The Emotional Intelligence Bandwagon: Too Fast to Live, Too Young to Die?

Author(s): Moshe Zeidner, Richard D. Roberts and Gerald Matthews

Source: Psychological Inquiry, Vol. 15, No. 3 (2004), pp. 239-248
Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.
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20)4, Vol. 15,No. 3, 239-248 LawrenceErlbaumAssociates, Inc.

AUTHORS' RESPONSES

The Emotional Intelligence Bandwagon:

Too Fast To Live, Too Young To Die?
Moshe Zeidner
Department of Education
Center for Interdisciplinary Research on Emotions
University of Haifa, Israel

Richard D. Roberts
Centerfor New Constructs
Educational Testing Service
Princeton,NJ
Gerald Matthews
Department of Psychology
University of Cincinnati
Overview our own experiences, we can readily call to mind

peoplewho arehigh on cognitive intelligencebut quite

As evidenced in the two lead articles, ensuing com
unremarkablein their social adroitness.This divide
mentaries, and subsequentrejoinders,emotional intel helps us to fully appreciate,for example,Renee's la
conic remark in the popular TV show Ally McBeal:
ligence (El) has emerged as a high profile, yet
contentious, issue inmodern day psychology (see also "Emotionally,you're an idiot!"
In our target article we sought to separate beliefs
Mtatthews, Zeidner, & Roberts, 2002). From fairly
about El that are speculative and mythical from state
humble beginnings, El has come into its own as one of
the mlost popular psychological concepts of the last de ments and claims that have a firm foundation in empir

cade. However, for all its charm and youthful energy, ical science. We thank each of the commentators for

El appears to be living "life in the fast lane" and is acknowledgingour contributionin advancing the field
moving at blistering pace towardconceptual stardom by presenting a critical, yet not dismissive, view on the
(,Zeidner,Roberts,& Matthews, underpreparation)A. evidence for the construct of El. We particularly wel
recentWeb searchon the termemotional intelligence come Averill's (this issue) remarks that the two lead
resulted in over 140,000 URLs; a search of various sci articles in this issue provide a "textbook example" of

entific databases (e.g., PsychInfo, Social Sciences In how theHegelian dialectic of science shouldproceed.
dex) resulted in a comparably modest count (i.e., Accordingly, following the thesis put forthby propo
350-400 hits). The disparity in these numbers illus nents of El (beginning in the early 1990s), a skeptical antithesis
tratesstrikinglyan imbalancebetween popular interest has been put forth, articulated in our target article. The future,
and the status of El in peer-reviewed, psychological re according to this dialectic, fore
searchAside. fromvariouswell-documented sociolog bodes a synthesis between proponentsand opponents
ical reasons for popular interest in El (see Matthews, of El to advance the field further (assuming the wheels do
Zeidner et al., 2002), most people seem intuitively to not come off the bandwagon altogether).
feel thattherearemeaningful individualdifferences in The fourdistinguishedcommentatorson our article
the domain of emotional functioningAs. Averill (this havemade variouspertinentcomments relating tokey
issue) so aptly puts it, "it [El] has an easily recogniz issues in the domain of El research and have suggested
able grain of truth." Another important factor account ways to advance the field and push the domain-specific
irig for the widespread popularity of El, also taken up knowledge about EI beyond its present equivocal sta tus. In
by Averill, is the frequentlyobserved disjuncturebe this rejoinder, we note from the outset the fol
tween intellectual and emotional acumen. Thus, from lowing as points of general agreement:
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 ZEIDNER,ROBERTS,MATTHEWS

