any widening
of the concept should be made, it should be in order to include the economic
dimension (Buzan, 1991; Walt, 1994).
Some realists would likely consider information warfare as relevant, if defined
as a new technological component in otherwise traditional interstate conflict
(Lonsdale, 1999). Psychological warfare has been a central element in military
thinking at least since Chinese strategist Sun Tzu wrote his famous The Art of War
some 2000 years ago.1' Electronic warfare, such as the electronic jamming of radio
communication, has been an element of interstate conflict for a much shorter
time (since the Second World War), but is also a precursor of the much more
recent talk of warfare in the digital age. The introduction of information warfare
in strategic studies and military planning (which generally has been informed by
realist thinking) could be seen as a marker of continuity rather than dramatic
change. Some of the technology is new, as is the global capacity of resourceful
digital adversaries, but the basic notions of attacking and defending information
and information systems are as old as warfare itself - basically, old wine in new
bottles.

Liberalism
Liberalism is a broad perspective which includes, inter alia, Wilsonian idealism
and neoliberal theories (Moravcsik, 1998, 1999; Walker, 1993), democratic peace
theory (Russett and Antholis, 1993), interdependence theory (Keohane and Nye,
1977, 1989), second-image theory (Gourevitch, 1978), the bureaucratic politics
approach (Allison and Zelikow, 1999), and domestic politics approaches (Risse
Kappen, 1995; Snyder, 1991). The most important contributions of liberal theory
to the discipline of IR can thus be summarized as: (1) the emphasis on a plurality
of international actors; (2) the importance of domestic political factors in
determining the international behavior of states; (3) the role of international
institutions'2 in establishing (although not enforcing) rules of behavior (or
regimes) for state actors; and (4) expanding the agenda of international studies

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230 International Political Science Review 27 (3)

(particularly in the subfield of international political economy) by focusing on a


broader set of issue areas than mere "Hobbesian" survival in an anarchic inter
national environment.'3
Liberals agree with realists that states are central actors in world politics, but in
contrast to realists, argue that states are by no means the only actors that play
significant roles in international relations. Indeed, the most prominent change in
recent years in the field of international politics has been the emergence of a wide
range of new non-state international actors (transnational corporations, social
movements, pressure groups, political party networks, migrants, and terrorists).
Thus liberalism has the potential to show awareness of the emergence of new
online groups, operating in chat rooms and "blogs," and through new types of
audio-visual ICTs.
In most liberal readings of contemporary world politics, it is argued that the
sovereignty of the nation-state is being permeated and fragmented by the
development of transnational relations. Though a single transnational actor is
seldom able to challenge the political, military, or economic power of a state, the
increasingly complex and globally penetrating web of transnational relations
perforates sovereign states to the extent that sovereignty is hardly more than a
symbol of territorial integrity which, in reality, is no longer sustainable. Indeed,
some liberals go as far as to claim that sovereignty is a burden rather than a power
asset, as suggested by Rosenau's (1990) distinction between "sovereignty-bound"
and "sovereignty-free" actors.'4
The long-standing clash between realists and liberals in IR has, to some extent,
overshadowed important similarities between the two. In particular, realism and
liberalism share a rationalistic epistemological approach, including an emphasi
on interest-based interaction (Buzan et al., 1998; Fearon and Wendt, 2002;
Katzenstein et al., 1998; Schmidt, 2002). This distinguishes realism and liberalism
from constructivism, and even more so from other "interpretative" approaches
such as post-structuralism and postmodernism. Liberalism, with its emphasis on
non-state actors with transnational capacity and its insistence that the economy
matters as much as security (the former is seen as the underlying element for the
latter), broadens the definition of what international relations is about.
In general, liberalism tends to emphasize the positive outcomes of inter
dependence and interconnectedness, rather than the increasing vulnerability and
insecurity that might ensue. There are two possible reasons for this "optimistic"
tendency within liberalism. First, modern liberalism is influenced by Kantian and
Wilsonian idealism (Duncan et al., 2003: 21-2, 32-4). Emphasis is on the possi
bilities of overcoming conflicts by peaceful means, in particular, by norm an
institution building at an international level. In contrast to realists, liberals believe
that humans are, if not inherently "good," then at least morally receptive.
Modernization, including technological development, is generally seen as a
vehicle of enlightenment and peaceful change. Against this background, liberals
have promoted notions such as collective security, and cooperative security, which,
among others things, have influenced the United Nations, and the Organization
for Security and Co-operation in Europe.
Liberalism has also responded to realist state-centric and security-oriented
theories of international relations by emphasizing the significance of non-state
actors and "non-security" issues, such as trade and travel. Many liberals have
actually taken a realist perspective of security for granted, and have taken a critica
stance against addressing issues labeled "security" altogether. Consequently, the

