Accounttn~ Organtzations and Society, Vol. 18, No. 2/3, pp. 231-25 2,1993. 0 3 6 1 - 3 6 8 2 / 9 3 $6.00+.

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Printed in Great Britain Pergamon Press Ltd

ACCOUNTING FOR OURSELVES: ACCOUNTING PRACTICE AND THE

DISCOURSE OF ETHICS*

WlI.I.IAM SCHWEIKER
The University of Chicago

Abstract

This essay is a hermeneutical and ethical examination of t h e activity of giving an account as basic to
understanding the moral d i m e n s i o n of accounting practice and research. The author argues that this
discursive act is o n e in w h i c h t h e identity of agents is displayed as intersubjective and constituted by
fiduciary relations through time. The essay seeks to s h o w that by rendering an identity so conceived,
accounting practice o p e n s corporate forces to ethical evaluation regarding wider h u m a n purposes. T h u s
the essay raises to reflection the activity basic to accounting itself. In doing so, it unfolds t h e structure and
significance of this activity for moral identity.

Ours is a time of moral turmoil and ethical strife.
From the e c o n o m i c and political fallout of the
Savings and Loan crisis to environmental
disasters and the whirl o f - d e b a t e about cor-
porate responsibility that surrounded them,
there is no mistaking the fact of moral problems
in our e c o n o m i c life. And beneath all of these
specific disputes is the ongoing and unresolved
question of the just distribution of goods and ser-
vices in a market driven economy. In this admit-
tedly confused situation ethical debates often pit
dogmatists fearful of moral anarchy against those
w h o proclaim a relativism b o r n of suspicions
about all system of belief (see MacIntyre, 1981,
King, 1986). Our public life is in constant confu-
sion about h o w w e should live while the prob-
lems calling for answers continue to m o u n t and
to press u p o n us.
Despite this confusion, the need for e c o n o m i c
accountability in our world situation cannot be
doubted. If it is impossible to render e c o n o m i c
forces morally accountable, then h u m a n beings
have b e c o m e s slaves to their o w n financial and
corporate creations and the earth is subjected to
unending exploitation under the aegis of
"efficiency". The history of this century is one of
such servitude and destruction. As bleak as this
all sounds, it has at long last awakened theo-
logians, philosophers, cultural critics,
economists and accounting researchers from
their theoretical slumbers and set them to w o r k
at addressing issues of real h u m a n relevance. My
h o p e is to contribute in s o m e small way to this
r e n e w e d c o n c e r n for the particulars of practical
life.
One approach to these matters would be to
explore directly the pressing question of
accountability for social and distributive justice
in our e c o n o m i c life. However, such arguments
often run aground on the p r o b l e m of h o w to
speak about corporate and personal agents. If w e
cannot make sense of "who" is acting, it is dif-
ficult to imagine h o w w e might legitimate and
specify the claims of justice. An important first
step, therefore, to putting accounting research
and practice in the service of wider h u m a n pur-

"The author w o u l d like to thank C. Edward Arrington, Jane E. Jadlns, T e r e n c e J. Martin, Jr, and the a n o n y m o u s reviewers for
Accounting Organizations and Society for their helpful c o m m e n t s on this essay.

231
 232 WILLIAMSCHWEIKER
poses is to explore what is entailed in giving an
account of the identity of agents. The title of
this essay signals its task. I want to explore the
general topic of h o w to speak of moral agents
as beings w h o give accounts of themselves.
Admittedly, this is a "philosophical" argument
in the wide sense of the term rather than an
inquiry into the details of accounting research.
Yet I hope it helps us understand the ethical
import of accounting practice and research.
To explore something ethically means to take
up Socrates's question as still a complex and
engaging one for us: "how should we live?" What
I try to demonstrate is that accounting practice
and research can be seen as helping us undertake
such reflection by discursively portraying the
identity of economic agents. It exercises this
task, I argue, within a temporal and fiduciary
relation of accountants to clients and the wider
public through its own specific discourse. I
admit that this might appear counterfactual, as a
strange depiction of actual accounting practice.
Too often accountants and research scholars do
not see themselves as giving an account in this
way. They understand their work in purely func-
tional terms with a keen sense of the difference
between its language and the discourse of ethics.
Yet if ethics is to aid in understanding h o w we
should live, then it must help us see dimensions
of existence, experience and language often
overlooked or denied. To understand the moral
character of giving an account requires that we
grasp the possibilities and demands it entails for
those w h o undertake it. In doing so, we will see
that the accounting profession has a moral task
since it makes possible claims about h o w identi-
fiable agents can and must live in relation to
others and themselves. In this, accounting is in
the service of moral as well as economic reflec-
tion.
My argument will move in several interrelated
steps. First, I want to clarify what this essay
attempts to show and h o w it will do so over and
against other approaches to talking about
agency. Next, I will isolate the specific problems
about agency which must be addressed as well as
larger issues in dispute within current moral
philosophy. While some of these concerns may
seem peripheral to accounting practice and
research, we will see that they bear directly on
the moral problems facing accountants and
scholars. I will then turn, third, to the relation of
accountability to moral identity. This section of
the paper forms the core of the argument. I seek
to bring to reflection the moral dimension
implicit in the everyday act of giving an account.
Finally, I will return to the debates in ethics in
order to draw together the sum and substance of
my argument as it bears on moral problems in
accounting practice and research. Throughout I
hope to show that the task of giving an account
is crucial to our life and well-being.
PERSPECTIVES ON ACTION: SETFING THE
ARGUMENT
The thesis of this essay is simple enough. It is
this. The discursive act of giving an account is
one activity in which moral identity is enacted
through time. By exploring the act of giving an
account I claim we learn something about moral
existence that is important for accounting
research and practice since these are defined by
just this activity. The remainder of the argument
is nothing more than an elucidation of this thesis
in order to show h o w it is a fitting interpretation
of the moral dimension of accounting practice
and research. However, before undertaking that
elucidation we confront two prior issues of con-
siderable m o m e n t for the argument. First, there
is the issue of the perspective from which the
argument will be carried out. The second
question concerns the kind of claims I will be
making.
Jiirgen Habermas (1990, pp. 2 1 - 4 2 ) has
noted that there have been at least two perspec-
tives from which human action has been
examined. These are well known, but they bear
mentioning. One is the observer's perspective
often identified with theoretical and scientific
thought and characterized by a third-person
attitude. The c o n c e r n of the observer is to adopt
a detached posture in order to make proposi-
tional claims about a state of affairs. We want to
know, for instance, what actually happened in
 ACCOUNTING FOR OURSELVES
t h e M a r k e t C r a s h o f t h e 1980s. P r o p o s i t i o n s are
true, t h e r e f o r e , w h e n t h e y r e f l e c t b u t d o n o t
a l t e r e x i s t i n g c o n d i t i o n s a n d a r e free o f t h e
observer's own involvement.
T h e o b s e r v e r ' s p e r s p e c t i v e has d o m i n a t e d
m u c h w o r k in t h e social s c i e n c e s a n d e v e n s o m e
m o r a l p h i l o s o p h i e s . Yet for a v a r i e t y o f r e a s o n s it
has c o m e u n d e r i n c r e a s i n g c r i t i c i s m in r e c e n t
years. I d o n o t w a n t t o d e t a i l t h e s e in this essay
s i n c e t h e y a r e n o w s t a n d a r d in t h e d e b a t e a b o u t
m e t h o d in t h e h u m a n a n d social s c i e n c e s . T h e
p o i n t is that t h e r e s e a r c h e r is n o t s i m p l y r e c o r d -
ing o b j e c t i v e e v e n t s a n d c o n d i t i o n s . She o r h e
t r i e s to u n d e r s t a n d t h e m as o b s e r v a b l e r e a l i t i e s
a n d as o b j e c t i f i c a t i o n s o f m e a n i n g . T h e
r e s e a r c h e r l i k e w i s e c a n n o t e s c a p e t h e fact that
s h e o r h e is t h e o n e thinking. W e w a n t t o u n d e r -
s t a n d w h a t a M a r k e t Crash m e a n s a n d at e a c h
p o i n t o f t h e i n q u i r y it is w e w h o w a n t to u n d e r -
s t a n d this. In o r d e r to u n d e r s t a n d t h e m e a n i n g o f
s o m e t h i n g a n d t h e n t o c o m m u n i c a t e it to o t h e r s
entails a d i f f e r e n t p o s t u r e t h a n t h e o b s e r v e r
s i m p l y b e c a u s e w e a r e i n v o l v e d . It r e q u i r e s t h e
participant's perspective and a performance
attitude.
This p e r s p e c t i v e a n d a t t i t u d e is c o n c e r n e d
with the meaning of something, the appropriate
m a n n e r for u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d c o m m u n i c a t i n g
it, and, m o r e p r o f o u n d l y , t h e c o n d i t i o n s , criteria,
a n d m e d i u m s for u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n y t h i n g at all.
H e r m e n e u t i c a l r e f l e c t i o n has t a k e n u p t h e s e
issues w i t h i n t h e w h o l e r e a c h o f t h e h u m a n a n d
social s c i e n c e s . It is t h e k i n d o f r e f l e c t i o n I
u n d e r t a k e in this essay. F o r t h e sake o f m y argu-
m e n t a c r u c i a l h e r m e n e u t i c a l c l a i m is t h a t t h e
truth of an interpretation entails the interpreter
( s e e G a d a m e r , 1975). W e u n d e r s t a n d t h r o u g h
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n a n d as s u c h w e c a n n o t e s c a p e t h e
p e r f o r m a t i v e i n v o l v e m e n t w i t h w h a t w e a r e try-
ing t o u n d e r s t a n d . In this s e n s e all u n d e r s t a n d i n g
is p r a c t i c a l in c h a r a c t e r , e v e n o u r m o s t " t h e o r e -
tical" c o n s t r u c t s , s i n c e it i n v o l v e s t h e o n e think-
ing. This d o e s n o t m e a n that i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s a r e
simple fabrications of our wishes, however.
W h a t it d o e s m e a n is that a c o r r e c t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n
is not true in the sense in which a proposition that reflects
an existing state of affairs is true. it would be better to say
233
that a correct interpretation fits, suits, or explicates the
meaning of the interpretandum, that which the interpre-
ter is to understand (Habermas, 1990, p. 27).
T h e a r g u m e n t I f o w a r d in t h e s e p a g e s c o n -
sciously adopts the posture of hermeneutical
reflection. This q u i t e n a t u r a l l y b e a r s o n t h e
status o f m y c l a i m s as well. T h e i r v a l i d i t y c a n n o t
b e that o f t h i r d - p e r s o n r e p o r t o f s u p p o s e d l y
e x i s t i n g states o f affairs. Rather, t h e a r g u m e n t
s e e k s t o b e a fitting i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f w h a t giving
an a c c o u n t o f m o r a l i d e n t i t y m e a n s . To g r a s p its
f o r c e r e q u i r e s t h e r e a d e r ' s w i l l i n g n e s s to partici-
p a t e in this i n q u i r y in o r d e r t o s e e if t h e i n t e r p r e -
t a t i o n I offer d o e s i n d e e d fit w h a t h a p p e n s w h e n
w e g i v e an a c c o u n t .
Adopting a participant's perspective and
a t t i t u d e is u n a v o i d a b l e in e t h i c a l r e f l e c t i o n , it
s e e m s to me. This is b e c a u s e w h a t w e a r e t r y i n g
to u n d e r s t a n d , that is, h o w w e c a n a n d s h o u l d
live, n e c e s s a r i l y i n v o l v e s us. A c c o r d i n g l y , t h e
p e r s p e c t i v e a n d a t t i t u d e a s s u m e d in this essay
n o t o n l y l o c a t e s t h e a r g u m e n t r e l a t i v e to
m e t h o d o l o g i c a l o p t i o n s c u r r e n t in t h e s o c i a l a n d
h u m a n s c i e n c e s . It also p l a c e s t h e a r g u m e n t
w i t h i n d e b a t e s in ethics. It is i m p o r t a n t to b e
a w a r e o f this p l a c e m e n t s i n c e it t o o b e a r s o n t h e
status o f t h e c l a i m s to b e m a d e .
First o f all, I a m n o t a t t e m p t i n g to v i e w
a c c o u n t i n g o r e c o n o m i c life s i m p l y f r o m w h a t is
c a l l e d t h e " m o r a l p o i n t o f v i e w " (Baier, 1965).
S u c h a p e r s p e c t i v e c l a i m s t h a t to b e m o r a l m e a n s
adopting a disinterested observer's perspective
o n life in o r d e r t o a v o i d bias a n d f a v o r i t i s m a b o u t
w h a t is g o o d a n d bad, r i g h t a n d w r o n g , just a n d
unjust. T o b e m o r a l is t o act o n t h e p r i n c i p l e o f
e q u a l r e s p e c t for o t h e r s , to t r e a t t h e m as e n d s in
t h e m s e l v e s . T h e m o r a l life is t h e n an act o f trans-
lating t h e s i n g u l a r i t y o f e x i s t e n c e i n t o u n i v e r -
salizable m o r a l laws, g o o d s a n d j u d g m e n t s .
Ethics is t o p r o v i d e t h e r a t i o n a l justification o f
n o r m s b i n d i n g o n all a g e n t s for this " v i e w f r o m
n o w h e r e " as w e l l as e x p l a i n i n g t h e m e a n i n g o f
t e r m s like just a n d g o o d . As R. M. H a r e p u t it,
"Ethics, as t h e s t u d y o f m o r a l a r g u m e n t , is t h u s a
b r a n c h o f logic" ( H a r e , 1989, p. 175). A n d
a p p l i e d ethics, for its part, s o l v e s s p e c i f i c m o r a l
q u a n d a r i e s (e.g. i n s i d e r t r a i n i n g ) f r o m t h e m o r a l
 234 WILLIAMSCHWEIKER

p o i n t o f v i e w b y clarifying moral a r g u m e n t s ( s e e level o f r e f l e c t i o n in o r d e r to b r i n g to light w h a t