1. The need tomap out the construct of El accord specific definition or model, etc.). However, as with El
ing to a more rigorous conceptual and defini research in general, we see little convergence on a con
tional system. sensual definition; indeed, each new perspective may
2. A requirementto develop more sophisticated open furtherdivides.
measurement tools and techniques. Averill (this issue) laments that the emotional com
3. The identification of appropriatebehavioral ponent is given short shrift in the literature on El when
criteria forEl. comparedwith the intelligencecomponent.Averill is
4. The systematic mapping of the nexus of rela particularly vexed by the following conceptual pitfall
tions between El and related criterion variables haunting, in particular, ability models of El: Whereas
of interest. they clearly specify and delineate the information pro
5. The implementationof proper statistical con cessing components central to reasoning about emo
trolsforpersonalityand abilitymeasures when tions (e.g., emotion perception and expression,
considering the empirical status of El. understanding affect, assimilating emotions in mental
6. The application of alternative domains of knowl schemata), these models fail to specify the specific
edge to complement criterion validity stud emotional content being processed by abstract compu
ies-ranging from literature,creativity,andhis tational modules. Averill questions the underlying
toricalaccounts topopularculturaltrends. working assumption, namely, that the processing com
7. The investigationof whether it is practically ponents are of equal relevance across different catego
useful in applied settings to train higher El or to ries of emotions. Extending this concern, we may
measure El for selection purposes. question whether any model of El generalizes across
the universe of basic emotions, given evidence differ
Despite some promising researchdevelopments entiating discrete, universal basic emotions (Ekman,
re lated to each of the preceding issues, we also take this 1989). Furthermore, it is too early to dismiss the possi
opportunityto furtherhighlight various "mythical"be bility of the existence of multiple Els underlying emo
liefs about El that are not scientifically supported. We aim to tions and their manifestations embedded within
reinforce or complement previous points that specific cultural contexts.
we have made in four broad areas of El research: (a) Gohm (this issue) claims that the contention that
conceptualization, (b) assessment, (c) basic empirical definitions of El are conceptually coherent could be
issues, and (d) practical applications. We show how each of viewed as a myth only if published in the popular
the commentators have substantially furthered our case, press, but when addressed to scientists reading Psy
rendering El as having a slippery scientific status, which has chological Inquiry, sounds like a "straw man" posi
lead to the spread of a number of un tion. This claim suggests a misreading of the peer-re
foundedmyths. In certain other instances, however, viewed literature on El, in which questionnaire
moving more toward synthesis than our target article may studies are at least as prominent as those using objec
suggest, we show how concepts surrounding El may be tive or quasiobjective tests. The leading questionnaire
vindicated by further conceptual refinement or empirical developers are quite explicit that they seek to mea
research. sure an ability that predicts objective behavior (e.g.,
Bar-On, 2000; Boyatzis, Goleman, & Rhee, 2000).
Conceptual Issues We agree with Gohm that questionnaires are an un
promising means to this end, but we cannot dismiss
Our target article has drawn attention to the prob this approach by arbitrary fiat. Indeed, Gohm' s
lematic nature of current definitions and conceptual
(2003) own published work has used questionnaire
izations of El and the limited theoretical basis for
measures, including the Trait Meta-Mood Scale, to
developing the El construct. The lack of a consensual
relate self-reports of mood management to El. Fur
definition of El is highlighted by the major disjunction
thermore, neither questionnaire nor objective ap
that exists between ability and mixed models of El
proaches prevail on predictive validity, so far as we
(e.g., Mayer, Salovey, & Caruso, 2000). The construct
can tell from the few studies that have aimed to con
also lacks content validity in that, especially within the
trol personality or cognitive ability (cf. Brackett &
mixed model approach, the multitude of qualities cov
Mayer, 2003; Brody, this issue). Consequently, the
ered by the concept is overwhelming (Roberts, 2003).
weakness of correlations between objective (e.g., the
Such differing definitions and conceptions have led to
Mayer-Salovey-Caruso Emotional Intelligence Test;
considerableconfusion in the scientific literatureAc. MSCEIT) and questionnaire (e.g., the Emotional
knowledging the tenuous conceptual status of El, each Quotient Inventory; EQ-I; Bar-On, 1997) measures of
of the various commentators proposes interesting solu El may indicate a significant failing of the field as a
tions (i.e., toleratingthecoexistence of multiple defini whole (i.e., lack of convergent validity).
tions in semantic space, tapping related domains for In fact, thereare at least two dimensions of concep
in-depthunderstandingof El, early foreclosure on a tualconfusion evident in the scientific literatureFirst,.

