SET I CASES

429 U.S. 190

Craig v. Boren (No. 75-628)

Syllabus

Appellant Craig, a male then between 18 and 21 years old, and appellant Whitener, a licensed vendor of
3.2% beer, brought this action for declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that an Oklahoma statutory
scheme prohibiting the sale of "nonintoxicating" 3.2% beer to males under the age of 21 and to females
under the age of 18 constituted a gender-based discrimination that denied to males 18-20 years of age
the equal protection of the laws. Recognizing that Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, and later cases establish
that classification by gender must substantially further important governmental objectives, a three-
judge District Court held that appellees' statistical evidence regarding young males' drunk-driving arrests
and traffic injuries demonstrated that the gender-based discrimination was substantially related to the
achievement of traffic safety on Oklahoma roads.

Held:

1. Since only declaratory and injunctive relief against enforcement of the gender-based differential was
sought, the controversy has been mooted as to Craig, who became 21 after this Court had noted
probable jurisdiction. See, e.g., DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312. P. 192.

2. Whitener has standing to make the equal protection challenge. Pp. 192-197.

(a) No prudential objective thought to be served by limitations of jus tertii standing can be furthered
here, where the lower court already has entertained the constitutional challenge and the parties have
sought resolution of the constitutional issue. Pp. 193-194.

(b) Whitener in any event independently has established third-party standing. She suffers "injury in
fact," since the challenged statutory provisions are addressed to vendors like her, who either must obey
the statutory provisions and incur economic injury or disobey the statute and suffer sanctions. In such
circumstances, vendors may resist efforts to restrict their operations by advocating the rights of third
parties seeking access to their market. See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438. Pp. 194-197.
KILOS BAYAN V. GUINGONA

In 1993, the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office decided to put up an on-line lottery system which will
establish a national network system that will in turn expand PCSO’s source of income.

A bidding was made. Philippine Gaming Management Corporation (PGMC) won it. A contract of lease
was awarded in favor of PGMC.

Kilosbayan opposed the said agreement between PCSO and PGMC as it alleged that:

PGMC does not meet the nationality requirement because it is 75% foreign owned (owned by a
Malaysian firm Berjaya Group Berhad);

PCSO, under Section 1 of its charter (RA 1169), is prohibited from holding and conducting lotteries “in
collaboration, association or joint venture with any person, association, company or entity”;

The network system sought to be built by PGMC for PCSO is a telecommunications network. Under the
law (Act No. 3846), a franchise is needed to be granted by the Congress before any person may be
allowed to set up such;

PGMC’s articles of incorporation, as well as the Foreign Investments Act (R.A. No. 7042) does not allow it
to install, establish and operate the on-line lotto and telecommunications systems.

PGMC and PCSO, through Teofisto Guingona, Jr. and Renato Corona, Executive Secretary and Asst.
Executive Secretary respectively, alleged that PGMC is not a collaborator but merely a contractor for a
piece of work, i.e., the building of the network; that PGMC is a mere lessor of the network it will build as
evidenced by the nature of the contract agreed upon, i.e., Contract of Lease.

ISSUE: Whether or not Kilosbayan is correct.

HELD: Yes, but only on issues 2, 3, and 4.

On the issue of nationality, it seems that PGMC’s foreign ownership was reduced to 40% though.

On issues 2, 3, and 4, Section 1 of R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42, prohibits the PCSO from
holding and conducting lotteries “in collaboration, association or joint venture with any person,
association, company or entity, whether domestic or foreign.” There is undoubtedly a collaboration
between PCSO and PGMC and not merely a contract of lease. The relations between PCSO and PGMC
cannot be defined simply by the designation they used, i.e., a contract of lease. Pursuant to the
wordings of their agreement, PGMC at its own expense shall build, operate, and manage the network
system including its facilities needed to operate a nationwide online lottery system. PCSO bears no risk
and all it does is to provide its franchise – in violation of its charter. Necessarily, the use of such
franchise by PGMC is a violation of Act No. 3846.
KILOS BAYAN V. MORATO

ASE DIGEST

KILOSBAYAN vs. MANUEL L. MORATO

G.R. No. 118910. November 16, 1995.

FACTS:

In Jan. 25, 1995, PCSO and PGMC signed an Equipment Lease Agreement (ELA) wherein PGMC leased
online lottery equipment and accessories to PCSO. (Rental of 4.3% of the gross amount of ticket or at
least P35,000 per terminal annually). 30% of the net receipts is allotted to charity. Term of lease is for 8
years. PCSO is to employ its own personnel and responsible for the facilities. Upon the expiration of
lease, PCSO may purchase the equipment for P25 million. Feb. 21, 1995. A petition was filed to declare
ELA invalid because it is the same as the Contract of Lease Petitioner's Contention: ELA was same to the
Contract of Lease.. It is still violative of PCSO's charter. It is violative of the law regarding public bidding.
It violates Sec. 2(2) of Art. 9-D of the 1987 Constitution. Standing can no longer be questioned because it
has become the law of the case Respondent's reply: ELA is different from the Contract of Lease. There is
no bidding required. The power to determine if ELA is advantageous is vested in the Board of Directors
of PCSO. PCSO does not have funds. Petitioners seek to further their moral crusade. Petitioners do not
have a legal standing because they were not parties to the contract

ISSUES:

Whether or not the petitioners have standing?

HELD:

NO. STARE DECISIS cannot apply. The previous ruling sustaining the standing of the petitioners is a
departure from the settled rulings on real parties in interest because no constitutional issues were
actually involved. LAW OF THE CASE cannot also apply. Since the present case is not the same one
litigated by theparties before in Kilosbayan vs. Guingona, Jr., the ruling cannot be in any sense be
regarded as the law of this case. The parties are the same but the cases are not. RULE ON
CONCLUSIVENESS cannot still apply. An issue actually and directly passed upon and determine in a
former suit cannot again be drawn in question in any future action between the same parties involving a
different cause of action. But the rule does not apply to issues of law at least when substantially
unrelated claims are involved. When the second proceeding involves an instrument or transaction
identical with, but in a form separable from the one dealt with in the first proceeding, the Court is free
in the second proceeding to make an independent examination of the legal matters at issue. Since ELA is
a different contract, the previous decision does not preclude determination of the petitioner's standing.
STANDING is a concept in constitutional law and here no constitutional question is actually involved. The
more appropriate issue is whether the petitioners are REAL PARTIES in INTEREST.

FRANCISCO VS. FERNANDO

G.R. No. 166501, November 16 2006

FACTS:

Petitioner Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr. (petitioner), as member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and
taxpayer, filed this original action for the issuance of the writs of Prohibition and Mandamus. Petitioner
prays for the Prohibition writ to enjoin respondents Bayani F. Fernando, Chairman of the Metropolitan
Manila Development Authority (MMDA) and the MMDA (respondents) from further implementing its
“wet flag scheme” (“Flag Scheme”).

Petitioner contends that the Flag Scheme: (1) has no legal basis because the MMDA’s governing body,
the Metro Manila Council, did not authorize it; (2) violates the Due Process Clause because it is a
summary punishment for jaywalking; (3) disregards the Constitutional protection against cruel,
degrading, and inhuman punishment; and (4) violates “pedestrian rights” as it exposes pedestrians to
various potential hazards.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petition was valid.

HELD:

The Court dismissed the petition. A citizen can raise a constitutional question only when (1) he can
show that he has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal
conduct of the government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and (3) a favorable
action will likely redress the injury. On the other hand, a party suing as a taxpayer must specifically show
that he has a sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation and
that he will sustain a direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the questioned statute. Petitioner
meets none of the requirements under either category.

Nor is there merit to petitioner’s claim that the Court should relax the standing requirement because of
the “transcendental importance” of the issues the petition raises. As an exception to the standing
requirement, the transcendental importance of the issues raised relates to the merits of the petition.
Thus, the party invoking it must show, among others, the presence of a clear disregard of a
constitutional or statutory prohibition. Petitioner has not shown such clear constitutional or statutory
violation.

On the Flag Scheme’s alleged lack of legal basis, we note that all the cities and municipalities within the
MMDA’s jurisdiction, except Valenzuela City, have each enacted anti-jaywalking ordinances or traffic
management codes with provisions for pedestrian regulation. Such fact serves as sufficient basis for
respondents’ implementation of schemes, or ways and means, to enforce the anti-jaywalking ordinances
and similar regulations. After all, the MMDA is an administrative agency tasked with the
implementation of rules and regulations enacted by proper authorities. The absence of an anti-
jaywalking ordinance in Valenzuela City does not detract from this conclusion absent any proof that
respondents implemented the Flag Scheme in that city

PHILCONSA V. ENRIQUEZ

Facts:

This is a consolidation of cases which sought to question the veto authority of the president involving
the General Appropriations Bill of 1994 as well as the constitutionality of the pork barrel. The Philippine
Constitution Association (PHILCONSA) questions the countrywide development fund. PHILCONSA said
that Congress can only allocate funds but they cannot specify the items as to which those funds would
be applied for since that is already the function of the executive.

