Name: Buddy Brylle P.

Ybanez
Title: Bagaoisan v. NTA
TOPIC: Power to Reorganize by the President
REFERENCE: G.R. No. 152845.
FACTS: President Estrada issued several Eos reorganizing the National Tobacco
Administration. The NTA prepared and adopted a new Organization Structure and
Staffing Pattern. Petitioners were rank and file employees of NTA who were terminated
and were not considered in the OSSP.
Petitioners files a motion questioning the legality and constitutionality of the
reorganization of NTA by the President.
ISSUE: Whether or not the reorganization of the President of the NTA is constitutional.
RULING: Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that this involved neither an abolition nor transfer
of offices. The assailed action was merely reorganization under the general provisions of
the law consisting mainly of streamlining the NTA in the interest of simplicity, economy
and efficiency. It was then an act well within the authority of the President which was
carried out in good faith.
Title: Buklod ng Kawaning v. Zamora
TOPIC: Power to Reorganize by the President
REFERENCE: G.R. No. 142801.
FACTS: Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau was created. However,
President Estrada issued an Executive Order deactivating said Bureau. Its functions were
transferred to the newly created Task Force Aduana which utilized the personnel, facilities
and resources of existing departments, agencies, and bureaus. Thus, no new employees
were hired. Another EO was issued separating all EIIB personnel from the service.
Aggrieved, the employees of the EIIB, without exhausting administrative remedies and
hierarchy of courts, resorted to challenge the EO as violative of their rights to security of
tenure and usurpation by the President of the power of the Congress to abolish public
office.
Petitioners files a motion questioning the legality and constitutionality of the
reorganization of NTA by the President.
ISSUE: Whether or not the reorganization of the President of the EIIB is constitutional.
RULING: Yes. General rule is that the power to abolish lies with the legislature. However,
the President may abolish, in good faith, bureaus, agencies or offices pursuant to Sec.
31, Book III of EO 292, Sec. 28 of RA 7645, Sec. 20 of Book III of E.O. No. 292, and
Section 78 of R.A. 8760.
Where an office is abolished to achieve the ultimate purpose of economy, as in the case
at bar, the same is made in good faith.
Iron and Steel Authority vs Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 102976, October 25, 1995
Facts:
Petitioner Iron and Steel Authority ("ISA") was created by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
272 generally to develop and promote the iron and steel industry in the Philippines.

P.D. No. 272 initially created petitioner ISA for a term of five (5) years. When ISA's original
term expired, its term was extended for another ten (10) years by Executive Order No.
555.

The National Steel Corporation (NSC) then a wholly owned subsidiary of the National
Development Corporation which is an entity wholly owned by the National Government
embarked on an expansion program which includes the construction of a steel mill in
Iligan City. Proclamation No. 2239 was issued by the President withdrawing from sale or
settlement a tract of land in Iligan City to be used by the NSC. However, certain portions
of the public land under Proclamation 2239 were occupied by Maria Cristina Fertilizer Co.
(MCFC). LOI No. 1277 was issued directing NSC to negotiate with the owners of MCFC
for and on behalf of the Government for the compensation of MCFC’s present occupancy
rights on the subject land. The LOI directed that ISA may exercise the power of eminent
domain should the negotiations fail. The negotiations failed and ISA commenced
expropriation proceedings against MCFC. While trial was on-going the statutory existence
of ISA had expired prompting MCFC to file the dismissal of the case since ISA has
ceased to be a juridical person.
The trial court granted MCFC’s motion to dismiss anchoring on the Rules of Court that
“only natural or juridical persons or entities authorized by law may be parties to a
civil case.” ISA moved for a reconsideration contending that despite the expiration of its
term, its juridical existence continued until the winding up of its affairs could be completed.
In the alternative ISA urged that the Republic of the Philippines should be allowed to be
substituted in its place. The RTC denied its motion for reconsideration. This was affirmed
by the CA. The Court of Appeals held that petitioner ISA, "a government regulatory
agency exercising sovereign functions," did not have the same rights as an ordinary
corporation and that the ISA, unlike corporations organized under the Corporation Code,
was not entitled to a period for winding up its affairs after expiration of its legally mandated
term, with the result that upon expiration of its term on 11 August 1987, ISA was
"abolished and [had] no more legal authority to perform governmental functions." The
Court of Appeals went on to say that the action for expropriation could not prosper
because the basis for the proceedings, the ISA's exercise of its delegated authority to
expropriate, had become ineffective as a result of the delegate's dissolution, and could
not be continued in the name of Republic of the Philippines

Issue:
Whether or not the Republic of the Philippines is entitled to be substituted for ISA in view
of the expiration of ISA’s term

Ruling:

ISA was vested with some of the powers or attributes normally associated with juridical
personality. There is, however, no provision in P.D. No. 272 recognizing ISA as
possessing general or comprehensive juridical personality separate and distinct from that
of the Government. The ISA in fact appears to the Court to be a non-incorporated agency
or instrumentality of the Republic of the Philippines, or more precisely of the Government
of the Republic of the Philippines. It is common knowledge that other agencies or
instrumentalities of the Government of the Republic are cast in corporate form, that is to
say, are incorporated agencies or instrumentalities, sometimes with and at other times
without capital stock, and accordingly vested with a juridical personality distinct from the
personality of the Republic. Among such incorporated agencies or instrumentalities are:
National Power Corporation; Philippine Ports Authority; National Housing Authority;
Philippine National Oil Company; Philippine National Railways; Public Estates
Authority; Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration, and so forth. It is worth noting that
the term "Authority" has been used to designate both incorporated and non-incorporated
agencies or instrumentalities of the Government.

The Court considers that ISA is properly regarded as an agent or delegate of the Republic
of the Philippines.

The Republic itself is a body corporate and juridical person vested with full panoply of
powers and attributes which are compendiously described as “legal personality.” When
the statutory term of a non-incorporated agency expires, the powers, duties and functions
as well as the assets and liabilities of that agency revert back to, and are re-assumed by,
the Republic of the Philippines, in the absence of special provisions of law specifying
some other disposition thereof such as e.g. devolution or transmission of
such powers, duties, functions, etc. to some other identified successor agency or instru
mentality of the Republic of thePhilippines. When the expiring agency is an incorporated
one, the consequences of such expiry must be looked for, in the first instance, in the
charter of that agency and, by way of supplementation in the provisions of the
Corporation Code.

Since ISA is a non-incorporated agency or instrumentality of the Republic, its powers,

duties, functions, assets and liabilities are properly regarded as folded back into the
Government of the Philippines and hence assumed once again bythe Republic, no special
statutory provision having been shown to have mandated succession thereto by some
other entity or agency of the Republic.

It follows that the Republic of the Philippines is entitled to be substituted in the

expropriation proceedings as party-plaintiff in lieu of ISA, the statutory term of ISA
having expired. The expiration of ISA’s statutory did not by itself require or justify the
dismissal of the eminent domain proceedings. Further, no new legislative act is necessary
should the Republic decide, upon being substituted for ISA, in fact to continue to
prosecute the expropriation proceedings