Case Digests by 1 LE - 104 |

CHARACTERISTICS OF CRIMINAL LAW started on November 20. Twenty-one Senators took their
oath as judges with Supreme Court Chief Justice Hilario
A. Generality Davide, Jr. presiding.

a. Laws on Presidential Immunity
ESTRADA v. DESIERTO
G.R. No. 146738
March 2, 2001
Case digest by: AGULAN, Rona Marie P.
Principle: “The president shall be immune from suit during
his tenure.” remains in consideration that if the President is
not immune from suit, he may have to spend all of his time
facing litigations. Therefore, incumbent presidents are
immune from suit during the period of their incumbency and
tenure but not beyond.
Furthermore, the cases filed against the petitioner are
criminal in character involving plunder, graft and corruption
and bribery. One of the great themes of the 1987
Constitution is that a public office is a public trust. It declared
that “The State shall maintain honesty and integrity in the
public service and take positive and effective measures
against graft and corruption.” These Constitutional policies
will be devalued if a non-sitting president enjoys immunity
from suit for criminal acts committed during his incumbency.
Well-known lawyers fought the battle royal. The day to day
trial was covered by live TV with the testimony of Equitable-
PCI’s senior vice president Clarissa Ocampo as the most
dramatic point of the hearings. She testified that she was a
foot away from the petitioner when he affixed the signature
Jose Velarde on documents involving a 500-million
investment agreement with their bank on February 4, 2000.
Furthermore, Atty. Edgardo Espiritu, the petitioner’s
Secretary of Finance, alleged that the petitioner jointly
owned BW Resources Corporation with Mr. Dante Tan who
was facing charges of insider trading. On January 16, by a
vote of 11-10, the opening of the second envelope allegedly
containing the evidence that the petitioner held P 3.3 Billion
under a Jose Velarde account was ruled against. This sparked
an outburst of anger that eventually led to an assembly of
people at EDSA on January 18 calling for the petitioner’s
resignation. The following day, the Philippine National Police
and the Armed forces of the Philippines also withdrew their
support for the petitioner and joined the people at EDSA.
At 2:00 PM, the petitioner appeared on-air stressing that he
will not resign and only a guilty verdict will remove him from
the Presidency. At 6:15 PM, he appeared again on-air calling
for a snap Presidential election and that he will not become a
candidate for the said election.

Facts:
On January 20, the SC declared the seat of presidency vacant
as the petitioner had “constructively resigned from his post”.
In the May 11, 1998 elections, Joseph E. Estrada and Gloria th
Respondent took oath as the 14 president of the
Macapagal-Arroyo were elected as president and vice-
Philippines at 12 noon. Petitioner and his family left the
president respectively. Both were to serve a six-year term
Malacanan Palace shortly thereafter releasing a statement
commencing on June 30, 1998.
that he had “strong and serious doubts about the legality
and constitutionality of her proclamation as President.”
However, the petitioner was plagued by a plethora of
problems that slowly eroded his popularity. His downfall,
A heap of cases filed against the petitioner followed. He filed
however, started when Ilocos Sur Governor Luis “Chavit”
a petition for prohibition with a prayer for a writ of
Singson went on air and exposed that the petitioner was part
preliminary injunction. It sought to enjoin the respondent
of the Jueteng scandal and had received millions of pesos
Ombudsman from “conducting any further proceedings in
from jueteng lords. The expose ignited reactions of rage.
cases filed against him not until his term as President ends.”
Different groups and personalities asked for the resignation
He also prayed for judgment “confirming petitioner to be the
of the petitioner. This included Archbishop Jaime Cardinal
lawful and incumbent President temporarily unable to
Sin, Senator Aquilino Pimentel, former President Fidel Ramos
discharge the duties of his Office, and declaring respondent
and former President Corazon Aquino who asked the
to have taken her oath as and to be holding the Office of the
petitioner to make the “supreme self-sacrifice”. Early on, or
President, only in acting capacity pursuant to the provisions
on October 12, the respondent resigned as Secretary of
of the Constitution.”
Department of Social Welfare and Services and later asked
the petitioner to resign as well. However, the petitioner
Issue/s:
refused to resign and held on to his office. Four senior
economic advisers of the petitioner resigned and Speaker
1. Whether or not the petitions present a justiciable
Manuel Villar, together with forty-seven representatives, then
controversy.
defected from Lapian ng Masang Pilipino.
2. Whether or not the petitioner truly resigned from
Office.
On November 13, House Speaker Villar transmitted the
3. Whether or not the petitioner is still immune from
Articles of Impeachment, signed by 115 representatives, or
criminal prosecution.
more than 1/3 of all the members of the House to the Senate
causing political convulsions in both Houses of Congress.
Senator Pimentel replaced Senator Drilon as Senate
President. Speaker Villar was unseated by Representative
Fuentebella. Impeachment trial of the petitioner formally
 Case Digests by 1 LE - 104 |2