Pincoffs, 1986).
Since w e seek to u n d e r s t a n d the m e a n i n g of
o u r moral e x i s t e n c e in o r d e r to r e s p o n d to h o w
w e s h o u l d live, w e c a n say that the m o r a l p o i n t of
v i e w is s i m p l y i n c o m p l e t e , h o w e v e r m u c h w e
h o p e to avoid bias, strive for clarity, a n d s e n s e
the d e m a n d o f acting o n t h e p r i n c i p l e of equal
respect. This is b e c a u s e life takes place in
specific a n d c o m p l e x situations that bear o n its
m o r a l import. A c k n o w l e d g i n g this will n o t keep
us from m a k i n g m o r e g e n e r a l claims, h o w e v e r . It
was the e n d u r i n g insight of Kant to realize that
the aspiration to g e n e r a l i t y u to the m o r a l p o i n t
of v i e w - - is essential to o u r m o r a l being.~ If
n o t h i n g else, w e w a n t to b e u n d e r s t o o d b y
others. My point, then, is that m o r a l claims arise
from s o m e w h e r e , from the activity of giving an
a c c o u n t w i t h i n c o m m u n i t i e s amid c h a n g i n g cir-
c u m s t a n c e s . This has to d o as well w i t h the status
of the n o r m a t i v e claims w e make in ethics.
Taking this tactic to moral r e f l e c t i o n also
bears o n the p a r t i c u l a r c o n c e r n s of this essay. It
m e a n s that I a m n o t m a k i n g m y a r g u m e n t b y
b e g i n n i n g w i t h obligations i m p l i e d in b u s i n e s s
d i s c o u r s e ( B r u m m e r , 1986), the legitimacy o f a
fairness or justice c r i t e r i o n for e c o n o m i c
b e h a v i o r ( P a u l F. Williams, 1987), o r analyzing
the effects o f c o r p o r a t e a c t i o n o n others, o n so-
called " e x t e r n a l i t i e s " ( B e n s t o n , 1982). All of
these options, n o w s t a n d a r d in so-called "busi-
ness ethics", r e m a i n w i t h i n the theoretical
s p h e r e of utilitarianism or d e o n t o l o g y a n d the
moral p o i n t of view. T h e y fail, in m y j u d g m e n t ,
to u n d e r t a k e the p r i o r i n v e s t i g a t i o n of w h a t giv-
ing an a c c o u n t m e a n s for m o r a l e x i s t e n c e a n d
the b u s i n e s s w o r l d a n d thus leave u n t o u c h e d
a s s u m p t i o n s a b o u t a g e n c y that are n o w s e e n as
p r o b l e m a t i c . I w a n t to engage in this m o r e basic
it is that m a k e s a c c o u n t i n g a n activity c o n c e r n e d
w i t h h o w w e s h o u l d live.
It is o b v i o u s that m y ethical c o n c e r n s a n d m y
m e t h o d o l o g i c a l o n e s are b o u n d together. This
essay u n d e r t a k e s a h e r m e n e u t i c a l ethics m i n d f u l
of the p e r s p e c t i v e , attitude, a n d kinds o f claims
that d o i n g so entails. As will b e c o m e clear, it is
also an u n d e r t a k i n g i n f o r m e d b y t h e insights o f
theological reflection. That said, it is n o w pos-
sible to r e t u r n to o u r thesis. The first step to
e l u c i d a t i n g its m e a n i n g for a c c o u n t i n g is to
specify the p r o b l e m s the a r g u m e n t h o p e s to
address. I will b e g i n w i t h p a r t i c u l a r o n e s in busi-
ness a n d m o v e to m o r e g e n e r a l o n e s f o u n d in
m o r a l philosophy. That will p r o v i d e the c o n t e x t
for the actual i n v e s t i g a t i o n of the activity of giv-
ing a n a c c o u n t .
PROBLEMS IN TALKING ABOUT AGENTS
It takes little i m a g i n a t i o n to grasp t h e i m p o r -
tance of giving an a c c o u n t of o u r lives. Some of
us all the time and all o f us at least s o m e of the time
seek to r e n d e r o u r lives intelligible to o u r s e l v e s
a n d to others. I n its simplest sense, giving an
a c c o u n t is p r o v i d i n g r e a s o n s for c h a r a c t e r a n d
c o n d u c t , o n e s h e l d to b e u n d e r s t a n d a b l e to
o t h e r s a n d t h e r e b y r e n d e r i n g a life intelligible
a n d meaningful. It is t h e discursive act of saying
o r w r i t i n g s o m e t h i n g a b o u t i n t e n t i o n s , actions,
relations a n d o u t c o m e s to s o m e o n e - - e v e n if
this is o u r s e l v e s m a m i d c o m p l e x a n d o f t e n
l i m i t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s in s u c h a w a y that an
i n d e n t i t y is e n a c t e d as intrinsically i n t e r d e p e n -
d e n t w i t h others. 2 This is crucial for the m o r a l
life. T h e ability to e n g a g e freely in p u r p o s i v e
actions, to u n d e r g o , i n t e r p r e t and evaluate

IBernard Williams( 1985 ) has spoken of morality as that "peculiar institution" concerned with order and discipline. He sees
this as but a subset of the concerns of ethics. This is because ethics centers on the question of how we should live. I agree
with Williamson this point. Where I disagree with him concerns the limits he places on reflection to address the particular
problems that confront us. 1 also want to thank the anonymous reviewer of Accounting Organizations and Society for
insisting on the importance of Kant's insight at this point in my argument and for other helpful comments as well.
Zl am arguing here that the discursive activity of giving an account is helpfully understood on analogy to "texts". Like texts,
as Ricoeur has shown ( 1984), givingan account discloses something for understanding. We come to some self-understanding
by interpreting these accounts. Yet with texts we are concerned with what they say, their subject matter, and not the
subjectivity of the author that generated the text. Concern for the author's "genius"was the mark of Romantic hermeneutics.
 ACCOUNTINGFOR OURSELVES 235

a c t i o n s a n d relations, to m a k e j u d g m e n t s o f a s s u m p t i o n h e r e is that a m o r a l a g e n t is a self-

praise a n d b l a m e a b o u t c h a r a c t e r a n d c o n d u c t ,
a n d to a c c o u n t for all o f these activities is con-
stitutive o f the b e i n g o f a n agent. This is so e v e n
as e v e r y "morality r e v o l v e s a r o u n d e q u a l i t y of
respect, solidarity, a n d the c o m m o n good"
( H a b e r m a s , 1990, p. 201). In a w o r d , giving a n
a c c o u n t is o n e activity in w h i c h w e c o m e to b e as
selves a n d p a r t i c u l a r kinds of c o m m u n i t i e s
t h r o u g h forms of d i s c o u r s e that shape, g u i d e a n d
j u d g e life r e g a r d i n g c o n c e r n for the c o m m o n
good, h u m a n solidarity a n d basic respect.
H o w e v e r , t h e r e are a n u m b e r of p r o b l e m s in
talking a b o u t a g e n c y g e r m a n e to the c o n c e r n s o f
o u r a r g u m e n t . O n e c e n t e r s o n the a g e n c y of t h e
c o r p o r a t i o n . Can w e really ask: w h o is the cor-
p o r a t i o n ? 3 T h e first a n d m o s t o b v i o u s r e t o r t to
this q u e s t i o n was forcefully p u t b y Milton Fried-
m a n ( 1 9 7 0 , 1979; see also Mulligan, 1 9 8 6 ) a n d
m o r e r e c e n t l y b y Paul W e a v e r ( 1 9 8 8 ) . I n s u m
the claim is this: talk a b o u t t h e a c c o u n t a b i l i t y
o r social r e s p o n s i b i l i t y o f b u s i n e s s is d e c e p t i v e
a n d / o r confused. It is d e c e p t i v e s i n c e b u s i n e s s
exists to m a k e a profit a n d a n y so-called altruistic
o r " m o r a l " activities (e.g. c o n t r i b u t i o n s to
charities, the arts) are always d r i v e n b y that in-
terest d e s p i t e claims to t h e contrary. O b v i o u s l y
such drives m u s t b e a c k n o w l e d g e d . T h e
q u e s t i o n is w h e t h e r or n o t the i d e n t i t y of any
agent c a n b e u n d e r s t o o d s o l e l y o n these
grounds. I argue that it c a n n o t b e so c o n c e i v e d
w i t h o u t c o n t r a d i c t i o n , that is, w i t h o u t the loss of
w h a t is actually e n t a i l e d in any a c c o u n t i n g for
c o r p o r a t e life w h e t h e r that c e n t e r s o n profit,
survival, o r o t h e r ends.
Claims a b o u t social r e s p o n s i b i l i t y are con-
fused, so the a r g u m e n t goes, b e c a u s e w e c a n n o t
speak o f a c o r p o r a t i o n as a m o r a l agent; it is, after
all, an artificial reality, a legal creation. T h e
identical c e n t e r of c o n s c i o u s n e s s a n d valuation,
that is, s o m e o n e w h o has a "soul" ( s e e McCraw,
1988). As Amartya Sen has p o i n t e d out, t h e v i e w
o f the h u m a n i n m o d e r n e c o n o m i c t h e o r y "is
that e v e r y a g e n t is a c t u a t e d o n l y b y self interest"
(Sen, 1979, p. 87; see also N o r e e n , 1988). Such
a n a g e n t freely d e t e r m i n e s h e r o r his b e h a v i o r
while entering into constitutive relations with
others through contractual agreements. These
agents e x e r c i s e t h e i r s u b j e c t i v e p r e f e r e n c e s b y
s e e k i n g to m a x i m i z e i n t e r e s t s c o n s t r a i n e d o n l y
b y t h o s e c o n t r a c t s w i t h others. This idea o f
a g e n c y is a h a l l m a r k o f m u c h m o d e r n thought.
In fact, " m o d e r n i s m is i n g e n e r a l a n d f u n d a m e n t -
ally the ideology of self-realization" ( T h e u n i s s e n ,
1982, p. 2). O n c e this p o r t r a i t of m o r a l a g e n c y
was a c c e p t e d b y political e c o n o m i s t s a n d o t h e r s
a n y a t t e m p t to reflect in o t h e r ways o n eco-
n o m i c life s e e m e d foiled at the outset. This is the
case b e c a u s e it is difficult to speak of corpora-
t i o n s as agents in this sense, as h a v i n g a self-
realizing soul.
O r is it? O n the o n e hand, the c o r p o r a t i o n is
n o t called a m o r a l a g e n t b y F r i e d m a n a n d o t h e r s
b e c a u s e it is d r i v e n b y t h e profit motive, a n d
o u g h t to b e so d r i v e n w i t h i n the c o n t e x t of the
marketplace. O n the o t h e r hand, h u m a n agents
are d e f i n e d as m o r a l agents b y just s u c h self-
i n t e r e s t e d b e h a v i o r w h e n it g r o u n d s c o n t r a c t u a l
relations that p r o v i d e n o r m s for behavior. I n
fact, e c o n o m i s t s c l a i m e d this is h o w p e r s o n s d o
act a n d h o w t h e y o u g h t to act as well. "The idea
of the s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f the h u m a n " , as
Michael T h e u n i s s e n ( 1 9 8 2 , p. 9 ) notes, " m e a n t
n o t h i n g o t h e r t h a n the m a n d a t e that a p e r s o n
had f o r e m o s t to fulfill his o w n life." T h u s t h e r e is
a c i r c u l a r i t y in t h e d e s c r i p t i o n of the h u m a n as a
p r e f e r e n c e d r i v e n a n d self-realizing b e i n g

