CHINA INDIA MILITARY CONFLICT

By sheer demographics, it's the world's most important relationship. China and India comprise 40% of
humanity and boast economies that are expected to loom large over the 21st century. They also represent two of
the world's fastest-growing militaries, armed with nuclear weapons, and are expanding their spheres of
influence across oceans. Jonathan Holslag, a Brussels-based scholar of Chinese foreign policy and author of the
recent bookChina and India: Prospects for Peace, is among a growing number of observers who have
dismissed the idea of "Chindia" — a term once often invoked, expressing optimism over the joint geopolitical
rise of the two Asian giants. He spoke to TIME about the fault lines between the two neighbors, Washington's
place in the region and how tensions could escalate into war.

Maritime disputes are getting

more serious
China's maritime-border disputes with neighbouring states, long simmering, have intensified in
recent months. The country has clashed diplomatically with the Philippines and Vietnam over the
South China Sea, and with Japan over the status of the Senkaku islands (known as the Diaoyu
islands in China) in the East China Sea. One reason behind the up-tick in tensions has been poor
bureaucratic co-ordination and the conflicting goals of a number of government agencies in
China. Outright militarisation of the various disputes appears to be some way off. Yet the failure
to make diplomatic progress has become a worrying trend, and armed clashes cannot be ruled
out.

Maritime border disputes between China and its neighbours, which have increased notably in frequency
since 2010, are showing few signs of abating. On July 12th an ASEAN summit ended in acrimony after
Cambodia, which was chairing the meeting, apparently yielded to Chinese pressure to veto any mention
of the Scarborough Shoal (called Huangyan Island in Chinese), a reef in the South China Sea over which
China and the Philippines have been locked in dispute since April. On July 17th it was reported that a
recently established prefecture-level city in China's Hainan province, Sansha, was to appoint a 60-
member legislature to administer territories in the Paracel Islands, which are also claimed by Vietnam. In
addition, China and Japan have recently revived their argument over the status of the Senkaku Islands,
after Japan protested about the presence of Chinese state fishery patrols in the area. This followed the
announcement by the Japanese government that it would "nationalise" some of the islands, which are
currently owned by a Japanese private citizen.

Policy co-ordination remains poor

The persistence of such frictions is in part owing to a failure of Chinese foreign policy. When concerns
about China's growing "assertiveness" in relation to its maritime periphery spiked in late 2010, this
prompted widespread debate in China about whether the country's more forceful stance was undoing
much of the progress that it had made in improving its image in the surrounding region through its
"good neighbour" policy in the early 2000s. For many observers, the most worrying thing was that the
ambiguity surrounding China's ambitions was encouraging a number of states in the region to look to the
US for greater political and military support, in a trend that was considered detrimental to China's overall
strategic environment. As a result, China looked to soften aspects of its approach, increasing its bilateral
and multilateral engagement in the region. In mid-2011 it agreed to ASEAN-backed implementation
guidelines for a "code of conduct" for interested parties in the South China Sea. Some of China's more
hardline domestic voices were quieted, and the foreign policy apparatus re-emphasised the rhetoric of
"peaceful development".

Events in 2012 indicate that this modified approach has not yielded benefits in improving China's
relations with its neighbours. The maritime disputes are driven at a basic level by competition over the oil
and gas reserves, as well as fisheries, to which the various islands groups are linked. But China's failure
to allay concerns in the region also stems from problems relating to ineffective policy co-ordination. A
report published in May by the International Crisis Group highlighted the number of Chinese institutional
actors, ranging from the fisheries administration to local governments, the navy and energy companies,
that now have a stake in the South China Sea. These bureaucracies often have competing interests, and
are typically content to pursue them narrowly without reference to national foreign-policy goals. This
makes diplomacy difficult, particularly as China's foreign ministry—the body that might be expected to
manage such efforts—lacks clout within the country's policymaking structures. Efforts to set up a more
centralised decision-making authority have so far stumbled.

Domestic politics matters

Clearly, the ineffectiveness of Chinese policy is not the only factor stoking tensions. The domestic politics
of the countries involved has also played an important role. In China's case, the change of leadership in
the Chinese Communist Party that is expected later this year renders any perception of concessions to
neighbours politically difficult at a time when factions within the ruling party are jostling for influence. In
Japan, the government's suggestion that it would buy some of the Senkaku Islands was made in response
to pressure applied by the nationalist mayor of Tokyo, Shintaro Ishihara, who has garnered popular
support for a campaign to develop the islands. The governments of the Philippines and Vietnam have also
both looked to use their disagreements with China for domestic political gain, and anti-China rallies have
been staged in the countries' respective capitals. Although imbuing such territorial disputes with
nationalist sentiment may enable governments to make short-term political capital, it means that they
have less room to adopt accommodative positions when the situation requires it.

The US role

In the likely absence of a more conciliatory Chinese approach and the complications of domestic political
environments across the region, the prospects for resolving maritime disputes in East Asia currently look
bleak. The "pivot" in US diplomatic and defence policy towards Asia under Barack Obama's presidency
adds a further level of complexity. This change in emphasis is viewed with suspicion in China, where it
seen as an attempt by the US to encircle China and to try to set the agenda on politics in the region. This
does little for hopes of a permanent solution to territorial rivalries, as it means that China is also likely to
become more entrenched in its position and averse to engaging with multilateral forums that the US also
attends. Renewed US interest in Asia also risks emboldening local actors to take a more confrontational
approach towards China in the expectation that they can rely on American support. Although the US has
defence agreements with a number of Asian states, its commitments under such treaties are often
ambiguous. It is unlikely to look kindly on requests to intervene in Asian waters at a time when it
continues to maintain a considerable security presence in the Middle East and is in the process of
implementing significant cuts in its military budget.

China and weapons of mass destruction

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
(Redirected from People's Republic of China and weapons of mass destruction)
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It has been suggested that China's nuclear testing series be merged
into this article. (Discuss) Proposed since January 2014.