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 AUTHORS' RESPONSES

there is no agreement on the specific qualities that de fine El proach concur that "a consensus about the major trait
and no decision rules that would allow us to dimensionsof personalityhas begun to emerge among
parse personal qualities as emotionally intelligent or contemporary trait psychologists" (Pervin, 2002, p.
not.Emotional creativity,as discussed byAverill (this 29), and "there is no disagreement among us regarding
issue), is a case in point. If we apply Oatley's (this is the usefulness of a common conceptual scheme [i.e.,
sue) method of seeking exemplars of outstanding ex the Big Five] that is both parsimonious and compre
pertise, we see, like Averill and Seneca, that writers hensive" (Block, 1995, p. 26).
and artists with a genius for expressing emotion are of Indeed, the following thoughtexperiment is illumi
tenpoor atmanaging interpersonalrelationships.Sec nating. Imagine that traitpsychologists assumed the
ond, there is no agreement on the nature of the El construct; is existence of a single construct of personality (let us call
it temperament, a set of specific compo it PQ for personality quotient), so that one researcher
nent processes, metacognitions of personal compe pronounced thatextravertedqualitieswere the key to
tence,or acquiredskills?TheMayer-Salovey-Caruso PQ, whereas another researcher argued in favor of
conception is probably the clearest with respect to spe emotionality. The Babel that would result is obvious.
cific qualities,but thepsychological underpinningsof Our concern is that research on El is hobbled by similar
the four branches remain ambiguous (Matthews, confusions, exacerbatedby poor discriminationfrom
Zeidner & Roberts, in press-a). For example, a per existing constructs. Indeed, conceptual overlapswith
so:)n's understanding of the Mona Lisa may be sup the Five FactorModel (McCrae, 2000; Matthews,
ported by various, qualitatively different processes Zeidner et al., 2002) imply thatwe have at least five ex
ranging from hard-wired subcorticalcircuits for pat pressions of El that can be directly tied to the Five Fac
tern recognition of emotional stimuli that are activated by a torModel (see Table 1). We cannot blithely assume
smiling face, to use of cultural knowledge about that itwill all come right in the end. To find the elusive
Renaissance Italy, to stillmore intimateknowledge of El, we need a targeted search guided by an explicit
Da Vinci's artistic agenda to decode hidden meaning. T'he conceptualization ofeither a single or multiple dimen
specific qualities assessed by the MSCEIT Face sion(s) of competence. We strongly advocate separate
PerceptionTest are conjecturalMore. disturbingly, in researchefforts directed to each possible conceptual
a study of over 100 college freshman, we recently ization listed in our original target article (and possibly
fouLnd that this subtest of theMSCEITcorrelates near others). Once we have better measures of well-defined
zero with a widely used objective measure of facial constructs, we can begin to ask whether they possess a
emtnotion recognition, the Japanese and Caucasian Brief structure(e.g., a positivemanifold) thatwould support
Affect Recognition Test (inwhich clearlymoderate the existence of an overarching El (or Els).
re lations would seem requisite; see MacCann, Oatley (this issue) warns us against a premature
MIatthews,Zeidner,& Roberts, in press-a). definitional narrowing of the field (while at the same
Gohm (this issue) is remarkably blase concerning time, paradoxically,embracinga particulardefinition
themultiplicity of conceptualizations of El. There is no and conception of El)! He takes us to task for placing
a priori certainty that El exists at all, and hunting a sin too much emphasis on definitional issues rather than
gle Snark is difficult enough without admitting a whole devoting more energy to clarifying the El concept. Per
mienagerieof disparate,possibly chimerical creatures force he is also sanguine about the peaceful coexis
tence of various alternative definitions of El in
to be acceptable prey. Certainly, definitions develop
semantic space, certainly at this early stage of concep
over time, with some imprecision expected of an emer
genit construct. Even so, we contend that researchers tual development. He sees the essence of emotionally
are enititled to expect greater coherence in specification intelligent behavior as the proper exercise of perceived
o:f content and process than currently exists in the El control in solving problems in specific social contexts.
literature. The comparison with personality traitsmade To enrich our understanding of the El concept, Oatley
by Gohm is illuminating. In fact, contrary to her state also suggests that we draw on novel domains (e.g., lit
mrrent, there is very good consensus on the nature of the erature, history, music, plastic arts, theatre, and cin
mrrajor personality traits, such as extraversion ema) and learn from the paradigmatic examples or
(M atthews, Deary, & Whiteman, 2003). In discussing experts in these fields (e.g., authors of imaginative
thie Five Factor Model, even critics of the trait ap novels, playwrights, poets, and historical figures).

Table 1. Core Attributes of El Allocated Across the Five-Factor Model of Personality

Extraversion Emotional Stability Conscientiousness Agreeableness Openness
Aspect of El Social skills Tolerance of stress Self-control Empathy Creativity

Social confidence Effective coping Organizationalcitizenship Interpersonalsensitivity Artistic sensitivity

Optimism Lack of pessimism Hard-working Caring for others
Note. El = emotional intelligence.

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 ZEIDNER, ROBERTS, MATTHEWS

Whereas these idiographicsourcesmay offer consider Oatley (this issue) raises the concern that the teams
able insight into emotional phenomena, resonating to authoring the two lead papers have become too fo
the emotional experiences of generations of people cused on measurement issues, equating the concept of
over the ages, they cannot and should not replace El with its measurement. In fact, there are two issues
nomothetic empirical research. It is the latter that en here. The first is what type of truth is sought concern
ables us to generate replicable lawful relations that ing El. We agree with Oatley that coherence truth and
generalize across time and context and thereby help personal truth are important, but it is not clear that
transform a concept into a scientific construct.' these truths are properly a part of science, although
In defense of El, one should bear inmind that, after there is a tradition of idiographic personality research
over a century of research there still remains contro that points toward some possible approaches to inves
versy over the precise meaning of intelligence. How tigating El at an individual level. In addition, truths can
ever, there appears to be less implicit agreement dissociate. Classical psychoanalysis possesses coher
among researchers on the content domains of El than ence-and has generated numerous textbooks-and to
was the case for intelligence tests, even during the this day informs personal truth, at least among psycho
early days of testing (see Roberts, Markham, analysts and their clients. However, it has failed as a
Matthews, & Zeidner, in press). In part, at least, the full path toward scientific truth (one may comment simi
promise of El measures (and ensuing research) de larly on religious beliefs). Furthermore, personal truth,
pends on resolving issues surroundingcontent valid and, we suspect, coherence truth are highly sensitive to
ity; an important undertaking that needs to be cultural values. Oatley cites examples of the stoic vir
addressed for the field to progress. It is currently an tues but part of the zeitgeist for current interest in El is
open question whether future researchwill arrive at a the neoromanticism that values emotional expression
more solid operational definition of El. If not, El will above self-control (Matthews, Zeidner et al., 2002;
come to be seen as awoolly prescientific term thatmay Mayer, Salovey, & Caruso, 2000). Fashions in emo
be replaced by a variety of more precisely specified tion are important in their own right as an object of

constructs. study and feed into the social aspects of emotion de

scribed by Averill (this issue). However, we cannot
look to cultural trends to define what is, and what is

Assessment Issues not, intelligent.