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ERIKSSON/GIACOMELLO: The Information Revolution 231

liberal critique of realist security thinking has prevented liberalism from


developing its own perspective on security.
This problem has not gone unnoticed. Some liberals have advocated a widened
perspective, which, for example, includes economic, ecological, and human
security concerns. Paradoxically, however, few liberals seem to have apprehended
the challenge of the information revolution. Moreover, those that have are still
silent on its implications for security. The influential theory of complex inter
dependence, initially developed in the 1970s byJoseph Nye and Robert Keohane,
has recently been updated to meet the challenges of the digital age (Keohane and
Nye, 1998; Nye, 2003, 2004b). In this updated version, the costs of interdepen
dence (sensitivity and vulnerability) are added as a new component to the theory.
In addition, the impact of the information revolution on international relations is
analyzed. It is, however, noteworthy that the costs of interdependence are framed
merely in economic terms, and are not portrayed as matters of national or
international security (Nye, 2003: 199-202, 2004b).
Nye briefly observes that national security, defined as the absence of threat to
major values, can be at stake. He does not, however, make any attempt to elabo
rate, critique, or place images of cyber-security threats within his own theoretical
framework. Nye's influential concept of "soft power" is relevant for our topic
nonetheless. Soft power is "the ability to get what you want through attraction
rather than coercion or payments. It arises from the attractiveness of a country's
culture, political ideals, and policies ... Soft power rests on the ability to shape the
preferences of others" (Nye, 2004a: x, 5). Nye argues that soft power is becoming
more important in the digital age than ever before, mainly because of the evolving
multiple channels of global communication which easily transcend sovereign
boundaries (Nye, 2004b: Ch. 7). Importantly, however, soft power is more about
form than content. Soft power and the global ICTs that facilitate it are not simply
instruments of cooperation, democratization, and peace, as Nye and other liberals
would like to have it, but may just as easily be means of deception, propaganda,
and terror.
If idealism and the fear of treading on realist ground by doing security analysis
are removed, liberal theory implicitly provides insight into the nature of security
in the digital age. In particular, it does so by paying due attention to the increasing
plurality and significance of non-state actors, which are "sovereignty free," and to
global complex interdependence, particularly its costs in terms of sensitivity and
vulnerability. Two contemporary socioeconomic trends that are consistent with the
dictum of liberal theory are important for our analysis: (1) the expanding
partnership between the public and private sectors to provide services and (2) the
merging of the civil and military spheres. Because of these trends, the distinctions
in jurisdiction, competencies, duties, and risks that used to pertain to different
segments of societies have become blurred.
Governments have increasingly recognized that they alone cannot provide the
growing number of public services needed by modern societies. The trend toward
public-private partnership and privatization evident in, among others, the health,
education, and transportation sectors has even extended to national security. For
example, in the USA, the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace of the
President's Critical Infrastructure Protection Board of September 2002 relies on
public-private partnership, conceding that "Government alone cannot secure
cyberspace" (PCCIP, 2000: 5). This might be seen as a "civilianization" of the
military or, perhaps, a "militarization" of society. For instance, the recent "war on