China

First nuclear weapon test October 16, 1964

Last nuclear test July 29, 1996
4 Mt
 Atmospheric - 4 Mt(November 17,
1976)
Largest yield test
 Underground - 660~1,000 kt(May 21,
1992)

Total tests 45[1]

Peak stockpile 434[2]
Current stockpile ~240[3]
Maximum missile range 14,000 km[4]
NPT signatory Yes (1992, one of five recognized powers)
The People's Republic of China has developed and possessed weapons of mass destruction,
including chemical and nuclear weapons. China's first nuclear test took place in 1964 and first
hydrogen bomb test occurred in 1967. Tests continued until 1996 when it signed the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). China has acceded to the Biological and Toxin
Weapons Convention (BWC) in 1984 and ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)
in 1997.
The number of nuclear warheads in China's arsenal is a state secret and is therefore unknown.
There are varying estimates of the size of China's arsenal. A 2011Georgetown University study
estimated that China has as many as 3,000 warheads [5] hidden in underground tunnels, whereas
China is estimated by the Federation of American Scientists to have an arsenal of about 180
active nuclear weapon warheads and 240 total warheads as of 2009, which would make it the
second smallest nuclear arsenal amongst the five nuclear weapon states acknowledged by the
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. According to some estimates, the country
could "more than double" the "number of warheads on missiles that could threaten the United
States by the mid-2020s".[6]
Early in 2011, China published a defense white paper, which repeated its nuclear policies of
maintaining a minimum deterrent with a no-first-use pledge. Yet China has yet to define what it
means by a "minimum deterrent posture". This, together with the fact that "it is deploying four
new nuclear-capable ballistic missiles, invites concern as to the scale and intention of China’s
nuclear upgrade".
Contents
 1 Chemical weapons
 2 Biological weapons
3 Nuclear weapons
o 3.1 History
o 3.2 Size
o 3.3 Nuclear policy
3.4 Delivery Systems Estimates
 3.4.1 2010 IISS Military Balance
 3.4.2 2010 DoD annual PRC military report
 3.4.3 2006 FAS & NRDC report
 3.4.4 Situation in 2013
o 3.5 Land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles
3.6 Medium range ballistic missiles
 3.6.1 DF-3A/CSS-2
 3.6.2 DF-21/CSS-5
o 3.7 Tactical cruise missiles
3.8 Long range ballistic missiles
 3.8.1 DF-4/CSS-3
3.9 Intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs)
 3.9.1 DF-5A/CSS-4 Mod 2
 3.9.2 DF-31/CSS-10
 3.9.3 DF-41/CSS-X-10
3.10 Nuclear cruise missiles
 3.10.1 DH-10
 3.10.2 CJ-10
 3.10.3 HongNiao missile family
 3.10.4 ChangFeng missile family
o 3.11 Sea-based weapons
o 3.12 Heavy bomber group
 4 Missile ranges
 5 Notes
 6 Further reading
 7 See also
 8 External links
Chemical weapons
China signed the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) on January 13, 1993. The CWC was
ratified on April 25, 1997.[7] In the official declaration submitted to theOPCW, the Chinese
government declared that it had possessed a small arsenal of chemical weapons in the past but
that it had destroyed it before ratifying the Convention. It has declared only three former
chemical production facilities that may have produced mustard gas, phosgene and Lewisite.[8]
China was found to have supplied Albania with a small stockpile of chemical weapons in the
1970s during the Cold War.[9]
Biological weapons
China is currently a signatory of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and Chinese
officials have stated that China has never engaged in biological activities with offensive
military applications. However, China was reported to have had an active biological weapons
program in the 1980s.[10]
Kanatjan Alibekov, former director of one of the Soviet germ-warfare programs, said that
China suffered a serious accident at one of its biological weapons plants in the late 1980s.
Alibekov asserted that Soviet reconnaissance satellites identified a biological weapons
laboratory and plant near a site for testing nuclear warheads. The Soviets suspected that two
separate epidemics of hemorrhagic fever that swept the region in the late 1980s were caused by
an accident in a lab where Chinese scientists were weaponizing viral diseases. [11]
US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright expressed her concerns over possible Chinese
biological weapon transfers to Iran and other nations in a letter to Senator Robert E. Bennett
(R-Utah) in January 1997.[12] Albright stated that she had received reports regarding transfers of
dual-use items from Chinese entities to the Iranian government which concerned her and that
the United States had to encourage China to adopt comprehensive export controls to prevent
assistance to Iran's alleged biological weapons program. The United States acted upon the
allegations on January 16, 2002, when it imposed sanctions on three Chinese firms accused of
supplying Iran with materials used in the manufacture of chemical and biological weapons. In
response to this, China issued export control protocols on dual use biological technology in late
2002.[13]
Nuclear weapons
History

Mao Zedong decided to begin a Chinese nuclear-weapons program during the First Taiwan
Strait Crisis of 1954-1955 over the Quemoy and Matsu Islands. While he did not expect to be
able to match the large American nuclear arsenal, Mao believed that even a few bombs would
increase China's diplomatic credibility. Construction of uranium enrichment plants in Baotou
and Lanzhou began in 1958, and a plutonium facility in Jiuquan and the Lop Nur nuclear test
site by 1960. The Soviet Union provided assistance in the early Chinese program by sending
advisers to help in the facilities devoted to fissile material production, [14] and in October 1957
agreed to provide a prototype bomb, missiles, and related technology. The Chinese, who
preferred to import technology and components to developing them within China, exported
uranium to the Soviet Union, and the Soviets sent two R-2 missiles in 1958.[15]
That year, however, Soviet leader Nikita Khruschev told Mao that he planned to discuss arms
control with the United States and Britain. China was already opposed to Khruschev's post-
Stalin policy of "peaceful coexistence". Although Soviet officials assured China that it was
under the Soviet nuclear umbrella, the disagreements widened the emerging Sino-Soviet split.
In June 1959 the two nations formally ended their agreement on military and technology
cooperation,[15] and in July 1960 all Soviet assistance with the Chinese nuclear program was
abruptly terminated and all Soviet technicians were withdrawn from the program. [16] The
American government under John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson was concerned about
the program and studied ways to sabotage or attack it, perhaps with the aid of Taiwan or the
Soviet Union,[citation needed] but Khruschev did not display interest. The first Chinese nuclear test,
code-named 596, occurred on 16 October 1964.[14]
The Chinese acknowledged that their nuclear program would have been impossible to
complete without the Soviet help.[15] China's first test of a nuclear device took place on October
16, 1964, at the Lop Nur test site. China's last nuclear test was on July 29, 1996. According to
the Australian Geological Survey Organization in Canberra, the yield of the 1996 test was 1-5
kilotons. This was China's 22nd underground test and 45th test overall. [17]
Size