Held: 3. No. Under the 1973 Constitution, Article VII Section 17

1. No. Respondent contended that she ascended the
presidency through people power; that she has
th
already taken oath as the 14 President of the
Philippines and her legitimacy as president was
accepted by foreign governments. The Court rules
otherwise.
Political question has been defined by Our Court as
“those questions which, under the Constitution, are
to be decided by the people in their sovereign
capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary
authority has been delegated to the legislative or
executive branch of the government. It is concerned
with the issues dependent upon the wisdom, not
legality of a particular measure.” Respondents
allege that the legality of the Arroyo administration
should be treated similarly with the Aquino
administration and that their situation is similar.
Again, Court finds it otherwise. Aquino
administration was the result of a successful
revolution and was instilled directly by the people
defiance of the 1973 Constitution as amended
whereas Arroyo’s administration was a result of a
peaceful revolution and that she took the oath of
the 1987 Constitution. A successful revolution i.e.
EDSA I, is beyond judicial scrutiny as it is extra-
constitutional and that it is the exercise of the
people power of revolution which overthrew the
whole government. EDSA II, on the other hand,
makes the resignation of the petitioner a subject for
judicial review as the respondent’s oath included
the protection and upholding of the 1987
Constitution. EDSA II only affected the office of the
President as the people only exercised their power
of freedom of speech and freedom of assembly to
petition the government for redress of grievances.
Hence, the Court holds that the issue is legal and
not political.
stated, “The president shall be immune from suit
during his tenure. Thereafter, no suit whatsoever shall
lie for official acts done by him or by others pursuant
to his specific orders during his tenure.”
However, the 1973 Constitution ceased to exist when
President Marcos was ousted and the second
sentence of the aforementioned provision was not
reenacted in the 1987 Constitution. The first sentence,
“The president shall be immune from suit during his
tenure.” remains in consideration that if the President
is not immune from suit, he may have to spend all of
his time facing litigations. Therefore, incumbent
presidents are immune from suit during the period of
their incumbency and tenure but not beyond.
Furthermore, the cases filed against the petitioner are
criminal in character involving plunder, graft and
corruption and bribery. One of the great themes of
the 1987 Constitution is that a public office is a public
trust. It declared that “The State shall maintain
honesty and integrity in the public service and take
positive and effective measures against graft and
corruption.” These Constitutional policies will be
devalued if a non-sitting president enjoys immunity
from suit for criminal acts committed during his
incumbency. Therefore, the petitioner is not immune
from prosecution of the cases filed against him.

2. Yes. Resignation is a factual question and its elements

are beyond protest. There must be intent to resign
and the intent must be coupled by acts of
relinquishment.

It may be oral, written, expressed or implied. As long

as the intent to resign is clear, it must be given legal
effect. Entries in the Angara Diary serialized in the
Philippine Daily Inquirer reveals that the petitioner had
intended to give up the presidency. His call for snap
elections without him as a candidate implied his intent
to resign. Petitioner did not object when he was
advised to consider the option of a dignified exit and
to go abroad with enough funds to support him and
his family. Rather, he said he would never leave the
country but expressed no objection to the suggestion
of a dignified exit. Hence, the petitioner’s resignation
cannot be doubted and was confirmed further by his
leaving of the Malacanang.

