#17 We find no grave abuse of discretion committed by respondent judge.

The elements of litis pendentiaand

forum-shopping were not met in this case.7
Suspension of Civil Action
xxxx
LILY LIM, Petitioner,
vs. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is DENIED. This case is REMANDED to the
KOU CO PING a.k.a. CHARLIE CO, Respondent. court of origin for further proceedings.

x-----------------------x SO ORDERED.8

G.R. No. 179160 Factual Antecedents

KOU CO PING a.k.a. CHARLIE CO, Petitioner, In February 1999, FR Cement Corporation (FRCC), owner/operator of a cement manufacturing plant,
vs. issued several withdrawal authorities9 for the account of cement dealers and traders, Fil-Cement Center
LILY LIM, Respondent. and Tigerbilt. These withdrawal authorities state the number of bags that the dealer/trader paid for and
can withdraw from the plant. Each withdrawal authority contained a provision that it is valid for six
months from its date of issuance, unless revoked by FRCC Marketing Department.
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,*

Fil-Cement Center and Tigerbilt, through their administrative manager, Gail Borja (Borja), sold the
PERLAS-BERNABE,**
withdrawal authorities covering 50,000 bags of cement to Co for the amount of ₱ 3.15 million or ₱ 63.00
per bag.10 On February 15, 1999, Co sold these withdrawal authorities to Lim allegedly at the price of ₱
DECISION 64.00 per bag or a total of ₱ 3.2 million.11

DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Is it forum shopping for a private complainant to pursue a civil complaint for specific performance and
damages, while appealing the judgment on the civil aspect of a criminal case for estafa?
Before the Court are consolidated Petitions for Review assailing the separate Decisions of the Second
and Seventeenth Divisions of the Court of Appeals (CA) on the above issue.
Lily Lim’s (Lim) Petition for Review1 assails the October 20, 2005 Resolution2 of the Second Division in CA-
G.R. CV No. 85138, which ruled on the above issue in the affirmative:
Using the withdrawal authorities, Lim withdrew the cement bags from FRCC on a staggered basis. She
successfully withdrew 2,800 bags of cement, and sold back some of the withdrawal authorities, covering
10,000 bags, to Co.
Sometime in April 1999, FRCC did not allow Lim to withdraw the remaining 37,200 bags covered by the
withdrawal authorities. Lim clarified the matter with Co and Borja, who explained that the plant
implemented a price increase and would only release the goods once Lim pays for the price difference or
agrees to receive a lesser quantity of cement. Lim objected and maintained that the withdrawal
authorities she bought were not subject to price fluctuations. Lim sought legal recourse after her
demands for Co to resolve the problem with the plant or for the return of her money had failed.

The criminal case

Due to the filing of the said civil complaint (Civil Case No. 5112396), Charlie Co filed the instant motion to
dismiss [Lily Lim’s] appeal, alleging that in filing said civil case, Lily Lim violated the rule against forum
shopping as the elements of litis pendentia are present. An Information for Estafa through Misappropriation or Conversion was filed against Co before Branch
154 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City. The accusatory portion thereof reads:

This Court agrees.3

On or about between the months of February and April 1999, in San Juan, Metro Manila and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused, with intent to defraud Lily Lim, with grave abuse of
xxxx confidence, with unfaithfulness, received in trust from Lily Lim cash money in the amount of ₱
2,380,800.00 as payment for the 37,200 bags of cement, under obligation to deliver the 37,200 bags of
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the appeal is DISMISSED. cement to said Lily Lim, but far from complying with his obligation, misappropriated, misapplied and
converted to his own personal use and benefit the said amount of ₱ 2,300,800.00 [sic] and despite
demands, the accused failed and refused to return said amount, to the damage and prejudice of Lily Lim
SO ORDERED.4 in the amount of ₱ 2,380,800.00.