China has made significant improvements in its miniaturization techniques since the 1980s.
There have been accusations, notably by the Cox Commission, that this was done primarily by
covertly acquiring the U.S.'s W88nuclear warhead design as well as guided ballistic missile
technology.[citation needed] Chinese scientists have stated that they have made advances in these
areas, but insist that these advances were made without espionage.
The international community has debated the size of the Chinese nuclear force since the nation
first acquired such technology. Because of strict secrecy it is very difficult to determine the
exact size and composition of China's nuclear forces. Estimates vary over time. Several
declassified U.S. government reports give historical estimates. The 1984 Defense Intelligence
Agency's Defense Estimative Brief estimates the Chinese nuclear stockpile as consisting of
between 150 and 160 warheads.[18] A 1993 United States National Security Council report
estimated that China's nuclear deterrent force relied on 60 to 70 nuclear armed ballistic
missiles.[19] The Defense Intelligence Agency's The Decades Ahead: 1999 - 2020 report
estimates the 1999 Nuclear Weapons' Inventory as between 140 and 157. [20] In 2004 the U.S.
Department of Defense assessed that China had about 20intercontinental ballistic missiles
capable of targeting the United States.[21] In 2006 a U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency estimate
presented to the Senate Armed Services Committee was that "China currently has more than
100 nuclear warheads." [22]

A mock-up of China's first nuclear bomb.

A variety of estimates abound regarding China's current stockpile. Although the total number
of nuclear weapons in the Chinese arsenal is unknown, as of 2005 estimates vary from as low
as 80 to as high as 2,000. The 2,000-warhead estimate has largely been rejected by diplomats
in the field. It appears to have been derived from a 1990s-era Usenet post, in which a
Singaporean college student made unsubstantiated statements concerning a supposed 2,000
warhead stockpile.[23][24]
In 2004, China stated that "among the nuclear-weapon states, China... possesses the smallest
nuclear arsenal," implying China has fewer than the United Kingdom's 200 nuclear weapons.
[25]
Several non-official sources estimate that China has around 400 nuclear warheads.
However, U.S. intelligence estimates suggest a much smaller nuclear force than many non-
governmental organizations.[26]
In 2011, high estimates of the Chinese nuclear arsenal again emerged. One three year study by
Georgetown University raised the possibility that China had 3 000 nuclear weapons, hidden in
a sophisticated tunnel network. The study was based on state media footage showing tunnel
entrances, and estimated a 4 800 km (3 000 mile) network. The tunnel network was revealed
after the 2008 Sichuan earthquake collapsed tunnels in the hills. China has confirmed the
existing of the tunnel network.[27][28] In response, the US military was ordered by law to study
the possibility of this tunnel network concealing a nuclear arsenal. [29] However, the tunnel
theory has come under substantial attack due to several apparent flaws in its reasoning. From a
production standpoint, China probably does not have enough fissile material to produce 3,000
nuclear weapons. Such an arsenal would require 9-12 tons of Plutonium as well as 45-75 tons
of Enriched uranium and a substantial amount of Tritium.[30][31] The Chinese are estimated to
have only 2 tons of weapons grade plutonium, which limits their arsenal to 450-600 weapons,
despite a 16 ton disposable supply of uranium, theoretically enough for 1,000 warheads.
Additionally, the PRC's supply of Tritium limits its stockpile to around 300 weapons. [30]
In 2012, A retired Russian officer, Viktor Yesin, stated that the Chinese arsenal was at 1,800
nuclear weapons.[32] Yesin's statements, however, have incited backlash. His claims may have
originated from the same Usenet post that previous dubious assertions of 2,000 or more nuclear
warheads stemmed from.[33]
As of 2011, the Chinese nuclear arsenal was estimated to contain 55-65 ICBM's. [34]
In 2012, STRATCOM commander C. Robert Kehler said that the best estimates where "in the
range of several hundred" warheads and FAS estimated the current total to be "approximately
240 warheads".[35]
The U.S. Department of Defense 2013 report to Congress on China's military developments
stated that the Chinese nuclear arsenal consists of 50-75 ICBM's, located in both land-based
silo's and Ballistic missile submarineplatforms. In addition to the ICBM's, the report stated that
China has approximately 1,100 Short-range ballistic missiles, although it does not have the
warhead capacity to equip them all with nuclear weapons. [36]
Nuclear policy

China is one of the five nuclear weapons states (NWS) recognized by the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty, which China ratified in 1992. China is the only NWS [37] to give an
unqualified security assurance to non-nuclear-weapon states:
"China undertakes not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-
weapon States or nuclear-weapon-free zones at any time or under any circumstances."[38]
Chinese public policy has always been one of the "no first use rule" while maintaining a
deterrent retaliatory force targeted for countervalue targets.[1]
In 2005, the Chinese Foreign Ministry released a white paper stating that the government
"would not be the first to use [nuclear] weapons at any time and in any circumstance". In
addition, the paper went on to state that this "no first use" policy would remain unchanged in
the future and that China would not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against any non-
nuclear-weapon states or nuclear-weapon-free zones. [39]
Historically, China has been implicated in the development of the Pakistani nuclear program.
In the early 1980s, China is believed to have given Pakistan a "package" including uranium
enrichment technology, high-enriched uranium, and the design for a compact nuclear weapon
Delivery Systems Estimates