In G.R. No. 113766, after the vetoing by the president of some provisions of the GAB of 1994, neither
house of congress took steps to override the veto. Instead, Senators Wigberto Tañada and Alberto
Romulo sought the issuance of the writs of prohibition and mandamus against Executive Secretary
Teofisto Guingona et al. Tañada et al contest the constitutionality of: (1) the veto on four special
provisions added to items in the GAB of 1994 for the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the
Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH); and (2) the conditions imposed by the President in
the implementation of certain appropriations for the CAFGU’s, the DPWH, and the National Housing
Authority (NHA)

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the petitioners have locus standi

HELD:

Locus Standi

We rule that a member of the Senate, and of the House of Representatives for that matter, has the legal
standing to question the validity of a presidential veto or a condition imposed on an item in an
appropriation bill.

To the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member thereof, since his
office confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution (Coleman v. Miller,
307 U.S. 433 [1939]; Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F. 2d 1307 [1973]).
G.R. No. 112399 July 14, 1995REPRESENTATIVE AMADO S. BAGATSING VSCOMMITTEE ON
PRIVATIZATIONFACTS OF THE CASE

PETRON was originally registered with the Securitiesand Exchange Commission (SEC) in 1966 under
thecorporate name "Esso Philippines, Inc." .ESSO becamea wholly-owned company of the government
under thecorporate name PETRON and as a subsidiary of PNOC.PETRON owns the largest, most modern
complexrefinery in the Philippines. It is listed as the No. 1corporation in terms of assets and income in
thePhilippines in 1993.President Corazon C. Aquino promulgated ProclamationNo. 50 in the exercise of
her legislative power underthe Freedom Constitution. Implicit in the Proclamationis the need to raise
revenue for the Government andthe ideal of leaving business to the private sector bycreating the
committee on privatization. TheGovernment can then concentrate on the delivery of basic services and
the performance e of vital publicfunctions. The Presidential Cabinet of President Ramos approvedthe
privatization of PETRON as part of the EnergySector Action Plan. PNOC Board of Directors passed
aresolution authorizing the company to negotiate andconclude a contract with the consortium of
SalomonBrothers of Hongkong Limited and PCI CapitalCorporation for financial advisory services to
berendered to PETRON. The Petron Privatization WorkingCommittee (PWC) was thus formed. It finalized
aprivatization strategy with 40% of the shares to be soldto a strategic partner and 20% to the general
public The President approved the 40% — 40% — 20%privatization strategy of PETRON. The invitation to
bid was published in severalnewspapers of general circulation, both local andforeign. The PNOC Board
of Directors then passedResolution No. 866, S. 1993, declaring ARAMCO thewinning bidder. PNOC and
ARAMCO signed the StockPurchase Agreement, the two companies signed theShareholders' Agreement.
The petition for prohibition in G.R. No. 112399 sought:(1) to nullify the bidding conducted for the sale of
ablock of shares constituting 40% of the capital stock(40% block) of Petron Corporation (PETRON) and
theaward made to Aramco Overseas Company, B.

.(ARAMCO) as the highest bidder and (2) to stop thesale of said block of shares to ARAMCO. The petition
forprohibition and

certiorari

in G.R. No. 115994 sought toannul the sale of the same block of Petron sharessubject of the petition in
G.R. No. 112399.ARAMCO entered a limited appearance to question the jurisdiction over its person,
alleging that it is a foreigncompany organized under the laws of the Netherlands,that it is not doing nor
licensed to do business in thePhilippines, and that it does not maintain an office or abusiness address in
and has not appointed a residentagent for the Philippines (

Rollo

, p. 240).Petitioners however, countered that they filed theaction in their capacity as members of
Congress.

ISSUE:

WON Petitioners have a locus standi

DECISION:

Petition is dismissed.

LOCUS STANDI

In

Philippine Constitution Association

Hon. Salvador Enriquez

, G.R. No. 113105, August 19, 1994, we heldthat the members of Congress have the legal standingto
question the validity of acts of the Executive whichinjures them in their person or the institution of
Congress to which they belong. In the latter case, theacts cause derivative but nonetheless
substantialinjury which can be questioned by members of Congress (Kennedy

. James, 412 F. Supp. 353 [1976]).In the absence of a claim that the contract in questionviolated the
rights of petitioners or impermissiblyintruded into the domain of the Legislature, petitionershave no
legal standing to institute the instant action intheir capacity as members of Congress.However,
petitioners can bring the action in theircapacity as taxpayers under the doctrine laid downin

Kilosbayan, Inc.

. Guingona

, 232 SCRA 110 (1994).Under said ruling, taxpayers may question contractsentered into by the national
government orgovernment-owned or controlled corporations allegedto be in contravention of the law.
As long as the rulingin

Kilosbayan

on

locus

standi

is not reversed, we haveno choice but to follow it and uphold the legal standingof petitioners as
taxpayers to institute the presentaction
IBP vs. Zamora, G.R. No. 141284 G.R. No. 141284. August 15, 2000.

07/06/20100 Comments

Facts: At bar is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for issuance of a temporary
restraining order seeking to nullity on constitutional grounds the order of President Joseph Ejercito
Estrada commanding the deployment of the Philippine Marines (the Marines) to join the Philippine
National Police (the "PNP") in visibility patrols around the metropolis. Formulated Letter of Instruction
02/2000 1 (the "LOI") which detailed the manner by which the joint visibility patrols, called Task Force
Tulungan, would be conducted. 2 Task Force Tulungan was placed under the leadership of the Police
Chief of Metro Manila through a sustained street patrolling to minimize or eradicate all forms of high-
profile crimes especially those perpetrated by organized crime syndicates whose members include those
that are well-trained, disciplined and well-armed active or former PNP/Military personnel.

Issue:

1. Whether the deployment of soldiers for law enforcement is in derogation of Article 2, Section 3 of the
Constitution;

2. Whether the deployment constitutes incursion in a civilian function of law enforcement;

3. Whether the deployment creates a dangerous tendency to rely on the military to perform civilian
functions of the government

4. Whether the deployment gives more power to the military than what it should be under the
Constitution.

The issues raised in the present petition are: (1) Whether or not petitioner has legal standing; (2)
Whether or not the President's factual determination of the necessity of calling the armed forces is
subject to judicial review, and, (3) Whether or not the calling of the armed forces to assist the PNP in
joint visibility patrols violates the constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy over the military and
the civilian character of the PNP.

Held: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.

Ratio: The question of deployment of the Marines is not proper for judicial scrutiny since the same
involves a political question; that the organization and conduct of police visibility patrols, which feature
the team-up of one police officer and one Philippine Marine soldier, does not violate the civilian
supremacy clause in the Constitution.
In view of standing

Apart from this declaration, however, the IBP asserts no other basis in support of its locus standi The
mere invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more, while undoubtedly
true, is not sufficient to clothe it with standing in this case.

National President of the IBP who signed the petition, is his alone, absent a formal board resolution
authorizing him to file the present action. Indeed, none of its members, whom the IBP purportedly
represents, has sustained any form of injury as a result of the operation of the joint visibility patrols.

Nevertheless, the Court does not automatically assume jurisdiction over actual constitutional cases
brought before it even in instances that are ripe for resolution. One class of cases wherein the Court
hesitates to rule on are ''political questions." The reason is that political questions are concerned with
issues dependent upon the wisdom, not the legality, of a particular act or measure being assailed.
Moreover, the political question being a function of the separation of powers, the courts will not
normally interfere with the workings of another co-equal branch unless the case shows a clear need for
the courts to step in to uphold the law and the Constitution

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS and HSBC vs. JOSE O. VERA 65 Phil 56

G.R. No. L-45685 November 16, 1937

FACTS: Petitioners herein, the People of the Philippine and the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking
Corporation, are respectively the plaintiff and the offended party, and the respondent herein Mariano
Cu Unjieng is one of the defendants, in the criminal case entitled “The People of the Philippine Islands
vs. Mariano Cu Unjieng, et al.”,

Court of First Instance of Manila, on January 8, 1934, rendered a judgment of conviction sentencing the
defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng to indeterminate penalty.

The instant proceedings have to do with the application for probation filed by the herein respondent
Mariano Cu Unjieng, before the trial court, under the provisions of Act No. 4221 of the defunct
Philippine Legislature. The CFI of Manila, Judge Pedro Tuason presiding, referred the application for
probation of the Insular Probation Office which recommended denial of the same. June 18, 1937.
Thereafter, the Court of First Instance of Manila, seventh branch, Judge Jose O. Vera presiding, set the
petition for hearing.

Fiscal of the City of Manila filed an opposition to the granting of probation to the herein respondent
Mariano Cu Unjieng. The private prosecution also filed an opposition, alleging, among other things, that
Act No. 4221, assuming that it has not been repealed by section 2 of Article XV of the Constitution, is
nevertheless violative of section 1, subsection (1), Article III of the Constitution guaranteeing equal
protection of the laws for the reason that its applicability is not uniform throughout the Islands (in that
Philippine Legislature is made to apply only to the provinces of the Philippines; it nowhere states that it
is to be made applicable to chartered cities like the City of Manila) and because section of the said Act
endows the provincial boards with the power to make said law effective or otherwise in their respective
or otherwise in their respective provinces.

HELD:

The unchallenged rule is that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustained, direct injury as a result of its
enforcement. It goes without saying that if Act No. 4221 really violates the constitution, the People of
the Philippines, in whose name the present action is brought, has a substantial interest in having it set
aside. Of grater import than the damage caused by the illegal expenditure of public funds is the mortal
wound inflicted upon the fundamental law by the enforcement of an invalid statute. Hence, the well-
settled rule that the state can challenge the validity of its own laws.