On the other hand, Charlie Co’s (Co) Petition for Review5 assails the April 10, 2007 Decision6 of the Contrary to Law.12
Seventeenth Division in CA-G.R. SP No. 93395 for ruling on the same issue in the negative:
The private complainant, Lily Lim, participated in the criminal proceedings to prove her damages. She
prayed for Co to return her money amounting to ₱ 2,380,800.00, foregone profits, and legal interest, and
for an award of moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney’s fees.13
On November 19, 2003, the RTC of Pasig City, Branch 154, rendered its Order14 acquitting Co of the
estafa charge for insufficiency of evidence. The criminal court’s Order reads:
The first and second elements of the crime of estafa [with abuse of confidence under Article 315,
paragraph 1(b)] for which the accused is being charged and prosecuted were not established by the
prosecution’s evidence.
xxxx
In view of the absence of the essential requisites of the crime of estafa for which the accused is being
charged and prosecuted, as above discussed, the Court has no alternative but to dismiss the case against
the accused for insufficiency of evidence.15
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Demurrer to Evidence is GRANTED, and the accused is
hereby ACQUITTED of the crime of estafa charged against him under the present information for
insufficiency of evidence.
Insofar as the civil liability of the accused is concerned, however, set this case for the reception of his
evidence on the matter on December 11, 2003 at 8:30 o’clock [sic] in the morning.
SO ORDERED.16
After the trial on the civil aspect of the criminal case, the Pasig City RTC also relieved Co of civil liability to
Lim in its December 1, 2004 Order.17 The dispositive portion of the Order reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered holding the accused CHARLIE COnot
civilly liable to the private complainant Lily Lim.
18
SO ORDERED.
Lim sought a reconsideration of the above Order, arguing that she has presented preponderant evidence
that Co committed estafa against her.19
The trial court denied the motion in its Order20 dated February 21, 2005.
On March 14, 2005, Lim filed her notice of appeal21 on the civil aspect of the criminal case. Her appeal
was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 85138 and raffled to the Second Division of the CA.
The civil action for specific performance
On April 19, 2005, Lim filed a complaint for specific performance and damages before Branch 21 of the
RTC of Manila. The defendants in the civil case were Co and all other parties to the withdrawal
authorities, Tigerbilt, Fil-Cement Center, FRCC, Southeast Asia Cement, and La Farge Corporation. The
complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 05-112396, asserted two causes of action: breach of contract and
abuse of rights. Her allegations read:
ALLEGATIONS COMMON
TO ALL CAUSES OF ACTION
xxxx
23. Charlie Co obligated himself to deliver to Lily Lim 50,000 bags of cement of ₱ 64.00 per bag on an x-
plant basis within 3 months from the date of their transaction, i.e. February 15, 1999. Pursuant to said
agreement, Lily Lim paid Charlie Co ₱ 3.2 Million while Charlie Co delivered to Lily Lim FR Cement
Withdrawal Authorities representing 50,000 bags of cement.
24. The withdrawal authorities issued by FR Cement Corp. allowed the assignee or holder thereof to
withdraw within a six-month period from date a certain amount of cement indicated therein. The
Withdrawal Authorities given to Lily Lim were dated either 3 February 1999 or 23 February 1999. The
Withdrawal Authorities were first issued to Tigerbilt and Fil-Cement Center which in turn assigned them
to Charlie Co. Charlie Co then assigned the Withdrawal Authorities to Lily Lim on February 15, 1999.
Through these series of assignments, Lily Lim acquired all the rights (rights to withdraw cement) granted
in said Withdrawal Authorities.
25. That these Withdrawal Authorities are valid is established by the fact that FR Cement earlier allowed
Lily Lim to withdraw 2,800 bags of cement on the basis thereof.
26. However, sometime 19 April 1999 (within the three (3)-month period agreed upon by Charlie Co and
Lily Lim and certainly within the six (6)-month period indicated in the Withdrawal Authorities issued by
FR Cement Corp.), Lily Lim attempted but failed to withdraw the remaining bags of cement on account of
FR Cement’s unjustified refusal to honor the Withdrawal Authorities. x x x
xxxx
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION:
BREACH OF CONTRACT
30. Charlie Co committed and is therefore liable to deliver to Lily Lim 37,200 bags of cement. If he
cannot, then he must pay her the current fair market value thereof.
31. FR Cement Corporation is also liable to deliver to Lily Lim the amount of cement as indicated in the
Withdrawal Authorities it issued. xxx FR Cement Corporation has no right to impose price adjustments as
a qualification for honoring the Withdrawal Authorities.
32. Fil-Cement Center, Tigerbilt and Gail Borja as the original holders/ assignees of the Withdrawal
Authorities repeatedly assured Lily Lim that the same were valid and would be honored. They are liable
to make good on their assurances.
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION:
ABUSE OF RIGHTS AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT
33. Charlie Co’s acts of falsely representing to Lily Lim that she may be able to withdraw the cement from
FR Cement Corp. caused Lily Lim to incur expenses and losses. Such act was made without justice,
without giving Lily Lim what is due her and without observing honesty and good faith, all violative of the
law, more specifically Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code. Such willful act was also made by Charlie Co in
a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy, in violation of Article 21 of the Civil Code.
34. FR Cement Corporation’s unjust refusal to honor the Withdrawal Authorities they issued also caused
damage to Lily Lim. Further, FR Cement Corporation’s act of withholding the 37,200 bags of cement
despite earning income therefor constitutes as an unjust enrichment because FR Cement Corporation
acquired income through an act or performance by another or any other means at the expense of
another without just or legal ground in violation of Article 22 of the Civil Code.
35. Fil-Cement Center, Tigerbilt and Gail Borja’s false assurances that Lily Lim would be able to withdraw
the remaining 37,200 bags of cement caused Lily Lim to incur expenses and losses. x x x Moreover, Fil-
Cement Center admitted receiving payment for said amount of cement, thus they are deemed to have
come into possession of money at the expense of Lily Lim without just or legal ground, in violation of
Article 22 of the Civil Code.
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION:
MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES and
ATTORNEY’S FEES AND COSTS OF SUIT22
Lim prayed for Co to honor his contractual commitments either by delivering the 37,200 bags of cement,
making arrangements with FRCC to allow Lim to withdraw the cement, or to pay for their value. She
likewise asked that the defendants be held solidarily liable to her for the damages she incurred in her
failed attempts to withdraw the cement and for the damages they inflicted on her as a result of their
abuse of their rights.23
Motions to dismiss both actions
In reaction to the filing of the civil complaint for specific performance and damages, Co filed motions to
dismiss the said civil case24 and Lim’s appeal in the civil aspect of the estafa case or CA-G.R. CV No.
85138.25 He maintained that the two actions raise the same issue, which is Co’s liability to Lim for her
inability to withdraw the bags of cement,26 and should be dismissed on the ground of lis pendens and
forum shopping.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals Second Division in CA-G.R CV No. 85138
The appellate court (Second Division) favorably resolved Co’s motion and dismissed Lim’s appeal from
the civil aspect of the estafa case. In its Resolution dated October 20, 2005, the CA Second Division held
that the parties, causes of action, and reliefs prayed for in Lim’s appeal and in her civil complaint are
identical. Both actions seek the same relief, which is the payment of the value of the 37,200 bags of
cement.27 Thus, the CA Second Division dismissed Lim’s appeal for forum shopping.28 The CA
denied29 Lim’s motion for reconsideration.30
Lim filed the instant petition for review, which was docketed as G.R. No. 175256.
Ruling of the Manila Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. 05-112396
Meanwhile, the Manila RTC denied Co’s Motion to Dismiss in an Order31 dated December 6, 2005. The
Manila RTC held that there was no forum shopping because the causes of action invoked in the two
cases are different. It observed that the civil complaint before it is based on an obligation arising from
contract and quasi-delict, whereas the civil liability involved in the appeal of the criminal case arose from
a felony.
Co filed a petition for certiorari,32 docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 93395, before the appellate court. He
prayed for the nullification of the Manila RTC’s Order in Civil Case No. 05-112396 for having been issued
with grave abuse of discretion.33
Ruling of the Court of Appeals Seventeenth Division in CA-G.R. SP No. 93395
The CA Seventeenth Division denied Co’s petition and remanded the civil complaint to the trial court for
further proceedings. The CA Seventeenth Division agreed with the Manila RTC that the elements of litis
pendentia and forum shopping are not met in the two proceedings because they do not share the same
cause of action.34
The CA denied35 Co’s motion for reconsideration.36