While subjectivity in this generative sense is a remainder concept in giving an account, we are, nevertheless, interested in
the agent's identity as it is rendered in the discursive act. The reason for this is simple: we hold agents responsible for what
they are and what they do in ways that texts escape evaluation. The moral act of giving an account can be helpfully explored
on analogy to texts. Yet it is more ambiguous and complex than a text and must be interpreted on its own.
~his question was recently put to the Pennwalt corporation by Federal District Judge Jack E. Tanner in a case against that
corlx~ration concerning the spilling of cancer-causing chemicals. The judge requested that the chairman of Pennwalt enter
the guilty plea so that the public could know who the corporation is. This action has provoked considerable debate. Mypoint
in calling attention to it is merely to show that the question of agency is central in current corporate life (see Timothy Egan,
1989).
 236 WILLIAMSCHWEIKER

r e g a r d i n g claims a b o u t the reality o f t h e cor- m o r a l c o m m u n i t y s e e m s to d e m e a n the d i g n i t y

poration. T h e p e r s o n ' s behavior, "it appears, is to
b e e x p l a i n e d in t e r m s of p r e f e r e n c e s w h i c h are
in t u r n d e f i n e d o n l y b y behavior" (Sen, 1979, p.
93). T o avoid total c o n f u s i o n the a r g u m e n t
against the a c c o u n t a b i l i t y o f c o r p o r a t i o n s can-
not center then on motive (preferences) and
self-realizing b e h a v i o r s i n c e b y a r e d u c t i o a d
a b s u r d u m t h e s e a r e s h o w n to b e viciously cir-
cular. T h e a r g u m e n t must, therefore, t u r n o n the
c o n s c i o u s n e s s p e r s o n s have o f b e i n g agents w h o
e n t e r c o n t r a c t u a l a g r e e m e n t s s u b j e c t to m o r a l
criterion, like a p r i n c i p l e of justice. H o w c a n o n e
speak o f c o r p o r a t i o n s in these terms, as h a v i n g a
c o n s c i o u s n e s s , assuming, for the m o m e n t , that
w e m u s t so c o n c e i v e of agents? 4
In r e s p o n s e to these p r o b l e m s various
a t t e m p t s have b e e n m a d e to speak of " c o r p o r a t e
m o r a l agency", as P e t e r F r e n c h calls it ( 1 9 8 4 ) .
To d o so r e q u i r e s s h o w i n g that a c o r p o r a t i o n ( 1 )
is the cause o f e v e n t s that c a n b e evaluated
r e g a r d i n g t h e i r i n t e n t i o n s a n d o u t c o m e s , ( 2 ) is
free a n d p u r p o s i v e , or rational, a b o u t its
activities, and, finally, ( 3 ) is admissible to m e m -
b e r s h i p in s o m e m o r a l c o m m u n i t y to w h i c h it is
a c c o u n t a b l e a n d w h o s e beliefs a n d values are
n o r m s for j u d g i n g actions, i n t e n t i o n s a n d out-
comes. T h i n k e r s have tried to m e e t these
d e m a n d s for specifying t h e a g e n c y of a corpora-
tion in o n e of t w o ways. First, s o m e e x p l o r e the
d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g s t r u c t u r e in a c o r p o r a t i o n as
a n a l o g o u s t o h u m a n agency, like F r e n c h does,
a n d thus c e n t e r o n the p r o b l e m of c o n s c i o u s -
ness itself. If it c a n b e s h o w n that this analogy
holds, t h e n w e c a n speak of c o r p o r a t e agency.
O t h e r s c o n t e s t this "corporatist" a r g u m e n t ,
c l a i m i n g that o n l y h u m a n p e r s o n s can b e m o r a l
agents, w i t h all the rights a n d b u r d e n s this
entails. Indeed, to a d m i t c o r p o r a t i o n s to the
of b e i n g h u m a n ( s e e Danley, 1984). G r a n t i n g
the veracity of the c r i t i q u e of c o r p o r a t e r e s p o n -
sibility, these t h i n k e r s c o n c e n t r a t e o n t h e
decisions, v i r t u e s a n d c h a r a c t e r of managers, the
agents o f shareholders. Regardless o f t h e status
of the c o r p o r a t i o n p e r se, at least m a n a g e r s are
m o r a l agents a n d t h u s h e l d to c a n o n s o f social
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y relative to t h e i r shareholders,
p r i n c i p a l a n d the w i d e r public.
Must w e grant the initial a s s u m p t i o n s a b o u t
a g e n c y f o u n d in t h e debate? Do w e Face a
g e n u i n e either/or: e i t h e r c o r p o r a t i o n s are m o r a l
agents a n d thus h u m a n d i g n i t y is qualified, o r
o n l y p e r s o n s are m o r a l agents s u c h that corpora-
tions e l u d e m o r a l responsibility? I n o r d e r to
u n d e r t a k e a different w a y of t h i n k i n g a b o u t
agency, w e m u s t e x p l o r e o n e activity, the dis-
c u r s i v e act o f giving an a c c o u n t , w i t h i n w h i c h
m o r a l i d e n t i t y arises a n d is r e n d e r e d intelligible.
The argument about agency would then hinge
n o t o n c o n s c i o u s n e s s b u t o n t h e r e l a t i o n of
language a n d activity, in this case t h e act o f
"giving an account". 5
I a m n o t c l a i m i n g that c o r p o r a t i o n s are m o r a l
agents p r i o r to o r o u t s i d e o f t h e lingusitic act of
giving an a c c o u n t . T h e r e are in this a r g u m e n t n o
o n t o l o g i c a l a s s u m p t i o n s a b o u t the "personality"
of a c o r p o r a t i o n , o r a b o u t the origins o f h u m a n
c h a r a c t e r in t r a n s c e n d e n t a l freedom. I n d e e d ,
the m a i n p h i l o s o p h i c a l p r o b l e m I am a d d r e s s i n g
is h o w to t h i n k w i t h a n d yet b e y o n d n o t i o n s of
rational a g e n c y c e n t e r i n g o n a self-realizing
"self' w h o e n t e r s c o n t r a c t u a l relations s u b j e c t to
specific n o r m s , a n o t i o n that has c o m e increas-
ingly u n d e r q u e s t i o n in the past few decades.
This is n o t to d e n y , as w e will see, t h e c o n s t i t u -
tive i m p o r t a n c e o f affections, desires, interests,
a n d relations w i t h i n identity. In Fact, it is to

4Tbe locus classicus for this argument in theological circles is Reinhold Niebuhr's Moral Man andlmmoralSociety(1932).
His point was that only persons have the degree of self.transcendence necessary to qualify as true moral agents. I will argue
that there is a qualitative difference between human and corporate agents even when both are admissible, in different
degrees, to the moral community. I want to show, by exploring anew what it is that renders an acting force into an agent, that
we can speak of corporate agents. In our technological, political and economic situation the ability to speak of such
accountability is of the utmost importance.
Sl want to stress here that the discursive act of giving an account is only one possible form of activity within which moral
identity arises. I would also argue that cultural practices, such as ritual acts, the appropriation of communal myths, personal
and social narration, and manifoldother forms of activity also shape and render forth moral existence ( see Schweiker, 1990).
 ACCOUNTINGFOR OURSELVES 237

c o u n t e r the idealist p r e o c c u p a t i o n w i t h the o t h e r p r o b l e m s s u r r o u n d i n g talk a b o u t a g e n c y

r e l a t i o n of the self to itself i n t h o u g h t a l o n e ( s e e
T h e u n i s s e n , 1982, pp. 25ff.). T h u s the o n t o -
logical a s s u m p t i o n s I d o h o l d c o n c e r n the c o m -
p l e x o f relations a m o n g language, action, a n d
time. W h i l e t h e s e c a n n o t b e d e f e n d e d in this
paper, I h o p e the a r g u m e n t will i l l u m i n a t e their
i m p o r t a n c e a n d e v e n truth.
I a m also n o t d i s c o u n t i n g the o b v i o u s fact that
d i s c u r s i v e acts take p l a c e w i t h i n a variety of
social, political a n d e c o n o m i c c o n d i t i o n s that
c a n distort c o m m u n i c a t i o n . I n fact, part of t h e
c o n d i t i o n o f o u r p e r s o n a l a n d social lives is pre-
cisely t h e o m n i p r e s e n t force of c o r p o r a t e reality
in o u r w o r l d , a force m e t at virtually all levels o f
life. A c o m p r e h e n s i v e analysis of c o r p o r a t e a n d
social e x i s t e n c e w o u l d have to evaluate this
m i n d f u l of its o w n i m p l i c a t i o n in s u c h condi-
tions. Obviously, that is n o t p o s s i b l e in this essay.
My p o i n t is a m o r e basic one: an u n d e r s t a n d a b l e
identity, e v e n if a d i s t o r t e d one, arises w i t h i n
forms of activity like that of giving an a c c o u n t . 6
This is the case, I hold, for individuals as well
as groups, e v e n if p e r s o n s e m p l o y radically dif-
f e r e n t linguistic forms in a c c o u n t i n g for t h e i r
lives t h a n c o m m u n i t i e s do. Making this claim
a b o u t i d e n t i t y d o e s n o t entail a " c o r p o r a t i s m " in
F r e n c h ' s sense, h o w e v e r . I d o a r g u e that t h e r e is
an a n a l o g o u s fiduciary a n d t e m p o r a l s t r u c t u r e
e n t a i l e d i n giving an a c c o u n t of the i d e n t i t y of
p e r s o n s a n d that of c o r p o r a t i o n s . This analogy is
the b a c k d r o p for f u r t h e r claims a b o u t justice,
o n e s that I c a n n o t e x p l o r e in this essay. Yet m y
a r g u m e n t d o e s n o t m e a n that collectives are
equal m e m b e r s w i t h h u m a n p e r s o n s in the
m o r a l c o m m u n i t y . T h e y are not. W e will see
w h y later.
It is p r e c i s e l y w h e n w e b e g i n to speak of m o r a l
c o m m u n i t i e s a n d i n d e e d of m o r a l i t y itself that
c o m e to t h e fore. T h e y are o n e s f o u n d i n t h e gen-
eral d e b a t e s w i t h i n m o r a l p h i l o s o p h y a n d theol°
ogy. I m u s t n o t e these s i n c e m y a r g u m e n t seeks
to address the specific p r a c t i c e o f a c c o u n t i n g
a n d g e n e r a l ethical q u e s t i o n s as well. T h e first
d i s p u t e to m e n t i o n has arisen w i t h the t u r n to
l a n g u a g e in this c e n t u r y , b u t it m i r r o r s Hegel's
criticism o f K a n t i a n m o r a l formalism. It t u r n s o n
the r e l a t i o n of ethics to d i s c o u r s e a n d i d e n t i t y
a n d h e n c e is c r u c i a l for m y a r g u m e n t .
O n o n e side, t h e r e are t h i n k e r s as diverse as
Charles Taylor ( 1 9 8 9 ) , Alasdair M a c l n t y r e
( 1 9 8 8 ) a n d Stanley H a u e r w a s ( 1 9 8 1 ) w h o are
c o n c e r n e d in different ways w i t h the f o r m a t i o n
of identity, t h e s u s t a i n i n g of values, a n d the
d e m a n d s of criticism i n t e r n a l to a historical
tradition. T h e s e t h i n k e r s are d e e p l y i n t e r e s t e d in
w h a t a c o m m u n i t y says a b o u t its life that forms
a n d forges social i d e n t i t y a r o u n d i n h e r i t e d
n o r m s a n d values. T h e r e l a t i o n of d i s c o u r s e a n d
identity centers on the content of a tradition's
d i s c o u r s e e v e n if it is simply a debate, s u c h as in
liberalism, a b o u t w h e t h e r o r n o t a c o m m u n i t y
o u g h t to d e t e r m i n e h o w w e live. I n a w o r d , this
k i n d o f p o s i t i o n stresses s u b s t a n t i v e claims
a b o u t the shape o f the m o r a l life a n d t h e r e l a t i o n
of h u m a n i d e n t i t y to s o m e n o t i o n of the good.
O n t h e o t h e r side, t h e r e are thinkers, again as
different as J i i r g e n H a b e r m a s ( 1979, 1 9 9 0 ) , J o h n
Rawls ( 1971 ) a n d H e l m u t P e u k e r t ( 1 9 8 4 ) , w h o
a t t e m p t to d e r i v e n o r m s for m o r a l life from o u r
ability to c o m m u n i c a t e or relative to w h a t prin-
ciples of fairness w e w o u l d agree to if w e w e r e in
a free p o s i t i o n to d o so. T h e y base these n o t o n
w h a t a c o m m u n i t y o r t r a d i t i o n says a b o u t life,
s i n c e its discourse, n o r m s a n d values m i g h t b e
d i s t o r t e d a n d p e r s o n s m u s t b e free to forge their
o w n rational life plans. In c o n t i n u i t y w i t h

