Oriel Magno vs. CA violation of B.P. Blg.
violation of B.P. Blg. 22 (The Bouncing Checks Law) where he found guilty and affirmed by the
26 June 1992
Nature:
Appeal by certiorari to review thedecision of Court of Appeals
Facts:
Petitioner was in process of putting up a car repair shop sometime in
April 1983, but he did not havecomplete equipment that couldmake his venture workable. H
elacked funds to purchasenecessary equipment.
He approached Corazon Teng, VP of Mancor Industries, a distributor of equipment who
referred him to LS Finance.
A lease/purchase agreement specifying a warranty deposit (29,790) of 30% for Magno to put
up. Claiming he could not afford it, Magno asked LS Finance to find a 3rd party lender to lend
him the amount. LENDER = TENG, specified a 3% interest on short term loan.
Magno issued postdated checks to LS Finance, who gave it to Teng. When check matured,
Magno said he could not cover it and he was not banking with Pacific Bank anymore. In lieu,
he issued 6 check- first 2 checks honored, last 4 in question. When business failed, Magno
could no longer pay rent to LS Finance, LS pulled out equipment. Magno promised to pay
the rest of the warranty deposit, but the remaining checks were no
longer honored due to “closed account”. He was convicted of four
counts of violating BP 22. CA affirmed this decision because issuing a bouncing check is a
crime.
Oriel Magno is on the process of putting up a car repair shop sometime in April 1983 but he
lacks fund in acquiring complete set of equipments for him to make his shop operational.
Thus, she approached corazon Teng, Vice President of Mancor Industries, for his needed
equipment for car repair of which Mancor was a distributor. Having been approached by
petitioner on his predicament, who fully bared that he had no sufficient funds to buy the
equipment needed, Teng referred Magno to LS Finance and
Management Corporation advising its Vice-President, Joey Gomez, that Mancor was willing
and
able to supply the pieces of equipment needed if LS Finance could accommodate petitioner
and
provide him credit facilities.
The arrangement went on requiring Magno to pay 30% of the total amount of the equipment
as a warranty deposit. Since Magno don’t have that money he requested Joey Gomez to look
for third party who could lend him that amount. And apparently Corazon Teng was the one
who provided that amount without the knowledge of Magno. As a payment to the
equipment, Magno issued six checks wherein only two of them were cleared and the rest
have no sufficient fund. Likewise, because of unsuccessful venture, Magno also failed to pay
LS Finance who then pulled out the garage equipments. Magno was charged four counts of
Court of Appeals. Hence, the present petition for review
ISSUE:
(1)WON Magno is guilty of violating B.P. 22 upon review
(2)WON post-dated checks were drawn or issued "to apply on account or for value", as
required under Section 1 of B.P. Blg, 22.
Ruling: Decision REVERSED, accused-petitioner, ACQUITTED
Held:
(1)
NO. There is no violation of
BP22by issuance of check to coverwarranty deposit given bycomplainant to enable drawer to
import equipment financed onlease-
purchase agreement. Sincetransaction did not becomepurchase when Magno failed to pay
rent and LS Finance pulled out equipment. No need for Magno to
continue paying warranty deposit(warranty deposit is for purchase of equipment).
(2)
NO violation is committed when complainant told drawer that he has insufficient funds in the
bank. The 4 checks were issued tocollateralize “rent”/ anaccommodation and not forpurchas
e equipment/receipt of anactual “account or credit forvalue”.
Ratio:
RTC and CA’s decision merely relied on the law, without looking into
the real nature of warranty deposit. Acquittal based on action not
constituting a wrong sought to be punished in offense charged (not because of lack of
intent).
Protective theory – “affirms that the primary function of punishment is the protective of
society against actual and potential wrongdoers”
Ex. Actuations of Mrs. Carolina Tengamount to that of potential wrongdoerswhose
operations should also be clipped in order that the unwary public will not fall prey to
vicious transactions.
G.R. No. 193169 April 6, 2015
ROGELIO ROQUE, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PIDLIPPINES, Respondent.
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Petitioner Rogelio Roque (petitioner) was charged with the crime of frustrated homicide in
an Information that reads as follows:
That on or about the 22nd day of November, 2001, in the municipality of Pandi, province of
Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, with intent to kill[,] attack,
assault and shoot with a gun complain[an]t Reynaldo Marquez, hitting the latter on his right
ear and nape, and kick[ing] him on the face and back, causing serious physical injuries which
ordinarily would have caused the death of the said Reynaldo Marquez, thus, performing all
the acts of execution which should have produced the crime of homicide as a consequence,
but nevertheless did not produce it by reason of causes independent of his will, that is[,] by
the timely and able medical attendance rendered to said Reynaldo Marquez which prevented
his death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.1
When arraigned on March 23, 2003, petitioner pleaded "not guilty." During the pre-trial
conference, the defense admitted the identity of petitioner; that he is a Kagawad of
Barangay Masagana, Pandi, Bulacan; and that the day of the incident, November 22, 2001
was the Thanksgiving Day of the said barangay. Trial thereafter ensued where the parties
presented their respective versions of the incident.
The prosecution averred that on November 22, 2001, while brothers Reynaldo Marquez
(Reynaldo) and Rodolfo Marquez (Rodolfo) were in the house of Bella Salvador-Santos (Bella)
in Pandi, Bulacan, Rodolfo spotted Rogelio dela Cruz (dela Cruz) and shouted to him to join
them. At that instant, petitioner and his wife were passing-by on board a tricycle. Believing
that Rodolfo's shout was directed at him, petitioner stopped the vehicle and cursed the
former. Reynaldo apologized for the misunderstanding but petitioner was unyielding. Before
leaving, he warned the Marquez brothers that something bad would happen to them if they
continue to perturb him.
Bothered, Rodolfo went to the house of Barangay Chairman Pablo Tayao (Tayao) to ask for
assistance in settling the misunderstanding. Because of this, Reynaldo, who had already gone
home, was fetched by dela Cruz and brought to the house of Tayao. But since Tayao was then
no longer around, Reynaldo just proceeded to petitioner's house to follow Tayao and Rodolfo
who had already gone ahead. Upon arriving at petitioner's residence, Reynaldo again
apologized to petitioner but the latter did not reply. Instead, petitioner entered the house
and when he came out, he was already holding a gun which he suddenly fired at Reynaldo
who was hit in his right ear. Petitioner then shot Reynaldo who fell to the ground after being
hit in the nape. Unsatisfied, petitioner kicked Reynaldo on the face and back. Reynaldo
pleaded Tayao for help but to no avail since petitioner warned those around not to get
involved. Fortunately, Reynaldo's parents arrived and took him to a local hospital for
emergency medical treatment. He was later transferred to Jose Reyes Memorial Hospital in
Manila where he was operated on and confined for three weeks. Dr. Renato Raymundo
attended to him and issued a medical certificate stating that a bullet entered the base of
Reynaldo's skull and exited at the back of his right ear. Presenting a totally different version,
the defense claimed that on November 22, 2001, petitioner went to the house of Bella on
board a tricycle to fetch his child. While driving, he was cursed by brothers Reynaldo and
Rodolfo who were visibly intoxicated. Petitioner ignored the two and just went home. Later,
however, the brothers appeared in front of his house still shouting invectives against him.
Petitioner's brother tried to pacify Rodolfo and Reynaldo who agreed to leave but not
without threatening that they would return to kill him. Petitioner thus asked someone to call
Tayao. Not long after, the brothers came back, entered petitioner's yard, and challenged him
to a gun duel. Petitioner requested Tayao to stop and pacify them but Reynaldo refused to
calm down and instead fired his gun. Hence, as an act of self-defense, petitioner fired back
twice.
On March 12, 2007, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 84, rendered
its Decision2 finding petitioner guilty as charged, viz:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged in
the information, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of six ( 6)
years [of] prision correccional, as minimum[;] to ten (10) years of prision mayor in its medium
[period], as maximum.
SO ORDERED.3
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied in an Order4 dated August 16,
2007.
Undaunted, petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA). In its Decision5 dated February
27, 2009, the CA affirmed in full the RTC's Decision, thus:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing premises, the decision appealed from is hereby
AFFIRMED in its entirety.
SO ORDERED.6
Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration7 thereto was likewise denied in a Resolution8 dated
July 30, 2010.
Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari9 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court where
petitioner imputes upon the CA the following errors:
I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY APPRECIATED THE FACTS AND
EVIDENCE ON RECORD WHEN IT RULED THAT THE ELEMENT OF UNLAWFUL AGGRESSION
WAS NOT SATISFACTORILY PROVEN SINCE 1HE ACCUSED-APPELLANT HAS NOT
SATISFACTORILY SHOWN THAT THE VICTIM/PRIV A TE COMPLAINANT WAS INDEED ARMED
WITH AGUN.
II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY APPRECIATED THE FACTS AND
EVIDENCE ON RECORD WHEN IT RULED THAT GRANTING FOR THE BENEFIT OF ARGUMENT
THAT THERE WAS INDEED UNLAWFUL AGGRESSION, PETITIONER WAS NO LONGER JUSTIFIED
IN FIRING AT THE VICTIM/PRIVATE COMPLAINANT FOR THE SECOND TIME.
III. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOSUL Y APPRECIATED THE FACTS AND
EVIDENCE ON RECORD WHEN IT RULED THAT INTENT TO KILL ON THE PART OF PETITIONER
WAS PRESENT CONSIDERING: (A) THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT ALLEGEDLY RECEIVED TWO
GUNSHOT WOUNDS, AND (B) THE PETITIONER PREVENTED BARANGA Y OFFICIALS FROM
INTERVENING AND HELPING OUT THE WOUNDED PRIVATE COMPLAINANT.10
Our Ruling
The Petition must be denied.
The errors petitioner imputes upon the CA all pertain to "appreciation of evidence" or factual
errors which are not within the province of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.
The Court had already explained in Batistis v. People11 that:
Pursuant to Section 3, Rule 122, and Section 9, Rule 45, of the Rules of Court, the review on
appeal of a decision in a criminal case, wherein the CA imposes a penalty other than death,
reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, is by petition for review on certiorari.
A petition for review on certiorari raises only questions of law. Sec. 1, Rule 45, Rules of Court,
explicitly so provides, viz:
Section I. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. - A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from
a judgment, final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Court
of Tax Appeals, the Regional Trial Court or other courts, whenever authorized by law, may
file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition may
include an application for a writ of preliminary injunction or other provisional remedies and
shall raise only questions of law, which must be distinctly set forth. The petitioner may seek
the same provisional remedies by verified motion filed in the same action or proceeding at
any time during its pendency.
Petitioner's assigned errors, requiring as they do a re-appreciation and reexamination of the
evidence, are evidentiary and factual in nature.12 The Petition must therefore be denied on
this basis because "one, the petition for review thereby violates the limitation of the issues to
only legal questions, and, two, the Court, not being a trier of facts, will not disturb the factual
findings of the CA, unless they were mistaken, absurd, speculative, conflicting, tainted with
grave abuse of discretion, or contrary to the findings reached by the court of origin,"13 which
was not shown to be the case here.
Besides, findings of facts of the RTC, its calibration of the testimonial evidence, its
assessment of the probative weight thereof, as well as its conclusions anchored on the said
findings, are accorded high respect if not conclusive effect when affirmed by the CA,14 as in
this case. After all, the RTC "had the opportunity to observe the witnesses on the stand and
detect if they were telling the truth."15 "To [thus] accord with the established doctrine of
finality and bindingness of the trial court's findings of fact, [the Court shall] not disturb [the]
findings of fact of the RTC, particularly after their affirmance by the CA"16 as petitioner was
not able to sufficiently establish any extraordinary circumstance which merits a departure
from the said doctrine.17
In any event, the Court observes that the CA correctly affirmed the RTC 's ruling that
petitioner is guilty of frustrated homicide and not merely of less serious physical injuries as
the latter insists. As aptly stated by the CA:
In attempted or frustrated homicide, the offender must have the intent to kill the
victim.1âwphi1 If there is no intent to kill on the part of the offender, he is liable for physical
injuries only. Vice-versa, regardless of whether the victim only suffered injuries that would
have healed in nine to thirty days, if intent to kill is sufficiently borne out, the crime
committed is frustrated homicide (Arts. 263-266).
Usually, the intent to kill is shown by the kind of weapon used by the offender and the parts
of the victim's body at which the weapon was aimed, as shown by the wounds inflicted.
Hence, when a deadly weapon, like a bolo, is used to stab the victim in the latter's abdomen,
the intent to kill can be presumed (Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, 13TH ED., P. 431).
It is worth highlighting that the victim received two gunshot wounds in the head. Indeed the
location of the wounds plus the nature of the weapon used are ready indications that the
accused-appellant's objective is not merely to warn or incapacitate a supposed aggressor.
Verily, had the accused-appellant been slightly better with his aim, any of the two bullets
surely would have killed him outright. Also, the intent to kill is further exhibited by the fact
that the accused-appellant even prevented barangay officials from intervening and helping x
x x the bleeding victim. Indeed, the fact that Reynaldo Marquez was miraculously able to live
through the ordeal and sustain only modicum injuries does not mean that the crime ought to
be downgraded from frustrated homicide to less serious physical injuries. After all, as was
mentioned above, what should be determinative of the crime is not the gravity of the
resulting injury but the criminal intent that animated the hand that pulled the trigger. 18
The Court, however, notes that while the penalty imposed upon appellant is also proper,
there is a need to modify the assailed CA Decision in that awards of damages must be made
in favor of the victim Reynaldo.
The RTC and the CA correctly held that actual damages cannot be awarded to Reynaldo due
to the absence of receipts to prove the medical expenses he incurred from the incident.
"Nonetheless, absent competent proof on the actual damages suffered, a party still has the
option of claiming temperate damages, which may be allowed in cases where, from the
nature of the case, definite proof of pecuniary loss cannot be adduced although the court is
convinced that the aggrieved party suffered some pecuniary loss."19 Since it was undisputed
that Reynaldo was hospitalized due to the gunshot wounds inflicted by petitioner, albeit as
observed by the RTC there was no evidence offered as to the expenses he incurred by reason
thereof, Reynaldo is entitled to temperate damages in the amount of P25,000.00. Aside from
this, he is also entitled to moral damages of P25,000.00. These awards of damages are in
accordance with settled jurisprudence.20 An interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum must
also be imposed on the awarded damages to commence from the date of finality of this
Resolution until fully paid.21

