VENUE

MARICRIS D. DOLOT v. RAMON PAJE, GR No. 199199,

2013-08-27

Facts:
petitioner Maricris D. Dolot (Dolot), together with the
parish priest of the Holy Infant Jesus Parish and the officers
of Alyansa Laban sa Mina sa Matnog (petitioners), filed a
petition for continuing mandamus, damages and
attorney's fees with the
RTC of Sorsogon. The petition contained the following
pertinent allegations: (1) sometime in 2009, they protested
the iron ore mining operations being conducted by Antones
Enterprises, Global Summit Mines Development
Corporation and TR Ore in Barangays Balocawe and Bon-ot
Daco, located in the Municipality of Matnog, to no avail; (2)
Matnog is located in the southern tip of Luzon and there is a
need to protect, preserve and maintain the geological
foundation of the municipality; (3) Matnog is susceptible to
flooding and landslides, and confronted with the
environmental dangers of flood hazard, liquefaction, ground
settlement, ground subsidence and landslide hazard; (4)
after investigation, they learned that the mining operators
did not have the required... permit to operate; (5) Sorsogon
Governor Raul Lee and his predecessor Sally Lee issued to
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the operators a small-scale mining permit, which they did
not have authority to issue; (6) the representatives of the
Presidential Management Staff and the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), despite
knowledge, did not do anything to protect the interest of
the people of Matnog;and (7) the respondents violated
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7076 or the People's Small-Scale
Mining Act of 1991, R.A. No. 7942 or the Philippine Mining
Act of 1995, and the Local Government Code.
Thus, they prayed for the following reliefs: (1) the issuance
of a writ commanding the respondents to immediately stop
the mining operations in the Municipality of Matnog; (2) the
issuance of... a temporary environment protection order or
TEPO; (3) the creation of an inter-agency group to
undertake the rehabilitation of the mining site; (4) award of
damages; and (5) return of the iron ore, among others. ...
Referred by the Executive Judge to the RTC of Sorsogon,
Branch 53 being the designated environmental court. Case
was summarily dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Petitioners
filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied in the
Resolution aside from sustaining the dismissal of the case
for lack of jurisdiction, the RTC[11] further ruled that: (1)
there was... no final court decree, order or decision yet that
the public officials allegedly failed to act on, which is a
condition for the issuance of the writ of continuing
mandamus; (2) the case was prematurely filed as the
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petitioners therein failed to exhaust their... administrative
remedies; and (3) they also failed to attach judicial affidavits
and furnish a copy of the complaint to the government or
appropriate agency, as required by the rules. Petitioner
Dolot went straight to this Court on pure questions of law.
Issues:
main issue in this case is whether the RTC-Branch 53 has
jurisdiction... m... whether the petition is dismissible on the
grounds that: (1) there is no final court decree, order or
decision that the public officials allegedly... failed to act on;
(2) the case was prematurely filed for failure to exhaust
administrative remedies; and (3) the petitioners failed to
attach judicial affidavits and furnish a copy of the complaint
to the government or appropriate agency.
Ruling:
... At most, the error committed by the petitioners in filing
the case with the RTC of Sorsogon was that of improper
venue. Special civil action for continuing mandamus... shall
be filed with the "[RTC] exercising jurisdiction over the
territory where the actionable neglect or omission occurred
x x x." In this case, it appears that the alleged actionable
neglect or omission occurred in the Municipality of
Matnog... and as such, the petition should have been filed
in the RTC of Irosin. But even then, it does not warrant the
outright dismissal of the petition by the RTC as venue may
be waived. Moreover, the action filed by the petitioners... is
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not criminal in nature where venue is an essential element
of jurisdiction. A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC: Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases In its Resolution dated October 18,
2011, which resolved the petitioners' motion for
reconsideration of the order of dismissal, the RTC further
ruled that the petition was dismissible on the following
grounds: (1) there is no final court decree, order or decision
yet that the... public officials allegedly failed to act on; (2)
the case was prematurely filed for failure to exhaust
administrative remedies; and (3) there was failure to attach
judicial affidavits and furnish a copy of the complaint to the
government or appropriate agency. Concept of continuing
mandamus was first introduced in Metropolitan Manila
Development Authority v. Concerned Residents of Manila
Bay. He writ of continuing mandamus enjoys a... distinct
procedure than that of ordinary civil actions for the
enforcement/violation of environmental laws, which are
covered by Part II (Civil Procedure) similar to the procedure
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court for special civil actions
for certiorari, prohibition... and mandamus, Section 4, Rule
8 of the Rules requires that the petition filed should be
sufficient in form and substance before a court may take
further action; otherwise, the court may dismiss the
petition outright. Courts must be cautioned, however, that
the... determination to give due course to the petition or
dismiss it outright is an exercise of discretion that must be
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applied in a reasonable manner in consonance with the
spirit of the law and always with the view in mind of seeing
to it that justice is served. Sufficiency in form and substance
refers to the contents of the petition filed under Rule 8,
Section 1: When any agency or instrumentality of the
government or officer thereof unlawfully neglects the
performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a
duty resulting from an office, trust or station in connection
with the enforcement or violation of an... environmental
law rule or regulation or a right therein, or unlawfully
excludes another from the use or enjoyment of such right
and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby
may file a verified petition in the... proper court, alleging
the facts with certainty, attaching thereto supporting
evidence, specifying that the petition concerns an
environmental law, rule or regulation, and praying that
judgment be rendered commanding the respondent to do
an act or series of acts until the... judgment is fully satisfied,
and to pay damages sustained by the petitioner by reason
of the malicious neglect to perform the duties of the
respondent, under the law, rules or regulations.

Principles:
Writ of continuing mandamus is a special civil action that
may be availed of "to compel the performance of an act
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specifically enjoined by law." The petition should mainly
involve an environmental and other related law, rule or
regulation... or a right therein. Continuing mandamus is a
writ issued by a court in an environmental case directing
any agency or instrumentality of the government or officer
thereof to perform an act or series of acts decreed by final
judgment which shall remain effective until... judgment is
fully satisfied.

NOCUM V. LUCIO TAN ARMAND NOCUM and THE

PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER, INC., Petitioners, vs. LUCIO
TAN, Respondent.

Jurisdiction is conferred by law based on the facts alleged in

the complaint since the latter comprises a concise
statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's
cause of action. Objections to venue in civil actions arising
from libel may be waived since they do not involve a
question of jurisdiction. The laying of venue is procedural
rather than substantive. Venue relates to trial and not
jurisdiction. In contrast, in criminal actions, it is
fundamental that venue is jurisdictional it being an
essential element of jurisdiction.
FACTS: •Lucio Tan filed a complaint for damages (moral and
exemplary) for alleged malicious and defamatory
imputations against him in 2 articles of the Philippine Daily
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Inquirer. Petitioners Inquirer and reporter Nocum , and
ALPAP and Capt. Umali, in their respective joint answers
alleged that the complaint stated no cause of action. ALPAP
and Capt. Umali also alleged that the venue was improperly
laid. The complaint failed to state the residence of
complainant Lucio Tan at the time of the alleged
commission of the offense and the place where the libelous
article was printed and first published. •RTC of Makati:
Complaint was dismissed without prejudice on the ground
of improper venue •Lucio Tan filed an omnibus motion
seeking reconsideration and admission of the amended
complaint now alleging that "This article was printed and
first published in the City of Makati" and that “This
caricature was printed and first published in the City of
Makati." •RTC then set aside the previous order of dismissal
stating that the defect in the original complaint has already
been cured in the Amended complaint which can still be
properly admitted pursuant to Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of
CivPro since the Order of Dismissal was not yet final. Also,
the amendment was merely formal. •2 petitions for
certiorari were then filed (one by Nocum and PDI, one by
ALPAP and Umali) but CA dismissed the petition. The
motions for reconsideration were likewise denied. Thus, the
appeal at the SC. After the filing of comment by Tan and the
reply filed by PDI and Nocum, SC resolved to give due
course to the petition. •Contention of PDI and Nocum: Art
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360 of RPC vests jurisdiction over all civil and criminal
complaints for libel on the RTC of the place (1) where the
libelous article was printed and first published; or (2) where
the complainant, if pirivate person, resides; or (3) where the
complaint, if a public official, holds office. Thus, since the
original lcomplaint stated only the business adress of Lucio
Tan and not his actual residence or the place of printing and
first publication, the original complaint failed to confer
jurisdiction on the RTC.