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232 International Political Science Review 27 (3)

terrorism" is being waged with a mix of military and law enforcement approaches.
The post-9/11 reform resulting in the new US Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) is yet another illustration. In a speech to the Electronics Industries
Alliance, Homeland Security Director Tom Ridge (2002) argued that the DHS
indeed encouraged interoperability and cooperation at all levels.
The integration and complex interdependencies that follow from the infor
mation revolution are most apparent in the telecom sector. The military has always
used civilian telecom networks to some extent, but, currently, the vast majority of
military communication is transmitted through civilian networks and is indeed
dependent upon them. Computer networks have become incorporated in the
development of hard military power, but they have also become the mainstay of
soft power (Fountain, 2001; Nye, 2002, 2004a).
The question remains, nonetheless, whether a theory that was originally
designed for analyzing actors and processes primarily in a political economy
context can capture the impact of the information revolution on security. Is the
development of global ICTs mainly a continuation and expansion of the trans
nationalization of society and economy which first began with trade and travel or
is it something qualitatively different? Liberal analysts, including Nye, seem to
suggest the former, but the question should remain open for further inquiry and
critique. The inherent bias toward modernism and enlightenment tends to make
liberals emphasize the positive rather than the negative aspects of complex
interdependence and information technology.'5
Cyber-threats and other challenges of the information revolution are clear and
present elements of the more general trend of globalization, which arguably
weakens the sovereignty and security of the state. Non-state actors are becoming
even more numerous and powerful because of the information revolution. The
emergence of the Internet not only made real-time global communications
possible for existing NGOs, but also for new, exclusively online groups. This can
obviously have both positive as well as negative effects: integration, cooperation,
and liberation may be eased, but also terrorism, transnational crime, and the
destabilization of states.'6
The liberal emphasis on a plurality of world actors is perhaps the most valuable
contribution to theory building with regard to security in the digital age. This
theme, however, is still underdeveloped. Arquilla and Ronfeldt (2001) are among
the few scholars who not only adopt mainstream liberal notions of globalization
and other challenges to state sovereignty, but also explicitly address the issue of
actor plurality in the security problems of the digital age. They do so mainly by
introducing and applying general network theory. Nevertheless, they do not make
any explicit attempt to communicate with or contribute to theory. Although
providing a theoretically informed analysis, their writing is most accessible to
policy analysts and policy-makers, rather than to students of international
relations.

Constructivism
In the late 1980s, social constructivism (or simply "constructivism") was explicitly
introduced in the IR discipline. Since then, IR constructivism has expanded
enormously, making a significant impact, in particular, on meta-theoretical
debates, and increasingly on theory building and empirical research in IR.'7 The
breakthrough for IR constructivism came partly from attacking the meta

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ERIKSSON/GiACOMELLO: The Information Revolution 233

