Republic of the Philippines did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
SUPREME COURT commit acts of lasciviousness upon the person of AAA, a
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 208469 August 13, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
SAMUEL "TIW-TIW" SANICO, Accused-Appellant.
R E S O L U T I O N
REYES, J.:
For review is the Decision rendered by the Court of Appeals
(CA) on November 19, 2012 in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00769-MIN
affirming, but with modifications as to the penalties,
damages and interests imposed, the conviction by the
Regional Trial Court (R TC) of Butuan City, Branch 1, of
Samuel "Tiw-Tiw" Sanico (accused-appellant) for one count
of rape under paragraph 1(a) of Article 266-A of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC), as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No.
8353, and lascivious conduct under Article 336 of the same
code, in relation to R.A. No. 7610, otherwise known as "The
Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse,
Exploitation and Discrimination Act."
Antecedents
Two separate Informations were filed against the accused-
appellant before the RTC, viz:
In Criminal Case No. 12021 for Acts of Lasciviousness
That at more or less 1:00 P.M. of April 19, 2006 at XXX
City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, with lewd design,
twelve (12) year [old] minor, by touching her breast
against her will, to the damage and prejudice of the latter
in such amount as may be proven in Court.
CONTRARY TO LAW: (Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended in relation to R.A. [No.] 7610) (Citation
omitted)
In Criminal Case No. 12022 for Rape
That sometime in the year 2005 at XXX City, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, by means of force, threat or
intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have carnal knowledge with one AAA, a twelve
(12) year old minor, against her will.
CONTRARY TO LAW: (Article 266-A, par. (1)(a), in relation
to Article 266-B, par. 6(10) of R.A. [No.] 8353 in relation
toR[.]A[.] [No.] 7610) (Citation omitted)
The accused-appellant went into hiding but was subsequently
arresJted in his hometown in Leyte on May 13, 2008. He was
arraigned on August 26, 2008, during which heentered a not
guilty plea.
During the pre-trial, the prosecution and the defense
stipulated on the following: (a) the identity of the
accused-appellant and the fact of his arrest in Leyte; (b)
AAA was more than 12 but less than 13 years of age at the
time the acts complained of were allegedly committed by
the accused-appellant; and (c) the incident on April 19,
2006 occurred in AAA’s residence.
In the joint trial that ensued, the prosecution offered
the testimonies of AAA, her mother BBB, and Dr. Roslyn
D.Orais (Dr. Orais), medico-legal officer of the National
Bureau of Investigation, Caraga Region. On the other hand,
the accused-appellant was the defense’s lone witness.
Version of the Prosecution
As indicated in her birth certificate, AAA was born on June
14, 1993. Her mother BBB works as a cook, while her father
is a "trisikad" driver. AAA was 12 years old when the acts
complained of were allegedly committed by the accused-
appellant, but was already 15 years of age at the time she
testified in court.
The accused-appellant was a pig butcher and ice cream
vendor. He and his children rented a room for about ten
(10) to eleven (11) years in the house where AAA lives with
her family. Thereafter, the accused-appellant’s family
moved to their own house built near AAA’s residence.
AAA claimed that the accused-appellant raped her in 2005,
but she could not recall the exact month and date. She
remembered though that she was raped at around 2:00
p.m.while she was washing dishes in the kitchen. There was
nobody else in the house except her and the accused-
appellant. He approached and held her hands tightly. She
boxed the accused-appellant, but he pushed her. Thereafter,
he threatened to kill her if she would shout. Knowing that
the accused-appellant was a pig butcher, AAA was overcome
by fear. He then succeeded in removing her clothes and
undergarments and pushing her against the wall. He took
off his short pants and briefs and inserted his penis into
her vagina for two to three minutes. She felt pain. The
accused-appellant then pulled up his short pants and laid
down in the sofa.
AAA alleged that she was again raped for six or seven times,
but she endured the harrowing experiences in silence due
to the accused-appellant’s threat to kill her. She also
dreaded the possibilities of quarrels and deaths, which
would ensue if her parents find out.
On April 19, 2006, at around 1:00 p.m., AAA was napping in
a room with her niece. AAA woke up when she felt that the
accused-appellant was touching her. AAA rose and repeatedly
boxed the accused-appellant, but the latter held her
tightly, pulled up her clothes and mashed her breast. Her
father, CCC, was just in another room atthat time, but out
of fear, AAA kept quiet. When the accused-appellant took
off his short pants and inserted his penis into AAA’s
vagina, the latter resisted. Being merely built out of
wood, the house shook, which caused CCC towake up. CCC lost
consciousness for a short period of time when he caught
the accused-appellant performing lascivious acts on AAA.
The accused-appellant then seized the opportunity to flee.
At around 4:00 p.m. on the same day, Dr. Orais performed a
medico- genital examination on AAA and found the latter to
have suffered from sexual abuse. AAA’s hymen was
"coaptated" or slightly open and bore "old healed
laceration at 3 and 9 o’clock positions". The hymenal
laceration was possibly caused by "an injury secondary to
intravaginal penetration by a blunt object". No human
spermatozoa was found in AAA’s vagina. Dr. Orais, however,
explained that even in the presence of seminal fluid, there
are cases whenno sperm can be found. Dr. Orais likewise
noted no physical or extra-genital injurieson AAA, but
found ample evidence of sexual intercourse having occurred
more than one but less than four month/s ago. Dr. Orais
also testified that AAA was at times uncooperative, timid,
and emotionally restrained.
BBB testified that it was CCC who saw the accused-appellant
touching AAA’s breast. BBB sought payment of moral damages.
Version of the Defense
The accused-appellant was the lone witness for the defense.
At the time he testified in court, he was 53 years old. He
stated that for years, he had lived in the house of AAA’s
family, but was no longer a resident therein when the acts
complained ofwere allegedly committed.
On April 19, 2006, the accused-appellant had a drinking
spree with CCC in the latter’s house lasting from 8:00 a.m.
to 12:00 p.m. As the two were both drunk, the accused-
appellant slept in the salawhile CCC did so in his room.
The accused-appellant woke up from slumber when AAA touched
the former’s pocket to search for money.She got some coins
and bills. The accused-appellant, in turn, touched AAA’s
chest and asked the latter to remove her short pants. AAA
complied. As the accused-appellant was touching AAA’s
breast, CCC woke up. Upon seeing what was taking place,
CCC got a boloto hack the accused-appellant, but the latter
escaped.
The accused-appellant testified that he had never inserted
his penis in AAA’s vagina. He admitted touching AAA on
April 19, 2006 but he did so only because the latter
initiated it. He also claimed that he was very close to
AAA and he treated her as if she were his own child.
The Ruling of the RTC
On October 13, 2009, the RTC rendered an Omnibus
Judgment convicting the accused-appellant of one count of
rapeand of acts of lasciviousness. The RTC found AAA’s
testimony of what had transpired as sincere and truthful,
noting though that a specific allegation as to the exact
date and month of the commission of rape in 2005 was absent.
The trial court thus pointed out the settled doctrine that
in a prosecution for rape, the material fact or
circumstance to be considered is the occurrence of rape,
not the time of its commission, the latter not being an
element of the crime. Further, the accused-appellant
cannotascribe any ill-motive against AAA which could have
induced the latter to fabricate such grave charges. The
accused-appellant’s flight after he learned that charges
were filed against him likewise worked to disfavor him. If
he were indeed innocent, he would have stayed to vindicate
himself from the accusations.
The dispositive portion of the RTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the prosecution having established the guilt of
the accused beyond reasonable doubt in the offenses as
charge[d], in criminal case no. 12022 for rape[,] he is
sentenced to reclusion perpetua, to pay [AAA][,] through
her father[,] the sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos
([P]50,000.00) as civil indemnity and another Fifty
Thousand Pesos ([P]50,000.00) as moral damages. In criminal
case no 12021 for acts of lasciviousness, he is sentenced
tosuffer imprisonment of 4 years, 2 months and 1 day to 6
years. He isfurther ordered to pay [AAA] the sum of Twenty
Five Thousand Pesos ([P]25,000.00) as moral damages and
another Twenty Five Thousand Pesos ([P]25,000.00) as
exemplary damages.
He shall serve his sentence at Davao Prison and Penal Farms,
Panabo City, Davao del Norte.In the service of his
sentence[,] he shall be credited with the full time benefit
of his preventive imprisonment provided he agrees in
writing to abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed
upon convicted prisoners[,] otherwise[,] if he does not[,]
he shall be entitled with only four-fifths (4/5) of his
preventive imprisonment pursuant to Article 29 as amended
of the [RPC].
SO ORDERED.
The Parties’ Arguments Before the CA
The accused-appellant challenged the above disquisition
before the CA. He argued that while the time of the
commission of the crime is not an essential element of
rape, a complainant’s inability to give the exact dates,
during which she was allegedly raped, puts her credibility
in question.
AAA alleged that she was raped on April 19, 2006, at around
1:00 p.m. However, Dr. Orais, who conducted a medical
examination on AAA three hours after the incident,
testified that human spermatozoa was absent in AAA’s vagina
and the hymenal lacerations found were possibly inflicted
more than a month ago.
The accused-appellant admitted though that he could be held
liable for acts of lasciviousness for touching AAA’s breast
and asking her to remove her short pants.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), on its part,
sought the dismissal of the appeal. It contended that the
accused-appellant’s denial of the charges against him
cannot prevail over AAA’s positive testimony. Further, the
date of the commission ofrape becomes relevant only when
the accuracy and truthfulness of the complainant’s
narration practically hinge thereon. Such circumstance does
not obtain in the case under review.
The accused-appellant was also nonchalant in admitting that
he touched AAA’s breast and asked her toremove her short
pants. The accused-appellant’s behavior exhibited no less
than his lewd designs on AAA.
The Ruling of the CA
On November 19, 2012, the CA rendered the herein assailed
decision, the decretal portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby
DISMISSED. The October 13, 2009 Omnibus Judgment of the
[RTC] of Butuan City, Branch 1, is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION as follows:
1) In Criminal Case No. 12021, [the accused-appellant] is
sentenced to 8 years and 1 day of prision mayoras minimum
to 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporalas
maximum. The moral and exemplary damages of [P]25,000.00
each awarded by the court a quoare reduce[d] to
[P]15,000.00 each. He is further ordered to pay civil
indemnity of [P]20,000.00 and a fine of [P]15,000.00.
2) In Criminal Case No. 12022, being in accordance with
the law and the evidence, [the accused-appellant] is
sentenced to reclusion perpetua. In addition to the awards
of civil indemnity of [P]50,000.00 and moral damages of
[P]50,000.00, [the accused-appellant] is further ordered
to pay AAA exemplary damages in the amount of [P]30,000.00.
3) [The accused-appellant] is further ordered to pay
interest at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per annumon
all the damages awarded in this case fromdate of finality
of this judgment until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
In additionally directing the payment of fine and civil
indemnity, and modifying both the penalty imposed upon the
accused-appellant and the award of damages to AAA as
regards Criminal Case No. 12021 for lascivious conduct,
the CA explained that:
[A]n assiduous review of the arguments [the accused-
appellant] proffered reveals that what was questioned by
him was his conviction for the crime of rape only. In fact,
in his appellant’s brief, he emphasized that he is liable
only for the charge of acts of lasciviousness after having
admitted that he merely touched the breast of AAA and asked
the latter to remove her short pants for him to see her
private part. Apparently, [the] accusedappellant no longer
assailed his conviction [for] the crime of acts of
lasciviousness.
This notwithstanding, we are constrained to review the
entire records of the case pursuant to the settled rule
that when an accused appeals from the sentence of the trial
court, he waives his constitutional safeguard against
double jeopardy and throws the whole case open to the review
of the appellate court, which is then called upon to render
such judgment as the law and justice dictate, whether
favorable or unfavorable to them, and whether they are
assigned as errors or not. x x x
x x x x
While we sustain [the] accused-appellant’s conviction of
acts of lasciviousness, yet, we nonetheless modify the
penalty imposed and the damages awarded by the court a quo.
x x x [W]e find that the court a quo erroneously imposed
the penalty [for] the crime of acts of lasciviousness under
Article 336 of the RPC in relation to RA 7610. It is
important to note that [the] accused-appellant was charged
[with] acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC
in relation to RA 7610 which defines sexual abuse of
children and prescribes the penalty therefore under Article
III, Section 5 thereof. Certainly, [the] accused-appellant
was sufficiently informed of the accusation against him
and he can thus be convicted of the crime of acts of
lasciviousness under RA 7610 based on the evidence
presented against him. Article III, Section 5, of RA 7610
reads:
Section 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse.-
Children, whether male or female, who for money or profit,
or any other consideration or due to the coercion or
influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in
sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be
children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse.
The penalty of reclusion temporalin its medium period to
reclusion perpetuashall be imposed upon the following:
(a) x x x
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct with a child exploited in prostitution
orsubject to other sexual abuse; Provided, That when the
victim is under twelve (12) years of age, the perpetrators
shall be prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3 for rape
and Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised
Penal Code, for rapeor lascivious conduct, as the case may
be; Provided, That the penalty for lascivious conduct when
the victim is under twelve (12) years of age shall be
reclusion temporal in its medium period, x x x.
x x x x
Paragraph (b) punishes sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct not only with a child exploited in prostitution,
but alsowith a child subjected to other sexual abuses. It
covers not only a situation where a child is abused for
profit, but also where one – through coercion, intimidation
or influence – engages in sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct with a child.
The elements of sexual abuse under Section 5, Article III
of RA 7610 are the following:
1. The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct;
2. The said act is performed with a child exploited in
prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse; and
3. The child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of
age.
[T]here is no doubt that [the] accused-appellant is guilty
of acts of lasciviousness under Section 5(b), Article XIII
of RA 7610 after having admitted the lascivious conduct he
made with AAA. It is undisputed that AAA was still 12 years
old when the crime happened and as admitted by [the]
accused-appellant himself, hewas touching AAA because AAA
was looking for money inside his pocket and he told AAA to
remove her short pants for him to see her private part. x
x x.
It is important to note however that a child is deemed
subjected to other sexual abuse when the child indulges in
lascivious conduct under the coercion or influence of any
adult. x x x
x x x x
Undoubtedly, [the] accused-appellant’s acts were covered
by the definitions of sexual abuse and lascivious conduct
under Section 2(g) and (h) of the Rules and Regulations on
the Reporting and Investigation of Child Abuse Cases
promulgated to implement the provisions of RA 7610,
particularly on child abuse:
(g) "Sexual abuse"includes the employment, use, persuasion,
inducement, enticement or coercion of a child to engage
in, or assist another person to engage in, sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct or the molestation,
prostitution, or incest with children;
(h) "Lascivious conduct" means the intentional touching,
either directly or through clothing, of the genitalia,
anus, groin,breast, inner thigh, or buttocks, or the
introduction of any object into the genitalia, anus or
mouth, of any person, whether of the same or opposite sex,
with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or
arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person,
bestiality, masturbation, lascivious exhibition of the
genitals or [pubic] area of a person. x x x Indubitably,