iSSUE:/ HELD: Whether the RTC had jurisdiction over the

case on the basis of the original complaint? YES. RATIO:
Jurisdiction is conferred by law based on the facts alleged in
the complaint since the latter comprises a concise
statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's
causes of action. Here. RTC acquired jurisdiction over the
case when the case was filed before it. Tan's cause of action
is for damages arising from libel, jurisdiction of which is
vested with the RTC. Art. 360 of RPC provides that is the CFI
that is specifically designated to try a libel case. Jurisdiction
is different from venue. (a) Jurisdiction is the authority to
hear and determine a case while venue is the place where
the case is to be heard or tried; (b) Jurisdiction is a matter of
substantive law; venue is a matter of procedural law; (c)
Jurisdiction establishes a relation between the court and
the subject matter, venue establishes a relation between
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the plaintiff and the defendant, or the petitioner and the
respondent; and (d) Jurisdiction is fixed by law and cannot
be conferred by the parties while venue may be conferred
by the act or agreement of the parties. In this case, the
additional allegations in the Amended Complainant as to
place of printing and first publication referred only to the
question of venue and not jurisdiction. They would neither
confer jurisdiction on the RTC nor would failure to include
them divest RTC of its jurisdiction over the case. Tan's
failure to allege these allegations gave the court, the power
upon motion by a party, to dismiss on the ground that the
venue was not properly laid. The amendment was not
intended to vest jurisdiction to the lower court,where
originally it had none. The amendment was merely to
establish the proper venue for the action. Venue has
nothing to do with jurisdiction except in criminal actions.
Assuming that the venue was improperly laid, the issue
would be procedural, not a jurisdictional impediment. In
civil cases, venue may be waived. By dismissing the case on
the ground of improper venue, RTC had jurisdiction over the
case. PDI and Nocum recognized RTC's jurisdiction by filing
their answers to the complaint by questioning the propriety
of venue instead of a motion to dismiss. Objections to
venue in civil actions arising from libel may be waived since
they do not involve a question of jurisdiction. The laying of
venue is procedural rather than substantive. Venue relates
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to trial and not jurisdiction. In contrast, in criminal actions,
it is fundamental that venue is jurisdictional it being an
essential element of jurisdiction.

Heirs of Pedro Lopez et. al. v Honesto C. de Castro, et. al.

GR No. 112905, February 3, 2000
“two applications of a parcel of land”

Facts:
The petitioners filed an application for registration
of parcel of land located in Tagaytay City with the CFI
in Cavite. The Municipality of Silang, Cavite files an
opposition alleging that the land is its patrimonial property.
The petitioners claim that the land is a part of the whole
tract of land as their inheritance sought to be registered
in Cavite but was excluded from their application upon
recommendation of the chief surveyor of the Land Reg.
Office because the land is located in the Province of Laguna.
The motion to dismiss by the Municipality of Silang was
denied by the court due to lack of merit on ground that the
municipality has no personality to intervene because the lot
was outside its territorial limits. And even if it is a communal
property of both municipalities, the incorporation
of Cavite to the city of Tagaytay makes it a property of the
latter. Thus the right to action accrues to
the municipality of Tagaytay. Upon deliberation, the Clerk of
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Court recommended to grant the application with its report
disclosing that since time immemorial, the De Los Reyes
family owned and possessed the land and sold it to the
father of the applicant, Pedro Lopez who later took over the
ownership and possession of the land. Upon his death, his
heirs succeeded over the property and subsequently
partitioned it. The court thus approved the application and
ordered the registration of the land in favor of the
petitioner. While examining the records in the course of
granting the registration to the petitioners, it was found out
that the land was already registered in favor of the
respondents Honesto de Castro. Apparently, de Castro filed
the registration of land in the CFI of Cavite in its Branch IV
in Tagaytay City and a decision was promulgated to issue
the decree of registration in his favor. The said land was
allegedly owned by Hermogenes Orte who sold it to the
father of the respondent by virtue of a deed of sale that was
destroyed during Japanese occupation. His father continued
possession and occupation of the land until his death and
his wife and children continued the possession thereof and
finally registered it in their name. 7 years later, the
petitioner files a complaint for the execution of the
judgment rendered in their favor by the court and
cancellation of title of the respondents and order the
respondents to vacate the property. In their counterclaim,
the respondents interpose the defense of latches,
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prescription and estoppel against the petitioners and
asserting the indefeasibility of their title under the Torrens
System.

Lower court: held that it could not enforce the judgment

against the respondents considering they were not made
parties to the case. Nor can it order the register of deeds
of Tagaytay City to cancel the title of respondents since it
was not also made a party to the case thus the court does
not acquire jurisdiction over it. Further, the court held that
the action brought by the petitioners would be tantamount
to the nature of collaterally attacking the validity of the title
of the respondents.

Court of appeals: Upon appeal to the CA, it re-affirms the

lower court’s decision with emphasis on the indefeasibility
of the Torrens Title while citing the Civil Code provisions on
Article 1544 on sale of property to different vendees where
in case the land has been registered in the name of two
different persons, the earlier in date of registration shall
prevail.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioners can question the validity of

the title of the respondents over the property in dispute?
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Ruling:

The court held that a land registration is an in rem

proceeding which involves a constructive notice against all
persons including the state which is effective through the
publication of the application for land registration. The
court held that when more than one certificate of title is
issued over the land, the person holding the prior certificate
of title is entitled to a better right against the person who
relies on the subsequent certificate. This rule refers to the
date of the certificate of title and not on the date of filing
the application for registration of title. In land registration
proceedings, all interested parties are obliged to take care
of their interests and to zealously pursue their objective of
registration on account of the rule that whoever first
acquires title to a piece of land shall prevail. The publication
made with respect to the application of the respondents
served as a constructive notice against the whole world thus
the court upheld the validity of their title and its
indefeasibility against collateral attack from the petitioners.

Granting that the petitioners did not have actual knowledge

about the respondent’s application to the land, they waited
for 7 more years after knowing that the property was
already registered in the name of the respondents to
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demand for the execution of judgment and cancellation of
the respondent’s title. Therefore the SC finds them guilty of
latches. Petitioner’s petition was denied.

Note:

Jurisdiction issue:

The governing law when the respondent sought registration

of their land was the Judiciary Act of 1948 providing
permanent station of 2 district judges in Cavite, thus the
application was filed before the court in Cavite. This was
later amended providing for the 4 judges to preside in
the Province of Cavite, the cities of Cavite and Tagaytay.
Following the rule on jurisdiction, the court of the place
where the property is located should take cognizance over
the registration of property therefore upon the creation
of Tagaytay City branch of court, the application should
have been transferred from Cavite to Tagaytay branch.
Retaining the venue of the application in Cavite however is
in order since venue is merely procedural not jurisdictional
and may be waived in lieu of convenience to the parties.
The petitioner’s assailing the jurisdiction of
the Cavite branch rendering decision in favor of the
respondent’s title over the property located in Tagaytay
cannot be sustained by the court.
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GENEROSA ALMEDA LATORRE,
Petitioner,
- versus -
LUIS ESTEBAN LATORRE,
Respondent.

The facts of the case are as follows:

In October 2000, petitioner filed before the RTC of
Muntinlupa City a Complaint[3] for Collection and
Declaration of Nullity of Deed of Absolute Sale with
application for Injunction against her own son, herein
respondent.

Petitioner averred that, on September 28, 1999, respondent

and Ifzal entered into a Contract of Lease[4] over a 1,244-
square meter real property, situated at No. 1366 Caballero
St., Dasmarias Village, Makati City (subject property). Under
the said contract, respondent, as lessor, declared that he
was the absolute and registered owner of the subject
property. Petitioner alleged that respondent's declaration
therein was erroneous because she and respondent were
co-owners of the subject property in equal shares.

Petitioner narrated that, on March 14, 1989, she and

respondent executed their respective Deeds of Donation,
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conveying the subject property in favor of The Porfirio D.
Latorre Memorial & Fr. Luis Esteban Latorre Foundation,
Inc. (the Foundation). Thus, Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. 161963[5] was issued in the name of the
Foundation. Subsequently, on September 2, 1994,
petitioner and respondent executed separate Deeds of
Revocation of Donation and Reconveyance of the subject
property, consented to by the Foundation, through the
issuance of appropriate corporate resolutions. However,
the Deeds of Revocation were not registered; hence, the
subject property remained in the name of the Foundation.
Petitioner insisted, however, that respondent was fully
aware that the subject property was owned in common by
both of them. To protect her rights as co-owner, petitioner
formally demanded from Ifzal the payment of her share of
the rentals, which the latter, however, refused to heed.

Moreover, petitioner averred that, on or about August 16,

2000, she discovered that respondent caused the
annotation of an adverse claim on the TCT of the subject
property, claiming full ownership over the same by virtue
of a Deed of Absolute Sale[6] dated March 21, 2000,
allegedly executed by petitioner in favor of respondent.
Petitioner claimed that the deed was a falsified document;
that her signature thereon was forged by respondent.