Co filed the instant Petition for Review, which was docketed as G.R. No. 179160.
Upon Co’s motion,37 the Court resolved to consolidate the two petitions.38
Kou Co Ping’s arguments
Co maintains that Lim is guilty of forum shopping because she is asserting only one cause of action in CA-
G.R. CV No. 85138 (the appeal from the civil aspect of Criminal Case No. 116377) and in Civil Case No. 05-
112396, which is for Co’s violation of her right to receive 37,200 bags of cement. Likewise, the reliefs
sought in both cases are the same, that is, for Co to deliver the 37,200 bags of cement or its value to Lim.
That Lim utilized different methods of presenting her case – a criminal action for estafa and a civil
complaint for specific performance and damages – should not detract from the fact that she is
attempting to litigate the same cause of action twice.39
Co makes light of the distinction between civil liability ex contractu and ex delicto. According to him,
granting that the two civil liabilities are independent of each other, nevertheless, the two cases arising
from them would have to be decided using the same evidence and going over the same set of facts.
Thus, any judgment rendered in one of these cases will constitute res judicata on the other.40
In G.R. No. 179160, Co prays for the annulment of the CA Decision and Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No.
93395, for a declaration that Lim is guilty of forum shopping, and for the dismissal of Civil Case No. 05-
112396.41
In G.R. No. 175256, Co prays for the affirmation of the CA Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 85138 (which
dismissed Lim’s appeal from the trial court’s decision in Criminal Case No. 116377).42
Lily Lim’s arguments
Lim admits that the two proceedings involve substantially the same set of facts because they arose from
only one transaction.43 She is quick to add, however, that a single act or omission does not always make a
single cause of action.44 It can possibly give rise to two separate civil liabilities on the part of the offender
– (1) ex delicto or civil liability arising from crimes, and (2) independent civil liabilities or those arising
from contracts or intentional torts. The only caveat provided in Article 2177 of the Civil Code is that the
offended party cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission.45 Because the law allows her
two independent causes of action, Lim contends that it is not forum shopping to pursue them.46
She then explains the separate and distinct causes of action involved in the two cases. Her cause of
action in CA-G.R CV No. 85138 is based on the crime of estafa. Co violated Lim’s right to be protected
against swindling. He represented to Lim that she can withdraw 37,200 bags of cement using the
authorities she bought from him. This is a fraudulent representation because Co knew, at the time that
they entered into the contract, that he could not deliver what he promised.47 On the other hand, Lim’s
cause of action in Civil Case No. 05-112396 is based on contract. Co violated Lim’s rights as a buyer in a
contract of sale. Co received payment for the 37,200 bags of cement but did not deliver the goods that
were the subject of the sale.48
In G.R. No. 179160, Lim prays for the denial of Co’s petition.49 In G.R. No. 175256, she prays for the
reversal of the CA Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 85138, for a declaration that she is not guilty of forum
shopping, and for the reinstatement of her appeal in Criminal Case No. 116377 to the CA.50
Issue
Did Lim commit forum shopping in filing the civil case for specific performance and damages during the
pendency of her appeal on the civil aspect of the criminal case for estafa?
Our Ruling
A single act or omission that causes damage to an offended party may give rise to two separate civil
liabilities on the part of the offender51 - (1) civil liability ex delicto, that is, civil liability arising from the
criminal offense under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code,52 and (2) independent civil liability, that is,
civil liability that may be pursued independently of the criminal proceedings. The independent civil
liability may be based on "an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony,"
as provided in Article 31 of the Civil Code (such as for breach of contract or for tort53 ). It may also be
based on an act or omission that may constitute felony but, nevertheless, treated independently from
the criminal action by specific provision of Article 33 of the Civil Code ("in cases of defamation, fraud and
physical injuries").
The civil liability arising from the offense or ex delicto is based on the acts or omissions that constitute
the criminal offense; hence, its trial is inherently intertwined with the criminal action. For this reason,
the civil liability ex delicto is impliedly instituted with the criminal offense.54 If the action for the civil
liability ex delicto is instituted prior to or subsequent to the filing of the criminal action, its proceedings
are suspended until the final outcome of the criminal action.55 The civil liability based on delict is
extinguished when the court hearing the criminal action declares that "the act or omission from which
the civil liability may arise did not exist."56
On the other hand, the independent civil liabilities are separate from the criminal action and may be
pursued independently, as provided in Articles 31 and 33 of the Civil Code, which state that:
ART. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained
of as a felony, such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of
the result of the latter. (Emphasis supplied.)
ART. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries a civil action for damages, entirely separate
and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed
independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Because of the distinct and independent nature of the two kinds of civil liabilities, jurisprudence holds
that the offended party may pursue the two types of civil liabilities simultaneously or cumulatively,
without offending the rules on forum shopping, litis pendentia, or res judicata.57 As explained in Cancio,
Jr. v. Isip:58
One of the elements of res judicata is identity of causes of action. In the instant case, it must be stressed
that the action filed by petitioner is an independent civil action, which remains separate and distinct
from any criminal prosecution based on the same act. Not being deemed instituted in the criminal action
based on culpa criminal, a ruling on the culpability of the offender will have no bearing on said
independent civil action based on an entirely different cause of action, i.e., culpa contractual.
In the same vein, the filing of the collection case after the dismissal of the estafa cases against the
offender did not amount to forum-shopping. The essence of forum shopping is the filing of multiple suits
involving the same parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, to secure
a favorable judgment. Although the cases filed by [the offended party] arose from the same act or
omission of [the offender], they are, however, based on different causes of action. The criminal cases for
estafa are based on culpa criminal while the civil action for collection is anchored on culpa contractual.
Moreover, there can be no forum-shopping in the instant case because the law expressly allows the filing
of a separate civil action which can proceed independently of the criminal action.59
Since civil liabilities arising from felonies and those arising from other sources of obligations are
authorized by law to proceed independently of each other, the resolution of the present issue hinges on
whether the two cases herein involve different kinds of civil obligations such that they can proceed
independently of each other. The answer is in the affirmative.
The first action is clearly a civil action ex delicto, it having been instituted together with the criminal
action.60
On the other hand, the second action, judging by the allegations contained in the complaint,61 is a civil
action arising from a contractual obligation and for tortious conduct (abuse of rights). In her civil
complaint, Lim basically alleges that she entered into a sale contract with Co under the following terms:
that she bought 37,200 bags of cement at the rate of ₱ 64.00 per bag from Co; that, after full payment,
Co delivered to her the withdrawal authorities issued by FRCC corresponding to these bags of cement;
that these withdrawal authorities will be honored by FRCC for six months from the dates written
thereon. Lim then maintains that the defendants breached their contractual obligations to her under the
sale contract and under the withdrawal authorities; that Co and his co-defendants wanted her to pay
more for each bag of cement, contrary to their agreement to fix the price at ₱ 64.00 per bag and to the
wording of the withdrawal authorities; that FRCC did not honor the terms of the withdrawal authorities it
issued; and that Co did not comply with his obligation under the sale contract to deliver the 37,200 bags
of cement to Lim. From the foregoing allegations, it is evident that Lim seeks to enforce the defendants’
contractual obligations, given that she has already performed her obligations. She prays that the
defendants either honor their part of the contract or pay for the damages that their breach has caused
her.
Lim also includes allegations that the actions of the defendants were committed in such manner as to
cause damage to Lim without regard for morals, good customs and public policy. These allegations, if
proven, would constitute tortious conduct (abuse of rights under the Human Relations provisions of the
Civil Code).