6 In hermeneutical terms I am suggesting that the "I" or self is never understandable to itself in any immediate fashion even if
we have present affective senses of being in relation to others and ourselves. That presence, which is extremely elusive,
always comes to self.understanding through an interpretative act, in this case giving an account. Following Hans-Georg
Gadamer, we can call this "I" donated through interpretive action the "understanding r' (Gadamer, 1975). I am contesting,
then, the assumption that an account of economic actors by theorists, accountants, and ethicists can hold the uI" of the agent
as immediately understandable in self-interested terms. What is missed in this is how the portrayal of those agents grants to
them a self-understanding as self-interested. When carefully examined, this portrayal of agency is impossible because in the
act of giving an account the agent is constituted as interdependent with others and hence moved by various motives.
Analogous arguments were made long ago by Bishop Butler in his sermons at Royce Chapel, Jonathan Edwards in his The
Nature o f True Virtue, and even Adam Smith. For a discussion of these issues see Sen (1979).
238 WILLIAMSCHWEIKER
Kantian ethics, these thinkers seek principles of
justice and validity from the fact that human
beings are beings w h o speak to each other, w h o
communicate. They are concerned then with
procedural justice and the discursive justifica-
tion of moral norms. The ability to communicate
is the condition of possibility for any debate
about the content of the moral life while also
providing grounds for the e x t e r n a l criticism of a
community's mores and discourse. It shows that
persons possess the minimal requirements of
moral agency (freedom and rational purposive-
ness or communicative competence). Agents
are the bearers of rights that extend to others
(Rawls) and the makers of validity claims that
entail duties (Habermas).
It is important to realize that each side of the
dispute between procedural and substantive
ethics has shifted from the self-realizing modern
self to forms of intersubjectivity, to the ways in
which moral agency is always interdependent
with others for its existence, values and norms.
What is at issue, therefore, is h o w to account for
ourselves as moral agents relative to social life.
Do we concentrate on belonging to a commun-
ity, as, for instance, those thinkers concerned
with business character and professional virtues
do (Westra, 1986)? Perhaps we try, as others
have, to articulate the norms of accounting im-
plied in the structure of communicative practice
or the demands of a principle of justice (Paul F.
Williams, 1987, Brummer, 1986). Surely we
must mediate this debate. It is important both
that we are speaking beings relative to the formal
conditions for the justification of norms as well
as w h a t a community says about h o w one ought
to live. Moral agency is shaped through dis-
course which embeds one in a community and
some vision of the good. Yet it also implies
claims that extend beyond that community.
This debate is not simply a speculative one
about the historical or communicative justifica-
tion of norms and values. It bears on the practical
problem of what and whose good is sought in
personal and corporative behavior. As such it
brings into focus the problem of the social con-
text of moral existence. This is the case because
determination of whose goods or needs c o u n t is
coextensive with the scope of a moral commun-
ity. For instance, should w e see the moral dimen-
sion of economic life within the context of the
"culture of business" that bears its o w n norms
and virtues about purely e c o n o m i c flourishing,
even granting the inability of Friedman and
others to articulate w h y "profits", and not some
other "economic" norm, ought to be determina-
tive (see King, 1986; McDonald, 1986; Everett,
1986)? If this is the scope of the moral commun-
ity and whose goods are sought, then social
justice and well-being are collapsed into the cal-
culation of e c o n o m i c good. Contrariwise,
maybe all of life is to be seen, as some theo-
logians claim, within a specific religious com-
munity struggling for the reign of God that
requires a preferential option for the p o o r
(Segundo, 1976)? If this is the case, then the
entitlement to goods and services is such that
radical redistribution of wealth is possible and
indeed required. These examples illustrate that
the debate about discourse and morality brings
to light the problem of the scope of moral com-
munity and claims about what and whose goods
we ought to seek.
Just as in the question about norms and dis-
course, a neat distinction between descriptive
and normative claims about moral c o m m u n i t y
and its good is difficult to sustain. In determining
what is the social context of behavior one is
simultaneously making a judgment about what
and whose goods o u g h t to be sought. Con-
versely, prescriptions about goods and action
entail claims about the conditions in which life
and decisions take place. This is obviously im-
portant for accounting practice and research.
Many of its moral dilemmas center on the social
context of its activity, what goods are sought and
whose, and therefore the kinds of reasons it can
give for its activity. Does the accountant serve
the wider public and its c o m m o n good, clients,
the corporation, the academy, or the guild of
accounts? Clearly she or he serves them all and
thus is unavoidably met by perplexing conflicts
of interests and loyalties. The scope of the moral
life, raised by the relation between w h a t and
that we communicate, poses problems on an im-
mediate, practical level. I will return to these
 ACCOUNTINGFOROURSELVES
issues later concerning the temporal and social
character of giving an account.
At this point in the argument we see that the
question of the scope of moral c o m m u n i t y leads
directly to another debate that bears on consid-
ering accounting as a moral practice. This one
concerns the shape of practical reasoning in situ-
ations of moral perplexity. Until the 1960s m u c h
moral philosophy, particularly in the English
speaking world, was c o n c e r n e d with justifying
moral principles and analyzing the meaning of
moral terms (cf. Toulmin, 1986; Bowie, 1986).
This meant that moral philosophers often did
not make judgments about substantive issues or
saw questions of applied ethics simply as the
testing ground for theory. Adopting a "moral
point of view" sometimes meant failing to take a
stand on specific moral issues. 7
There is an important contrast here with
theologians. A good deal of thinking about eco-
nomic life has been done by Christian theo-
logians, whether the 17th century Jesuits on
usury in the development of banking and trad-
ing, Leo XIII on just wages and the industrial
state, or the influence of Protestantism on the
rise of capitalism, and, in the Social Gospel, its
criticism as well. It is also currently engaging
theological reflection, ranging from liberation
theologians using critical social theory to the
recent U.S.A. Roman Catholic Bishops' pastoral
letter, Economic Justice for All (1986). The
bishops, to illustrate this point, begin with a
specifically Christian "vision" of e c o n o m i c life
and c o n c e r n for the poor. They then p r o c e e d to
spell out more general claims about c o m m u n i t y
and justice as well as specific policy recommen-
dations in a way they think is intelligible and
convincing to the wider public (see Curran,
1988, pp. 110-137; Hollenbach, 1988, pp. 3 5 -
84).
Part of the amnesia of much modernist moral
philosophy is that it simply disregarded cen-
turies of reflection on economic and social life
by Jewish and Christian thinkers while remain-
7There are, of course, many exceptions to this. R. M. Hare in particular has contested this vision of analyticmoral philosophy
(see Hare, 1989, pp. 1-13). Nevertheless, it must be admitted that analytic phiio~phy became so engro~ed in the logic of
moral discourse that practical concerns were often neglected.
239
ing satisified in its ignorance of the contempor-
ary discussion in these traditions (for example,
see DeGeorge, 1986). As noted abo~e, I draw on
these resources, an approach hardly surprising
for a theologian! I hold that religious traditions
have something to contribute to the task of
ethical reflection. In this I am not alone. Thinkers
are increasingly acknowledging the contextual
and practical shape of reasoning and understand-
ing (see Gadamer, 1982; Bernstein, 1983). There
is likewise a revival of case method, or casuistry,
in applied ethics and ethics in general (see
Jonsen and Toulmin, 1988; DeMarco and Fox,
1986). For these thinkers the long tradition of
moral reflection in the West, philosophical and
also theological, is important for current
thought. They simply do not think that moral
theory c o n c e r n e d with the justification of norms
can answer our actual practical problems. Given
this, we must draw again from the wells of moral
wisdom found in our religious and cultural tradi-
tions.
Yet here too there are problems to mediate.
To be sure, moral theory divorced from actual
practical reasoning is inadequate. This is
because what w e seek in ethics is not simply to
know what the good is, but what we are to be
and to do in complex and changing situations in
order to live well, to be good and just. The
neglect of this demand is what made much mod-
ernist ethics so boring. Yet while we do seek
guidance for life through ethical reflection, h o w
does one keep thinking about specific cases from
becoming a subtle evasion of the question of the
legitimacy of institutional purposes and norms?
The force of this question has been felt at least
since Pascal's criticism of the Jesuit casuists in
his Provincial Letters. Lately it has been raised
by critical theorists. The point has been made in
accounting research through the examination
by Richardson ( 1 9 8 7 ) and others of the profes-
sion as a legitimating institution. To explore
accounting as a moral practice requires, there-
fore, that one detail not only the situation-
 240 WILLIAMSCHWEIKER

d e p e n d e n t shape o f practical reasoning, b u t also Taking a p a r t i c i p a n t p e r s p e c t i v e , w e c a n say

the ways in w h i c h s u c h r e a s o n i n g c a n escape un-
critical s e r v i t u d e to i n s t i t u t i o n s a n d t h e i r values.
W h a t these d e b a t e s in ethics s h o w is that
e x p l o r i n g a c c o u n t i n g as a m o r a l p r a c t i c e
r e q u i r e s that w e face the issues o f the s c o p e o f
m o r a l c o m m u n i t y a n d its goods, the f o r m a t i o n o f
m o r a l a g e n c y a r o u n d n o r m s a n d values, a n d t h e
ability of m o r a l r e f l e c t i o n to i n t e r p r e t a n d
critique those goods and norms. The position
d e v e l o p e d b e l o w a t t e m p t s this. That said, I w a n t
n o w to e x p l o r e giving an a c c o u n t of m o r a l
i d e n t i t y as a r e s p o n s e to the c h a l l e n g e of
c o r p o r a t e responsibility.
GIVING AN ACCOUNT OF MORAL IDENTITY
Giving an a c c o u n t is an i n t e r p r e t a t i v e action.
It has t h r e e d i m e n s i o n s that c o h e r e w i t h the
t e m p o r a l s t r u c t u r e o f life. This has b e e n n o t e d
before, a n d h e r e m y a r g u m e n t is hardly original.
My c o n c e r n , in fact, is to e x a m i n e in s o m e detail
this r e l a t i o n o f giving an a c c o u n t as a discursive
a n d i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e act to t h e t e m p o r a l i z a t i o n
o f identity. In d o i n g so I will d r a w o n the
w o r k o f H. Richard N i e b u h r ( 1 9 6 3 ) , Josiah
Royce ( 1 9 6 8 ) and c u r r e n t h e r m e n e u t i c a l a n d
m o r a l t h e o r y e v e n as I chart a d i s t i n c t p o s i t i o n
r e g a r d i n g moral identity. What I w a n t to s h o w is
that giving an a c c o u n t is i m p o r t a n t for u n d e r -
s t a n d i n g the ways in w h i c h m o r a l i d e n t i t y is
shaped a n d enacted. F u r t h e r m o r e , n o t o n l y indi-
viduals b u t c o m m u n i t i e s as well give interpreta-
tions o f t h e m s e l v e s and t h e i r actions t h r o u g h
time. In each case, I hold that o n e does so
t h r o u g h the activity of an "accountant". It is the
analogy, the similarity-in-difference, b e t w e e n
p e r s o n a l a n d c o r p o r a t e acts of giving an a c c o u n t
that w e m u s t explore.
that h u m a n s are b e i n g s g u i d e d b y p u r p o s e s a n d
d r i v e n b y interests w h o e x e r t force o n o t h e r s
a n d a n i n t e r d e p e n d e n t w o r l d e v e n w h i l e w e also
suffer the forces a n d relations o f o t h e r s and the
world. As moral agents w e give various a c c o u n t s
o f t h o s e actions, relations a n d sufferings in a w a y
that b i n d s us to others, manifests t h e c h a r a c t e r
a n d i n c o n s i s t e n c i e s o f an identity, a n d t h e r e b y
r e n d e r s force a q u e s t i o n o f p o w e r s u b j e c t to
ethical evaluation. This t r a n s f o r m a t i o n o f force
to m o r a l l y assessable p o w e r is crucial to m o r a l
existence. It is part o f w h a t distinguishes
g e n u i n e a c t i o n from s i m p l e physical m o t i o n . So
w e m u s t ask, h o w d o e s this t r a n s f o r m a t i o n o f ex-
e r t i o n to m o r a l agency, force to p o w e r , trans-
pire? H o w is r e s p o n s i b i l i t y a c o r r e l a t e o f
power.#
Here w e m u s t a c k n o w l e d g e s o m e t h i n g a b o u t
the c o m p l e x i t y of p e r s o n a l life: at o n e a n d the
same t i m e that o n e acts, a n actor can, a n d often
must, give a n a c c o u n t o f h e r o r his o w n life. In
d o i n g so w e e x p e r i e n c e a discursive a n d affec-
t i r e o t h e r n e s s , e v e n a n e s t r a n g e m e n t as theolo-
gians say, w i t h i n o u r identity. I a m acting a n d yet
also a c c o u n t i n g for the o n e acting. This other-
ness is b e t w e e n , o n t h e o n e hand, o u r e x e r t i o n
a n d suffering, and, o n the other, o u r a c c o u n t o f
these. T h u s w h e n I say s o m e t h i n g a b o u t m y life
I d o n o t simply instantiate the i d e n t i t y of the my-
self w i t h myself. O n the contrary, t h e r e is
e n a c t e d a p r e - g i v e n r e l a t i o n a n d difference to
m y s e l f as a n actor a n d " a c c o u n t a n t " as well as to
o t h e r s w i t h w h o m I speak. Not surprisingly,
w h e n this d o u b l e n e s s in i d e n t i t y is b r o u g h t to
light, b y w h a t e v e r means, it can e v o k e a shock of
self-recognition, u n d e r s t a n d i n g , a s e n s e of pride,
flat denial, shame, o r s i m p l e evasion a b o u t w h o
w e are a n d w h a t w e are doing. 9 This d o u b l e n e s s