b. Warship Rule
ARIGO v. SWIFT
G.R. No. 206510
September 16, 2014
Case digest by: AGULAN, Rona Marie P.
Principle: State immunity extends to acts Jure imperii or
sovereign and governmental acts i.e. officers acting in the
exercise of their official functions are afforded with the cloak
of protection. The US respondents were performing their
official military duties as commanding officers of the US Navy
when the alleged act or omission resulted in the unfortunate
grounding of the USS Guardian on the TRNP.
“The principle of State immunity therefore bars the exercise
of jurisdiction by this Court over the persons of respondents
Swift, Rice and Robling.”
While warships enjoy sovereign immunity from suit as
extensions of their flag State, Art. 31 of the UNCLOS states:
“The flag State shall bear international responsibility for any
loss or damage to the coastal State resulting from the non-
compliance by a warship or other government ship operated
for non-commercial purposes with the laws and regulations
of the coastal State concerning passage through the
territorial sea or with the provisions of this Convention
(UNCLOS) or other rules of international law.”
Facts:
On January 17, 2013, the USS Guardian, an Avenger-class
mine countermeasures ship of the US Navy, ran aground on
the northwest side of South Shoal of the Tubbataha Reefs.
Under R.A. 10067 or the “Tubbataha Reefs Natural Park
(TRNP) Act of 2009, the Tubbataha Reef is protected against
many human activities such as fishing and entry into its
waters is strictly regulated. Although no one was injured nor
th
were there reports of oil leaks, US 7 Fleet Commander Vice
Admiral Scott Swift expressed regret for the incident in a
press statement. By March 30, 2013, the US Navy-led salvage
team had finished removing the last piece of the grounded
ship from the coral reef.
Petitioners claim that the grounding, salvaging and post-
salvaging operations of the USS Guardian cause and
continue to cause environmental damage of such magnitude
to affect the provinces of Palawan, Antique, Aklan, Guimaras,
Iloilo, Negros Occidental, Zamboanga del Norte, Basilan, Sulu
and Tawi-tawi, which events violate their constitutional rights
to a balanced and healthful ecology under Article 2 sec. 16 of
the Philippine Constitution.
Issue/s:
1. Whether or not petitioners have a legal standing.
2. Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the
persons of US respondents.
3. Whether or not US may be held liable for damages
caused by the USS Guardian.
Case Digests by 1 LE - 104 |
3
Held:
1. Yes. Locus standi is “a right of appearance in a court
of justice on a given question.” Specifically, it is “a
party’s personal and substantial interest in a case
where he has sustained or will sustain direct injury
as a result” of the act being challenged and “calls
for more than just a generalized grievance.”
Ordinary citizens have the “public right” to a
“balanced and healthful ecology”. Hence, there is no
dispute on the legal standing of the petitioners.
2. No. State immunity extends to acts Jure imperii or
sovereign and governmental acts i.e. officers acting
in the exercise of their official functions are afforded
with the cloak of protection. The US respondents
were performing their official military duties as
commanding officers of the US Navy when the
alleged act or omission resulted in the unfortunate
grounding of the USS Guardian on the TRNP.
Hence, Court ruled that “the principle of State
immunity therefore bars the exercise of jurisdiction
by this Court over the persons of respondents Swift,
Rice and Robling,.”
3. Yes. The High Court ruled that “the suit is deemed
against the US itself” and that “the entry of the US
warship into a restricted area was within the
jurisdiction of the United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).” Senior Associate
Justice Antonio T. Carpio explained that while
warships enjoy sovereign immunity from suit as
extensions of their flag State, Art. 31 of the UNCLOS
states: “The flag State shall bear international
responsibility for any loss or damage to the coastal
State resulting from the non-compliance by a
warship or other government ship operated for
non-commercial purposes with the laws and
regulations of the coastal State concerning passage
through the territorial sea or with the provisions of
this Convention (UNCLOS) or other rules of
international law.” Although the US had not ratified
with the INCLOS and therefore is not a member of
the convention, the Court concurs with Justice
Carpio’s views that the “non-membership in the
UNCLOS does not mean that the US will disregard
the rights of the Philippines as a coastal State over
its internal waters and territorial sea” and thus
expect the US to bear “international responsibility”
under Article 31.
 Case Digests by 1 LE - 104 |4

US v. FOWLER
G.R. No. L-496
December 31, 1902
Case digest by: AMACIO, Greshiel G.

Principle: The Philippine court has no jurisdiction over

crimes committed on the high seas on board a vessel not
registered or licensed in the Philippines as provided for by
the law. Even when the ship “Lawton” was navigating within
the Philippine territory, the same is not a registered or
licensed vessel in the Philippines.