Thus, Civil Case No. 05-112396 involves only the obligations arising from contract and from tort, whereas
the appeal in the estafa case involves only the civil obligations of Co arising from the offense charged.
They present different causes of action, which under the law, are considered "separate, distinct, and
independent"62 from each other. Both cases can proceed to their final adjudication, subject to the
prohibition on double recovery under Article 2177 of the Civil Code.63

WHEREFORE, premises considered, Lily Lim’s Petition in G.R. No. 175256 is GRANTED. The assailed
October 20, 2005 Resolution of the Second Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 85138
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Lily Lim’s appeal in CA-G.R. CV No. 85138 is ordered REINSTATED and the
Court of Appeals is DIRECTED to RESOLVE the same with DELIBERATE DISPATCH.

Charlie Co’s Petition G.R. No. 179160 is DENIED. The assailed April 10, 2007 Decision of the Seventeenth
Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 93395 is AFFIRMED in toto.
#54
Motion to quash
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET AL.,
vs.
PANFILO M. LACSON
RESOLUTION
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision1 of the Court
of Appeals dated August 24, 2001 in CA-G.R. SP No. 65034.2 The said Decision of the appellate court
granted respondent Lacson's Second Amended Petition for Prohibition with application for the issuance
of a Temporary Restraining Order, (1) assailing the Order issued by Judge Herminia Pasamba of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 40, that allowed the continuation of the re-investigation of
Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 or the Kuratong Baleleng cases; and (2) praying for the
dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-01-101102 to Q-01-101112 entitled "People of the Philippines v.
Panfilo Lacson, et al." pending before Branch 81 of the RTC of Quezon City.
The following appear in the records of this case:
(1) On May 18, 1995, then PNP Director-General Recaredo Sarmiento II announced, in a press
conference, the killing of eleven (11) members of the Kuratong Baleleng Gang (KBG) in a shootout with
police elements near the fly-over along Commonwealth Avenue, Quezon City at about 4:00 A.M. that
day.3
(2) On May 22, 1995, morning papers carried the news that SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes had claimed that
the killing of the eleven (11) gang members was a "rub-out" or summary execution and not a shootout.4
(3) In an affidavit he executed the following day, delos Reyes stated, among others, that he was part of a
composite police team called the Anti-Bank Robbery and Intelligence Task Force Group (ABRITFG)
composed of elements of the National Capital Region Command (NCRC) and headed by Chief
Superintendent Jewel Canson; Traffic Management Command, headed by Senior Superintendent
Francisco Subia, Jr.; Presidential Anti-Crime Commission (PACC), headed by Chief Superintendent Panfilo
M. Lacson; Central Police District Command, headed by Chief Superintendent Ricardo de Leon; and
Criminal Investigation Command (CIC), headed by Chief Superintendent Romeo Acop. Delos Reyes
claimed that the police team arrested the eleven (11) gang members in early morning of May 18, 1995 at
the gang's safe house in Superville Subdivision, Parañaque; that after their arrest, the gang members
were made to board two vans, their hands tied behind their backs, and brought initially to Camp Crame
where a decision to summarily execute them was made, and later to Commonwealth Avenue where they
were shot to death by elements of ABRITFG.5
(4) On May 26, 1995, SPO2 Corazon dela Cruz, another CIC investigator, executed an affidavit
corroborating the material allegations of delos Reyes. Dela Cruz claimed that she was with delos Reyes
from the time the eleven (11) KBG members were arrested up to the time they were killed in
Commonwealth Avenue.6
(5) On May 31, 1995, Armando Capili, a reporter of Remate, executed an affidavit stating that he was
present when the KBG members were arrested in Superville Subdivision.7
(6) On June 1, 1995, Chief Superintendent Job A. Mayo, PNP Director for Investigation, filed murder
charges with the Office of the Ombudsman against ninety-seven (97) officers and personnel of ABRITFG.
The next-of-kin of the slain KBG members also filed murder charges against the same officers and
personnel.8
(7) Ombudsman Aniano Desierto then created a panel of investigators to conduct a preliminary
investigation of the murder charges. The panel was headed by Deputy Ombudsman for Military Affairs
Bienvenido Blancaflor. On October 20, 1995, the panel issued a resolution recommending the dismissal
of the charges for lack of probable cause.
(8) Ombudsman Desierto referred the resolution for review by a panel composed of Over-all Deputy
Ombudsman Francisco Villa as head, and Special Prosecutor Leonardo Tamayo and Assistant
Ombudsman Abelardo Aportadera as members. On November 20, 1995, the review panel reversed the
Blancaflor resolution and found probable cause for the prosecution of multiple murder charges against
twenty-six (26) officers and personnel of ABRITFG.9
(9) On November 2, 1995, the Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan eleven (11) Informations for
MURDER, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 23047 to 23057, against respondent Panfilo M. Lacson and
twenty-five (25) other accused. All twenty-six (26) of them were charged as principals.10 The following
appear to be the victims: Meleubren Sorronda in Crim. Case No. 23047; Welbor Elcamel in Crim. Case No.
23048; Carlito Alap-ap in Crim. Case No. 23049; Jevy Redillas in Crim. Case No. 23050; Ray Abalora in
Crim. Case No. 23051; Joel Amora in Crim. Case No. 23052; Alex Neri in Crim. Case No. 23053; Rolando
Siplon in Crim. Case No. 23054; Manuel Montero in Crim. Case No. 23055; Sherwin Abalora in Crim. Case
No. 23056; and Pacifico Montero in Crim. Case No. 23057.
(10) Upon motion of the respondent, the criminal cases were remanded to the Ombudsman for
reinvestigation. On March 1, 1996, Amended Informations were filed against the same twenty-six (26)
suspects but the participation of respondent Lacson was downgraded from principal to accessory.
Arraignment then followed and respondent entered a plea of not guilty.11
(11) With the downgrading of charges against him, respondent Lacson questioned the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan to hear the criminal cases as none of the "principal" accused in the Amended
Informations was a government official with a Salary Grade (SG) 27 or higher, citing Section 2 of R. A. No.
7975 then prevailing. Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan ordered the cases transferred to the Regional Trial
Court.12
(12) The Office of the Special Prosecutor filed a motion for reconsideration of the transfer. Pending
resolution of the motion, R. A. No. 8249 took effect on February 23, 1997, amending R. A. No. 7975. In
particular, the amendatory law deleted the word "principal" in Section 2 of R. A. No. 7975, thereby
expanding the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to include all cases where at least one of the accused,
whether principal, accomplice or accessory, is a government official of Salary Grade (SG) 27 or higher.
The amendment is made applicable to all cases pending in any court in which trial has not yet begun as
of the date of its approval.13
(13) In Lacson v. Executive Secretary,14 respondent Lacson challenged the constitutionality of the
amendment and contended that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the criminal cases. This
Court, while dismissing the constitutional challenge, nonetheless ordered the transfer of the criminal
cases to the Regional Trial Court on the ground that the Amended Informations for murder failed to
indicate that the offenses charged therein were committed in relation to, or in discharge of, the official
functions of the respondent, as required by R. A. No. 8249.
(14) Criminal Cases Nos. 23047 to 23057 were raffled off to Branch 81 of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, then presided by Judge, now Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals, Wenceslao Agnir, Jr.,
and re-docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689.
(15) Before the accused could be arraigned, prosecution witnesses Eduardo de los Reyes, Corazon de la
Cruz, Armando Capili and Jane Gomez recanted their affidavits which implicated respondent Lacson in
the murder of the KBG members.
On the other hand, private complainants Myrna Abalora,15 Leonora Amora,16 Nenita Alap-ap,17 Imelda
Montero,18Margarita Redillas,19 Carmelita Elcamel20 and Rolando Siplon21 also executed their respective
affidavits of desistance declaring that they were no longer interested to prosecute these cases.22
(16) Due to these developments, the twenty-six (26) accused, including respondent Lacson, filed five
separate but identical motions to (1) make a judicial determination of the existence of probable cause
for the issuance of warrants of arrest; (2) hold in abeyance the issuance of the warrants, and (3) dismiss
the cases should the trial court find lack of probable cause.
(17) The records of the case before us are not clear whether the private offended parties were notified
of the hearing on March 22, 199923 held by Judge Agnir to resolve the motions filed by respondent
Lacson and the other accused.
(18) During the said hearing, the private offended parties who desisted do not appear to have been
presented on the witness stand. In their stead, Atty. Godwin Valdez testified that he assisted them in
preparing their affidavits of desistance and that he signed said affidavits as witness. On the other hand,
Atty. Aurora Bautista of the Philippine Lawyer's League presented the affidavits of recantation of
prosecution witnesses Eduardo de los Reyes, Armando Capili and Jane Gomez. Only prosecution witness
Corazon de la Cruz testified to affirm her affidavit.24
(19) On March 29, 1999, Judge Agnir issued a Resolution25 dismissing Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to
Q-99-81689, as follows:
"As already seen, the documents attached to the Informations in support thereof have been
rendered meaningless, if not absurd, with the recantation of the principal prosecution
witnesses and the desistance of the private complainants. There is no more evidence to show
that a crime has been committed and that the accused are probably guilty thereof. Following