Our concern is with EI as a nomothetic construct. If
In our target article, we identified myths relating to we wish to investigate El as an attribute of all people,
assessment: that measures of El meet standard measurement is the primary key to a science of El. In
psychometric criteria, that self-reportEl is distinct fact, the history of science amply shows that scientific
from existing personality constructs, and that ability progress advances hand in hand with the development
tests meet criteria for a standard intelligence. Serious of appropriate measurement procedures to
concerns are raised by the lack of convergence be operationalize, and hence to define, nascent constructs.
tween alternate measures of El, by the high degree of Without precise astronomical measurements of the
overlap of El with the Big Five personality traits, and movements of the planets, and definitions of force,
by difficulties in veridical scoring of ability tests (see mass, momentum and the like, there would be no New
Matthews, Zeidner et al., 2002; Matthews, Zeidner, & tonian physics. In fact, Newton's attempts to under
Roberts, in press-b). stand mathematical laws, in terms of the Cartesian
Furthermore, a clear and coherent definitional system is essential theory of his day, have been discarded (Lakatos, 1978).
If El can not be measured reliably and validly-and
this thorny issue appears to be its Achilles heel con
temporaneously-it can not be placed in a nexus of
in the El concept as a viable scientific construct. Accord
establishing lawful relations (its nomological network) and thus
facet theory, it is
ing to the tenets of precisely the definitional system
will be slow at achieving the status of a true scientific
(i.e., specification of the basic content and response facets of El) that
specifies the universe of discourse of the concept. The specification
construct. In fact, given the problematic status of El
of a rigorous mapping sentence for El would help illuminate the con measurement, it is currently difficult to advance credi
cept's key dimensions, its critical attributes, and help in differentiat ble propositions about individual differences in El.
El from related constructs in the same semantic domain. In a
ing fact, Consider, in particular, that the direction and magni
concept reaches the status of a construct if itmeets three basic crite
ria: (a) the concept is accorded a formal definition, an tude of several important group differences (e.g., men
(b)
operational
procedure can be specified for measuring the vs. women, ethnic vs. majority, gifted vs. nongifted)
concept, and (c) it is em
bedded in a
nomological network of related constructs (Kerlinger, are measure dependent, with different profiles evi
we believe
1973). Thus, that a major effort should be devoted to set denced as a function of differing measurement tech
tling on a coherent definition of it be
El, and to at
tempt to measure El without
may premature
first reaching some form of scientific
niques (see e.g., Matthews, Zeidner et al., 2002;
consensus on what we mean as well as the of domain Roberts, Zeidner, & Matthews, 2001; Zeidner,
by El, mapping
elements and the issue of dimensionality. Shani-Zinovich,Matthews, & Roberts, 2004).