2010 IISS Military Balance

The following are estimates of China's strategic missile forces from the International Institute
of Strategic Studies Military Balance 2010.[41] According to these estimates, China has up to 90 inter-
continental range ballistic missiles (66 land-based ICBMs and 24 submarine-based JL-2 SLBMs), not
counting MIRV warheads.
Missil Estimated
Type
es Range
Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles
DF-5A (CSS-4 Mod 2) ICBM 20 13,000+ km
DF-31A (CSS-10 Mod 2) road-mobile
24 11,200+ km
ICBM
DF-31 (CSS-10) road-mobile ICBM 12 7,200+ km
DF-4 (CSS-3) ICBM 10 5,500 km
Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles
DF-3A (CSS-2 Mod) IRBM 2 3,000+ km
Medium Range Ballistic Missiles
DF-21C (CSS-5 Mod 3) road-mobile
36 1,750+ km
MRBM
DF-21 (CSS-5) road-mobile MRBM 80 1,750+ km
Short Range Ballistic Missiles
DF-15 (CSS-6) road-mobile SRBM 96 600 km
DF-11A (CSS-7 Mod 2) road-mobile
108 300 km
SRBM
Land Attack Cruise Missiles
DH-10 LACM 54 3,000+ km
Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles
JL-1 SLBM 12 1,770+ km
JL-2 SLBM 24 7,200+ km
Total 478
2010 DoD annual PRC military report[edit]

The following are estimates from the United States Department of Defense 2010 report to
Congress concerning the Military Power of the People's Republic of China [42]
Type Launchers Missiles Estimated Range
CSS-2 IRBM 5-10 15-20 3,000+ km
CSS-3 ICBM 10-15 15-20 5,400+ km
DF-5A (CSS-4)
20 20 13,000+ km
ICBM
DF-31 ICBM <10 <10 7,200+ km
DF-31A ICBM 10-15 10-15 11,200+ km
CSS-5 MRBM Mod
75-85 85-95 1,750+ km
1/2
CSS-6 SRBM 90-110 350-400 600 km
CSS-7 SRBM 120-140 700-750 300 km
DH-10 LACM 45-55 200-500 1,500+ km
JL-1 SLBM ? ? 1,770+ km
JL-2 SLBM ? ? 7,200+ km
Total 375-459 1395-1829
2006 FAS & NRDC report[edit]

The following table is an overview of PRC nuclear forces taken from a November 2006 report
by Hans M. Kristensen, Robert S. Norris, and Matthew G. McKinzie of the Federation of
American Scientists and the Natural Resources Defense Council titled Chinese Nuclear Forces
and U.S. Nuclear War Planning.[43]:202
Chinese Nuclear Forces, 2006
China Year Ra
U.S./NATO Warhea Number Warheads
designati deploy ng
designation d x yield deployed deployed
on ed e
Land-based missiles
3,
10
1 x 3.3
DF-3A CSS-2 1971 0 16 16
Mt
k
m
55
00 1 x 3.3
DF-4 CSS-3 1980 22 22
k Mt
m
13
,0
CSS-4 Mod 1 x 4-5
DF-5A 1981 00 20 20
2 Mt
k
m
DF-21A CSS-5 Mod 1991 2, 1 x 200- 35 35
1/2 15 300 kt
0
k
 m
7,
25
DF-31 (CSS-X-10) 2006? 0+ 1 x ? n.a. n.a.
k
m
11,
27
2007–
DF-31A n.a. 0+ 1 x ? n.a. n.a.
2009
k
m
Subtotal 93 93
Submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs)**
1,
77
1 x 200-
JL-1 CSS-NX-3 1986 0+ 12 12
300 kt
k
m
8,
00
2008-
JL-2 CSS-NX-4 0+ 1 x ? n.a. n.a.
2010 ?
k
m
Subtotal 12 12
Total strategic ballistic missiles 105 105
Aircraft***
3,
10
1-3 x
Hong-6 B-6 1965 0 100 20
bomb
k
m
(Q-5, 1x
Attack 20
others?) bomb
Subtotal 40
Short-range tactical weapons
60
0
DF-15 CSS-6 1990 1 x low ~300 ?
k
m
DH-10? (LACM) 2006- ~1 1 x low ? n.a. n.a.
2007 ? ,5
 00
k
m
?
Total ~145
Situation in 2013[edit]

After increasing under Bush, the number of Chinese nuclear armed missiles capable of
reaching North America leveled off under Obama with delays in bringing forth new
capabilities such as MIRV and operational sub launched missiles. [44] The U.S. DOD 2013
report to Congress continued to state that China had 50-75 ICBM's. [36] However the United
States-China Economic and Security Review Commission stated that it was possible for China
to finally have an operational Submarine-launched ballistic missile capability by the end of the
year.[45]
Land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles[edit]

Although unconfirmed, most Western analysts believe China has deployed anywhere from 18
to 36 Dongfeng 5 ("East Wind") intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) since the 1980s.
[citation needed]
The Dongfeng 5A is a single-warhead, three-stage, liquid-fueled missile with a range
of 13,000+ km. In 2000, General Eugene Habiger of the U.S. Air Force, then-commander of
the U.S. Strategic Command, testified before Congress that China has 18 silo-based DF-5s.[46]
Since the early 21st century, the Second Artillery Corps have also deployed up to 10 Solid-
fueled mobile DF-31 ICBMs, with a range of 7,200+ km and possibly up to 3 MIRVs.[47] China
has also developed the DF-31A, an intercontinental ballistic missile with a range of 11,200+
km with possibly 3-6 multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) capability.
China stores many of its missiles in huge underground tunnel complexes; US Representative
Michael Turner[48] referring to 2009 Chinese media reports said “This network of tunnels could
be in excess of 5,000 kilometers (3,110 miles), and is used to transport nuclear weapons and
forces,”,[49] the Chinese Army newsletter calls this tunnel system an underground Great Wall of
China.[50]
Medium range ballistic missiles[edit]

Approximately 55% of China's missiles are in the medium range category, targeted at regional
theater targets.[43]:61
DF-3A/CSS-2[edit]

Main article: DF-3A

DF-21/CSS-5[edit]
Main article: DF-21
Tactical cruise missiles[edit]

The CJ-10 long-range cruise missile made its first public appearance during the military parade
on the 60th Anniversary of the People's Republic of China as a part of the Second Artillery
Corps' long range conventional missile forces; the CJ-10 represents the next generation in
rocket weapons technology in the PLA. A similar naval cruise missile, the YJ-62, was also
revealed during the parade; the YJ-62 serves as the People's Liberation Army Navy's latest
development into naval rocketry.
Long range ballistic missiles[edit]