the doctrine above-cited, there is no more reason to hold the accused for trial and further
expose them to an open and public accusation. It is time to write finis to these cases and lay
to rest the ghost of the incident of May 18, 1995 so that all those involved--- the accused, the
prosecution witnesses and the private complainants alike--- may get on with their lives.
The Court is not unmindful of the admonition in the recent case of People vs. Court of
Appeals (G.R. No. 126005, January 21, 1999) where the Supreme Court said that the general
rule is that 'if the Information is valid on its face and there is no showing of manifest error,
grave abuse of discretion or prejudice on the part of the public prosecutor, courts should not
dismiss it for want of evidence, because evidentiary matters should be presented and heard
during the trial', and that the ruling in Allado vs. Diokno 'is an exception to the general rule
and may be invoked only if similar circumstances are clearly shown to exist.'
This Court holds that the circumstances in the case at bench clearly make an exception to the
general rule.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds no probable cause for the issuance of
the warrants of arrest against the accused or to hold them for trial. Accordingly, the
Informations in the above-numbered cases are hereby ordered dismissed."
SO ORDERED."26
(20) On March 27, 2001, PNP Director Leandro R. Mendoza indorsed to the Department of Justice the
new affidavits of P/Insp. Ysmael S. Yu and P/S Insp. Abelardo Ramos regarding the Kuratong
Baleleng incident for preliminary investigation. On the strength of this indorsement, Secretary of Justice
Hernando B. Perez formed a panel to investigate the matter. On April 17, 2001, the respondent was
subpoenaed to attend the investigation of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689.27
(21) On May 28, 2001, respondent Lacson, et al., invoking, among others, their constitutional right
against double jeopardy, filed a petition for prohibition with application for temporary restraining order
and/or writ of preliminary injunction with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, primarily to enjoin the State
prosecutors from conducting the preliminary investigation. The petition was docketed as Civil Case No.
01-100933 and raffled to Branch 40, presided by Judge Herminia V. Pasamba.28
(22) The plea for temporary restraining order was denied by Judge Pasamba in an Order29 dated June 5,
2001, viz:
"After a study, this Court submits that the dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-
99-81689 is not one on the merits and without any recorded arraignment and entered plea on
the part of the herein petitioners. The dismissal was a direct consequence of the finding of
the Quezon City RTC that no probable cause exists for the issuance of warrants of arrest
against petitioners herein and to hold them for trial. The arraignment had with
the Sandiganbayan does not put the case in a different perspective since
the Sandiganbayan was adjudged to be without any jurisdiction to try the cases. It is the
People of the Philippines who is the complainant in the Kuratong Baleleng case and remains
to be the complainant in the present investigation initiated thru a letter of PNP Chief
Mendoza dated March 27, 2001 (Exhibit "B") together with the sworn statements of
witnesses Ramos and Yu (Exhibits "2" and "3" - supportive of the refiling of the case (Exhibit
"9").
xxx xxx xxx
Above considered, this Court finds petitioners have not preliminarily established that they
have a right to be preserved pending hearing on the injunctive relief.
WHEREFORE, the prayer for temporary restraining order is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED."30
(23) On June 6, 2001, eleven (11) Informations for murder involving the killing of the same members of
the Kuratong Baleleng gang were filed before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City and were docketed
as Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112. The new Informations charged as principals thirty-four
(34) people, including respondent Lacson and his twenty-five (25) other co-accused in Criminal Cases
Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689. The criminal cases were assigned to Judge Ma. Theresa L. Yadao.
(24) On the same day, respondent Lacson filed before the Court of Appeals a petition for
certiorari31 against Judge Pasamba, the Secretary of Justice, the PNP Chief, State Prosecutors Ong and
Zacarias, 2nd Assistant City Prosecutor Jamolin, and the People of the Philippines. The said petition was
amended to implead as additional party-respondents State Prosecutor Claro Arellano and the RTC,
Quezon City, Branch 81 in which the Informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 were
filed.32
(25) The Second Amended Petition33 dated June 14, 2001 and admitted by the Court of Appeals on June
26, 2001, alleged:
"The reliefs of certiorari, prohibition and injunction against the questioned Order (Annex A)
and the new Informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 pending before
respondent Yadao (Annex B) are founded upon the grave abuse of discretion by respondent
Judge Pasamba of her discretion in its issuance, the illegality of the proceedings of the
respondent State Prosecutors as they cannot revive complaints which had been dismissed
over two (2) years from the date the dismissal order was issued, and the invalidity of the new
Informations for Murder filed against petitioners and others, all in defiance of law and
jurisprudence as shown by the following:
(a) Respondent judge had ruled on the merits of the main prohibition action a quo rendering
the same moot and academic by concluding that the dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-
81679-Q-99-81689 by the QC RTC was not final and executory, hence [i] the complaints
therein can be reinvestigated, and [ii] petitioner's arraignment while the case had not yet
been remanded to the QC RTC and while the Sandiganbayan had valid jurisdiction thereover
[Criminal Cases No. 23047-2048] was void, notwithstanding that the only issue in the TRO
application was the existence or lack of a valid complaint as defined in S1 and S3, Rule 110.
(b) Respondent Judge ruled that respondent State Prosecutors could proceed to re-
investigate and thereafter file new Informations on June 6, 2001 covering those offenses
subject of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679-Q-99-81689 on the basis of affidavits filed after
said cases were dismissed on March 29, 1999, despite the fact that under Section 8, Rule 117,
cases similar to those filed against the petitioner and others (where the penalty imposable is
imprisonment of six (6) years or more) cannot be revived after two (2) years from the date
the dismissal order was issued.
(c) Respondent Judge held that the petitioner had not shown a right to be preserved despite
evidence showing the short cuts taken by respondent State prosecutors in re-investigating a
dismissed case, in not complying with Rules in respect of its re-opening, and in insisting that a
valid complaint was filed in clear violation of the Rules and case law thereon, and despite the
fact that the petitioner had shown that an inextendible deadline of June 5, 2001 was given
him to file his counter-affidavit without which his indictment for a non-bailable offense is
assured because of DOJ Secretary Hernando Perez's political schemes."34
(28) On August 24, 2001, the Court of Appeals (Special Third Division), rendered the now assailed
Decision. It characterized the termination of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 as
"provisional dismissal," and considered Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 as mere revivals of
the same. Applying Section 8, Rule 117 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, it dismissed the
criminal cases against the respondent, viz:
"In sum, this Court is of the considered view that the subject dismissal of [the] criminal cases
was provisional in nature and that the cases presently sought to be prosecuted by the
respondents are mere revival or re-opening of the dismissed cases. The present controversy,
being one involving "provisional dismissal" and revival of criminal cases, falls within the
purview of the prescriptive period provided under Section 8, Rule 117 of the 2000 Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure. The second paragraph of the said provision is couched in clear,
simple and categorical words. It mandates that for offenses punishable by imprisonment of
more than six (6) years, as the subject criminal cases, their provisional dismissal shall become
permanent two (2) years after the issuance of the order without the case having been
revived. It should be noted that the revival of the subject criminal cases, even if reckoned
from the DOJ's issuance of subpoenas to petitioner, was commenced only on April 19, 2001,
that is, more than two (2) years after the issuance, on March 29, 1999, of RTC-Quezon City's
Resolution, provisionally dismissing the criminal cases now sought to be revived. Applying the
clear and categorical mandate of Section 8, Rule 117, supra, such efforts to revive the criminal
cases are now definitely barred by the two-year prescriptive period provided therein.
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. As prayed for, the Temporary Restraining Order earlier
issued against the conduct of further proceedings in Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-
101112, including the issuance of warrants of arrest against the petitioner, PANFILO M.
LACSON, is hereby made PERMANENT. Accordingly, with respect to said accused, the
proceedings conducted by respondent State Prosecutors in respect of the said criminal cases
are declared NULL AND VOID and the corresponding Informations, docketed as Criminal Cases
Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112, entitled 'People of the Philippines vs. Panfilo M. Lacson, et
al." and filed before respondent Judge Maria Theresa L. Yadao of Branch 81 of the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City, are hereby ordered DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED."37
The issue is whether Section 8, Rule 117 bars the filing of the eleven (11) informations against the
respondent Lacson involving the killing of some members of the Kuratong Baleleng gang. This rule which
took effect on December 1, 2000 provides:
"SEC. 8. Provisional dismissal.- A case shall not be provisionally dismissed except with the
express consent of the accused and with notice to the offended party.

