MODULE IV: Handout 5

What is nuclear non-proliferation?

Nuclear non-proliferation is the effort to eliminate the spread of nuclear weapon technology,
and to reduce existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons. Nuclear-weapon nations and their allies
don’t want any other nations or entities to get the technology, and those threatened by or
otherwise hostile to these nations (or any other nations) often want to have it. Meanwhile,
peaceful people across the world want no one to have nuclear weapons.
To reach their goal, people working for non-proliferation must secure and monitor existing
nuclear weapons and weapon material, they must monitor facilities conceivably able to
produce weapon material and minimize the construction of such facilities, and they must
perform political gymnastics to minimize the allure of nuclear weapons to the world.

How is nuclear power tied to nuclear non-proliferation?

The two practical materials with which one can fabricate nuclear weapons are plutonium and
highly-enriched uranium. Certainly the precision explosives and fabrication of weapons is
difficult, but obtaining material is the major hurdle. As they currently operate, most nuclear
reactors are proliferation concerns for two corresponding reasons:

1. Nuclear reactors produce plutonium as they operate, which would conceivably be

extracted and used for weapons.
2. The enrichment plants required to fuel reactors can be operated in such a way to produce
weapon material.

Thus, any country with a nuclear reactor and a plutonium chemist or an enrichment plant can
"easily" develop nuclear weapons. However, both items have many subtleties to complicate
their discussion.

What can be done to stop proliferation?

So, can we expand nuclear power without risking proliferation? Certainly not without being
careful. Currently, the IAEA (the UN nuclear watchdog) routinely inspects nuclear facilities
around the world to verify that only peaceful work is being done. They inventory all special
material very carefully. If a facility doesn’t allow inspectors in or shows signs of
militarization, the political world decides what to do. This method of non-proliferation is
called something along the lines of "safeguards and verification."
One rather harsh non-proliferation action, called Operation Opera, occurred when the Israeli
Air Force bombed a nearly-completed nuclear reactor in Iraq back in 1981. This was widely
condemned by the international community.
Besides inspections and political action, there are inherent changes to the nuclear power
status-quo that can help with non-proliferation. The most mainstream change is the
establishment of an international fuel bank, where weapon states enrich and fabricate nuclear
fuel and then sell it through an internationally-controlled middleman who guarantees its
delivery to non-weapon user-states. This would keep enrichment facilities out of the hands of
new users of nuclear power. User-nations would benefit from not requiring the expensive
front-end infrastructure of fuel fabrication, but they would probably be slightly worried about
their energy supplies in any politically turbulent times. This idea has come under the
names GNEP and, more recently, the international nuclear fuel bank.
Another option is to use a thorium fuel cycle, based on natural thorium minerals rather than
natural uranium. This would (at least at first) still require enrichment or some other supply of
fissile material, but it has the benefit of not producing plutonium. It produces U-233 which
could also be used in weapons, though not as easily as plutonium.

Can we get rid of all nuclear weapons forever?

Technically, of course, yes we can. We can just burn the material in nuclear reactors and
convert it to electricity (we actually do this. About 10% of US electricity comes from
dismantled Soviet weapons). Realistically, however, the issue is that of Pandora’s box. We
now know that using 1940s technology, nuclear weapons can be made. Even if we could
somehow convince every country to destroy their weapons (good luck keeping them from
hiding just a few of them in some dark mountain cavern, for old time’s sake), we cannot
forget the concept. So rather than fighting for the eradication of nuclear weapons altogether,
try rallying for the reduction of our stockpiles from tens of thousands to about ten.

Which countries have nuclear weapons?

Weapon states are listed here with the date of their first test in parenthesis.

 United States of America (1945)

 Russia (1949)
 United Kingdom (1952)
 France (1960)
 China (1964)
 Israel (*suspected)
 India (1974)
 Pakistan (1998)
 North Korea (2006)

* Israel has never actually admitted having nuclear weapons, but is widely accused of having
many [bbc].
Several other NATO countries control nuclear weapons produced by weapon-states under the
non-proliferation treaty (NPT).

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)

The NPT is a landmark international treaty whose objective is to prevent the spread of
nuclear weapons and weapons technology, to promote cooperation in the peaceful uses of
nuclear energy and to further the goal of achieving nuclear disarmament and general and
complete disarmament. The Treaty represents the only binding commitment in a multilateral
treaty to the goal of disarmament by the nuclear-weapon States. Opened for signature in
1968, the Treaty entered into force in 1970. On 11 May 1995, the Treaty was extended
indefinitely. A total of 191 States have joined the Treaty, including the five nuclear-weapon
States. More countries have ratified the NPT than any other arms limitation and disarmament
agreement, a testament to the Treaty’s significance.
The provisions of the Treaty, particularly article VIII, paragraph 3, envisage a review of the
operation of the Treaty every five years, a provision which was reaffirmed by the States
parties at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference.
To further the goal of non-proliferation and as a confidence-building measure between States
parties, the Treaty establishes a safeguards system under the responsibility of
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Safeguards are used to verify compliance
with the Treaty through inspections conducted by the IAEA. The Treaty promotes
cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear technology and equal access to this technology
for all States parties, while safeguards prevent the diversion of fissile material for weapons
use.
The 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons, held in New York from 27 April to 22 May and presided over by Ambassador
Taous Feroukhi (Algeria), ended without the adoption of a consensus substantive outcome.
After a successful 2010 Review Conference at which States parties agreed to a final
document which included conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions, including
the implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East, the 2015 outcome constitutes
a setback for the strengthened review process instituted to ensure accountability with respect
to activities under the three pillars of the Treaty as part of the package in support of the
indefinite extension of the Treaty in 1995.