theoretical rationalism which is common to both realism and liberalism18 and


partly from providing substantive interpretations of those processes and factors
downplayed by these theories. The end of the cold war implied a crisis for both
realism and liberalism, as both perspectives failed to account for this paradigmatic
change. This consequently opened a window of opportunity for constructivism. In
terms of ontological and epistemological positioning, IR constructivists claim to
have seized the "middle ground" between rationalism and postmodernism (Adler,
1997; Wight, 2002: 36).
Constructivists emphasize the unavoidability of the interpretation (and thus
distortion) of reality, especially with respect to the understanding of social and
political activity. The ambition to uncover causal mechanisms and patterns is,
notwithstanding, seen as entirely compatible with constructivism. Constructivists
maintain that there is a material reality (for example, computers and cables) as
well as a social reality (identities, interests, norms, and institutions), and that it is
meaningful to distinguish between the two. The argument here is that, unlike
material reality, social reality is socially constructed, and so is consequently always
susceptible to change. Thus constructivists argue that social realities such as
interests and identities can never be seen as static or be taken for granted, but
should be seen as constantly produced and reproduced. Rather than asking what
social realities are, IR constructivists ask how social realities become what they are
(Adler, 2002; Wendt, 1992).
Constructivists come in many forms and guises (modernist, critical, and prag
matic) and advocate a very wide range of methodologies and an even wider range
of particular IR theories. Some constructivists focus entirely on states and the
interstate system (Wendt, 1999), while others study, for example, NGOs and trans
national communities (Keck and Sikkink, 1998) and epistemic communities (Adler,
1992; Haas, 1990). Adler (2002: 108, 110) has also suggested that constructivists
should focus more on the individual. In terms of providing frameworks for
understanding world politics, constructivism is clearly much more heterogeneous
than realism and liberalism (Checkel, 1997; Fearon and Wendt, 2002: 56).
If there is anything resembling a core constructivist theorem on what forces
shape world politics or social reality in general, it goes something like this. At the
most basic level, actors have a set of norms - beliefs about right and wrong. Norms
shape identities - the separation of "we" from "them." In turn, identities shape
interests. Importantly and in contrast to rationalism, all of these elements are seen
as inherently dynamic. If interests change, it is because there is an underlying shift
in identities and norms (Adler, 2002: 103-4; compare Ruggie, 1998).
Social factors are seen not only as dynamic, but also as strongly conditional.
Unlike realism and liberalism, constructivism does not aim for universal theory,
but for conditional generalizations (Adler, 2002: 101). Unlike postmodernists,
however, constructivists do not resort to idiosyncratic narrations, but rather strive
to uncover patterns of similarities and differences. What constructivism con
tributes is a pragmatic meta-theoretical stance on material as well as social reality,
an emphasis on conditional generalizations, and a few guidelines as to what
substantive IR theories should include and look at, especially the dynamic inter
play between social factors such as norms, identities, interests, and institutions.
Constructivist security studies have contributed both with elaborations on the
security concept and with more substantive analyses of security policy, as well as
illuminating the relationship between security policy and national identity (Buzan
et al., 1998; Katzenstein, 1996; Waever et al., 1993).

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234 International Political Science Review 27 (3)

When using a theoretical framework based in realism or liberalism, it is more or


less prescribed as to what can or cannot be a security threat. In general, realists
focus on violent actor-based threats (interstate war), while liberals tend to apply a
wider perspective, including both non-state actors and structural threats (compare
Sundelius, 1983). Constructivism, on the other hand, does not take a general
stance as to what can or cannot be framed as a security threat and how such
threats can be dealt with. Constructivism focuses on the verb "become" rather
than "can" or "cannot" (Adler, 2002: 95). Nevertheless, constructivist security
studies tend to emphasize identity and culturally related threats, particularly as
these have been downplayed in realist and liberal accounts of security (Buzan et
al., 1998). The empirical openness of constructivism makes it possible to address
the widest possible range of perceived security threats. In terms of threats to
critical infrastructures, this could, for example, include not only digital attacks,
but also technical collapses and bugs such as the infamous Y2K problem, as well as
natural disasters such as earthquakes and volcanic eruptions.
A noteworthy constructivist approach to security is the theory of "securiti
zation," developed by the "Copenhagen school." This is about how, when, and
with what consequences political actors frame something (anything) as a matter of
security (Buzan et al., 1998; Waever, 1995; Williams, 2003). The emphasis is on
"speech acts" (that is, political language) and the implications this has for political
agenda-setting and political relations. Securitization implies that an "existential
threat" is identified, and that this "speech act" prioritizes the issue on the political
agenda, legitimating extraordinary measures such as secrecy, the use of force, and
the invasion of privacy. The Copenhagen school, while advocating a wide
understanding of security, has not considered the information revolution at all.
Eriksson (2001a, 2001b), however, has studied the securitization of information
technology in Swedish politics. His analysis shows the impact of different frames of
IT-related threats on whom or what is blamed, and who is allocated responsibility
for dealing with the problems. For instance, framing an incident as "cyber-crime"
implies that criminals are to be blamed, and that the police are responsible for
dealing with them. In contrast, the very same incident can also be framed as an
instance of "information warfare," which implies that enemies to a given nation
state (other states or non-state actors) are to be blamed, and that the military has a
responsibility to respond to the threat (Bendrath, 2001; Eriksson, 2001a, 2001b).
In the few additional constructivist accounts of digital-age security currently
available, the emphasis is mainly on how information warfare challenges a multi
tude of boundaries, notably, boundaries of identity. Everard (2000) argues that
information warfare is a particular kind of "identity warfare" in which all kinds of
boundaries are challenged, including the classical domestic-international divide.
Hence, the identity of the nation-state is at stake, although it may very well adapt,
rather than succumb, to the constant penetration of formally sovereign
boundaries and the emergence and articulation of new identities in cyberspace
(compare Saco, 1999).
The constructivist analysis of power and security in a virtual world implies
emphasizing the significance of images and symbols in addition to the material
reality of computers and cables. According to Der Derian (2000), one of many
effects of war in the digital age is that it distances (some) actors from the bloody
reality of war. This distancing is not about rendering geographical distance
irrelevant (for example, the possibility of a hacker attacking a computer in
Shanghai from a computer in Seattle, via a computer in St Petersburg). While not