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 AUTHORS' RESPONSES

The second issue raised by Oatley (this issue) is the We endorseBrody's (this issue) observation that
imlportanceof lookingat expertise ratherthanfocusing items on ability-based El tests (such as theMSCEIT)
onmeasurement.Thus, if onewants tounderstandhow are fundamentallydifferent from those assessing cog
tobecomemore emotionally intelligent,onewould ob serve nitive ability (in which there is typically a clearly jus tified
leadersor high emotionally intelligent individu als, correct answer for each item). According to
interview them about their propositional or psychometric theorizing, for an item to be considered
proceduralknowledge, take think-aloudaccounts of how a true ability item itmust be capable of being mapped
they reason about emotionally loaded contexts, onto a veridical (rather than sentimental) criterion us
and use this to build models of what they know and ing some mapping rule, be it logical, semantic, empir
how they use their knowledge in forms that can help ical, or normative (Guttman & Levy, 1991). This
people improvetheiremotional skillsWe. endorse this seems not to be the case for the vast majority of items
as a powerful technique, although we note that there may be comprising the MSCEIT, or its predecessor, the
difficulties in deciding who is genuinely an ex Multifactor Emotional IntelligenceScale (MEIS).Al
pert. For example, charismatic leaders of religious though the use of a greater expert pool in developing
cultsmay exert powerful control over theirfollowers' the MSCEIT is to be applauded, it does not circum
emnotions while also showing severe maladaptation to vent this important criticism. At present, there is no
life in generalMore. important,we see investigations definitive, universally accepted body of knowledge
of expertise and measurement as complementary about emotional competence that can be used for
rather than exclusive. We can have more confidence in veridical scoring, in part because of the context- and
expertise that can be predicted from an independent culture-dependentnature of competence (Zeidner et
test than in expertise that is self-proclaimed or depend al., 2001).
erat on the subjective value judgments of others. Con Indeed, each of the two principal scoringmeth
versely, we can have more confidence inmeasurement ods, expert and consensus scoring, adopted by
devices if they successfully discriminateexperts from Mayer, Caruso, & Salovey (1999; also see Mayer,
novices. Indeed, such studiesmake a powerful contri Salovey, et al., 2001) has problems. The commenta
buition to the nomological network of ability con tors add to the critique we present in our target arti
structsOur. understandingof cognitive intelligence is cle. As noted by Averill (this issue) and Brody (this
informedby studies showingwhich typesof expertise issue), the problems in using experts to pick the right
it predicts (various types of academic and occupational answers are that experts are fallible (academics may,
expertise), and which types it does not (the skills of the according to the consensus of their students,
"idiot savant," some forms of tacit knowledge). spouses, or children, be highly deficient in this re
Gohm (this issue) suggests that it is time to spect!), that academic psychologists may possess
move; beyond debates about El meets traditional declarative but not procedural knowledge of emo
standards for intelligence (see Mayer, Salovey, tion, and that some items may simply not have a cor
Caruso, & Sitarenios, 2001; Roberts et al., 2001; rect answer in that the best response may depend on
Ze.iidner, Matthews, & Roberts, 2001). This is a cu circumstances. There are also doubts about the cul
rious suggestion. As Brody (this issue) articulately ture-fairness of expert judgments.2 The obvious
discusses, abilities have special defining proper problem with the second, consensus-based scoring
ties, and we cannot understand a construct without method is that the consensus may not in fact be cor
knowing whether it meets these criteria. In addi rect; beliefs about emotion may be affected, for ex
tion--curious and curiouser-Gohm also suggests ample, by culturally defined stereotypes (Zeidner et
that it is up to critics to show that suggested scor al., 2001). Brody and Averill note that a logical diffi
ing procedures are incorrect. We disagree. There culty with consensus scoring is that it leaves little
are sufficient reasoned grounds for questioning the scope for the itemetric analyses that are a central ele
validity of both expert and consensus scoring that ment of intelligence test development, such as
the onus must always be on the test developer to Guttman scaling and its derivatives. Consensus scor
demonstrate that scoring is valid. Experts in psy ing sui generis excludes identification of extremely
chology do not have an unblemished track record, difficult items on which, say, only the 10% most able
and, historically, their prescriptions for curing individuals pick the correct answer, and the consen
mental illness, raising children, and managing the sus answer is incorrect. Distinctions between emo
ills of society have often been found to be fallible.
Evidence that would justify the practical use of El
measures as intelligence tests is essential as part of 2
Curiously enough, Moshe
Zeidner, one of the authors on this pa
the construct validation of this fledgling concept was
per, or so
experts who were consulted
in
among the 20 developing
the If one asked his wife, chil
and can not simply be ignored for sake of expedi expert scoring scheme for theMSCEIT.
or students, how he would rate on El in true-to-life situations, the
ency, or because the evidence is slow or difficult to dren,
answer may well be, in the spirit of Ren?e' s assessment in
Ally
come by. McBeal's TV show: he is but intelligent"!
"Emotionally, anything

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 ZEIDNER,ROBERTS,MATTHEWS
tional genius and the normal functioning person are spect to disparate gender, age, ethnic, or national

rendered difficult if not impossible. As a result, groups.

consensually scored ability measures of El may be Our targetarticle highlights failuresof convergent
more effective in screening for "emotional stupid validity, for example, the MSCEIT appears to share
ity" than in discriminating levels of El at the upper less than5% of its variancewith questionnaire-based
end of the range.3 We concur with the position ad assessments of El (e.g., Brackett & Mayer, 2003).
vanced by both Brody and Averill claiming that cur Gohm (this issue) responds that because humans are
rent ability-based measures (e.g., MSCEIT) often notoriously poor at evaluating their own ability, the
assess explicit, declarative beliefs about emotion, fact that self-report measures of El do not predict abil
which can be expressed verbally, in contrast tomuch ity-basedEl does not necessarily discredit the con
emotional and social knowledge, which is implicit struct. In fact, this argument would be quite tenable if self-
and procedural(Wells & Matthews, 1994). Either report measures were in fact designed to assess
(or both) processes may contribute to El, but their self-perceptionsof theEl constructHowever,. the truth
roles are poorly differentiated in the theorizing of of the matter is that self-report measures,such as the
Mayer, Salovey, and colleagues. EQ-i, are commonly touted as valid measures of the El
Gohm (this issue) points out that our criticism was construct-not self-perceptionsof the construct, and
unjustly targetedat the first performance-basedmea there is a petite difference between these two mean
sure (i.e.MEIS), whereas currentjudgmentshould in ings. Gohm also argues that, because what is to be con
stead rest on the newer, revised instrument (i.e., sideredan emotionally intelligent response to real-life
MSCEIT; purportedlythe best available ability-based contexts is often unclear, we need to accept less preci
test of El). However, a review of the psychometric data sion in our measurement of El than we would like, and
available for theMSCEIT shows that itmay be less de this does not preclude important clinical predictive va
sirable and valid than the older version on a number of lidityHowever,. lackof precisionofmeasurementpro
counts.4 Given the reduced number of items on the duces not just poor test reliability, but also limits the
subtests assessing each of the four branches of the correlationbetween predictorand criterion (Nunnally,
MSCEIT, subscale reliabilities generally do not fare 1978): Gohm's prescription condemns us to a
better than the MEIS (see MacCann, Matthews, half-bakedscience of artificially low, hard-to-replicate
Zeidner, & Roberts, in press-b). The factor structure of validity coefficients. Furthermore,high levels of reli
the MSCEIT is difficult to assess because there are ability are particularly important for assessments of the
only two marker tests for each of the branches, and individual, such as those performed in education and
structural invariance has yet to be determined with re clinical practice.
In a somewhat related
vein, Averill
(this issue) underscores an Research Issues