Sl would argue that the temporal and interactive dynamic is true of all life. With the emergence of the human we see the
transformation of life into moral awareness through responsibility. Nevertheless, the relation of human agency to the whole
communityof life must be kept in mind. For a similar argument see Jonas ( 1982, 1984).
"~This doubleness can be seen in phrases like this: "did I do that!" (recognition); "so that is the kind of person I am"
(understanding); "1 accomplished what I intended" (pride); "1 did not do that" (denial); "so that is the kind of person I am"
( shame ); "it was not me" (evasion). i note these examples not for the purpose of analyzingmoral sentences. Indeed, someone
like Hare (1989) would not see these as moral since they are not prescriptive in character,t I think they show us three
important things. First, giving an account as a discursive act is diaiogical and relies semantically on the sentence as its basic
 ACCOUNTINGFOR OURSELVES 241

is t h e r o o t o f s e l f - d e c e p t i o n a n d h y p o c r i s y , t h e
gap b e t w e e n o u r d i s c u s i v e l y p o r t r a y e d i d e n t i t y
a n d o u r e x e r t i o n a n d suffering.
This o t h e r n e s s f o u n d in p e r s o n a l i d e n t i t y is
also p r e s e n t in c o r p o r a t i o n s . It i n h e r e s in t h e
fiduciary r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n a c o r p o r a t i o n as an
e c o n o m i c f o r c e a n d t h e a c c o u n t a n t as t h e o n e
w h o r e n d e r s an identity. It is e n a c t e d w h e n t h e
a c c o u n t a n t p o r t r a y s actors, r e l a t i o n s and e v e n
sufferings r e l a t i v e t o a l a r g e r c o m m u n i t y o f dis-
c o u r s e ( s h a r e h o l d e r s , etc.). O f c o u r s e p e r s o n s
and c o r p o r a t i o n s are different, and radically so.
But t h e activity o f a c c o u n t i n g e n a c t s a d o u b l e -
ness c r u c i a l to t h e m o r a l c o m p l e x i t y o f identity.
This is b e c a u s e it e v o k e s s o m e a w a r e n e s s o f p r e -
g i v e n r e l a t i o n s t o o th e r s , r e l a t i o n s s u b j e c t t o
c l a i m s a b o u t w h a t is g o o d a n d evil.
It is t h e c a p a c i t y o f g i v i n g an a c c o u n t t o pre-
s e n t s u c h an i d e n t i t y and h e n c e t r a n s f o r m f o r c e
i n t o m o r a l p o w e r that w e m u s t e x p l o r e . If it c a n
i n d e e d b e s h o w n that i d e n t i t y arises w i t h i n t h e
dialogical p r a c t i c e o f g i v i n g an a c c o u n t , w e will
then have a purchase on understanding the
m o r a l d i m e n s i o n o f a c c o u n t i n g as a p r o f e s s i o n as
w e l l as t h e g r o u n d s for t h e social r e s p o n s i b i l i t y
o f c o r p o r a t i o n s . A n d w e will h a v e also g a i n e d
s o m e t h i n g for o u r o w n m o r a l awareness. T o d o
so I w a n t car efu l l y to e x a m i n e t h e a c t i v i t y o f giv-
ing an a c c o u n t , l° I c l a i m that f o r c e is trans-
f o r m e d i n t o p o w e r a n d t h u s o p e n to m o r a l
e v a l u a t i o n w h e n an i d e n t i t y is r e n d e r e d t h r o u g h
time. This is b e c a u s e by g i v i n g an a c c o u n t t h e
m e a n i n g o f t e m p o r a l i t y is t r a n s f o r m e d t h r o u g h
trust.
It is c u s t o m a r y t o sp eak o f g i v i n g an a c c o u n t o f
past a c t i o n s and t h e i r c o n s e q u e n c e s , that is, o f
a s c r i b i n g a c c o u n t a b i l i t y ex post facto. W e read-
ily h o l d o u r s e l v e s an d o t h e r s a c c o u n t a b l e for
w h a t has b e e n d o n e an d t h e o u t c o m e s o f actions,
if it is clear that n o c o e r c i o n w as involved. T h o s e
a c t i o n s an d t h e i r o u t c o m e s usually are de-
s c r i b e d in a n u m b e r o f ways: political, e c o n o m i c ,
social, p e r s o n a l ( s e e G u st af so n an d J o h n s o n ,
1988). Y et b y a c c o u n t i n g for t h e m u n d e r any o f
t h e s e d e s c r i p t i o n s , t h e r e is s i m u l t a n e o u s l y ren-
d e r e d forth claims about the identity of the one
a c t i n g in r e l a t i o n to o t h e r s an d c i r c u m s t a n c e s
s u c h that o u t c o m e s an d a c t i o n s h a v e a m o r a l di-
m e n s i o n . O u t c o m e s and a c t i o n s can b e
evaluated relative to h o w the one acting should
live; t h e y b e a r o n t h e flourishing, goods, rights,
an d p u r p o s e s o f h u m a n beings.
By g i v i n g r e a s o n s for past b e h a v i o r , o n e
l o c a t e s an i d e n t i t y o f an a g e n t in t h e past that w e
c o m m o n l y a s s u m e is in c o n t i n u i t y w i t h t h e pre-
s e n t act o f a c c o u n t i n g for it. T h u s a c c o u n t i n g for
actions, r e l a t i o n s an d i n t e n t i o n s ex post facto
h o l d s w i t h i n itself an a c t o r an d t h e o n e p r e s e n t l y
g i v i n g t h e a c c o u n t . This a c t i v i t y manifests t h e
i n t e r n a l c o m p l e x i t y o r p l u r al i t y o f t i m e ( p ast
an d p r e s e n t ) as w e l l as t h e d o u b l e n e s s o f
i d e n t i t y in t h e r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n a c t o r and
a c c o u n t a n t . H o w e v e r , giving an a c c o u n t also
infuses t h e t e m p o r a l s t r u c t u r e o f i d e n t i t y into a
unity. It d o e s so t h r o u g h t h e fiduciary r e l a t i o n
b e t w e e n t h e a g e n t so i d e n t i f i e d an d t h e a c c o u n t -
ant. That is, t h e r e is a trust e s t a b l i s h e d b e t w e e n
t h e a c t o r and t h e o n e r e n d e r i n g t h e i d e n t i t y ( t h e

unit of meaning, although it often is expressed in larger linguistic units (narratives, reports, histories, etc.). This counters the
analytic concern for the meaning of moral terms. Throughout this essay I assume that giving an account can take rather
diverse discursive forms. Second, these examples, and others could be added, remind us that we give all kinds of accounts of
ourselves, even deceptive ones. Yet in each case there is a linking between what one does and who one is. This means that
moral reflection cannot center simply on prescriptions for courses of action; it is also concerned with individual and social
character, the being of the agent. ! am trying to explore the connection between conduct and character throughout this essay.
Finally, I am also suggesting, by the parallel between understanding and shame noted above, that giving an account enacts
not simply a doubleness between actor and their self-account but also the ambiguity in moral awareness itself. This is more
true of individual persons, it seems to me. than collectives. However, the pervasive malaise that besets corporations in the
midst of political and moral problems thereby affecting the spirit of management and workers may be a rough analogy to this
personal experience. I cannot explore these points further in this essay.
t°My arguments may appear at this point to have some relation to claims about procedural rationality and justice (see
Habermas, 1979; Rawis, 1971 ). The difference, and it is an important one, is that I am claiming that the activity of giving an
account is crucial not simply for rational claims or the principles of justice but for the being of the agent. If understanding is
the human mode of being in the world, then giving an account is one way we understand ourselves as moral beings.
 242 WILLIAMSCHWEIKER

" a c c o u n t a n t " ) e v e n if t h e s e are o n e a n d t h e s a m e a b o u t w h a t o n e is doing, thinking, h o p i n g , plan-

being. T h e a c t o r e n t r u s t s its i d e n t i t y to t h e
a c c o u n t a n t w h o a c c e p t s t h e task o f faithfully
r e n d e r i n g it t h r o u g h t i m e t o o t h e r s and itself.
G i v i n g an a c c o u n t , in w h a t e v e r f o r m it takes,
r e n d e r s d i s c u r s i v e l y a t e m p o r a l and e x i s t e n t i a l
plurality into a t e n u o u s w h o l e . T h e "trust"
e n t a i l e d in this act is o f t e n implicit, s o m e t i m e s
o n l y d i s c l o s e d in m o m e n t s o f d i s r u p t i o n o r
betrayal.~t It is not, in th e first instance, a for-
m a l i z e d c o n t r a c t o r c o v e n a n t b e t w e e n self-
d e t e r m i n e d beings, as it is in t h e p r o f e s s i o n a l
setting. This trust is, rather, a m o o d o r affective
c o m p o r t m e n t that shapes h o w agents u n d e r -
stand and e v a l u a t e t h e m s e l v e s a n d o t h e r s e v e n
as it is e v o k e d by t h o s e o t h e r s a n d t h e w o r l d . As
t h e o l o g i a n s like to p o i n t out, w h e n this trust is
t h r e a t e n e d o r b r o k e n , life is c h a r a c t e r i z e d by
a n x i e t y a b o u t t h e w o r t h o f e x i s t e n c e e v e n as
social life is r i d d l e d b y d e c e p t i o n and d i s t o r t i o n
( s e e Tillich, 1952; N i e b u h r , 1989). T h e formal-
ized trust b e t w e e n a p r o f e s s i o n a l a c c o u n t a n t
a n d a firm is just that: a f o r m a l i z a t i o n o f this m o r e
basic c o m p o r t m e n t that shapes h o w relations,
activities and i d e n t i t i e s are u n d e r s t o o d a n d
evaluated. W i t h o u t a grasp o f t h e s e different
f o r m s o f trust, w e c a n n o t u n d e r s t a n d t h e m o r a l
q u a n d a r i e s I will n o t e l a t e r that a c c o u n t a n t s d o
in fact face. 12 W e w o u l d also b e b l i n d to t h e dif-
f e r e n t t y p e s o f g i v i n g an a c c o u n t r e l a t i v e t o t h e
trusts t h e y entail. G r a n t i n g that, at this stage o f
t h e a r g u m e n t it is e n o u g h to n o t e t h e c u r i o u s
r e l a t i o n o f identity, t e m p o r a l i t y and trust w i t h i n
t h e d i s c u r s i v e act o f g i v i n g an a c c o u n t .
But that is n o t all. In r e s p o n s e to q u e s t i o n s
ning, and t h e like, giving an a c c o u n t also b ear s
o n t h e c u r r e n t si t u at i o n as w e l l as i n t e n d e d
f u t u r e r e l a t i o n s an d actions. W e n o t o n l y g i v e
r easo n s to r e n d e r u n d e r s t a n d a b l e past acts and
traits o f c h a r a c t e r , w e also a t t e m p t t o a c c o u n t
for t h e p r e s e n t . This p r e s e n t is e x t r e m e l y
elusive. It q u i c k l y fades i n t o t h e past, and thus
calls for a r e t r o s p e c t i v e a c c o u n t , e v e n as it
a n t i c i p a t e s t h e o u t c o m e s o f p u r p o s e s , relations,
an d a c t i o n s initiated in t h e p r e s e n t . This
a m b i g u i t y o f t h e t e m p o r a l s t r u c t u r e o f t h e pre-
sent an d its r e l a t i o n to m o r a l i d e n t i t y has b e e n
l o n g i d e n t i f i e d ) 3 For m y p u r p o s e s , it situates
g i v i n g an a c c o u n t in t h e c o n t e x t o f t h e full s c o p e
of our temporality.
It is i m p o r t a n t t o n o t e h e r e that w e n e e d not,
as A u g u s t i n e in his C o n f e s s i o n s an d o t h e r s did,
see t h e u n i t y o f past an d f u t u r e as ecstases, o r
d i m e n s i o n s , o f t h e p r e s e n t s u c h that t h e p r e s e n t
alone, in its f i d u ci ar y c h a r a c t e r , b e c o m e s d e t e r -
m i n a t i v e o f o u r t e m p o r a l being. W e d o n o t h a v e
t o c o n c e n t r a t e o n t h e p r e s e n t act o f t h e self in
p e r s o n a l life o r t h e p r e s e n t a c c o u n t a n t ' s act in
t h e e c o n o m i c r e a l m as o f sole i m p o r t a n c e
s i m p l y b e c a u s e t h e s e acts link past and future. It
is t r u e that e c o n o m i c r e p o r t s are s h o r t l i v e d
things, an d that, as m a n y h a v e n o t e d , A m e r i c a n
c o r p o r a t i o n s are d a n g e r o u s l y n e a r s i g h t e d . It is
also t h e c a s e that this c o n c e n t r a t i o n o n t h e pre-
sent has led t o t h e a h i s t o r i c a l c h a r a c t e r o f
a c c o u n t i n g r esear ch . Yet is t h e fact that a p r e s e n t
act s y n t h e s i z e s past and f u t u r e into an u n d e r -
s t a n d a b l e w h o l e w a r r a n t e n o u g h for giving
m o r a l p r i o r i t y to t h e p r e s e n t ?