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ERIKSSON/GIACOMELLO: The Information Revolution 235

discounting the significance of decreasing geographical distance, what we are


rather referring to here is how virtuality affects the perception and conduct of war.
Digital war is similar to computer games, to the extent that simulation is per
formed and perceived in the same way, that is, by using the mouse and keyboard of
a computer. Virtuality thus blurs the boundary between the real and the imagined.
It is no coincidence that the entertainment industry, including the film and
computer-gaming industries with their effects and tactical tools and software, are
also an increasingly important source of inspiration and expertise for the military
(Der Derian, 2000; Everard, 2000).
The study of "symbolic politics" (the use and abuse of symbols for manipulating
political discourse and public opinion) is highly relevant for studying digital-age
security. The symbolic politics approach, first and foremost represented by Murray
Edelman, is a constructivist contribution in social science, introduced long before
the information revolution (Edelman, 1964, 1977, 1985, 1988; Merelman, 1993;
Sears, 1993; 't Hart, 1993). One study has been conducted regarding the digital
symbolic politics of US presidential campaigning (Klinenberg and Perrin, 2000),
yet the symbolic politics approach has not previously been applied in studies of
digital-age security.
Defacing websites is a noteworthy practice of symbolic politics, less antagonistic
than, but nonetheless comparable to, the burning of an enemy's flag. The cost of
mending a website and securing a server are usually negligible in comparison with
the cost in terms of lost confidence, disparagement, and feelings of vulnerability.
Assaults and counterattacks against US and Chinese government websites by
hackers from the respective countries have transpired. Similar digital wars are
going on between Israeli and Arab hackers and between Pakistani and Indian
ones. A symbolic politics approach shows how and why these actions are seen as an
insult, an offense to national pride (or a corporate brand). The Internet could be
seen as the vast new global arena for symbolic politics par excellence.
Constructivist analysis can, moreover, illustrate the function and impact of
language in digital-age security. By making use of analogies to things familiar in
the "real" or off-line world (comparisons to "bugs," "viruses," "worms," and "fire
walls," for example), the abstract and technically complex world of cyber-security
is made intelligible and indeed meaningful. The use of terms such as information
"warfare" and "electronic Pearl Harbor" convey a special meaning: that which is
digital by nature has, nonetheless, physical consequences comparable to those of
conventional war. Constructivist analysis can contribute to revealing and under
standing the significance of such rhetoric and symbolic actions.