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision dated February 27, 2009 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 31084 affirming in its entirety the March 12, 2007 Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 84 in Criminal Case No. 3486-M-2002
convicting petitioner Rogelio Roque of the crime of :frustrated homicide, is AFFIRMED with
the MODIFICATION that the petitioner is ordered to pay the victim Reynaldo Marquez moral
damages and temperate damages in the amount of P25,000,00 each, with interest at the
legal rate 6% per annum from the date of finality of this Resolution until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 178512 November 26, 2014
ALFREDO DE GUZMAN, JR., Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Frustrated homicide requires intent to kill on the part of the offender. Without proof of such
intent, the felony may only be serious physical injuries. Intent to kill may be established
through the overt and external acts and conduct of the offender before, during and after the
assault, or by the nature, location and number of the wounds inflicted on the victim.
The Case
Under review at the instance of the petitioner is the decision promulgated on September 27,
2006,1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed his conviction for frustrated homicide
committed against Alexander Flojo under the judgment rendered on September 10, 2003 by
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 213, in Mandaluyong City in Criminal Case No. 191-
MD.2
Antecedents
The CA summarized the versions of the parties as follows:
x x x [O]n December 24, 1997, at aboutten o’clock in the evening, Alexander Flojo (hereafter
"Alexander") was fetching water below his rented house at 443 Aglipay Street, Old Zaniga St.,
Mandaluyong City when suddenly Alfredo De Guzman (hereafter "Alfredo"), the brother of
his land lady, Lucila Bautista (hereafter "Lucila"), hit him on the nape. Alexander informed
Lucila about what Alfredo did to him. Lucila apologized to Alexander by saying, "Pasensya ka
na Mang Alex" and told the latter to just go up. Alexander obliged and went upstairs. He took
a rest for about two hours. Thereafter, at around 12:00 to 12:15 A.M., Alexander went down
and continued to fetch water. While pouring water into a container, Alfredo suddenly
appeared in front of Alexander and stabbed him on his left face and chest.
Cirilino Bantaya, a son-in-law of Alexander, saw the latter bleeding on the left portion of his
body and begging for help. Alexander then told Cirilino that Alfredo stabbed him. Cirilino
immediately loaded Alexander into his motorcycle (backride) and brought him to the
Mandaluyong City Medical Center. Upon arrival at the hospital, the doctors immediately
rendered medical assistance to Alexander. Alexander stayed in the emergency room of said
hospital for about 30 to 40 minutes. Then, he was brought to the second floor of the said
hospital where he was confined for two days. Thereafter, Alexander was transferred to the
Polymedic General Hospital where he was subjected for (sic) further medical examination.
Alexander sustained two stabbed (sic) wounds. (sic) One of which was on the zygoma, left
side, and aboutone (1) cm. long. The other is on his upper left chest which penetrated the
fourth intercostal space at the proximal clavicular line measuring about two (2) cm. The
second stabbed (sic) wound penetrated the thoracic wall and left lung of the victim which
resulted to blood air (sic) in the thoracic cavity thus necessitating the insertion of a
thoracostomy tube toremove the blood. According to Dr. Francisco Obmerga, the physician
who treated the victim at the Mandaluyong City Medical Center, the second wound was fatal
and could have caused Alexander’s death without timely medical intervention. (Tsn, July 8,
1998, p.8).
On the other hand, Alfredo denied having stabbed Alexander. According to him, on
December 25,1997 at around midnight, he passed by Alexander who was, then, fixing a
motorcycle. At that point, he accidentally hit Alexander’s back, causing the latter to throw
invective words against him. He felt insulted, thus, a fistfight ensued between them. They
even rolled on the ground. Alfredo hit Alexander on the cheek causing blood to ooze from
the latter’s face.3
The RTC convicted the petitioner, decreeing thusly:
PRESCINDING (sic) FROM THE FOREGOING
CONSIDERATIONS, the court finds accused Alfredo De Guzman y Agkis a.k.a., "JUNIOR," guilty
beyond reasonable doubt for (sic) the crime of FRUSTRATED HOMICIDE defined and
penalized in Article 250 of the Revised Penal Code and in the absence of any modifying
circumstance, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of Six (6) Months
and One (1) day of PRISION CORR[R]ECCIONAL as MINIMUM to Six (6) Years and One (1) day
of PRISION MAYOR as MAXIMUM.
The accused is further ordered topay the private complainant compensatory damages in the
amount ofP14,170.35 representing the actual pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly
proven.
SO ORDERED.4
On appeal, the petitioner contended that his guilt had not been proved beyond reasonable
doubt; that intent to kill, the critical element of the crime charged, was not established; that
the injuries sustained by Alexander were mere scuffmarks inflicted in the heatof anger during
the fist fight between them; that he did not inflict the stabwounds, insisting that another
person could have inflicted such wounds; and that he had caused only slight physical injuries
on Alexander, for which he should be accordingly found guilty.
Nonetheless, the CA affirmedthe petitioner’s conviction, viz:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The September 10, 2003
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong City, Branch 213, is hereby AFFIRMED in
toto.
SO ORDERED.5
The CA denied the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration on May 2, 2007.6
Issue
Was the petitioner properly found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of frustrated homicide?
Ruling
The appeal lacks merit.
The elements of frustrated homicide are: (1) the accused intended to kill his victim, as
manifested by his use of a deadly weapon in his assault; (2) the victim sustained fatal or
mortal wound but did not die because of timely medical assistance; and (3) noneof the
qualifying circumstances for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, is present.7 Inasmuch as the trial and appellate courts found none of the qualifying
circumstances in murder under Article 248 to be present, we immediately proceed to
ascertain the presence of the two other elements.
The petitioner adamantly denies that intent to kill was present during the fistfight between
him and Alexander.1âwphi1 He claims that the heightened emotions during the fistfight
naturally emboldened both of them, but he maintains that he only inflicted minor abrasions
on Alexander, not the stab wounds that he appeared to have sustained. Hence, he should be
held liable only for serious physical injuries because the intent to kill, the necessary element
to characterize the crime as homicide, was not sufficiently established. He avers that such
intentto kill is the main element that distinguishes the crime of physical injuries from the
crime of homicide; and that the crime is homicide only if the intent to kill is competently
shown.
The essential element in frustrated or attempted homicide is the intent of the offender to kill
the victim immediately before or simultaneously with the infliction of injuries. Intent to kill is
a specific intent that the State must allege in the information, and then prove by either direct
or circumstantial evidence, as differentiated from a general criminal intent, which is
presumed from the commission of a felony by dolo.8 Intent to kill, being a state of mind, is
discerned by the courts only through external manifestations, i.e., the acts and conduct of
the accused at the time of the assault and immediately thereafter. In Rivera v. People,9 we
considered the following factors to determine the presence of intent to kill, namely: (1) the
means used by the malefactors; (2) the nature, location, and number of wounds sustained by
the victim; (3) the conduct of the malefactors before, during, or immediately after the killing
of the victim; and (4) the circumstances under which the crime was committed and the
motives of the accused. We have also considered as determinative factors the motive of the
offender and the words he uttered at the time of inflicting the injuries on the victim.10
Here, both the trial and the appellate court agreed that intent to kill was present. We concur
with them. Contrary to the petitioner’s submission, the wounds sustained by Alexander were
not mere scuffmarks inflicted in the heat of anger or as the result ofa fistfight between them.
The petitioner
wielded and used a knife in his assault on Alexander. The medical records indicate, indeed,
that Alexander sustained two stab wounds, specifically, one on his upper left chest and the
other on the left side of his face. The petitioner’s attack was unprovoked with the knife used
therein causing such wounds, thereby belying his submission, and firmly proving the
presence of intent to kill. There is also to beno doubt about the wound on Alexander’s chest
being sufficient to result into his death were it not for the timely medical intervention.
With the State having thereby shown that the petitioner already performed all the acts of
execution that should produce the felony of homicide as a consequence, but did not produce
it by reason of causes independent of his will, i.e., the timely medical attention accorded to
Alexander, he was properly found guilty of frustrated homicide.
We have no cogent reason to deviate from or to disregard the findings of the trial and
appellate courts on the credibility of Alexander’s testimony. It is not disputed that the
testimony of a single but credible and trustworthy witness sufficed to support the conviction
of the petitioner. This guideline finds more compelling application when the lone witness is
the victim himself whose direct and positive identification of his assailant is almost always
regarded with indubitable credibility, owing to the natural tendency of the victim to seek
justice for himself, and thus strive to remember the face of his assailant and to recall the
manner in which the latter committed the crime.11Moreover, it is significant that the
petitioner’s mere denial of the deadly manner of his attack was contradicted by the credible
physical evidence corroborating Alexander’s statements. Under the circumstances, we can
only affirm the petitioner’s conviction for frustrated homicide. The affirmance of the
conviction notwithstanding, we find the indeterminate penalty of "Six (6) Months and One
(1) day of PRISION CORR[R]ECCIONAL as MINIMUM to Six (6) Years and One (1) day of
PRISION MAYOR as MAXIMUM"12 fixed by the RTC erroneous despite the CA concurring with
the trial court thereon. Under Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, an
indeterminate sentence is imposed on the offender consisting of a maximum term and a
minimum term.13 The maximum term is the penaltyproperly imposed under the Revised
Penal
Code after considering any attending modifying circumstances; while the minimum term is
within the range of the penalty next lower than that prescribed by the Revised Penal Codefor
the offense committed. Conformably with Article 50 of the Revised Penal Code,14 frustrated
homicide is punished by prision mayor, which is next lower to reclusion temporal, the penalty
for homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. There being no aggravating or
mitigating circumstances present, however, prision mayorin its medium period – from eight
years and one day to 10 years – is proper. As can be seen, the maximum of six years and one
day of prision mayor as fixed by the RTC and affirmed by the CA was not within the medium
period of prision mayor. Accordingly, the correct indeterminate sentence is four years of
prision correccional, as the minimum, to eight years and one day of prision mayor, as the
maximum.
The RTC and the CA also agreed on limiting the civil liability to the sum of P14,170.35 as In addition, the amounts awarded ascivil liability of the petitioner shall earn interest of 6%
compensatory damages "representing the actual pecuniary loss suffered by [Alexander] as he per annumreckoned from the finality of this decision until full payment by the accused.
has duly proven."15 We need to revise such civil liability in order to conform to the law, the WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on September 27, 2006 finding
Rules of Court and relevant jurisprudence. In Bacolod v. People,16 we emphatically declared petitioner Alfredo De Guzman, Jr. GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of FRUSTRATED
to be "imperative that the courts prescribe the proper penalties when convicting the HOMICIDE, and SENTENCES him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four years of prision
accused, and determine the civil liability to be imposed on the accused, unless there has correccional, as the minimum, to eight years and one day of prision mayor, as the maximum;
been a reservation of the action to recover civil liability or a waiver of its recovery." We ORDERS the petitioner to pay to Alexander Flojo civil indemnity of P30,000.00; moral
explained why in the following manner: damages of P30,000.00; and compensatory damages of Pl4,170.35, plus interest of 6% per
annum on all such awards from the finality of this decision until full payment; and DIRECTS
It is not amiss to stress that both the RTC and the CA disregarded their express mandate the petitioner to pay the costs of suit.
under Section 2, Rule 120 of the Rules of Courtto have the judgment, if it was of conviction,
state: "(1) the legal qualification of the offense constituted by the acts committed by the SO ORDERED.
accused and the aggravating or mitigating circumstances which attended its commission; (2)
the participation of the accused in the offense, whether as principal, accomplice, or
accessory after the fact; (3) the penalty imposed upon the accused; and (4) the civil liability
or damages caused by his wrongful act or omission to be recovered from the accused by the
offended party, if there is any, unless the enforcement of the civil liability by a separate civil
action has been reserved or waived." Their disregard compels us to actas we now do lest the
Court be unreasonably seen as tolerant of their omission. That the Spouses Cogtas did not
themselves seek the correction of the omission by an appeal is no hindrance to this action
because the Court, as the final reviewing tribunal, has not only the authority but also the
duty to correct at any time a matter of law and justice.

We also pointedly remind all trial and appellate courts to avoid omitting reliefs that the
parties are properly entitled to by law or in equity under the established facts. Their
judgments will not be worthy of the name unless they thereby fully determine the rights and
obligations of the litigants. It cannot be otherwise, for only by a full determination of such
rights and obligations would they be true to the judicial office of administering justice and
equity for all. Courts should then be alert and cautious in their rendition of judgments of
conviction in criminal cases. They should prescribe the legal penalties, which is what the
Constitution and the law require and expect them to do. Their prescription of the wrong
penalties will be invalid and ineffectual for being done without jurisdiction or in manifest
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. They should also determine and
set the civil liability ex delicto of the accused, in order to do justice to the complaining victims
who are always entitled to them. The Rules of Court mandates them to do so unless the
enforcement of the civil liability by separate actions has been reserved or waived.17

Alexander as the victim in frustrated homicide suffered moral injuries because the offender
committed violence that nearly took away the victim’s life. "Moral damages include physical
suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings,
moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary
computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the
defendant's wrongful act for omission."18 Indeed, Article 2219, (1), of the Civil Code expressly
recognizes the right of the victim in crimes resulting in physical injuries. 19 Towards that end,
the Court, upon its appreciation of the records, decrees that P30,000.00 is a reasonable
award of moral damages.20 In addition, AAA was entitled to recover civil indemnity
of P30,000.00.21 Both of these awards did not require allegation and proof.
Esmeraldo Rivera vs People of the Philippines

480 SCRA 188 – Criminal Law – Mens Rea – Criminal Intent – Intent to Kill

Victim, Ruben went to a nearby store to buy food. Accused Rivera was in the same vicinity.
When he saw Ruben, Rivera mocked Ruben for being jobless and dependent on his wife. This
caused an exchange of heated words between the two.
The next day when Ruben and his daughter were once again buying food, Rivera and two
other men attacked Ruben. The two men punched and mauled Ruben while Rivera, on the
other hand, got a hollowblock and hit Rubens’s head with it three times. Rivera and his
companions left only when the policemen arrived.

Ruben was brought to the hospital and it was said that he suffered only slight and superficial
wounds but were it not for the arrival of the policemen, Ruben would have died.

TC- the three are guilty of frustrated murder.

CA- affirmed the decision of the trial court, with modifications.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was INTENT TO KILL.

HELD: Yes. There is intent to kill in the case at bar.

The pieces of evidence required to prove intent to kill are as follows:
1.means used by the malefactors
2.nature,location and number of wounds sustained by the victim
3. conduct of the malefactor before, during and after the commission of the crime,
4.circumstances under which the crime was committed
5. motive of the accused.

Applying the elements to the case at bar, the means or weapons used by RIVERA is a piece of
hollow block.

As to nature, location and number of wounds, Rivera inflicted injuries on the head of Ruben
three times.

Conduct before during and after the commission of the crime, Rivera was angry at Ruben
because of the circumstances that transpired between Ruben and him…
G.R. No. L-5272 March 19, 1910 which he kept under his pillow, the defendant struck out wildly at the intruder who, it
afterwards turned out, was his roommate, Pascual. Pascual ran out upon the porch and fell
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, down on the steps in a desperately wounded condition, followed by the defendant, who
vs. immediately recognized him in the moonlight. Seeing that Pascual was wounded, he called to
AH CHONG, defendant-appellant. his employers who slept in the next house, No. 28, and ran back to his room to secure
bandages to bind up Pascual's wounds.
Gibb & Gale, for appellant.
Attorney-General Villamor, for appellee. There had been several robberies in Fort McKinley not long prior to the date of the incident
just described, one of which took place in a house in which the defendant was employed as
cook; and as defendant alleges, it was because of these repeated robberies he kept a knife
CARSON, J.:
under his pillow for his personal protection.