other major weakness of consensus scoring (i.e., that it tends to de

Research on El and Coping With
value unusual and exceptional emotional responses that are highly
weighted in test of creativity and
ability). Thus, consensus scoring
leaves little room for emotional creativity, inwhich respondents with Stress
novel, different from the norm, unusual, or rare responses should be The transactional theory of emotion (Lazarus, 1991,
given higher scores, rather than the opposite. In our own research, we
have also noted that consensually scored tests result in very high lev
1999) provides an account of emotion and its behav
els of kurtosis and negative skew, such that statistical analysis assum
ioral consequences in terms of the personal meaning of
ing multivariate normality cannot be validly applied to scores based
on these measures (MacCann, Roberts, Matthews, & 2004). events and high-level appraisal and coping processes.
Zeidner,
Further research focus on improving the validity of expert judg This level of analysis is appropriate for understanding
may
ments,
4
which do not suffer from these statistical difficulties. El as an index of individual differences in adaptation
That said, the correlation between MSCEIT consensus and expert (or adaptability) to emotional demands. In particular,
scores of r = 0.98 for a general El composite that Salovey, et
al. and a
Mayer,
the emotionally intelligent person should cope more
(2001) mention is impressive, significant advance in estab
lishing validity. Nevertheless, such a result leaves open significant adaptively, particularly with his or her emotions than
unresolved questions. Are the in this latest study still the low emotionally intelligent person, perhaps in part
experts predom
inantly White, Western, well-educated men was the case for the
(as due to superior abilities to appraise emotions of self and others
expert weights comprising the a
MEIS)? Given relatively large pool
(cf. Salovey, Bedell, Detweiler, & Mayer,
of
experts, perhaps their views primarily reflect cultural consensus
rather than special expertise. Also, what is the level of inter rater
1999).Unfortunately, the existing research literature
agreement? Furthermore, little information is available concerning does not support the notion of a continuum of adaptive
the relation between the MSCEIT and older versions of the MEIS. competence in that there are no good criteria for rating the
These shortcomings of the recent versions of theMSCEIT are
partic outcomes of events in terms of overall adaptive
ularly noticeable in the context of other standardized, psychological
success or failure (Matthews& Zeidner, 2000), and
tests that are operational, in which such issues are contemporane
ously given detailed treatment in test manuals and other forms of sup empirical studies have suggested particular coping
porting documentation. strategies are only weakly related to outcomes