Conclusion
In this article, we have attempted to demonstrate the need to develop middle
range theories that integrate liberalism, constructivism, and realism for under
standing the impact of the information revolution on security. The specialist
literature on security in the digital age is policy oriented with little or no ambition
to apply or contribute to theory, and IR scholars have, with few exceptions, paid
only scant attention to the security problems of the digital age. In this conclusion,
we seek to provide some initial guiding direction as to how this gap between
theory and research can be bridged.
Liberalism and constructivism nominally seem to have more to say about our
topic than is the case with realism. If stripped from its idealist and antirealist pre

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236 International Political Science Review 27(3)

tensions, liberalism grasps many of the elements of security in the digital age: the
multiplicity of non-state actors with transnational capacity, network economies,
"vulnerability interdependence," and the consequent perforation of formally
sovereign boundaries. Likewise, constructivism seems apt for analyzing the
symbolic, rhetorical, and identity-based aspects of digital-age security. In general,
realism tackles the challenge of the digital age as it has tackled other features of
globalization - by largely ignoring it, or by subsuming information security to
either political economy or domestic politics, none of which fit comfortably in the
(neo) realist field of vision. There is, however, another possible application of
(classical) realist thought in strategic studies in which information warfare is a key
concept. In this perspective, information warfare is the technological continuation
of classical forms of psychological warfare and, more recently, of electronic
warfare. Yet even in this perspective, the analysis does not go beyond a military
and state-centric orientation.
The foregoing analysis has shown that there are two interrelated problems in
past efforts at understanding security in the digital age. First, theory and practice
on this matter are so distant that they hardly ever inform each other. Second,
existing IR theories are plagued by an entrenched dualism, implying great diffi
culties for theoretical adaptation and application in analyses of the complexities of
the emerging new digital world.
One possible way of overcoming these problems is by adopting a more "prag
matic" approach.'9 While there are several strands of pragmatist philosophy,
pragmatism generally advocates bridge building between theory and practice,
methodological pluralism, contingent generalizations, and theoretical comple
mentarities and tolerance rather than entrenched opposition (Bauer and Brighi,
2002: iii). This seems to be exactly what is needed to bridge the gap between
theory and practice, and to help overcome the dualistic conflicts in academic IR.
There is thus no reason why the scholar trying to understand digital-age security
cannot draw simultaneously on insights from a diverse range of IR theories,
unfortunately often depicted as contending or incompatible, and on insights from
the policy-oriented literature.
The critical reader might wonder whether "pragmatist" is another word for
"empiricist" or, more cynically worded, for "not smart enough for theory"
(Lewontin, 1992). Indeed, pragmatism is more of an orientation, or ethos, than a
theory. This is, however, a necessary first step to overcoming the chasm between
theory and practice, and while a particular theory is not proffered, a fruitful
starting point for the development of theory on security in the digital age is
provided. With such a pragmatic approach applied to case studies and compar
ative analyses, it is possible to build a foundation upon which further theory
building can be done, with an emphasis on middle-range theory and on
conditional rather than universal generalizations.

Notes
1. A noteworthy exception is Millenniums special issue on IR and the digital age (Vol. 31,
No. 3). This issue deals primarily with IR theory and the information age in general,
however. Contemporary Security Studies has also had a special issue (Vol. 24, No. 1)
published on national security in the information age. This special issue makes several
interesting policy-relevant points, but does not tackle the question of what IR theory can
or should say about the empirical puzzle. The same weakness plagues an otherwise

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ERIKSSON/GIACOMELLO: The Information Revolution 237