The evidence as to many of the essential and vital facts in this case is limited to the testimony
The deceased and the accused, who roomed together and who appear to have on friendly
of the accused himself, because from the very nature of these facts and from the
and amicable terms prior to the fatal incident, had an understanding that when either
circumstances surrounding the incident upon which these proceedings rest, no other
returned at night, he should knock at the door and acquiant his companion with his identity.
evidence as to these facts was available either to the prosecution or to the defense. We
Pascual had left the house early in the evening and gone for a walk with his friends, Celestino
think, however, that, giving the accused the benefit of the doubt as to the weight of the
Quiambao and Mariano Ibañez, servants employed at officers' quarters No. 28, the nearest
evidence touching those details of the incident as to which there can be said to be any doubt,
house to the mess hall. The three returned from their walk at about 10 o'clock, and Celestino
the following statement of the material facts disclose by the record may be taken to be
and Mariano stopped at their room at No. 28, Pascual going on to his room at No. 27. A few
substantially correct:
moments after the party separated, Celestino and Mariano heard cries for assistance and
upon returning to No. 27 found Pascual sitting on the back steps fatally wounded in the
The defendant, Ah Chong, was employed as a cook at "Officers' quarters, No. 27," Fort Mc stomach, whereupon one of them ran back to No. 28 and called Liuetenants Jacobs and
Kinley, Rizal Province, and at the same place Pascual Gualberto, deceased, was employed as Healy, who immediately went to the aid of the wounded man.
a house boy or muchacho. "Officers' quarters No. 27" as a detached house situates some 40
meters from the nearest building, and in August, 19087, was occupied solely as an officers'
The defendant then and there admitted that he had stabbed his roommate, but said that he
mess or club. No one slept in the house except the two servants, who jointly occupied a small
did it under the impression that Pascual was "a ladron" because he forced open the door of
room toward the rear of the building, the door of which opened upon a narrow porch
their sleeping room, despite defendant's warnings.
running along the side of the building, by which communication was had with the other part
of the house. This porch was covered by a heavy growth of vines for its entire length and
height. The door of the room was not furnished with a permanent bolt or lock, and No reasonable explanation of the remarkable conduct on the part of Pascuals suggests itself,
occupants, as a measure of security, had attached a small hook or catch on the inside of the unless it be that the boy in a spirit of mischief was playing a trick on his Chinese roommate,
door, and were in the habit of reinforcing this somewhat insecure means of fastening the and sought to frightened him by forcing his way into the room, refusing to give his name or
door by placing against it a chair. In the room there was but one small window, which, like say who he was, in order to make Ah Chong believe that he was being attacked by a robber.
the door, opened on the porch. Aside from the door and window, there were no other
openings of any kind in the room. Defendant was placed under arrest forthwith, and Pascual was conveyed to the military
hospital, where he died from the effects of the wound on the following day.
On the night of August 14, 1908, at about 10 o'clock, the defendant, who had received for
the night, was suddenly awakened by some trying to force open the door of the room. He sat The defendant was charged with the crime of assassination, tried, and found guilty by the
up in bed and called out twice, "Who is there?" He heard no answer and was convinced by trial court of simple homicide, with extenuating circumstances, and sentenced to six years
the noise at the door that it was being pushed open by someone bent upon forcing his way and one day presidio mayor, the minimum penalty prescribed by law.
into the room. Due to the heavy growth of vines along the front of the porch, the room was
very dark, and the defendant, fearing that the intruder was a robber or a thief, leaped to his At the trial in the court below the defendant admitted that he killed his roommate, Pascual
feet and called out. "If you enter the room, I will kill you." At that moment he was struck just Gualberto, but insisted that he struck the fatal blow without any intent to do a wrongful act,
above the knee by the edge of the chair which had been placed against the door. In the in the exercise of his lawful right of self-defense.
darkness and confusion the defendant thought that the blow had been inflicted by the
person who had forced the door open, whom he supposed to be a burglar, though in the
Article 8 of the Penal Code provides that —
light of after events, it is probable that the chair was merely thrown back into the room by
the sudden opening of the door against which it rested. Seizing a common kitchen knife
 The following are not delinquent and are therefore exempt from criminal liability:
xxx xxx xxx
4 He who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided there are the following
attendant circumstances:
(1) Illegal aggression.
(2) Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it.
(3) Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
Under these provisions we think that there can be no doubt that defendant would be entitle
to complete exception from criminal liability for the death of the victim of his fatal blow, if
the intruder who forced open the door of his room had been in fact a dangerous thief or
"ladron," as the defendant believed him to be. No one, under such circumstances, would
doubt the right of the defendant to resist and repel such an intrusion, and the thief having
forced open the door notwithstanding defendant's thrice-repeated warning to desist, and his
threat that he would kill the intruder if he persisted in his attempt, it will not be questioned
that in the darkness of the night, in a small room, with no means of escape, with the thief
advancing upon him despite his warnings defendant would have been wholly justified in
using any available weapon to defend himself from such an assault, and in striking promptly,
without waiting for the thief to discover his whereabouts and deliver the first blow.
But the evidence clearly discloses that the intruder was not a thief or a "ladron." That neither
the defendant nor his property nor any of the property under his charge was in real danger
at the time when he struck the fatal blow. That there was no such "unlawful aggression" on
the part of a thief or "ladron" as defendant believed he was repelling and resisting, and that
there was no real "necessity" for the use of the knife to defend his person or his property or
the property under his charge.
The question then squarely presents it self, whether in this jurisdiction one can be held
criminally responsible who, by reason of a mistake as to the facts, does an act for which he
would be exempt from criminal liability if the facts were as he supposed them to be, but
which would constitute the crime of homicide or assassination if the actor had known the
true state of the facts at the time when he committed the act. To this question we think
there can be but one answer, and we hold that under such circumstances there is no criminal
liability, provided always that the alleged ignorance or mistake or fact was not due to
negligence or bad faith.
In broader terms, ignorance or mistake of fact, if such ignorance or mistake of fact is
sufficient to negative a particular intent which under the law is a necessary ingredient of the
offense charged (e.g., in larcerny, animus furendi; in murder, malice; in crimes intent)
"cancels the presumption of intent," and works an acquittal; except in those cases where the
circumstances demand a conviction under the penal provisions touching criminal negligence;
and in cases where, under the provisions of article 1 of the Penal Code one voluntarily
committing a crime or misdeamor incurs criminal liability for any wrongful act committed by
him, even though it be different from that which he intended to commit. (Wharton's Criminal
Law, sec. 87 and cases cited; McClain's Crim. Law, sec. 133 and cases cited; Pettit vs. S., 28
Tex. Ap., 240; Commonwealth vs. Power, 7 Met., 596; Yates vs. People, 32 N.Y., 509;
Isham vs. State, 38 Ala., 213; Commonwealth vs. Rogers, 7 Met., 500.)
The general proposition thus stated hardly admits of discussion, and the only question
worthy of consideration is whether malice or criminal intent is an essential element or
ingredient of the crimes of homicide and assassination as defined and penalized in the Penal
Code. It has been said that since the definitions there given of these as well as most other
crimes and offense therein defined, do not specifically and expressly declare that the acts
constituting the crime or offense must be committed with malice or with criminal intent in
order that the actor may be held criminally liable, the commission of the acts set out in the
various definitions subjects the actor to the penalties described therein, unless it appears
that he is exempted from liability under one or other of the express provisions of article 8 of
the code, which treats of exemption. But while it is true that contrary to the general rule of
legislative enactment in the United States, the definitions of crimes and offenses as set out in
the Penal Code rarely contain provisions expressly declaring that malice or criminal intent is
an essential ingredient of the crime, nevertheless, the general provisions of article 1 of the
code clearly indicate that malice, or criminal intent in some form, is an essential requisite of
all crimes and offense therein defined, in the absence of express provisions modifying the
general rule, such as are those touching liability resulting from acts negligently or
imprudently committed, and acts done by one voluntarily committing a crime or
misdemeanor, where the act committed is different from that which he intended to commit.
And it is to be observed that even these exceptions are more apparent than real, for "There
is little distinction, except in degree, between a will to do a wrongful thing and indifference
whether it is done or not. Therefore carelessness is criminal, and within limits supplies the
place of the affirmative criminal intent" (Bishop's New Criminal Law, vol. 1, s. 313); and,
again, "There is so little difference between a disposition to do a great harm and a disposition
to do harm that one of them may very well be looked upon as the measure of the other.
Since, therefore, the guilt of a crime consists in the disposition to do harm, which the
criminal shows by committing it, and since this disposition is greater or less in proportion to
the harm which is done by the crime, the consequence is that the guilt of the crime follows
the same proportion; it is greater or less according as the crime in its own nature does
greater or less harm" (Ruth. Ints. C. 18, p. 11); or, as it has been otherwise stated, the thing
done, having proceeded from a corrupt mid, is to be viewed the same whether the
corruption was of one particular form or another.
Article 1 of the Penal Code is as follows:
Crimes or misdemeanors are voluntary acts and ommissions punished by law.
Acts and omissions punished by law are always presumed to be voluntarily unless
the contrary shall appear.
 An person voluntarily committing a crime or misdemeanor shall incur criminal
liability, even though the wrongful act committed be different from that which he
had intended to commit.
The celebrated Spanish jurist Pacheco, discussing the meaning of the word "voluntary" as
used in this article, say that a voluntary act is a free, intelligent, and intentional act, and
roundly asserts that without intention (intention to do wrong or criminal intention) there can
be no crime; and that the word "voluntary" implies and includes the words "con malicia,"
which were expressly set out in the definition of the word "crime" in the code of 1822, but
omitted from the code of 1870, because, as Pacheco insists, their use in the former code was
redundant, being implied and included in the word "voluntary." (Pacheco, Codigo Penal, vol.
1, p. 74.)
Viada, while insisting that the absence of intention to commit the crime can only be said to
exempt from criminal responsibility when the act which was actually intended to be done
was in itself a lawful one, and in the absence of negligence or imprudence, nevertheless
admits and recognizes in his discussion of the provisions of this article of the code that in
general without intention there can be no crime. (Viada, vol. 1, p. 16.) And, as we have
shown above, the exceptions insisted upon by Viada are more apparent than real.
Silvela, in discussing the doctrine herein laid down, says:
In fact, it is sufficient to remember the first article, which declared that where
there is no intention there is no crime . . . in order to affirm, without fear of
mistake, that under our code there can be no crime if there is no act, an act which
must fall within the sphere of ethics if there is no moral injury. (Vol. 2, the Criminal
Law, folio 169.)
And to the same effect are various decisions of the supreme court of Spain, as, for example in
its sentence of May 31, 1882, in which it made use of the following language:
It is necessary that this act, in order to constitute a crime, involve all the malice
which is supposed from the operation of the will and an intent to cause the injury
which may be the object of the crime.
And again in its sentence of March 16, 1892, wherein it held that "considering that, whatever
may be the civil effects of the inscription of his three sons, made by the appellant in the civil
registry and in the parochial church, there can be no crime because of the lack of the
necessary element or criminal intention, which characterizes every action or ommission
punished by law; nor is he guilty of criminal negligence."
And to the same effect in its sentence of December 30, 1896, it made use of the following
language:
. . . Considering that the moral element of the crime, that is, intent or malice or
their absence in the commission of an act defined and punished by law as criminal,
is not a necessary question of fact submitted to the exclusive judgment and
decision of the trial court.
That the author of the Penal Code deemed criminal intent or malice to be an essential
element of the various crimes and misdemeanors therein defined becomes clear also from
an examination of the provisions of article 568, which are as follows:
He who shall execute through reckless negligence an act that, if done with malice,
would constitute a grave crime, shall be punished with the penalty of arresto
mayor in its maximum degree, to prision correccional in its minimum degrees if it
shall constitute a less grave crime.
He who in violation of the regulations shall commit a crime through simple
imprudence or negligence shall incur the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium
and maximum degrees.
In the application of these penalties the courts shall proceed according to their
discretion, without being subject to the rules prescribed in article 81.
The provisions of this article shall not be applicable if the penalty prescribed for the
crime is equal to or less than those contained in the first paragraph thereof, in
which case the courts shall apply the next one thereto in the degree which they
may consider proper.
The word "malice" in this article is manifestly substantially equivalent to the words "criminal
intent," and the direct inference from its provisions is that the commission of the acts
contemplated therein, in the absence of malice (criminal intent), negligence, and
imprudence, does not impose any criminal liability on the actor.
The word "voluntary" as used in article 1 of the Penal Code would seem to approximate in
meaning the word "willful" as used in English and American statute to designate a form of
criminal intent. It has been said that while the word "willful" sometimes means little more
than intentionally or designedly, yet it is more frequently understood to extent a little further
and approximate the idea of the milder kind of legal malice; that is, it signifies an evil intent
without justifiable excuse. In one case it was said to mean, as employed in a statute in
contemplation, "wantonly" or "causelessly;" in another, "without reasonable grounds to
believe the thing lawful." And Shaw, C. J., once said that ordinarily in a statute it means "not
merely `voluntarily' but with a bad purpose; in other words, corruptly." In English and the
American statutes defining crimes "malice," "malicious," "maliciously," and "malice
aforethought" are words indicating intent, more purely technical than "willful" or willfully,"
but "the difference between them is not great;" the word "malice" not often being
understood to require general malevolence toward a particular individual, and signifying
rather the intent from our legal justification. (Bishop's New Criminal Law, vol. 1, secs. 428
and 429, and cases cited.)
But even in the absence of express words in a statute, setting out a condition in the
definition of a crime that it be committed "voluntarily," willfully," "maliciously" "with malice
aforethought," or in one of the various modes generally construed to imply a criminal intent,
we think that reasoning from general principles it will always be found that with the rare
exceptions hereinafter mentioned, to constitute a crime evil intent must combine with an
act. Mr. Bishop, who supports his position with numerous citations from the decided cases,
thus forcely present this doctrine:
In no one thing does criminal jurisprudence differ more from civil than in the rule
as to the intent. In controversies between private parties the quo animo with which
a thing was done is sometimes important, not always; but crime proceeds only
from a criminal mind. So that —
There can be no crime, large or small, without an evil mind. In other words,
punishment is the sentence of wickedness, without which it can not be. And
neither in philosophical speculation nor in religious or mortal sentiment would any
people in any age allow that a man should be deemed guilty unless his mind was
so. It is therefore a principle of our legal system, as probably it is of every other,
that the essence of an offense is the wrongful intent, without which it can not
exists. We find this doctrine confirmed by —
Legal maxims. — The ancient wisdom of the law, equally with the modern, is
distinct on this subject. It consequently has supplied to us such maxims as Actus
non facit reum nisi mens sit rea, "the act itself does not make man guilty unless his
intention were so;" Actus me incito factus non est meus actus, "an act done by me
against my will is not my act;" and others of the like sort. In this, as just said,
criminal jurisprudence differs from civil. So also —
Moral science and moral sentiment teach the same thing. "By reference to the
intention, we inculpate or exculpate others or ourselves without any respect to the
happiness or misery actually produced. Let the result of an action be what it may,
we hold a man guilty simply on the ground of intention; or, on the dame ground,
we hold him innocent." The calm judgment of mankind keeps this doctrine among
its jewels. In times of excitement, when vengeance takes the place of justice, every
guard around the innocent is cast down. But with the return of reason comes the
public voice that where the mind is pure, he who differs in act from his neighbors
does not offend. And —
In the spontaneous judgment which springs from the nature given by God to man,
no one deems another to deserve punishment for what he did from an upright
mind, destitute of every form of evil. And whenever a person is made to suffer a
punishment which the community deems not his due, so far from its placing an evil
mark upon him, it elevates him to the seat of the martyr. Even infancy itself
spontaneously pleads the want of bad intent in justification of what has the
appearance of wrong, with the utmost confidence that the plea, if its truth is
credited, will be accepted as good. Now these facts are only the voice of nature
uttering one of her immutable truths. It is, then, the doctrine of the law, superior
to all other doctrines, because first in nature from which the law itself proceeds,
that no man is to be punished as a criminal unless his intent is wrong. (Bishop's
New Criminal Law, vol. 1, secs. 286 to 290.)
Compelled by necessity, "the great master of all things," an apparent departure from this
doctrine of abstract justice result from the adoption of the arbitrary rule that Ignorantia juris
non excusat ("Ignorance of the law excuses no man"), without which justice could not be
administered in our tribunals; and compelled also by the same doctrine of necessity, the
courts have recognized the power of the legislature to forbid, in a limited class of cases, the
doing of certain acts, and to make their commission criminal without regard to the intent of
the doer. Without discussing these exceptional cases at length, it is sufficient here to say that
the courts have always held that unless the intention of the lawmaker to make the
commission of certain acts criminal without regard to the intent of the doer is clear and
beyond question the statute will not be so construed (cases cited in Cyc., vol. 12, p. 158,
notes 76 and 77); and the rule that ignorance of the law excuses no man has been said not to
be a real departure from the law's fundamental principle that crime exists only where the
mind is at fault, because "the evil purpose need not be to break the law, and if suffices if it is
simply to do the thing which the law in fact forbids." (Bishop's New Criminal Law, sec. 300,
and cases cited.)
But, however this may be, there is no technical rule, and no pressing necessity therefore,
requiring mistake in fact to be dealt with otherwise that in strict accord with the principles of
abstract justice. On the contrary, the maxim here is Ignorantia facti excusat ("Ignorance or
mistake in point of fact is, in all cases of supposed offense, a sufficient excuse"). (Brown's
Leg. Max., 2d ed., 190.)
Since evil intent is in general an inseparable element in every crime, any such mistake of fact
as shows the act committed to have proceeded from no sort of evil in the mind necessarily
relieves the actor from criminal liability provided always there is no fault or negligence on his
part; and as laid down by Baron Parke, "The guilt of the accused must depend on the
circumstances as they appear to him." (Reg. vs. Thurborn, 1 Den. C., 387; P. vs.Anderson, 44
Cal.., 65; P. vs. Lamb, 54 Barb., 342; Yates vs. P., 32 N. Y., 509; Patterson vs. P., 46 Barb., 625;
Reg.vs. Cohen, 8 Cox C. C., 41; P. vs. Miles, 55 Cal., 207, 209; Nalley vs. S., 28 Tex. Ap., 387.)
That is to say, the question as to whether he honestly, in good faith, and without fault or
negligence fell into the mistake is to be determined by the circumstances as they appeared
to him at the time when the mistake was made, and the effect which the surrounding
circumstances might reasonably be expected to have on his mind, in forming the intent,
criminal or other wise, upon which he acted.
If, in language not uncommon in the cases, one has reasonable cause to believe the
existence of facts which will justify a killing — or, in terms more nicely in accord
with the principles on which the rule is founded, if without fault or carelessness he
does believe them — he is legally guiltless of the homicide; though he mistook the
facts, and so the life of an innocent person is unfortunately extinguished. In other
words, and with reference to the right of self-defense and the not quite
harmonious authorities, it is the doctrine of reason and sufficiently sustained in
adjudication, that notwithstanding some decisions apparently adverse, whenever a
man undertakes self-defense, he is justified in acting on the facts as they appear to
 him. If, without fault or carelessness, he is misled concerning them, and defends
himself correctly according to what he thus supposes the facts to be the law will
not punish him though they are in truth otherwise, and he was really no occassion
for the extreme measures. (Bishop's New Criminal Law, sec. 305, and large array of
cases there cited.)
The common illustration in the American and English textbooks of the application of this rule
is the case where a man, masked and disguised as a footpad, at night and on a lonely road,
"holds up" his friends in a spirit of mischief, and with leveled pistol demands his money or his
life, but is killed by his friend under the mistaken belief that the attack is a real one, that the
pistol leveled at his head is loaded, and that his life and property are in imminent danger at
the hands of the aggressor. No one will doubt that if the facts were such as the slayer
believed them to be he would be innocent of the commission of any crime and wholly
exempt from criminal liability, although if he knew the real state of the facts when he took
the life of his friend he would undoubtedly be guilty of the crime of homicide or
assassination. Under such circumstances, proof of his innocent mistake of the facts
overcomes the presumption of malice or criminal intent, and (since malice or criminal intent
is a necessary ingredient of the "act punished by law" in cases of homicide or assassination)
overcomes at the same time the presumption established in article 1 of the code, that the
"act punished by law" was committed "voluntarily."
Parson, C.J., in the Massachusetts court, once said:
If the party killing had reasonable grounds for believing that the person slain had a
felonious design against him, and under that supposition killed him, although it
should afterwards appear that there was no such design, it will not be murder, but
it will be either manslaughter or excusable homicide, according to the degree of
caution used and the probable grounds of such belief. (Charge to the grand jury in
Selfridge's case, Whart, Hom., 417, 418, Lloyd's report of the case, p.7.)
In this case, Parker, J., charging the petit jury, enforced the doctrine as follows:
A, in the peaceable pursuit of his affairs, sees B rushing rapidly toward him, with an
outstretched arms and a pistol in his hand, and using violent menaces against his
life as he advances. Having approached near enough in the same attitude, A, who
has a club in his hand, strikes B over the head before or at the instant the pistol is
discharged; and of the wound B dies. It turns out the pistol was loaded with powder
only, and that the real design of B was only to terrify A. Will any reasonable man
say that A is more criminal that he would have been if there had been a bullet in
the pistol? Those who hold such doctrine must require that a man so attacked
must, before he strikes the assailant, stop and ascertain how the pistol is loaded —
a doctrine which would entirely take away the essential right of self-defense. And
when it is considered that the jury who try the cause, and not the party killing, are
to judge of the reasonable grounds of his apprehension, no danger can be
supposed to flow from this principle. (Lloyd's Rep., p. 160.)
To the same effect are various decisions of the supreme court of Spain, cited by Viada, a few
of which are here set out in full because the facts are somewhat analogous to those in the
case at bar.
QUESTION III. When it is shown that the accused was sitting at his hearth, at night,
in company only of his wife, without other light than reflected from the fire, and
that the man with his back to the door was attending to the fire, there suddenly
entered a person whom he did not see or know, who struck him one or two blows,
producing a contusion on the shoulder, because of which he turned, seized the
person and took from his the stick with which he had undoubtedly been struck, and
gave the unknown person a blow, knocking him to the floor, and afterwards
striking him another blow on the head, leaving the unknown lying on the floor, and
left the house. It turned out the unknown person was his father-in-law, to whom
he rendered assistance as soon as he learned his identity, and who died in about six
days in consequence of cerebral congestion resulting from the blow. The accused,
who confessed the facts, had always sustained pleasant relations with his father-in-
law, whom he visited during his sickness, demonstrating great grief over the
occurrence. Shall he be considered free from criminal responsibility, as having
acted in self-defense, with all the circumstances related in paragraph 4, article 8, of
the Penal Code? The criminal branch of the Audiencia of Valladolid found that he
was an illegal aggressor, without sufficient provocation, and that there did not
exists rational necessity for the employment of the force used, and in accordance
with articles 419 and 87 of the Penal Code condemned him to twenty months of
imprisonment, with accessory penalty and costs. Upon appeal by the accused, he
was acquitted by the supreme court, under the following sentence: "Considering,
from the facts found by the sentence to have been proven, that the accused was
surprised from behind, at night, in his house beside his wife who was nursing her
child, was attacked, struck, and beaten, without being able to distinguish with
which they might have executed their criminal intent, because of the there was no
other than fire light in the room, and considering that in such a situation and when
the acts executed demonstrated that they might endanger his existence, and
possibly that of his wife and child, more especially because his assailant was
unknown, he should have defended himself, and in doing so with the same stick
with which he was attacked, he did not exceed the limits of self-defense, nor did he
use means which were not rationally necessary, particularly because the
instrument with which he killed was the one which he took from his assailant, and
was capable of producing death, and in the darkness of the house and the
consteration which naturally resulted from such strong aggression, it was not given
him to known or distinguish whether there was one or more assailants, nor the
arms which they might bear, not that which they might accomplish, and
considering that the lower court did not find from the accepted facts that there
existed rational necessity for the means employed, and that it did not apply
paragraph 4 of article 8 of the Penal Code, it erred, etc." (Sentence of supreme
court of Spain, February 28, 1876.) (Viada, Vol. I, p. 266.) .
QUESTION XIX. A person returning, at night, to his house, which was situated in a
retired part of the city, upon arriving at a point where there was no light, heard the
voice of a man, at a distance of some 8 paces, saying: "Face down, hand over you
 money!" because of which, and almost at the same money, he fired two shots from adopted by him to defend himself from the imminent danger which he believe threatened
his pistol, distinguishing immediately the voice of one of his friends (who had his person and his property and the property under his charge.
before simulated a different voice) saying, "Oh! they have killed me," and
hastening to his assistance, finding the body lying upon the ground, he cried, The judgment of conviction and the sentence imposed by the trial court should be reversed,
"Miguel, Miguel, speak, for God's sake, or I am ruined," realizing that he had been and the defendant acquitted of the crime with which he is charged and his bail bond
the victim of a joke, and not receiving a reply, and observing that his friend was a exonerated, with the costs of both instance de oficio. So ordered.
corpse, he retired from the place. Shall he be declared exempt in toto from
responsibility as the author of this homicide, as having acted in just self-defense
under the circumstances defined in paragraph 4, article 8, Penal Code? The criminal
branch of the Audiencia of Malaga did not so find, but only found in favor of the
accused two of the requisites of said article, but not that of the reasonableness of
the means employed to repel the attack, and, therefore, condemned the accused
to eight years and one day of prison mayor, etc. The supreme court acquitted the
accused on his appeal from this sentence, holding that the accused was acting
under a justifiable and excusable mistake of fact as to the identity of the person
calling to him, and that under the circumstances, the darkness and remoteness,
etc., the means employed were rational and the shooting justifiable. (Sentence
supreme court, March 17, 1885.) (Viada, Vol. I, p. 136.)