Facts:

In August 12, 1901, the defendants William Fowler, et al were

accused of the theft of 16 champagne bottles worth 20
dollars while on board the vessel, “Lawton”. The counsel for
the defendants alleged to the Court of First Instance of
Manila that they were without the jurisdiction of the crime
charged. Since it happened in the high seas and not it the
City if Manila or in the territory I which the jurisdiction of the
court extends, they wished that the case be dismissed.

Issue/s:

1. Whether or not the Court of First Instance of Manila

has jurisdiction over the criminal case theft
committed on board a vessel not registered in the
Philippines.

Held:

1. No. The Philippine court has no jurisdiction over

crimes committed on the high seas on board a
vessel not registered or licensed in the Philippines
as provided for by the law. Even when the ship
“Lawton” was navigating within the Philippine
territory, the same is not a registered or licensed
vessel in the Philippines, thereby, the case of theft
was dismissed.
 Case Digests by 1 LE - 104 |5

c. PD 1083

MARBILLA-BOBIS v. BOBIS
G.R. NO. 138509,
July 31, 2000
Case digest by: AMACIO, Greshiel G.

Principle: A decision in the civil case is not essential to the

determination of the criminal charge and is therefore not a
prejudicial question.

Facts:

On October 21, 1985, respondent Isagan D. Bobis contracted

a first marriage with Ma. Dulce Javier. With said marriage not
yet annulled, nullified or terminated, he contracted a second
marriage with herein petitioner Imelda Marbella on January
28, 1996 and a third marriage with a certain Julia Hernandez,
thereafter.

Petitioner then filed a case of bigamy against the respondent

on February 25, 1998 at the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City. Thereafter, respondent initiated a civil action for
declaration of absolute nullity of his first marriage on the
ground of it being celebrated without the marriage license.
He then filed a motion to suspend the criminal proceedings
for bigamy invoking the civil case for nullity of the first
marriage or prejudicial question to the criminal case. The RTC
granted the motion while the petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration was denied. Hence, this petition for review
on certiorari was submitted.

Issue/s:

1. Whether or not the subsequent filing of a civil action

for declaration of nullity of a previous marriage
constitute a prejudicial question to a rime of bigamy.

Held:

1. No. The respondent was not able to present issue

similar or intimately related to the same issue raised
in the criminal action and its resolution
determinative of whether or not the latter action
may proceed to constitute a prejudicial question.
Further, not every defense raised in the civil action
may be used as a prejudicial question to obtain the
suspension of the crime. Thus, a decision in the civil
case is not essential to the determination of the
criminal charge and is therefore not a prejudicial
question.

The petition of Marbella-Bobis was granted and the

decision of the RTC was reversed. The Court also
recommended the immediate filing of the criminal
cases against the respondent.
 Case Digests by 1 LE - 104 |
6

NOLLORA, JR v. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 191425 Nollora put up his Muslim religion as his sole
September 7, 2011 defense. He alleged that his religion allows him to
Case digest by: CAJEGAS, Sheena Angela A. marry more than once. Granting arguendo that
Nollora is indeed of Muslim faith at the time of
celebration of both marriages, Nollora cannot deny
Principle: Article 13(2) of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws
that both marriage ceremonies were not conducted
states that in case of a marriage between a Muslim and a
in accordance with the Code of Muslim Personal
non-Muslim, solemnized not in accordance with Muslim law
Laws, or Presidential Decree No. 1083.
or this Code, the [Family Code of the Philippines, or Executive
Order No. 209, in lieu of the Civil Code of the Philippines]
shall apply. Article 13(2) of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws
states that in case of a marriage between a Muslim
and a non-Muslim, solemnized not in accordance
Nollora is indeed of Muslim faith at the time of celebration of
with Muslim law or this Code, the [Family Code of
both marriages; Nollora cannot deny that both marriage
the Philippines, or Executive Order No. 209, in lieu
ceremonies were not conducted in accordance with the Code
of Muslim Personal Laws, or Presidential Decree No. 1083. of the Civil Code of the Philippines] shall apply.
Nollora’s religious affiliation is not an issue here.
Neither is the claim that Nollora’s marriages were
Facts:
solemnized according to Muslim law. Thus,
regardless of his professed religion, Nollora cannot
Jesusa Pinat Nollora, who was working as a staff midwife in
claim exemption from liability for the crime of
King Abdulah Naval Base Hospital, and Atilano Nollora, Jr.
bigamy.
met in Saudi Arabia. He courted her and they on April 06,
1999, they got married in Sapang Palay, San Jose del Monte,
Bulacan. While working abroad, Jesusa heard some rumors
that her husband married another woman, because of
anxiety and emotional stress, prompting her to go back to
the Philippines. While in the Philippines, Jesusa learned that
indeed her husband, Atilano Nollara, Jr. contracted a second
marriage with co-accused Rowena P. Geraldino, when she
secured a certification as to the civil status of Atilano O.
Nollora, Jr. from the National Statistics Office sometime in
November 2003.