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Respondent immediately filed a Motion to Dismiss[7] on
the sole ground that the venue of the case was improperly
laid. He stressed that while the complaint was denominated
as one for Collection and Declaration of Nullity of Deed of
Absolute Sale with application for Injunction, in truth the
case was a real action affecting title to and interest over the
subject property. Respondent insisted that all of petitioner's
claims were anchored on her claim of ownership over one-
half () portion of the subject property. Since the subject
property is located in Makati City, respondent argued that
petitioner should have filed the case before the RTC of
Makati City and not of Muntinlupa City.

Ifzal also filed his motion to dismiss on the ground of want

of jurisdiction, asserting that he was immune from suit
because he was an officer of the Asian Development Bank,
an international organization.

The RTC issued a Temporary Restraining Order dated

November 6, 2000, restraining Ifzal from paying his rentals
to respondent and enjoining the latter from receiving from
the former the aforesaid rentals. The RTC also directed both
Ifzal and respondent to pay petitioner her share of the
rentals, with the corresponding order against respondent
not to commit any act in derogation of petitioner's interest
over the subject property.
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In its Order dated January 2, 2001, the RTC denied
respondent's motion to dismiss. The RTC ruled that the
nature of an action whether real or personal was
determined by the allegations in the complaint,
irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff was entitled to
recover upon the claims asserted - a matter resolved only
after, and as a result of, a trial. Thus, trial on the merits
ensued.

On April 29, 2008, the RTC ruled in favor of respondent,

disposing of the case in this wise:

While the case herein filed by the plaintiff involves recovery

of possession of a real property situated at 1366 Caballero
St., Dasmarias Village, Makati City, the same should have
been filed and tried in the Regional Trial Court of Makati
City who, undoubtedly, has jurisdiction to hear the matter
as aforementioned the same being clearly a real action.

Aggrieved, petitioner filed her Motion for

Reconsideration,[13] which the RTC denied in its
Order[14] dated July 24, 2008 for lack of merit.

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Hence, this Petition, claiming that the RTC erred in treating
the venue as jurisdiction and in treating petitioner's
complaint as a real action.

While the instant case was pending resolution before this

Court, petitioner passed away on November 14, 2009. Thus,
petitioner's counsel prayed that, pending the appointment
of a representative of petitioner's estate, notices of the
proceedings herein be sent to petitioners other son, Father
Roberto A. Latorre.[15]

As early as the filing of the complaint, this case had been

marred by numerous procedural infractions committed by
petitioner, by respondent, and even by the RTC, all of
which cannot be disregarded by this Court.

First. Petitioner filed her complaint with the RTC of

Muntinlupa City instead of the RTC of Makati City, the
latter being the proper venue in this case.

Sections 1 and 2, Rule 4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure

provide an answer to the issue of venue.[16] Actions
affecting title to or possession of real property or an
interest therein (real actions) shall be commenced and tried
in the proper court that has territorial jurisdiction over the
area where the real property is situated. On the other hand,
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all other actions (personal actions) shall be commenced and
tried in the proper courts where the plaintiff or any of the
principal plaintiffs resides or where the defendant or any of
the principal defendants resides.[17] The action in the RTC,
other than for Collection, was for the Declaration of Nullity
of the Deed of Absolute Sale involving the subject property,
which is located at No. 1366 Caballero
St., Dasmarias Village, Makati City. The venue for such
action is unquestionably the proper court of Makati City,
where the real property or part thereof lies, not the RTC of
Muntinlupa City.[18]

In this jurisdiction, we adhere to the principle that the

nature of an action is determined by the allegations in the
Complaint itself, rather than by its title or heading.[19] It is
also a settled rule that what determines the venue of a case
is the primary objective for the filing of the case.[20] In her
Complaint, petitioner sought the nullification of the Deed of
Absolute Sale on the strength of two basic claims that (1)
she did not execute the deed in favor of respondent; and (2)
thus, she still owned one half () of the subject property.
Indubitably, petitioner's complaint is a real action involving
the recovery of the subject property on the basis of her co-
ownership thereof.

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Second. The RTC also committed a procedural blunder when
it denied respondent's motion to dismiss on the ground of
improper venue.

The RTC insisted that trial on the merits be conducted even

when it was awfully glaring that the venue was improperly
laid, as pointed out by respondent in his motion to dismiss.
After trial, the RTC eventually dismissed the case on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction, even as it invoked, as
justification, the rules and jurisprudence on venue. Despite
the conduct of trial, the RTC failed to adjudicate this case on
the merits.

Third. Respondent also did not do very well, procedurally.

When the RTC denied his Motion to Dismiss, respondent
could have filed a petition for certiorari and/or prohibition
inasmuch as the denial of the motion was done without
jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.[21] However,
despite this lapse, it is clear that respondent did not waive
his objections to the fact of improper venue, contrary to
petitioner's assertion. Notably, after his motion to dismiss
was denied, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration
to contest such denial. Even in his Answer Ad Cautelam,
respondent stood his ground that the case ought to be
dismissed on the basis of improper venue.
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Finally, petitioner came directly to this Court on a Petition
for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, in relation to Rule
41, of the Rules of Civil Procedure on alleged pure questions
of law. In Murillo v. Consul,[22] we laid down a doctrine that
was later adopted by the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure. In that case, this Court had the occasion to
clarify the three (3) modes of appeal from decisions of the
RTC, namely: (1) ordinary appeal or appeal by writ of error,
where judgment was rendered in a civil or criminal action
by the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction; (2)
petition for review, where judgment was rendered by the
RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction; and (3)
petition for review to the Supreme Court.

The first mode of appeal, governed by Rule 41, is brought to

the Court of Appeals (CA) on questions of fact or mixed
questions of fact and law. The second mode of appeal,
covered by Rule 42, is brought to the CA on questions of
fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law. The third
mode of appeal, provided in Rule 45, is filed with the
Supreme Court only on questions of law.

A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the

law is on a certain state of facts, while there is a question of
fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the
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alleged facts.[23] Our ruling in Velayo-Fong v. Velayo[24] is
instructive:

A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the

law is on a certain state of facts, while there is a question of
fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the
alleged facts. For a question to be one of law, the same
must not involve an examination of the probative value of
the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them. The
resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law
provides on the given set of circumstances. Once it is clear
that the issue invites a review of the evidence presented,
the question posed is one of fact. Thus, the test of whether
a question is one of law or of fact is not the appellation
given to such question by the party raising the same; rather,
it is whether the appellate court can determine the issue
raised without reviewing or evaluating the evidence, in
which case, it is a question of law; otherwise it is a question
of fact.[25]

Accordingly, we find no merit in the instant

petition. Neither do we find any reversible error in the trial
courts dismissal of the case ostensibly for want of
jurisdiction, although the trial court obviously meant to
dismiss the case on the ground of improper venue.

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G.R. No. L-27033 October 31, 1969
POLYTRADE CORPORATION, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
VICTORIANO BLANCO, defendant-appellant.