Bayan v. zamora

Case Digest: G.R. No. 138570. October 10, 2000. 342 SCRA 449

BAYAN (Bagong Alyansang Makabayan), a Junk VFA Movement, Bishop Tomas Millamena (Iglesia Filipina
Independiente), Bishop Elmer Bolocan (United Church of Christ of the Phil.), Dr. Reynaldo Legasca, Md,
Kilusang Mambubukid Ng Pilipinas, Kilusang Mayo Uno, Gabriela, Prolabor, and The Public Interest Law
Center, petitioners, vs. Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora, Foreign Affairs Secretary Domingo Siazon,
Defense Secretary Orlando Mercado, Brig. Gen. Alexander Aguirre, Senate President Marcelo Fernan,
Senator Franklin Drilon, Senator Blas Ople, Senator Rodolfo Biazon, And Senator Francisco Tatad,
respondents.

Facts: On March 14, 1947, the Philippines and the United States of America forged a Military Bases
Agreement which formalized, among others, the use of installations in the Philippine territory by United
States military personnel. In view of the impending expiration of the RP-US Military Bases Agreement in
1991, the Philippines and the United States negotiated for a possible extension of the military bases
agreement. On September 16, 1991, the Philippine Senate rejected the proposed RP-US Treaty of
Friendship, Cooperation and Security which, in effect, would have extended the presence of US military
bases in the Philippines. On July 18, 1997, the United States panel, headed by US Defense Deputy
Assistant Secretary for Asia Pacific Kurt Campbell, met with the Philippine panel, headed by Foreign
Affairs Undersecretary Rodolfo Severino Jr., to exchange notes on “the complementing strategic
interests of the United States and the Philippines in the Asia-Pacific region.” Both sides discussed,
among other things, the possible elements of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA for brevity).
Thereafter, then President Fidel V. Ramos approved the VFA, which was respectively signed by public
respondent Secretary Siazon and Unites States Ambassador Thomas Hubbard. On October 5, 1998,
President Joseph E. Estrada, through respondent Secretary of Foreign Affairs, ratified the VFA. On
October 6, 1998, the President, acting through respondent Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora,
officially transmitted to the Senate of the Philippines, the Instrument of Ratification, the letter of the
President and the VFA, for concurrence pursuant to Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution

Issues (justiciable controversy): (1) Whether or not petitioners have legal standing as concerned citizens,
taxpayers, or legislators to question the constitutionality of the VFA; (2) whether the VFA is governed by
the provisions of Section 21, Article VII or of Section 25, Article XVIII of the Constitution; (3) and whether
or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction.

Ruling: (1) No. Petitioners failed to show that they have sustained, or are in danger of sustaining any
direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the VFA. As taxpayers, petitioners have not established
that the VFA involves the exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending powers. On this point, it bears
stressing that a taxpayer’s suit refers to a case where the act complained of directly involves the illegal
disbursement of public funds derived from taxation.

(2) Yes.The fact that the President referred the VFA to the Senate under Section 21, Article VII, and that
the Senate extended its concurrence under the same provision, is immaterial. For in either case,
whether under Section 21, Article VII or Section 25, Article XVIII, the fundamental law is crystalline that
the concurrence of the Senate is mandatory to comply with the strict constitutional requirements.

(3) No. In fine, absent any clear showing of grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondents, the
Court as the final arbiter of legal controversies and staunch sentinel of the rights of the people is then
without power to conduct an incursion and meddle with such affairs purely executive and legislative in
character and nature. For the Constitution no less, maps out the distinct boundaries and limits the
metes and bounds within which each of the three political branches of government may exercise the
powers exclusively and essentially conferred to it by law.

Gonzales vs. Narvasa G.R. No. 140835, August 14, 2000

Sunday, January 25, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes

Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: Petitioner Ramon Gonzales, in his capacity as a citizen and taxpayer, assails the constitutionality
of the creation of the Preparatory Commission on Constitutional Reform (PCCR) and of the positions of
presidential consultants, advisers and assistants.

The PCCR was created by Pres. Estrada by virtue of EO 43 in order to study and recommend proposed
amendments and/or revisions to the Constitution, and the manner of implementing them.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner has legal standing to file the case

Held: In assailing the constitutionality of EO 43, petitioner asserts his interest as a citizen and taxpayer.

A citizen acquires standing only if he can establish that he has suffered some actual or threatened injury
as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; the injury is fairly traceable to the
challenged action; and the injury is likely to be addressed by a favorable action. Petitioner has not
shown that he has sustained or in danger of sustaining any personal injury attributable to the creation of
the PCCR and of the positions of presidential consultants, advisers and assistants. Neither does he claim
that his rights or privileges have been or are in danger of being violated, nor that he shall be subjected
to any penalties or burdens as a result of the issues raised.

In his capacity as a taxpayer, a taxpayer is deemed to have the standing to raise a constitutional issue
when it is established that public funds have disbursed in alleged contravention of the law or the
Constitution. Thus, payer’s action is properly brought only when there is an exercise by Congress of its
taxing or spending power. In the creation of PCCR, it is apparent that there is no exercise by Congress of
its taxing or spending power. The PCCR was created by the President by virtue of EO 43 as amended by
EO 70. The appropriations for the PCCR were authorized by the President, not by Congress. The funds
used for the PCCR were taken from funds intended for the Office of the President, in the exercise of the
Chief Executive’s power to transfer funds pursuant to Sec. 25(5) of Art. VI of the Constitution. As to the
creation of the positions of presidential consultants, advisers and assistants, the petitioner has not
alleged the necessary facts so as to enable the Court to determine if he possesses a taxpayer’s interest
in this particular issue.

SET II CASES
Miners Association of the Philippines v. Factoran, Case Digest

G.R. No. 98332 January 16, 1995

Facts :

Former President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order Nos 211 and 279 in the exercise of her
legislative powers. EO No. 211 prescribes the interim procedures in the processing and approval of
applications for the exploration, development and utilization of minerals pursuant to Section 2, Article
XII of the 1987 Constitution. EO No. 279 authorizes the DENR Secretary to negotiate and conclude joint-
venture, co-production, or production- sharing agreements for the exploration, development, and
utilization of mineral resources.

The issuance and the impeding implementation by the DENR of Administrative Order Nos. 57 which
declares that all existing mining leases or agreements which were granted after the effectivity of the
1987 Constitution…shall be converted into production-sharing agreements within one (1) year from the
effectivity of these guidelines.” and Administrative Order No. 82 which provides that a failure to submit
Letter of Intent and Mineral Production-Sharing Agreement within 2 years from the effectivity of the
Department Administrative Order No. 57 shall cause the abandonment of the mining, quarry, and sand
and gravel claims, after their respective effectivity dates compelled the Miners Association of the
Philippines, Inc., an organization composed of mining prospectors and claim owners and claim holders,
to file the instant petition assailing their validity and constitutionality before this Court.

Issue :

Are the two Department Administrative Orders valid?

Ruling :

Yes. Petitioner's insistence on the application of Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, as the
governing law on the acceptance and approval of declarations of location and all other kinds of
applications for the exploration, development, and utilization of mineral resources pursuant to
Executive Order No. 211, is erroneous. Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, pertains to the old
system of exploration, development and utilization of natural resources through "license, concession or
lease" which, however, has been disallowed by Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. By virtue
of the said constitutional mandate and its implementing law, Executive Order No. 279 which superseded
Executive Order No. 211, the provisions dealing on "license, concession or lease" of mineral resources
under Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, and other existing mining laws are deemed repealed
and, therefore, ceased to operate as the governing law. In other words, in all other areas of
administration and management of mineral lands, the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 463, as
amended, and other existing mining laws, still govern. Section 7 of Executive Order No. 279 provides,
thus:

Sec. 7. All provisions of Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, other existing mining laws, and their
implementing rules and regulations, or parts thereof, which are not inconsistent with the provisions of
this Executive Order, shall continue in force and effect.

Well -settled is the rule, however, that regardless of the reservation clause, mining leases or agreements
granted by the State, such as those granted pursuant to Executive Order No. 211 referred to this
petition, are subject to alterations through a reasonable exercise of the police power of the State.

Accordingly, the State, in the exercise of its police power in this regard, may not be precluded by the
constitutional restriction on non-impairment of contract from altering, modifying and amending the
mining leases or agreements granted under Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, pursuant to
Executive Order No. 211. Police Power, being co-extensive with the necessities of the case and the
demands of public interest; extends to all the vital public needs. The passage of Executive Order No. 279
which superseded Executive Order No. 211 provided legal basis for the DENR Secretary to carry into
effect the mandate of Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Ynot v. IAC

There had been an existing law which prohibited the slaughtering of carabaos (EO 626). To strengthen
the law, Marcos issued EO 626-A which not only banned the movement of carabaos from interprovinces
but as well as the movement of carabeef. On 13 Jan 1984, Ynot was caught transporting 6 carabaos from
Masbate to Iloilo. He was then charged in violation of EO 626-A. Ynot averred EO 626-A as
unconstitutional for it violated his right to be heard or his right to due process. He said that the authority
provided by EO 626-A to outrightly confiscate carabaos even without being heard is unconstitutional.
The lower court ruled against Ynot ruling that the EO is a valid exercise of police power in order to
promote general welfare so as to curb down the indiscriminate slaughter of carabaos.