HThis is an important experiential and hermeneutical point. That is, the negative, like death or suffering, can, hut need not,
disclose the character of the agent better than ecstatic participation in collectives which may efface the identity of the
individual. One sees this in Sartre's The Wall, for instance, or Augustine's treatment of suffering in The City of God. It is related
to the Memento mori found in much Western moral and religious thought. It is one reason that death and philosophy ( love
of wisdom) have a close relation, as Socrates put it. My point here is not to center on such disclosive experiences, including
positive ones like natality, but rather to explore the affective comportments, like that of trust, they bring to light.
t2I should note here that I am not claiming that "trust" alone is sufficient for understanding the full complexity of moral
existence. It is not. There are other moods or comportments of equal importance which, when shaped into settled
dispositions, are called "virtues". I am exploring trust simply because it seems Central to giving an account within the context
of business. This account of affective comportments is also important for the relation between religious and moral
experience.
J3St Augustine, in his Confessions, explores the ambiguity of the present regarding the past and future through the
examination of the retention and distention of the soul, and, more recently, Paul Ricoeur (1984) has made it central for
understanding narrative.
 ACCOUNTING FOR OURSELVES 243

Hans J o n a s ( 1 9 8 4 ) has r e c e n t l y a r g u e d that ply, a c t i o n is n o t blind; it is u n d e r t a k e n w i t h a

t o o o f t e n t r a d i t i o n a l W e s t e r n t h o u g h t has con-
c e n t r a t e d its m o r a l r e f l e c t i o n o n t h e p r e s e n t o r
n e a r p a s t a n d p r o x i m a t e future. This has left
m u c h W e s t e r n e t h i c s u n a b l e to a d d r e s s
q u e s t i o n s that arise w i t h i n t h e t e m p o r a l e x t e n -
sion o f h u m a n p o w e r t h r o u g h t e c h n o l o g y , seen,
for e x a m p l e , in m u l t i n a t i o n a l c o r p o r a t i o n s .
W h a t I h a v e a r g u e d is that giving an a c c o u n t
r e n d e r s all d i m e n s i o n s o f t e m p o r a l i t y (past, pre-
sent, f u t u r e ) m o r a l l y significant w h i l e s h o w i n g
t h e i r m u t u a l infusion w i t h i n that a c t i v i t y ) 4 W e
q u i t e n a t u r a l l y s p e a k o f giving r e a s o n s for w h a t is
p r e s e n t l y d o n e o r i n t e n d e d . Yet w e also g r a s p
t h e r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n s u c h giving an a c c o u n t a n d
o u r p a s t a n d future. This is c r u c i a l for t h e s c o p e
o f r e s p o n s i b i l i t y I n o t e d b e f o r e a n d w i l l r e t u r n to
later. It d i s c l o s e s that t h e f i d u c i a r y s t r u c t u r e o f
a c c o u n t i n g is f o u n d t h r o u g h t h e w h o l e r a n g e o f
t e m p o r a l identity. This is w h a t t r a n s f o r m s f o r c e
i n t o p o w e r r e g a r d i n g t h e m o r a l m e a n i n g o f time.
In s o far as w h a t is p r e s e n t l y a c c o u n t e d for
fades i n t o t h e p a s t a n d y e t affects t h e future, a n d
that h u m a n life, w h e t h e r i n d i v i d u a l o r c o m -
m u n a l , is u n d e r t a k e n w i t h ends-in-view, w e c a n
also s p e a k o f p r o s p e c t i v e a c c o u n t i n g . Such
f o r w a r d - l o o k i n g a c c o u n t a b i l i t y is r i d d l e d w i t h
difficulties. Utilitarian e t h i c i s t s h a v e l o n g
wrestled with the problem of developing a
calculus to judge when intended consequences
h a v e b e e n s e c u r e d that m e e t c r i t e r i a for
m a x i m i z i n g t h e g r e a t e s t g o o d for t h e g r e a t e s t
n u m b e r o f s e n t i e n t beings. T h e fragility o f life
c o u n t s against p r e c i s i o n here. It also c o n c e r n s
t h e limits o f a c c o u n t a b i l i t y w e will n o t e b e l o w .
F o r e g o i n g t h e n e e d for s u c h a calculus, t h e o -
logians, like H. R i c h a r d N i e b u h r ( 1 9 6 3 ) , h a v e
a r g u e d that a c c o u n t a b i l i t y entails t h e ability to
r e s p o n d to a n t i c i p a t e d r e a c t i o n s t o o n e ' s
actions. In p a r t this is d u e to t h e J e w i s h a n d
C h r i s t i a n s e n s e o f t h e future, a c o n c e r n for t h e
o t h e r , a n d t h e m o n o t h e i s t i c c o n v i c t i o n that G o d
is a c t i v e in all things a n d events. Put m o r e sim-
p u r p o s e . This m e a n s that t h e f i d u c i a r y s t r u c t u r e
o f t e m p o r a l i d e n t i t y b i n d s t h e p r e s e n t a g e n t to
f u t u r e c o u r s e s o f actions, states o f affairs, rela-
tions, a n d its o w n i d e n t i t y in c o m m u n i t y w i t h
others.
T h u s n o t o n l y d o w e give an a c c o u n t o f o u r
ends-in-view, a n d w h y w e t h i n k t h e y a r e g o o d
a n d w o r t h p u r s u i n g , b u t w e c a n also h o l d a g e n t s
a c c o u n t a b l e for t h e ability to r e s p o n d t o antici-
p a t e d r e s p o n s e s . This p r o s p e c t i v e s t r u c t u r e o f
a c c o u n t a b i l i t y is n o t f o r e i g n to t h e b u s i n e s s
w o r l d , as seen, for instance, in b u d g e t i n g
q u e s t i o n s . A d a p t a b i l i t y t o c h a n g i n g m a r k e t situa-
tions d e m a n d s a n t i c i p a t o r y p l a n n i n g a n d
r e s p o n s i v e n e s s . T h e c o r p o r a t i o n that fails to
e v i d e n c e s u c h abilities is n o r m a l l y h e l d a c c o u n t -
a b l e for its failures (e.g. b a n k r u p t c y ) . N o t sur-
prisingly, this o f t e n l e a d s to d e f e n s i v e n e s s a n d
r e a c t i o n a r y p l a n n i n g b o r n o f fear ( M a c I n t y r e ,
1981, pp. 92ff.; N i e b u h r , 1963, pp. 1 2 7 - 1 4 5 ) .
H e r e w e s e e t h e c o r p o r a t e a n a l o g u e to a n x i e t y
a n d b r o k e n n e s s in e x i s t e n c e I n o t e d above. Sadly
m u c h c u r r e n t c o r p o r a t e p l a n n i n g is m a r k e d b y
just this k i n d o f s t r a t e g i c defensiveness. T h e per-
vasive m o o d o f fear c a n c r e a t e c o n d i t i o n s in
w h i c h fraud, i n s i d e r t r a d i n g a n d t h e like b e c o m e
p e r c e i v e d as v i a b l e o p t i o n s for survival. Yet e v e n
t h e s e failures s h o w us that i d e n t i t y is anticipa-
t o r y a n d social a n d i n v o l v e s t h e ability to re-
s p o n d to o t h e r s ' r e s p o n s e s .
G i v i n g an a c c o u n t is t h e n an activity in w h i c h
s o m e o n e w i t h a f i d u c i a r y r e l a t i o n to an a c t o r
p r o v i d e s r e a s o n s for actions, r e l a t i o n s a n d pur-
p o s e s that i n s t a n t i a t e a c o m p l e x t e m p o r a l struc-
t u r e d e m a r c a t i n g t h e i d e n t i t y o f t h e a c t o r as a
m o r a l a g e n t in c o m m u n i t y w i t h others. It w o u l d
n o t b e t o o m u c h to say that giving an a c c o u n t is
t h e linguistic act o f r e n d e r i n g t i m e m o r a l l y sig-
nificant t h r o u g h its m u t u a l l y infused d i m e n s i o n s
o f past, p r e s e n t , a n d future. Even m o r e p o i n t e d -
ly, w e c a n say that p e r s o n s a n d c o m m u n i t i e s live
in r e l a t i o n s t o o t h e r s a n d self, act as causal f o r c e s

m4Icannot explore here in detail the question of temporality. My point is that concentrating on the performative activity of
giving an account means seeing the mutual infusion of past, present and future in such a way that giving priority to one of these
is difficult to sustain. In doing so 1 am countering the priority of the future, found in Heidegger's concentration on the
projective character of Dasein in Being a n d Time and recent eschatological theologies, as well as the preoccupation with
our tradition in Gadamer and much narrative theology.
244 WILLIAM SCHWEIKER

within a world of power, and have some under- coherent life; such a life, enacted in part by giving
standable being w i t h i n the activity of giving an an account, presents such a trust or its failure.
account. How we understand that activity, along Identity is not then simply an act of self-realiza-
with the narratives and rhetorics we employ in tion; it is donated and constituted through active
construing it, necessarily shapes life, helps to engagement with others. This is w h y deception
determine courses of action and signals the is self-destructive, an insight that contests the
meaningfulness and value of existence. That is modernist vision of the human found in m u c h
the profound moral significance of giving an accounting research. The point is that the tem-
account. poral identity of a person or community is not a
This is why, incidentally, religious traditions matter of hours or days or a simple perception of
customarily place human life, action and being temporal passage. It entails a trust. Temporal
within a mythic or narrative framework that identity and consciousness are always and
speaks of origins and ultimate ends as bearing on already moral in character.iS
present acts of fidelity. It is also the reason for The character of giving an account has several
political philosophies developing myths of important implications for understanding
origins, like Rousseau did, or seeking to trace the accounting as a moral practice. First, giving an
tradition-bound shape of political identity as account is an intrinsically social act. We give an
crucial for structures of authority (see Arendt, account to ourselves, our past, present and
1977; Schweiker, 1987). We seek the unity of future selves, enacting their fundamental unity
life within the plurality of lived time through through time. When the entailed fiduciary rela-
performative activities like that of giving an tion is disrupted between actor and accountant,
account. These activities help to constitute life. which in this case is the same being, we speak of
This temporally constituted identity co- self-deception, or, more radically, loss of self in
inheres with a relation of trust. Here too I have estrangement. We also give an account regard-
drawn on a religious insight found in m u c h ing intentions, actions and outcomes to others
Jewish and Christian thought: the eternal being w h o donate value to us (economically or other-
of God is known through the divine faithfulness wise). Here the violation of trust entails fraud or
and not as abstract timelessness. Temporal deceit, as in the Savings and Loan crisis. The for-
integrity, the fragile unity of an agent or com- mal condition t h a t w e can give an account is
munity in time, entails trust and fidelity. The pragmatically crucial for the unity-in-diversity
unique p o w e r or giving an account, and its fun- that is temporal identity; it demarcates member-
damental importance to the moral life, lies in this ship in a linguistic and moral community. W h a t
ability to render forth, within a fiduciary relation, we account for (actions, outcomes, intentions,
a unified identity amid a plurality of relations and relations) and our substantive notions of what is
changes. good are bound up with these relations to others
The activity of giving an account presents the and ourselves. As w e will see, the social nature of
temporal infusion of past, present, future giving an account also forms the backdrop for
through a fiduciary relation; it does not ground understanding the moral task of accounting
that trust or re-present it - - it en-acts it. I do not research and practice. It is the roots for develop-
first "trust" and then decide to have a temporally ing claims about distributive and social justice. ~6
~While it is beyond the scope of this paper, I am contesting any phenomenology or hermeneutic of temporality that attempts
to speak of"pure" temporality devoid of the moral dimension I have outlined. In so far as w e are speaking of the temporalizing
of the human being in time, there is an element of interdependence instantiated in the very account of that event. This is one
point, it seems to me, that calls for further inquiry.
*6By distributive justice is meant the distribution of communal goods, services, and responsibilities to the members of a
community relative to principles of fairness. Social justice is concerned with what those m e m b e r s o w e the community. Aside
from determining principles for fair distribution or service, a central question in both cases centers on entitlement. That is,
what "entitles" individuals to goods, services and responsibilities? What right has the community to its member's goods and
serv/ces? It is beyond the scope of this paper to explore this problem and what it means for the various forms of justice.
 ACCOUNTINGFOROURSELVES
The second significant thing about giving an
account touches the complex and nebulous
arena of motives and p u ~ o s ~ in moral existence
relative to goods sought. I can only note this
here since a detailed consideration is well
beyond the scope of this essay. Yet this much
seems clear. In so far as the unity and identity of
an agent is presented through the linguistic act
of giving an account that renders time morally
meaningful, the motive for accountability is that
of existence itself. There are prudential reasons
for our explicit, even contractual, relations to
others. Moralists have always recognized the
motive p o w e r of serf-interest, or fidelity to serf. It
is w h y theologians have long been suspicious of
acts of serf-justification, of being one's o w n
moral accountant as it were. Driven by serf-
interest, such accounts can be deceptive and
idolatrous since they too easily place the agent
so identified and constituted at the center of all
value relations. It is the possibility and fact of
such fault and deception that lends a measure of
plausibility to Friedman's and Weaver's argu-
ments against corporate responsibility along
with the assumptions about human agents they
entail. It is also what lies behind the need for a
critical social theory.
However, we must see that because identity
so engendered is deeply social, as I have
suggested, the motive for being accountable is
never simple, unadorned serf-interest. It entails a
constitutive relation to others b e y o n d simple
contractual relations. This too has long been
seen in the Western religious traditions. Love of
self and of others are deeply intertwined such
that the disordering of one necessarily distorts
and destroys the other. I am not suggesting here
that love is constitutive of corporative purposes.
A more naive remark can hardly be imagined!
What I am suggesting is that motives for being
accountable are never simple serf-interest since
the very act of giving an account constitutes
identity as temporally complex and social. This
means that whose goods are to be sought in any
particular situation is always a complex question
m pure hedonism or pure altruism are conceiv-
able but hardly livable. The point is that giving an
account raises the question of the motives for
245
actions and the goods sought. That it does so is
only possible if the temporalizing of identity has
an irreducible moral dimension b e y o n d what-
ever natural and psychological accounts of time
we employ.
Finally, the argument forwarded here says
something about the limits of responsibility and
also its scope. The limits seem clear enough.
Actors can only be accountable for those
actions, intentions and o u t c o m e s the construal
of which entail and enact their identity. Moral
agents are therefore normally only accountable
for actions they intended and/or undertook
either directly or through the aid of others. This
is why, one must assume, a corporation has a
good deal at stake in the portrayal of an environ-
mental disaster; they may well be seeking to pre-
sent the situation so as to engender the identity
and responsibility of others.
However, the limits of accountability, which
seem rather narrow as I have stated them, must
be set within its scope. And in so far as giving an
account is a rendering forth of the social and
temporal structure of life through a fiduciary
relation, that scope is indeed considerable. It
potentially opens on to an unlimited horizon of
c o m m u n i t y and time within which to under-
stand identity. The structure of giving an
account raises thereby the question, accounta-
ble to whom?
The Jewish and Christian traditions radicalize
this question since they claim that agents live,
act, and have their being before the ultimate. Life
is enacted amid an infinite otherness. Giving an
account in this context often takes the linguistic
form of confession, as it did for Augustine w h o
confessed his failure of trust and professed the
divine faithfulness. It is also why Jews and
Christians have insisted that the fundamental
needs of the other override perceived serf-
interest: serf and other are, ultimately speaking,
members of one created order. The demands of
justice are universal. Such a moral posture on the
part of religious thinkers makes claims about the
inviolability of private property difficult to sus-
tain. ~7 There are reasons for a priority of the
c o m m o n good and social justice in these tradi-
tions, whatever ambiguities inhere in specifying
246 WILLIAMSCHWEIKER

t h e g o o d a n d f o r m s o f justice. a r g u m e n t has n o t a d o p t e d F r e n c h ' s c o r p o r a t i s m .