AAA was deemed to be [a] "child subjected to other sexual
abuse" as defined above. Accordingly, the imposable penalty
should be the penalty prescribed under RA 7610 and not the
penalty under Article 336 of the RPC as imposed by the
court a quo. In People v. Leonardo, the Supreme Court ruled
that the penalty to be imposed for violation of Section 5,
Article III of RA 7610 is as follows:
For acts of lasciviousness performed on a child under
Section 5(b), Article III of Republic Act No. 7610, the
penalty prescribed is reclusion temporalin its medium
period to reclusion perpetua. Notwithstanding that Republic
Act No. 7610 is a special law, the [accused-] appellant
may enjoy the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the [accused-
]appellant shall be entitled to a minimum term to be taken
within the range of the penalty next lower to that
prescribed by Republic Act No. 7610. The penalty next lower
in degree is prision mayor medium to reclusion
temporalminimum, the range of which is from 8 years and 1
day to 14 years and 8 months. On the other hand, the maximum
term of the penalty should be taken from the penalty
prescribed under Section 5(b), Article III of Republic Act
No. 7610, which is reclusion temporalin its medium period
to reclusion perpetua, the range of which is from 14 years,
8 months and 1 day to reclusion perpetua. The minimum,
medium and maximum term of the same is as follows: minimum
– 14 years, 8 months and 1 day to 17 years and 4 months;
medium – 17 years, 4 months and 1 day to 20years; and
maximum – reclusion perpetua.
Thus, in this case, we imposed on [the] accused-appellant
the indeterminate sentence of 8 years and 1 day of prision
mayoras minimum to 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion
temporalas maximum.
Corollarily, in view of recent jurisprudence,we deem it
proper to reduce the amount of moral and exemplary damages
awarded by the court a quofrom [P]25,000.00 each to
[P]15,000.00 each. [The] accusedappellant is however
ordered to pay civil indemnity of [P]20,000.00 and a fine
of [P]15,000.00. (Citations omitted)
On the other hand, in Criminal Case No. 12022, the CA
affirmed the accused-appellant’s conviction for rapeand the
award by the RTC of civil indemnity and moral damages in
favor of AAA. Additionally, the CA ordered the payment of
₱30,000.00 asexemplary damages. In both Criminal Case Nos.
12021 and 12022, the CA likewise directed the
accusedappellant to pay AAA the legal interest of twelve
percent (12%) per annum on all damages awarded to be
computedfrom the date of finality of the decision until
full payment. The CA cited the following as reasons:
Indubitably, it is unimaginable for a young girl like AAA
to concoct a tale of defloration, drag herself and the rest
of her family to a lifetime of shame, and make them the
object of gossip among their neighbors and friends if the
accusation was indeed untrue. x x x.
x x x x
The contention of [the] accused-appellant that the rape
allegedly committed on April 19, 2006 was highly
implausible because of the absence of fresh lacerations
and spermatozoa in AAA’s vagina is untenable. It should be
emphasizedthat [the] accused-appellant was charged [with]
rape that occurred sometime in 2005 and not on April 19,
2006. The fact that only old healed lacerations were found
does not negate rape. x x x:
x x x In People v. Espinoza, it was held that healed
lacerations do not negate rape. In fact, lacerations,
whether healed or fresh, are the best physical evidence of
forcible defloration.x x x. Moreover, in the present case,
Dr. Orais clarified to the court that even if the alleged
sexual assault took place in the year 2005 or a year after
AAA was examined, the old healed lacerations could still
be found.
x x x x
[T]he absence of spermatozoa does not disprove rape, In
fact, in People v. Perez, it was held that:
x x x The absence of spermatozoa is not a negation of rape.
The presence or absence of spermatozoa isimmaterial since
it is penetration, not ejaculation, which constitutes the
crime of rape. x x x.
x x x x
As to the award of damages, x x x the victim shall likewise
be entitled to exemplary damages in the amount of Thirty
Thousand Pesos ([P]30,000.00) as justified under Article
2229 of the Civil Code to set a public example and serve
as a deterrent against the elders who abuse and corrupt
the youth. (Citations omitted)
Issue
The accused-appellant now comes before the court for relief
insisting anew on the alleged failure of the prosecution
to prove beyond reasonable doubt that he had, in fact,
raped AAA.
Both the accused-appellant and the OSG did not file
supplemental briefs, adopting instead their respective
arguments raised before the CA.
The Ruling of the Court
We affirm the CA’s verdict convicting the accused-appellant
of the charges against him, but modify the sameby (a)
reinstating the penalty and damages for lascivious conduct
imposed by the RTC in Criminal Case No. 12021; and (b)
reducing to six percent the interests imposed upon the
damages awarded to AAA in both Criminal Case Nos. 12021
and 12022.
Criminal Case No. 12021
As aptly stated by the CA, it would be a superfluity to
exhaustively re-evaluate the accused-appellant’s
conviction in Criminal Case No. 12021 for lasciviousness
conduct committed on April 19, 2006. First. The RTC and
the CA uniformly found the accused-appellant guilty as
charged. Second. The accused-appellant himself admitted
touching AAA’s breast and directing the latter totake off
her short pants. Third. In the appeal filed before the CA
and this court, no error was ascribed on the part of the
RTC in convicting the accused-appellant for lascivious
conduct.
The RTC and the CA, were however, not in agreement as to
the proper imposable penalty for the accused-appellant’s
lascivious conduct. The RTC applied the provisions of
Article 336 of the RPC and sentenced the accused-appellant
to 4 years, 2 months and 1 day to 6 years of imprisonment.
The CA, on the other hand, invoking Section 5(b) of R.A.
No. 7610, which punishes sexual abuses committed against
minors, imposed upon the accused-appellant the
indeterminate penalty of 8 years and 1 day of prision
mayoras minimum to 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion
temporalas maximum.
In the instant appeal, the Information relative to Criminal
Case No. 12021 bears the caption "for acts of
lasciviousness." It is, however, indicated that the acts
are being prosecuted pursuant to the provisions of "Article
336 of the RPC, in relation to R.A. No. 7610."
In the herein assailed decision, the CA explained that
during the trial, the prosecution was able to prove the
existence of the requisites of sexual abuse under Section
5(b), R.A. No. 7610. The CA thus modified the penalty and
imposed instead the one provided for in R.A. No. 7610.
In Flordeliz v. People, we allowed the imposition of a
penalty provided for in R.A. No. 7610 despite the absence
in the Information filed of any explicit reference to the
saidstatute. We declared that:
We are aware that the Information specifically charged
petitioner with Acts of Lasciviousness under the RPC,
without stating therein that it was in relation to R.A.
No. 7610. However, the failure to designate the offense by
statute or to mention the specific provision penalizing
the act, or an erroneous specification of the law violated,
does not vitiate the information if the facts alleged
therein clearly recite the facts constituting the crime
charged. The character of the crime is not determined by
the caption or preamble of the information nor by the
specification of the provision of law alleged to have
beenviolated, but by the recital of the ultimate facts and
circumstances inthe complaint or information.
In the instant case, the body of the Information contains
an averment of the acts alleged to have been committed by
petitioner and unmistakably describes acts punishable under
Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610. (Citation
omitted)
In the accused-appellant’s case beforethe Court, the
Information even specifically mentions R.A. No. 7610. The
accused-appellant, therefore, was fairly apprised that he
was being charged with violation of R.A. No. 7610 as well.
Further, it was shown that the requisites of Section 5(b)
of the statute are present. The CA thus inferred that it
could not be precluded from imposing the proper penalty
provided for in R.A. No. 7610.
The CA aptly declared that when an appeal isfiled in a
criminal action, it opens the entire matter for review and
that the requisites of sexual abuse under Section 5(b) of
R.A. No. 7610 are present in the accused-appellant’s case.
However, grounds exist compelling us to reinstate the
penalty and damages imposed by the RTC in Criminal Case
No. 12021.
It bears stressing that the case before the Court involves
two separate Informations filed – one for rape and another
for lascivious conduct.
People v. Francisco involved the issue ofunder which
appellate jurisdiction the crimes of rape and lascivious
conduct fall. The court, however, had the occasion to
explain that:
Nor can we widen the scope of our appellate jurisdiction
on the basis of the fact that the trial court heard two
(2) distinct and separate cases simultaneously. Such
procedure [referring to the conduct of a joint trial]
adopted by the trial court cannot and did not result in
the merger of the two (2) offenses. In fact, a cursory
reading of the assailed decision of the court a quoreveals
with pristine clarity that each case was separately
determined by the trial judge, as each should be separately
reviewed on appeal. x x x.
In the case at bench, the commission of lascivious conduct
was admitted by the accused-appellant in his testimony. No
issue regarding his conviction for lascivious conduct had
been raised in his appeal before the CA as well. Despite
the fact that the appeal filed was captioned as one with
reference to Criminal Case Nos. 12021 and 12022, the body
stated in no uncertain terms that what was being assailed
was merely the conviction for rape. Effectively then, it
was as if no appeal was filed relative to Criminal Case
No. 12021. Hence, the penalty imposed by the RTC for
lascivious conduct should not be disturbed
anymore.Necessarily then, the CA cannot impose upon the
accused-appellant a graverpenalty and increase the amount
of damages awarded to AAA at least relative to Criminal
Case No. 12021. This is the path more in accord with the
general rule that penal laws are to be construed liberally
in favor of the accused. Criminal Case No. 12022
The court finds no reversible error committed by the RTC
and the CA anent the accused-appellant’sconviction for rape
in Criminal Case No. 12022.
In People of the Philippines v. Hermenigildo Delen y Esco
Billa, the court emphatically stated that:
It is a fundamental rule that the trial court’s factual
findings, especially its assessment of the credibility of
witnesses, are accorded great weight and respect and
binding upon this Court, particularly when affirmed by the
Court of Appeals. This Court has repeatedly recognized that
the trial court is in the bestposition to assess the
credibility of witnesses and their testimonies because of
its unique position of having observed that elusive and
incommunicable evidence of the witnesses’ deportment on the
stand while testifying, which opportunity is denied to the
appellate courts. Only the trial judge can observe the
furtive glance, blush of conscious shame, hesitation,
flippant or sneering tone, calmness, sigh, or the scant or
full realization of an oath. These are significant factors
in evaluating the sincerity of witnesses, in the process
of unearthing the truth. The appellate courts will
generally not disturb such findings unless it plainly
overlooked certain facts of substance and value that, if
considered, might affect the result of the case.
Moreover, "[w]e have repeatedly held that when the offended
parties are young and immature girls, as in this case,
courts are inclined to lend credence to their version of
what transpired, considering not only their relative
vulnerability, but also the shame and embarrassment to
which they would be exposed if the matter about which they
testified were not true."
The foregoing doctrines apply with greater force in the
instant case where the accused-appellant cannot ascribe any
ill-motive against AAA in accusing him of the offenses
charged,and where the factual findings of the RTC coincide
with those of the CA.
"For conviction to be had in the crime of rape, the
following elements must be proven beyond reasonable doubt:
(1) that the accused had carnal knowledge of the victim;
and (2) that said act was accomplished (a) through the use
of force or intimidation, or (b) when the victim is deprived
of reason or otherwise unconscious, or (c) when the victim
is twelve years of age, or is demented."
In the instant appeal, the RTC and the CA both found AAA’s
testimony that she was raped in 2005 as credible. AAA did
not specifically refer to an exact month and date when the
sordid act was committed. Nonetheless, her testimony that
the accused-appellant threatened to kill her, pushed her
to the wall and inserted his penis in her vagina at around
2:00 p.m., while she was alone washing dishes at home, was
positive, clear and categorical.
To exculpate him from liability, the accused-appellant
invokes Dr. Orais’ medical findings that human spermatozoa
was absent in AAA’s vagina, and that her hymen bore old
healed and not fresh lacerations possibly sustained more
than one but less than four month/s ago. These, however,
are not compelling reasons to warrant the reversal of the
assailed decision.
The Information in Criminal Case No. 12022 charged the
accused-appellant for raping AAA in 2005.On the other hand,
in Criminal Case No. 12021, the accused-appellantwas
indicted for committing lascivious conduct on April 19,
2006. The results of the medical examination conducted on
April 19, 2006 by Dr. Orais, finding that there was no
human spermatozoa found in AAA’s vagina and that the
latter’s hymen bore old healed and not fresh lacerations,
are not inconsistent with the conclusion that the latter
was raped in 2005. Repetitive as it may be, the rape was
committed in 2005 and not shortly before the medical
examination conducted upon AAA on April 19, 2006.
Interests on all the damages imposed upon the accused
appellant reduced from 12% to 6% Prescinding from the
above, the Court finds no grounds to reverse the herein
assailed decision convicting the accused-appellant of one
count of rape and of lascivious conduct. The Court likewise
finds no error in the penalty, civil indemnity, and damages
ordered by the CA relative to Criminal Case No. 12022.
However, inCriminal Case No. 12021, the lesser penalty and
damages imposed by the RTC are reinstated. Lastly, to
conform to prevailing jurisprudence, an interest at the
rate of six percent (6%) per annumshall be imposed on all
the damages awarded to AAA in both Criminal Case Nos. 12021
and 12022, to be computed from the date of the finality of
this judgment until fully paid.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Decision dated November 19,
2012 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00769-
MIN, is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS: (a) In
Criminal Case No. 12021, the indeterminate penalty of 4
years, 2 months and 1 day of imprisonment as minimum to 6
years as maximum imposed by the R TC upon the accused-
appellant, and the award in favor of AAA of Twenty Five
Thousand Pesos (₱25,000.00) as moral damages and Twenty
Five Thousand Pesos (₱25,000.00) as exemplary damages, are
reinstated; and
(b) An interest at the rate of six percent ( 6%) per annum
on all the damages awarded to AAA in Criminal Case Nos.
12021 to 12022 is likewise imposed upon the accused-
appellant to be computed from the date of the finality of
this judgment until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines That undersigned Second Assistant City Prosecutor hereby
SUPREME COURT accuses Christian Caballo of the crime of Violation of
Manila Section 10 (a) of Republic Act No. 7610, committed as
follows:
SECOND DIVISION
That in or about the last week of March 1998, and on
G.R. No. 198732 June 10, 2013 different dates subsequent thereto, until June 1998, in
the City of Surigao, Philippines, and within the
CHRISTIAN CABALLO, Petitioner, jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
vs. accused, a 23 year old man, in utter disregard of the
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. prohibition of the provisions of Republic Act No. 7610 and
taking advantage of the innocence and lack of worldly
D E C I S I O N experience of AAA who was only 17 years old at that time,
having been born on November 3, 1980, did then and there
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.: willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit sexual abuse
upon said AAA, by persuading and inducing the latter to
Before the Court is a petition for review on have sexual intercourse with him, which ultimately resulted
certiorari assailing the January 28, 2011 Decision and to her untimely pregnancy and delivery of a baby on March
September 26, 2011 Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) 8, 1999, a condition prejudicial to her development, to
in CA-G.R. CR No. 27399-MIN which affirmed with the damage and prejudice of AAA in such amount as may be
modification the April 1, 2003 Decision of the Regional allowed by law.
Trial Court of Surigao City, Branch 30 (RTC), finding
petitioner Christian Caballo (Caballo) guilty beyond CONTRARY TO LAW.
reasonable doubt of violating Section 10(a), Article VI of
Republic Act No. 7610 (RA 7610), otherwise known as the Surigao City, Philippines, May 28, 1999.
"Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse,
Exploitation and Discrimination Act," in relation to Upon arraignment, Caballo pleaded not guilty to the
Section 2 of the Rules and Regulations on the Reporting aforesaid charges.
and Investigation of Child Abuse Cases (Rules on Child
Abuse Cases). Based on the records, the undisputed facts are as follows:

The Facts AAA, then 17 years old, met Caballo, then 23 years old, in
her uncle’s place in Surigao City. Her uncle was a
On March 16, 1999, an Information was filed charging choreographer and Caballo was one of his dancers. During
Caballo of violation of Section 10(a), Article VI of RA that time, AAA was a sophomore college student at the
7610 which was later amended on May 28, 1999, to include University of San Carlos and resided at a boarding house
statements pertaining to the delivery of private in Cebu City. On January 17, 1998, Caballo went to Cebu
compJlainant AAA’s baby. The Amended Information reads: City to attend the Sinulog Festival and there, visited AAA.
After spending time together, they eventually became
sweethearts. Sometime during the third week of March 1998,
AAA went home to Surigao City and stayed with her uncle.
In the last week of March of the same year, Caballo
persuaded AAA to have sexual intercourse with him. This
was followed by several more of the same in April 1998, in
the first and second weeks of May 1998, on August 31, 1998
and in November 1998, all of which happened in Surigao
City, except the one in August which occurred in Cebu. In
June 1998, AAA becamepregnant and later gave birth on March
8, 1999.
During the trial, the prosecution asserted that Caballo
was only able to induce AAA to lose her virginity due to
promises of marriage and his assurance that he would not
get her pregnant due to the use of the "withdrawal method."
Moreover, it claimed that Caballo was shocked upon hearing
the news of AAA’s pregnancy and consequently, advised her
to have an abortion. She heeded Caballo’s advice; however,
her efforts were unsuccessful. Further, the prosecution
averred that when AAA’s mother confronted Caballo to find
out what his plans were for AAA, he assured her that he
would marry her daughter.
Opposed to the foregoing, Caballo claimed that during their
first sexual intercourse, AAA was no longer a virgin as he
found it easy to penetrate her and that there was no
bleeding. He also maintained that AAA had (3) three
boyfriends prior to him. Further, he posited that he and
AAA were sweethearts who lived-in together, for one (1)
week in a certain Litang Hotel and another week in the
residence of AAA’s uncle. Eventually, they broke up due to
the intervention of AAA’s parents. At a certain time, AAA’s
mother even told Caballo that he was not deserving of AAA
because he was poor. Lastly, he alleged that he repeatedly
proposed marriage to AAA but was always rejected because
she was still studying.
The RTC’s Ruling
In a Decision dated April 1, 2003, the RTC found Caballo
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section
10(a), Article VI of RA 7610, in relation to Section 2 of
the Rules on Child Abuse Cases. Accordingly, it sentenced
Caballo to suffer imprisonment for an indeterminate period
ranging from prision correccional, in its maximum period
of four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day, as
minimum, to prision mayor in its minimum period of six (6)
years, eight (8) months and one (1) day, as maximum. It
also ordered Caballo to pay AAA moral damages in the amount
of ₱50,000.00.
Aggrieved, Caballo elevated the case to the CA.
The CA’s Ruling
In a Decision dated January 28, 2011, the CA dismissed the
appeal and affirmed with modification the RTC’s ruling,
finding Caballo guilty of violating Section 5(b), Article
III of RA 7610.
It ruled that while the Amended Information denominated
the crime charged as violation of Section 10(a), Article
VI of RA 7610, the statements in its body actually support
a charge of violation of Section 5(b), Article III of RA
7610.
On the merits of the case, it found that the evidence
adduced by the prosecution clearly showed that Caballo
persuaded, induced and enticed AAA, then a minor, to have
carnal knowledge with him. Towards this end, Caballo
repeatedly assured AAA of his love and even went on to
promise marriage to her. He also assured AAA that she would
not get pregnant because he would be using the "withdrawal
method." Thus, it was upon these repeated coaxing and
assuring words that AAA succumbed to Caballo’s evil desires
which deflowered and got her pregnant. On this score, it
observed that consent is immaterial in child abuse cases
involving sexual intercourse and lascivious conduct and
therefore, the sweetheart defense remains unacceptable. It
also found basis to sustain the award of moral damages.
Caballo filed a motion for reconsideration which was,
however, denied on September 26, 2011.
Hence, the instant petition.
The Issue
The core of the present controversy revolves around the
interpretation of the phrase "due to the coercion or
influence of any adult" which would thereby classify the
victim as a "child exploited in prostitution and other
sexual abuse" as found in Section 5, Article III of RA
7610. Consequently, the interpretation which the Court
accords herein would determine whether or not the CA erred
in finding Caballo guilty of violating paragraph (b) of
the same proviso.
In his petition, Caballo essentially argues that his
promise to marry or his use of the "withdrawal method"
should not be considered as "persuasion" or "inducement"
sufficient to convict him for the aforementioned offense,
asserting that these should be coupled with some form of
coercion or intimidation to constitute child abuse. He
further alleges that he and AAA were sweethearts which
thus, made the sexual intercourse consensual.
In its Comment, respondent advances the argument that there
was "sexual abuse" within the purview of RA 7610 as well
as the Rules on Child Abuse Cases since it was only upon
Caballo’s repeated assurances and persuasion that AAA gave
in to his worldly desires. Likewise, it points out that
the sweetheart theory, as relied on by Caballo, deserves
scant consideration in view of the Court’s ruling in Malto
v. People (Malto).
The Court’s Ruling
The petition has no merit.
Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610 pertinently reads:
SEC. 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. -
Children, whether male or female, who for money, profit,
or any other consideration or due to the coercion or
influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in
sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be
children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse.
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to
reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon the following: x
x x x
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct with a child exploited in prostitution
or subject to other sexual abuse; Provided, That when the
victim is under twelve (12) years of age, the perpetrators
shall be prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3 for rape
and Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised
Penal Code, for rape or lascivious conduct, as the case
may be; Provided, That the penalty for lascivious conduct
when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age shall be
reclusion temporal in its medium period x x x x (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
As determined in the case of Olivarez v. CA (Olivarez),
the elements of the foregoing offense are the following:
(a) The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse
or lascivious conduct;
(b) The said act is performed with a child exploited
in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse;
and
(c) The child, whether male or female, is below 18
years of age.
In this case, the existence of the first and third elements
remains undisputed. Records disclose that Caballo had
succeeded in repeatedly having sexual intercourse with AAA
who, during all those instances, was still a minor. Thus,
the only bone of contention lies in the presence of the
second element. On this note, the defense submits that AAA
could not be considered as a "child exploited in
prostitution and other sexual abuse" since the incidents
to do not point to any form of "coercion" or "influence"
on Caballo’s part.
The argument is untenable.
To put things in proper perspective, it must be pointed
out that RA 7610 was meant to advance the state policy of
affording "special protection to children from all forms
of abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation and discrimination
and other conditions prejudicial to their development" and
in such regard, "provide sanctions for their
commission." It also furthers the "best interests of
children" and as such, its provisions are guided by this
standard.
Driven by the foregoing considerations, Congress crafted
Article III of the same law in order to penalize child
prostitution and other forms of sexual abuse. Section 5
thereof provides a definition of who is considered a "child
exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse." As
illumined in Olivarez, citing People v. Larin and Amployo
v. People, the final version of the aforesaid provision
was a product of various deliberations to expand its
original coverage to cases where the minor may have been
coerced or intimidated into sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct, not necessarily for money or profit,
viz:
The second element, i.e., that the act is performed with a
child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other
sexual abuse, is likewise present. As succinctly explained
in People v. Larin:
A child is deemed exploited in prostitution or subjected
to other sexual abuse, when the child indulges in sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct (a) for money, profit,
or any other consideration; or (b) under the coercion or
influence of any adult, syndicate or group...
It must be noted that the law covers not only a situation
in which a child is abused for profit, but also one in
which a child, through coercion or intimidation, engages
in lascivious conduct.
We reiterated this ruling in Amployo v. People:
... As we observed in People v. Larin, Section 5 of Rep.
Act No. 7610 does not merely cover a situation of a child
being abused for profit, but also one in which a child
engages in any lascivious conduct through coercion or
intimidation...
Thus, a child is deemed subjected to other sexual abuse
when the child indulges in lascivious conduct under the
coercion or influence of any adult. In this case, Cristina
was sexually abused because she was coerced or intimidated
by petitioner to indulge in a lascivious conduct.
Furthermore, it is inconsequential that the sexual abuse
occurred only once. As expressly provided in Section 3(b)
of R.A. 7610, the abuse may be habitual or not. It must be
observed that Article III of R.A. 7610 is captioned as
"Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse" because
Congress really intended to cover a situation where the
minor may have been coerced or intimidated into lascivious
conduct, not necessarily for money or profit. The law
covers not only child prostitution but also other forms of
sexual abuse. This is clear from the deliberations of the
Senate:
Senator Angara. I refer to line 9, ‘who for money or
profit.’ I would like to amend this, Mr. President, to
cover a situation where the minor may have been coerced or
intimidated into this lascivious conduct, not necessarily
for money or profit, so that we can cover those situations
and not leave loophole in this section.
The proposal I have is something like this: WHO FOR MONEY,
PROFIT, OR ANY OTHER CONSIDERATION OR DUE TO THE COERCION
OR INFLUENCE OF ANY ADULT, SYNDICATE OR GROUP INDULGE, et
cetera.
The President Pro Tempore. I see. That would mean also
changing the subtitle of Section 4. Will it no longer be
child prostitution?
Senator Angara. No, no. Not necessarily, Mr. President,
because we are still talking of the child who is being
misused for sexual purposes either for money or for
consideration. What I am trying to cover is the other
consideration. Because, here, it is limited only to the
child being abused or misused for sexual purposes, only
for money or profit.
I am contending, Mr. President, that there may be
situations where the child may not have been used for profit
or ...
The President Pro Tempore. So, it is no longer
prostitution. Because the essence of prostitution is
profit.
Senator Angara. Well, the Gentleman is right. Maybe the
heading ought to be expanded. But, still, the President
will agree that that is a form or manner of child abuse.
The President Pro Tempore. What does the Sponsor say? Will
the Gentleman kindly restate the amendment?
ANGARA AMENDMENT
Senator Angara. The new section will read something like
this, Mr. President: MINORS, WHETHER MALE OR FEMALE, WHO
FOR MONEY, PROFIT, OR ANY OTHER CONSIDERATION OR INFLUENCE
OF ANY ADULT, SYNDICATE OR GROUP INDULGE IN SEXUAL
INTERCOURSE, et cetera.
Senator Lina. It is accepted, Mr. President.
The President Pro Tempore. Is there any objection?
[Silence] Hearing none, the amendment is approved.
How about the title, ‘Child Prostitution,’ shall we change
that too?
Senator Angara. Yes, Mr. President, to cover the expanded
scope.
The President Pro Tempore. Is that not what we would call
probable ‘child abuse’?
Senator Angara. Yes, Mr. President.
The President Pro Tempore. Subject to rewording. Is there
any objection? [Silence] Hearing none, the amendment is
approved. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
As it is presently worded, Section 5, Article III of RA
7610 provides that when a child indulges in sexual
intercourse or any lascivious conduct due to the coercion
or influence of any adult, the child is deemed to be a
"child exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse."
In this manner, the law is able to act as an effective
deterrent to quell all forms of abuse, neglect, cruelty,
exploitation and discrimination against children,
prejudicial as they are to their development.
In this relation, case law further clarifies that sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct under the coercion or
influence of any adult exists when there is some form of
compulsion equivalent to intimidation which subdues the
free exercise of the offended party’s free will. Corollary
thereto, Section 2(g) of the Rules on Child Abuse Cases
conveys that sexual abuse involves the element of influence
which manifests in a variety of forms. It is defined as:
The employment, use, persuasion, inducement, enticement or
coercion of a child to engage in or assist another person
to engage in, sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct or
the molestation, prostitution, or incest with children.
To note, the term "influence" means the "improper use of
power or trust in any way that deprives a person of free
will and substitutes another’s objective." Meanwhile,
"coercion" is the "improper use of x x x power to compel
another to submit to the wishes of one who wields it."
In view of the foregoing, the Court observes that Caballo’s
actuations may be classified as "coercion" and "influence"
within the purview of Section 5, Article III of RA 7610:
First, the most crucial element is AAA’s minority. It is
undisputed that AAA was only 17 years old at the time of
the commission of the crime and is hence, considered a
child under the law. In this respect, AAA was not capable
of fully understanding or knowing the import of her actions
and in consequence, remained vulnerable to the cajolery
and deception of adults, as in this case.
Based on this premise, jurisprudence settles that consent
is immaterial in cases involving a violation of Section 5,
Article III of RA 7610; as such, the argument that AAA and
Caballo were sweethearts remains irrelevant. The Malto
ruling is largely instructive on this point:
For purposes of sexual intercourse and lascivious conduct
in child abuse cases under RA 7610, the sweetheart defense
is unacceptable. A child exploited in prostitution or
subjected to other sexual abuse cannot validly give consent
to sexual intercourse with another person.
The language of the law is clear: it seeks to punish "those
who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected
to other sexual abuse."
Unlike rape, therefore, consent is immaterial in cases
involving violation of Section 5, Article III of RA 7610.
The mere act of having sexual intercourse or committing
lascivious conduct with a child who is exploited in
prostitution or subjected to sexual abuse constitutes the
offense. It is a malum prohibitum, an evil that is
proscribed.
A child cannot give consent to a contract under our civil
laws. This is on the rationale that she can easily be the
victim of fraud as she is not capable of fully understanding
or knowing the nature or import of her actions. The State,
as parens patriae, is under the obligation to minimize the
risk of harm to those who, because of their minority, are
as yet unable to take care of themselves fully. Those of
tender years deserve its protection.
The harm which results from a child’s bad decision in a
sexual encounter may be infinitely more damaging to her
than a bad business deal. Thus, the law should protect her
from the harmful consequences of her attempts at adult
sexual behavior. For this reason, a child should not be
deemed to have validly consented to adult sexual activity
and to surrender herself in the act of ultimate physical
intimacy under a law which seeks to afford her special
protection against abuse, exploitation and discrimination.
(Otherwise, sexual predators like petitioner will be
justified, or even unwittingly tempted by the law, to view
her as fair game and vulnerable prey.) In other words, a lascivious conduct with Caballo due to the same, she is
child is presumed by law to be incapable of giving rational deemed as a "child exploited in prostitution and other
consent to any lascivious act or sexual intercourse. x x x sexual abuse"; as such, the second element of the subject
x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied; citations omitted) offense exists.