Plaintiff corporation has its principal office and place of

business in Makati, Rizal. Defendant is a resident of
Meycauayan, Bulacan. Defendant moved to dismiss upon
the ground of improper venue. He claims that by contract
suit may only be lodged in the courts of Manila. The Bulacan
court overruled him. He did not answer the complaint. In
consequence, a default judgment was rendered against him
on September 21, 1966, thus:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of
plaintiff and against defendant ordering defendant to pay
plaintiff the following amounts:
First Cause of Action P60,845.67, with interest thereon at
1% a month from May 9, 1965 until the full amount is paid.
Second Cause of Action P51,952.55, with interest thereon at
1% a month from March 30, 1965 until the full amount is
paid.
Third Cause of Action P53,973.07, with interest thereon at
1% a month from July 3, 1965 until the full amount is paid.
24 | P a g e
1. The forefront question is whether or not venue was
properly laid in the province of Bulacan where defendant
is a resident.
Section 2 (b), Rule 4 of the Rules of Court on venue of
personal actions triable by courts of first instance — and
this is one — provides that such “actions may be
commenced and tried where the defendant or any of the
defendants resides or may be found, or where the plaintiff
or any of the plaintiffs resides, at the election of the
plaintiff.” Qualifying this provision in Section 3 of the same
Rule which states that venue may be stipulated by written
agreement — “By written agreement of the parties the
venue of an action may be changed or transferred from one
province to another.”
Defendant places his case upon Section 3 of Rule 4 just
quoted. According to defendant, plaintiff and defendant, by
written contracts covering the four causes of action,
stipulated that: “The parties agree to sue and be sued in the
Courts of Manila.” This agreement is valid.3 Defendant says
that because of such covenant he can only be sued in the
courts of Manila. We are thus called upon to shake meaning
from the terms of the agreement just quoted.
But first to the facts. No such stipulation appears in the
contracts covering the first two causes of action. The
general rule set forth in Section 2 (b), Rule 4, governs, and
25 | P a g e
as to said two causes of action, venue was properly laid in
Bulacan, the province of defendant’s residence.
The stipulation adverted to is only found in the agreements
covering the third and fourth causes of action. An accurate
reading, however, of the stipulation, “The parties agree to
sue and be sued in the Courts of Manila,” does not preclude
the filing of suits in the residence of plaintiff or defendant.
The plain meaning is that the parties merely consented to
be sued in Manila. Qualifying or restrictive words which
would indicate that Manila and Manila alone is the venue
are totally absent therefrom. We cannot read into that
clause that plaintiff and defendant bound themselves to file
suits with respect to the last two transactions in question
only or exclusively in Manila. For, that agreement did not
change or transfer venue. It simply is permissive. The
parties solely agreed to add the courts of Manila as
tribunals to which they may resort. They did not waive their
right to pursue remedy in the courts specifically mentioned
in Section 2(b) of Rule 4. Renuntiatio non praesumitur.
Illuminating on this point is Engel vs. Shubert Theatrical Co.,
151 N.Y.S. 593, 594. And this, became there the stipulation
as to venue is along lines similar to the present. Said
stipulation reads: “In case of dispute, both contracting
parties agree to submit to the jurisdiction of the Vienna
courts.” And the ruling is: “By the clause in question the
parties do not agree to submit their disputes to the
26 | P a g e
jurisdiction of the Viennese court, and to those courts only.
There is nothing exclusive in the language used. They do
agree to submit to the Viennese jurisdiction, but they say
not a word in restriction of the jurisdiction of courts
elsewhere; and whatever may be said on the subject of the
legality of contracts to submit controversies to courts of
certain jurisdictions exclusively, it is entirely plain that such
agreements should be strictly construed, and should not be
extended by implication.”
Venue here was properly laid.

UNIMASTERS CONGLOMERATION, INC. vs.COURT OF

APPEALS

FACTS: Kubota Agri-Machinery Philippines, Inc. and

Unimasters Conglomeration, Inc. entered into a Dealership
Agreement for Sales and Services of the former's products
in Samar and Leyte Provinces.
The Agreement contained a stipulation that “All suits arising
out of this Agreement shall be filed with the proper Court of
Quezon City.”
Five years later, Unimasters filed an action in the RTC of
Tacloban against Kubota, Reynaldo Go and Metrobank for
damages and breach of contracts, and injunction with
prayer for temporary restraining order. Kubota filed two
motions, one for the dismissal of the case on the ground of
27 | P a g e
improper venue, the other prayed for the transfer of the
injunction hearing because its counsel is unavailable on the
given date. The court issued an order allowing the issuance
of preliminary injunction. Also, said court denied the
motion to dismiss on the reason that Unimasters’ place of
business is in Tacloban City while Kubota’s principal place of
business is in Quezon City. In accordance with the Rules of
Court, the proper venue would either be Quezon City or
Tacloban City at the election of the plaintiff. Hence, the
filing in the RTC of Tacloban is proper. Kubota appealed to
both orders on the grounds they were issued with grave
abuse of discretion in a special action for certiorari and
prohibition filed with the CA. Kubota asserted that RTC of
Tacloban had no jurisdiction was improperly laid.
The Court of Appeals decided in favor of Kubota and it held
that: “the stipulation respecting venue in
its Dealership Agreement with Unimasters did in truth limit
the venue of all suits arising thereunder only and exclusively
to the proper courts of Quezon City.
Subsequently, Unimasters filed a motion for
reconsideration, but was turned down by the appellate
court.

ISSUE: Whether the venue stipulated in the contract has the

effect of limiting the venue to a specified place.

28 | P a g e
HELD: NO. The Polytrade doctrine was applied in the case at
bar. This doctrine enunciated that as long as the stipulation
does not set forth qualifying or restrictive words to indicate
that the agreed place alone and none other is the venue of
the action, the parties do not lose the option of choosing
the venue. According to the court, in the absence of
qualifying or restrictive words, venue stipulations in a
contract should be considered merely as agreement on
additional forum, not as limiting venue to the specified
place. Unless the parties make it clear, by employing
categorical and suitably limiting language, that they wish
the venue of actions between them be laid only and
exclusively at a definite place, and to disregard the
prescriptions of Rule 4, agreements on venue are not to be
regarded as mandatory or restrictive, but merely
permissive, or complementary of said rule. In light of all the
cases surveyed, and the general postulates distilled
therefrom, the question should receive a negative answer.
Absent additional words and expressions definitely and
unmistakably denoting the parties' desire and intention that
actions between them should be ventilated only at the
place selected by them, Quezon City -- or other contractual
provisions clearly evincing the same desire and intention --
the stipulation should be construed, not as confining suits
between the parties only to that one place, Quezon City,
but as allowing suits either in Quezon City or Tacloban City,
29 | P a g e
at the option of the plaintiff. Kubota's theory that the RTC
had no jurisdiction considering that the venue was
improperly laid is not an accurate statement of legal
principle. It equates venue with jurisdiction; but venue has
nothing to do with jurisdiction, except in criminal actions.
This is fundamental. The action at bar, for the recovery of
damages in an amount considerably in excess of
P20,000.00, is assuredly within the jurisdiction of a Regional
Trial Court. Assuming that venue was improperly laid in the
Court where the action was instituted, the Tacloban City
RTC, that would be a procedural, not a jurisdictional
impediment -- precluding ventilation of the case before that
Court of wrong venue notwithstanding that the subject
matter is within its jurisdiction. However, if the objection to
venue is waived by the failure to set it up in a motion to
dismiss, the RTC would proceed in perfectly regular fashion
if it then tried and decided the action

GOCHAN VS. GOCHAN

FACTS:

• Respondents were stockholders of the Felix Gochan and

Sons Realty Corporation and the Mactan Realty
Development Corporation. Respondents offered to sell
their shares in the two corporations to the individual
30 | P a g e
 petitioners in consideration of the sum of
P200,000,000:00. Petitioners accepted and paid the said
amount to respondents.
• Respondents, through Crispo Gochan, Jr., required
individual petitioners to execute a "promissory note. The
former drafted the promissory note in his own
handwriting and had the same signed by the petitioners.
Unbeknown to petitioners, Crispo Gochan, Jr. inserted in
the "promissory note" a phrase that says, "Said amount is
in partial consideration of the sale."6
• Respondents filed a complaint against petitioners
for specific performance and damages alleging that the
petitioners that offered to buy their shares of stock,in
consideration of P200M and multiple properties.
Accordingly, respondents claimed that they are entitled to
the conveyance of the properties, in addition to the
amount of P200,000,000.00, which they acknowledge to
have received from petitioners plus damages.
• Petitioners filed their answer, raising the
following affirmative defences one of which is the lack of
jurisdiction by the trial court for non-payment of the
correct docket fees;
• Trial court ruled in favor of the defendants. It cited that
respondents paid the necessary filing and docket fees of
at least P165K.
31 | P a g e
• MR denied. Petition for certiorari with CA dismissed. MR
denied. Hence this petition.
ISSUE:
• Did the respondent filed and paid the necessary docket
fees to warrant court’s jurisdiction?
• What is the real nature of the case?
• What should be the basis for the assessment of the
correct docket fees?
RULING:
• NO
• Real action not specific performance
• Assessed value of the property, or the estimated value
The rule is well-settled that the court acquires jurisdiction
over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed
docket fees. In the case of Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. (SIOL)
v. Asuncion,12 this Court held that it is not simply the filing
of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the
payment of the prescribed docket fee that vests a trial court
with jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the
action.
Petitioners, that the complaint is in the nature of a real
action which affects title to real properties; hence,
respondents should have alleged therein the value of the

32 | P a g e
real properties which shall be the basis for the assessment
of the correct docket fees.
It is necessary to determine the true nature of the
complaint in order to resolve the issue of whether or not
respondents paid the correct amount of docket fees
therefor. In this jurisdiction, the dictum adhered to is that
the nature of an action is determined by the allegations in
the body of the pleading or complaint itself, rather than by
its title or heading. The caption of the complaint below was
denominated as one for "specific performance and
damages." The relief sought, however, is the conveyance or
transfer of real property, or ultimately, the execution of
deeds of conveyance in their favor of the real properties
enumerated in the provisional memorandum of agreement.
Under these circumstances, the case below was actually a
real action, affecting as it does title to or possession of real
property.
Real action is one where the plaintiff seeks the recovery of
real property or, as indicated in section 2(a) of Rule 4 (now
Section 1, Rule 4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure), a real
action is an action affecting title to or recovery of
possession of real property.
In the case at bar, therefore, the complaint filed with the
trial court was in the nature of a real action, although
ostensibly denominated as one for specific performance.