Rowena Geraldino allegedly knew that Atilano Nollora, Jr. is

allegedly already married to Jesusa Pinat but she married
Atilano anyway because she loves him very much.

Nollora, Jr. claimed that he was a Muslim Convert way back

in January 10, 1992, to prove this he presented a Pledge of
Conversion dated January 10, 1992 and Certificate of
Conversion dated August 2, 2004. However, on his marriage
contract with Jesusa Pinat, his religion was Catholic
Pentecostal while his religion in his marriage contract with
Rowena Geraldino, is Catholic.

Issue/s:

1. Whether or not Nollora, Jr. is guilty of bigamy.

Held:

1. Yes. The circumstances in the present case satisfy all

the elements of bigamy:

(1) Nollora is legally married to Pinat;

(2) Nollora and Pinats marriage has not been legally
dissolved prior to the date of the second marriage;
(3) Nollora admitted the existence of his second
marriage to Geraldino; and
(4) Nollora and Geraldinos marriage has all the
essential requisites for validity except for the lack of
capacity of Nollora due to his prior marriage.
 Case Digests by 1 LE - 104 |
7

d. Military Offenses under RA 7055

We think that the terms "person in authority," and
US v. SMITH "public officer" found in the Spanish Penal Code
G.R. No. 14057 must be given a restricted meaning so as to include
January 2, 1919 only persons who perform some of the functions of
Case digest by: CAJEGAS, Sheena Angela A. the Government of the Philippine Islands.

Principle: The Philippine courts have jurisdiction to try

military offenders charged with a violation of penal laws of
the Philippine Islands. (U.S. vs. Sweet [1901], 1 Phil., 18.) Yet,
such jurisdiction does not necessarily mean that officer of
the United States Army are to be given special protection by
laws of a civil nature.

Facts:

The defendant, Sydney Smith, a civil employee of the United

States Army, was charged by appropriate information filed in
the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila with having
assaulted Colonel J. B. Bellinger, of the United States Army, “a
person in authority.”

Issue/s:

1. Whether a person in authority or a public officer

includes an officer in the United States Army.

Held:

1. Yes. A person in authority within the purview of this

Penal Code included religious, military, and civil
officials.

The United States Army is a national organization

with laws, rules, and regulations especially provided
for its efficiency and discipline. These laws, rules,
and regulations are presumably effective in the
Philippines. The Government of the Philippine
Islands, a civil government, has likewise laws, rules,
and regulations especially adapted to its objects.
Members of the Army are for many purposes
governed by these civil laws. The Philippine courts
have jurisdiction to try military offenders charged
with a violation of penal laws of the Philippine
Islands. (U.S. vs. Sweet [1901], 1 Phil., 18.) Yet, such
jurisdiction does not necessarily mean that officer of
the United States Army are to be given special
protection by laws of a civil nature.

The officer referred to was a functionary of the civil

Government. But when Major Carrington of the
United States Army was charged with a violation of
the penal Code, the United States Supreme Court
said that "As a soldier he (Carrington) was not an
official of the Philippines, but of the United States."
(Carrington vs. United States [1908], 208 U.S., 1. See
also in re Fair [1900], 100 Fed., 149.) Within the
meaning of articles 264 and 401 of the Penal Code,
an officer of the United States is not a person
vested with jurisdiction and is not a public officer,
who takes part in the performance of duties in the
public service of the Philippine Islands.
 Case Digests by 1 LE - 104 |
8

US v. SWEET An offense charged against a military officer in

G.R. No. 448 consequence of an act done in obedience to an
September 20, 1901 order is clearly shown on the face, where such
*Case digest lifted from the internet. offense is against the military law, is not within the
Ms. Cassion has yet to submit her digest* jurisdiction of the courts of the Civil Government.

Principle: Though assault by military officer against a POW is

not in the RPC, physical assault charges may be pressed
under the RPC.