QUESTION VI. The owner of a mill, situated in a remote spot, is awakened, at night,
by a large stone thrown against his window — at this, he puts his head out of the
window and inquires what is wanted, and is answered "the delivery of all of his
money, otherwise his house would be burned" — because of which, and observing
in an alley adjacent to the mill four individuals, one of whom addressed him with
blasphemy, he fired his pistol at one the men, who, on the next morning was found
dead on the same spot. Shall this man be declared exempt from criminal
responsibility as having acted in just self-defense with all of the requisites of law?
The criminal branch of the requisites of law? The criminal branch of
the Audiencia of Zaragoza finds that there existed in favor of the accused a majority
of the requisites to exempt him from criminal responsibility, but not that of
reasonable necessity for the means, employed, and condemned the accused to
twelve months of prision correctional for the homicide committed. Upon appeal,
the supreme court acquitted the condemned, finding that the accused, in firing at
the malefactors, who attack his mill at night in a remote spot by threatening
robbery and incendiarism, was acting in just self-defense of his person, property,
and family. (Sentence of May 23, 1877). (I Viada, p. 128.)

A careful examination of the facts as disclosed in the case at bar convinces us that the
defendant Chinaman struck the fatal blow alleged in the information in the firm belief that
the intruder who forced open the door of his sleeping room was a thief, from whose assault
he was in imminent peril, both of his life and of his property and of the property committed
to his charge; that in view of all the circumstances, as they must have presented themselves
to the defendant at the time, he acted in good faith, without malice, or criminal intent, in the
belief that he was doing no more than exercising his legitimate right of self-defense; that had
the facts been as he believed them to be he would have been wholly exempt from criminal
liability on account of his act; and that he can not be said to have been guilty of negligence or
recklessness or even carelessness in falling into his mistake as to the facts, or in the means
John Eric Loney vs People of the Philippines MP-it is a violation of the special laws

Criminal Law – Mala In Se vs Mala Prohibita 5. AS TO INTENT

Marcopper Mining has been storing mine tailings from its operations. At the base of the pit, MI-intent is material
there is a drainage that leads to two rivers.
MP-intent is not material
Marcopper was charged with violation of 3 special laws and reckless imprudence resulting in
damage to property. 6. AS TO MORAL

It is the contention of marcopper that the violations of the special laws are absorbed in MI- involves moral turpitude
reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property.
MP- does not involve moral tupitude
ISSUE: Whether or not crimes mala inse are absorbed in crimes mala prohibita.
7. AS TO CIRCUMSTANCES
HELD: No. crimes mala inse are not absorbed in crimes mala prohibita.
MI- taken into consideration
Distinctions of mala inse (MI) vs mala prohibita (MP):
MP-not taken into consideration
*my mnemonics are PEGVIMC*

1. AS TO PERFORMANCE

MI-taken into consideration

MP- not taken into consideration

2. AS TO EXECUTION

MI-taken into consideration

MP-not taken into consideration

3. AS TO GOOD FAITH

MI-it is a valid defense

MP-not a valid defense

4. AS TO VIOLATION

MI-it is a violation of the RPC

Arsenia Garcia vs Court of Appeals

484 SCRA 617 – Criminal Law – Felonies – Mala In Se vs Mala Prohibita Crimes – Defense of
Good Faith

In 1995, Aquilino Pimentel, Jr., ran for the senatorial elections.

Meanwhile, in Alaminos, Pangasinan, Arsenia Garcia was one of the designated election
officers. Garcia was accused by Pimentel of violating the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987.
Pimentel alleged that Garcia decreased Pimentel’s vote by 5,000 votes.

The trial court found Garcia guilty. On appeal, Garcia invoked that the trial court erred in
ruling that her defense of good faith was not properly appreciated. She averred that due to
the workload given to her during said elections, she got fatigued and that caused the error in
the tabulation of Pimentel’s votes.

Pimentel argued that the Electoral Reforms Law is a special law hence it is a malum
prohibitum law and therefore, good faith is not a defense.

ISSUE: Whether or not the alleged violation of Garcia of the Electoral Reforms Law is a
malum prohibitum.

HELD: No. Generally, mala in se crimes refer to those felonies in violation of the Revised
Penal Code. However, it must be noted that mala in se are crimes which are inherently
immoral. Hence, even if the crime is punished by a special law, if it is inherently immoral,
then it is still a crime mala in se.

In this case, the said violation of the Electoral Reforms Law is a mala in se crime because it is
inherently immoral to decrease the vote of a candidate. Note also that what is being
punished is the intentional decreasing of a candidate’s votes and not those arising from
errors and mistakes. Since a violation of this special law is a malum in se, good faith can be
raised as a defense.

However, Garcia’s defense of good faith was not proven. Facts show that the decreasing of
Pimentel’s vote was not due to error or mistake. It was shown that she willingly handled
certain duties which were not supposed to be hers to perform. That’s a clear sign that she
facilitated the erroneous entry.
Amado Alvarado Garcia vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 171951 28 August 2009

FACTS:

The Fozes were having a drinking spree at their apartment when Chy asked them to quiet
down to which Garcia commented that Chy was being arrogant and that one day he would
lay a hand on him. Two days later, the group decided to drink at a store owned by Chy’s
sister, Esquibel. Chy was about to come out of his house and upon being summoned, Garcia
suddenly punched him. Chy continued to parry the blows and when he found an opportunity
to escape, he ran home and phoned his wife to call the police regarding the mauling. He also
complained of difficulty in breathing. He was found later unconscious on the kitchen floor,
salivating.

Cause of death is heart attack to which Garcia appeals that the injuries he caused were not as
violent in nature as to have caused the death of Chy. Garcia pleaded not guilty to the crime
of homicide. The autopsy doctor confirms that the boxing and the striking of the bottle beer
on the victim could not have caused any direct physical effect to cause the heart attack if the
victim’s heart is healthy. What could have caused said heart attack is the victims emotions
concerning the violence inflicted upon him.

ISSUE:
Whether the circumstance of having no intention to commit so grave a wrong as that
committed should be appreciated

RULING:

The circumstance that the petitioner did not intend so grave an evil as the death of the victim
does not exempt him from criminal liability. Since he deliberately committed an act
prohibited by law, said condition simply mitigates his guilt in accordance with Article 13(3) of
the Revised Penal Code. Nevertheless, said circumstance must be appreciated in favour of
the petitioner. The fact that the physical injuries he inflicted on the victim could not have
naturally and logically caused the actual death of the victim, if the latter’s heart is in good
condition.

Considering this mitigating circumstance, imposable penalty should be in the minimum

period, that is, reclusion temporal in its minimum period. Applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, the trial court properly imposed upon petitioner an indeterminate penalty of
ten (10) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of
reclusion temporal as maximum.
Urbano v. IAC
Facts:
On October 23, 1980, petitioner Filomeno Urbano was on his way to his ricefield. He found
the place where he stored palay flooded with water coming from the irrigation canal. Urbano
went to the elevated portion to see what happened, and there he saw Marcelino Javier and
Emilio Efre cutting grass. Javier admitted that he was the one who opened the canal. A
quarrel ensued, and Urbano hit Javier on the right palm with his bolo, and again on the leg
with the back of the bolo. On October 27, 1980, Urbano and Javier had an amicable
settlement. Urbano paid P700 for the medical expenses of Javier. On November 14, 1980,
Urbano was rushed to the hospital where he had lockjaw and convulsions. The doctor found
the condition to be caused by tetanus toxin which infected the healing wound in his palm. He
died the following day. Urbano was charged with homicide and was found guilty both by the
trial court and on appeal by the Court of Appeals. Urbano filed a motion for new trial based
on the affidavit of the Barangay Captain who stated that he saw the deceased catching fish in
the shallow irrigation canals on November 5. The motion was denied; hence, this petition.
Issue:
The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and logical consequence
of the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused. And since we are dealing with a criminal
conviction, the proof that the accused caused the victim's death must convince a rational
mind beyond reasonable doubt. The medical findings, however, lead us to a distinct
possibility that the infection of the wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later
or between the time Javier was wounded to the time of his death. The infection was,
therefore, distinct and foreign to the crime.
There is a likelihood that the wound was but the remote cause and its subsequent infection,
for failure to take necessary precautions, with tetanus may have been the proximate cause of
Javier's death with which the petitioner had nothing to do. "A prior and remote cause cannot
be made the be of an action if such remote cause did nothing more than furnish the
condition or give rise to the occasion by which the injury was made possible, if there
intervened between such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct, successive,
unrelated, and efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury would not have
happened but for such condition or occasion. If no danger existed in the condition except
because of the independent cause, such condition was not the proximate cause. And if an
independent negligent act or defective condition sets into operation the instances which
result in injury because of the prior defective condition, such subsequent act or condition is
the proximate cause."

Whether the wound inflicted by Urbano to Javier was the proximate cause of the latter’s
death

Held:

A satisfactory definition of proximate cause is... "that cause, which, in natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without
which the result would not have occurred."And more comprehensively, "the proximate legal
cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other
events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a
close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain
immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first
acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an
ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment
of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom."

If the wound of Javier inflicted by the appellant was already infected by tetanus germs at the
time, it is more medically probable that Javier should have been infected with only a mild
cause of tetanus because the symptoms of tetanus appeared on the 22nd dayafter the
hacking incident or more than 14 days after the infliction of the wound. Therefore, the onset
time should have been more than six days. Javier, however, died on the second day from
theonset time. The more credible conclusion is that at the time Javier's wound was inflicted
by the appellant, the severe form of tetanus that killed him was not yet present.
Consequently, Javier's wound could have been infected with tetanus after the hacking
incident. Considering the circumstance surrounding Javier's death, his wound could have
been infected by tetanus 2 or 3 or a few but not 20 to 22 days before he died.
People of the Philippines vs Orlito Villacorta

657 SCRA 270 – Criminal Law – Criminal Liability – Proximate Cause – Efficient Intervening
Cause

On January 22, 2002, Danilo Cruz went to a sari-sari store to buy bread. Out of nowhere,
Orlito Villacorta appeared and thereafter stabbed the left part of the body of Cruz with a
sharpened bamboo stick. After that, Villacorta fled.

Cruz was helped by bystanders and he was brought to a nearby hospital where he was
treated as out-patient. He was discharged on the same day but on February 14, 2002, or 21
days after the stabbing incident, he returned to the same hospital where he was treated for
severe tetanus. The next day on February 15, 2002, Cruz died. The medical report states that
Cruz died of tetanus infection secondary to stab wound.

The trial court as well as the Court of Appeals convicted Villacorta for murder.

ISSUE: Whether or not Villacorta is guilty of murder.

HELD: No. In this case, the proximate cause of the death is not the stabbing done by
Villacorta upon Cruz. There was an efficient intervening cause which appeared between the
time of the stabbing and the time of the death of Cruz.

In explaining this, the Supreme Court took into consideration the fact that severe tetanus
(the kind of tetanus which causes immediate death) has an incubation period of 14 days or
less. In this case, the stabbing made by Vilalcorta could not have caused the tetanus infection
as 22 days already lapsed from the time of the stabbing until the date of death of Cruz.
Something else caused the tetanus other than the stabbing – in short, Cruz acquired the
tetanus 14 days or less before February 15, 2003 and not on the date of stabbing.

The court explained further:

The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and logical consequence of
the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused. And since we are dealing with a criminal
conviction, the proof that the accused caused the victim’s death must convince a rational
mind beyond reasonable doubt. The medical findings, however, lead us to a distinct possibility
that the infection of the wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or
between the time [Cruz] was wounded to the time of his death. The infection was, therefore,
distinct and foreign to the crime.