Second, coupled with AAA’s minority is Caballo’s seniority.
Records indicate that Caballo was 23 years old at the time
of the commission of the offense and therefore, 6 years
older than AAA, more or less. The age disparity between an
adult and a minor placed Caballo in a stronger position
over AAA so as to enable him to force his will upon the
latter.
In fine, finding all elements to be present, the Court
hereby sustains Caballo's conviction for violation of
Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The January 28, 2011
Decision and September 26, 2011 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CAG.R. CR No. 27399-MIN are hereby AFFIRMED.

Third, Caballo's actions effectively constitute overt acts SO ORDERED .

of coercion and influence. Records reveal that Caballo
repeatedly assured AAA of his love for her, and even,
promised to marry her. In addition, he also guaranteed that
she would not get pregnant since he would be using the
"withdrawal method" for safety. Irrefragably, these were
meant to influence AAA to set aside her reservations and
eventually give into having sex with him, with which he
succeeded.

Fourth, at least, with respect to the parties' first sexual

encounter, it is observed that the brash and unexpected
manner in which Caballo pursued AAA to her room and pressed
on her to have sex with him, effectively placed her in, to
a certain extent, a position of duress .. An important
factor is that AAA refused Caballo's incipient advances
and in fact, asked him to leave. However, AAA eventually
yielded. Thus, it stands to reason that she was put in a
situation deprived of the benefit of clear thought and
choice. In any case, the Court observes that any other
choice would, nonetheless, remain tarnished due to AAA's
minority as above-discussed.