An offense charged against a military officer in consequence

of an act done in obedience to an order is clearly shown on
the face, where such offense is against the military law, is not
within the jurisdiction of the courts of the Civil Government.

Facts:

Sweet was employed by the United States military who

committed an offense against a POW. His case is filed with
the CFI, who is given original jurisdiction in all criminal cases
for which a penalty of more than 6 months is imposed. He is
now contending that the courts are without jurisdiction
because he was “acting in the line of duty.”

Issue/s:

1. Whether or not this case is within the jurisdiction of

the CFI.
2. Whether or not an assault committed by a soldier
or military employee upon a prisoner of war is not
an offense under the penal code.
3. Assuming that it is an offence under the penal code,
whether or not the military character sustained by
the person charged with the offence at the time of its commission
exempts him from the ordinary jurisdiction of the civil tribunals.

Held:

1. Yes. By Act No. 136 of the US-Phil Commission, the

CFIs are given original jurisdiction in all criminal
cases in which a penalty more than 6 months
imprisonment or a fine greater than $100 may be
imposed. Furthermore, CFIs have jurisdiction to try
offenders charged with violation of the Penal Code
within their territorial limits, regardless of the
military character of the accused. The defendant
and his acts are within the jurisdiction of the CFI
because he failed to prove that he was indeed
acting in the line of duty.

2. Yes. Though assault by military officer against a

POW is not in the RPC, physical assault charges may
be pressed under the RPC.

3. No. The application of the general principle that the

jurisdiction of the civil tribunals is unaffected by the
military or other special character brought before
them for trial (R.A. No. 7055). Appellant claims that
the act was service but this cannot affect the right of
the Civil Court to takes jurisdiction of the case.
 Case Digests by 1 LE - 104 |
9

NAVALES v. ABAYA charge against the accused concerns the alleged

G.R. No. 162318
October 25, 2004
*Case digest lifted from the internet.
Ms. Cassion has yet to submit her digest*
Principle: No. RA 7055 identifies the service-connected
crimes including violation of Article 96 of the Articles of War.
It is triable by the court martial. The charge against the
accused concerns the alleged violation of their solemn oath
as officers to defend the Constitution and the duly-
constituted authorities. Such violation caused dishonor and
discredit to the military profession. The charge has a bearing
on the professional conduct and behavior as military officers.
violation of their solemn oath as officers to defend
the Constitution and the duly-constituted
authorities. Such violation caused dishonor and
discredit to the military profession. The charge has
a bearing on the professional conduct and behavior
as military officers. Equally indicative of the service-
connected nature of the offense is the penalty
prescribed by the same, that is, dismissal from the
service, imposable only by the military court. Such
penalty is purely disciplinary in character, evidently
intended to cleanse the military profession of
misfits and to preserve the stringent standard of
military discipline.

Facts:

Only July 27, 2003 at around 1:00am, more than 300 heavily
armed junior officers and enlisted men of the AFP entered
the premises of Oakwood Apartments in Makati. They then
announced their grievances against the Arroyo
Administration, corruption in the Military; illegal sale of arms
and ammunitions to the enemies; they demanded for the
resignation of the President, the Cabinet and AFP and PNP
top brass. The President issued G.O. No. 4 declaring a state of
rebellion. Negotiates were sent to the place and the soldiers
finally laid their arms.

After investigation, they were charged with coup d’ etat

penalized under Article 134-A, RPC. They were likewise
charged under the Articles of War, specifically Article 96 for
conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman. They filed a
motion with the RTC where the coup d’etat case was pending
to take over jurisdiction over all the cases pending with the
military tribunal following the doctrine of absorption. The
RTC ruled that the cases before the military tribunal were not
service-connected but rather absorbed in furtherance of the
crime of coup d’etat.

When they were charged under Art. 96 of the Articles of War,

they filed a petition for prohibition praying that the
respondents be ordered to desist from charging them with
violation of Article 96 of the Articles of War. They maintained
that Article 96 is not service connected, hence, absorbed by
coup d’etat, thus, within the jurisdiction of the RTC. The OSG
contended that under RA 7055, violation of Art. 96 is service-
connected, hence, within the jurisdiction of the military
tribunal. They further contended that the offense has already
prescribed since they were not arraigned within 2 years from
the date of the commission of the offense.