The Chinese categorize long-range ballistic missiles as ones with a range between 3000 and
8000 km.[43]:103
DF-4/CSS-3[edit]

Main article: DF-4

The Dong Feng 4 or DF-4 (also known as the CSS-3) is a long-range two-stage Chinese
intermediate-range ballistic missile with liquid fuel (nitric acid/UDMH). It was thought to be
deployed in limited numbers in underground silos beginning in 1980. [43]:67 The DF-4 has a
takeoff thrust of 1,224.00 kN, a takeoff weight of 82000 kg, a diameter of 2.25 m, a length of
28.05 m, and a fin span of 2.74 m. It is equipped with a 2190 kg nuclear warhead with 3300 kt
explosive yield, and its range is 5,500 km. [43]:68 The missile uses inertial guidance, resulting in a
relatively poor CEP of 1,500 meters.[citation needed]
Intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs)[edit]

DF-5A/CSS-4 Mod 2[edit]

Main article: DF-5

The Dongfeng 5 or DF-5 is a 3 stage Chinese ICBM. It has a length 32.6 m and a diameter of
3.35 m. It weighs 183 tonnes and has an estimated range of 12,000–15,000 kilometers. [43]:71–72
The DF-5 had its first flight in 1971 and was in operational service 10 years later. One of the
downsides of the missile was that it took between 30 and 60 minutes to fuel. [citation needed]
DF-31/CSS-10[edit]

Main article: DF-31

The Dong Feng 31 (a.k.a. CSS-10) is a medium-range, three stage, solid propellant
intercontinental ballistic missile developed by the People's Republic of China. It is a land-
based variant of the submarine-launched JL-2. It is operated by the Second Artillery Corps
(SAC) which is estimated to have 8-12 missiles in inventory[2]. [citation needed]
DF-41/CSS-X-10[edit]

Main article: DF-41

The DF-41 or CSS-X-10 is an intercontinental ballistic missile developed by China. It can
carry up to 10 nuclear warheads, which are maneuverable reentry vehicles. It has a range of
approximately 12,000-14,000 km and can cover any position on the planet. [51][52][53][54]
Nuclear cruise missiles[edit]

The US DoD estimated in 2006 that the PRC was developing ground- and air-launched cruise
missiles that could easily be converted to carry nuclear warheads once developed. [55]
DH-10[edit]

Main article: DH-10

The DongHai 10 (DH-10) is a cruise missile developed in the People's Republic of China.
According to Jane's Defense Weekly, the DH-10 is a second-generation land-attack cruise
missile (LACM), with over 4,000 km range, integrated inertial navigation system, GPS, terrain
contour mapping system, and digital scene-matching terminal-homing system. The missile is
estimated to have a circular error probable (CEP) of 10 meters.
CJ-10[edit]

Main article: CJ-10

The ChangJian-10 (Long Sword 10) is a cruise missile developed by China, based on the
Hongniao missile family. It has a range of 2,200 km. Although not confirmed, it is suspected
that the CJ-10 could carry nuclear warheads. An air-launched variant (named CJ-20) has also
been developed.[56][57]
HongNiao missile family[edit]

Main article: Hongniao missile

There are three missiles in this family: the HN-1, HN-2, and HN-3. Reportedly based on the
Kh-SD/65 missiles, the Hongniao (or Red Bird) missiles are some of the first nuclear-capable
cruise missiles in China. The HN-1 has a range of 600 km, the HN-2 has a range of 1,800 km,
and the HN-3 has a range of 3,000 km.[58][59][60]
ChangFeng missile family[edit]

Main article: Changfeng missile

There are 2 missiles in the Chang Feng (or Long Wind) family: CF-1 and CF-2. These are the
first domestically developed long-range cruise missiles for China. The CF-1 has a range of 400
km while the CF-2 has a range of 800 km. Both variants can carry a 10 kt nuclear warhead. [58]
[59]
Sea-based weapons[edit]

The submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) stockpile of the People's Liberation Army
Navy (PLAN) is thought to be relatively new. China launched its first second-generation
nuclear submarine in April 1981. The navy currently has a 1 Type 092 Xia class SSBN at
roughly 8000 tons displacement. A second Type 092 was reportedly lost in an accident in 1985.
The Type 092 is equipped with 12 JL-1 SLBMs with a range of 2150–2500 km. The JL-1 is a
modified DF-21 missile. It is suspected that the Type 092 is being converted into a cruise
missile submarine.
The Chinese navy has developed Type 094 ballistic missile submarine, open source satellite
imagery has shown that at least 2 of these have been completed. This submarine will be
capable of carrying 12 of the longer ranged, more modern JL-2s with a range of approximately
14000 km.[citation needed]
China is also developing the Type 096 submarine, claimed to be able to carry up to 24 JL-2
ballistic missiles each. Some Chinese sources states that the submarine is already undergoing
trials.[61]
Also a new nuclear attack submarine is under development, the Type 095 submarine.[62][63]
Heavy bomber group[edit]

China's bomber force consists mostly of Chinese-made versions of Soviet aircraft. The People's
Liberation Army Air Force has 120 H-6s (a variant of the Tupolev Tu-16). These bombers are
outfitted to carry nuclear as well as conventional weapons. While the H-6 fleet is aging, it is
not as old as the American B-52 Stratofortress.[43]:93–98 The Chinese have also produced the Xian
JH-7 Flying Leopard fighter-bomber with a range and payload exceeding the F-111 (currently
about 80 are in service) capable of delivering a nuclear strike. China has also bought the
advanced Sukhoi Su-30 from Russia; currently, about 100 Su-30s (MKK and MK2 variants)
have been purchased by China. The Su-30 is capable of carrying tactical nuclear weapons.[43]:102
China is alleged to be testing rumored new H-8 and H-9 strategic bombers which are either
described as an upgraded H-6 or an aircraft in the same class as the US B-2, able to carry
nuclear weapons.[64][65][66]
China is also testing the JH-7B strike fighter, a stealthy variant of the Xian JH-7.[67][68]