Hence, considering that Caballo's acts constitute

"coercion" and "influence" within the context of the law,
and that AAA indulged in sexual intercourse and/or
 On 28 October 2003, AAA was brought to
SECOND DIVISION the Virgen Milagrosa Medical Center by her father BBB and
JOJIT GARINGARAO, G.R. No. 192760 mother CCC due to fever and abdominal pain. Dr.
Petitioner, George Morante (Dr. Morante), the attending physician,
Present: recommended that AAA be confined at the hospital for
CARPIO, J., further observation. AAA was admitted at the hospital and
Chairperson, confined at a private room where she and her parents stayed
- versus - LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,* for the night.
BRION,
PERALTA,** and On 29 October 2003, BBB left the hospital to go to
PEREZ, JJ. Lingayen, Pangasinan to process his daughters Medicare
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Promulgated: papers. He arrived at Lingayen at around 8:00 a.m. and left
Respondent. July 20, 2011 the place an hour later. CCC also left the hospital that
same morning to attend to their store
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - at Urbiztondo, Pangasinan, leaving AAA alone in her room.
- - - - x
When BBB returned to the hospital, AAA told him that she
D E C I S I O N wanted to go home. Dr. Morante advised against it but due
to AAAs insistence, he allowed AAA to be discharged from
CARPIO, J.: the hospital with instructions that she should continue
her medications. When AAA and her parents arrived at their
The Case house around 11:30 a.m., AAA cried and told her parents
that Garingaraosexually abused her. They all went back to
Before the Court is a petition for review assailing the 26 the hospital and reported the incident to Dr. Morante. They
November 2009 Decision and 22 June 2010 Resolution of the inquired from the nurses station and learned
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 31354. The Court of that Garingarao was the nurse on duty on that day.
Appeals affirmed with modifications the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of San Carlos City, Pangasinan, Branch On 20 January 2004, the City Prosecutor filed an
56 (trial court), finding Jojit Garingarao (Garingarao) Information against Garingarao for acts of lasciviousness
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of acts of in relation to RA 7610, as follows:
lasciviousness in relation to Republic Act No. 7610 (RA
7610). That on or about the 29th day of October 2003,
at Virgen Milagrosa University Hospital, San Carlos
The Antecedent Facts City, Pangasinan, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with
The facts of the case, as can be gleaned from the decision lewd designs, did then and there, willfully,
of the Court of Appeals, are as follows: unlawfully and feloniously touched the breast of
AAA, 16 years of age, touched her genitalia, and
inserted his finger into her vagina, to the damage
 and prejudice of said AAA who suffered psychological (a) AAAs birth certificate to establish that she was
and emotional disturbance, anxiety, sleeplessness 16 years old at the time of the incident;
and humiliation.
(b) AAAs medical records establishing her confinement
Contrary to Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code in to and discharge from Virgen Milagrosa Medical
relation to RA 7610. Center;

During the trial, AAA testified that on 29 October 2003, (c) the schedule of duties of the nurses at the
between 7:00 a.m. and 8:00 a.m., Garingarao, who was hospital showing that Garingarao was on duty from
wearing a white uniform, entered her room and asked if she 12:00 a.m. to 8:00 a.m. on 29 October 2003;
already took her medicines and if she was still
experiencing pains. AAA replied that her stomach was no (d) a certificate from the Department of Education
longer painful. Garingarao then lifted AAAs bra and touched Division Office showing that BBB was present at the
her left breast. Embarrassed, AAA asked Garingarao what he office from 8:00 a.m. to 9:00 a.m. on 29 October 2003;
was doing. Garingarao replied that he was just examining
her. Garingarao then left the room and returned 15 to 30 (e) AAAs Medical Payment Notice;
minutes later with a stethoscope. Garingarao told AAA that
he would examine her again. Garingarao lifted AAAs shirt, (f) the incident report filed by AAAs parents with the
pressed the stethoscope to her stomach and touched her two police; and
nipples. Garingarao then lifted AAAs pajama and underwear
and pressed the lower part of her abdomen. Garingarao then (g) a letter from the hospital administrator
slid his finger inside AAAs private part. AAA instinctively requiring Garingarao to explain why no administrative
crossed her legs and again asked Garingarao what he was action should be filed against him in view of the
doing. She asked him to stop and informed him she had her incident.
monthly period. Garingarao ignored AAA and continued to
insert his finger inside her private part. Garingarao only For the defense, Garingarao gave a different version of the
stopped when he saw that AAA really had her monthly period. incident. Garingarao alleged that on 29 October 2003, he
He went inside the bathroom of the private room, washed and his nursing aide Edmundo Tamayo (Tamayo) went inside
his hands, applied alcohol and left. When BBB arrived at AAAs room to administer her medicines and check her vital
the hospital, AAA insisted on going home. She only narrated signs. BBB then accused them of not administering the
the incident to her parents when they got home and they medicines properly and on time. Garingarao told BBB that
went back to the hospital to report the incident to they should not be told how to administer the medicines
Dr. Morante. because they knew what they were doing and that they would
be accountable should anything happen to AAA. A heated
Dr. Morante testified on AAAs confinement to and discharge argument ensued between BBB and Garingarao. BBB
from the hospital. told Garingarao he was an arrogant
nurse. Garingarao replied that if BBB had any complaint,
The prosecution presented the following documents before he could report the matter to the
the trial court: hospital. Garingaraodenied that he inserted his finger into
AAAs private part and that he fondled her relation to Republic Act 7610, and sentencing him to
breasts. Garingarao alleged that the filing of the case was suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from 12
motivated by the argument he had with BBB. years to 1 day of Reclusion Temporal as minimum to 14
years and 8 months of Reclusion Temporal as maximum.
Tamayo testified that he was with Garingarao when they went
to AAAs room between 7:00 a.m. and 8:00 a.m. of 29 October The accused is ordered to pay to the minor victim
2003. He alleged that BBB was present and he [AAA] P20,000.00 as moral damages and P10,000.00 as
accused Garingarao of not administering the medications fine.
properly. Tamayo alleged that Garingarao and BBB had an
argument. Tamayo stated that he would always SO ORDERED.
accompany Garingaraowhenever the latter would visit the
rooms of the patients. Garingarao appealed from the trial courts Decision.

The Decision of the Trial Court The Decision of the Court of Appeals

In its Decision dated 5 November 2007, the trial court
found Garingarao guilty as charged. The trial court gave
credence to the testimony of AAA over Garingaraos denial.
The trial court ruled that Garingarao was positively
identified by AAA as the person who entered her room,
touched her breasts and inserted his finger into her
private part. The trial court also found that the
prosecution was able to establish that BBB and CCC were
not in the room when Garingarao went inside.
The trial court found as baseless Garingaraos defense that
the case was only motivated by the argument he had with
BBB. The trial court ruled that it was illogical for BBB
to convince his daughter to fabricate a story of sexual
abuse just to get even at Garingarao over a heated
argument.
The dispositive portion of the trial courts Decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby
rendered finding the
accused Jojit Garingarao GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of acts of lasciviousness in
In its 26 November 2009 Decision, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the trial courts decision with modifications.
The Court of Appeals ruled that while Garingarao was
charged for acts of lasciviousness in relation to RA 7610,
he should be convicted under RA 7610 because AAA was 16
years old when the crime was committed. The Court of Appeals
ruled that under Section 5(b) of RA 7610, the offender
shall be charged with rape or lascivious conduct under the
Revised Penal Code (RPC) only if the victim is below 12
years old; otherwise, the provisions of RA 7610 shall
prevail.
The Court of Appeals ruled that based on the evidence on
record and the testimony of AAA, the decision of the trial
court has to be affirmed. The Court of Appeals ruled that
under Section 2(h) of the Rules and Regulations on the
Reporting and Investigation of Child Abuse Cases, the
introduction of any object into the genitalia of the
offended party as well as the intentional touching of her
breasts when done with the intent to sexually gratify the
offender qualify as a lascivious act. AAAs testimony
established that Garingarao committed the lascivious acts.
The Court of Appeals found no reason for AAA or her family Garingarao filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 22
to fabricate the charges against Garingarao. The Court of June 2010 Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied the
Appeals ruled that Garingaraos claim that the case was motion.
filed so that BBB could get even with him because of the
argument they had was too shallow to be given Hence, the petition before this Court.
consideration. The Court of Appeals likewise
rejected Garingaraos defense of denial which could not The Issue
prevail over the positive testimony of AAA.
The only issue in this case is whether the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals modified the penalty imposed by the committed a reversible error in affirming with
trial court. The Court of Appeals ruled that the duration modifications the trial courts decision.
of reclusion temporal in its maximum period should be 17
years, 4 months and 1 day to 20 years and not 14 years and The Ruling of this Court
8 months as imposed by the trial court. The Court of Appeals
also raised the award of moral damages and fine, which was The petition has no merit.
deemed as civil indemnity, to conform with recent
jurisprudence. Garingarao alleges that the Court of Appeals erred in
affirming the trial courts decision finding him guilty of
The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals Decision acts of lasciviousness in relation to RA
reads: 7610. Garingarao insists that it was physically impossible
for him to commit the acts charged against him because
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision there were many patients and hospital employees around. He
dated November 5, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court of alleges that AAAs room was well lighted and that he had an
San Carlos City, Pangasinan in Criminal Case No. SCC- assistant when the incident allegedly
4167 is hereby AFFIRMED with the following occurred. Garingarao further alleges that, assuming the
MODIFICATIONS: charges were correct, there was only one incident when he
allegedly touched AAA and as such, he should have been
1. The penalty imposed on the accused- convicted only of acts of lasciviousness and not of
appellant is 14 years and 8 months of violation of RA 7610.
reclusion temporal as minimum to 20 years
of reclusion temporal as maximum[;] We do not agree.

2. The award of moral damages is raised Credibility of Witnesses

from P20,000.00 to P50,000.00; and
The Court has ruled that in case of acts of lasciviousness,
3. The award of indemnity is raised the lone testimony of the offended party, if credible, is
from P10,000.00 to P50,000.00. sufficient to establish the guilt of the accused. In this
case, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found
SO ORDERED the testimony of AAA credible over Garingaraos defense of
denial and alibi. It is a settled rule that denial is a
weak defense as against the positive identification by the
victim. Both denial and alibi are inherently weak defenses
and constitute self-serving negative evidence which cannot
be accorded greater evidentiary weight than the positive
declaration by a credible witness.Garingaraos defense of
denial and alibi must fail over the positive and
straightforward testimony of AAA on the incident. Further,
like the trial court and the Court of Appeals, we find
incredible Garingaraos defense that the case was an
offshoot of a heated argument he had with AAAs father over
the manner Garingarao was giving AAAs medications. It is
hard to believe that AAAs parents would expose her to a
public trial if the charges were not true. In addition, the
prosecution was able to establish that, contrary
to Garingaraos allegation, both BBB and CCC were not in
AAAs room at the time of the incident.
Violation of RA 7610
Section 5, Article III of RA 7610 provides:
Section 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual
Abuse. - Children, whether male or female, who for
money, profit, or any other consideration or due to
the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or
group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in
prostitution and other sexual abuse.
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period
to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon the
following:
(a) x x x
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct with a child exploited in
prostitution or subject to other sexual abuse;
Provided, That when the victim is under twelve (12)
years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted
under Article 335, paragraph 3 for rape and Article
336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal
Code, for rape or lascivious conduct, as the case may
be; Provided, That the penalty for lascivious conduct
when the victim is under twelve (12) yeas of age shall
be reclusion temporal in its medium period, x x x
(c) x x x
The elements of sexual abuse under Section 5, Article III
of RA 7610 are the following:
1. The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct;
2. The said act is performed with a child exploited in
prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse; and
3. The child, whether male or female, is below 18 years
of age.
Under Section 32, Article XIII of the Implementing Rules
and Regulations of RA 7610, lascivious conduct is defined
as follows:
[T]he intentional touching, either directly or through
clothing, of the genitalia, anus, groin, breast,
inner thigh, or buttocks, or the introduction of any
object into the genitalia, anus or mouth, of any
person, whether of the same or opposite sex, with the
intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse
or gratify the sexual desire of any person,
bestiality, masturbation, lascivious exhibition of
the genitals or pubic area of a person.
In this case, the prosecution established
that Garingarao touched AAAs breasts and inserted his
finger into her private part for his sexual awarded by the Court of Appeals to P15,000. We also impose
gratification. Garingarao used his influence as a nurse by on Garingarao a fine of P15,000.
pretending that his actions were part of the physical
examination he was doing. Garingarao persisted on what he WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the 26 November
was doing despite AAAs objections. AAA twice 2009 Decision and 22 June 2010 Resolution of the Court of
asked Garingarao what he was doing and he answered that he Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 31354 with MODIFICATIONS. The
was just examining her. Court finds Jojit Garingarao GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of acts of lasciviousness in relation to Republic
The Court has ruled that a child is deemed subject to other Act No. 7610. He is sentenced to suffer the penalty of 14
sexual abuse when the child is the victim of lascivious years and 8 months of reclusion temporal as minimum to 20
conduct under the coercion or influence of any adult. In years of reclusion temporal as maximum and ordered to pay
lascivious conduct under the coercion or influence of any AAA P20,000 as civil indemnity, P15,000 as moral damages
adult, there must be some form of compulsion equivalent to and a fine of P15,000.
intimidation which subdues the free exercise of the
offended partys free will. In this case, Garingarao coerced SO ORDERED.
AAA into submitting to his lascivious acts by pretending
that he was examining her.