33 | P a g e
Consequently, the basis for determining the correct docket
fees shall be the assessed value of the property, or the
estimated value thereof as alleged by the claimant
We are not unmindful of our pronouncement in the case
of Sun Insurance, to the effect that in case the filing of the
initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the
docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a
reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable
prescriptive period. However, the liberal interpretation of
the rules relating to the payment of docket fees as applied
in the case of Sun Insurance cannot apply to the instant case
as respondents have never demonstrated any willingness to
abide by the rules and to pay the correct docket fees.
Instead, respondents have stubbornly insisted that the case
they filed was one for specific performance and damages
and that they actually paid the correct docket fees therefor
at the time of the filing of the complaint.

SPOUSES TEODORO AND ROSARIO SARAZA AND

FERNANDO SARAZA VS. WILLIAM FRANCISCO

** Same; Same; Actions; Venue; Section 2 Rule 4 of the

Rules of Court provides that personal actions „may be
commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of the
principal plaintiffs resides or where the defendantor any of

34 | P a g e
the principal defendants resides or in the case of a non-
residentdefendant where he may be found, at the election of
the plaintiff.
Section2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court then governs the
venue for therespondentÊs action. It provides that personal
actions „may be commencedand tried where the plaintiff or
any of the principal plaintiffs resides, orwhere the defendant
or any of the principal defendants resides, or in thecase of a
non-resident defendant where he may be found, at the
electionof the plaintiff.‰ Considering the respondentÊs
statement in his complaintthat he resides in Imus, Cavite,
the filing of his case with the RTC of Imus was proper.

FACTS: A complaint filed by William Francisco (respondent)

against Fernando Saraza (Fernando) and Spouses Teodoro
and Rosario (Rosario) Saraza (Spouses Saraza) (petitioners).
The respondent alleged in his complaint that on September
1, 1999, he and Fernando executed an Agreement that
provided for the latter’s sale of his 100-square meter share
in a lot situated in Bangkal, Makati City,, for a total
consideration of ₱3,200,000.00.
The amount of ₱1,200,000.00 was paid upon the
Agreement’s execution, while the balance of ₱2,000,000.00
was to be paid on installments to the Philippine National
Bank (PNB), to cover a loan of Spouses Saraza, Fernando’s
parents, with the bank. A final deed of sale conveying the
35 | P a g e
property was to be executed by Fernando upon full
payment of the PNB loan.
It was also agreed upon that should Spouses Teodoro and
Rosario (Rosario) Saraza (Spouses Saraza) (petitioners). fail
for any reason to transfer the subject property to the
respondent’s name, Rosario and Fernando’s property
covered by encumbered to PNB to secure the loan that was
to be paid by the respondent shall be considered a
collateral in favor of the respondent. Spouses Saraza
signified their conformity to the Agreement.
When the remaining balance of the PNB loan reached
₱226,582.13, the respondent asked for the petitioners’
issuance of a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) that would
authorize him to receive from PNB the owner’s duplicate
copy of TCT upon full payment of the loan. The petitioners
denied the request.
Upon inquiry from PNB, the respondent found out that the
petitioners had instead executed an Amended Authority,
which provided that the owner’s copy of TCT should be
returned to the mortgagors upon full payment of the loan.
Spouses Saraza also caused the eviction of the respondent
from the property covered by TCT.
These prompted the respondent to institute the civil case
for specific performance, sum of money and damages with
the RTC of Imus, Cavite.
The Ruling of the RTC
36 | P a g e
RTC rendered a Decision in favor of the respondent. The
RTC considered the contents of the Agreement executed by
the parties, taking into account that it was a notarized
document.
ordering [petitioner] Fernando M. Saraza as follows, viz:
1. to EXECUTE a Deed of Absolute Sale covering the 100-
square meter parcel of land located in Barangay Bangkal,
City of Makati and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 220530 of the Registry of Deeds of Makati in favor of
[respondent] William Francisco pursuant to their
Agreement dated 01 September 1999;
2. to DELIVER to [respondent] William Francisco the
Owner’s Copy of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 220530
covering the 100-square meter parcel of land located in
Barangay Bangkal, City of Makati which is subject of the
Deed of Absolute Sale; and
3. to PAY all taxes imposable by law for the transfer of the
title in the name of [respondent], pursuant to the parties’
AGREEMENT dated 1 September 1999;
4. to PAY [respondent] William Francisco the following:
4.1 One Hundred Thousand Pesos (Php 100,000.00) as and
by way of damages;
4.2 One Hundred Seventy-Seven Thousand Pesos (Php
177,000.00) as and by way of attorney’s fees; and
4.3 the costs of suit.

37 | P a g e
Dissatisfied, Fernando questioned the RTC Decision before
the CA.
In addition to the defenses which he raised during the
proceedings before the RTC, he argued that the RTC of Imus
lacked jurisdiction over the case as it involved an
adjudication of ownership of a property situated in Makati
City.
The Ruling of the CA
The CA affirmed the RTC rulings..
On the issue of jurisdiction, the CA cited Fernando’s failure
to seasonably file before the lower court a motion to dismiss
stating that the action should have been filed in Makati City.
More importantly, the Court explained that the case was a
personal action since it did not involve a claim of ownership
of the subject property, but only sought Fernando’s
execution of a deed of sale in the respondent’s favor. Thus,
the venue for the action was the residence of the plaintiff or
the defendant, at the plaintiff’s option.
Petitioner Fernando’s Motion for Reconsideration was
denied by the CA.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE: WON THE VENUE OF THE ACTION IS RTC MAKATI OR
RTC IMUS, CAVITE?
RULING: Venue of an Action for Specific Performance

38 | P a g e
As to the issue of venue, the petitioners’ argument that the
action should have been instituted with the RTC of Makati
City, and not the RTC of Imus, Cavite, is misplaced.
The suit was still essentially for specific performance, a
personal action, because it sought Fernando’s execution of a
deed of absolute sale based on a contract which he had
previously made.
Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court then governs the
venue for the respondent’s action. It provides that personal
actions "may be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or
any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the
defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, or in
the case of a non-resident defendant where he may be
found, at the election of the plaintiff."
Considering the respondent’s statement in his complaint
that he resides in Imus, Cavite, the filing of his case with the
RTC of Imus was proper.

Emergency Loan Pawnshop Incorporated vs. Court of

Appeals,
Civil Procedure ; Actions ; Venue ;
An action affecting title to real property, or for recovery of,
or foreclosure of mortgage on real property, shall be
commenced and tried in the proper court having jurisdiction

39 | P a g e
over the area where the real property or any part thereof
lies.
The motion of respondent TRB was well founded because
venue was clearly improperly laid. The action in the Regional
Trial Court was for annulment of sale involving a parcel of
land located at Km. 3 Asin Road, Baguio City. The venue of
such action is unquestionably within the territorial
jurisdiction of the proper court where the real property or
part thereof lies. An action affecting title to real property, or
for recovery of, or foreclosure of mortgage on real property,
shall be commenced and tried in the proper court having
jurisdiction over the area where the real property or any
part thereof lies.
On January 18, 1996, Traders Royal Bank (TRB for brevity)
sold in favor of petitioner Emergency Loan Pawnshop
Incorporated (ELPI for brevity) a parcel of land located at
Km. 3 Asin, Baguio City for Five Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P500,000.00).
At the time of the sale, TRB misrepresented to ELPI that the
subject property was a vacant residential lot without any
illegal occupants or squatters, when it truth the subject
property was dominantly a public road with only 140 square
meters usable area.

40 | P a g e
ELPI, after having spent to fully ascertain the actual
condition of the property, demanded from TRB the
rescission and cancellation of the sale of the property.
TRB refused, hence, on April 16, 1996, ELPI filed with the
Regional Trial Court, Davao, for annulment of sale and
damages against TRB.
TRB filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint on the ground
of improper venue.
The trial court denied the motion to dismiss.
TRB filed a motion for reconsideration, the trial court
denied the motion.7
TRB elevated the case to the Court of Appeals by petition
for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction or
temporary restraining order, contending that the trial court
committed a grave abuse of discretion in denying its motion
to dismiss the complaint on the ground of improper venue.
The Court of Appeals promulgated its decision, REVERSING
THE DECISION OF THE RTC on ground of improper venue.”9
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: WON DISMISSAL WAS VALID ON THE GROUND OF
IMPROPER VENUE?