China's Nuclear Weapons

Present Capabilities
Last changed 1 May 2001
Given the People's Republic of China's size in terms of geography (third in the world, only
slightly behind Canada), population (number one), and economy (second largest in the world
by 1999 CIA equivalent purchasing power estimates, with current growth rates in the high
single digits), it seems inevitable that China (also called the PRC) will become the dominant
power in the world within a few decades. China's leaders are acutely aware of this fact, and are
also acutely aware that except for the last few centuries, China has consistently been the most
powerful and advanced society in the world for 3500 years. They undoubtedly intend that
China will have military capabilities commensurate with this once and future status.
Over the years China has certainly invested a much smaller amount of resources (although not
necessarily a much smaller proportion of its resources) to developing and deploying nuclear
weapons than either of the two superpowers. The exact size and composition of its nuclear
forces is very difficult to determine however due to strict secrecy. Force structure estimates
consequently are rather uncertain, and published estimates are even a bit mysterious. It is hard
to assess the ultimate source or reliability of the data provided.
Since the cut-off of aid to its nuclear weapons program in 1960 by the Soviet Union, most of
the technology used on the program has been developed indigenously. There has been (and
continues to be) considerable concern in the West about the export of this technology to non-
nuclear powers interested in acquiring these weapons. China is known to have given Pakistan
considerable assistance, possibly including actual warhead designs. Recent concern has
focused on Chinese deals with Iran. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, China has turned its
interest to obtaining more advanced nuclear technology from the successor to its old mentor.
Nihon Keizai Shimbun has reported that China bought computer simulation technology for
nuclear warheads from Russia during the mid-90s.
To date China has conducted many fewer nuclear tests than the United States or the Soviet
Union/Russia (less than 5% as many as either) and this discrepancy accounts for China's initial
reluctance to sign on to a permanent ban of all nuclear tests at the CTBT negotiations, although
these reservations have now been overcome since the conclusion of China's final test series
The final test series concluded in the spring and summer of 1996. According to Japanese
government sources (reported in Nihon Keizai Shimbun), the penultimate underground
Chinese nuclear test on 8 June 1996 (calculated at 20 to 80 kilotons) was actually a
simultaneous detonation of multiple warheads (a common practice by both the U.S. and
USSR). It was said to be part of a program to produce smaller warheads for submarine-
launched and multiple-targeted missiles. Overall, the yields since 1990 have suggested that two
warheads have been in development: one in the 100-300 kt range, and one in the 600-700 kt
range.
China's last nuclear test was detonated at 0149 GMT (9:49 p.m. EDT) on 29 July 1996.
According to the Australia Geological Survey Organization in Canberra its yield was 1 to 5
kilotons, with a seismic magnitude of Mb 4.3. This was China's 45th test, and its 22nd
underground one.
It is believed that with the conclusion of this series, China has completed development of a
range of warheads similar to the state of the art weapons developed by the other major nuclear
powers. These would be miniaturized hardened thermonuclear warheads with yields in the tens
to hundreds of kilotons, as well as warheads with variable yield options, and enhanced
radiation ("neutron bomb") warheads.
The subject of China's neutron bomb capability has been the subject of considerable public
attention over the last several years. China reportedly conducted a successful test of a neutron
bomb on 29 September 1988; in March 2000 a Chinese military newspaper threatened to use
neutron bombs to capture Taiwan if it declared independence. But most of the attention has
centered on alleged connections with the theft of nuclear secrets from the United States.
Allegations have circulated for over 20 years that U.S. nuclear weapon technology has been
leaked to China. CIA Director George Tenet reported in the 1999 "Intelligence Community
Damage Assessment" on Chinese spying, that China "obtained information on a variety of U.S.
weapon design concepts and weaponization features, including those of the neutron bomb."
As was reported by Dan Stober in the 13 April 2000 San Jose Mercury News, in 1981 Gwo-
Bao Min, a nuclear weapons engineer in the D-Division at the Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory, was forced to resign form the laboratory due to suspicions about having provided
China with information about U.S. neutron bomb technology from the W-70 warhead.
According to Stober:
Exactly how the government discovered the loss of neutron bomb secrets to China and what
led investigators to Min remain a secret.Sources outside the FBI say the agency is protecting
its source, which could be a spy or the clandestine interception of an electronic
communication.
Min continued to be investigated after his resignation by an FBI operation known as "Tiger
Trap". Stober interviewed a number of officials familiar with the case:"We did not design
nuclear warheads (in D-Division), but we had access to all that stuff," said one of Min's co-
workers. "They're classified documents and you go down and check them out. There's a
classified library and you sign your name to show what you checked out."

"If the information was compromised, (the damage) could have been quite severe," said
Houston T. Hawkins, an expert on Chinese nuclear weapons who is the top intelligence official
at Los Alamos. Hawkins directs the group that wrote the "damage assessment" in the wake of
the Tiger Trap case".
Although no prosecution ever developed from Tiger Trap, a December 1982 phone call
between Min and Los Alamos scientist Wen Ho Lee emerged as an important piece in the
infamous case against Lee two decades later.
Walter Pincus and Vernon Loeb reported in stories published in the Washington Post on 8 April
and 9 May 1999 that in 1997 another Chinese-American scientist named Peter H. Lee had been
arrested and pled guilty to verbally passing classified nuclear weapons information to Chinese
scientists while he was employed as a physicist at Los Alamos. Like Wen Ho Lee (who is
unrelated), Peter Lee is a naturalized citizen born in Taiwan. The 1985 incident for which he
was convicted involved a briefing Lee gave seven or more top Chinese nuclear scientists for
two hours in a small conference room at another Beijing hotel. According to Pincus and Loeb;
"He talked about laser fusion and even discussed problems the United States was having in its
nuclear weapons simulation program. He drew diagrams and supplied specifications. He
explained test data. And he described at least one portion of a classified paper he had written,
knowing that his disclosures violated the law.