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 AUTHORS' RESPONSES

(Zeidner& Saklofske, 1996).More generally, it is cen 1996; Wells & Matthews, 1994). Flow may be no more
tral to the transactional approach that emotions must be than the end-point of a continuum of task engagement,
understoodwithin the specific context inwhich they a state thatmay be operationally defined and measured
occOurAlthough. theconcept is superficiallyappealing, as a complex of energetic mood, attentional focus, and
we cannot identifyEl with emotional adaptability. intrinsic taskmotivation (Matthewset al., 2002).We
Both Oatley (this issue) and Gohm (this issue) join agree with Oatley that such studies are enlightening in
us in our plea for additional research designed to un themselves, but they may be still more informative if
cover the relations among various facets of El and as the experiences of individuals are placed within a di
pects of coping (i.e., problem-focused vs. mensional framework, such as the Matthews et al.
enmotion-focusedcoping). At present, however, very (2002) three-factormodel of subjective statesMayer,.
little empirical research has been conducted on these Perkins,Caruso, andSalovey (2001) reportedinterest
issuesWe. have recentlyobtained smallbut significant ing case studies of how emotionally gifted children
correlations, rs < .2, between low El as defined by the talkabout theiremotions. Importantly,theiruse of the
MSCEIT and use of emotion-focused and avoidant MSCEIT to assess giftedness places the idiographic
coping during performance of cognitive tasks casematerialwithin a nomothetic framework.
(Matthews,Emo, Funke, Zeidner, & Roberts, 2002).
The correlationwith emotion focus, but not the corre
laition with avoidance, was mediated by neurotic per One or Two Processing Systems?
sonality. Salovey et al. (1999) summarized past
research regarding some potential interveningvari El is commonly viewed as the integration of ratio
ables (e.g., social support,disclosure, rumination),but nal and emotional processing systems (Ben-Ze'ev,
presented little hard data bearing directly on the rela 2000), a view placing rational and emotional modes of
tion between coping and El or mediating variables. In reasoning in direct opposition to one another
deed, considerablework remains inmapping out the (Goleman, 1995; Izard,2001). Thus, of fundamental
nexus of relations among various components of El relevance to El theory and research is the question of whether
and various aspects of coping. Furthermore,research there are indeed two discrete forms of infor
would most profitably be directed not toward global mation processing or reasoning (i.e., emotional and
coping effectiveness, but towardamore fine-grained cognitive, relatingtopeople andobjects, respectively).
undlerstanding of adaptational processes that may be Elsewhere (Matthews, Zeidner et al., 2002), we have
closer to the El constructs than to standard personality identifiedweaknesses of the theoreticalstancepositing
andc ability measures. Such processes may well relate separate emotional and cognitive systems. In brief, the
to styles of adaptation rather than to more or less suc idea of separate emotional and cognitive systems is
based on a misunderstanding of cognitive psychology,
cessful adaptation(Matthews,Zeidner et al., 2002).
Oatley (this issue) argues that standard self-report presuming thatcognition is necessarily slow, delibera
co)ping measures are far from generating the most tive, and logical. In fact, cognition may operate
useftul source of knowledge about coping under ad through rapid, associative, and parallel-but still
ver-sity. Instead, Oatley champions the use of literary, meaning-based-processing, operating through re
historical, or live figures and examples (e.g., the stoic trieval of schematic information from memory (see
Clore & Ortony, 2000). Thus, we have found difficul
phillosopherEpictetus; the prisoner of war, Admiral
ties with the prevalent assumption in research on El
James Stockdale). These figures personify the suc
cessful rallying to life's challenges and weathering of that IQ and "EQ" map onto separate cognitive and
life's storms. Although we can certainly profit from emotional systems. Averill's (this issue) point that we
the writings of those who have suffered in life, unique may be observing two different modes of functioning
events such as coping with torture or eviction from of the same underlying system is especially well-taken.
their homes constitute an inextricable blend of acci We concur with Gohm' s (this issue) view that emo
dental and essential features related to coping; it is tional and cognitive processes are interactive in a com
doubtful if these case studies or unique events could plex way and that the measurement of El does not
serve as a basis for deducing lawful and generalizable depend on settling the issue of separate or unitary cog
relations or could help in uncovering the mechanisms nitive versus emotional systems. However, to say that
underlying the El-coping interface, which is the very emotion and cognition interact is to state the obvious.
We cannot progress furtherwith theoretical under
stuff of science.
Furthermore, the messages that Oatley (this issue) standing of constructs labeled as El without addressing
takes from studies of individual life experiences may such issues. Zeidner, Matthews, Roberts, and
also be read from standard, nomothetic stress research. MacCann (2003) presented a developmental account

JoannaField's (1934/1952) experiencescorrespondto of individualdifferences in self-regulation thatdiffer

findings thatbothminor hassles and persistentworry entiates levels of emotionalcompetence.First, compe
mnay signifilcantlydisturbmental equilibrium (Kohn, tence reflects temperamental qualities such as