41 | P a g e
In the case at bar, the trial court erred grievously amounting
to ousting itself of jurisdiction. The motion of respondent
TRB was well founded because venue was clearly improperly
laid. The action in the Regional Trial Court was for
annulment of sale involving a parcel of land located at Km. 3
Asin Road, Baguio City.
The venue of such action is unquestionably within the
territorial jurisdiction of the proper court where the real
property or part thereof lies.
IN THE CASE AT BAR THE PROPERTY WAS LOCATED IN
BAGUIO BUT THE COM[PLAINT WAS FILED IN RTC DAVA0
The Regional Trial Court has committed a palpable and
grievous error amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
denying the motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground
of improper venue.
An action affecting title to real property, or for recovery of,
or foreclosure of mortgage on real property, shall be
commenced and tried in the proper court having jurisdiction
over the area where the real property or any part thereof
lies (BAGUIO CITY)
Pacific Consultants International Asia, Inc. and Jens Peter
Henrichsen v. Klaus Schonfeld G.R. 166920

42 | P a g e
FACTS:

Respondent is a Canadian citizen and was a resident of New

Westminster, British Columbia, Canada. He had been a
consultant in the field of environmental engineering and
water supply and sanitation.

Pacicon Philippines, Inc. (PPI) is a corporation duly

established and incorporated in accordance with the laws of
the Philippines. The primary purpose of PPI was to engage
in the business of providing specialty and technical services
both in and out of the Philippines.

It is a subsidiary of Pacific Consultants International of Japan

(PCIJ). The president of PPI, Jens Peter Henrichsen, who was
also the director of PCIJ, was based in Tokyo, Japan.

In 1997, PCIJ decided to engage in consultancy services for

water and sanitation in the Philippines. In October 1997,
respondent was employed by PCIJ, as Sector Manager of PPI
in its Water and Sanitation Department. However, PCIJ
assigned him as PPI sector manager in the Philippines. His
salary was to be paid partly by PPI and PCIJ.

Under the employment contract reads

43 | P a g e
Section 21 of the General Conditions of Employment
appended to the letter of employment reads:

21 Arbitration

Any question of interpretation, understanding or fulfillment

of the conditions of employment, as well as any question
arising between the Employee and the Company which is in
consequence of or connected with his employment with the
Company and which can not be settled amicably, is to be
finally settled, binding to both parties through written
submissions, by the Court of Arbitration in London.5

Respondent arrived in the Philippines and assumed his

position as PPI Sector Manager. He was accorded the status
of a resident alien.

PPI applied for an Alien Employment Permit (Permit) for

respondent before the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE). The DOLE granted the application and
issued the Permit to respondent.

On May 5, 1999, respondent received a letter from

Henrichsen informing him that his employment had been
terminated effective August 4, 1999 for the reason that PCIJ

44 | P a g e
and PPI had not been successful in the water and sanitation
sector in the Philippines.

Respondent filed with PPI several money claims, including

unpaid salary, leave pay, air fare from Manila to Canada,
and cost of shipment of goods to Canada. PPI partially
settled some of his claims (US$5,635.99), but refused to pay
the rest.

Respondent filed a Complaint for Illegal Dismissal against

petitioners PPI and Henrichsen with the Labor Arbiter.
(NLRC)

In his Complaint, respondent alleged that he was illegally

dismissed; PPI had not notified the DOLE of its decision to
close one of its departments, which resulted in his
dismissal; Respondent also claimed for separation pay and
other unpaid benefits. He alleged that the company acted in
bad faith and disregarded his rights. He prayed for the
following reliefs:

Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint on the

following grounds: (1) the Labor Arbiter had no jurisdiction
over the subject matter; and (2) venue was improperly laid.
It averred that respondent was a Canadian citizen, a
transient expatriate who had left the Philippines. He was
45 | P a g e
employed and dismissed by PCIJ, a foreign corporation with
principal office in Tokyo, Japan.

Since respondent’s cause of action was based on his letter of

employment executed in Tokyo, Japan dated January 7,
1998, under the principle of lex loci contractus, the
complaint should have been filed in Tokyo, Japan.

Moreover, under Section 12 of the General Conditions of

Employment appended to the letter of employment dated
January 7, 1998, complainant and PCIJ had agreed that any
employment-related dispute should be brought before the
London Court of Arbitration. hENCE, pHILIPPINE COURT HAS
NO JURISDICTION

The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint.

The Labor Arbiter found, that the contract of employment

between respondent and PCIJ was controlling; the
Philippines was only the "duty station" where Schonfeld
was required to work under the General Conditions of
Employment.

PCIJ remained respondent’s employer despite his having

been sent to the Philippines. Since the parties had agreed
that any differences regarding employer-employee
46 | P a g e
relationship should be submitted to the jurisdiction of the
court of arbitration in London, this agreement is controlling.

On appeal, the NLRC agreed with the disquisitions of the

Labor Arbiter

Respondent then filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65

with the CA

The CA reversed the decision of LA NLRC. Applying the four-

fold test21 of determining an employer-employee
relationship, the CA declared that respondent was an
employee of PPI.

On the issue of venue, the appellate court declared that,

even under the January 7, 1998 contract of employment,
the parties were not precluded from bringing a case related
thereto in other venues.

While there was, indeed, an agreement that issues between

the parties were to be resolved in the London Court of
Arbitration, the venue is not exclusive, since there is no
stipulation that the complaint cannot be filed in any other
forum other than in the Philippines.

47 | P a g e
A motion for the reconsideration of the above decision was
filed by PPI and Henrichsen, which the appellate court
denied for lack of merit.

ISSUE: WON LABOR ARBITER HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE

RESPONDENT

RULING: YES PHILIPPINE COURTS (LA-NLRC) HAS

JURISDICTION

The settled rule on stipulations regarding venue, as held by

this Court in the vintage case of Philippine Banking
Corporation v. Tensuan, is that while they are considered
valid and enforceable, venue stipulations in a contract do
not, as a rule, supersede the general rule set forth in Rule 4
of the Revised Rules of Court in the absence of qualifying or
restrictive words.

They should be considered merely as an agreement or

additional forum, not as limiting venue to the specified
place.

They are not exclusive but, rather permissive. If the

intention of the parties were to restrict venue, there must
be accompanying language clearly and categorically

48 | P a g e
expressing their purpose and design that actions between
them be litigated only at the place named by them.

In the instant case, no restrictive words like "only," "solely,"

"exclusively in this court," "in no other court save —,"
"particularly," "nowhere else but/except —," or words of
equal import were stated in the contract. It cannot be said
that the court of arbitration in London is an exclusive venue
to bring forth any complaint arising out of the employment
contract.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the

Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 76563 is AFFIRMED. This
case is REMANDED to the Labor Arbiter for disposition of
the case on the merits. Cost against petitioners

G.R. No. 132753. February 15, 1999

SIASOCO, ET. AL., vs. CA, ET. AL.,

FACTS: Petitioners were the registered owners of nine

parcels of land located in Montalban, Rizal. In December
1994, they began to offer the subject properties for sale.
Petitioners made a final offer to the INC. The latter’s
counsel sent a reply received by Petitioner Mario Siasoco on
December 24, 1996, stating that the offer was accepted, but
49 | P a g e
that the INC was “not amenable to your proposal to an
undervaluation of the total consideration.” In their letter
dated January 8, 1997, petitioners claimed that the INC had
not really accepted the offer; adding that, prior to their
receipt of the aforementioned reply on December 24, 1996,
they had already “contracted” with Carissa Homes for the
sale of the said properties “due to the absence of any
response to their offer from INC.”
Maintaining that a sale had been consummated, INC
demanded that the corresponding deed be executed in its
favor. Petitioners refused.

Private respondent (INC) filed a civil suit for specific

performance and damages against petitioners and Carissa
Homes and Development & Properties. Pending resolution
of petitioners’ Motion to Dismiss, private respondent
negotiated with Carissa Homes which culminated in the
purchase of the subject properties of Carissa Homes by
private respondent. Private respondent filed an Amended
Complaint, dropping Carissa Homes as one of the
defendants and changing the nature of the case to a mere
case for damages.