"In December 1997 -- more than 12 years after the events, and after a six-year FBI
investigation that included agents tapping his phones for months, reading his e-mail and his
personal diaries, trailing him to China and conducting a polygraph -- Lee finally confessed and
pleaded guilty. He was not paid by the Chinese for information, receiving only some travel
expenses in 1997, and there was no evidence he disclosed classified information other than
what he, himself, had described".
Ironically even though Peter Lee pled to passing classified defense information to unauthorized
recipients (for which he was sentenced in March 1998 to a five-year prison term, suspended in
favor of 12 months in a halfway house, a $20,000 fine and 3,000 hours of community service),
by the time of his arrest much of the information on laser fusion had been declassified (in
1993). But a DOE impact analysis of Lee's disclosures completed in February 1998 held that
the information "was of significant material assistance to the PRC in their nuclear weapons
development program, ... This analysis indicates that Dr. Lee's activities have directly
enhanced the PRC nuclear weapons program to the detriment of U.S. national security." Lee
had also revealed current classified information to Chinese scientists in 1997 about his work at
TRW involving space radar imaging of submarines.
By far the most celebrated case of actual and alleged Chinese-American nuclear espionage
involved the case against Los Alamos nuclear scientist Wen Ho Lee. This saga grew out of a
strange incident in 1995, in which a Chinese intelligence agent walked in to a U.S. diplomatic
office unannounced and handed over a collection of highly classified Chinese documents,
which included a 1988 Chinese document that made reference to design features of America's
miniaturized nuclear warheads. The CIA later concluded that, for unknown reasons, this "walk-
in" had acted at the direction of Chinese intelligence.
Of particular interest were some design details of the W-88 warhead, America's most
sophisticated design. The details fell far short of evidence that China had obtained anything
close to a complete design however, a fact that was often ignored in the later controversy, and
it transpired could have been obtained from documents about the warhead distributed at many
sites around the country and accessible to thousands of people. Nonetheless, because the
warhead design had originated at Los Alamos, an FBI investigation focused there, and because
Wen Ho Lee was the only Chinese-American employed in the X-Division, he quickly became
the focus of the investigation. Lee's early appearance in Tiger Trap essentially clenched him as
the prime (and sole) suspect in the eyes of Department of Energy investigator Notra Trulock.
The Wen Ho Lee investigation was kicked into hyperdrive when the Cox Committee,
organized to investigate the transmission of space and missile technology to China, got wind of
it and hastily added a sensationalized section on nuclear weapon espionage to the committees
final report in December 1998. Virtually no attention was paid to Chinese nuclear spying
allegations until a front-page 6 March 1999 New York Times story about the investigation.
DOE Secretary Richardson fired Wen Ho Lee two days later. During the next 18 months
circumspection was rarely seen in pronouncements made politicians, pundits, and officials. The
extravagant claims made about Lee and supposed intelligence compromises led to Lee's arrest,
extended imprisonment in solitary confinement, threats of capital punishment, and sworn
testimony by government witnesses that was later admitted to be false. In the end the
espionage case utterly collapsed with no evidence of spying by Lee ever having been found.
Finally a plea agreement was reached on 13 September 2000 in which Lee pleaded guilty to
one count of improperly handling classified information and was released.
As far as can be determined from publicly available information, there appears to be no real
evidence of China obtaining actual nuclear warhead designs from the U.S. At most the
information seems to have been information about warhead design and technology, possibly
quite sketchy, that would help guide Chinese research and development down the most
productive tracks. Without detailed designs of warheads ("blueprints"), Chinese weapons
would necessarily be based on indigenous designs even if they incorporated design features
and concepts derived from U.S. systems.
China's nuclear delivery system program's have traditionally proceeded very slowly. This has resulted in
the deployment of forces that have been one to two decades behind the other nuclear powers in technology
(although cause and effect may be reversed, lack of advanced technology may have been the cause of such
tardy deployments). It is believed that fewer than 250 ballistic missiles have ever been deployed (with only
the first cryogenic liquid fuel missile having been retired). The vast majority of China's arsenal is not
capable of reaching the United States, and thus seems geared towards deterring (or threatening) its
immediate neighbors.

DF-3 Missile DF-4 Missile

The oldest weapon in China's missile arsenal, the single stage liquid fueled DF-3 deployed in 1971, is gradually being
retired. The DF-3 has a range of 2800 km. The DF-4 missile has a range of 4750 km, making it capable of reaching any
part of Russia.

Current estimates assert that only about 20 ICBMs are in service - the Dong Feng (East Wind)-5A. This
figure is surprising in light of China's ability to produce the same basic booster in larger numbers as the
Long March 2 satellite launcher. The U.S. government has stated that in 1981 there were DF-5As deployed
in hardened silos at two sites. It is thought to carry the largest warhead ever tested by China (4-5 Mt).
 Long March
DF-5 Missile
Booster

China has placed little emphasis on aircraft as a strategic weapon carrier. The Hong-6 and
Qian-5 are short-medium range, light payload aircraft suitable more for tactical or regional-
strategic operations. The main bomber, the Hong-6, is based on the Tu-16 Badger which
entered Soviet service in 1955 and first flew in China on 27 September 1959. This plane was
used to drop two live nuclear weapons in tests: a fission bomb in May 1965 and a megaton-
range thermonuclear bomb in June 1967.
The Xian Aircraft Company has been developing the Hong-7 (FB-7), a supersonic fighter-bomber, for over
10 years, but no date has been given for its deployment. The most attractive possibility for modernization
of the air arm is simply to purchase advanced fighter bombers from Russia (where they are readily
available on easy terms) and modify them to carry Chinese nuclear weapons. China has already purchased
24 Su-27SK and 2 Su-27UBK Flankers (in 1992). Russia has also sold production rights for the Su-27 to
China, and an assembly plant has been set up at Shenyang. The first two Chinese-made SU-27s flew in
December 1998. China plans to build at least 200 SU-27s over the next 15 years. There is no information
available to indicate that they have been assigned a nuclear role however.