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 ZEIDNER,ROBERTS,MATTHEWS

emotional stability and capacity for effortful control. Gohm (this issue) suggests that much of the poor
Such competencies are contextualized in that their re evidence for El and real-life success is based on
lation to outcome success varies across situations. self-reportdata, leaving hope for thepredictive valid
Emotional stability facilitates productive interactions ity of ability-basedmeasures. A recentmeta-analysis
with caregivers, but may also promote exposure to haz (Van Rooy & Viswesvaran, 2002) showing very mod
ardous situations, for example. Second, children may est predictivevalidity for El measures was based
differ in their acquisition of rules for appropriate feel mostly on self-report measures, but the few studies
ing, emotion display, and coping.Third, older children based on the MSCEIT do not fare much better. As
acquire insightful understanding of the self as a social Brody (this issue) discusses, the recent work of
being with a particular sociocultural context. These Brackett andMayer (2003) suggests only weak predic
different typesof competencemay indeed supportdif tive validity for this instrument.Indeed, these authors
ferent constructs.Self-reportEl may reflect tempera found no evidence for greater predictive validity for
ment, ability testsmay assess specific acquired skills, theMSCEIT comparedwith questionnairemeasures.
and self-awareness may be treated best idiographically Future researchon both types of instrumentmay iso
ratherthannomothetically. late aspects of behavior that are more strongly predict able
from El. For the present,though, by contrast with
the impressive predictive validity of general intelli
gence to which Brody alludes, there is little evidence
Applications that suggests an essential role of tests of El in
real-worldselection and assessment applications.
El research has prospered, in part, because it is claimed to
predict important educational and occupa tional criteria above
and beyond those predicted by Conclusion
personality and general intellectual ability. Unfortu
nately, however, the ratio of hyperbole to hard evi Our initial review identified seven myths sur
dence is ratherhigh. Currently, interest in promoting rounding El, but further pitfalls and shortcomings
emotional competence in real-world settings exceeds were identified in the commentaries and this re
the contribution to psychological science made by El. sponse. The bandwagon may indeed be rolling to
In occupational psychology, inflated claims that the ward a painful collision with reality. Nevertheless, it
predictive validity of EQ exceeds that of IQ have not is important not to squash potentially informative re
been substantiated by data. Indeed, there is little evi search in its early stages and the mythology of El
dence that current tests predict any objective index of may actually serve in the added capacity of a
work performance with ability and personality con soupstone. For those not familiar with the term, a
trolled (Zeidner,Matthews, & Roberts, in press). Fu soupstone is an idea that is falsely believed to be an
ture research may benefit from validation research essential ingredientof valid psychological theorybut
suggestedby commentators,such as diary time/experi nevertheless stimulates research in the area under
ence sampling (Oatley, this issue) and behavior sam consideration (cf. Navon, 1984). As also suggested
ples in true-to-life situations (Gohm, this issue). by Averill (this issue), one of the major virtues of El
Brody's (this issue) caustic review of the evidence pre has been to stir interest in the emotional domain and
sented for the predictive validity of theMSCEIT reveals to put emotional competencies on the agenda of psy
some of the key weaknesses in this body of literature (see chologists. Indeed, El has already served to reorient
also Matthews, Zeidner et al., 2002). These include wide the study of human emotions in a more positive,
reliance on unpublished studies or studies appearing in functional direction by motivating policy makers in
nonpeer-reviewedjournals,lackof propercontrolsforper business, management, politics, and education to take
sonality and ability in assessing the relation between pre dictor emotional issues seriously. We do not actually need
and criterion, use of self-report assessment of success on the job the concept to understand individual differences in
or other nonobjective external criteria, and accounting for emotional function, but bothGoleman's (1995) book
trivial amounts of variance in the crite rionmeasure. Brody and scientific studies (see e.g., Bar-On & Parker,
contends thatmuch of the evidence is 2000) have increased interest in this important area of
highly selective, incomplete,and contradictory,with re psychology, education, andmanagement.
searchers simply presenting the statistic most suitable in We endorse the view that there may be various new
supporting their case for the predictive validity of current constructs, beyond standard personality and intelli
measures (e.g., subtests, total score). Brody concludes gence, which could usefully be identified. However,
rather pessimistically "there is not a single study reported such constructs may be heterogeneous in nature, and
thatindicatesthatEl has nontrivialincrementalvalidityfor much of what is of interestmay not in factbe properly
a sociallyimportantoutcomevariableaftercontrollingfor described as intelligenceat all.We have recently iden
intelligenceandpersonality." tified at least fourdifferent typesof construct thatap

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 AUTHORS' RESPONSES
Table 2.Multiple Types of Construct ThatMay Contribute toEmotional Competence

Construct Possible Current Measure Key Processes Adaptive Significance Developmental Influences
Temperament Scales forBig Five EQ-i Neural and cognitive Mixed: Most temperamentalGenetics and early learning

(Bar-On,1997) processes controlling factorsconfer amixture of

arousal, attention, and costs and benefits
reinforcementsensitivity
Informationprocessing JACBART,emotional Specific processing Uncertain: Is speed of Genetics and early learning
Stroop modules processing necessarily
adaptive?
Emotional Subcomponentsof Self-concept and Predominantlybut not Learning and socialization:
self-confidence self-reportmeasures self-regulation exclusively positive:
For example,mastery
of El presumed similar to experiences,modeling,
self-esteem direct reinforcement(in
emotive contexts)
EmrotLionalknowledge MSCEIT Multiple acquired Adaptive within context for Learning, socialization,and
and skills proceduraland learning:may be trainingof specific skills
declarative skills irrelevantor and knowledge
counterproductivein
other contexts
Notes. EQ-i = EmotionalQuotient Inventory;El = emotional intelligence;MSCEIT =Mayer-Salovey-Caruso Emotional IntelligenceTest.
JAC1BART = Japanese and Caucasian Brief Affect Recognition Test.

pear to be measured, to varying degrees, in current El Notes

research:temperament(overlappingwith personality),
information-processing components, emotional The ideas expressed in this manuscript are those of
self-confidence, and acquired cultural-bound skills the authors and not necessarily of the Educational
and knowledge(see Table 2; also Matthewset al., in Testing Service.
press-b). It is precisely because of this heterogeneity Moshe Zeidner,Center for the InterdisciplinaryRe
thatwe need clear conceptualizationand definition. searchon Emotions,University of Haifa, Mt. Carmel,
The confusion causedby thecurrentfree-for-allin test 31905, Israel.E-mail: zeidner@research.haifa.ac.il
developmentwill continue until researchersbecome
more adept at communicating what exactly it is that
they want to measure.
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