ISSUE: Whether or not the law is valid.

Ads by OffersWizard×HELD: The SC ruled that the EO is not valid as it indeed violates due process. EO
626-A ctreated a presumption based on the judgment of the executive. The movement of carabaos from
one area to the other does not mean a subsequent slaughter of the same would ensue. Ynot should be
given to defend himself and explain why the carabaos are being transferred before they can be
confiscated. The SC found that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power
because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of
the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner of the property
confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and punished.
The conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed
offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the doctrine of separation of
powers. There is, finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned
therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken.

In 1981, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, entitled “An Act Reorganizing the Judiciary, Appropriating Funds
Therefor and for Other Purposes”, was passed. Gualberto De la Llana, a judge in Olongapo, was assailing
its validity because, first of all, he would be one of the judges that would be removed because of the
reorganization and second, he said such law would contravene the constitutional provision which
provides the security of tenure of judges of the courts. He averred that only the Supreme Court can
remove judges NOT the Congress.

ISSUE: Whether or not a judge like Judge De La Llana can be validly removed by the legislature by such
statute (BP 129).

Ads by OffersWizard×HELD: Yes. The SC ruled the following way: “Moreover, this Court is empowered
“to discipline judges of inferior courts and, by a vote of at least eight members, order their dismissal.”
Thus it possesses the competence to remove judges. Under the Judiciary Act, it was the President who
was vested with such power. Removal is, of course, to be distinguished from termination by virtue of
the abolition of the office. There can be no tenure to a non-existent office. After the abolition, there is in
law no occupant. In case of removal, there is an office with an occupant who would thereby lose his
position. It is in that sense that from the standpoint of strict law, the question of any impairment of
security of tenure does not arise. Nonetheless, for the incumbents of inferior courts abolished, the
effect is one of separation. As to its effect, no distinction exists between removal and the abolition of
the office. Realistically, it is devoid of significance. He ceases to be a member of the judiciary. In the
implementation of the assailed legislation, therefore, it would be in accordance with accepted principles
of constitutional construction that as far as incumbent justices and judges are concerned, this Court be
consulted and that its view be accorded the fullest consideration. No fear need be entertained that
there is a failure to accord respect to the basic principle that this Court does not render advisory
opinions. No question of law is involved. If such were the case, certainly this Court could not have its say
prior to the action taken by either of the two departments. Even then, it could do so but only by way of
deciding a case where the matter has been put in issue. Neither is there any intrusion into who shall be
appointed to the vacant positions created by the reorganization. That remains in the hands of the
Executive to whom it properly belongs. There is no departure therefore from the tried and tested ways
of judicial power. Rather what is sought to be achieved by this liberal interpretation is to preclude any
plausibility to the charge that in the exercise of the conceded power of reorganizing the inferior courts,
the power of removal of the present incumbents vested in this Tribunal is ignored or disregarded. The
challenged Act would thus be free from any unconstitutional taint, even one not readily discernible
except to those predisposed to view it with distrust. Moreover, such a construction would be in
accordance with the basic principle that in the choice of alternatives between one which would save and
another which would invalidate a statute, the former is to be preferred.”

Hirabashi v. US
Facts of the Case

In the wake of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, President Roosevelt acted to prevent incidents of
subversion and espionage from individuals of Japanese descent living in the United States. He issued
two executive orders which were quickly enacted into law. One gave the Secretary of War the power to
designate certain parts of the country "military areas" and exclude certain persons from them. The
second established the War Relocation Authority which had the power to remove, maintain, and
supervise persons who were excluded from the military areas. Gordon Kiyoshi Hirabayashi, a student at
the University of Washington, was convicted of violating a curfew and relocation order.

Question

Did the President's executive orders and the power delegated to the military authorities discriminate
against Americans and resident aliens of Japanese descent in violation of the Fifth Amendment?

Conclusion

Ads by OffersWizard×The Court found the President's orders and the implementation of the curfew to
be constitutional. Chief Justice Stone, writing for the unanimous Court, took into account the great
importance of military installations and weapons production that occurred on the West Coast and the
"solidarity" that individuals of Japanese descent felt with their motherland. He reasoned that
restrictions on Japanese actions served an important national interest. The Court ducked the thorny
relocation issue and focused solely on the curfew, which the Court viewed as a necessary "protective
measure." Stone argued that racial discrimination was justified since "in time of war residents having
ethnic affiliations with an invading enemy may be a greater source of danger than those of a different
ancestry."

CHIONGBIAN VS. ORBOS

(from Champ)

• Congress passed the ORGANIC ACT FOR ARMM, calling for a plebiscite in Mindanao.

• Only 4 provinces voted for the creation of ARMM (LanaoSur, Maguindanao, Sulu, Tawi2)

• The other provinces who did not vote for ARMM shall remain in the existing administrative
regions, provided that the PRESIDENT may by ADMINISTRATIVE DETERMINATION, MERGE THE EXISTING
REGIONS.

• So, President Cory issued EO 429 which reorganized those regions who did not vote for ARMM.
• Petitioners are Congressmen who opposed the issuance of EO 429. They claim that President
Cory had no authority to restructure new administrative regions. They insist that the provinces should
remain as they are.

ISSUE:

Whether the Organic Act for ARMM unduly delegates legislative power to the President by allowing
Cory to merge the existing regions by mere ADMINISTRATIVE DETERMINATION.

Whether the Organic Act provided a standard to guide President Cory’s discretion.

DEFENSE: The SOLGEN argues that the Act is valid and there is no undue delegation but only a POWER
TO FILL UP THE DETAILS OF LEGISLATION which was given to Cory.

SC:

LAW VALID. NO UNDUE DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWERS TO THE PRESIDENT.

While the power to merge regions is not expressly provided for in the Constitution, it is a power
traditionally lodged with the President, in view of the POWER OF GENERAL SUPERVISION OVER LOCAL
GOVERNMENTS. Thus there is no abdication by Congress of its legislative powers in conferring on the
President the POWER TO MERGE ADMINISTRATIVE REGIONS.

As to the question of STANDARD, a legislative standard NEED NOT BE EXPRESSED. IT MAY SIMPLY BE
GATHERED OR IMPLIED. Nor need it be found in the law challenged because it may be EMBODIED IN
OTHER STATUTES ON THE SAME SUBJECT as that of the challenged legislation.

With respect to the power to merge existing administrative regions, the STANDARD IS TO BE FOUND IN
THE SAME POLICY underlying the grant o the PRESIDENT in RA5434, THE POWER TO REORGANIZE THE
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT. Under said law, the standard is “to promote simplicity, economy and
efficiency in the government, to enable it to pursue programs consistent with national goals for
acceleration socio-economic development and to improve the service in the transaction of public
business.”

Since the original 11 administrative regions were established with this same law/ policy, it is but logical
to suppose that in authorizing the President to merge by administrative determination, the existing
regions (following the rejection of the ARMM by some regions), the purpose of Congress in enacting the
Organic Act of ARMM was to reconstitute the original basis for the organization of administrative
regions.
YNOT VS. IAC

(from Champ)

• EO 626 was enacted prohibiting the INTERPROVINCIAL MOVEMENT OF CARABAOS. Those found
violating the law shall be subject to confiscation and FORFEITURE BY THE GOVERNMENT.

• The law further provides that the confiscated beef shall be distributed to CHARITABLE
INSTITUTIONS, and OTHER SIMILAR INSTITUTIONS AS THE CHAIRMAN of the NMIC may see fit.

• Ynot was found to have violated the law, transporting 6 carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate
to Iloilo.

• Ynot assails the constitutionality of EO 626, claiming that there is undue delegation of legislative
powers to the chairman of the NMIC, with respect to the MANNER OF DISPOSITION OF THE
CONFISCATED BEEF.

• Ynot argues that the term, “as may see fit” is extremely generous and dangerous, and with an
opportunity for partiality and abuse.

ISSUE: Whether the phrase “as may see fit” is a sufficient standard.

SC:

LAW INVALID. NO SUFFICIENT STANDARD.

There are no limitations nor reasonable guidelines which said officers of the NMIC must observe when
they make their distribution or disposition of the confiscated beef. There is invalid delegation of
legislative powers to the offers who are granted UNLIMITED DISCRETION in the distribution of the
properties arbitrarily taken.

Their options are apparently boundless. Who shall be the fortunate beneficiaries of the beef and by
what criteria shall they be chosen? Only the officers named can supply the answers, and they alone may
choose the grantee as they see fit, in the own executive discretion. Definitely there is here a roving
commission, a wide and sweeping authority, that is not canalized within the banks that keep it from
overflowing. In short, a CLEARLY PROFILGATE AND INVALID DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWERS.
Another issue: Whether the law has a lawful subject and lawful method?

NO. there is no reasonable connection between the purpose and the means. We cannot see how the
prohibition of interprovincial transport of carabaos (means) could prevent their indiscriminate slaughter
(purpose) considering that they can be killed anywhere. Retaining carabos in one province will not
prevent there slaughter there, any more that moving them to another province.