Julang-1 Missile DF-21 (CSS-5) Missile

China has had a rather unsuccessful ballistic missile submarine program. China has only one operational ballistic missile
submarine, theXia (No. 406). This 6500 ton nuclear-powered boat was laid down in 1978, and launched in April 1981
from the Huludao Shipyard and Naval Base on the northern Bohai Gulf but achieved operational status only with great
difficulty. The first attempt to fire a missile from the Xia failed in 1985, and it entered service only after a successful test
launch was conducted on 27 September 1988. It was deployed to the Jianggezhuang Submarine Base, where the nuclear
warheads for the missiles are believed to be stored, in January 1989. A second submarine was reportedly launched in
1982, but is not now in service. Unsubstantiated reports claim it was lost in a 1985 accident. The Xia underwent a
modernization refit beginning in 1995. It has never sailed beyond China's regional waters and is believed incapable of
deployment to distant areas. The submarine is armed with the Julang-1 (Giant Wave, or Tsunami) two-stage solid fuel
missile, which was first test fired 30 April 1982. The Julang-1 was adapted to land service as the DF-21 (CSS-5). There
will very probably be no more submarines of this class. A new design (Type 094) submarine, to be equipped with the
longer range three stage Julang-2, a variant of the DF-31, is been under development for several years but probably won't
see deployment for several more.

Much less is known about Chinese tactical nuclear weapons, which are believed to comprise a large part of
the Chinese nuclear arsenal. The neutron bomb claimed by China is strictly a tactical weapon (designed for
use against armored vehicles). China has conducted a number of low yield tests that may have been tactical
weapons, and a large military exercise incorporating simulated nuclear weapons was held in June 1982.
China's M-family of tactical ballistic missiles, the M-9, M-11 and M-18, are believed to be nuclear
capable. Taiwanese officials have said that over the last four years the number of M-family missiles in
China's three southern provinces nearby, have increased from 30-50 to 160-200 today. Estimates of
Chinese tactical warheads range from 100 to 200, with yields from a few kilotons to hundreds of kilotons.

Chinese Tactical Forces: End of 2000

R
Pay
an Accu
loa
Delivery Entry into ge racy Warhead Number Launcher
d
Systems Service (k (CEP and Type Number
(kg
m , m)
)
)

60
M-9 1988 500 300 Single HE or nuclear ?
0
30
M-11 1988 500 < 300 <="" td=""> ?
0
M-18 1990s? Single HE or nuclear ?

Grand Total 120 [1]

Notes

1. Nuclear armed.

Chinese Strategic Forces: End of 2000

 Total
Warhead Total
Yield
Weapon Launcher Loading Warhead Yield
(Equiv
Designations Number (Number x Number (Gross
Mt)
Mt) Mt)
[1]

Land Based Missiles

Dong Feng-3A 1 x 2-3.3, or 3

16.3-
(DF-3A) 40 MRV 50-100 40 6-132
88.7
CSS-2 (NATO) kt
Dong Feng-4 (DF-
31.7-
4) 20 1 x 2-3.3 20 40-66
44.3
CSS-3 (NATO)
Dong Feng-5A
50.4-
(DF-5A) 20 1 x 4-5 20 80-100
58.4
CSS-4 (NATO)
Dong Feng-21A
16.4-
(DF-21A) 48 1 x 0.20-0.50 48 9.6-24
30.2
CSS-5 (NATO)
Dong Feng-31 (DF-
0 MIRV x ? 0 0 0
31)

SLBMs/Submarines

Julang (JL)-1
12 1 x 0.20-0.50 12 2.4-6 4.1-7.6
CSS-N-3 (NATO)
Xia Class
1 12 x JL-1
Submarine

Aircraft

kt to Mt
Hong-6 (H-6);
120 1-3 x bomb 120 (120 120 [2]
B-6 (NATO)
[2])
Qian-5 (Q-5); kt to Mt
30 1 x bomb 30 30 [2]
A-5 (NATO) (30 [2])

Grand Total 288-478 269-379

Notes

1. Equivalent megatonnage (EMT) is based on the relative blast effect and is calculated by Y 2/3
where Y is the yield in megatons.
2. Assumes 1 Mt nominal average yield (both gross and EMT).
 Chinese Delivery Systems and Characteristics

Ra Accur
Payl
Entry into nge acy Warhead Number and
Delivery Systems oad
Service (k (CEP, Type
(kg)
m) m)

Land-Based Missiles

Dong Feng-3A (DF-

280 1 x 2-3.3 Mt, or 3 MRV
3A) 1971 2150 1000
0 50-100 kt
CSS-2 (NATO)
Dong Feng-4 (DF-4) 475
1980 2200 1 x 2-3.3 Mt
CSS-3 (NATO) 0
Dong Feng-5A (DF-
130
5A) 1981 3200 500 1 x 4-5 Mt
00
CSS-4 (NATO)
Dong Feng-21A
180
(DF-21A) 1985 600 1 x 0.20-0.50 Mt
0
CSS-5 (NATO)
Dong Feng-31 (DF- 800
2001? MIRV x ?
31) 0
12-
New ICBM 2010? 130 MIRV x ?
00

SLBMs/Submarines

Julang (JL)-1 170

1987 600 1 x 0.20-0.50 Mt
CSS-N-3 (NATO) 0
Xia Class Submarine 1987 12 x JL-1
Julang (JL)-2 800
2010? 600 1 x 0.20-0.50 Mt
CSS-NX-4 (NATO) 0

Aircraft

Hong-6 (H-6); 310

1965 4500 1-3 x bomb (kt to Mt)
B-6 (NATO) 0
Qian-5 (Q-5);
1970 400 1500 1 x bomb (kt to Mt)
A-5 (NATO)
Notes
Principal sources for the section on China are:
 Nuclear Weapons Databook Volume 5: British, French, and Chinese Nuclear Weapons
Robert S. Norris, Andrew S. Burrows, Richard W. Fieldhouse; 1994, NRDC (Natural
Resources Defense Council)/Westview Press;
 Chinese Nuclear Forces, 2000 Robert S. Norris, William M. Arkin; Bulletin of the
Atomic Scientists, November/December 2000, pp. 78-79.
 Janes Strategic Weapon Systems by the Janes Information Group
 News service reports from the San Jose Mercury News, Washington Post, the New York
Times, Reuters, the Associated Press, and Agence France-Presse.