Villacorta is however guilty of slight physical injuries based on the facts. Neither is he guilty of
attempted nor frustrated murder, his intent to kill was not proven by the prosecution.
G.R. No. 205228 July 15, 2015
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff and Appellee,
vs.
ROLLY ADRIANO y SAMSON, LEAN ADRIANO @ DENDEN, ABBA SANTIAGO y ADRIANO,
JOHN DOE AND PETER DOE, Accused,
ROLLY ADRIANO y SAMSON, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
This is an appeal of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated 30 May 2011 in CA-G.R. CR-
HC No. 04028, which affirmed the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court dated 7 April 2009,
convicting accused-appellant Rolly Adriano y Santos (Adriano) for the crime of Homicide
(Crim. Case No. 13159-07) for the killing of Ofelia Bulanan (Bulanan) and for the crime of
Murder (Crim. Case No. 13160-07) for the killing of Danilo Cabiedes (Cabiedes) in "People of
the Philippines v. Rolly Adriano y Sales."
Adriano was charged with two (2) counts of Murder. The two (2) sets of Information read:
Crim. Case No. 13159-07
On or about March 13, 2007, around 8:00 o'clock (sic) in the morning, in Malapit, San Isidro,
Nueva Ecija, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conniving together, with intent to kill, treachery and abuse of superior strength, willfully shot
several times with assorted firearms Ofelia Bulanan, hitting her on the different parts of her
body, resulting in her death to the damage of her heirs.3
Crim. Case No. 13160-07
On or about March 13, 2007, around 8:00 o'clock (sic) in the morning, in Malapit, San Isidro,
Nueva Ecija, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conniving together, with intent to kill, treachery and abuse of superior strength, willfully shot
several times with assorted firearms Danilo Cabiedes, hitting him on the different parts of his
body, resulting in his death to the damage of his heirs.4
Version of the Prosecution:
On 13 March 2007, at around 8:00 a.m., Police Officer 1 Matthew Garabiles (POI Garabiles)
and P02 Alejandro Santos (P02 Santos), in civilian clothes, were on their way to Camp Olivas,
Pampanga, riding a motorcycle along Olongapo-Gapan National Road.5
While they were at Barangay Malapit San Isidro, Nueva Ecija, a speeding blue Toyota Corolla
(Corolla) with plate no. WHK 635, heading towards the same direction, overtook them and
the car in front of them, a maroon Honda CRV (CRY) with plate no. CTL 957.6
When the Corolla reached alongside the CRV, the passenger on the front seat of the Corolla
shot the CRV and caused the CRV to swerve and fall in the canal in the road embankment.
Four (4) armed men then suddenly alighted the Corolla and started shooting at the driver of
the CRV, who was later identified as Cabiedes. During the shooting, a bystander, Bulanan,
who was standing near the road embankment, was hit by a stray bullet. The four armed men
hurried back to the Corolla and immediately left the crime scene. PO 1 Garabiles and P02
Santos followed the Corolla but lost track of the latter.7
Later, both Cabiedes and Bulanan died from fatal gunshot wounds: Cabiedes was
pronounced dead on arrival (DOA) at the Good Samaritan General Hospital due to three (3)
gunshot wounds on the left side of his chest while Bulanan died on the spot after being shot
in the head.
During the investigation, the police learned that the Corolla was registered under the name
of Antonio V. Rivera (Rivera). Upon inquiry, Rivera admitted that he is the owner of the
Corolla but clarified that the Corolla is one of the several cars he owns in his car rental
business, which he leased to Adriano. Later that day, Adriano arrived at Rivera's shop with
the Corolla, where he was identified by P02 Santos and PO 1 Garabiles as one of the four
assailants who alighted from the passenger's seat beside the driver of the Corolla and shot
Cabiedes. He was immediately arrested and brought to the Provincial Special Operations
Group (PSOG) headquarters in Cabanatuan City.8
In examining the crime scene, the Nueva Ecija Provincial Crime Laboratory Office recovered
one (1) deformed fired bullet from a .45 caliber firearm and five (5) cartridges from a .45
caliber firearm.9
Version of the Defense
Adriano testified that on 13 March 2007, at about 6:00 a.m., at the time of the incident, he
was at his house in Dolores, Magalang, Pampanga, washing the clothes of his child. After
doing the laundry, he took his motorcycle to a repair shop and left it there.10
At about 8:00 a.m., Adriano went to the house of his friend, Ruben Mallari (Mallari), to ask
for a lighter spring needed to repair his motorcycle. After having coffee in Mallari' s house,
Adriano went home and brought his child to his mother. On his way to his mother's house,
he met his brother-in-law, Felix Aguilar Sunga (Sunga). After leaving his child at his mother's
house, Adriano went to the cockpit arena to watch cockfights, where he saw his friend,
Danilo Dizon (Dizon). After the fights, he left the cockpit at about 2:00 p.m. and went home
and took a rest.11
After resting, Adriano picked-up his motorcycle and proceeded to a store and stayed there.
At around 5 :00 p.m., he went back home. After a while, he received a call from a certain
Boyet Garcia (Garcia), who borrowed the Corolla from him, which he rented from Rivera.12
At 8:00 p.m., he met with Garcia to get the Corolla back. After dropping Garcia off, Adriano
went to Rivera to return the Corolla, where he was arrested by police officers, thrown inside
the Corolla's trunk, and brought to a place where he was tortured. 13
The other defense's witnesses, Lucita Tapnio (Tapnio), Mallari, Sunga, and Dizon
corroborated Adriano's testimony.14
When arraigned, Adriano pleaded not guilty. The other accused, Lean Adriano alias
"Denden," Abba Santiago y Adriano, John Doe, and Peter Doe remained at large.
During trial, the prosecution presented eight (8) witnesses: (1) PO1 Garabiles, (2) P02 Santos,
(3) Police Senior Inspector Roger V. Sebastian, (4) SP02 Alejandro Eduardo, (5) P02 Jay
Cabrera, (6) P03 Antonio dela Cruz, (7) Adelaida Cabiedes, widow of Cabiedes, and (8) Ricky
Flores.
On the other hand, the defense presented Adriano, Tapnio, Sunga, Mallari, and Dizon as
witnesses.
Ruling of the Lower Courts
After trial, the RTC convicted Adriano. The RTC rejected Adriano's defense of alibi on the
ground that it was not supported by clear and convincing evidence. According to the RTC,
Adriano's alibi cannot prevail over the testimonies of credible witnesses, who positively
identified Adriano as one of the perpetrators of the crime. Also, contrary to the allegations of
the defense, the RTC gave full credence to the testimony of prosecution witnesses, POI
Garabiles and P02 Santos. The RTC determined that the defense failed to show proof that will
show or indicate that PO1 Garabiles and P02 Santos were impelled by improper motives to
testify against Adriano. The RTC found as proven the assessment of damages against the
accused. Thus did the RTC order Adriano to pay the heirs of Cabiedes the amount
of P222,482.00 based on the following: (1) One Hundred Thousand Pesos (Pl00,000.00) as
funeral expenses; (2) Sixty Thousand Pesos (P60,000.00) as expenses for the food served
during the burial; (3) Twelve Thousand Four Hundred Eighty Two Pesos (1!12,482.00) as
groceries used and served during the wake; and Sixty Thousand Pesos (P60,000.00) for the
parts and service repair of the CRV.15
The dispositive portion of the R TC Decision dated 7 April 2009 reads:
WHEREFORE, finding accused ROLLY ADRIANO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Murder, as
charged, for the death of Danilo Cabiedes, there being no aggravating or mitigating
circumstance that attended the commission of the crime, he is hereby sentenced to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Accused Rolly Adriano is also ordered to indemnify the
heirs of Danilo Cabiedes in the amount of Php 50,000.00 and to pay the sum of Php
222,482.00 as actual damages.
And finding ROLLY ADRIANO also guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Homicide, as charged,
for the death of Ofelia Bulanan, likewise, there being no aggravating or mitigating
circumstance that attended the commission of the offense, he is further sentenced to suffer
an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from Eight (8) years and One (1) day of prision
mayor medium, as minimum, to Seventeen (17) years and Four (4) months of reclusion
temporal medium, as maximum, and to indemnify the heirs of Ofelia Bulanan in the amount
of Php 50,000.00.16
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, Adriano alleged that the R TC erred when it failed to
appreciate his defense of alibi, as well as the testimonies of the other defense's witnesses.
Adriano contended that the RTC erred when it gave credence to the testimony of the
prosecution witnesses which are inconsistent and contradictory. In detail, Adriano referred
to the following particulars: 1) whether the culprits started shooting when the victim's
vehicle was still in motion; 2) which side of the vehicle did the shooters alight from; 3) the
identity of the culprit who triggered the fatal shot; 4) whether the trip of PO1 Garabiles and
P02 Santos going to Camp Olivas, Pampanga was official business; 5) the precise distance of
the assailants' vehicle from that of the two (2) eyewitnesses; and 6) the precise minutes of
the shooting incident.
The Court of Appeals rejected Adriano's attempt to becloud the testimony of the prosecution
witnesses. According to the Court of Appeals, the prosecution witnesses' positive
identification of Adriano as one of the perpetrators of the crime cannot be overcome by
minor inconsistencies in their testimony. The Court of Appeals ruled that these trivial
differences in fact constitute signs of veracity.
On the defense of alibi, the Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the R TC that Adriano's
claim that he was in Dolores, Magalang, Pampanga at the time of the incident does not
convince because it was not impossible for Adriano to be physically present at the crime
scene, in Barangay Malapit, San Isidro, Nueva Ecija, which can be reached by car in less than
an hour.17 The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The decision of the Regional Trial Court of Gapan City,
Nueva Ecija, Br. 36, in Crim. Case Nos. 13159-07 and 13160-07 is AFFIRMED subject to the
Modification that the award of Fifty Thousand Pesos (Php50,000.00) as civil indemnity to the
heirs of Danilo Cabiedes is INCREASED to Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (Php75,000.00). In
addition, the Accused-Appellant is ORDERED to pay the heirs of Danilo Cabiedes the amount
of Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (Php75,000.00) as moral damages; and the heirs of Ofelia
Bulanan the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (Php50,000.00) as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.18
Our Ruling
In cases of murder, the prosecution must establish the presence of the following elements:
1. That a person was killed.
2. That the accused killed him.
3. That the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Art. 248.
4. The killing is not parricide or infanticide.
In the case at bar, the prosecution has established the concurrence of the elements of
murder: (1) the fact of death of Cabiedes and Bulanan; (2) the positive identification of
Adriano as one of perpetrators of the crime; and (3) the attendance of treachery as a
qualifying aggravating circumstance and use of firearms and abuse of superior strength as
generic aggravating circumstances.
Death of Cabiedes
The present case is a case of murder by ambush. In ambush, the crime is carried out to
ensure that the victim is killed and at the same time, to eliminate any risk from any possible
defenses or retaliation from the victim—19ambush exemplifies the nature of treachery.
Paragraph 16 of Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) defines treachery as the direct
employment of means, methods, or forms in the execution of the crime against persons
which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to the offender arising
from the defense which the offended party might make. In order for treachery to be properly
appreciated, two elements must be present: (1) at the time of the attack, the victim was not
in a position to defend himself; and (2) the accused consciously and deliberately adopted the
particular means, methods or forms of attack employed by him. 20 The "essence of treachery
is the sudden and unexpected attack by an aggressor on the unsuspecting victim, depriving
the latter of any chance to defend himself and thereby ensuring its commission without risk
of himself."21
Clearly, treachery is present in the case at bar as the victims were indeed defenseless at the
time of the attack. Adriano, together with the other accused, ambushed Cabiedes by
following the unsuspecting victim along the national highway and by surprise, fired multiple
shots at Cabiedes and then immediately fled the crime scene, causing Cabiedes to die of
multiple gunshot wounds. When the Corolla swerved into the CRV's lane, Cabiedes was
forced to swiftly turn to the right and on to the road embankment, finally falling into the
canal where his CRY was trapped, precluding all possible means of defense. There is no other
logical conclusion, but that the orchestrated ambush committed by Adriano, together with
his co-accused, who are still on the loose, was in conspiracy with each other to ensure the
death of Cabiedes and their safety. The means of execution employed was deliberately and
consciously adopted by Adriano so as to give Cabiedes no opportunity to defend himself or to
retaliate.22
All these circumstances indicate that the orchestrated crime was committed with the
presence of the aggravating circumstances of treachery, which absorbs the aggravating
circumstance of abuse of superior strength, and use of firearms. Indeed, Cabiedes had no
way of escaping or defending himself.
Death of Bulanan
We refer back to the settled facts of the case. Bulanan, who was merely a bystander, was
killed by a stray bullet. He was at the wrong place at the wrong time.
Stray bullets, obviously, kill indiscriminately and often without warning, precluding the
unknowing victim from repelling the attack or defending himself. At the outset, Adriano had
no intention to kill Bulanan, much less, employ any particular means of attack. Logically,
Bulanan's death was random and unintentional and the method used to kill her, as she was
killed by a stray a bullet, was, by no means, deliberate. Nonetheless, Adriano is guilty of the
death of Bulanan under Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code,23 pursuant to the doctrine of
aberratio ictus, which imposes criminal liability for the acts committed in violation of law and
for all the natural and logical consequences resulting therefrom. While it may not have been
Adriano's intention to shoot Bulanan, this fact will not exculpate him. Bulanan' s death
caused by the bullet fired by Adriano was the natural and direct consequence of Adriano's
felonious deadly assault against Cabiedes.
As we already held in People v. Herrera24 citing People v. Hilario,25 "[t]he fact that accused
killed a person other than their intended victim is of no moment." Evidently, Adriano's
original intent was to kill Cabiedes. However, during the commission of the crime of murder,
a stray bullet hit and killed Bulanan. Adriano is responsible for the consequences of his act of
shooting Cabiedes. This is the import of Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code. As held in People
v. Herrera citing People v. Ural:
Criminal liability is incurred by any person committing a felony although the wrongful act be
different from that which is intended. One who commits an intentional felony is responsible
for all the consequences which may naturally or logically result therefrom, whether foreseen
or intended or not. The rationale of the rule is found in the doctrine, 'el que es causa de la
causa es causa del mal causado ', or he who is the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil
caused.26
As regards the crime(s) committed, we reiterate our ruling in People v. Nelmida.27 In the
aforesaid case, we ruled that accused-appellants should be convicted not of a complex crime
but of separate crimes of two counts of murder and seven counts of attempted murder as
the killing and wounding of the victims were not the result of a single act but of several
acts.28 The doctrine in Nelmida here is apt and applicable.
In Nelmida, we distinguished the two kinds of complex crime: compound crime, when a
single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, and complex crime proper,
when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other. Moreover, we also made a
distinction that "when various victims expire from separate shots, such acts constitute
separate and distinct crimes,"29 not a complex crime.
As borne by the records, the Nueva Ecija Provincial Crime Laboratory Office recovered six (6)
cartridges of bullets from a .45 caliber firearm. This does not indicate discharge by a single
burst. Rather, separate shots are evidenced. One or more of which, though fired to kill
Cabiedes, killed Bulanan instead. There is thus no complex crime. The felonious acts resulted
in two separate and distinct crimes.
Finally, we ask, may treachery be appreciated in aberratio ictus?
Although Bulanan's death was by no means deliberate, we shall adhere to the prevailing
jurisprudence pronounced in People v. Flora,30 where the Court ruled that treachery may be
appreciated in aberratio ictus. In Flora, the accused was convicted of two separate counts of
murder: for the killing of two victims, Emerita, the intended victim, and Ireneo, the victim
killed by a stray bullet. The Court, due to the presence of the aggravating circumstance of
treachery, qualified both killings to murder. The material facts in Flora are similar in the case
at bar. Thus, we follow the Flora doctrine.
Also, contrary to the defense's allegation that Bulanan' s death was not established, a perusal
of the records would reveal that Bulanan's fact of death was duly established as the
prosecution offered in evidence Bulanan's death certificate.31
To recover actual or compensatory damages, basic is the rule that the claimant must
establish with a reasonable degree of certainty, the actual amount of loss by means of
competent proof or the best evidence obtainable.34Documentary evidence support the
award of actual damages in this case. The RTC computed the amount of actual damages
as P222,482.00. However, a perusal of the records reveals that the amount of award of
actual damages should be P232,482.00 as duly supported by official receipts.35 Therefore, we
hereby increase the award of actual damages from P222,482.00 to P232,482.00.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR-HC No. 04028 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Appellant-appellant ROLL Y
ADRIANO y SAMSON is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of MURDER (Criminal Case
No. 13160-07) for the killing of DANILO CABIEDES and is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua. Accused-appellant ROLLY ADRIANO y SAMSON is ordered to
pay the heirs of DANILO CABIEDES the amount of Seventy Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00)
as civil indemnity, Seventy Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00) as moral damages, Thirty
Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) as exemplary damages, and Two Hundred Thirty Two Thousand
Four Hundred Eighty Two Pesos {P232,482.00) as actual damages.
Accused-appellant ROLLY ADRIANO y SAMSON is also found guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of MURDER (Criminal Case No. 13159-07) for the killing of OFELIA BULANAN and
is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Accused-appellant ROLLY
ADRIANO y SAMSON is ordered to pay the heirs of OFELIA BULANAN in the amount of the
amount of Seventy Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00) as civil indemnity, Seventy Five
Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00) as moral damages, Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) as
exemplary damages, and Twenty Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00) as temperate damages in
lieu of actual damages.

On the alibi as defense, time and again, we have ruled alibis like denials, are inherently weak
All monetary awards shall earn interest at the rate of 6o/o per annum from the date of
and unreliable because they can easily be fabricated.32 For alibi to prosper, the accused must
finality until fully paid.
convincingly prove that he was somewhere else at the time when the crime was committed
and that it was physically impossible for him to be at the crime scene.33 In the case at bar,
Adriano claimed he was in Dolores, Magalang, Pampanga at the time of incident. Adriano's SO ORDERED.
claim failed to persuade. As admitted, Dolores, Magalang, Pampanga was only less than an
hour away from the crime scene, Barangay Malapit, San Isidro, Nueva Ecija. Hence, it was not
physically impossible for Adriano to be at the crime scene at the time of the incident.

It is likewise uniform holding that denial and alibi will not prevail when corroborated not by
credible witnesses but by the accused's relatives and friends.1âwphi1 Therefore, the
defense's evidence which is composed of Adriano's relatives and friends cannot prevail over
the prosecution's positive identification of Adriano as one of the perpetrators of the crime.

The penalty for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion perpetua to
death. In the case at bar, as the circumstance of abuse of superior strength concurs with
treachery, the former is absorbed in the latter. There being no aggravating or mitigating
circumstance present, the lower penalty should be imposed, which is reclusion perpetua, in
accordance with Article 63, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code.
People vs. Noel T. Sales GR. No 177218 Rulings:

Facts: Yes. All the elements of the crime of parricide is present in this case.

On September 19, 2002, brothers Noemar and Junior, then nine and eight years old,
respectively, left their home to attend the fluvial procession of Our Lady of Peñafrancia
without the permission of their parents. They did not return home that night. When their Parricide is committed when: (1) a person is killed; (2) the deceased is killed by the accused;
mother, Maria Litan Sales (Maria), looked for them the next day, she found them in the (3) the deceased is the father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or a
nearby Barangay of Magsaysay. Afraid of their father’s rage, Noemar and Junior initially legitimate other ascendant or other descendant, or the legitimate spouse of accused.
refused to return home but their mother prevailed upon them. When the two kids reached
home a furious appellant confronted them. Appellant then whipped them with a stick which
In the case at bench, there is overwhelming evidence to prove the first element, that is, a
was later broken so that he brought his kids outside their house. With Noemar’s and Junior’s
person was killed. There is likewise no doubt as to the existence of the second element that
hands and feet tied to a coconut tree, appellant continued beating them with a thick piece of
the appellant killed the deceased. It is sufficiently established by the positive testimonies of
wood.
Maria and Junior. As to the third element, appellant himself admitted that the deceased is
his child.
When the beating finally stopped, the three walked back to the house, Noemar collapsed and
lost consciousness. Maria then told appellant to call a quack doctor. He left and returned
As to the charge of Physical injuries, the victim himself, Junior testified that he, together with
with one, who told them that they have to bring Noemar to a hospital. Appellant thus
his brother Noemar, were beaten by their father, herein appellant, while they were tied to a
proceeded to take the unconscious Noemar to the junction and waited for a vehicle to take
coconut tree. He recalled to have been hit on his right eye and right leg and to have been
them to a hospital. As there was no vehicle and because another quack doctor they met at
examined by a physician thereafter. Maria corroborated her son’s testimony.
the junction told them that Noemar is already dead, appellant brought his son back to their
house.

Appellant denied that his son died from his beating since no parent could kill his or her
child. He claimed that Noemar died as a result of difficulty in breathing. In fact, he never
complained of the whipping done to him. Besides, appellant recalled that Noemar was
brought to a hospital more than a year before September 2002 and diagnosed with having a
weak heart.

On the other hand, Maria testified that Noemar suffered from epilepsy. Whenever he suffers
from epileptic seizures, Noemar froths and passes out. But he would regain consciousness
after 15 minutes. His seizures normally occur whenever he gets hungry or when scolded.

The trial court charged the accused guilty of parricide and slight physical injuries.

Issue:

Whether or not the accused is guilty of the crimes charged.

INTOD vs CA
FACTS:
• February 4, 1979: Sulpicio Intod, Jorge Pangasian, Santos Tubio and Avelino Daligdig went
to Salvador Mandaya's house and asked him to go with them to the house of Bernardina
Palangpangan. Thereafter, they had a meeting with Aniceto Dumalagan who told Mandaya
that he wanted Palangpangan to be killed because of a land dispute between them and that
Mandaya should accompany them. Otherwise, he would also be killed.
• February 4, 1979 10:00 pm: All of them armed arrived at Palangpangan's house and fired
at Palangpangan's bedroom but there was no one in the room.
• RTC: convicted Intod of attempted murder based on the testimony of the witness
• Factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown to the actor or
beyond his control prevent the consummation of the intended crime – this case
o Ex: man who puts his hand in the coat pocket of another with the intention to steal the
latter's wallet and finds the pocket empty
• United States: where the offense sought to be committed is factually impossible or
accomplishment - attempt to commit a crime; legally impossible of accomplishment - cannot
be held liable for any crime

ISSUE: W/N Intod is guilty attempted murder since it is an impossible crime under Art. 4 (2)

HELD: YES. petition is hereby GRANTED, the decision of respondent Court of Appeals holding
Petitioner guilty of Attempted Murder is hereby MODIFIED. sentences him to suffer the
penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor, together with the accessory penalties provided by
the law, and to pay the costs

• Art. 4(2). CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY. — Criminal Responsibility shall be incurred:

xxx xxx xxx
2. By any person performing an act which would be an offense against persons or property,
were it not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or on account of the
employment of inadequate or ineffectual means.

Petitioner contends that, Palangpangan's absence from her room on the night he and his
companions riddled it with bullets made the crime inherently impossible.