Issue/s:

1. Whether or not they are entitled to the writ of

prohibition.

Held:

1. No. No. RA 7055 identifies the service-connected

crimes including violation of Article 96 of the
Articles of War. It is triable by the court martial. The
 Case Digests by 1LE - 1 0 4 | 10

e. RA 75

SHNECKENBURGER v. MORAN
G.R. No. L-44896
July 31, 1936
Case digest by: DOMINGO, Mark Ivan Khalser A.

Principle: Although section 17 of Act No. 136 vests in the

Supreme Court the original jurisdiction to issue writs of
mandamus, certiorari, prohibition, habeas corpus, and quo
warranto, such jurisdiction was also conferred on the Courts
of First Instance by the Code of Civil Procedure.

Facts:

The petitioner, Schneckenburger, was duly accredited

honorary consul of Uruguay at Manila. He was charged in the
Court of First Instance of Manila with the crime of
falsification of a private document. He objected to the
jurisdiction of the court on the ground that both under the
Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the
Philippines the court below had no jurisdiction to try him.

His objection having been overruled, he filed this petition for

a writ of prohibition with a view to preventing the Court of
First Instance of Manila from taking cognizance of the
criminal action filed against him.

The petitioner contends (1) that the court of first instance of

Manila is without jurisdiction to try the case filed against the
petitioner and (2) that under the Constitution of the
Philippines original jurisdiction over cases affecting
ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls, is
conferred exclusively upon the Supreme Court of the
Philippines.

The case involves no question of diplomatic immunity since a

consul is not exempt from criminal prosecution for violations
of the laws of the country where he resides.

Issue/s:

1. Whether or not the Court of First Instance of Manila

has jurisdiction to try the petitioner.

Held:

1. Yes. Although section 17 of Act No. 136 vests in the

Supreme Court the original jurisdiction to issue writs
of mandamus, certiorari, prohibition, habeas corpus,
and quo warranto, such jurisdiction was also
conferred on the Courts of First Instance by the
Code of Civil Procedure. (Act No. 190, secs.197, 217,
222, 226, and 525.)

Hence, it results that the original jurisdiction

possessed and exercised by the Supreme Court of
the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of
the Constitution was not exclusive of, but
concurrent with, that of the Courts of First Instance.
 Case Digests by 1 LE - 104 |
11

MINUCHER v. CA Philippine territory of agent Scalzo of the United

G.R. No. 142396 States Drug Enforcement Agency.
February 11, 2006
Case digest by: DOMINGO, Mark Ivan Khalser A. The task of Scalzo is to conduct surveillance on
suspected drug supplier and, after having
ascertained the target, to inform the local law
Principle: A foreign agent, operating within a territory, can
enforcers who would then be expected to make
be cloaked with immunity from suit but only as long as it can
arrest. In conducting surveillance activities on
be established that he is acting within the directives of the
Minucher, later acting as the poseur-buyer during
sending state. The consent of the host state is an
the buy-bust operation, and then becoming a
indispensable requirement of basic courtesy between the
principal witness in the criminal case against
two sovereigns.
Minucher, Scalzo hardly can be said to have acted
beyond the scope of his official function or duties.
Facts:

Violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 was filed

against the petitioner, Minucher. The criminal charged
followed a “buy-bust operation” conducted by the Philippine
police narcotic agent, accompanied by Arthur Scalzo, in the
house of the Minucher, an Iranian national, where a quantity
of heroin, a prohibited drug, was said to be seized. Minucher
was later acquitted by the court. Minucher later on filed for
damages due to trumped-up charge of drug trafficking made
by Arthur Scalzo.

In his answer, Scalzo denied material allegations of the

complaint and raised that he had acted in the discharge of
his official duties as being merely an agent of the Drug
Enforcement Administration of the United States Department
of Justice. Subsequently, he filed a motion to dismiss the
complaint on the ground that, being a special agent of the
United States Drug Enforcement Administration, he was
entitled to diplomatic immunity. Scalzo attached in his
motion a Diplomatic Note of the United States Embassy
addressed to DOJ of the Philippines and a Certification of
Vice Consul Donna Woodward, certifying that the note is a
true and faithful copy of its original.

Issue/s:

1. Whether or not Arthur Scalzo is entitled to diplomatic

immunity.