Garingarao insists that, assuming that the testimonies of

the prosecution witnesses were true, he should not be
convicted of violation of RA 7610 because the incident
happened only once. Garingarao alleges that the single
incident would not suffice to hold him liable under RA
7610.

Garingaraos argument has no legal basis.

The Court has already ruled that it is inconsequential that

sexual abuse under RA 7610 occurred only once. Section 3(b)
of RA 7610 provides that the abuse may be habitual or not.
Hence, the fact that the offense occurred only once is
enough to hold Garingarao liable for acts of lasciviousness
under RA 7610.

Indemnity and Moral Damages

In view of recent jurisprudence, we deem it proper to reduce

the amount of indemnity to P20,000 and moral damages

EN BANC
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
- versus -
RICHARD O. SARCIA,
Accused-Appellant.
x----------------------------------------------x
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape committed
against AAA, and sentenced him to suffer the penalty
of Reclusion Perpetua and to pay the amount of P50,000.00
G.R. No. 169641 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and the
cost of the suit. However, the CA modified the penalties
imposed by the RTC by imposing the death penalty,
Present: increasing the award of civil indemnity to P75,000.00, and
PUNO, C.J., awarding P25,000.00 as exemplary damages, aside from
QUISUMBING, the P50,000.00 for moral damages.
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
CARPIO, The crime of rape was allegedly committed sometime in
CORONA, 1996 against AAA, a five (5) year old girl. After almost
CARPIO MORALES, four (4) years, AAAs father filed a complaint for acts of
CHICO-NAZARIO, lasciviousness against herein accused-appellant on July 7,
VELASCO, JR., 2000. Upon review of the evidence, the Office of the
NACHURA, Provincial Prosecutor at Ligao, Albay upgraded the charge
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, to rape. The Information dated September 5, 2000 reads:
BRION,
PERALTA, That sometime in 1996 at Barangay Doa
BERSAMIN, Tomasa, Municipality of Guinobatan, Province of
DEL CASTILLO, and Albay, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
ABAD, JJ. of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
with lewd and unchaste design, and by means of
force, threats and intimidation, did then and
Promulgated: there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have
sexual intercourse with [AAA], who was then 6
September 10, 2009 years of age, against her will and consent, to
her damage and prejudice.

D E C I S I O N ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.: At his arraignment on October 25, 2000, accused-

On automatic review is the decision dated July 14,
2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No.
00717 which affirmed, with modifications, an earlier
decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Ligao City,
Branch 13, in Criminal Case No. 4134, finding herein
accused-appellant Richard O. Sarcia alias Nogi guilty
appellant, with the assistance of his counsel, entered a
plea of not guilty. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
The prosecution presented the oral testimonies of the
victim AAA; her minor cousin; her father; and Dr. Joana
Manatlao, the Municipal Health Officer of Guinobatan,
Albay. The defense presented the accused-appellant
himself, who vehemently denied committing the crimes
imputed to him and Manuel Casimiro, Clerk of Court II of
the Municipal Trial Court at Guinobatan, Albay.
On January 17, 2003, the trial court rendered its
Decision finding the accused-appellant guilty of the crime
of rape and imposed the penalty mentioned above.
The record of this case was forwarded to this Court
in view of the Notice of Appeal filed by the accused-
appellant.
Accused-appellant filed his Appellants Brief on July 15,
2004, while the People, through the Office of the Solicitor
General, filed its Appellees Brief on December 15, 2004.
Pursuant to our pronouncement in People v. Mateo, modifying
the pertinent provisions of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure insofar as they provide for direct appeals from
the RTC to this Court in cases in which the penalty imposed
by the trial court is death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, and the Resolution dated September 19, 1995
in Internal Rules of the Supreme Court, the case was
transferred, for appropriate action and disposition, to the
CA where it was docketed as CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00717.
As stated at the beginning hereof, the CA, in its
decision of July 14, 2005, in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 000717,
affirmed with modification the judgment of conviction
pronounced by the trial court. We quote the fallo of the
CA decision:
WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction
is AFFIRMED. The accused, Richard Sarcia y
Olivera, is ordered to suffer the penalty of
DEATH, and to pay the victim, [AAA], the amount
of (1) P75,000.00 as civil indemnity;
(2) P50,000.00 as moral damages, and
(3) P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
Let the entire records of this case be elevated
to the Supreme Court for review, pursuant to A.M.
No. 00-5-03-SC (Amendments to the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure to Govern Death Penalty
Cases), which took effect on October 15, 2004.
SO ORDERED.
On September 30, 2005, the case was elevated to this Court
for further review.
In our Resolution of November 15, 2005, we required the
parties to simultaneously submit their respective
supplemental briefs. Accused-appellant filed his
Supplemental Brief on April 7, 2006. Having failed to
submit one, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) was
deemed to have waived the filing of its supplemental brief.
In his Brief filed before the CA, accused-appellant raised
the following assignment of errors:
I
THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE
TO THE TESTIMONY OF [AAA], [her cousin] and [her
father].
II
THE LOWER COURT GLARINGLY ERRED IN REJECTING THE
DEFENSE OF ALIBI INTERPOSED BY THE ACCUSED WHICH
IS MORE CREDIBLE.
III
THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING
THE ACCUSED RICHARD SARCIA.
The evidence for the prosecution is summarized by the
OSG in the Appellee's Brief, as follows:

On December 16, 1996, five-year-old [AAA],
together with her [cousin and two other
playmates], was playing in the yard of Saling
Crisologo near a mango tree.
Suddenly, appellant appeared and invited
[AAA] to go with him to the backyard of Saling
Crisologos house. She agreed. Unknown to
appellant, [AAAs cousin] followed them.
Upon reaching the place, appellant removed
[AAAs] shorts and underwear. He also removed his
trousers and brief. Thereafter, he ordered [AAA]
to lie down on her back. Then, he lay on top of
her and inserted his penis into [AAAs] private
organ. Appellant made an up-and-down movement
(Nagdapadapa tabi). [AAA] felt severe pain
inside her private part and said aray. She also
felt an intense pain inside her stomach.
[AAAs cousin], who positioned herself
around five (5) meters away from them, witnessed
appellants dastardly act. Horrified, [AAAs
cousin] instinctively rushed to the house of
[AAAs] mother, her aunt Emily, and told the
latter what she had seen. [AAAs] mother answered
that they (referring to {AAA and her cousin} were
still very young to be talking about such
matters.
Meanwhile, after satisfying his lust,
appellant stood up and ordered [AAA] to put on
her clothes. Appellant then left.
Perplexed, [AAAs cousin] immediately
returned to the backyard of Saling Crisologo
where she found [AAA] crying. Appellant,
however, was gone. [AAAs cousin] approached
[AAA] and asked her what appellant had done to
her. When [AAA] did not answer, [her cousin] did
not ask her any further question and just
accompanied her home.
At home, [AAA] did not tell her mother what
appellant had done to her because she feared that
her mother might slap her. Later, when her mother
washed her body, she felt a grating sensation in
her private part. Thereafter, [AAA] called for
[her cousin]. [AAAs cousin] came to their house
and told [AAAs] mother again that appellant had
earlier made an up-and-down movement on top of
[AAA]. [AAAs mother], however did not say
anything. At that time, [AAAs] father was working
in Manila.
Dr. Joana Manatloa is the Municipal Health
Officer of Guinobatan, Albay. She testified
that: (1) it was the rural health officer, Dr.
Reantaso, who conducted a physical examination
on [AAA]; (2) Dr. Reantaso prepared and signed a
medico-legal certificate containing the result
of [AAA]s examination; (3) Dr. Reantaso, however,
had already resigned as rural health officer of
Guinobatan, Albay; (4) as a medical doctor, she
can interpret, the findings in said medico-legal
certificate issued to [AAA]; (5) [AAA]s medical
findings are as follows: negative for introital
vulvar laceration nor scars, perforated hymen,
complete, pinkish vaginal mucosa, vaginal admits
little finger with resistance; (6) the finding
negative for introital bulvar laceration nor
scars means, in laymans language, that there was
no showing of any scar or wound, and (7) there
is a complete perforation of the hymen which
means that it could have been subjected to a
certain trauma or pressure such as strenuous
 exercise or the entry of an object like a medical
instrument or penis.
On the other hand, the trial court summarized the
version of the defense as follows:
Richard Sarcia, 24 years old, single,
student and a resident of Doa Tomasa, Guinobatan,
Albay denied he raped [AAA]. While he knows
[AAAs] parents, because sometimes they go to
their house looking for his father to borrow
money, he does not know [AAA] herself. His father
retired as a fireman from Crispa in 1991 while
his mother worked as an agriculturist in
the Municipality of Teresa, Antipolo, Rizal. As
an agriculturist of the Department of
Agriculture, his mother would bring seedlings and
attend seminars in Batangas and Baguio. They
were residing in Cainta, Rizal when sometime in
1992 they transferred residence to Guinobatan,
Albay. His father is from barangay Masarawag
while his mother is from barangay Doa Tomasa both
of Guinobatan, Albay. After their transfer in
Guinobatan, his mother continued to be an
agriculturist while his father tended to his 1-
hectare coconut land. Richard testified he was
between fourteen (14) and fifteen (15) years old
in 1992 when they transferred to
Guinobatan. Between 1992 and 1994 he was out of
school. But from 1994 to 1998 he took his high
school at Masarawag High School. His daily
routine was at about 4:00 oclock in the afternoon
after school before proceeding home he would
usually play basketball at the basketball court
near the church in Doa Tomasa about 1 kilometer
away from their house. When her mother suffered
a stroke in 1999 he and his father took turns
taking care of his mother. Richard denied
molesting other girls ... and was most surprised
when he was accused of raping [AAA]. He knows
Saling Crisologo and the latters place which is
more than half kilometer to their house. Richard
claimed Salvacion Bobier, grandmother of Mae
Christine Camu, whose death on May 7, 2000 was
imputed to him and for which a case for Murder
under Criminal Case No. 4087 was filed against
him with the docile cooperation of [AAAs] parents
who are related to Salvacion, concocted and
instigated [AAAs] rape charge against him to make
the case for Murder against him stronger and life
for him miserable. He was incarcerated on May 10,
2000 for the Murder charge and two (2) months
later while he already in detention, the rape
case supposedly committed in 1996 was filed
against him in the Municipal Trial Court (MTC)
of Guinobatan, Albay. He was to learn about it
from his sister, Marivic, on a Sunday afternoon
sometime on July 20, 2000 when his sister visited
him in jail. He naturally got angry when he heard
of this rape charge because he did not do such
thing and recalled telling his sister they can
go to a doctor and have the child examine to
prove he did not rape her. Subsequently, from his
sister again he was to learn that the rape case
was ordered dismissed.
On cross-examination, Richard admitted
[AAAs] mother, is also related to his father,
[AAA mothers] father, being a second cousin of
his father. Richard is convinced it is not the
lending of money by his father to the AAAs family
as the motive for the latter to file the rape
case against him but the instigation of Salvacion
Bobier.
Manuel A. Casimiro, Clerk of Court II of
the Municipal Trial Court (MTC), Guinobatan,
Albay, testified on the records of Criminal Case
 No. 7078 filed in MTC Guinobatan, Albay against
Richard Sarcia for Rape in relation to RA 7610
relative to the alleged withdrawal of said rape
case but the accused through counsel failed to
formally offer the marked exhibits relative to
said case.
Accused-appellant alleges that the trial court erred
in convicting him, as the prosecution was not able to prove
his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. He assailed the
credibility of the prosecution witnesses, AAA, her cousin
and her father on the following grounds: (1) the
testimonies of AAA and her cousin were inconsistent with
each other; (2) the victim was confused as to the date and
time of the commission of the offense; (3) there was a
four-year delay in filing the criminal case, and the only
reason why they filed the said case was to help Salvacion
Bobier get a conviction of this same accused in a murder
case filed by said Salvacion Bobier for the death of her
granddaughter Mae Christine Camu on May 7, 2000. Accused-
appellant stressed that the same Salvacion Bobier helped
AAAs father in filing the said case for rape. Accused-
appellant also claimed that the prosecution failed to prove
that he employed force, threats or intimidation to achieve
his end. Finally, accused-appellant harped on the finding
in the medical certificate issued by Dr. Reantaso and
interpreted by Dr. Joana Manatlao, stating negative for
introital bulvar laceration nor scar which means that there
was no showing of any scar or wound.
In his Appellee's Brief accused-appellant pointed out
the inconsistencies between AAAs and her cousins
testimonies as follows: (1) the cousin testified that she
played with AAA at the time of the incident, while AAA
testified that she was doing nothing before accused-
appellant invited her to the back of the house of a certain
Saling; (2) the cousin testified that when she saw accused-
appellant doing the push-and-pull motion while on top of
AAA, the latter shouted in a loud voice contrary to AAAs
testimony that when accused-appellant was inside her and
started the up-and-down motion, she said aray; (3) when
the cousin returned to AAA after telling the latters mother
what accused-appellant had done to AAA, she found AAA
crying. AAA however testified that, after putting on her
clothes, she invited the cousin to their house; and (4)
the cousin testified that other children were playing at
the time of the incident, but AAA testified that there were
only four of them who were playing at that time.
As it is oft-repeated, inconsistencies in the
testimonies of witnesses, which refer only to minor details
and collateral matters, do not affect the veracity and
weight of their testimonies where there is consistency in
relating the principal occurrence and the positive
identification of the accused. Slight contradictions in
fact even serve to strengthen the credibility of the
witnesses and prove that their testimonies are not
rehearsed. Nor are such inconsistencies, and even
improbabilities, unusual, for there is no person with
perfect faculties or senses. The alleged inconsistencies
in this case are too inconsequential to overturn the
findings of the court a quo. It is important that the two
prosecution witnesses were one in saying that it was
accused-appellant who sexually abused AAA. Their positive,
candid and straightforward narrations of how AAA was
sexually abused by accused-appellant evidently deserve full
faith and credence. When the rape incident happened, AAA
was only five (5) years old; and when she and her cousin
testified, they were barely 9 and 11 years old,
respectively. This Court has had occasion to rule that the
alleged inconsistencies in the testimonies of the witnesses
can be explained by their age and their inexperience with
court proceedings, and that even the most candid of
witnesses commit mistakes and make confused and
inconsistent statements. This is especially true of young
witnesses, who could be overwhelmed by the atmosphere of
the courtroom. Hence, there is more reason to accord them
ample space for inaccuracy.