Inchong v. hernandez

Constitutional Law – Treaties May Be Superseded by Municipal Laws in the Exercise of Police Power

Lao Ichong is a Chinese businessman who entered the country to take advantage of business
opportunities herein abound (then) – particularly in the retail business. For some time he and his fellow
Chinese businessmen enjoyed a “monopoly” in the local market in Pasay. Until in June 1954 when
Congress passed the RA 1180 or the Retail Trade Nationalization Act the purpose of which is to reserve
to Filipinos the right to engage in the retail business. Ichong then petitioned for the nullification of the
said Act on the ground that it contravened several treaties concluded by the RP which, according to him,
violates the equal protection clause (pacta sund servanda). He said that as a Chinese businessman
engaged in the business here in the country who helps in the income generation of the country he
should be given equal opportunity.

ISSUE: Whether or not a law may invalidate or supersede treaties or generally accepted principles.

HELD: Yes, a law may supersede a treaty or a generally accepted principle. In this case, there is no
conflict at all between the raised generally accepted principle and with RA 1180. The equal protection of
the law clause “does not demand absolute equality amongst residents; it merely requires that all
persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred
and liabilities enforced”; and, that the equal protection clause “is not infringed by legislation which
applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such
class, and reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction between those who fall within such class
and those who do not.”

For the sake of argument, even if it would be assumed that a treaty would be in conflict with a statute
then the statute must be upheld because it represented an exercise of the police power which, being
inherent could not be bargained away or surrendered through the medium of a treaty. Hence, Ichong
can no longer assert his right to operate his market stalls in the Pasay city market.

The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals (or local courts) are confronted
with situations in which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law and the
provisions of the constitution or statute of the local state. Efforts should first be exerted to harmonize
them, so as to give effect to both since it is to be presumed that municipal law was enacted with proper
regard for the generally accepted principles of international law in observance of the Incorporation
Clause in the above-cited constitutional provision (Cruz, Philippine Political Law, 1996 ed., p. 55). In a
situation, however, where the conflict is irreconcilable and a choice has to be made between a rule of
international law and municipal law, jurisprudence dictates that municipal law should be upheld by the
municipal courts (Ichong vs. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155 [1957]; Gonzales vs. Hechanova, 9 SCRA 230
[1963]; In re: Garcia, 2 SCRA 984 [1961]) for the reason that such courts are organs of municipal law and
are accordingly bound by it in all circumstances (Salonga & Yap, op. cit., p. 13). The fact that
international law has been made part of the law of the land does not pertain to or imply the primacy of
international law over national or municipal law in the municipal sphere. The doctrine of incorporation,
as applied in most countries, decrees that rules of international law are given equal standing with, but
are not superior to, national legislative enactments. Accordingly, the principle lex posterior derogat
priori takes effect – a treaty may repeal a statute and a statute may repeal a treaty. In states where the
constitution is the highest law of the land, such as the Republic of the Philippines, both statutes and
treaties may be invalidated if they are in conflict with the constitution (Ibid.). Manikanä

IBP VS ZAMORA

Posted by kaye lee on 11:27 PM

G.R. No. 141284 August 15 2000 [Judicial Review; Civilian supremacy clause]

FACTS:

Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, President Estrada,
in verbal directive, directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the
proper deployment and campaign for a temporary period only. The IBP questioned the validity of the
deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in law enforcement.

ISSUE:

1. WoN the President's factual determination of the necessity of calling the armed forces is subject to
judicial review.

2. WoN the calling of AFP to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols violate the constitutional provisions
on civilian supremacy over the military.

RULING:

1. The power of judicial review is set forth in Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, to wit:

Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.

When questions of constitutional significance are raised, the Court can exercise its power of judicial
review only if the following requisites are complied with, namely: (1) the existence of an actual and
appropriate case; (2) a personal and substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional question;
(3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional
question is the lis mota of the case.

2. The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy clause. The
calling of the Marines in this case constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law
enforcement. The participation of the Marines in the conduct of joint visibility patrols is appropriately
circumscribed. It is their responsibility to direct and manage the deployment of the Marines. It is,
likewise, their duty to provide the necessary equipment to the Marines and render logistical support to
these soldiers. In view of the foregoing, it cannot be properly argued that military authority is supreme
over civilian authority. Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake
the civilian character of the police force. Neither does it amount to an “insidious incursion” of the
military in the task of law enforcement in violation of Section 5(4), Article XVI of the Constitution.

Digest: Calalang vs Williams

By nutshellgirl ¶ Posted in Digest, Digest: Labor Standards, General ¶ Tagged digest, labor, social
justice ¶ Leave a comment

MAXIMO CALALANG vs A. D. WILLIAMS, ET AL.,

G.R. No. 47800 December 2, 1940

Doctrine: Social Justice

LAUREL, J.:

Facts:
The National Traffic Commission, in its resolution of July 17, 1940, resolved to recommend to the
Director of the Public Works and to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications that animal-
drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing along the following for a period of one year from the date of
the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic:

1) Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to Dasmariñas

Street from 7:30Am to 12:30 pm and from 1:30 pm to 530 pm; and

2) along Rizal Avenue extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to

Echague Street from 7 am to 11pm

The Chairman of the National Traffic Commission on July 18, 1940 recommended to the Director of
Public Works with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works the adoption of thethemeasure
proposed in the resolution aforementioned in pursuance of the provisions of theCommonwealth Act No.
548 which authorizes said Director with the approval from the Secretary of the Public Works and
Communication to promulgate rules and regulations to regulate and control the use of and traffic on
national roads.

On August 2, 1940, the Director recommended to the Secretary the approval of the recommendations
made by the Chairman of the National Traffic Commission with modifications. The Secretary of Public
Works approved the recommendations on August 10,1940. The Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief of
Police of Manila have enforced and caused to be enforced the rules and regulation. As a consequence,
all animal-drawn vehicles are not allowed to pass and pick up passengers in the places above mentioned
to the detriment not only of their owners but of the riding public as well.

Issues:

1) Whether the rules and regulations promulgated by the respondents pursuant to the provisions of
Commonwealth Act NO. 548 constitute an unlawful inference with legitimate business or trade and
abridged the right to personal liberty and freedom of locomotion?
2) Whether the rules and regulations complained of infringe upon the constitutional precept regarding
the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the people?

Held:

1) No. The promulgation of the Act aims to promote safe transit upon and avoid obstructions on
national roads in the interest and convenience of the public. In enacting said law, the National Assembly
was prompted by considerations of public convenience and welfare. It was inspired by the desire to
relieve congestion of traffic, which is a menace to the public safety. Public welfare lies at the bottom of
the promulgation of the said law and the state in order to promote the general welfare may interfere
with personal liberty, with property, and with business and occupations. Persons and property may be
subject to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the general comfort, health, and
prosperity of the State. To this fundamental aims of the government, the rights of the individual are
subordinated. Liberty is a blessing which should not be made to prevail over authority because society
will fall into anarchy. Neither should authority be made to prevail over liberty because then the
individual will fall into slavery. The paradox lies in the fact that the apparent curtailment of liberty is
precisely the very means of insuring its preserving.

2) No. Social justice is “neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy,” but the
humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that justice in
its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated. Social justice means the
promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the Government of measures calculated to
insure economic stability of all the competent elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper
economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community,
constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through
the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all governments on the time-honored principles of
salus populi estsuprema lex.

Social justice must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence among divers and
diverse units of a society and of the protection that should be equally and evenly extended to all groups
as a combined force in our social and economic life, consistent with the fundamental and paramount
objective of the state of promoting health, comfort and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about “the
greatest good to the greatest number.”

Oposa vs. Factoran Case Digest (G.R. No. 101083, July 30, 1993)

FACTS:
The plaintiffs in this case are all minors duly represented and joined by their parents. The first complaint
was filed as a taxpayer's class suit at the Branch 66 (Makati, Metro Manila), of the Regional Trial Court,
National capital Judicial Region against defendant (respondent) Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Reasources (DENR). Plaintiffs alleged that they are entitled to the full benefit,
use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests. They
further asseverate that they represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn and asserted
that continued deforestation have caused a distortion and disturbance of the ecological balance and
have resulted in a host of environmental tragedies.

Plaintiffs prayed that judgement be rendered ordering the respondent, his agents, representatives and
other persons acting in his behalf to cancel all existing Timber License Agreement (TLA) in the country
and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new TLAs.

Defendant, on the other hand, filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint had no cause
of action against him and that it raises a political question.

The RTC Judge sustained the motion to dismiss, further ruling that granting of the relief prayed for
would result in the impairment of contracts which is prohibited by the Constitution.

Plaintiffs (petitioners) thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari and asked the court to
rescind and set aside the dismissal order on the ground that the respondent RTC Judge gravely abused
his discretion in dismissing the action.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether or not the plaintiffs have a cause of action.

(2) Whether or not the complaint raises a political issue.

(3) Whether or not the original prayer of the plaintiffs result in the impairment of contracts.

RULING:

First Issue: Cause of Action.

Respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a specific legal right violated by
the respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided by law. The Court did not agree with this. The
complaint focuses on one fundamental legal right -- the right to a balanced and healthful ecology which
is incorporated in Section 16 Article II of the Constitution. The said right carries with it the duty to refrain
from impairing the environment and implies, among many other things, the judicious management and
conservation of the country's forests. Section 4 of E.O. 192 expressly mandates the DENR to be the
primary government agency responsible for the governing and supervising the exploration, utilization,
development and conservation of the country's natural resources. The policy declaration of E.O. 192 is
also substantially re-stated in Title XIV Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987. Both E.O. 192 and
Administrative Code of 1987 have set the objectives which will serve as the bases for policy formation,
and have defined the powers and functions of the DENR. Thus, right of the petitioners (and all those
they represent) to a balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as DENR's duty to protect and advance
the said right.

A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the correlative duty or obligation to respect or
protect or respect the same gives rise to a cause of action. Petitioners maintain that the granting of the
TLA, which they claim was done with grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to a balance and
healthful ecology. Hence, the full protection thereof requires that no further TLAs should be renewed or
granted.

After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, the Court finds it to be adequate enough to
show, prima facie, the claimed violation of their rights.

ASLP VS. SEC. OF AGRARIAN REFORM [175 SCRA 343; G.R. NO. 78742; 14 JUL 1989]

Saturday, January 31, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes

Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: Several petitions are the root of the case:

e. A petition alleging the constitutionality of PD No. 27, EO 228 and 229 and RA 6657. Subjects of the
petition are a 9-hectare and 5 hectare Riceland worked by four tenants. Tenants were declared full
owners by EO 228 as qualified farmers under PD 27. The petitioners now contend that President Aquino
usurped the legislature’s power.

f. A petition by landowners and sugarplanters in Victoria’s Mill Negros Occidental against Proclamation
131 and EO 229. Proclamation 131 is the creation of Agrarian Reform Fund with initial fund of P50Billion.
g. A petition by owners of land which was placed by the DAR under the coverage of Operation Land
Transfer.

h. A petition invoking the right of retention under PD 27 to owners of rice and corn lands not exceeding
seven hectares.

Issue: Whether or Not the aforementioned EO’s, PD, and RA were constitutional.

Held: The promulgation of PD 27 by President Marcos was valid in exercise of Police power and eminent
domain.

The power of President Aquino to promulgate Proc. 131 and EO 228 and 229 was authorized under Sec.
6 of the Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution. Therefore it is a valid exercise of Police Power
and Eminent Domain.

RA 6657 is likewise valid. The carrying out of the regulation under CARP becomes necessary to deprive
owners of whatever lands they may own in excess of the maximum area allowed, there is definitely a
taking under the power of eminent domain for which payment of just compensation is imperative. The
taking contemplated is not a mere limitation of the use of the land. What is required is the surrender of
the title and the physical possession of said excess and all beneficial rights accruing to the owner in
favour of the farmer.

A statute may be sustained under the police power only if there is concurrence of the lawful subject and
the method.

Subject and purpose of the Agrarian Reform Law is valid, however what is to be determined is the
method employed to achieve it.

WHAT IS THE CONCEPT OF JURE REGALIA?

(REGALIAN DOCTRINE)
> Generally, under this concept, private title to land must be traced to some grant, express or implied,
from the Spanish Crown or its successors, the American Colonial Government, and thereafter, the
Philippine Republic

> In a broad sense, the term refers to royal rights, or those rights to which the King has by virtue of his
prerogatives

> The theory of jure regalia was therefore nothing more than a natural fruit of conquest

CONNECTED TO THIS IS THE STATE’S POWER OF DOMINUUM

> Capacity of the state to own or acquire property—foundation for the early Spanish decree embracing
the feudal theory of jura regalia

> This concept was first introduced through the Laws of the Indies and the Royal Cedulas

> The Philippines passed to Spain by virtue of discovery and conquest. Consequently, all lands became
the exclusive patrimony and dominion of the Spanish Crown.

> The Law of the Indies was followed by the Ley Hipotecaria or the Mortgage Law of 1893. This law
provided for the systematic registration of titles and deeds as well as possessory claims

> The Maura Law: was partly an amendment and was the last Spanish land law promulgated in the
Philippines, which required the adjustment or registration of all agricultural lands, otherwise the lands
shall revert to the State

TAKE NOTE THAT THE REGALIAN DOCTRINE IS ENSHRINED IN OUR PRESENT AND PAST CONSTITUTIONS
THE 1987 CONSTITUTION PROVIDES UNDER NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY THE FOLLOWING—

> “ Section 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils,
all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural
resources are owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources
shall not be alienated. The exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources shall be under
the full control and supervision of the State. The State may directly undertake such activities, or it may
enter into co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens, or
corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens. Such
agreements may be for a period not exceeding

twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and under such terms and conditions
as may be provided by law. In cases of water rights for irrigation, water supply fisheries, or industrial
uses other than the development of water power, beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the
grant.”
> The abovementioned provision provides that except for agricultural lands for public domain which
alone may be alienated, forest or timber, and mineral lands, as well as all other natural resources must
remain with the State, the exploration, development and utilization of which shall be subject to its full

control and supervision albeit allowing it to enter into coproduction, joint venture or production-sharing
agreements, or into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving technical or financial
assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization

THE 1987 PROVISION HAD ITS ROOTS IN THE 1935 CONSTITUTION

WHICH PROVIDES—

> Section 1. All agricultural timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal,
petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy and other natural resources of the
Philippines belong to the State, and their disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization shall be
limited to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the
capital of which is owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or concession at the
time of the inauguration of the Government established under this Constitution. Natural resources, with
the exception of public agricultural land, shall not be alienated, and no license, concession, or lease for
the exploitation, development, or utilization of any of the natural resources shall be granted for a period
exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for another twenty-five years, except as to water rights for
irrigation, water

supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power, in which cases
beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the grant.

THE 1973 CONSTITUTION REITERATED THE REGALIAN DOCTRINE

AS FOLLOWS—

> Section 8. All lands of public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, all
forces of potential energy, fisheries, wildlife, and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to
the State. With the exception of agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential, or resettlement lands
of the public domain, natural resources shall not be alienated, and no license, concession, or lease for
the exploration, or utilization of any of the natural resources shall be granted for a period exceeding
twentyfive years, except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other
than development of water power, in which cases, beneficial use may by the measure and the limit of
the grant.
THE REGALIAN DOCTRINE DOESN'T NEGATE NATIVE TITLE. THIS IS IN PURSUANCE TO WHAT HAS BEEN
HELD IN CRUZ V. SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES

> Petitioners challenged the constitutionality of Indigenous Peoples Rights Act on the ground that it
amounts to an unlawful deprivation of the State’s ownership over lands of the public domain and all
other natural resources therein, by recognizing the right of ownership of ICC or IPs to their ancestral
domains and ancestral lands on the basis of native title.

> As the votes were equally divided, the necessary majority wasn’t obtained and petition was dismissed
and the law’s validity was upheld

> Justice Kapunan: Regalian theory doesn’t negate the native title to lands held in private ownership
since time immemorial, adverting to the landmark case of CARINO V. LOCAL GOVERNMENT, where the
US SC through Holmes held: “xxx the land has been held by individuals under a claim of private
ownership, it will be presumed to have been held in the same way from before the Spanish conquest,
and never to have been public land.”

> Existence of native titie to land, or ownership of land by Filipinos by virtue of possession under a claim
of ownership since time immemorial and independent of any grant from the Spanish crown as an
exception to the theory of jure regalia

> Justice Puno: Carino case firmly established a concept of private land title that existed irrespective of
any royal grant from the State and was based on the strong mandate extended to the Islands via the
Philippine Bill of 1902. The IPRA recognizes the existence of ICCs/IPs as a distinct sector in the society. It
grants this people the ownership and possession of their ancestral domains and ancestral lands and
defines the extent of these lands and domains

> Justice Vitug: Carino cannot override the collective will of the people expressed in the Constitution.

> Justice Panganiban: all Filipinos, whether indigenous or not, are subject to the Constitution, and that
no one is exempt from its allencompassing provisions

REPUBLIC v. COURT OF APPEALS

GR Nos. 103882, 105276 November 25, 1998

FACTS:

On June 22, 1957, RA 1899 was approved granting authority to all municipalities and chartered
cities to undertake and carry out at their own expense the reclamation by dredging, filling, or other
means, of any foreshore lands bordering them, and to establish, provide, construct, maintain and repair
proper and adequate docking and harbor facilities as such municipalities and chartered cities may
determine in consultation with the Secretary of Finance and the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications.
Pursuant to the said law, Ordinance No. 121 was passed by the city of Pasay for the reclamation of
foreshore lands within their jurisdiction and entered into an agreement with Republic Real Estate
Corporation for the said project.

Under the Regalian doctrine or jura regalia, all lands of the public domain belong to the State, and the
State is the source of any asserted right to ownership in land and charged with the conservation of such
patrimony.[19] Under this doctrine, lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private
ownership are presumed to belong to the State.[20] In instances where a parcel of land considered to
be inalienable land of the public domain is found under private ownership, the Government is allowed
by law to file an action for

reversion,[21] which is an action where the ultimate relief sought is to revert the land to the
government under the Regalian doctrine. Considering that the land subject of the action originated from
a grant by the government, its cancellation is a matter between the grantor and the grantee.[22]

It has been held that a complaint for reversion involves a serious controversy, involving a question of
fraud and misrepresentation committed against the government and it is aimed at the return of the
disputed portion of the public domain. It seeks to cancel the original certificate of registration, and
nullify the original certificate of title, including the transfer certificate of title of the successors-in-
interest because the same were all procured through fraud and misrepresentation.[23] Thus, the State,
as the party alleging the fraud and misrepresentation that attended the application of the free patent,
bears that burden of proof. Fraud and misrepresentation, as grounds for cancellation of patent and
annulment of title, should never be presumed but must be proved by clear and convincing evidence,
mere preponderance of evidence not even being adequate.