useful volume on The Information Revolution and International Security, edited by Henry
andPeartree (1998).
2. A possible point that might be raised by the reader here is whether this is not true for
nearly all information technologies. Radio, television, telegraph, and even books and
newspapers are, after all, both infrastructure and medium. This possible criticism misses
the point, however. With the Internet information about the status of the network,
about financial transactions, and about the functioning of other utilities travels on
computer networks along with emails to friends and relatives or messages in "intimate"
chat groups. This is not the case with radio or television. Data on the functioning and
management of a television or radio network does not travel "in clear" (that is,
unencrypted) on the same wavelength along with the morning news or weather
forecast.
3. The US Department of Defense has rechristened information warfare (IW) as
information operations (IO). NATO has also adopted the same definition. IO are
"actions taken to affect adversary information and information systems while defending
one's own information and information systems" (Department of Defense, 1998: vii).
Hence, IO is a broad concept that includes physical means (for example, a precision
bomb or a hammer) as well as digital means (a virus or a "hoax") to fulfill that objective.
If the tools used are digital, then the operation falls into the subclass of Computer
Networks Operations (CNO). CNO are further divided into Computer Networks
Exploitation (CNE), Computer Networks Attacks (CNA), and Computer Networks
Defense (CND). CNO are also divided into nonlethal and lethal CNO. The former
group is much larger and comprises the most diverse actions, ranging from propaganda
and perception management to psychological operations (psychops), denial-of-service
(DoS) attacks on commercial websites, web defacement, espionage, and cyber-crime.
The goal is to control, disrupt, alter, or deny use of information, more than to cause
damage or kill people. The latter class of CNO aims at destruction or disruption of
information infrastructures to provoke economic damage or even casualties.
4. RMA, which depicts a technologically driven change in military strategy, has received
considerable scholarly attention both within and beyond the military. Like most other
work on information security and technology, however, the RMA literature is distinc
tively empiricist (see Goldman, 2005; Goldman and Mahnken, 2004; Gongora and Von
Riekhoff, 2000; Laird, 1999; Matthews and Tredderick, 2001; Sloan, 2002).
5. See also the following statement by US Senator John Edwards (2002): "We live in a
world where a terrorist can do as much damage with a keyboard and a modem as with a
gun or a bomb."
6. This is a metaphor that has been circulating among so-called "infowarriors" since the
mid-1990s, reportedly coined by Winn Schwartau, the creator ofwww.infowar.com.
7. Libicki (1997: 38) hoists a warning against equating the destruction of bits and bytes
with the bloodshed of conventional war and terrorism. To some extent, the edited
volume by Robert Latham (2003) inadvertently suggests that type of association.
8. For instance, in 1994, the Russian hacker "Vladimir Lenin" illegally transferred $10
million from the American Citibank (Cordesman, 2002; Freedman, 2000; PBS Online,
2002).
9. On this point, see, for example, Denning (2001a, 2001b), DSBTF (2001: ES-4), and F
secure (2003).
10. This is illustrated by well-known incidents of cyber-attacks. In 1998, three young hackers
successfully intruded upon hundreds of computer systems with sensitive US armed
forces information. The incident, subsequently dubbed "Solar Sunrise," initially pro
voked fear of a possible information attack by a "hostile nation," supposedly Iraq. Two of
the young hackers turned out to be located in California and the third in Israel
(Bendrath, 2001; Cordesman, 2002: 40; DSBTF, 2001: 2).
11. According to several scholars (Kaldor, 1999; Keegan, 1993; Van Creveld, 1991),
contemporary wars have rendered Clausewitz obsolete. War as a rational instrument of a
state's foreign policy is too limited a concept. Sun Tzu (1963) with his emphasis on

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238 International Political Science Review 2 7 (3)