(26) In the meantime, on June 8, 2001, respondent Lacson also filed with the RTC-QC Branch 81 (presided
The provisional dismissal of offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years
by Judge Ma. Theresa Yadao), a Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause and in the absence
or a fine of any amount, or both, shall become permanent one (1) year after issuance of the
thereof, to dismiss the cases outright. Respondent Lacson, however, filed a Manifestation and Motion
order without the case having been revived. With respect to offenses punishable by
dated June 13, 2001 seeking the suspension of the proceedings before the trial court.35
imprisonment of more than six (6) years, their provisional dismissal shall become permanent
two (2) years after issuance of the order without the case having been revived."
(27) The Court of Appeals issued a temporary restraining order enjoining Judge Yadao from issuing a
warrant of arrest or conducting any proceeding or hearing in Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-
Like any other favorable procedural rule, this new rule can be given retroactive effect. However, this
101112.36
Court cannot rule on this jugular issue due to the lack of sufficient factual bases. Thus, there is need of
proof of the following facts, viz: (1) whether the provisional dismissal of the cases had the express
consent of the accused; (2) whether it was ordered by the court after notice to the offended party, (3)
whether the 2-year period to revive has already lapsed, and (4) whether there is any justification for the
filing of the cases beyond the 2-year period.
There is no uncertainty with respect to the fact that the provisional dismissal of the cases against
respondent Lacson bears his express consent. It was respondent Lacson himself who moved to dismiss
the subject cases for lack of probable cause before then Judge Agnir, hence, it is beyond argument that
their dismissal bears his express consent.
This is not to be wondered at. The applicability of Section 8, Rule 117 was never considered in the trial
court. It was in the Court of Appeals where respondent Lacson raised for the first time the argument that
Section 8, Rule 117 bars the revival of the multiple murder cases against him. But even then, the
appellate court did not require the parties to elucidate the crucial issue of whether notices were given to
the offended parties before Judge Agnir ordered the dismissal of the cases against respondent Lacson
and company. To be sure, there is a statement in the Decision of the appellate court to the effect that
"records show that the prosecution and the private offended parties were notified of the hearing x x
x."39 It is doubtful whether this finding is supported by the records of the case. It appears to be contrary
to Judge Agnir's finding that only seven (7) of the complainants submitted affidavits of desistance.