Cruz v. DENR

Cruz, a noted constitutionalist, assailed the validity of the RA 8371 or the Indigenous People’s Rights Act
on the ground that the law amount to an unlawful deprivation of the State’s ownership over lands of the
public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian
doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution. The IPRA law basically enumerates the
rights of the indigenous peoples over ancestral domains which may include natural resources. Cruz et al
contend that, by providing for an all-encompassing definition of “ancestral domains” and “ancestral
lands” which might even include private lands found within said areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b) of said law
violate the rights of private landowners.

ISSUE: Whether or not the IPRA law is unconstitutional.

HELD: The SC deliberated upon the matter. After deliberation they voted and reached a 7-7 vote. They
deliberated again and the same result transpired. Since there was no majority vote, Cruz’s petition was
dismissed and the IPRA law was sustained. Hence, ancestral domains may include public domain –
somehow against the regalian doctrine.

La Bugal B’laan Tribal Association Inc., et al. V. Victor O. Ramos, Secretary

Department of Environment and Natural Resources; Horacio Ramos, Director,

Mines and Geosciences Bureau (MGB-DENR); Ruben Torres, Executive Secretary;

and WMC (Philippines) Inc.

G.R. No. 127882, 01 December 2004, En Banc (Panganiban, J.)

A verba legis scrutiny of Section 2 Article XII of the Constitution discloses not even a hint of a desire to
prohibit

foreign involvement in the management or operation of mining activities, or to eradicate service

contracts. Such moves would

necessarily imply an underlying drastic shift in fundamental economic and developmental policies of the
State. That change

requires a much more definite and irrefutable basis than mere omission of the words “service contract”
from the new

Constitution.

In a decision dated January 27, 2004, the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional RA 7942 or the

Philippine Mining Act of 1995, its implementing rules (DENR Department Administrative Order 96-40)

and the Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA) entered into by the government and

Western Mining Corp. Philippines, an Australian corporation. The Court said RA 7942 or the Philippine

Mining Act of 1995 and its implementing rules are unconstitutional for allowing “service contracts” now

prohibited by the 1987 Charter. The Court said FTAA is a service contract that grants control or
beneficial

ownership over the nation’s mineral resources to foreign contractors, leaving the State with nothing but
bare

title thereto. It was also on this ground that the Court struck down as constitutionally infirm the FTAA

between the government and WMCP.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the case has been rendered moot by the sale of WMC shares in WMCP to

Sagittarius (60% of Sagittarius’ equity is owned by Filipinos and/or Filipino-owned corporations

while 40% is owned by Indophil Resources NL, an Australian company) and by the subsequent

transfer and registration of the FTAA from WMCP to Sagittarius

2. Whether or not the phrase “Agreements Involving Either Technical or Financial Assistance”

contained in paragraph 4 of Section 2 of Article XII of the Constitution was properly interpreted

HELD:

The Philippine Mining Act, its rules and the FTAA entered into by the Government and private

respondents are valid.

The application of familiar principles of statutory construction in the scrutiny of Section 2 Article

XII does not reveal any intention to proscribe foreign involvement in the management or operation of

mining activities or to eliminate service contracts. Section 2 Article XII contains no express prohibition to

this effect. Had the framers intended to prohibit direct participation of alien corporation in the
exploration

of the country’s natural resources, they would employed clearly restrictive language barring foreign

corporation from directly engaging in the exploration of the country’s natural resources.

Foreign corporations may indeed participate in the exploitation, development and use of Philippine

natural resources but subject to the full control and supervision of the State. RA 7942, its implementing

rules (DAO 96-40) and the FTAA entered into by then Government and WMCP grant the Government full

control and supervision over all aspects of planned exploration, development and utilization activities.
RECENT JURISPRUDENCE – POLITICAL LAW

Sections 7.8 and 7.9 of the FTAA however are objectionable and void for being contrary to public

policy. Section 7.8 permits the sum spent by government for the benefit of the contractor to be
deductible

from the State’s share in the net mining revenues since it constitutes unjust enrichment on the part of
the

contractor at the government’s expense. Section 7.9, meanwhile, deprives the Government of its share
in

the net mining revenues in the event the foreign stockholders of a foreign mining company sell 60% or

more of their equity to a Filipino citizen or corporation.

Thus, with the exception of Sections 7.8 and 7.9 of the subject FTAA, the FTAA, RA 7942 and
DAO 96-40 are declared constitutional.

The Meaning of “Agreements Involving Either Technical or Financial Assistance”

A constitutional provision specifically allowing foreign-owned corporation to render financial or

technical assistance in respect of mining or any other commercial activity was clearly unnecessary; the

provision meant to refer to more than mere financial or technical assistance.

Chavez v.PEA

The Public Estates Authority is the central implementing agency tasked to undertake reclamation
projects nationwide. It took over the leasing and selling functions of the DENR insofar as reclaimed or
about to be reclaimed foreshore lands are concerned.

PEA sought the transfer to AMARI, a private corporation, of the ownership of 77.34 hectares of the
Freedom Islands. PEA also sought to have 290.156 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay to AMARI.

ISSUE: Whether or not the transfer is valid.

HELD: No. To allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the public domain to be transferred to PEA as
private lands will sanction a gross violation of the constitutional ban on private corporations from
acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.

Ads by OffersWizard×The Supreme Court affirmed that the 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands
comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered by certificates of title in the name of PEA, are alienable
lands of the public domain. The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable
natural resources of the public domain. Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI, a private
corporation, ownership of 77.34 hectares of the Freedom Islands, such transfer is void for being contrary
to Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any
kind of alienable land of the public domain. Furthermore, since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer
to AMARI ownership of 290.156 hectares of still submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is void for
being contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits the alienation of natural
resources other than agricultural lands of the public domain.

Meyer v. Nebraska

Brief Fact Summary. Plaintiff was convicted for teaching a child German under a Nebraska statute that
outlawed the teaching of foreign languages to students that had not yet completed the eighth grade.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits states from creating legislation that
restricts liberty interests when the legislation is not reasonably related to an acceptable state objective.

Facts. Plaintiff was convicted for teaching a child German under a Nebraska statute that outlawed the
teaching of foreign languages to students that had not yet completed the eighth grade. The Supreme
Court of Nebraska upheld the conviction.

Issue. Does the statute as construed and applied unreasonably infringe on the liberty guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment?

Held:unconstitutional because it infringes on the liberty interests of the plaintiff and fails to reasonably
relate to any end within the competency of the state.

The Fourteenth Amendment encompasses more than merely the freedom from bodily restraint. The
state argues that the purpose of the statute is to encourage the English language to be the native
tongue of all children raised in the state. Nonetheless, the protection of the Constitution extends to
those who speak other languages. Education is a fundamental liberty interest that must be protected,
and mere knowledge of the German language cannot be reasonably regarded as harmful.

Discussion. Liberty interests may not be interfered with by the states when the interference is arbitrary
and not reasonably related to a purpose which the state may permissively regulate

Pierce v. Society…..

Brief Fact Summary. Appellees, two non-public schools, were protected by a preliminary restraining
order prohibiting appellants from enforcing an Oregon Act that required parents and guardians to send
their children to public school. Appellants appealed the order.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. The 14th Amendment provides a liberty interest in a parent’s or guardian’s right
to decide the mode in which their children are educated. State’s may not usurp this right when the
questioned legislation does not reasonably relate to a viable state interest.
Facts. Appellee the Society of Sisters, a corporation with the power to establish and maintain academies
or schools and Appellee Hill Military Academy, a private organization conducting an elementary, college
preparatory, and military training school, obtained preliminary restraining orders prohibiting appellants
from enforcing Oregon’s Compulsory Education Act. The Act required all parents and guardians to send
children between 8 and 16 years to a public school. The appellants appealed the granting of the
preliminary restraining orders.

Issue. Does the Act unreasonably interfere with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the
upbringing and education of children under their control?

Pierce v. Society of Sisters

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Held. The Act violates the 14th Amendment because it interferes with protected liberty interests and
has no reasonable relationship to any purpose within the competency of the state.

The Appellees have standing because the result of enforcing the Act would be destruction of the
appellees’ schools. The state has the power to regulate all schools, but parents and guardians have the
right and duty to choose the appropriate preparation for their children.

Discussion. While the state has the right to insure that children receive a proper education, the 14th
Amendment provides parents and guardians with a liberty interest in their choice in the mode in which
their children are educated.

Wisconsin v. Yoder

Bloomberg Law

Citation. 406 U.S. 205,92 S. Ct. 1526,32 L. Ed. 2d 15,1972 U.S.

Brief Fact Summary. Several Amish families appealed a decision convicting them of failing to send their
children to school until the age of 16 based upon Freedom of Religion under the constitution.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. The law compelling parents to send their children to public school until the age
of 16 is unconstitutional as applied because it impermissibly interferes with the Amish religious beliefs.