• The Revised Penal Code, inspired by the Positivist School, recognizes in the offender his
formidability to punish criminal tendencies in Art. 4(2)

• Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts, even if completed, would not amount
to a crime

• Legal impossibility would apply to those circumstances where

1. the motive, desire and expectation is to perform an act in violation of the law
2. there is intention to perform the physical act
3. there is a performance of the intended physical act
4. the consequence resulting from the intended act does not amount to a crime
o Ex: The impossibility of killing a person already dead
GEMMA JACINTO vs PEOPLE
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner Gemma T. Jacinto seeking
the reversal of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 23761
dated December 16, 2003, affirming petitioner's conviction of the crime of Qualified Theft,
and its Resolution[2] dated March 5, 2004 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner, along with two other women, namely, Anita Busog de Valencia y Rivera and
Jacqueline Capitle, was charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of CaloocanCity, Branch
131, with the crime of Qualified Theft, allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about and sometime in the month of July 1997, in Kalookan City, Metro Manila,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring
together and mutually helping one another, being then all employees of MEGA FOAM
INTERNATIONAL INC., herein represented by JOSEPH DYHENGCO Y CO, and as such had free
access inside the aforesaid establishment, with grave abuse of trust and confidence reposed
upon them with intent to gain and without the knowledge and consent of the owner thereof,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and deposited in their own
account, Banco De Oro Check No. 0132649 dated July 14, 1997 in the sum of P10,000.00,
representing payment made by customer Baby Aquino to the Mega Foam Int'l. Inc. to the
damage and prejudice of the latter in the aforesaid stated amount of P10,000.00.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]
The prosecution's evidence, which both the RTC and the CA found to be more credible,
reveals the events that transpired to be as follows.
In the month of June 1997, Isabelita Aquino Milabo, also known as Baby Aquino, handed
petitioner Banco De Oro (BDO) Check Number 0132649 postdated July 14, 1997 in the
amount of P10,000.00. The check was payment for Baby Aquino's purchases from Mega
Foam Int'l., Inc., and petitioner was then the collector of Mega Foam. Somehow, the check
was deposited in the Land Bank account of Generoso Capitle, the husband of Jacqueline
Capitle; the latter is the sister of petitioner and the former pricing, merchandising and
inventory clerk of Mega Foam.
Meanwhile, Rowena Ricablanca, another employee of Mega Foam, received a phone call
sometime in the middle of July from one of their customers, Jennifer Sanalila. The customer
wanted to know if she could issue checks payable to the account of Mega Foam, instead of
issuing the checks payable to CASH. Said customer had apparently been instructed by
Jacqueline Capitle to make check payments to Mega Foam payable to CASH. Around that
time, Ricablanca also received a phone call from an employee of Land Bank, Valenzuela
Branch, who was looking for Generoso Capitle. The reason for the call was to inform Capitle
that the subject BDO check deposited in his account had been dishonored.
Ricablanca then phoned accused Anita Valencia, a former employee/collector of Mega
Foam, asking the latter to inform Jacqueline Capitle about the phone call from Land Bank
regarding the bounced check. Ricablanca explained that she had to call and relay the
message through Valencia, because the Capitles did not have a phone; but they could be
reached through Valencia, a neighbor and former co-employee of Jacqueline Capitle at Mega
Foam.
Valencia then told Ricablanca that the check came from Baby Aquino, and instructed
Ricablanca to ask Baby Aquino to replace the check with cash. Valencia also told Ricablanca
of a plan to take the cash and divide it equally into four: for herself, Ricablanca, petitioner
Jacinto and Jacqueline Capitle. Ricablanca, upon the advise of Mega Foam's accountant,
reported the matter to the owner of Mega Foam, Joseph Dyhengco.
Thereafter, Joseph Dyhengco talked to Baby Aquino and was able to confirm that the latter
indeed handed petitioner a BDO check for P10,000.00 sometime in June 1997 as payment for
her purchases from Mega Foam.[4] Baby Aquino further testified that, sometime in July 1997,
petitioner also called her on the phone to tell her that the BDO check bounced. [5] Verification
from company records showed that petitioner never remitted the subject check to Mega
Foam. However, Baby Aquino said that she had already paid Mega Foam P10,000.00 cash in
August 1997 as replacement for the dishonored check.[6]
Generoso Capitle, presented as a hostile witness, admitted depositing the subject BDO check
in his bank account, but explained that the check came into his possession when some
unknown woman arrived at his house around the first week of July 1997 to have the check
rediscounted. He parted with his cash in exchange for the check without even bothering to
inquire into the identity of the woman or her address. When he was informed by the bank
that the check bounced, he merely disregarded it as he didnt know where to find the woman
who rediscounted the check.
Meanwhile, Dyhengco filed a Complaint with the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and
worked out an entrapment operation with its agents. Ten pieces of P1,000.00 bills provided
by Dyhengco were marked and dusted with fluorescent powder by the NBI. Thereafter, the
bills were given to Ricablanca, who was tasked to pretend that she was going along
with Valencia's plan.
On August 15, 2007, Ricablanca and petitioner met at the latter's house. Petitioner, who was
then holding the bounced BDO check, handed over said check to Ricablanca. They originally
intended to proceed to Baby Aquino's place to have the check replaced with cash, but the
plan did not push through. However, they agreed to meet again on August 21, 2007.
On the agreed date, Ricablanca again went to petitioners house, where she met petitioner
and Jacqueline Capitle. Petitioner, her husband, and Ricablanca went to the house of Anita
Valencia; Jacqueline Capitle decided not to go with the group because she decided to go
shopping. It was only petitioner, her husband, Ricablanca and Valencia who then boarded
petitioner's jeep and went on to Baby Aquino's factory. Only Ricablanca alighted from the imprisonment of FIVE (5) YEARS, FIVE (5) MONTHS AND ELEVEN (11) DAYS,as minimum, to
jeep and entered the premises of Baby Aquino, pretending that she was getting cash from SIX (6) YEARS, EIGHT (8) MONTHS AND TWENTY (20) DAYS, as maximum.
Baby Aquino. However, the cash she actually brought out from the premises was
the P10,000.00 marked money previously given to her by Dyhengco. Ricablanca divided the SO ORDERED.[7]
money and upon returning to the jeep, gave P5,000.00 each to Valencia and
petitioner. Thereafter, petitioner and Valencia were arrested by NBI agents, who had been
The three appealed to the CA and, on December 16, 2003, a Decision was promulgated, the
watching the whole time.
dispositive portion of which reads, thus:

Petitioner and Valencia were brought to the NBI office where the Forensic Chemist found
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the trial court is MODIFIED, in that:
fluorescent powder on the palmar and dorsal aspects of both of their hands. This showed
that petitioner and Valencia handled the marked money. The NBI filed a criminal case for
qualified theft against the two and one Jane Doe who was later identified as Jacqueline (a) the sentence against accused Gemma Jacinto stands;
Capitle, the wife of Generoso Capitle.
(b) the sentence against accused Anita Valencia is reduced to 4 months arresto
The defense, on the other hand, denied having taken the subject check and presented the mayor medium.
following scenario.
(c) The accused Jacqueline Capitle is acquitted.
Petitioner admitted that she was a collector for Mega Foam until she resigned on June 30,
1997, but claimed that she had stopped collecting payments from Baby Aquino for quite SO ORDERED.
some time before her resignation from the company. She further testified that, on the day of
the arrest, Ricablanca came to her mothers house, where she was staying at that time, and A Partial Motion for Reconsideration of the foregoing CA Decision was filed only for
asked that she accompany her (Ricablanca) to Baby Aquino's house. Since petitioner was petitioner Gemma Tubale Jacinto, but the same was denied per Resolution datedMarch 5,
going for a pre-natal check-up at the Chinese General Hospital, Ricablanca decided to hitch a 2004.
ride with the former and her husband in their jeep going to Baby Aquino's place
in Caloocan City. She allegedly had no idea why Ricablanca asked them to wait in their jeep,
which they parked outside the house of Baby Aquino, and was very surprised when Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner alone, assailing the
Ricablanca placed the money on her lap and the NBI agents arrested them. Decision and Resolution of the CA. The issues raised in the petition are as follows:

Anita Valencia also admitted that she was the cashier of Mega Foam until she resigned 1. Whether or not petitioner can be convicted of a crime not charged in the information;
on June 30, 1997. It was never part of her job to collect payments from customers.According
to her, on the morning of August 21, 1997, Ricablanca called her up on the phone, asking if 2. Whether or not a worthless check can be the object of theft; and
she (Valencia) could accompany her (Ricablanca) to the house of Baby
Aquino. Valencia claims that she agreed to do so, despite her admission during cross- 3. Whether or not the prosecution has proved petitioner's guilt beyond
examination that she did not know where Baby Aquino resided, as she had never been to
said house. They then met at the house of petitioner's mother, rode the jeep of petitioner
reasonable doubt.[8]
and her husband, and proceeded to Baby Aquino's place. When they arrived at said place,
Ricablanca alighted, but requested them to wait for her in the jeep. After ten minutes,
Ricablanca came out and, to her surprise, Ricablanca gave her money and so she even asked, The petition deserves considerable thought.
What is this? Then, the NBI agents arrested them.
The prosecution tried to establish the following pieces of evidence to constitute the
The trial of the three accused went its usual course and, on October 4, 1999, the RTC elements of the crime of qualified theft defined under Article 308, in relation to Article 310,
rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads: both of the Revised Penal Code: (1) the taking of personal property - as shown by the fact
that petitioner, as collector for Mega Foam, did not remit the customer's check payment to
her employer and, instead, appropriated it for herself; (2) said property belonged to
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds accused Gemma Tubale De Jacinto y
another − the check belonged to Baby Aquino, as it was her payment for purchases she
Latosa, Anita Busog De Valencia y Rivera and Jacqueline Capitle GUILTY beyond reasonable
made; (3) the taking was done with intent to gain this is presumed from the act of unlawful
doubt of the crime of QUALIFIED THEFT and each of them is hereby sentenced to suffer
taking and further shown by the fact that the check was deposited to the bank account of
petitioner's brother-in-law; (4) it was done without the owners consent petitioner hid the
fact that she had received the check payment from her employer's customer by not remitting
the check to the company; (5) it was accomplished without the use of violence or
intimidation against persons, nor of force upon things the check was voluntarily handed to
petitioner by the customer, as she was known to be a collector for the company; and (6) it
was done with grave abuse of confidence petitioner is admittedly entrusted with the
collection of payments from customers.
However, as may be gleaned from the aforementioned Articles of the Revised Penal
Code, the personal property subject of the theft must have some value, as the intention of
the accused is to gain from the thing stolen. This is further bolstered by Article 309, where
the law provides that the penalty to be imposed on the accused is dependent on the value of
the thing stolen.
In this case, petitioner unlawfully took the postdated check belonging to Mega Foam, but the
same was apparently without value, as it was subsequently dishonored. Thus, the question
arises on whether the crime of qualified theft was actually produced.
The Court must resolve the issue in the negative.
Intod v. Court of Appeals[9] is highly instructive and applicable to the present case. In Intod,
the accused, intending to kill a person, peppered the latters bedroom with bullets, but since
the intended victim was not home at the time, no harm came to him. The trial court and the
CA held Intod guilty of attempted murder. But upon review by this Court, he was adjudged
guilty only of an impossible crime as defined and penalized in paragraph 2, Article 4, in
relation to Article 59, both of the Revised Penal Code, because of the factual impossibility of
producing the crime. Pertinent portions of said provisions read as follows:
Article 4(2). Criminal Responsibility. - Criminal responsibility shall be incurred:
xxxx
2. By any person performing an act which would be an offense against persons or
property, were it not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or on account of
the employment of inadequate to ineffectual means. (emphasis supplied)
Article 59. Penalty to be imposed in case of failure to commit the crime because the means
employed or the aims sought are impossible. - When the person intending to commit an
offense has already performed the acts for the execution of the same but nevertheless the
crime was not produced by reason of the fact that the act intended was by its nature one of
impossible accomplishment or because the means employed by such person are essentially
inadequate to produce the result desired by him, the court, having in mind the social danger
and the degree of criminality shown by the offender, shall impose upon him the penalty
of arresto mayor or a fine ranging from 200 to 500 pesos.
Thus, the requisites of an impossible crime are: (1) that the act performed would be an
offense against persons or property; (2) that the act was done with evil intent; and (3) that its
accomplishment was inherently impossible, or the means employed was either inadequate
or ineffectual. The aspect of the inherent impossibility of accomplishing the intended crime
under Article 4(2) of the Revised Penal Code was further explained by the Court in Intod[10] in
this wise:
Under this article, the act performed by the offender cannot produce an offense against
persons or property because: (1) the commission of the offense is inherently impossible of
accomplishment; or (2) the means employed is either (a) inadequate or (b) ineffectual.
That the offense cannot be produced because the commission of the offense is inherently
impossible of accomplishment is the focus of this petition. To be impossible under this
clause, the act intended by the offender must be by its nature one impossible of
accomplishment. There must be either (1) legal impossibility, or (2) physical impossibility of
accomplishing the intended act in order to qualify the act as an impossible crime.
Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts, even if completed, would not amount to
a crime.
xxxx
The impossibility of killing a person already dead falls in this category.
On the other hand, factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown to
the actor or beyond his control prevent the consummation of the intended crime. x x x [11]
In Intod, the Court went on to give an example of an offense that involved factual
impossibility, i.e., a man puts his hand in the coat pocket of another with the intention to
steal the latter's wallet, but gets nothing since the pocket is empty.
Herein petitioner's case is closely akin to the above example of factual impossibility given
in Intod. In this case, petitioner performed all the acts to consummate the crime ofqualified
theft, which is a crime against property. Petitioner's evil intent cannot be denied, as the mere
act of unlawfully taking the check meant for Mega Foam showed her intent to gain or be
unjustly enriched. Were it not for the fact that the check bounced, she would have received
the face value thereof, which was not rightfully hers. Therefore, it was only due to the
extraneous circumstance of the check being unfunded, a fact unknown to petitioner at the
time, that prevented the crime from being produced. The thing unlawfully taken by
petitioner turned out to be absolutely worthless, because the check was eventually
dishonored, and Mega Foam had received the cash to replace the value of said dishonored
check.
The fact that petitioner was later entrapped receiving the P5,000.00 marked money, which
she thought was the cash replacement for the dishonored check, is of no moment. The
Court held in Valenzuela v. People[12] that under the definition of theft in Article 308 of the
Revised Penal Code, there is only one operative act of execution by the actor involved in
theft ─ the taking of personal property of another. Elucidating further, the Court held, thus:
 x x x Parsing through the statutory definition of theft under Article 308, there is one SO ORDERED.
apparent answer provided in the language of the law that theft is already produced upon the
tak[ing of] personal property of another without the latters consent.

xxxx

x x x when is the crime of theft produced? There would be all but certain unanimity in the
position that theft is produced when there is deprivation of personal property due to its
taking by one with intent to gain. Viewed from that perspective, it is immaterial to the
product of the felony that the offender, once having committed all the acts of execution for
theft, is able or unable to freely dispose of the property stolen since the deprivation from the
owner alone has already ensued from such acts of execution. x x x

xxxx

x x x we have, after all, held that unlawful taking, or apoderamiento, is deemed complete
from the moment the offender gains possession of the thing, even if he has no opportunity
to dispose of the same. x x x

x x x Unlawful taking, which is the deprivation of ones personal property, is the element
which produces the felony in its consummated stage. x x x [13]

From the above discussion, there can be no question that as of the time that petitioner took
possession of the check meant for Mega Foam, she had performed all the acts to
consummate the crime of theft, had it not been impossible of accomplishment in this
case. The circumstance of petitioner receiving the P5,000.00 cash as supposed replacement
for the dishonored check was no longer necessary for the consummation of the crime of
qualified theft. Obviously, the plan to convince Baby Aquino to give cash as replacement for
the check was hatched only after the check had been dishonored by the drawee bank. Since
the crime of theft is not a continuing offense, petitioner's act of receiving the cash
replacement should not be considered as a continuation of the theft. At most, the fact that
petitioner was caught receiving the marked money was merely corroborating evidence to
strengthen proof of her intent to gain.