In t e r m s o f m y a r g u m e n t , t h e i n t e r d e p e n d e n t
and t e m p o r a l s h a p e o f a c c o u n t a b l e i d e n t i t y
m e a n s that t h e s c o p e o f r e s p o n s i b i l i t y e x t e n d s in
t i m e a n d social reality. T o d e m a n d t h e right o f
private good over the needs and goods of the
w i d e r c o m m u n i t y is s e l f - c o n t r a d i c t o r y . It
d e s t r o y s t h e a g e n t as c o n s t i t u t e d t h r o u g h t h e
social i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e in t i m e e n a c t e d in giving
an a c c o u n t . Any t h e o r y o f c o r p o r a t e b e h a v i o r as
a t o m i s t i c a n d p u r e l y profit d r i v e n i s t h e r e b y
c o u n t e r f a c t u a l , s i n c e in its v e r y act o f giving t h e
a c c o u n t o f that b e h a v i o r t h e t h e o r y instantiates
t h e social i d e n t i t y o f c o r p o r a t e forces. In this
r e s p e c t s o c i a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y is u n a v o i d a b l e
i n a s m u c h as a c o r p o r a t i o n seeks to give an
a c c o u n t o f itself to others. It fails t o d o so at t h e
c o s t o f its o w n identity. T h e issue, then, is n o t if
o n e is s o c i a l l y r e s p o n s i b l e , b u t h o w that r e s p o n -
sibility is e x e r c i s e d o r n e g l e c t e d b y t h e c o r p o r a -
tion.
W h a t h a v e w e seen? I have a r g u e d that to give
an a c c o u n t is to e n a c t t h e t e m p o r a l a n d social
s h a p e o f life a n d t h e r e b y p r e s e n t a m o r a l iden-
tity. T h r o u g h t h e c o m p l e x , d i s c u r s i v e act o f
giving an a c c o u n t t h e i d e n t i t y o f i n d i v i d u a l s o r
b u s i n e s s e s is p r e s e n t e d in w a y s that call for
e v a l u a t i o n a b o u t t h e agent, its a c t i o n s and out-
c o m e s , a n d r e l a t i o n s t o others. This is b e c a u s e in
t h e act o f giving an a c c o u n t t h e r e is a t e m p o r a l i z -
ing o f i d e n t i t y t h r o u g h a fiduciary r e l a t i o n w h i c h
c o n s t i t u t e s that i d e n t i t y as m o r a l in c h a r a c t e r .
We need not assume anything about the being of
t h e a c t o r p r i o r t o giving an a c c o u n t in o r d e r to
a s c r i b e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . I have s h o w n , then, that
t h e r e is n o t h i n g o d d in s p e a k i n g o f c o r p o r a t e
agency, e s p e c i a l l y if that e n t i t y gives an a c c o u n t
o f a c t i o n s a n d o u t c o m e s t h r o u g h its t e m p o r a l
life.
We have then answered the problem of how
to s p e a k o f t h e "agency" o f a c o r p o r a t i o n . My
This is b e c a u s e o n l y h u m a n p e r s o n s c a n a n d
must be their own moral accountants, render
forth t h e i r o w n i d e n t i t y a m i d social c o m p l e x i t y
w i t h t h e risk o f fault a n d e s t r a n g e m e n t as w e l l
as t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f f o r g i v e n e s s this entails.
P e r s o n s d o so w i t h i n l i n g u i s t i c a n d t e m p o r a l
p e r f o r m a t i v e a c t i v i t i e s t h a t e n g e n d e r identity.
Put differently, o n l y p e r s o n s c a n s e n s e t h e
t e n s i o n b e t w e e n t h e i r a c t i n g a n d suffering a n d
t h e i r b e i n g a c c o u n t a n t s for t h e i r lives, a s e n s e
that gives rise to m a n i f o l d f o r m s o f a c c o u n t i n g
for t h e m s e l v e s , like c o n f e s s i o n , thanksgiving, o r
evasive denial. O n l y p e r s o n s c a n reflect u p o n
this s e n s e a n d t h e i r b e h a v i o r w h i l e also e n g a g i n g
in d i s c o u r s e a b o u t that r e f l e c t i v e identity.
B e c a u s e o f this, o u r m o r a l b e i n g is a l w a y s in
balance. P e r h a p s t h e s e n s e o f this b a l a n c e is w h a t
is m e a n t b y t h e " v o i c e o f c o n s c i e n c e " as p a r t
o f w h a t it m e a n s t o h a v e a "soul".
P e r s o n s a r e c a p a b l e o f d e g r e e s o f self-
a w a r e n e s s , s e l f - d e c e p t i o n a n d fault n o t o p e n to
c o r p o r a t e a g e n t s e v e n if t h e d e s t r u c t i v e
c a p a b i l i t i e s o f c o r p o r a t i o n s far e x c e e d that o f
individuals. T h u s w h i l e c o r p o r a t e a g e n t s are, b y
giving an a c c o u n t , m e m b e r s o f t h e m o r a l c o m -
m u n i t y w i t h p e r s o n s , t h e y are n o t e q u a l
m e m b e r s . T h e y d o n o t e n j o y t h e s a m e rights a n d
b u r d e n s as h u m a n beings. T o d e m a n d e q u a l
r e s p e c t h e r e w o u l d b e to v i o l a t e c r u c i a l m o r a l
differences. It w o u l d fail t o u n d e r s t a n d t h e
a n a l o g y at w o r k in e x p l o r i n g t h e a c t i v i t y o f
giving an a c c o u n t o f p e r s o n a l a n d c o r p o r a t e
identity. P e r s o n s give a c c o u n t s o f t h e m s e l v e s ,
o n e s qualified b y r e f l e c t i o n a n d affective aware-
ness; c o r p o r a t i o n s m u s t e m p l o y a c c o u n t a n t s
a n d t h u s c o n s t i t u t e a f o r m a l r e l a t i o n at t h e c o r e
o f t h e i r identity. This l e a d s us t o t h e i m p o r t o f
this a r g u m e n t for a c c o u n t a n t s a n d a c c o u n t i n g
r e s e a r c h e r s b y r e t u r n i n g us t o t h e l a r g e r d e b a t e s
in m o r a l p h i l o s o p h y n o t e d before.

tTOne thinks here of St Thoma.s'squalified endorsement of private property due to sin. While his argument was altered in later
Papal encyclicals, there was always a concern for a just, livable wage, as in Leo XlIl'sRerum Novarum. These arguments move
between natural law claims and the specifically Christian beliefs about human sin. in Protestant thought there are also
qualifications on property relative to the public good. In this century this has been continued by the Social Gospelers, like
Walter Rauschenbusch in his A TheoloKyfor the Social Gospel, and socialist dimensions in the thought of Tillich, Barth, and
others. Given the context of this conference, these lines of thought cannot be traced here. However, it should be clear that
my own argument seriously qualifies claims about private goods before the demands of social justice and the common good.
 ACCOUNTINGFOR OURSELVES 247

ISSUES IN A C C O U N T I N G A N D ETHICS lines of fidelity b e t w e e n p r e s e n t , pagt, a n d f u t u r e

W e have s e e n partly t h r o u g h t h e h e l p of
religious t r a d i t i o n s that giving a n a c c o u n t has a
m o r a l quality in at least t h r e e ways. It is con-
c e r n e d , first, w i t h the d i s c u r s i v e ways that
persons and communities render meaningful
their i d e n t i t i e s t h r o u g h time. This entails a
fiduciary r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n actor a n d a c c o u n t a n t
a n d thus a n o r m for a c c o u n t i n g practice. This
n o r m is justified o n c e w e see that it is a condi-
tion o f the formal s t r u c t u r e of this discursive act.
Second, w e isolated the q u e s t i o n of "to w h o m "
o n e is a c c o u n t a b l e , to the a g e n t a n d to others,
a n d thus w h o s e g o o d s are sought. Here an
a c c o u n t is justified dialogically r e g a r d i n g the
i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e c o n s t i t u t i o n of identity. Finally,
w e have also m a d e p r o g r e s s in e x p l o r i n g a criti-
cal p o s t u r e for e x a m i n i n g the values, beliefs a n d
n o r m s of a c o m m u n i t y . Put s u c c i n c t l y , t h e m o r a l
quality of i d e n t i t y is p r e s e n t e d t h r o u g h activity
a n d language, in time, w i t h others, a m i d trust. TM
What d o e s this tell us a b o u t a c c o u n t i n g ?
In so far as t h e i d e n t i t y e n a c t e d t h r o u g h giving
an a c c o u n t achieves s o m e u n i t y t h r o u g h t i m e b y
m e a n s o f a fiduciary r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n a c t o r a n d
a c c o u n t a n t , t h e n o n e n o r m o f the p r o f e s s i o n is
that o f i n t e g r i t y a n d t r u t h f u l n e s s f o u n d e d o n
trust. This t r u s t is a d m i t t e d l y m o r e formal in the
business c o n t e x t than the affective trust w e have
w i t h others, the world, a n d o u r s e l v e s as selves.
And necessarily so. O t h e r w i s e w e c o u l d n o t
u n d e r s t a n d the difference b e t w e e n h u m a n a n d
c o r p o r a t e agents or the felt tensions, the conflict
of loyalties, that a c c o u n t a n t s have b e t w e e n t h e i r
o w n m o r a l integrity a n d the d e m a n d s m a d e o n
t h e m by c l i e n t s o r their o w n firms. Still, this
trust, in w h a t e v e r form it takes, charges the
a c c o u n t a n t ( w h e t h e r this is a self to itself or a
party c h a r g e d to r e n d e r a n o t h e r ' s i d e n t i t y ) w i t h
the task of p r e s e n t i n g the i d e n t i t y of an a g e n t
t h r o u g h time. To d o so r e q u i r e s specifying the
actions, i n t e n t i o n s , relations a n d o u t c o m e s , or
their d i s r u p t i o n . And o n e m u s t d o so to others,
e v e n to o n e ' s i n t e r n a l "otherness", i n the d i m e n -
sions o f time.
Take a p o p u l a r example. T h e so-called
"whistle b l o w e r " is m e r e l y i n d i c a t i n g a break-
d o w n of t h e lines of fidelity Oames, 1984). O f t e n
c h a r g e d w i t h unfaithfulness to the c l i e n t o r cor-
p o r a t i o n , h e r e the e m p l o y e e , o r a g e n t of s o m e
principal, faces a m o r a l q u a n d a r y . W h i c h rela-
t i o n of t r u s t o u g h t to o v e r r i d e t h e other, the o n e
to t h e c o r p o r a t i o n o r that to t h e fiduciary obliga-
t i o n as s u c h ( t h e d e m a n d to r e n d e r a truthful
i d e n t i t y o f that c o r p o r a t i o n a n d h e r o r himself)?
Cases like this call for s o m e critical p r i n c i p l e of
d e c i s i o n m a k i n g as well as practical d i s c e r n m e n t
a n d j u d g m e n t in the specific situation. I will n o t e
o n e critical p e r s p e c t i v e in a m o m e n t . T h e p o i n t
is that the fiduciary s t r u c t u r e of giving an
a c c o u n t h e l p s us u n d e r s t a n d h o w m o r a l quanda-
ries arise for a c c o u n t a n t s . This is so e v e n t h o u g h
financial a c c o u n t i n g a t t e m p t s to c o n t r o l the lan-
guage in w h i c h s u c h issues arise o r are kept from
arising. In any case, the fiduciary s t r u c t u r e
implies a n o r m of t r u t h f u l n e s s a n d trust that
bears o n the c o r p o r a t e agent a n d the a c c o u n t a n t
as well.
T h e c o n s t r u a l of giving a n a c c o u n t f o r w a r d e d
a b o v e also c o n c e r n s w h a t a n d w h o s e g o o d s an
a c c o u n t a n t serves. T h e s e c o h e r e w i t h the
m o t i v e s for a c c o u n t a b i l i t y . W e have s e e n that an
a c c o u n t a b l e i d e n t i t y is a t e n u o u s u n i t y t h r o u g h
t i m e a n d w i t h others. This suggests that t h e
a c c o u n t a n t serves b o t h the goods of the "agent"
a n d those o t h e r s to w h o m that a g e n t is responsi-
ble. O u r a r g u m e n t d o e s n o t n e g a t e the drive for
survival f o u n d in individual a n d c o r p o r a t e
agents. It d o e s n o t entail the o d d s u g g e s t i o n that
b u s i n e s s e s o u g h t n o t to seek a profit o r that
market m e c h a n i s m s can simply b e translated
into political ones. What it does d o is to d e s c r i b e