Facts. Respondents Jonas Yoder, Wallace Miller, and Adin Yutzy are members of the Amish religion.
Wisconsin’s compulsory school-attendance law required them to cause their children to attend public or
private school until they reach 16. Respondents declined to send their children to public school after
completion of the eighth grade. Respondents were convicted of violating the law and fined $5 each.

Issue. Did the application of the compulsory attendance law violate respondent’s rights under the First
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution?
Held:

Arguments were heard on December 8th, 1971. On May 15th 1972 the Supreme Court ruled 6 to 1 that
the compulsory education law in Wisconsin violated the Free Exercise Clause.

Justice Burger wrote in his majority opinion that Amish parents had legitimate reasons to want to
remove their children from school before they reached high school. The qualities emphasized in higher
education (self-distinction, competitiveness, scientific accomplishment, etc.) are contrary to Amish
values and the government could not require parents to allow them to be instilled.

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The Court first determined that the beliefs of the Amish were religiously based and of great antiquity.
Next, the Court rejected the State's arguments that the Free Exercise Clause extends no protection
because the case involved "action" or "conduct" rather than belief and because the regulation, neutral
on its face, did not single out religion.

The Court went on to analyze whether a "compelling" governmental interest required such "grave
interference" with Amish belief and practices. The governmental interest was not the general provision
of education, inasmuch as the State and the Amish were in agreement on education through the first
eight grades and since the Amish provided their children with additional education of a primarily
vocational nature.

The impact of the compulsory-attendance law on respondents' practice of the Amish religion is not only
severe, but inescapable, for the Wisconsin law affirmatively compels them, under threat of criminal
sanction, to perform acts undeniably at odds with fundamental tenets of their religious beliefs. ... As the
record shows, compulsory school attendance to age 16 for Amish children carries with it a very real
threat of undermining the Amish community and religious practice as they exist today; they must either
abandon belief and be assimilated into society at large, or be forced to migrate to some other and more
tolerant region.

Cabanas v. pilapil

Florentino Pilapil insured himself and he indicated in his insurance plan that his child will be his
beneficiary. He also indicated that if upon his death the child is still a minor; the proceeds of his benefits
shall be administered by his brother, Francisco Pilapil. The child was only ten years of age when
Florentino died and so Francisco then took charge of Florentino’s insurance proceeds for the benefit of
the child.

On the other hand, the mother of the child Melchora Cabanas filed a complaint seeking the delivery of
the insurance proceeds in favor and for her to be declared as the child’s trustee. Francisco asserted the
terms of the insurance policy and that as a private contract its terms and obligations must be binding
only to the parties and intended beneficiaries.

ISSUE: Whether or not the state may interfere by virtue of “parens patriae” to the terms of the
insurance policy.

Ads by OffersWizard×HELD: Yes. The Constitution provides for the strengthening of the family as the
basic social unit, and that whenever any member thereof such as in the case at bar would be prejudiced
and his interest be affected then the judiciary if a litigation has been filed should resolve that case
according to the best interest of that person. The uncle here should not be the trustee, it should be the
mother as she was the immediate relative of the minor child and it is assumed that the mother shall
show more care towards the child than the uncle will. The application of parens patriae here is in
consonance with this country’s tradition of favoring conflicts in favor of the family hence preference to
the parent (mother) is observed.

Tanada v. angara

[272 SCRA 18, May 2, 1997]

Facts:

Petitioner sought to have the agreement to join the World Trade Organization (WTO) declared
unconstitutional on the grounds that: “(1) that the WTO requires the Philippines .to place nationals and
products of member-countries on the same footing as Filipinos and local products. and (2) that the WTO
.intrudes, limits and/or impairs. the constitutional powers of both Congress and the Supreme Court, the
instant petition before this Court assails the WTO Agreement for violating the mandate of the 1987
Constitution to .develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by
Filipinos . . . (to) give preference to qualified Filipinos (and to) promote the preferential use of Filipino
labor, domestic materials and locally produced goods..”

Issues:

Whether or not the petition presents a justiciable controversy or involves a political question.

Whether or not the provisions of the Agreement contravene Sec. 19, Art II and Secs. 10 and 12, Art. XII,
of the Philippine Constitution.

Contravention of the Constitution

The Court held that there was no contravention of the Constitution since Art. II or the Declaration of
Principles and State Policies is not self-executory. Secs. 10 and 12, Art. XII, on the other hand, the Court
said:

Secs. 10 and 12 of Article XII, apart from merely laying down general principles relating to the national
economy and patrimony, should be read and understood in relation to the other sections in said article,
especially Secs. 1 and 13 thereof which read:

Sec. 1. The goals of the national economy are a more equitable distribution of opportunities, income,
and wealth; a sustained increase in the amount of goods and services produced by the nation for the
benefit of the people; and an expanding productivity as the key to raising the quality of life for all
especially the underprivileged.

The State shall promote industrialization and full employment based on sound agricultural development
and agrarian reform, through industries that make full and efficient use of human and natural resources,
and which are competitive in both domestic and foreign markets. However, the State shall protect
Filipino enterprises against unfair foreign competition and trade practices.

In the pursuit of these goals, all sectors of the economy and all regions of the country shall be given
optimum opportunity to develop. . . .
xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 13. The State shall pursue a trade policy that serves the general welfare and utilizes all forms and
arrangements of exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity.

The Court further stated that the WTO comes with safeguards to protect weaker economies and that
the Constitution does not rule out foreign competition

The WTO Agreement and Legislative Power

The court held that:

The point is that, as shown by the foregoing treaties, a portion of sovereignty may be waived without
violating the Constitution, based on the rationale that the Philippines “adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of . . . cooperation
and amity with all nations.”

Limbona vs. Mangelin (170 SCRA 786)

G.R. No. 80391, 28 February 1989

Facts: Petitioner was appointed member of the Sanguniang Pampook, Regional Autonomous
Government and was later elected Speaker of the Regional Legislative Assembly. Congressman Datu
invited petitioner in his capacity as Speaker of the Assembly for consulations and dialogues on the
recent and present political developments and other issues affecting Regions IX and XII hopefully
resulting to chart the autonomous governments of the two regions as envisioned and may prod the
President to constitute immediately the Regional Consultative Commission as mandated by the
Commission.

Consistent with the said invitation, Petitioner addressed all Assemblymen that there shall be no session
in November as “our presence in the house committee hearing of Congress take (sic) precedence over
any pending business in batasang pampook … .”

In defiance of Petitioner’s advice, After declaring the presence of a quorum, the Speaker Pro-Tempore
was authorized to preside in the session. On Motion to declare the seat of the Speaker vacant, all
Assemblymen in attendance voted in the affirmative.
Issue: Is the expulsion valid? Are the so-called autonomous governments of Mindanao, as they are now
constituted, subject to the jurisdiction of the national courts? In other words, what is the extent of self-
government given to the two autonomous governments of Region IX and XII?

Held: Firstly, We therefore order reinstatement, with the caution that should the past acts of the
petitioner indeed warrant his removal, the Assembly is enjoined, should it still be so minded, to
commence proper proceedings therefor in line with the most elementary requirements of due process.
And while it is within the discretion of the members of the Sanggunian to punish their erring colleagues,
their acts are nonetheless subject to the moderating band of this Court in the event that such discretion
is exercised with grave abuse.

the Decree PD 168 established “internal autonomy” in the two regions “[w]ithin the framework of the
national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines and its Constitution,” with
legislative and executive machinery to exercise the powers and responsibilities specified therein

Now, autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power. There is

decentralization of administration when the central government delegates administrative powers to
political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government power and in the process to make
local governments “more responsive and accountable,” “and ensure their fullest development as self-
reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the pursuit of national development and
social progress.” At the same time, it relieves the central government of the burden of managing local
affairs and enables it to concentrate on national concerns. The President exercises “general supervision”
over them, but only to “ensure that local affairs are administered according to law.” He has no control
over their acts in the sense that he can substitute their judgments with his own.

Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political power in the favor of
local governments units declare to be autonomous . In that case, the autonomous government is free to
chart its own destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention from central authorities.
According to a constitutional author, decentralization of power amounts to “self-immolation,” since in
that event, the autonomous government becomes accountable not to the central authorities but to its
constituency.

An autonomous government that enjoys autonomy of the latter category [CONST. (1987), art. X, sec.
15.] is subject alone to the decree of the organic act creating it and accepted principles on the effects
and limits of “autonomy.” On the other hand, an autonomous government of the former class is, as we
noted, under the supervision of the national government acting through the President (and the
Department of Local Government). If the Sangguniang Pampook (of Region XII), then, is autonomous in
the latter sense, its acts are, debatably beyond the domain of this Court in perhaps the same way that
the internal acts, say, of the Congress of the Philippines are beyond our jurisdiction. But if it is
autonomous in the former category only, it comes unarguably under our jurisdiction. An examination of
the very Presidential Decree creating the autonomous governments of Mindanao persuades us that they
were never meant to exercise autonomy in the second sense, that is, in which the central government
commits an act of self-immolation. Presidential Decree No. 1618, in the first place, mandates that “[t]he
President shall have the power of general supervision and control over Autonomous Regions.” In the
second place, the Sangguniang Pampook, their legislative arm, is made to discharge chiefly
administrative services

Hence, we assume jurisdiction.