surprise, deception, attacking weak points, and "unlimited war" seems to be the theorist
of modern times. Clausewitz (a romantic, dialectic, and complicated European) was
much more articulate than many readers might imagine, however. His point was that
war is policy as well as politics. There is no distinction between politics and war; they are
part of the same game. Clausewitz's conclusion is much more apt for modern network
societies than many might expect. As societies grow more and more dependent on
computer networks, they also increase their vulnerability. The artificial distinction
between politics and war (or peace and war) that Clausewitz warned against acquires
new meaning in the digital age.
12. There are a few liberal analyses of regime building and institutionalization concerning
the Internet and other elements of the digital age. Some concern mainly non-security
issues (Franda, 2001; Rosenau and Singh, 2002), but Valeri (2000) and Giacomello
(2005) are exceptions.
13. For an overview of IR liberalism, see, for example, Duncan et al. (2003: 29, 32-4).
14. On this point, see also Keohane and Nye (1977, 1989) and Camilleri and Falk (1992).
15. Liberals would acknowledge that "sovereignty-free" actors include, for example, not
only General Motors, the International Monetary Fund, and Amnesty International, but
also al-Qaeda, the Irish Republican Army, and the Cosa Nostra.
16. An anathema for liberalism is the contagious fear that democratically elected decision
makers cannot provide domestic security, let alone guard state and society against
transnational threats. With his theory of "risk society," German sociologist Ulrich Beck
(1992, 1999) provides a fundamental critique of liberal, Utopian visions of moderniz
ation. In Beck's analysis, the development of and increasing reliance on modern
technologies, such as nuclear power, has the effect of constantly producing new risks. In
this perspective, the focus is on the side effects of new technologies for communication,
energy production, and commerce. In particular, Beck emphasizes the ecological risks
of living with new technologies. Beck is, however, strikingly quiet on the risks of new
ICTs in general, and on cyber-threats in particular.
17. Onuf (1989) and Wendt (1992) are generally acknowledged as two of the original con
structivists in contemporary IR theory. For a useful overview of how IR constructivism
has developed since then, see Adler (2002).
18. Some scholars claim that the gap between rationalism and constructivism is exaggerated
and that it can and should be bridged (Checkel, 1997; Katzenstein et al., 1998). This
controversial argument presupposes, however, that a division of labor is made between
explaining instrumental action (rationalism) based on interests and explaining the
norms and identities which shape interests and thus action (constructivism). Adler
(2002: 108-9) considers this a way of subsuming constructivism under rationalism, a way
of seeing constructivism as merely a background theory of an otherwise rationalistic
approach.
19. Pragmatism is a philosophical orientation developed mainly by American thinkers such
as Charles Sanders Peirce (1963) and John Dewey (1948). Recently, a handful of IR
scholars have tried to restore pragmatism in IR. Millennium (Vol. 31, No. 3) recently
devoted a special issue to this topic.

References
Adler, E. (1992). "The Emergence of Cooperation: National Epistemic Communities and
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Biographical Notes
JOHAN ERIKSSON is Associate Professor of Political Science at Sodertorn University
College and Researcher at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs,
Stockholm. His research interests are international relations theory, foreign policy
analysis, security studies, cyber-security, ethnopolitics, the politics of expertise, and
the relationship between social science and public policy. His publications include
International Relations and Security in the Digital Age (Routledge, 2006), co-edited
with Giampiero Giacomello, and Threat Politics: Newv Perspectives of Security, Risk and
Crisis Management (Ashgate, 2001), for which he was a contributing editor.
ADDRESS: Department of Political Science, Sodertorn University College, SE-141
Huddinge, Sweden [email: johan.eriksson@sh.se].

GiAMPIERO GIACOMELLO is Assistant Professor of International Relations in the


Dipartimento di Politica, Istituzioni, Storia, Universita di Bologna. His research
interests include strategic studies, cyber-terrorism, foreign policy analysis, and
political psychology. He is the co-editor (with Johan Eriksson) of International
Relations and Security in the Digital Age (Routledge, 2006) and author of National
Governments and Control of the Internet (Routledge, 2005). ADDRESS: Dipartimento
Politica, Istituzioni, Storia, Universita di Bologna, Strada Maggiore 45, 40125
Bologna, Italy [email: giacomel@spbo.unibo.it].

Acknowledgements. The research and collaboration behind this article was made possible by a
generous grant from the US Social Science Research Council's program on Information
Technology, International Cooperation and Global Security. We are also thankful for the
support we received from Olav F. Knudsen's research project on power and security in the
Baltic Sea region, and from the Swedish Emergency Management Agency. Many thanks to
all of those who have commented on earlier versions of the paper - too many to list here -
including participants in the panel on theorizing security in the digital age, which we
organized at the meeting of the International Studies Association in Montreal in March
2004. Thanks also for the constructive comments we received from the anonymous
reviewers and the editors.

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