Accused-appellant capitalizes on AAAs inability to
recall the exact date when the incident in 1996 was
committed. Failure to recall the exact date of the crime,
however, is not an indication of false testimony, for even
discrepancies regarding exact dates of rapes are
inconsequential and immaterial and cannot discredit the
credibility of the victim as a witness. In People v.
Purazo, We ruled:
We have ruled, time and again that the date
is not an essential element of the crime of rape,
for the gravamen of the offense is carnal
knowledge of a woman. As such, the time or place
of commission in rape cases need not be
accurately stated. As early as 1908, we already
held that where the time or place or any other
fact alleged is not an essential element of the
crime charged, conviction may be had on proof of
the commission of the crime, even if it appears
that the crime was not committed at the precise
time or place alleged, or if the proof fails to
sustain the existence of some immaterial fact set
out in the complaint, provided it appears that
the specific crime charged was in fact committed
prior to the date of the filing of the complaint
or information within the period of the statute
of limitations and at a place within the
jurisdiction of the court.
Also in People v. Salalima, the Court held:
Failure to specify the exact dates or time
when the rapes occurred does not ipso facto make
the information defective on its face. The reason
is obvious. The precise date or time when the
victim was raped is not an element of the
offense. The gravamen of the crime is the fact
of carnal knowledge under any of the
circumstances enumerated under Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code. As long as it is alleged that
the offense was committed at any time as near to
the actual date when the offense was committed
an information is sufficient. In previous cases,
we ruled that allegations that rapes were
committed before and until October 15,
1994, sometime in the year 1991 and the days
thereafter, sometime in November 1995 and some
occasions prior and/or subsequent thereto and on
or about and sometime in the year 1988 constitute
sufficient compliance with Section 11, Rule 110
of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.
In this case, AAAs declaration that the rape incident
took place on December 15, 1996 was explained by the trial
court, and we quote:
The rape took place in 1996. As earlier
noted by the Court the date December 15, 1996
mentioned by [AAA] may have been arbitrarily
chosen by the latter due to the intense cross-
examination she was subjected but the Court
believes it could have been in any month and date
in the year 1996 as in fact neither the
information nor [AAAs] sworn statement mention
the month and date but only the year.
Likewise, witnesses credibility is not affected by the
delay in the filing of the case against accused-
appellant. Neither does the delay bolster accused-
appellants claim that the only reason why this case was
filed against him was to help Salvacion Bobier get a
conviction of this same accused-appellant in the case of
murder filed by Salvacion Bobier for the death of her
granddaughter Mae Christine Camu on May 7, 2000.
The rape victims delay or hesitation in reporting the
crime does not destroy the truth of the charge nor is it
an indication of deceit. It is common for a rape victim to
prefer silence for fear of her aggressor and the lack of
courage to face the public stigma of having been sexually
abused. In People v. Coloma we even considered an 8-year
delay in reporting the long history of rape by the victims
father as understandable and not enough to render
incredible the complaint of a 13-year-old daughter. Thus,
in the absence of other circumstances that show that the
charge was a mere concoction and impelled by some ill
motive, delay in the filing of the complainant is not
sufficient to defeat the charge.Here, the failure of AAAs
parents to immediately file this case was sufficiently
justified by the complainants father in the latters
testimony, thus:
Q But, did you not say, please correct me if I
am wrong, you got angry when your wife told
you that something happened to Hazel way back
in 1996?
A Yes, sir.
Q Yet, despite your anger you were telling us
that you waited until June to file this case?
A After I heard about the incident, I and my wife
had a talk for which reason that during that
time we had no money yet to use in filing the
case, so we waited. When we were able to save
enough amounts, we filed the case.
Accused-appellant also contends that he could not be
liable for rape because there is no proof that he employed
force, threats or intimidation in having carnal knowledge
of AAA. Where the girl is below 12 years old, as in this
case, the only subject of inquiry is whether carnal
knowledge took place. Proof of force, intimidation or
consent is unnecessary, since none of these is an element
of statutory rape. There is a conclusive presumption of
absence of free consent when the rape victim is below the
age of twelve.
Accused-appellant harps on the medical report,
particularly the conclusion quoted as follows: negative for
introital bulvar laceration nor scars, which means, in
layman language, that there was no showing of any scar or
wound. The Court has consistently ruled that the presence
of lacerations in the victims sexual organ is not necessary
to prove the crime of rape and its absence does not negate
the fact of rape. A medical report is not indispensable in
a prosecution for rape. What is important is that AAAs
testimony meets the test of credibility, and that is
sufficient to convict the accused.
Accused-appellants defense of denial was properly
rejected. Time and time again, we have ruled that denial
like alibi is the weakest of all defenses, because it is
easy to concoct and difficult to disprove. Furthermore, it
cannot prevail over the positive and unequivocal
identification of appellant by the offended party and other
witnesses. Categorical and consistent positive
identification, absent any showing of ill motive on the
part of the eyewitness testifying on the matter, prevails
over the appellants defense of denial and alibi. The
shallow hypothesis put forward by accused-appellant that
he was accused of raping AAA due to the instigation of
Salvacion Bobier hardly convinces this Court. On this
score, the trial court aptly reached the following
conclusion:
True, Salvacion Bobier actively assisted
AAAs family file the instant case against the
accused, but the Court believes [AAAs] parents
finally decided to file the rape case because
after they have come to realize after what
happened to Mae Christine Camu that what
previously [AAA and her cousin] told her mother
and which the latter had continually ignored is
after all true.
AAA was barely 9 years of age when she testified. It has
been stressed often enough that the testimony of rape
victims who are young and immature deserve full
credence. It is improbable for a girl of complainants age
to fabricate a charge so humiliating to herself and her
family had she not been truly subjected to the painful
experience of sexual abuse.At any rate, a girl of tender
years, innocent and guileless, cannot be expected to
brazenly impute a crime so serious as rape to any man if
it were not true. Parents would not sacrifice their own
daughter, a child of tender years at that, and subject her
to the rigors and humiliation of public trial for rape, if
they were not motivated by an honest desire to have their
daughters transgressor punished accordingly. Hence, the
logical conclusion is that no such improper motive exists
and that her testimony is worthy of full faith and credence.
The guilt of accused-appellant having been established
beyond reasonable doubt, we discuss now the proper penalty
to be imposed on him.
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Republic Act No. 7659, was the governing law at the time
the accused-appellant committed the rape in question.Under
the said law, the penalty of death shall be imposed when
the victim of rape is a child below seven years of age. In
this case, as the age of AAA, who was five (5) years old
at the time the rape was committed, was alleged in the
information and proven during trial by the presentation of
her birth certificate, which showed her date of birth as
January 16, 1991, the death penalty should be imposed.
However, this Court finds ground for modifying the penalty
imposed by the CA. We cannot agree with the CAs conclusion
that the accused-appellant cannot be deemed a minor at the
time of the commission of the offense to entitle him to
the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority pursuant
to Article 68(2) of the Revised Penal Code. When accused
appellant testified on March 14, 2002, he admitted that he
was 24 years old, which means that in 1996, he was 18 years
of age. As found by the trial court, the rape incident
could have taken place in any month and date in the year
1996. Since the prosecution was not able to prove the exact
date and time when the rape was committed, it is not certain
that the crime of rape was committed on or after he reached
18 years of age in 1996. In assessing the attendance of
the mitigating circumstance of minority, all doubts should
be resolved in favor of the accused, it being more
beneficial to the latter. In fact, in several cases, this
Court has appreciated this circumstance on the basis of a
lone declaration of the accused regarding his age.
Under Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code, when the
offender is a minor under 18 years, the penalty next lower
than that prescribed by law shall be imposed, but always
in the proper period. However, for purposes of determining
the proper penalty because of the privileged mitigating
circumstance of minority, the penalty of death is still
the penalty to be reckoned with. Thus, the proper imposable
penalty for the accused-appellant is reclusion perpetua.
It is noted that the Court is granted discretion in
awarding damages provided in the Civil Code, in case a
crime is committed. Specifically, Article 2204 of the Civil
Code provides that in crimes, the damages to be adjudicated
may be respectively increased or lessened according to the
aggravating or mitigating circumstances. The issue now is
whether the award of` damages should be reduced in view of
the presence here of the privileged mitigating circumstance
of minority of the accused at the time of the commission
of the offense.
A review of the nature and purpose of the damages
imposed on the convicted offender is in order. Article 107
of the Revised Penal Code defines the term indemnification,
which is included in the civil liability prescribed by
Article 104 of the same Code, as follows:
 Art. 107. Indemnification-What is included.
Indemnification for consequential damages shall
include not only those caused the injured party,
but also those suffered by his family or by a
third person by reason of the crime.
Relative to civil indemnity, People
Victor ratiocinated as follows:
The lower court, however, erred in
categorizing the award of P50,000.00 to the
offended party as being in the nature of moral
damages. We have heretofore explained in People
v. Gementiza that the indemnity authorized by
our criminal law as civil liability ex
delicto for the offended party, in the amount
authorized by the prevailing judicial policy and
aside from other proven actual damages, is itself
equivalent to actual or compensatory damages in
civil law. It is not to be considered as moral
damages thereunder, the latter being based on
different jural foundations and assessed by the
court in the exercise of sound discretion.
One other point of concern has to be
addressed. Indictments for rape continue
unabated and the legislative response has been
in the form of higher penalties. The Court
believes that, on like considerations, the
jurisprudential path on the civil aspect should
follow the same direction. Hence, starting with
the case at bar, if the crime of rape is committed
or effectively qualified by any of the
circumstances under which the death penalty is
authorized by the present amended law, the
indemnity for the victim shall be in the
increased amount of not less
than P75,000.00. This is not only a reaction to
the apathetic societal perception of the penal
law, and the financial fluctuations over time,
but also an expression of the displeasure of the
Court over the incidence of heinous crimes
against chastity. (Emphasis Supplied)
The Court has had the occasion to rule that moral damages
are likewise compensatory in nature. In San Andres v. Court
v. of Appeals, we held:
x x x Moral damages, though incapable of
pecuniary estimation, are in the category of an
award designed to compensate the claimant for
actual injury suffered and not to impose a
penalty on the wrongdoer. (Emphasis Supplied)
In another case, this Court also explained:
What we call moral damages are treated in
American jurisprudence as compensatory
damages awarded for mental pain and suffering or
mental anguish resulting from a wrong (25 C.J.S.
815). (Emphasis Supplied)
Thus, according to law and jurisprudence, civil
indemnity is in the nature of actual and compensatory
damages for the injury caused to the offended party and
that suffered by her family, and moral damages are likewise
compensatory in nature. The fact of minority of the