Indeed, the records of this case are inconclusive on the factual issue of whether the multiple murder
The records of the case, however, do not reveal with equal clarity and conclusiveness whether notices to
cases against respondent Lacson are being revived within or beyond the 2-year bar. The reckoning date
the offended parties were given before the cases against the respondent Lacson were dismissed by then
of the 2-year bar has to be first determined - - - whether it is from the date of the Order of then Judge
Judge Agnir. It appears from the resolution of then Judge Agnir that the relatives of the victims who
Agnir dismissing the cases or from the dates the Order were received by the various offended parties or
desisted did not appear during the hearing to affirm their affidavits. Their affidavits of desistance were
from the date of the effectivity of the new rule.
only presented by Atty. Godwin Valdez who testified that he assisted the private complainants in
preparing their affidavits and he signed them as a witness. It also appears that only seven (7) persons
submitted their affidavits of desistance, namely: If the cases were revived only after the 2-year bar, the State must be given the opportunity to justify its
failure to comply with said timeline. The new rule fixes a timeline to penalize the State for its inexcusable
delay in prosecuting cases already filed in courts. It can therefore present compelling reasons to justify
a. Myrna Abalora, mother of the victims Sherwin Abalora and Rey Abalora
the revival of cases beyond the 2-year bar.

b. Carmelita Elcamel, wife of Wilbur Elcamel;

In light of the lack of or the conflicting evidence on the various requirements to determine the
applicability of Section 8, Rule 117, this Court is not in a position to rule whether or not the re-filing of
c. Leonora Amora, mother of victim Joel Amora; the cases for multiple murder against respondent Lacson should be enjoined. Fundamental fairness
requires that both the prosecution and the respondent Lacson should be afforded the opportunity to be
d. Nenita Alap-ap, wife of victim Carlito Alap-ap; heard and to adduce evidence on the presence or absence of the predicate facts upon which the
application of the new rule depends. They involve disputed facts and arguable questions of law. The
reception of evidence on these various issues cannot be done in this Court but before the trial court.
e. Imelda Montero, wife of victim Manuel Montero;

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the case at bar is remanded to the RTC - Quezon City, Branch 81 so that
f. Margarita Redillas, mother of victim Hilario Jevy Redillas; and the State prosecutors and the respondent Lacson can adduce evidence and be heard on whether the
requirements of Section 8, Rule 117 have been complied with on the basis of the evidence of which the
g. Rolando Siplon. trial court should make a ruling on whether the Informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-
101112 should be dismissed or not. Pending the ruling, the trial court is restrained from issuing any
warrant of arrest against the respondent Lacson. Melo and Carpio, JJ., take no part.
From the records of the case before us, it cannot be determined whether there were affidavits of
desistance executed by the relatives of the three (3)38 other victims, namely: Meleubren Soronda,
Pacifico Montero, Jr., and Alex Neri. The same records do not show whether they were notified of the
hearing or had knowledge thereof. To be sure, it is not fair to expect the element of notice to be litigated
before then Judge Agnir for Section 8, Rule 117 was yet inexistent at that time.

The fact of notice to the offended parties was not raised either in the petition for prohibition with
application for temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction filed by respondent Lacson
in the RTC of Manila, presided by Judge Pasamba, to enjoin the prosecutors from reinvestigating the said
cases against him. The only question raised in said petition is whether the reinvestigation will violate the
right of respondent Lacson against double jeopardy. Thus, the issue of whether or not the reinvestigation
is barred by Section 8, Rule 117 was not tackled by the litigants.

Nor was the fact of notice to the offended parties the subject of proof after the eleven (11) informations
for murder against respondent Lacson and company were revived in the RTC of Quezon City presided by
Judge Yadao. There was hardly any proceeding conducted in the case for respondent Lacson immediately
filed a petition for certiorari in the appellate court challenging, among others, the authority of Judge
Yadao to entertain the revived informations for multiple murder against him.
#91
Appeals Information[6]for estafa against petitioner. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 02-199357 and

MERCEDITA T. GUASCH, G.R. No. 176015 raffled to Honorable William Simon P. Peralta, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
Petitioner,
50, Manila.
Present:

PUNO, C.J., Chairperson, After petitioner entered her plea of not guilty and after the prosecution rested its case, petitioner filed a
- versus - CARPIO,
Motion With Leave To Admit Demurrer to Evidence[7] with attached Demurrer to Evidence[8] on April 1,
CORONA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,* and 2005.
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, JJ.

ARNALDO DELA CRUZ, Promulgated: The trial court issued an Order[9] dated June 16, 2005 granting the demurrer to evidence and
Respondent. June 16, 2009
x------------------------------------------------x dismissing the case. The trial court found that respondents assertion of misrepresentation by petitioner

DECISION that her check will be fully funded on the maturity date was not supported by the evidence on

record. Accordingly, her guilt not having been proven beyond reasonable doubt, petitioner was acquitted.
PUNO, C.J.:

Before us is a Petition for Review[1] on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to set aside
On June 28, 2005, respondent received a copy of the said order. On July 14, 2005, respondent
the Decision[2] dated August 31, 2006 of the Court of Appeals which reversed the Order[3] dated September
filed a Manifestation[10] with attached Motion to Amend Order dated June 16, 2005[11] (Motion to Amend)
20, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 50, Manila in Criminal Case No. 02-199357.
to include a finding of civil liability of petitioner. In the Manifestation, respondents counsel justified his

On November 10, 2000, respondent Arnaldo dela Cruz (respondent) filed a Complaint- failure to file the motion within the reglementary period of 15 days because all postal offices in Metro

Affidavit[4] against petitioner Mercedita T. Guasch (petitioner) with the City Prosecutor of Manila were allegedly ordered closed in the afternoon due to the rally staged on Ayala Avenue.

Manila. Respondent alleged that petitioner was his neighbor and kumadre. On several occasions,
Meantime, on August 30, 2005, respondent filed a Petition for Certiorari[12] with the Court of
petitioner transacted business with him by exchanging cash for checks of small amount without
Appeals praying that the trial courts Order dated June 16, 2005 granting the demurrer to evidence be set
interest. On July 26, 1999, petitioner went to his residence requesting him to exchange her check with
aside.
cash of P3,300,000.00. Initially, he refused. However, petitioner returned the next day and was able to

convince him to give her P3,300,000.00 in cash in exchange for her Insular Savings Bank Check No. 0032082 The trial court denied respondents Motion to Amend in its Order[13] dated September 20, 2005
dated January 31, 2000 upon her assurance that she will have the funds and bank deposit to cover the said finding that counsel for respondent was inexcusably negligent; hence, the Order dated June 16, 2005 has
check by January 2000. On the date of maturity and upon presentment, however, the check was become final and executory. Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration[14] but the same was denied
dishonored for the reason that the account against which it was drawn was already closed. by the trial court in its Order[15] dated November 7, 2005.