CA ruled that although private respondent could no longer

amend its original Complaint as a matter of right, it was not
precluded from doing so with leave of court. Thus, the CA
50 | P a g e
concluded that the RTC had not acted with grave abuse of
discretion in admitting private respondent’s Amended
Complaint.
Petitioners argued that the trial court where the original
Complaint for specific performance had been filed was not
the proper venue. Debunking petitioners' argument, the CA
explained that the RTC nevertheless had jurisdiction over
the said Complaint. The CA also held that the amended
Complaint did not substantially alter private respondent's
cause of action, since petitioners were not being asked to
legal obligation different from that stated in the original
Complaint.
ISSUE: Whether or not action for specific performance with
damages is a personal action and may be filed in the proper
court where any of the parties reside

HELD: Yes. Petitioners also insist that the RTC of Quezon

City did not have jurisdiction over the original Complaint;
hence, it did not have any authority to allow the
amendment. They maintain that the original action for
specific performance involving parcels of land in Montalban,
Rizal should have been filed in the RTC of that area. Thus,
they chide the CA for allegedly misunderstanding the
distinction between territorial jurisdiction and venue,
thereby erroneously holding that the RTC had jurisdiction
51 | P a g e
over the original Complaint, although the venue was
improperly laid.

We disagree. True, an amendment cannot be allowed when

the court has no jurisdiction over the original Complaint and
the purpose of the amendment is to confer jurisdiction on
the court. In the present case, however, the RTC had
jurisdiction because the original Complaint involved specific
performance with damages. In La Tondeña Distillers v.
Ponferrada, this Court ruled that a complaint for “specific
performance with damages” is a personal action and may
be filed in the proper court where any of the parties reside,
viz.:

“Finally, [w]e are not also persuaded by petitioner’s

argument that venue should be lodged in Bago City where
the lot is situated. The complaint is one for “specific
performance with damages.” Private respondents do not
claim ownership of the lot but in fact [recognize the] title
of defendants by annotating a notice of lis pendens. In
one case, a similar complaint for “specific performance
with damages” involving real property, was held to be a
personal action, which may be filed in the proper court
where the party resides. Not being an action involving
title to or ownership of real property, venue, in this case,
was not improperly laid before the RTC of Bacolod City.”
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G.R. No. 198680. July 8, 2013
HEIRS OF MAGDALENO YPON vs. GAUDIOSO PONTERAS
RICAFORTE
FACTS: On July 29, 2010, petitioners, together with some of
their cousins, filed a complaint for Cancellation of Title and
Reconveyance with Damages (subject complaint) against
respondent Gaudioso, In their complaint, they alleged that
Magdaleno died intestate and childless on June 28, 1968,
leaving behind Lot Nos. 2-AA, 2-C, 2-F, and 2-J which were
then covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. T-44
and T-77-A. Claiming to be the sole heir of Magdaleno,
Gaudioso executed an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication and
caused the cancellation of the aforementioned certificates
of title, leading to their subsequent transfer in his name
under TCT Nos. T-2637 and T-2638, to the prejudice of
petitioners who are Magdaleno’s collateral relatives and
successors-in-interest.
In his Answer, Gaudioso alleged that he is the lawful son of
Magdaleno as evidenced by: (a) his certificate of Live Birth;
(b) two (2) letters from Polytechnic School; and (c) a
certified true copy of his passport. Further, by way of
affirmative defense, he claimed that: (a) petitioners have no
cause of action against him; (b) the complaint fails to state a
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cause of action; and (c) the case is not prosecuted by the
real parties-in-interest, as there is no showing that the
petitioners have been judicially declared as Magdaleno’s
lawful heirs.
The RTC Ruling: On July 27, 2011, the RTC issued the
assailed July 27, 2011 Order, finding that the subject
complaint failed to state a cause of action against Gaudioso.
It observed that while the plaintiffs therein had established
their relationship with Magdaleno in a previous special
proceeding for the issuance of letters of administration, this
did not mean that they could already be considered as the
decedent’s compulsory heirs. Quite the contrary, Gaudioso
satisfactorily established the fact that he is Magdaleno’s son
– and hence, his compulsory heir – through the
documentary evidence he submitted which consisted of: (a)
a marriage contract between Magdaleno and Epegenia
Evangelista; (b) a Certificate of Live Birth; (c) a Letter dated
February 19, 1960; and (d) a passport.
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC’s dismissal of the case on
the ground that the subject complaint failed to state a cause
of action was proper.
HELD: Yes. Cause of action is defined as the act or omission
by which a party violates a right of another. It is well-settled
that the existence of a cause of action is determined by the

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allegations in the complaint. In this relation, a complaint is
said to assert a sufficient cause of action if, admitting what
appears solely on its face to be correct, the plaintiff would
be entitled to the relief prayed for. Accordingly, if the
allegations furnish sufficient basis by which the complaint
can be maintained, the same should not be dismissed,
regardless of the defenses that may be averred by the
defendants.
As stated in the subject complaint, petitioners, who were
among the plaintiffs therein, alleged that they are the lawful
heirs of Magdaleno and based on the same, prayed that the
Affidavit of Self-Adjudication executed by Gaudioso be
declared null and void and that the transfer certificates of
title issued in the latter’s favor be cancelled. While the
foregoing allegations, if admitted to be true, would
consequently warrant the reliefs sought for in the said
complaint, the rule that the determination of a decedent’s
lawful heirs should be made in the corresponding special
proceeding precludes the RTC, in an ordinary action for
cancellation of title and reconveyance, from granting the
same. In the case of Heirs of Teofilo Gabatan v. CA, the
Court, citing several other precedents, held that the
determination of who are the decedent’s lawful heirs must
be made in the proper special proceeding for such purpose,
and not in an ordinary suit for recovery of ownership and/or
possession, as in this case:
55 | P a g e
Jurisprudence dictates that the determination of who are
the legal heirs of the deceased must be made in the proper
special proceedings in court, and not in an ordinary suit for
recovery of ownership and possession of property. This
must take precedence over the action for recovery of
possession and ownership. The Court has consistently ruled
that the trial court cannot make a declaration of heirship in
the civil action for the reason that such a declaration can
only be made in a special proceeding. Under Section 3, Rule
1 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court, a civil action is defined
as one by which a party sues another for the enforcement
or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a
wrong while a special proceeding is a remedy by which a
party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact.
It is then decisively clear that the declaration of heirship can
be made only in a special proceeding inasmuch as the
petitioners here are seeking the establishment of a status or
right.
By way of exception, the need to institute a separate special
proceeding for the determination of heirship may be
dispensed with for the sake of practicality, as when the
parties in the civil case had voluntarily submitted the issue
to the trial court and already presented their evidence
regarding the issue of heirship, and the RTC had
consequently rendered judgment thereon, or when a special

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proceeding had been instituted but had been finally closed
and terminated, and hence, cannot be re-opened.
In this case, none of the foregoing exceptions, or those of
similar nature, appear to exist. Hence, there lies the need to
institute the proper special proceeding in order to
determine the heirship of the parties involved, ultimately
resulting to the dismissal of Civil Case No. T-2246.
Verily, while a court usually focuses on the complaint in
determining whether the same fails to state a cause of
action, a court cannot disregard decisions material to the
proper appreciation of the questions before it. Thus,
concordant with applicable jurisprudence, since a
determination of heirship cannot be made in an ordinary
action for recovery of ownership and/or possession, the
dismissal of Civil Case No. T-2246 was altogether proper. In
this light, it must be pointed out that the RTC erred in ruling
on Gaudioso’s heirship which should, as herein discussed,
be threshed out and determined in the proper special
proceeding. As such, the foregoing pronouncement should
therefore be devoid of any legal effect.
G.R. No. 204528. February 19, 2013
SECRETARY LEILA M. DE LIMA vs. MAGTANGGOL B.
GATDULA

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FACTS: From the records, it appears that on 27 February
2012, respondent Magtanggol B. Gatdula filed a Petition for
the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo in the Regional Trial Court
of Manila. The Amparo was directed against petitioners
Justice Secretary Leila M. De Lima, Director Nonnatus R.
Rojas and Deputy Director Reynaldo O. Esmeralda of the
National Bureau of Investigation (DE LIMA, ET AL. for
brevity). Gatdula wanted De Lima, et al. "to cease and desist
from framing up Petitioner for the fake ambush incident by
filing bogus charges of Frustrated Murder against Petitioner
in relation to the alleged ambush incident."
Instead of deciding on whether to issue a Writ of Amparo,
the judge issued summons and ordered De Lima, et al. to
file an Answer. He also set the case for hearing on 1 March
2012. The hearing was held allegedly for determining
whether a temporary protection order may be issued.
During that hearing, counsel for De Lima, et al. manifested
that a Return, not an Answer, is appropriate
for Amparo cases.
Judge Pampilo insisted that "since no writ has been issued,
return is not the required pleading but answer". The judge
noted that the Rules of Court apply suppletorily
in Amparo cases. He opined that the Revised Rules of
Summary Procedure applied and thus required an Answer.