~aHabermas (1990, pp. 1-20) has noted that modern thought is characterized by t w o modes of justification, the
transcendental concerned with the conditions of Ix)ssibility for claims, and the dialectical which traces the progressive
realization of thought. Postmodern discourse has given up the hope of transcendental arguments rooted in a theory of
consciousness or dialectical ones alx)ut the progress of"spirit". It has turned instead to intersubjective activity and complex
forms of historical practice. In a way quite different than Habermas' own thinking about these issues, I have employed these
different strategies of justification within the activity of giving an account regarding trust and the dialogic act.
248 WILLIAMSCHWEIKER
that motive vis-a-vis the rendering forth of an
accountable identity. It thereby suggests that
self-interest, the profit motive, or fidelity to self-
integrity is always met and tested by other needs
and goods. This meeting is clarified through the
activity of the accountant who, in the portrayal
of an agent's identity, specifies that identity's
interdependence with others, those to w h o m
one is then accountable. Our argument exposes,
then, the ways in which accountants c a n evade
this task while also making strong claims for the
social responsibility and c o n c e r n for the com-
mon good by corporations. Such c o n c e r n is not,
as some argue, simply a matter for political con-
sideration. It is entailed in e c o n o m i c life as well
through the work of accountants w h o take on
the burden of understanding their task as that of
giving an account.
As with conflicts of trusts so too there can be
conflicts between what and whose goods are
sought. The current economic climate, as has
often been noted, is a struggle for survival and
this usually overrides other corporate concerns
and roles (see McCraw, 1988; Weaver, 1988).
The most pressing problem here is, no doubt,
that of w h o s e goods are sought since the goods
pursued are dictated by economic life and find a
minimum in mere existence. Not only are
employees often asked to sacrifice their goods
for the sake of a corporation, but businesses
struggling for survival often in turn sacrifice
claims of the c o m m o n good for their private
advancement (e.g. plant closing, waste disposal
as in the Pennwalt case, etc.). How are these con-
flicts between private and public goods, if I can
call them that, to be adjudicated? Clearly, this
too is a matter that cannot be answered simply
by appeal to principle. It requires practical dis-
cernment and judgment in specific situations by
individuals, management, accountants, advisors,
politicians and ethicists. Nevertheless, in so far
as actors seek to give an account for their deci-
sions, actions and outcomes, arguments will be
made about what and whose good overrides
others. To what will one appeal in these situa-
tions? This brings us to the last issue of concern
for accounting.
Thus far I have suggested, in response to cur-
rent debates in ethics, that my interpretation of
giving an account helps us understand the rela-
tion of discourse and identity around some norm
(trust), and that it also addresses the nagging
question of whose goods are to be sought by
agents. Yet in each case we confronted quand-
aries. How is an accountant, for instance, to
decide about conflicts of trust, h o w is she or he
to adjudicate between private and public good?
Ought she or he to do so at all? Given the con-
textual shape of moral reasoning, these are in
large measure matters of discernment and
judgment. They cannot be answered definitively
before the fact. Yet here we meet again a prob-
lem I noted at the outset of this essay. How is it
possible to acknowledge the contextual chara-
cter of practical reasoning without making
moral judgment uncritical of the institution it
serves? Does financial accounting so control
accounting discourse that no ethical perspective
on its language is possible at all? Has our argu-
ment made any headway in addressing these
questions? I think it has. It coheres with the
claims above about the limits and scope of
responsibility.
I have argued that the limits of responsibility
must be placed within its scope since an
accountable identity is constituted with others
and open, potentially, to the whole horizon of
time and community. This implies two things.
First, it provides reason for considering the
needs of others in the determination of courses
of action since those others help to constitute an
accountable identity. Yet is also implies, second,
that in conflict situations there is a presumption
on behalf of the priority of the c o m m o n good
and the needs of others from the perspective of
the temporal horizon of a specific identity. With-
out that horizon moral existence is collapsed
into the present and thereby lost. This is so
because, as w e have seen, the present quickly
fades to the past while anticipating the future. In
other words, there are moral demands that trans-
cend present survival because they concern the
very condition of meaningful existence: time. To
recur to an earlier point, this is something like
the c o n c e r n of the "moral point of view", but one
that arises out of a specific discursive practice,
 ACCOUNTINGFOR OURSELVES 249

that of giving a n a c c o u n t . W e have historically Yet in d o i n g so, the a c c o u n t a n t ' s a g e n c y is also

a n d socially situated p e r s p e c t i v e s o n c o m m o n
welfare a n d n e v e r attain a u n i v e r s a l p o i n t o f
view. But this is, for all its c o n t e x t u a l character,
still a p e r s p e c t i v e o n that c o m m o n good. 19 T h e
c o m m o n g o o d serves t h e m to c r i t q u e a n d to
g u i d e i n t e n d e d c o u r s e s o f action.
W h a t this m e a n s for t h e a c c o u n t a n t is that the
private g o o d s o f a c l i e n t c a n n o t easily o v e r r i d e
the p u b l i c good, as w i t h Exxon, P e n n w a l t , o r a n y
n u m b e r o f o t h e r examples. Likewise, the g o o d o f
b u s i n e s s c a n n o t b e e q u a t e d w i t h the c o m m o n
good since, as w e have seen, any identity requires
otherness and thus a wider scope of good than
itself. T h u s giving a n a c c o u n t r e n d e r s e c o n o m i c
forces servants of larger h u m a n a n d e n v i r o n -
m e n t a l p u r p o s e s w i t h o u t n e g a t i n g the singular-
ity o f t h e i r i d e n t i t i e s o r motives. This is h o w the
a c c o u n t i n g p r o f e s s i o n w o r k s f o r ourselves, h o w
it helps marshal e c o n o m i c forces as p o w e r s for
moral purposes. Yet is also m e a n s that the
a c c o u n t a n t , i f a n d o n l y i f she o r he u n d e r t a k e s
the a r d u o u s task o f r e n d e r i n g an agent, c a n n o t
b e m a d e servile to c o r p o r a t e i n t e n t i o n s a n d
values. This is so b e c a u s e the a c c o u n t a n t , ulti-
mately, is the a g e n t of a fiduciary r e l a t i o n
t h r o u g h the s c o p e o f t i m e a n d c o m m u n i t y , a
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t o o often n e g l e c t e d b y us all.
G r a s p i n g this r e q u i r e s a n d e v e n e n a b l e s a shift in
self-understanding, as all moral insight does. T h e
a c c o u n t a n t is bid to see herself o r h i m s e l f as b o t h
an i n t e r n a l and an e x t e r n a l critic: i n t e r n a l
b e c a u s e h e o r she is b o u n d t h r o u g h a fiduciary
r e l a t i o n to the c o r p o r a t e a c t o r a n d its discourse;
e x t e r n a l b e c a u s e the a c c o u n t a n t ' s p e r s p e c t i v e
r e a c h e s b e y o n d c o r p o r a t e i n t e n t i o n s . Part o f the
a c c o u n t a n t ' s task, in p o r t r a y i n g an i n d e n t i t y ,
o u g h t to b e to s h o w h o w these r e l a t i o n s a n d per-
s p e c t i v e s c o i n h e r e in that d i s c u r s i v e identity.
e n g e n d e r e d in s u c h a w a y that criteria, goods
a n d m e m b e r s h i p in a m o r a l c o m m u n i t y b e a r o n
g u i d i n g a n d assessing t h e i r o w n c h a r a c t e r a n d
conduct.
T h e s e are o f c o u r s e g e n e r a l guidelines, distil-
lations from t h e activity of giving an a c c o u n t .
T h e b u r d e n o f d e c i s i o n m a k i n g always e x c e e d s
in c o m p l e x i t y w h a t e v e r g u i d e l i n e s w e develop.
Nevertheless, r e g a r d i n g the c u r r e n t d e b a t e s in
ethics w e have s e e n that the n o t i o n o f giving an
a c c o u n t f o r w a r d e d a b o v e bears o n a c c o u n t i n g
p r a c t i c e a n d r e s e a r c h relative to n o r m s for iden-
tity, w h a t a n d w h o s e g o o d s are sought, practical
reasoning, a n d i n t e r n a l a n d e x t e r n a l criticism.
CONCLUSION
In this essay I have a t t e m p t e d an interpreta-
t i o n o f t h e basic activity of a c c o u n t i n g p r a c t i c e
a n d research: giving an a c c o u n t . D o i n g so has
e n a b l e d us to grasp the m o r a l t e x t u r e of that
p r a c t i c e a n d t h u s to specify s o m e t h i n g o f the
ethical task of these professions. I have d o n e so
n o t from a n o b s e r v e r ' s p e r s p e c t i v e o n h u m a n
action, b u t from a p e r f o r m a t i v e one. T h e validity
o f m y claims, therefore, rests o n the d e g r e e to
w h i c h t h e y fit a n d e x p l i c a t e w h a t t h e y have
s o u g h t to i n t e r p r e t . Put in t h e jargon of ethical
theory, w e have s e e n h o w d u t i e s a n d n o r m s , o r
d e o n t i c claims, arise w i t h i n an activity that
instantiates i d e n t i t y as i n t e r d e p e n d e n t . This
p r a c t i c e is also c o n c e r n e d w i t h g o o d s a n d con-
s e q u e n c e s , o r teleological criteria, relative to
the s c o p e a n d c o n t e x t of the m o r a l life. In a
w o r d , giving an a c c o u n t is o n e w a y of s p e a k i n g
a b o u t the shape of moral reasoning and existence
as c o n c e r n e d w i t h fitting r e s p o n s e s to relations

tgl am suggesting here that the common good, as the flourishing of (potentially) a (universal) community is a horizon on
which a perspective about what is good is projected in such a way that this transforms that perspective. Kant would speak of
this as the postulate of a kingdom of ends, while Christians might speak of it as the reign of God. This transformation, one that
matches the move from force to power noted before, takes place, I contend, in activities like giving an account. It is why the
demands of justice, for instance, are linked to the scope of a moral community(see Maclntyre, 1988). This is also part of the
contribution of Jews, Christians, the Stoics, and later Enlightenment thinkers to our moral reflection. In different ways each
radicalize the demand of justice to a universal community. I am making an analogous claim hut from within the act of giving
an account. That we give an account helps form what community of discourse is morally significant even as what
communitiessay about the moral life are the context for that action of giving an account. ! cannot enter here a discussion of
the common good.
 250 WILLIAM SCHWEIKER

marked by power, obligation, goods, and the manifest the disruptions within our moral world.
varied concerns and moods that motivate moral The attempt to account for ourselves and to
a g e n t s . It is p a r t o f a c a t h e c o n t i c e t h i c , a n e t h i c o f u n d e r s t a n d t h e a c c o u n t i n g p r o f e s s i o n i n t h e ser-
responsibility (see Niebuhr, 1963; Schrag, v i c e o f h u m a n a n d e n v i r o n m e n t a l n e e d s is t o
1986). acknowledge these problems and to attempt to
T h e a c c o u n t i n g p r o f e s s i o n a s s u m e s its e t h i c a l meet them. The difficulties we face are not only
t a s k w h e n it t a k e s s e r i o u s l y t h e w a y i n w h i c h its economic and political ones. They are also moral
practice contributes to our ability to speak about o n e s , a n d , I w o u l d a r g u e , r e l i g i o u s as w e l l . z°
m o r a l b e i n g s . A f t e r all, m o s t m o r a l c r i s e s a r e dis- T h e y c o n c e r n h o w w e s h o u l d live. C l a i m i n g
ruptions in how persons and communities e c o n o m i c life f o r o u r s e l v e s , s e e i n g a c c o u n t i n g
u n d e r s t a n d a n d v a l u e t h e i r lives. T h e m a n i f o l d i n t h e s e r v i c e o f l a r g e r p u r p o s e s , is t o s h o w t h a t
disputes surrounding current economic life it t o o c a n a n d m u s t h e l p u s a n s w e r t h a t q u e s t i o n .

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 ACCOUNTING FOR OURSELVES 251

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