Moreover, the fact that petitioner further planned to have the dishonored check replaced
with cash by its issuer is a different and separate fraudulent scheme. Unfortunately, since
said scheme was not included or covered by the allegations in the Information, the Court
cannot pronounce judgment on the accused; otherwise, it would violate the due process
clause of the Constitution. If at all, that fraudulent scheme could have been another possible
source of criminal liability.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals,
dated December 16, 2003, and its Resolution dated March 5, 2004, areMODIFIED. Petitioner
Gemma T. Jacinto is found GUILTY of an IMPOSSIBLE CRIME as defined and penalized in
Articles 4, paragraph 2, and 59 of the Revised Penal Code, respectively. Petitioner is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of six (6) months of arrresto mayor, and to pay the costs.
People v. Lizada (2003)
Short version: Lizada is being charged with 4 counts of raping his stepdaughter (first rape
occurred when she was about 11 yrs old). TC and CA found him guilty. On appeal to the SC,
Lizada assails the information against him for violating Rule 110, Section 11 of the Revised
Rules on CrimPro because the phrase “on or about August 1998"stated in the information is
too indefinite. SC says the failure to specify the exact date when it was committed does not
make the Information defective because the gravamen of rape is not the date and time of its
commission, but the carnal knowledge under any of the circumstances in RPC 335.
Facts: Lizada is charged with 4 counts of qualified rape, and meting on him the death penalty
for each count. (He is charged of raping a certain Analia Agoo in August, September, October,
and November of 1998) The words used in the complaints were: o First: “sometime in August
1998” o Second: “on or about September 15, 1998” o Third: “on or about October 22, 1998”
o Fourth: “on or about November 5, 1998”
The prosecution: A couple in Bohol had 3 children, one of them being Analia (born 1985).
They separated and the wife left to settle in Manila, took with her the kids, and worked as a
waitress. 1994: Wife met Lizada and lived together. The wife put up a video shop in the
house and sold Avon products door to door. When she was out, her kids tended to the video
shop. 1996: By this year, Analia was about 11 yrs old. One night, Lizada entered Analia’s
room and removed her clothes, had intercourse with her, and threatened to kill her if she
told anyone what happened. This happened in less than an hour. This happened again the
following year. And from 1996-98, Lizada sexually abused Analia twice a week. 1998:
Lizada, wearing only shorts, entered Analia’s room. Analia was not afraid because her
younger brother was just around the house. However, Lizada was still able to have
intercourse with her. The brother passed by Analia’s room and saw Lizada on top of her.
Lizada dismounted and berated the brother, told him to go to his room and sleep. 4 days
later, Analia was in the video shop when Lizada ordered her to go to the sala. She refused bec
no one would tend to the video shop. They fought. When the mother arrived, she sided
with Lizada which prompted Analia to shout “Ayoko na, ayoko na.” Analia then left to
retrieve unreturned tapes. When she got home, the mother asked her what she meant by
“ayoko na” so Analia told her that Lizada had been touching her private parts. They then
went to the police and made a report. She was examined by a doctor who found her hymen
intact. Later on, she also told her mother of the rapes. Analia then executed a “Dagdag na
Salaysay ng Paghahabla” and charged Lizada with rape.
The defense: Lizada denied the rapes, claimed that he loved the children as if they were his
own. He cooked and prepared their food, ironed their school uniforms, and bathed them,
except Analia who was already big. Analia was har headed and often disobeyed him. This
caused Lizada and the mother to quarrel. The relatives of the husband also frequently visited,
which irritated him. He says that the mother probably coached the children so that she
could manage the business and take control of all the property (VHS, 2 TVs, washing
machine, scooter, sala set, CD player, videoke). Also, the mother was exasperated bec he
was unemployed. ------the TC found him guilty of 4 counts of rape in 7 par, no 1, RPC 335.
Death penalty for each count.
Argument of Lizada #1: That his conviction for rape in December 1992 was so remote from
the date (November 1995) alleged in the Information, so that the Nov 1995 could no longer
be considered as being "as near to the actual date at which the offense was committed" as
provided under Section 11, Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure. SC says: No Does
not agree.
In People v. Garcia, Court upheld a conviction for 10 counts of rape based on an information
alleging multiple rape "from November 1990 up to July 21, 1994," a time difference of almost
four years. Such was longer than that involved in this case. In any case, Lizada's failure to
raise a timely objection based on this ground constitutes a waiver of his right to object.
Argument of Lizada #2: The information is defective because the date of the offense "on or
about August 1998" is too indefinite, in violation of Rule 110, Section 11 of the Revised Rules
on CrimPro: "Sec. 11. Date of commission of the offense. — It is not necessary to state in the
complaint or information the precise date the offense was committed except when it is a
material ingredient of the offense. The offense may be alleged to have been committed on a
date as near as possible to the actual date of its commission. " SC does not agree with
Lizada. The precise date of the commission of the rape is not an essential element of the
crime. Failure to specify the exact date when the rape was committed does not make the
Information defective. The reason for this is that the gravamen rape is carnal knowledge
under any of the circumstances enumerated under RPC 335. SC cites People v. Salalima: o
Failure to specify the exact dates or time when the rapes occurred does not make the
information defective because the precise date or is not an element of the offense. o As long
as it is alleged that the offense was committed at any time as near to the actual date when
the offense was committed an information is sufficient. o In previous cases, “before and
until”, “sometime in the year”, “some occasions prior and/or subsequent” have been ruled as
sufficient compliance with Section 11, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on CrimPro So, he
cannot complain that he was deprived of the right to be informed of the nature of the cases
against him and that he was deprived of the opportunity to prepare for his defense
Re: Lizardo’s failure to protest and object When Analia testified how Lizada defiled her
twice a week, Lizada did not protest. Lizada even cross-examined her. The presentation by
the prosecution to prove the charges, without objection by Lizada, constituted a waiver of his
right to object to any perceived infirmity. Also, Lizada did not even file a motion for a bill of
particulars under Rule 116, Section 9 of the Revised Rules on CrimPro before he was
arraigned. So, Lizada was duly arraigned under the Information and entered a plea of not
guilty to the charge without any plaint on the sufficiency of the Information. It was only on
appeal to the SC that he questioned for the first time the sufficiency of the Information. It is
now too late in the day for him to do so. Re: Hymen The fact that Analia remained a virgin
does not preclude her having been raped. She being of tender age, it is possible that the
penetration went only as deep as her labia. o Even, the slightest penetration of the labia by
the male organ constitutes consummated rape o Whether or not the hymen was still intact
has no substantial bearing Re: Criminal liability of Lizada Prosecution proved through the
testimony of Analia that Lizada raped her twice a week in 1998. In 3 criminal cases, Lizada is
guilty only of simple rape. As to the other one, the testimony of Analia and her brother
leads SC to believe Lizada is guilty of attempted rape. Based on the testimony, the brother
was able to interrupt the acts and so there was no introduction of the penis into the vagina.
Judgment set aside. Lizada guilty of simple rape in 3 cases, in the other one attempted rape.
Baleros v. People
G.R. No. 138033 February 22, 2006
Lessons Applicable: Attempted Rape
Laws Applicable: Art. 6
FACTS:
• Martina Lourdes Albano (Malou), a medical student of the University of Sto. Tomas,
stayed at Room 307 with her maid Marvilou.
• December 12 10:30 pm: Malou slept. Her maid Marvilou slept on a folding bed right in
front of her bedroom door.
• December 13, 1991 1:00 am: Chito left the fraternity party with Robert Chan and Alberto
wearing a barong tagalog, with t-shirt inside, with short pants with stripes lent by Perla
Duran and leather shoes.
• December 13, 1991 1:30 am: Chito arrived at the Building wearing a white t-shirt with
fraternity symbols and black shorts with the brand name “Adidas” from a party. He
requested permission from S/G Ferolin to go up to Room 306 leased by Ansbert Co but at
that time only Joseph Bernard Africa was there. Although Chito could not produce the
required written authorization, he let him in because he will be a tenant in the coming
summer break. Joseph was awaken by Chito’s knock so he glanced the alarm clock and let
him. He saw him wearing dark-colored shorts and white T-shirt.
• December 13, 1991 1:50 am: Renato Baleros, Jr. y David (Chito) forcefully covered the
face of Martina Lourdes T. Albano with a piece of cloth soaked in chemical with dizzying
effects. This awakened Malou. She struggled but could not move because she was tightly
held and pinned down on the bed. She kicked him and got her right hand free to squeeze his
sex organ causing him to let her go. She went for the bedroom door and woke up Marvilou.
She also intercommed S/G Ferolin saying: "may pumasok sa kuarto ko pinagtangkaan ako".
Malou proceed to Room 310 where her classmates Christian Alcala, Bernard Baptista,
Lutgardo Acosta and Rommel Montes were staying and seeked help. She saw her bed in a
mess and noticed that her nightdress was stained with blue. Aside from the window with
grills which she had originally left opened, another window inside her bedroom which leads
to Room 306 was now open.
• December 13, 1991 3:30 pm: Christian and his roommates, Bernard and Lutgardo were
asked by the CIS people to look for anything not belonging to them in their Unit when
Rommel Montes went inside and found a grey bag.
o Christian knew right away that it belonged to Chito. It contained white t-shirt with
fraternity symbol, a Black Adidas short pants, a handkerchief , 3 white T-shirts, an underwear
and socks.
• Chito pleaded NOT Guilty
• 13 witnesses including Malou and her classmates, Joseph Bernard Africa, Rommel
Montes, Renato Alagadan and Christian Alcala
o Malou: Chito was her classmate whom he rejected a week before
o Chito: He only slept and at about 6 to 6:30, Joseph told him that something had
happened and asked him to follow him to Room 310 carrying his gray bag and since no one
was there they went to Room 401 where Renato Alagadan was. He left his grey bag at Room
306 the day before.
• handkerchief and Malou’s night dress both contained chloroform, a volatile poison which
causes first degree burn exactly like what Malou sustained on that part of her face where the
chemical-soaked cloth had been pressed
• RTC: guilty of attempted rape
• CA: Affirmed
ISSUE: W/N Chito is guilty of attempted rape
HELD: NO. REVERSED and SET ASIDE. ACQUITTING Renato D. Baleros, Jr. of the charge for
attempted rape. GUILTY of light coercion and is accordingly sentenced to 30 days of arresto
menor and to pay a fine of P200.00, with the accessory penalties thereof and to pay the
costs.
• Under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, rape is committed by a man who has carnal
knowledge or intercourse with a woman under any of the following circumstances: (1) By
using force or intimidation; (2) When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious; and (3) When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.
• Under Article 6, in relation to the aforementioned article of the same code, rape is
attempted when the offender commences the commission of rape directly by overt acts and
does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the crime of rape by reason
of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.
o whether or not the act of the petitioner, i.e., the pressing of a chemical-soaked cloth
while on top of Malou, constitutes an overt act of rape.
o Overt or external act has been defined as some physical activity or deed, indicating the
intention to commit a particular crime, more than a mere planning or preparation, which if
carried out to its complete termination following its natural course, without being frustrated
by external obstacles nor by the voluntary desistance of the perpetrator, will logically and
necessarily ripen into a concrete offense
• Chito was fully clothed and that there was no attempt on his part to undress Malou, let
alone touch her private part
• Verily, while the series of acts committed by the petitioner do not determine attempted
rape, they constitute unjust vexation punishable as light coercion under the second
paragraph of Article 287 of the Revised Penal Code.
o As it were, unjust vexation exists even without the element of restraint or compulsion for
the reason that this term is broad enough to include any human conduct which, although not
productive of some physical or material harm, would unjustly annoy or irritate an innocent
person
o That Malou, after the incident in question, cried while relating to her classmates what she
perceived to be a sexual attack and the fact that she filed a case for attempted rape proved
beyond cavil that she was disturbed, if not distressed
G.R. No. 202867 July 15, 2013
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
REGIE LABIAGA, Appellant.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is an appeal assailing the Decision1 dated 18 October 2011 of the Court of
Appeals-Cebu (CA-Cebu) in CA-G.R. CEB CR-HC No. 01000. The CA-Cebu affirmed with
modification the Joint Decision2 dated 10 March 2008 of the Regional Trial Court of Barotac
Viejo, Iloilo, Branch 66 (RTC), in Criminal Case No. 2001-155) convicting Regie Labiaga alias
"Banok" (appellant) of murder and Criminal Case No. 2002-1777 convicting appellant of
frustrated murder.
The Facts
In Criminal Case No. 2001-1555, appellant, together with a certain Alias Balatong Barcenas
and Cristy Demapanag (Demapanag), was charged with Murder with the Use of Unlicensed
Firearm under an Information3which reads:
That on or about December 23, 2000 in the Municipality of Ajuy, Province of Iloilo,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring, confederating and helping one another, armed with unlicensed firearm, with
deliberate intent and decided purpose to kill, by means of treachery and with evident
premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and
shoot JUDY CONDE alias ‘JOJO’ with said unlicensed firearm, hitting her and inflicting gunshot
wounds on the different parts of her breast which caused her death thereafter.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The same individuals were charged with Frustrated Murder with the Use of Unlicensed
Firearm in Criminal Case No. 2002-1777, under an Information4 which states:
That on or about December 23, 2000 in the Municipality of Ajuy, Province of Iloilo,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring, confederating and helping one another, armed with unlicensed firearm, with
deliberate intent and decided purpose to kill, by means of treachery and with evident
premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and
shoot Gregorio Conde with said unlicensed firearm, hitting him on the posterior aspect,
middle third right forearm 1 cm. In diameter; thereby performing all the acts of execution
which would produce the crime of Murder as a consequence, but nevertheless did not
produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the accused; that is by the timely
and able medical assistance rendered to said Gregorio Conde which prevented his death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Alias Balatong Barcenas remained at large. Both appellant and Demapanag pled not guilty in
both cases and joint trial ensued thereafter. The prosecution presented four witnesses:
Gregorio Conde, the victim in Criminal Case No. 2002-1777; Glenelyn Conde, his daughter;
and Dr. Jeremiah Obañana and Dr. Edwin Jose Figura, the physicians at the Sara District
Hospital where the victims were admitted. The defense, on the other hand, presented
appellant, Demapanag, and the latter’s brother, Frederick.
Version of the prosecution
The prosecution’s version of the facts is as follows: At around 7:00 p.m. on 23 December
2000, Gregorio Conde, and his two daughters, Judy and Glenelyn Conde, were in their home
at Barangay Malayu-an, Ajuy, Iloilo. Thereafter, Gregorio stepped outside. Glenelyn was in
their store, which was part of their house.
Shortly thereafter, appellant, who was approximately five meters away from Gregorio, shot
the latter. Gregorio called Judy for help. When Judy and Glenelyn rushed to Gregorio’s aid,
appellant shot Judy in the abdomen. The two other accused were standing behind the
appellant. Appellant said, "she is already dead," and the three fled the crime scene.
Gregorio and Judy were rushed to the Sara District Hospital. Judy was pronounced dead on
arrival while Gregorio made a full recovery after treatment of his gunshot wound.
Dr. Jeremiah Obañana conducted the autopsy of Judy. His report stated that her death was
caused by "cardiopulmonary arrest secondary to Cardiac Tamponade due to gunshot
wound."5
Dr. Jose Edwin Figura, on the other hand, examined Gregorio after the incident. He found
that Gregorio sustained a gunshot wound measuring one centimeter in diameter in his right
forearm and "abrasion wounds hematoma formation" in his right shoulder.6
Version of the defense
Appellant admitted that he was present during the shooting incident on 23 December 2000.
He claimed, however, that he acted in self-defense. Gregorio, armed with a shotgun,
challenged him to a fight. He attempted to shoot appellant, but the shotgun jammed.
Appellant tried to wrest the shotgun from Gregorio, and during the struggle, the shotgun
fired. He claimed that he did not know if anyone was hit by that gunshot.
Demapanag claimed that at the time of the shooting, he was in D&D Ricemill, which is
approximately 14 kilometers away from the crime scene. This was corroborated by Frederick,
Demapanag’s brother.
The Ruling of the RTC
In its Joint Decision, the RTC acquitted Demapanag due to insufficiency of evidence.
Appellant, however, was convicted of murder and frustrated murder. The dispositive portion
of the Joint Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the court hereby finds the accused Regie Labiaga @
"Banok" GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the Crime of Murder in Crim. Case No. 2001-
1555 and hereby sentences the said accused to reclusion perpetua together with accessory
penalty provided by law, to pay the heirs of Judy CondeP50,000.00 as civil indemnity, without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs.
In Crim. Case No. 2002-1777, the court finds accused Regie Labiaga @ "Banok" GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Frustrated Murder and hereby sentences the said
accused to a prison term ranging from six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as
minimum to ten (10) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum, together with
the necessary penalty provided by law and without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency and to pay the costs.
Accused’s entire period of detention shall be deducted from the penalty herein imposed
when the accused serves his sentence.
For lack of sufficient evidence, accused Cristy Demapanag is acquitted of the crimes charged
in both cases. The Provincial Warden, Iloilo Rehabilitation Center, Pototan, Iloilo is hereby
directed to release accused Cristy Demapanag from custody unless he is being held for some
other valid or lawful cause.
SO ORDERED.7
The Ruling of the CA-Cebu
Appellant impugned the RTC’s Joint Decision, claiming that "the RTC gravely erred in
convicting the appellant of the crime charged despite failure of the prosecution to prove his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt."8 The CA-Cebu, however, upheld the conviction for murder
and frustrated murder.
The CA-Cebu also modified the Joint Decision by imposing the payment of moral and
exemplary damages in both criminal cases. The CA-Cebu made a distinction between the civil
indemnity awarded by the RTC in Criminal Case No. 2001-1555 and the moral damages. The
CA-Cebu pointed out that:
The trial court granted the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity in Criminal Case No.
2001-1555. It did not award moral damages. Nonetheless, the trial court should have
awarded both, considering that they are two different kinds of damages. For death
indemnity, the amount of P50,000.00 is fixed "pursuant to the current judicial policy on the
matter, without need of any evidence or proof of damages. Likewise, the mental anguish of
the surviving family should be assuaged by the award of appropriate and reasonable moral
damages."9
The dispositive portion of the Decision of the CA-Cebu reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DENIED. The Joint Decision dated March 10,
2008 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 66, in Barotac Viejo, Iloilo is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATIONS. The dispositive portion of the said Joint Decision should now read as
follows:
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the court hereby finds the accused Regie Labiaga @
"Banok" GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder in Crim. Case No. 2001-
1555 and hereby sentences the said accused to reclusion perpetua together with the
accessory penalty provided by law, to pay the heirs of Judy Conde P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages andP25,000.00 as exemplary damages, without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs.
In Crim. Case No. 2002-1777 the court finds accused Regie Labiaga @ "Banok" GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Frustrated Murder and hereby sentences the said
accused to suffer the indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of reclusion temporal, as
maximum, together with the accessory penalty provided by law, to pay Gregorio
Conde P25,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages, without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs Accused(’s) entire period
of detention shall be deducted from the penalty herein imposed when the accused serves his
sentence.
For lack of sufficient evidence, accused Cristy Demapanag is acquitted of the crime(s)
charged in both cases. The Provincial Warden, Iloilo Rehabilitation Center, Pototan, Iloilo is
hereby directed to release accused Cristy Demapanag from custody unless he is being held
for some other valid or lawful cause.
SO ORDERED.
SO ORDERED.10
Hence, this appeal.
The Ruling of the Court
Our review of the records of Criminal Case No. 2002-1777 convinces us that appellant is
guilty of attempted murder and not frustrated murder. We uphold appellant’s conviction in
Criminal Case No. 2001-1555 for murder, but modify the civil indemnity awarded in Criminal
Case No. 2001-1555, as well as the award of moral and exemplary damages in both cases.
Justifying circumstance of self-defense
Appellant’s feeble attempt to invoke self-defense in both cases was correctly rejected by the to render the victim defenseless, then treachery may be properly appreciated against the
RTC and the CA-Cebu. This Court, in People v. Damitan,11 explained that: accused.18

When the accused admits killing a person but pleads self-defense, the burden of evidence In the instant case, the Condes were unarmed when they were shot by appellant. The use of
shifts to him to prove by clear and convincing evidence the elements of his defense. a 12-gauge shotgun against two unarmed victims is undoubtedly treacherous, as it denies the
However, appellant’s version of the incident was uncorroborated. His bare and self-serving victims the chance to fend off the offender.
assertions cannot prevail over the positive identification of the two (2) principal witnesses of
the prosecution.12 We note, however, that appellant should be convicted of attempted murder, and not
frustrated murder in Criminal Case No. 2002-1777.
Appellant’s failure to present any other eyewitness to corroborate his testimony and his
unconvincing demonstration of the struggle between him and Gregorio before the RTC lead Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code defines the stages in the commission of felonies:
us to reject his claim of self-defense. Also, as correctly pointed out by the CA-Cebu,
appellant’s theory of self-defense is belied by the fact that:
Art. 6. Consummated, frustrated, and attempted felonies.— Consummated felonies as well
as those which are frustrated and attempted, are punishable.
x x x The appellant did not even bother to report to the police Gregorio’s alleged unlawful
aggression and that it was Gregorio who owned the gun, as appellant claimed. And, when
A felony is consummated when all the elements necessary for its execution and
appellant was arrested the following morning, he did not also inform the police that what
accomplishment are present; and it is frustrated when the offender performs all the acts of
happened to Gregorio was merely accidental.13
execution which would produce the felony as a consequence but which, nevertheless, do not
produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator.
Appellant’s claim that he did not know whether Gregorio was hit when the shotgun
accidentally fired is also implausible.
There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by
overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony
In contrast, we find that the Condes’ account of the incident is persuasive. Both the CA-Cebu by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.
and the RTC found that the testimonies of the Condes were credible and presented in a clear
and convincing manner. This Court has consistently put much weight on the trial court’s
In Serrano v. People,19 we distinguished a frustrated felony from an attempted felony in this
assessment of the credibility of witnesses, especially when affirmed by the appellate
manner:
court.14 In People v. Mangune,15 we stated that:

It is well settled that the evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is a
matter best undertaken by the trial court because of its unique opportunity to observe the
witnesses first hand and to note their demeanor, conduct, and attitude under grilling
examination. These are important in determining the truthfulness of witnesses and in
unearthing the truth, especially in the face of conflicting testimonies. For, indeed, the
emphasis, gesture, and inflection of the voice are potent aids in ascertaining the witness’
credibility, and the trial court has the opportunity to take advantage of these aids. 16
Since the conclusions made by the RTC regarding the credibility of the witnesses were not
tainted with arbitrariness or oversight or misapprehension of relevant facts, the same must
be sustained by this Court.
Attempted and Frustrated Murder
1.) In a frustrated felony, the offender has performed all the acts of execution which should
produce the felony as a consequence; whereas in an attempted felony, the offender merely
commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts and does not perform all the
acts of execution.
2.) In a frustrated felony, the reason for the non-accomplishment of the crime is some cause
independent of the will of the perpetrator; on the other hand, in an attempted felony, the
reason for the non-fulfillment of the crime is a cause or accident other than the offender’s
own spontaneous desistance.20
In frustrated murder, there must be evidence showing that the wound would have been fatal
were it not for timely medical intervention.21 If the evidence fails to convince the court that
the wound sustained would have caused the victim’s death without timely medical attention,
the accused should be convicted of attempted murder and not frustrated murder.

