Documenti di Didattica
Documenti di Professioni
Documenti di Cultura
P-11-
3019
A.M. No. P-11-3019
"x x x.
The Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service 27 govern the
conduct of disciplinary and non-disciplinary proceedings in administrative
cases. In Section 3, it provides that, “Administrative investigations shall be
conducted without necessarily adhering strictly to the technical rules of
procedure and evidence applicable to judicial proceedings.”
For these reasons, only substantial evidence is required to find Malunao guilty
of the administrative offense. In the hierarchy of evidentiary values, substantial
evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable man might
accept as adequate to justify a conclusion, is the lowest standard of proof
provided under the Rules of Court. In assessing whether there is substantial
evidence in administrative investigations such as this case, the Court is not
bound by technical rules of procedure and evidence.
Dela Cruz, in her Sinumpaang Salaysay dated 8 May 2008, claimed that
Malunao tried to extort money from her in exchange for a favorable resolution
in the case pending before Judge Flor in Branch 28. In the entrapment operation
conducted by the NBI, Malunao was arrested when she received ₱15,000.00
from Dela Cruz.
A criminal complaint for robbery with extortion was filed against Malunao with
attached supporting documents such as the Complaint Sheet, Sinumpaang
Salaysay of Dela Cruz, Affidavit of Arrest, Booking Sheet and Arrest Report,
photocopy of the marked money, photos of Malunao entering the house of Dela
Cruz and while in the house of Dela Cruz, and photos of the contents of her bag
after Malunao received the marked money. As a consequence of this case,
Judge Flor filed a criminal complaint against Malunao for violation of Section
3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019) and Section
7(d) of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees (R.A. No. 6713), which complaint was referred to this Court by the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor and now docketed as A.M. No. P-09-2732.
Malunao, on the other hand, claims that she was framed by Dela Cruz, and that
she received ₱15,000.00 as a loan. Malunao, however, did not impute any ill-
motive to Dela Cruz on why the latter would frame her.
Malunao has three administrative cases filed against her, aside from the present
case, all alleging the same conduct of extortion and solicitation. In Estabillo v.
Malunao, docketed as A.M. OCA IPI No. 08-2974-P, Estabillo, in her Affidavit,
claims that Malunao, in July 2006, asked money from her in exchange for a
favorable decision in a case pending before Judge Flor of Branch 28 where
Estabillo was a defendant. Estabillo gave Malunao ₱10,000.00. On November
2007, Estabillo learned that an administrative case was filed against Malunao
due to her practice of collecting money from litigants. After Estabillo
confronted Malunao, Malunao promised to return the ₱10,000.00. However, the
amount remains unpaid, so Estabillo filed the complaint against Malunao in
A.M. No. OCA IPI No. 08-2974-P.
The third case, Judge Fernando F. Flor v. Malunao (A.M. No. P-09-2732), is
an offshoot of this case. Judge Flor of Branch 28 where Malunao is employed
as Clerk III filed an administrative complaint against Malunao for soliciting
money from Dela Cruz with the promise of a favorable decision from Judge
Flor.
To date, none of these three administrative cases against Malunao has finally
been resolved by this Court.
In the present case, Malunao clearly used her position as Clerk III in Branch 28
to solicit money from Dela Cruz with the promise of a favorable decision. This
violation of Section 2, Canon 1 of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel
constitutes the offense of grave misconduct meriting the penalty of dismissal.
Dela Cruz’s Sinumpaang Salaysay, the joint affidavit of arrest executed by the
NBI agents, the Booking Sheet and Arrest Report, photocopy of the marked
money, the Complaint Sheet, and the photographs of Malunao entering Dela
Cruz’s house, and the contents of Malunao’s bag after receipt of the money, all
prove by subsantial evidence the guilt of Malunao for the offense of grave
misconduct.
What is more alarming and disconcerting is the fact that Malunao has continued
to solicit money from litigants, even after she had been preventively suspended
as Clerk III. Malunao has the propensity to abuse a position of public service
and is not fit to remain in the civil service.
x x x."
Some jurisprudence on
administrative cases involving
grave misconduct
By
Toni Umali, Esq.
-
February 22, 2015
Share on Facebook
Tweet on Twitter
OUR last column discussing a
hypothetical case on dishonesty generated several comments and requests
for us to discuss other offenses that may have been committed by the
“respondent” in said hypothetical case.
For example, the additional facts of the case is that the respondent
government official (let’s call him “Mr. X”) under the aforementioned
situation knows that the authority to sign that document lies with the head
of his division and that he is just claiming that it is okay for him to sign such
document because the head is “absent or is on leave.” Mr. X’s colleagues
said, “he should wait for the head of the office to sign the document,” but he
insisted since “the same document shall be reviewed by some other higher
authorities in the region anyway and so it is now up to such higher
authorities to disallow the act he has done.”
What happened now in our hypothetical case is that the “higher authorities
in the region” approved the document signed by Mr. X, and then authorized
some payments to some third persons based on that document, since the
“higher authorities in the region” just approved the document signed by Mr.