Held:

1. Yes. A foreign agent, operating within a territory,

can be cloaked with immunity from suit but only as
long as it can be established that he is acting within
the directives of the sending state. The consent of
the host state is an indispensable requirement of
basic courtesy between the two sovereigns.

The official exchanges of communication between

agencies of the government of the two countries,
certifications from officials of both the Philippine
Department of Foreign Affairs and the United States
Embassy, as well as the participation of members of
the Philippine Narcotics Command in the "buy-bust
operation" conducted at the residence of Minucher,
may be inadequate to support the "diplomatic
status" of the latter but they give enough indication
that the Philippine government has given its
imprimatur, if not consent, to the activities within
 Case Digests by 1 LE - 104 |
12

f. Liang v. People, GR No. 15865; January 8, officials of international organizations enjoy

2000 “functional” immunities that are immunity is
restricted only to official acts.
LIANG v. PEOPLE The issue whether or not Liang’s utterances
G.R. No. 15865 constituted to oral defamation is still for the trial to
January 8, 2000 determine. Considering that the immunity accorded
Case digest by: DY, Jennifer D. to the petitioner is limited only to acts performed in
his official capacity, it becomes necessary to
determine whether or not the petitioner’s
Principle: It is well-settled principle of law that a public
utterances were made pursuant and in relation to
official may be liable in his personal private capacity for
his official functions.
whatever damage he may have caused by his act done with
malice or in bad faith or beyond the scope of his authority or
Under Section 45 of the Agreement which provides:
jurisdiction.

"Officers and staff of the Bank including for the

Facts:
purpose of this Article experts and consultants
performing missions for the Bank shall enjoy the
This resolve’s petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration of the
following privileges and immunities:
SC’s decision denying the petition for review.

a.).......immunity from legal process with respect to

Petitioner is an economist working with the Asian
acts performed by them in their official capacity
Development Bank (ADB). Sometime in 1994, for allegedly
except when the Bank waives the immunity."
uttering defamatory words against co-worker Joyce Cabal, he
was charged with two counts of oral defamation. The judge
The immunity mentioned therein is not absolute,
dismissed the complaint stating that Liang enjoyed immunity
but subject to the exception that the act was done
from legal process under Section 45 of the Agreement
in "official capacity." It is therefore necessary to
between the ADB and the Philippine government. The People
determine if petitioner’s case falls within the ambit
of the Philippines filed a petition for certiorari and the case
of Section 45(a). Thus, the prosecution should have
was annulled and set aside. Petitioner brought a petition for
been given the chance to rebut the DFA protocol
review in the Supreme Court.
and it must be accorded the opportunity to present
its controverting evidence, should it so desire.
Petitioner’s Arguments
He contends that the immunity under Section 45 of the
Third, slandering a person could not possibly be
Agreement between the ADB and the Philippine government
covered by the immunity agreement because our
extends to all staff of the ADB and that it is absolute.
laws do not allow the commission of a crime, such
Petitioner asserts diplomatic immunity of the ADB, its
as defamation, in the name of official duty. The
officials and staff, from legal and judicial process in the
imputation of theft is ultra vires and cannot be part
Philippines.
of official functions. It is well-settled principle of law
that a public official may be liable in his personal
Respondents’ Arguments
private capacity for whatever damage he may have
They contend that the immunity granted to officers and staff
caused by his act done with malice or in bad faith
of the ADB is not absolute; it is limited to acts performed in
or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction.
an official capacity. They hold that the immunity cannot
It appears that even the government’s chief legal
cover the commission of a crime such as slander or oral
counsel, the Solicitor General, does not support the
defamation in the name of official duty.
stand taken by petitioner and that of the DFA.

Issues
Fourth, under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations, a diplomatic agent, assuming petitioner is
1. Whether or not petitioner, as an official of an
such, enjoys immunity from criminal jurisdiction of
international organization, is entitled to diplomatic
the receiving state except in the case of an action
immunity.
relating to any professional or commercial activity
exercised by the diplomatic agent in the receiving
Held:
state outside his official functions. As already
mentioned above, the commission of a crime is not
1. No. The Petitioner is not entitled to diplomatic
part of official duty.
immunity because he is an official of an
international organization and not a diplomatic
envoy and hence his immunity is not absolute.

Under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic

Relations, a diplomatic envoy is immune from
criminal jurisdiction of the receiving State for all acts
and hence he is inviolable. On the other hand,