Treachery was correctly appreciated by the RTC and CA-Cebu. A treacherous attack is one in
In the instant case, it does not appear that the wound sustained by Gregorio Conde was
which the victim was not afforded any opportunity to defend himself or resist the
mortal. This was admitted by Dr. Edwin Figura, who examined Gregorio after the shooting
attack.17 The existence of treachery is not solely determined by the type of weapon used. If it
incident:
appears that the weapon was deliberately chosen to insure the execution of the crime, and
Prosecutor Con-El: prision correccional as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as
maximum, and pay P40,000.00 as moral damages and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages. In
Q: When you examined the person of Gregorio Conde, can you tell the court what was the Criminal Case No. 2001-1555, appellant shall pay P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as
situation of the patient when you examined him? moral damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.

A: He has a gunshot wound, but the patient was actually ambulatory and not in distress. SO ORDERED.

xxxx

Court (to the witness)

Q: The nature of these injuries, not serious?

A: Yes, Your Honor, not serious. He has also abrasion wounds hematoma formation at the
anterior aspect right shoulder.22

Since Gregorio’s gunshot wound was not mortal, we hold that appellant should be convicted
of attempted murder and not frustrated murder. Under Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code,
the corresponding penalty for attempted murder shall be two degrees lower than that
prescribed for consummated murder under Article 248, that is, prision correccional in its
maximum period to prision mayor in its medium period. Section 1 of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law provides:

x x x the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence the maximum term
of which shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly
imposed under the rules of the Revised Penal Code, and the minimum which shall be within
the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense.1âwphi1

Thus, appellant should serve an indeterminate sentence ranging from two (2) years, four (4)
months and one (1) day of prision correccional in its medium period to eight (8) years and
one (1) day of prision mayor in its medium period.

Award of damages

In light of recent jurisprudence, we deem it proper to increase the amount of damages

imposed by the lower court in both cases. In Criminal Case No. 2001-1555, this Court hereby
awards P75,000.00 as civil indemnity23 andP30,000.00 as exemplary damages.24 The award
of P50,000.00 as moral damages in the foregoing case is sustained. Appellant is also liable to
pay P40,000.00 as moral damages and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages, in relation to
Criminal Case No. 2002-1777.

WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the 18 October 2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals-Cebu in CA-
G.R. CEB CR-HC No. 01000 with MODIFICATIONS. In Criminal Case No. 2002-1777, we find
that appellant Regie Labiaga is GUILTY of Attempted Murder and shall suffer an
indeterminate sentence ranging from two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of
Valenzuela v. People
Lessons Applicable: frustrated or consummated theft
Laws Applicable: Art. 6
FACTS:
• May 19, 1994 4:30 pm: Aristotel Valenzuela and Jovy Calderon were sighted outside the
Super Sale Club, a supermarket within the ShoeMart (SM) complex along North EDSA, by
Lorenzo Lago, a security guard who was then manning his post at the open parking area of
the supermarket. Lago saw Valenzuela, who was wearing an ID with the mark “Receiving
Dispatching Unit (RDU)” who hauled a push cart with cases of detergent of “Tide” brand and
unloaded them in an open parking space, where Calderon was waiting. He then returned
inside the supermarket and emerged 5 minutes after with more cartons of Tide Ultramatic
and again unloaded these boxes to the same area in the open parking space. Thereafter, he
left the parking area and haled a taxi. He boarded the cab and directed it towards the parking
space where Calderon was waiting. Calderon loaded the cartons of Tide Ultramatic inside the
taxi, then boarded the vehicle. As Lago watched, he proceeded to stop the taxi as it was
leaving the open parking area and asked Valenzuela for a receipt of the merchandise but
Valenzuela and Calderon reacted by fleeing on foot. Lago fired a warning shot to alert his
fellow security guards. Valenzuela and Calderon were apprehended at the scene and the
stolen merchandise recovered worth P12,090.
• Valenzuela, Calderon and 4 other persons were first brought to the SM security office
before they were transferred to the Baler Station II of the Philippine National Police but only
Valenzuela and Calderon were charged with theft by the Assistant City Prosecutor.
• They pleaded not guilty.
• Calderon’s Alibi: On the afternoon of the incident, he was at the Super Sale Club to
withdraw from his ATM account, accompanied by his neighbor, Leoncio Rosulada. As the
queue for the ATM was long, he and Rosulada decided to buy snacks inside the supermarket.
While they were eating, they heard the gunshot fired by Lago, so they went out to check
what was transpiring and when they did, they were suddenly grabbed by a security guard
• Valenzuela’s Alibi: He is employed as a “bundler” of GMS Marketing and assigned at the
supermarket. He and his cousin, a Gregorio Valenzuela, had been at the parking lot, walking
beside the nearby BLISS complex and headed to ride a tricycle going to Pag-asa, when they
saw the security guard Lago fire a shot causing evryon to start running. Then they were
apprehended by Lago.
• RTC: guilty of consummated theft
• CA: Confirmed RTC and rejected his contention that it should only be frustrated theft
since at the time he was apprehended, he was never placed in a position to freely dispose of
the articles stolen.
ISSUE: W/N Valenzuela should be guilty of consummated theft.
HELD: YES. petition is DENIED
• Article 6 defines those three stages, namely the consummated, frustrated and attempted
felonies.
o A felony is consummated “when all the elements necessary for its execution and
accomplishment are present.”
o It is frustrated “when the offender performs all the acts of execution which would
produce the felony as a consequence but which, nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of
causes independent of the will of the perpetrator.”
o It is attempted “when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by
overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony
by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.”
• Each felony under the Revised Penal Code has a:
o subjective phase - portion of the acts constituting the crime included between the act
which begins the commission of the crime and the last act performed by the offender which,
with prior acts, should result in the consummated crime
 if the offender never passes the subjective phase of the offense, the crime is merely
attempted
o objective phase - After that point of subjective phase has been breached
 subjective phase is completely passed in case of frustrated crimes
• the determination of whether a crime is frustrated or consummated necessitates an
initial concession that all of the acts of execution have been performed by the offender
• The determination of whether the felony was “produced” after all the acts of execution
had been performed hinges on the particular statutory definition of the felony.
• “actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea” - ordinarily, evil intent must unite with an
unlawful act for there to be a crime or there can be no crime when the criminal mind is
wanting
• In crimes mala in se, mens rea has been defined before as “a guilty mind, a guilty or
wrongful purpose or criminal intent” and “essential for criminal liability.”
• Statutory definition of our mala in se crimes must be able to supply what the mens rea of
the crime is and overt acts that constitute the crime
• Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code (Elements of Theft):
1. that there be taking of personal property - only one operative act of execution by the
actor involved in theft
2. property belongs to another
3. taking be done with intent to gain - descriptive circumstances
4. taking be done without the consent of the owner - descriptive circumstances
5. taking be accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidation of persons or
force upon things - descriptive circumstances
• Abandoned cases:
o U.S. v. Adiao: failed to get the merchandise out of the Custom House - consummated
theft
o Diño: Military Police inspected the truck at the check point and found 3 boxes of army
rifles - frustrated theft
o Flores: guards discovered that the “empty” sea van had actually contained other
merchandise as well - consummated theft
o Empelis v. IAC: Fled the scene, dropping the coconuts they had seized - frustrated
qualified theft because petitioners were not able to perform all the acts of execution which
should have produced the felony as a consequence
 cannot attribute weight because definition is attempted
• The ability of the actor “to freely dispose of the articles stolen, even if it were only
momentary.”
o We are satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the taking by the petitioner was
completed in this case. With intent to gain, he acquired physical possession of the stolen
cases of detergent for a considerable period of time that he was able to drop these off at a
spot in the parking lot, and long enough to load these onto a taxicab.
• Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, theft cannot have a frustrated stage. Theft can only
be attempted (no unlawful taking) or consummated (there is unlawful taking).
People vs. Arnulfo Chavez Orande

Facts:

Jessica Castro charged the plaintiff Arnulfo Orande for raping her four times between
1994 to 1996 while the former was still a minor (between 9-12 years old). The complainant
contends that all were executed by means of threat and intimidation, threatening her of feat
if she resists. RTC convicted Orande two counts of simple rape, one statutory and one
frustrated. The accused appealed that the court had a grave error on convicting him of
frustrated rape despite the fact that there is no such crime.

Issue:

WON there is a crime of frustrated rape?

Ruling:

The court said no, there is no crime of frustrated rape. In People vs. Orita, it was
reiterated that in the crime of rape, the moment the offender has carnal knowledge of his
victim, he actually attains his purpose and from that moment, all the elements of the crime is
consummated. Since the offender has performed the last act necessary to the crime, there is
nothing more left to be done by the offender. Thus, it is consummated rape. Also, perfect
penetration is not essential in consummating rape, mere or any penetration of the female
organ by the male organ is sufficient. Necessarily, when there is no penetration of the female
organ, the rape is considered attempted because not all acts of execution was performed.
Considering all the elements and manner of execution of the crime of rape and all
jurisprudence on the mater, it is hardly conceivable how the frustrated stage can be
committed. WHEREFORE, the court ruled that the RTC commited an error on convicting
Orande the crime of frustrated rape, for in fact, the rape was consummated. Hence, Orande
should be found guilty of consummated rape rather that frustrated.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
CHRISTOPHER PAREJA y VELASCO, Appellant.
FACTS:
At around 3:30 a.m. of June 16, 2003, AAA was sleeping beside her two-year old nephew,
BBB, on the floor of her sister’s room, when the appellant hugged her and kissed her nape
and neck.5 AAA cried, but the appellant covered her and BBB with a blanket. 6 The appellant
removed AAA’s clothes, short pants, and underwear; he then took off his short pants and
briefs.7 The appellant went on top of AAA, and held her hands. AAA resisted, but the
appellant parted her legs using his own legs, and then tried to insert his penis into her
vagina.8 The appellant stopped when AAA’s cry got louder; AAA kicked the appellant’s upper
thigh as the latter was about to stand up. The appellant put his clothes back on, and
threatened to kill AAA if she disclosed the incident to anyone. Immediately after, the
appellant left the room.9 AAA covered herself with a blanket and cried.10
The prosecution charged the appellant before the RTC with the crime of rape
The RTC convicted the appellant of rape
The CA affirmed the RTC decision. It explained that a slight penetration of the labia by the
male organ is sufficient to constitute rape.
ISSUE:
WON the rape was consummated.
HELD:
The Court ruled in the negative. We find that the prosecution failed to prove the appellant’s
guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of consummated rape. We convict him instead of
attempted rape, as the evidence on record shows the presence of all the elements of this
crime.
From the foregoing, we find it clear that the appellant’s penis did not penetrate, but merely
‘touched’ (i.e.,"naidikit"), AAA’s private part. In fact, the victim confirmed on cross-
examination that the appellant did not succeed in inserting his penis into her vagina.
Significantly, AAA’s Sinumpaang Salaysay24 also disclosed that the appellant was holding the
victim’s hand when he was trying to insert his penis in her vagina. This circumstance –
coupled with the victim’s declaration that she was resisting the appellant’s attempt to insert
his penis into her vagina – makes penile penetration highly difficult, if not improbable.
Significantly, nothing in the records supports the CA’s conclusion that the appellant’s penis
penetrated, however slightly, the victim’s female organ.
Simply put, "rape is consummated by the slightest penile penetration of the labia majora or
pudendum of the female organ."27 Without any showing of such penetration, there can be no
consummated rape; at most, it can only be attempted rape [or] acts of lasciviousness.
, the prosecution failed to present sufficient and convincing evidence to establish the
required penile penetration. AAA’s testimony did not establish that the appellant’s penis
touched the labias or slid into her private part. Aside from AAA’s testimony, no other
evidence on record, such as a medico-legal report, could confirm whether there indeed had
been penetration, however slight, of the victim’s labias. In the absence of testimonial or
physical evidence to establish penile penetration, the appellant cannot be convicted of
consummated rape.
Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, states that there is an attempt when the
offender commenced the commission of the crime directly by overt acts but does not
perform all the acts of execution by reason of some cause or accident other than his own
spontaneous desistance. In People v. Publico,29 we ruled that when the "touching" of the
vagina by the penis is coupled with the intent to penetrate, attempted rape is
committed; otherwise, the crime committed is merely acts of lasciviousness.
In the present case, the appellant commenced the commission of rape by the following overt
acts: kissing AAA’s nape and neck; undressing her; removing his clothes and briefs; lying on
top of her; holding her hands and parting her legs; and trying to insert his penis into her
vagina. The appellant, however, failed to perform all the acts of execution which should
produce the crime of rape by reason of a cause other than his own spontaneous desistance,
i.e., the victim's loud cries and resistance. The totality of the appellant’s acts demonstrated
the unmistakable objective to insert his penis into the victim’s private parts.
"In rape cases, the prosecution bears the primary duty to present its case with clarity and
persuasion, to the end that conviction becomes the only logical and inevitable
conclusion."42 We emphasize that a conviction cannot be made to rest on possibilities;
strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment. In the present case, the
prosecution failed to discharge its burden of proving all the elements of consummated rape.
Norberto Cruz y Bartolome v. People of the Philippines directly infer from them the intention to cause rape as the particular injury.
G.R. No. 166441, October 8, 2014
Bersamin, J.: The intent to penetrate is manifest only through the showing of the penis capable of
consummating the sexual act touching the external genitalia of the female. Without such
FACTS: showing, only the felony of acts of lasciviousness is committed. Petitioner’s embracing and
The petitioner Norberto Cruz was charged with attempted rape and acts of lasciviousness touching the victim’s vagina and breasts did not directly manifest his intent to lie with her.
involving different victims. The Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals found Cruz The lack of evidence showing his erectile penis being in the position to penetrate her when
guilty of both crimes charged, hence, this appeal. he was on top of her deterred any inference about his intent to lie with her. At most, his acts
reflected lewdness and lust for her. The intent to commit rape should not easily be inferred
Norberto and his wife employed AAA and BBB to help them in selling their plastic wares and against the petitioner, even from his own declaration of it, if any, unless he committed overt
glass wares in La Union. Upon reaching the place, they set up their tents to have a place to acts leading to rape.
sleep. Petitioner’s wife and their driver went back to Manila to get more goods. While
sleeping, AAA felt that somebody was on top of her mashing her breast and touching her
private part. Norberto ordered her not to scream or she will be killed. AAA fought back and
Norberto was not able to pursue his lustful desires. AA left the tent to seek for help. When
she returned to their tent, she saw Norberto touching the private parts of BBB. This
prompted Norberto to leave the tent.

Norberto denies the commission of the crime alleging that he could not possibly do the acts
imputed out in the open as there were many people preparing for the “simbang gabi”. He
further assails the credibility AAA for the crime of rape, alleging that the complaints were
filed only for the purpose of extorting money from him.

ISSUE:
Is petitioner guilty of attempted rape against AAA?

HELD:
NO, Cruz is guilty only of acts of lasciviousness. The basic element of rape is carnal knowledge
of a female. Carnal knowledge is defined simply as “the act of a man having sexual bodily
connections with a woman,” in other words, rape is consummated once the penis capable of
consummating the sexual act touches the external genitalia of the female. There must be
sufficient and convincing proof that the penis indeed touched the labias or slid into the
female organ, and not merely stroked the external surface thereof, for an accused to be
convicted of consummated rape.

Rape in its frustrated stage is a physical impossibility. Nonetheless, rape admits of an

attempted stage. In attempted rape, the concrete felony is rape, but the offender does not
perform all the acts of execution of having carnal knowledge. If the slightest penetration of
the female genitalia consummates rape, and rape in its attempted stage requires the
commencement of the commission of the felony directly by overt acts without the offender
performing all the acts of execution that should produce the felony, the only means by which
the overt acts performed by the accused can be shown to have a causal relation to rape as
the intended crime is to make a clear showing of his intent to lie with the female.

The petitioner climbed on top of the naked victim, and was already touching her genitalia
with his hands and mashing her breasts when she freed herself from his clutches and
effectively ended his designs on her. Yet, inferring from such circumstances that rape, and no
other, was his intended felony would be highly unwarranted. Such circumstances remained
equivocal, or “susceptible of double interpretation,” such that it was not permissible to