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004)

On 28 April 2004, the United Nations Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution
1540 (2004) under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter which affirms that the
proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their means of delivery
constitutes a threat to international peace and security. The resolution obliges States, inter
alia, to refrain from supporting by any means non-State actors from developing, acquiring,
manufacturing, possessing, transporting, transferring or using nuclear, chemical or biological
weapons and their delivery systems.

Resolution 1540 (2004) imposes binding obligations on all States to adopt legislation to
prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, and their means of
delivery, and establish appropriate domestic controls over related materials to prevent their
illicit trafficking. It also encourages enhanced international cooperation on such efforts. The
resolution affirms support for the multilateral treaties whose aim is to eliminate or prevent the
proliferation of WMDs and the importance for all States to implement them fully; it reiterates
that none of the obligations in resolution 1540 (2004) shall conflict with or alter the rights
and obligations of States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,
the Chemical Weapons Convention, or the Biological Weapons Convention or alter the
responsibilities of the IAEA and OPCW.

On 27 April 2006, the Security Council extended the mandate of the 1540 Committee for a
further two years with the adoption of Resolution 1673 , which reiterated the objectives of
Resolution 1540 (2004) and expressed the interest of the Security Council in intensifying its
efforts to promote full implementation of the resolution.

On 25 April 2008, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1810, which extended the
mandate of the 1540 Committee for a period of three years, with the continued assistance of
experts, until 25 April 2011. Through Resolution 1810 (2008), the Security Council urged the
1540 Committee to continue strengthening its role in facilitating technical assistance,
including by engaging actively in matching offers and requests for assistance, therefore
strengthening its clearinghouse function. The Security Council also requested the 1540
Committee to consider a comprehensive review of the status of implementation of Resolution
1540 (2004). As part of this comprehensive review, the 1540 Committee decided to hold
an open meeting with broad participation from UN Member States and relevant international
organizations. The open meeting took place at UN headquarters from 30 September to 2
October 2009 and a final document is published on the 1540 Committee website.

On 20 April 2011, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1977, which reaffirms that the
proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their means of delivery
constitutes a threat to international peace and security, and extends the mandate of the 1540
Committee for a period of ten years to 2021. The Security Council thus recognizes that full
implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) by all States is a long-term task that will require
continuous efforts at national, regional and international levels. Resolution 1977 (2011) also
provides for two Comprehensive Reviews, one after five years and one before the end of the
mandate. Additionally, the 1540 Committee is mandated by resolution 1977 (2011) to
continue to strengthen its role to facilitate the provision of technical assistance and to enhance
cooperation with relevant international organizations. The Committee is also mandated to
continue to refine its outreach efforts, and to continue to institute transparency measures.

On 29 June 2012, the Security Council adopted Resolution 2055 (2012), which enlarged the
Group of Experts supporting the work of the 1540 Committee to up to nine (9) experts.

1. What is resolution 1540 (2004) and what is its significance?

Resolution 1540 (2004) is a decision of the Security Council taken under Chapter VII of the
United Nations Charter affirming that the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological
weapons, as well as their means of delivery, constitutes a threat to international peace and
security. The resolution is significant as a binding instrument, which adds illicit trafficking in
nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, their means of delivery and related materials, as a
new dimension of proliferation, and recognises the nexus of proliferation and the risk posed
by non-State actors, including terrorists, of acquiring such weapons or related materials. As
other international legal instruments mostly govern the activities of States, Resolution 1540
(2004) addresses the threat posed by non-State actors by explicitly having States refrain from
providing any support for proliferation-related activities to such actors and by preventing
their involvement in such illicit activities.

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2. What does resolution 1540 (2004) require from States?

Resolution 1540 (2004) requires States to refrain from providing any form of support to non-
state actors that attempt to develop, acquire, manufacture, posses, transport, transfer or use
nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery.
States are also required, in accordance with their national procedures, to adopt and enforce
appropriate effective laws that prohibit any non-State actor to manufacture, acquire, possess,
develop, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of
delivery, in particular for terrorist purposes, as well as attempts to engage in any of the
foregoing activities, participate in them as an accomplice, assist or finance them.