On March 2, 2001, the City Prosecutor of Manila issued a Resolution[5] recommending that an information

for estafa be filed against petitioner. On February 7, 2002, the City Prosecutor of Manila filed an
 On December 7, 2005, respondent filed a Notice of Appeal[16] informing the trial court that he
was appealing the Order dated September 20, 2005 and the Order dated November 7, 2005. The trial court
likewise denied the notice of appeal in an Order[17] dated December 13, 2005.
Consequently, on February 13, 2006, respondent filed a Supplemental Petition for Certiorari[18] with the
Court of Appeals to set aside the Order dated September 20, 2005, the Order dated November 7, 2005,
and the Order dated December 13, 2005.
On August 31, 2006, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision.[19] On the issue of
whether the issuance of the Order dated June 16, 2005 granting the demurrer to evidence was made with
grave abuse of discretion, the Court of Appeals ruled in the negative as it found that the trial court did not
anchor the acquittal of petitioner on evidence other than that presented by the prosecution as contended
by petitioner. On the issue of whether the denial of respondents Motion to Amend was tainted with grave
abuse of discretion, the Court of Appeals ruled in the affirmative. The Court of Appeals ratiocinated that
matters of paramount importance outweigh rules of procedure in this instance. Accordingly, the Court of
Appeals ruled as follows:
WHEREFORE, the assailed order dated September 20, 2005 denying
petitioners Motion to Amend Order dated 16 [June] 2005 is hereby SET ASIDE. Public
respondent is hereby directed to determine and fix the amount due the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration[20] arguing that the Court of Appeals erred
in ruling that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied respondents Motion to
Amend.However, the same was denied by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution[21] dated December 20,
2006.
Hence, this petition.
The lone issue in this case is whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the trial court
committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied respondents Motion to Amend.
We affirm the ruling of the Court of Appeals.
Respondent contends that the delay of one day in filing his motion was due to circumstances
beyond his control. He submitted a Certification[22] from the Makati Central Post Office stating that it was
closed in the afternoon of July 13, 2005 due to the rally along Ayala Avenue per declaration by the City
Mayor.
Petitioner, on the one hand, alleges that the denial of respondents Motion to Amend was due
to the inexcusable negligence of respondents counsel; hence, the trial court did not commit grave abuse
of discretion.Furthermore, the Order dated June 16, 2005 granting the demurrer to evidence has become
final and executory and the remedy of certiorari cannot be used as a substitute for a lost appeal.
Respondents counsel received a copy of the Order dated June 16, 2005 granting the demurrer
to evidence on June 28, 2005. However, he only filed his Motion to Amend on July 14, 2005 which was one
day beyond the 15-day reglementary period to file a motion for reconsideration of final orders of the trial
court pursuant to Section 1, Rule 37 of the Rules of Court.
As a general rule, the statutory requirement that when no motion for reconsideration is filed within the
reglementary period, the decision attains finality and becomes executory in due course must be strictly
enforced as they are considered indispensable interdictions against needless delays and for orderly
discharge of judicial business. The purposes for such statutory requirement are twofold: first, to avoid
delay in the administration of justice and thus, procedurally, to make orderly the discharge of judicial
business, and, second, to put an end to judicial controversies, at the risk of occasional errors, which are
precisely why courts exist. Controversies cannot drag on indefinitely. The rights and obligations of every
litigant must not hang in suspense for an indefinite period of time.[23]
However, in exceptional cases, substantial justice and equity considerations warrant the giving of due
course to an appeal by suspending the enforcement of statutory and mandatory rules of
procedure.[24] Certain elements are considered for the appeal to be given due course, such as: (1) the
existence of special or compelling circumstances, (2) the merits of the case, (3) a cause not entirely
attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules, (4) lack of any

showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, and (5) the other party will not be unduly
prejudiced thereby.[25]
Several of these elements obtain in the case at bar.
First, there is ostensible merit to respondents cause. The records show that petitioner admits
her civil obligation to respondent. In her Kontra-Salaysay,[26] petitioner alleged that she owed respondent
a total of P3,300,000.00 as a result of their joint lending business whereby petitioner borrows money from
respondent with interest and petitioner, in turn, lends the money to her clients. Respondent did not waive,
reserve, nor institute a civil action for the recovery of civil liability. As correctly observed by the Court of
Appeals, respondents actual and active participation in the criminal proceedings through a private
prosecutor leaves no doubt with respect to his intentions to press a claim for the unpaid obligation of
petitioner in the same action. Hence, since the civil action is deemed instituted with the criminal action,
the trial court was duty-bound to determine the civil liability of petitioner pursuant to paragraph 2, Section
2, Rule 120 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure which provides:
SECTION 2. Contents of the judgment.
xxx
In case the judgment is of acquittal, it shall state whether the evidence
of the prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused or merely failed
to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In either case, the judgment shall
determine if the act or omission from which the civil liability might arise did not
exist. (2a)
Second, it cannot be said that petitioner will be unduly prejudiced if respondents Motion to Amend for the
sole purpose of including the civil liability of petitioner in the order of acquittal shall be allowed. Foremost,
petitioner admits her civil obligation to respondent. Respondent concededly has an available remedy
even if his Motion to Amend was denied, which is to institute a separate civil action to recover
petitioners civil liability. However, to require him to pursue this remedy at this stage will only prolong
the litigation between the parties which negates the avowed purpose of the strict enforcement of
reglementary periods to appeal, that is, to put an end to judicial controversies. Not only will that course
of action be a waste of time, but also a waste of the resources of both parties and the court as well. We
agree with the following observation made by the Court of Appeals:
To sustain the denial of the Motion to Amend the Order of June 16, 2005
on the ground that the private respondent was acquitted and the order of acquittal
had already attained its final and executory stage simply because the motion was
filed beyond the time fixed by the rules will necessarily constrained (sic) petitioner
to institute a separate civil action which in the end results in needless clogging of
court dockets and unnecessary duplication of litigation with all its attendant loss
of time, effort and money on the part of all concerned. Finally, the amendment of
the order of acquittal for the sole purpose of including therein the civil liability of
private complainant will not unduly prejudice her. It bears stressing that private
complainant was the first to agree that the transaction is a loan and she never
denied but even admitted her debt or obligation to herein petitioner.[27] (Emphasis
supplied)
A review of the records below shows that the evidence to make a determination of petitioners
civil liability is already at the disposal of the trial court. For example, the checks covering the amounts
owed by petitioner to respondent in the total amount of P3,300,000.00 were already submitted by
petitioner to the trial court as Annexes to the Motion to Quash[28] that she filed. Neither can it be said that
petitioners right to due process shall be violated if her civil liability be determined in the same
case. In Padilla v. Court of Appeals,[29] we held:
There appear to be no sound reasons to require a separate civil action
to still be filed considering that the facts to be proved in the civil case have already
been established in the criminal proceedings where the accused was
acquitted. Due process has been accorded the accused. He was, in fact, exonerated
of the criminal charged. The constitutional presumption of innocence called for
more vigilant efforts on the part of prosecuting attorneys and defense counsel, a
keener awareness by all witnesses of the serious implications of perjury, and a
more studied consideration by the judge of the entire records and of applicable
statutes and precedents. To require a separate civil action simply because the
accused was acquitted would mean needless clogging of court dockets and
unnecessary duplication of litigation with all its attendant loss of time, effort, and
money on the part of all concerned. (emphasis supplied)
As we ruled in Gayos v. Gayos,[30] it is a cherished rule of procedure that a court should always
strive to settle the entire controversy in a single proceeding leaving no root or branch to bear the seeds of
future litigation. Given the circumstances in this case, we find that the trial court committed grave abuse
of discretion when it denied respondents Motion to Amend.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. No
pronouncement as to costs.