offender at the time of the commission of the offense has
no bearing on the gravity and extent of injury caused to
the victim and her family, particularly considering the
circumstances attending this case. Here, the accused-
appelant could have been eighteen at the time of the
commission of the rape. He was accorded the benefit of the
privileged mitigating circumstance of minority because of
a lack of proof regarding his actual age and the date of
the rape rather than a moral or evidentiary certainty of
his minority.
 In any event, notwithstanding the presence of the award of P50,000.00 as moral damages should also
privileged mitigating circumstance of minority, which be increased to P75,000 pursuant to current
warrants the lowering of the public penalty by one degree, jurisprudence on qualified rape.
there is no justifiable ground to depart from the
jurisprudential trend in the award of damages in the case It should be noted that while the new law
of qualified rape, considering the compensatory nature of prohibits the imposition of the death
the award of civil indemnity and moral damages. This was penalty, the penalty provided for by law for a
the same stance this Court took in People v. Candelario, a heinous offense is still death and the offense
case decided on July 28, 1999, which did not reduce the is still heinous.Consequently, the civil
award of damages. At that time, the damages amounted indemnity for the victim is still P75,000.00.
to P75,000.00 for civil indemnity and P50,000.00 for moral
damages, even if the public penalty imposed on the accused People v. Quiachon also ratiocinates as follows:
was lowered by one degree, because of the presence of the With respect to the award of damages, the
privileged mitigating circumstance of minority. appellate court, following prevailing
jurisprudence, correctly awarded the following
The principal consideration for the award of damages, amounts; P75,000.00 as civil indemnity which is
under the ruling in People v. Salome and People v. awarded if the crime is qualified by
Quiachon is the penalty provided by law or imposable for circumstances warranting the imposition of the
the offense because of its heinousness, not the public death penalty; P75,000.00.00 as moral damages
penalty actually imposed on the offender. because the victim is assumed to have suffered
moral injuries, hence, entitling her to an award
Regarding the civil indemnity and moral of moral damages even without proof
damages, People v. Salome explained the basis for thereof, x x x
increasing the amount of said civil damages as follows:
Even if the penalty of death is not to be imposed
The Court, likewise, affirms the civil indemnity on the appellant because of the prohibition in
awarded by the Court of Appeals to Sally in R.A. No. 9346, the civil indemnity of P75,000.00
accordance with the ruling in People v. is still proper because, following the
Sambrano which states: ratiocination in People v. Victor, the said
award is not dependent on the actual imposition
As to damages, we have held that if the rape is of the death penalty but on the fact that
perpetrated with any of the attending qualifying qualifying circumstances warranting the
circumstances that require the imposition of the imposition of the death penalty attended the
death penalty, the civil indemnity for the victim commission of the offense. The Court declared
shall P75,000.00 Also, in rape cases, moral that the award of P75,000.00 shows not only a
damages are awarded without the need proof other reaction to the apathetic societal perception of
than the fact of rape because it is assumed that the penal law and the financial fluctuations over
the victim has suffered moral injuries entitling time but also the expression of the displeasure
her to such an award.However, the trial courts
 of the court of the incidence of heinous crimes
against chastity.
The litmus test therefore, in the determination of the
civil indemnity is the heinous character of the crime
committed, which would have warranted the imposition of the
death penalty, regardless of whether the penalty actually
imposed is reduced to reclusion perpetua.
As to the award of exemplary damages, Article 2229 of
the Civil Code provides that exemplary or corrective
damages are imposed in addition to the moral, temperate,
liquidated or compensatory damages. Exemplary damages are
not recoverable as a matter of right. The requirements of
an award of exemplary damagees are: (1) they may be imposed
by way of example in addition to compensatory damages, and
only after the claimants right to them has been
established; (2) they cannot be recovered as a matter of
right, their determination depending upon the amount of
compensatory damages that may be awarded to the claimant;
(3) the act must be accompanied by bad faith or done in a
wanton, fraudulent, oppressive or malevolent manner. Since
the compensatory damages, such as the civil indemnity and
moral damages, are increased when qualified rape is
committed, the exemplary damages should likewise be
increased in accordance with prevailing jurisprudence.
In sum, the increased amount of P75,000.00 each as
civil indemnity and moral damages should be maintained. It
is also proper and appropriate that the award of exemplary
damages be likewise increased to the amount of P30,000.00
based on the latest jurisprudence on the award of damages
on qualified rape. Thus, the CA correctly
awarded P75,000.00 as civil indemnity. However the award
of P50,000.00 as moral damages is increased
to P75,000.00 and that of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages
is likewise increased to P30,000.00.
Meanwhile, when accused-appellant was detained at the
New Bilibid Prison pending the outcome of his appeal before
this Court, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9344, the Juvenile
Justice and Welfare Act of 2006 took effect on May 20,
2006. The RTC decision and CA decision were promulgated on
January 17, 2003 and July 14, 2005, respectively.The
promulgation of the sentence of conviction of accused-
appellant handed down by the RTC was not suspended as he
was about 25 years of age at that time, in accordance
with Article 192 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 603, The
Child and Youth Welfare Code and Section 32 of A.M. No.
02-1-18-SC, the Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the
Law. Accused-appellant is now approximately 31 years of
age. He was previously detained at the Albay Provincial
Jail at Legaspi City and transferred to the New Bilibid
Prison, Muntinlupa City on October 13, 2003.
R.A. No. 9344 provides for its retroactive application
as follows:
Sec. 68. Children Who Have Been Convicted
and are Serving Sentence. Persons who have been
convicted and are serving sentence at the time
of the effectivity of this Act, and who were
below the age of eighteen (18) years at the time
of the commission of the offense for which they
were convicted and are serving sentence, shall
likewise benefit from the retroactive
application of this Act. x x x
The aforequoted provision allows the retroactive
application of the Act to those who have been convicted
and are serving sentence at the time of the effectivity of
this said Act, and who were below the age of 18 years at
the time of the commission of the offense. With more
reason, the Act should apply to this case wherein the
conviction by the lower court is still under review. Hence,
it is necessary to examine which provisions of R.A. No.
9344 shall apply to accused-appellant, who was below 18
years old at the time of the commission of the offense.
Sec. 38 of R.A. No. 9344 provides for the automatic
suspension of sentence of a child in conflict with the law,
even if he/she is already 18 years of age or more at the
time he/she is found guilty of the offense charged. It
reads:
Sec. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. Once
the child who is under eighteen (18) years of
age at the time of the commission of the offense
is found guilty of the offense charged, the court
shall determine and ascertain any civil liability
which may have resulted from the offense
committed. However, instead of pronouncing the
judgment of conviction, the court shall place the
child in conflict with the law under suspended
sentence, without need of application: Provided,
however, That suspension of sentence shall still
be applied even if the juvenile is already
eighteen (18) of age or more at the time of the
pronouncement of his/her guilt.
Upon suspension of sentence and after considering
the various circumstances of the child, the court
shall impose the appropriate disposition
measures as provided in the Supreme Court on
Juvenile in Conflict with the Law.
The above-quoted provision makes no distinction as to the
nature of the offense committed by the child in conflict
with the law, unlike P.D. No. 603 and A.M. No. 02-1-18-
SC. The said P.D. and Supreme Court (SC) Rule provide that
the benefit of suspended sentence would not apply to a
child in conflict with the law if, among others, he/she
has been convicted of an offense punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. In
construing Sec. 38 of R.A. No. 9344, the Court is guided
by the basic principle of statutory construction that when
the law does not distinguish, we should not
distinguish. Since R.A. No. 9344 does not distinguish
between a minor who has been convicted of a capital offense
and another who has been convicted of a lesser offense,
the Court should also not distinguish and should apply the
automatic suspension of sentence to a child in conflict
with the law who has been found guilty of a heinous crime.
Moreover, the legislative intent, to apply to heinous
crimes the automatic suspension of sentence of a child in
conflict with the law can be gleaned from the Senate
deliberations on Senate Bill No. 1402 (Juvenile Justice and
Delinquency Prevention Act of 2005), the pertinent portion
of which is quoted below:
If a mature minor, maybe 16 years old to below
18 years old is charged, accused with, or may
have committed a serious offense, and may have
acted with discernment, then the child could be
recommended by the Department of Social Welfare
and Development (DSWD), by the Local Council for
the Protection of Children (LCPC), or by my
proposed Office of Juvenile Welfare and
Restoration to go through a judicial proceeding;
but the welfare, best interests, and restoration
of the child should still be a primordial or
primary consideration. Even in heinous crimes,
the intention should still be the childs
restoration, rehabilitation and
reintegration. xxx (Italics supplied)
Nonetheless, while Sec. 38 of R.A. No. 9344 provides that
suspension of sentence can still be applied even if the
child in conflict with the law is already eighteen (18)
years of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of
his/her guilt, Sec. 40 of the same law limits the said
suspension of sentence until the said child reaches the
maximum age of 21, thus:
 Sec. 40. Return of the Child in Conflict with supervised and controlled by the BUCOR, in
the Law to Court. If the court finds that the coordination with the DSWD.
objective of the disposition measures imposed
upon the child in conflict with the law have not The civil liability resulting from the commission of the
been fulfilled, or if the child in conflict with offense is not affected by the appropriate disposition
the law has willfully failed to comply with the measures and shall be enforced in accordance with law.
condition of his/her disposition or
rehabilitation program, the child in conflict WHEREFORE, the decision of the CA dated July 14, 2005 in CA-
with the law shall be brought before the court G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00717 is hereby AFFIRMED with the
for execution of judgment. following MODIFICATIONS: (1) the penalty of death imposed
on accused-appellant is reduced to reclusion
If said child in conflict with the law has perpetua;[53] and (2) accused-appellant is ordered to pay
reached eighteen (18) years of age while under the victim the amount of P75,000.00 and P30,000.00 as moral
suspended sentence, the court shall determine damages and exemplary damages, respectively. The award of
whether to discharge the child in accordance with civil indemnity in the amount of P75,000.00 is
this Act, to order execution of sentence, or to maintained. However, the case shall be REMANDED to the
extend the suspended sentence for a certain court a quo for appropriate disposition in accordance with
specified period or until the child reaches the Sec. 51 of R.A. 9344.
maximum age of twenty-one (21) years. (emphasis
ours) SO ORDERED.

To date, accused-appellant is about 31 years of age, and

the judgment of the RTC had been promulgated, even before
the effectivity of R.A. No. 9344. Thus, the application of
Secs. 38 and 40 to the suspension of sentence is now moot
and academic. However, accused-appellant shall be entitled
to appropriate disposition under Sec. 51 of R.A. No. 9344,
which provides for the confinement of convicted children
as follows:

Sec. 51. Confinement of Convicted Children in

Agricultural Camps and Other Training
Facilities. A child in conflict with the law may,
after conviction and upon order of the court, be
made to serve his/her sentence, in lieu of
confinement in a regular penal institution, in
an agricultural camp and other training
facilities that may be established, maintained,