The resolution also requires States to take and enforce effective measures to establish
domestic controls to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and
their means of delivery, including by establishing appropriate controls over related materials
in the areas of accounting/securing, physical protection, border and law enforcement, export
and trans-shipment.

(a) Develop and maintain appropriate effective measures to account for and secure such items
in production, use, storage or transport;

(b) Develop and maintain appropriate effective physical protection measures;

(c) Develop and maintain appropriate effective border controls and law enforcement efforts to
detect, deter, prevent and combat, including through international cooperation when
necessary, the illicit trafficking and brokering in such items in accordance with their national
legal authorities and legislation and consistent with international law;

(d) Establish, develop, review and maintain appropriate effective national export and trans-
shipment controls over such items, including appropriate laws and regulations to control
export, transit, trans-shipment and re-export and controls on providing funds and services
related to such export and trans-shipment such as financing, and transporting that would
contribute to proliferation, as well as establishing end-user controls; and establishing and
enforcing appropriate criminal or civil penalties for violations of such export control laws and
regulations.

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3. Why is resolution 1540 (2004) relevant to States that do not possess weapons of mass
destruction?

Resolution 1540 (2004) is relevant to all States as the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and
biological weapons and their means of delivery is recognised by the Security Council as a
threat to international peace and security which affects all States. In case of use or threat of
use of weapons of mass destruction, no State in the international community would be
immune to the worldwide consequences.

In addition, persons or entities being engaged in or providing support for proliferation

activities, including terrorist activities and/or illicit trafficking, operate across national
boundaries or in different territories. Many States have industries or institutions that
possesses and/or trade in related materials that could also be used in weapons of mass
destruction programmes (dual-use materials). This calls for active participation and
cooperation of all States in the international community in non-proliferation prevention
efforts.

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4. What is the added value of resolution 1540 (2004) when most States have already
undertaken international obligations in the non-proliferation areas, for example,
through the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, the Chemical Weapons Convention, and
the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention?

Resolution 1540 (2004) complements relevant multilateral treaties and arrangements by

requiring all States to comply with the obligations outlined in the resolution, irrespective of
their status regarding such treaties and arrangements. Through its integrated approach,
resolution 1540 (2004) aims at preventing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
(WMD) and their means of delivery as well as illicit trafficking in WMD-related materials,
particularly with respect to the activities of non-State actors. Resolution 1540 (2004) is
particularly relevant at the practical level. For instance, by implementing resolution 1540
(2004) States better integrate their national capacities—such as with law enforcement and
border control agencies—to prevent the proliferation of illicit trafficking of WMD, an
augmentation to States’ treaty obligations.

Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones
The establishment of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones (NWFZ) is a regional approach to
strengthen global nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament norms and consolidate
international efforts towards peace and security. Article VII of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT) states: “Nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of States to
conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their
respective territories“.
General Assembly resolution 3472 B (1975) defines a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone as
…any zone recognized as such by the General Assembly of the United Nations, which any
group of States, in the free exercises of their sovereignty, has established by virtue of a treaty
or convention whereby:
(a) The statute of total absence of nuclear weapons to which the zone shall be subject,
including the procedure for the delimitation of the zone, is defined;
(b) An international system of verification and control is established to guarantee compliance
with the obligations deriving from that statute.

Guidelines and Principles for the Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones

The UN Disarmament Commission in its report of April 30, 1999, recommended a set of
principles and guidelines for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone, which
included, inter alia:

 Nuclear-weapon-free zones should be established on the basis of arrangements freely

arrived at among the States of the region concerned.
 The initiative to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone should emanate exclusively
from States within the region concerned and be pursued by all States of that region.
 The nuclear-weapon States should be consulted during the negotiations of each treaty
and its relevant protocol(s) establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in order to
facilitate their signature to and ratification of the relevant protocol(s) to the treaty,
through which they undertake legally binding commitments to the status of the zone
and not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against States parties to the treaty.
  A nuclear-weapon-free zone should not prevent the use of nuclear science and
technology for peaceful purposes and could also promote, if provided for in the
treaties establishing such zones, bilateral, regional and international cooperation for
the peaceful use of nuclear energy in the zone, in support of socio-economic,
scientific and technological development of the States parties.

Treaties Involved in the Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones

The following treaties form the basis for the existing NWFZs:

 Treaty of Tlatelolco — Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America
and the Caribbean
 Treaty of Rarotonga — South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty
 Treaty of Bangkok — Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone
 Treaty of Pelindaba — African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty
 Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia

Mongolia’s self-declared nuclear-weapon-free status has been recognized internationally

through the adoption of UN General Assembly resolution 55/33S on “Mongolia’s
international security and nuclear weapon free status.”
Other treaties that also deal with the denuclearization of certain areas are:

 Antarctic Treaty
 Outer Space Treaty — Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the
Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies
 Moon Agreement — Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and
Other Celestial Bodies
 Seabed Treaty — Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons
and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the
Subsoil Thereof

The text and status of all the above-mentioned treaties are available on the UNODA Treaty
Database.