58 | P a g e
Judge Pampilo proceeded to conduct a hearing on the main
case on 7 March 2012. Even without a Return nor an
Answer, he ordered the parties to file their respective
memoranda within five (5) working days after that hearing.
Since the period to file an Answer had not yet lapsed by
then, the judge also decided that the memorandum of De
Lima, et al. would be filed in lieu of their Answer.
On 20 March 2012, the RTC rendered a "Decision" granting
the issuance of the Writ of Amparo.
In an Order dated 8 October 2012, the RTC denied
the Motion for Reconsideration dated 23 March 2012 filed
by De Lima, et al.
Petitioners Sec. De Lima, et al. thus came to this Court
assailing the RTC "Decision" dated 20 March 2012 through
a Petition for Review on Certiorari (With Very Urgent
Application for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining
Order/Writ of Preliminary Injunction) via Rule 45.
ISSUE: whether or not rules on summary procedure are
applicable in petitions for the issuance of writs of amparo
HELD: The remedy of the Writ of Amparo is an equitable
and extraordinary remedy to safeguard the right of the
people to life, liberty and security as enshrined in the 1987
Constitution. The Rule on the Writ of Amparo was issued as
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an exercise of the Supreme Court's power to promulgate
rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights. It aims to address concerns such as,
among others, extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances.
The confusion of the parties arose due to the procedural
irregularities in the RTC.
First, the insistence on filing of an Answer was
inappropriate. It is the Return that serves as the responsive
pleading for petitions for the issuance of Writs of Amparo.
The requirement to file an Answer is contrary to the
intention of the Court to provide a speedy remedy to those
whose right to life, liberty and security are violated or are
threatened to be violated. In utter disregard of the Rule on
the Writ of Amparo, Judge Pampilo insisted on issuing
summons and requiring an Answer.
Considering the summary nature of the petition, Section 5
of the Revised Rules of Summary Procedure shall apply.
The 1991 Revised Rules of Summary Procedure is a special
rule that the Court has devised for the following
circumstances:
SECTION 1. Scope. – This rule shall govern the summary
procedure in the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal
60 | P a g e
Trial Courts in Cities, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in the following cases falling
within their jurisdiction:
A. Civil Cases:
(1) All cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer,
x x x.
(2) All other cases, except probate proceedings,
where the total amount of the plaintiff’s claim does
not exceed x x x.
B. Criminal Cases:
(1) Violations of traffic laws, rules and regulations;
(2) Violations of the rental law;
(3) Violations of municipal or city ordinances;
(4) All other criminal cases where the penalty
prescribed by law for the offense charged is
imprisonment not exceeding six months, or a fine
not exceeding one thousand pesos (P1,000.00), or
both, x x x.
It is clear from this rule that this type of summary procedure
only applies to MTC/MTCC/MCTCs. It is mind-boggling how
this rule could possibly apply to proceedings in an RTC.
Aside from that, this Court limited the application of
summary procedure to certain civil and criminal cases. A
writ of Amparo is a special proceeding. It is a remedy by
which a party seeks to establish a status, a right or
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particular fact. It is not a civil nor a criminal action, hence,
the application of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure
is seriously misplaced.
The second irregularity was the holding of a hearing on the
main case prior to the issuance of the writ and the filing of a
Return. Without a Return, the issues could not have been
properly joined.
Worse, is the trial court’s third irregularity: it required a
memorandum in lieu of a responsive pleading (Answer) of
De Lima, et al.
The Return in Amparo cases allows the respondents to
frame the issues subject to a hearing. Hence, it should be
done prior to the hearing, not after. A memorandum, on the
other hand, is a synthesis of the claims of the party litigants
and is a final pleading usually required before the case is
submitted for decision. One cannot substitute for the other
since these submissions have different functions in
facilitating the suit.
More importantly, a memorandum is a prohibited pleading
under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.
The fourth irregularity was in the "Decision" dated 20 March
2012 itself.

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The privilege of the Writ of Amparo should be distinguished
from the actual order called the Writ of Amparo. The
privilege includes availment of the entire procedure
outlined in A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC, the Rule on the Writ of
Amparo. After examining the petition and its attached
affidavits, the Return and the evidence presented in the
summary hearing, the judgment should detail the required
acts from the respondents that will mitigate, if not totally
eradicate, the violation of or the threat to the petitioner's
life, liberty or security.
A judgment which simply grants "the privilege of the writ"
cannot be executed. It is tantamount to a failure of the
judge to intervene and grant judicial succor to the
petitioner. Petitions filed to avail of the privilege of the Writ
of Amparo arise out of very real and concrete
circumstances. Judicial responses cannot be as tragically
symbolic or ritualistic as "granting the privilege of the Writ
of Amparo."
G.R. No. 198718. November 27, 2013
SPOUSES TEODORO and ROSARIO SARAZA and FERNANDO
SARAZA, vs. WILLIAM FRANCISCO
FACTS: The case stems from an amended complaint filed by
William Francisco against Fernando and Spouses Teodoro
and Rosario (Rosario) Saraza (Spouses Saraza). The

63 | P a g e
respondent alleged in his complaint that on September 1,
1999, he and Fernando executed an Agreement that
provided for the latter’s sale of his 100-square meter share
in a lot situated in Bangkal, Makati City, which at that time
was still registered in the name of one Emilia Serafico and
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 40376
(later covered by TCT No. 220530), for a total consideration
of ₱3,200,000.00. The amount of ₱1,200,000.00 was paid
upon the Agreement’s execution, while the balance of
₱2,000,000.00 was to be paid on installments to the
Philippine National Bank (PNB), to cover a loan of Spouses
Saraza, Fernando’s parents, with the bank. A final deed of
sale conveying the property was to be executed by
Fernando upon full payment of the PNB loan.
It was also agreed upon that should the parties fail for any
reason to transfer the subject property to the respondent’s
name, Rosario and Fernando’s 136-sq m property covered
by TCT No. 156126 and encumbered to PNB to secure the
loan that was to be paid by the respondent shall be
considered a collateral in favor of the respondent. Spouses
Saraza signified their conformity to the Agreement. The
respondent was also allowed to take immediate possession
of the property covered by TCT No. 156126 through a
contract of lease. The petitioners likewise furnished PNB
with an Authority, allowing the respondent to pay their
obligations to the PNB, to negotiate for a loan restructuring,
64 | P a g e
to receive the owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. 156126
upon full payment of the loan secured by its mortgage, and
to perform such other acts as may be necessary in
connection with the settlement of the loan.
When the remaining balance of the PNB loan reached
₱226,582.13, the respondent asked for the petitioners’
issuance of a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) that would
authorize him to receive from PNB the owner’s duplicate
copy of TCT No. 156126 upon full payment of the loan. The
petitioners denied the request. Upon inquiry from PNB, the
respondent found out that the petitioners had instead
executed an Amended Authority, which provided that the
owner’s copy of TCT No. 156126 should be returned to the
mortgagors upon full payment of the loan. Spouses Saraza
also caused the eviction of the respondent from the
property covered by TCT No. 156126. These prompted the
respondent to institute the civil case for specific
performance, sum of money and damages with the RTC of
Imus, Cavite on December 7, 2004.
ISSUE: Whether or not RTC of Imus lacked jurisdiction over
the case as it involved an adjudication of ownership of a
property situated in Makati City.
HELD: As to the issue of venue, the petitioners’ argument
that the action should have been instituted with the RTC of

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Makati City, and not the RTC of Imus, Cavite, is misplaced.
Although the end result of the respondent’s claim was the
transfer of the subject property to his name, the suit was
still essentially for specific performance, a personal action,
because it sought Fernando’s execution of a deed of
absolute sale based on a contract which he had previously
made.
In Siasoco v. Court of Appeals, private respondent filed a
case for specific performance with damages before the RTC
of Quezon City. It alleged that after it accepted the offer of
petitioners, they sold to a third person several parcels of
land located in Montalban, Rizal. The Supreme Court
sustained the trial court’s order allowing an amendment of
the original Complaint for specific performance with
damages. Contrary to petitioners’ position that the RTC of
Quezon City had no jurisdiction over the case, as the subject
lots were located in Montalban, Rizal, the said RTC had
jurisdiction over the original Complaint. The Court
reiterated the rule that a case for specific performance with
damages is a personal action which may be filed in a court
where any of the parties reside.
Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court then governs the
venue for the respondent’s action. It provides that personal
actions "may be commenced and tried where the plaintiff
or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the
66 | P a g e
defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, or in
the case of a non-resident defendant where he may be
found, at the election of the plaintiff." Considering the
respondent’s statement in his complaint that he resides in
Imus, Cavite, the filing of his case with the RTC of Imus was
proper.

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