X without even reviewing the document that he is approving. (Please take
note that Mr. X is not even designated as the “officer in charge” of his
division.)
Without discussing the liability of the “higher authorities in the region,” Mr.
X may be held liable here for Grave Misconduct.
In this case, Mr. X knew that he has no authority to sign. Mere absence of
the head of the office does not necessarily give Mr. X the authority to sign
the documents that may only be validly signed by the head of such office.
Mr. X’s contention—that “the same document shall be reviewed by some
other higher authorities in the region anyway and so it is now up to such
higher authorities to disallow the act he has done”—is totally misplaced and
has no legal leg to stand on.
SOURCE: OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR VS. CLAUDIO M. LOPEZ (A.M. NO. P-
10-2788, 18 JANUARY 2011, CORONA, C.J. ) SUBJECT: QUANTUM OF EVIDENCE
REQUIRED IN ADMIN CASES; DEFINITION OF MISCONDUCT AND WHEN IT IS GRAVE.
(BRIEF TITLE: OCA VS. LOPEZ).
x- – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – x
WHAT IS MISCONDUCT?
WHAT IS CORRUPTION?
No.
We agree with the findings and recommendation of both the Investigating Judge and
the OCA that respondent committed grave misconduct which, under Section 52 (A)(3),
Rule IV of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases, is a grave offense punishable
by dismissal even for the first offense.
Thus, the petitioner’s liability under the given facts only involves simple misconduct.
As Branch Manager of the GSIS Naga Field Office, he is presumed to know all existing
policies, guidelines and procedures in carrying out the agency’s mandate in the area.
By approving the loan applications of eight GSIS Naga Field Office employees who did
not fully meet the required qualifications, he committed a serious lapse of judgment
sufficient to hold him liable for simple misconduct.
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
NO. THERE MUST BE DELIBERATE DEFIANCE OF THE RULES. THE CSC’S FINDINGS ON
THE PETITIONER’S ACTIONS PRIOR TO THE APPROVAL OF THE LOANS NEGATE THE
PRESENCE OF ANY INTENT ON THE PETITIONER’S PART TO DELIBERATELY DEFY THE
POLICY OF THE GSIS. FIRST, GSIS BRANCH MANAGERS HAVE BEEN GRANTED IN THE
PAST THE AUTHORITY TO APPROVE LOAN APPLICATIONS BEYOND THE PRESCRIBED
REQUIREMENTS OF GSIS; SECOND, THERE WAS A CUSTOMARY LENIENT PRACTICE IN
THE APPROVAL OF LOANS EXERCISED BY SOME BRANCH MANAGERS
NOTWITHSTANDING THE EXISTING GSIS POLICY; AND THIRD, THE PETITIONER FIRST
SOUGHT THE APPROVAL OF HIS IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR BEFORE ACTING ON THE LOAN
APPLICATIONS. THESE CIRCUMSTANCES RUN COUNTER TO THE CHARACTERISTIC
FLAGRANT DISREGARD OF THE RULES THAT GRAVE MISCONDUCT REQUIRES.
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
WHAT IS MISCONDUCT?
XXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
AS FOLLOWS:
Flagrant disregard of rules is a ground that jurisprudence has already touched upon.
It has been demonstrated, among others, in the instances when there had been open
defiance of a customary rule; [4][23] in the repeated voluntary disregard of established
rules in the procurement of supplies; [5][24] in the practice of illegally collecting fees
more than what is prescribed for delayed registration of marriages; [6][25] when several
violations or disregard of regulations governing the collection of government funds
were committed; [7][26] and when the employee arrogated unto herself responsibilities
that were clearly beyond her given duties. [8][27] The common denominator in these
cases was the employee’s propensity to ignore the rules as clearly manifested by his
or her actions.
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
SUSPENSION FOR ONE MONTH AND ONE DAY TO SIX MONTHS FOR THE FIRST OFFENSE
AND DISMISSAL FOR THE SECOND OFFENSE.
XXXXXXXXXXXXX
BUT PETITIONER HAS COMMITTED THE OFFENSE TWICE. WHY SHOULD HIS PENALTY BE
NOT DISMISSAL?
BECAUSE IT IS NOT PROPORTIONATE TO THE NATURE AND EFFECT OF HIS
TRANSGRESSION.
The Revised Uniform Rules of the Civil Service (Civil Service Rules) classifies simple
misconduct as a less grave offense. Under Section 52(B) (2), Rule IV of the Civil
Service Rules, the commission of simple misconduct is penalized by suspension for
one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months for the first offense, and dismissal
from the service for the second offense. While records show that this is not the
petitioner’s first offense as he was previously suspended for one (1) year for neglect
of duty, we believe that his dismissal would be disproportionate to the nature and
effect of the transgression he committed as the GSIS did not suffer any prejudice
through the loans he extended; these loans were for GSIS employees and were duly
paid for. Thus, for his second simple misconduct, we impose on the petitioner the
penalty of suspension from the lapse of his preventive suspension by GSIS up to the
finality of this Decision. [9][28]
==================
Share this: