Agapay vs.

Agapay
287 SCRA 340

Topic:

Property Regime of Unions without marriage: Unions under FC 148

DOCTRINE:

Art. 148: only properties acquired by both through actual joint

contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned by them in
common, in proportion to their respective contributions. If a party’s
contribution isn’t proven, there will be no co- ownership and no presumption
of equal shares.

FACTS:

Miguel Palang contracted his first marriage in 1949 with Carlina/Cornelia

Vallesterol. A few months later, Miguel left to work in Hawaii. In 1954, Miguel
returned for a vacation but never stayed with his wife and child. In 1957, Miguel
had attempted to divorce Carlina in Hawaii. When he returned to the Philippines
in 1972 for good, he refused to live with Carlina and his son.

In 1973, Miguel (63 years old) contracted a second marriage with Erlinda
Agapay (19 years old). Two months before said marriage, Miguel and Erlinda
jointly purchased a piece of agricultural land. In September 1975, a house and
lot was purchased by Erlinda allegedly as sole vendee.

In October 1975, Miguel and Carlina executed a Deed of Donation as a

form of compromise agreement to settle case previously filed by Carlina. In
said document, the parties agreed to donate their conjugal property to their
only child, Herminia. Miguel and Erlinda had a son, Kristopher, born 1977.
Erlinda and Miguel were convicted of concubinage in 1979.

In 1981, Miguel died, and Carlina and Herminia filed an action for
recovery of ownership and possession of riceland and house and lot that were
allegedly purchased by Miguel during his cohabitation with Erlinda. Erlinda
alleged that she had already donated her half of the riceland property to
Kristopher, and that the house and lot is her sole property having bought it
with her own money.

RTC ruled in favor of 2nd wife Erlinda. CA ruled in favor of 1st wife Carlina.

ISSUES:

WON the properties in dispute (“piece of agricultural land” and house and lot)
belong to the conjugal property of Miguel and Carlina (1st wife) and is therefore
subject to reconveyance?

RULING:

YES the properties in dispute belong to the conjugal property. CA decision

affirmed.

RATIO:

1. The deeds of sale of the properties should go to Carlina and Herminia.

Deeds of conveyance were valid. Applicable provision of law is Art. 148 of

the Family Code: property regime for when a man and a woman who aren’t
capacitated to marry cohabitate or live under a void marriage. Miguel and
Erlinda married in 1973, but their union was void because Miguel was still
married to Carlina.
 Art. 148: only properties acquired by both through actual joint
contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned by them in
common, in proportion to their respective contributions. If a party’s
contribution isn’t proven, there will be no co- ownership and no presumption
of equal shares.

2. Erlinda tried to establish by her testimony that she is engaged in the business
of buy and sell and had a sari-sari store but failed to show that she actually
contributed money to buy the riceland. On the date of conveyance, she was
only around 20 years old and Miguel was already 64 and a pensioner of the
U.S. Government. It is unrealistic to conclude that she contributed P3,750.00
as her share in the purchase price of property. She now claims that the riceland
was bought 2 months. before they actually cohabited. She intended to exclude
their case from the operation of Article 148. No proof that the riceland was
purchased even before they started living together. Even assuming that the
property was bought before cohabitation, the rules of co-ownership would still
apply and proof of actual contribution would still be essential.

3. Erlinda allegedly bought it for PhP20,000, but the notary public testified that
Miguel provided the money and simply asked that Erlinda alone be placed as
vendee. This makes it a donation, which is void under Art. 739 of the Civil Code
since it was made by persons guilty of concubinage. Art. 87 also expressly
provides that donations between spouses now also applies to donations
between those who cohabitate as spouses.

Tumlos vs Fernandez
GR No. 137650, April 12, 2000

Topic:
Property Regime of Unions without marriage: Unions under FC 148

DOCTRINE:

Art. 148: only properties acquired by both through actual joint

contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned by them in
common, in proportion to their respective contributions. If a party’s
contribution isn’t proven, there will be no co- ownership and no presumption
of equal shares.

FACTS:

Mario and Lourdes Fernandez were plaintiffs in an action for ejectment filed
against Guillerma, Gina and Toto Tumlos. In the complaint, spouses Fernandez
alleged that they are the absolute owners of an apartment building that through
their tolerance they allowed the Tumlos’ to occupy the apartment for the last 7
years without payment of any rent. It was agreed that Guillerma will pay 1,600
a month while the other defendants promised to pay 1,000 a month which was
not complied with. Demand was made several times for the defendants to
vacate the premises as they are in need of the property for the construction of
a new building.

Defendants appealed to RTC that Mario and Guillerma had an amorous

relationship and that they acquired the property in question as their love nest.
It was likewise alleged that they lived together in the said apartment building
with their 2 children for about 10 years and that Gullerma administered the
property by collecting rentals from the lessees until she discovered that Mario
deceived her as to the annulment of their marriage.

ISSUE:
WON Guillerma is a co-owner of the said apartment under Article 148.

RULING:

SC rejected the claim that Guillerma and Mario were co-owners of the subject
property. The claim was not satisfactorily proven by Guillerma since there were
no other evidence presented to validate it except for the said affidavit. Even if
the allegations of having cohabited with Mario and that she bore him two
children were true, the claim of co-ownership still cannot be accepted. Mario
is validly married with Lourdes hence Guillerma and Mario are not capacitated
to marry each other. The property relation governing their supposed
cohabitation is under Article 148 of the Family Code. Actual contribution is
required by the said provision in contrast to Art 147 which states that efforts in
the care and maintenance of the family and household are regarded as
contributions to the acquisitions of common property by one who has no salary,
income, work or industry. Such is not included in Art 148. If actual contribution
is not proven then there can be no co-ownership and no presumption of equal
shares.

Atienza v de Castro
G.R. No. 1695698, Nov. 29, 2006

Topic:

Property Regime of Unions without marriage: Unions under FC 148

DOCTRINE:
 Art. 148: only properties acquired by both through actual joint contribution
of money, property or industry shall be owned by them in common, in
proportion to their respective contributions. If a party’s contribution isn’t
proven, there will be no co- ownership and no presumption of equal shares.

FACTS:

Lupo Atienza hired Yolanda De Castro as accountant for his two corporations
(Enrico Shipping Corporation and Eurasian Maritime Corporation) in 1983.

Then their relationship became intimate despite Lupo being a married man!
They lived together in the later part of 1983. They had 2 children, after the
second child they parted ways. Then Lupo filed a complaint against Yolanda
for a judicial partition of a land between them in the Bel-Air subdivision.

Lupo alleged that Yolanda bought the said property with his own funds. Yolanda
on the other hand said she bought it with her own funds.

Trial Court said that the contested property is owned common by him and
Yolanda and ordered the partition into two equal parts.

CA reversed the TC! Saying that it was the exclusive property of Yolanda.

ISSUE:

WON the disputed property is the exclusive property of Yolanda

RULING:

Yes. Since they are not capacitated to marry each other in their cohabitation,
FC 148 applies. Under this regime only the properties acquired by both of the
parties through their actual joint contribution shall be owned by them in
proportion to their contributions. Absent of proof of contribution, it shall be
presumed to be equal. He did not show any evidence that he contributed in the
parcel of land while the accountant showed bank accounts which apparently
shows that she was capacitated to buy the said land.

Evidence of De Castro was her job as accountant and businesswoman engaged

in foreign currency trading, money lending, and jewelry retail, promisorry notes
of dealings with clients, bank account statements, and business transactions
proves that she had financial capacity on the other hand Atienza merely
provided evidence that Yolanda had no such sufficient funds and didn‘t provide
for evidence regarding his own capacity to pay for such property.

SIGNEY v. SSS
GR No. 173582, January 28, 2008

Topic:

Property Regime of Unions without marriage: SSS LAW on

Beneficiaries

DOCTRINE:

Whoever claims entitlement to the benefits provided by law should

establish his or her right thereto by substantial evidence.

FACTS:
 Rodolfo Signey Jr. a member of the SSS, died on May 21, 2001. In his
member’s records, he had designated petitioner Yolanda Signey as primary
beneficiary and his four children with her as secondary beneficiaries. Petitioner
filed a claim for death benefits with the public respondent SSS. She revealed
in her SSS claim that the deceased had a common-law wife, Gina Servano, with
whom he had two minor children.

Petitioner’s declaration was confirmed when Gina herself filed a claim for
the same death benefits which she also declared that both she and petitioner
were common-law wives of the deceased and that Editha Espinosa was the
legal wife. In addition, in October 2001, Editha also filed an application for
death benefits with the SSS stating that she was the legal wife of the deceased.

SSS denied the death benefit claim of the petitioner and found that the
marriage between the deceased and the petitioner is null and void because of
a prior subsisting marriage contracted between the deceased and Editha as
confirmed by the local civil registry of Cebu. However, it recognized Ginalyn
and Rodelyn, the minor children of the deceased with Gina, as the primary
beneficiaries under the SSS Law.

Thereafter, petitioner filed a petition with the SSC in which she attached
a waiver of rights executed by Editha whereby the latter waived any/all claims
from Social Security System (SSS), among others due to the deceased Rodolfo
Signey Sr. SSC affirmed the decision of the SSS. The SSC gave more weight
to the SSS field investigation and the confirmed certification of marriage
showing that the deceased was married to Editha, than to the aforestated
declarations of Editha in her waiver of rights.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner has a superior legal right over the SSS benefits as
against the illegitimate minor children of the deceased?
RULING:

As to the issue of who has the better right over the SSS death benefits, Section
8(e) and (k) of R. A. No. 8282 is very clear. Hence, we need only apply the law.

Section 8(e) and (k) of R.A. No. 8282 provides:

SEC. 8. Terms Defined.— For the purposes of this Act, the following terms shall,
unless the context indicates otherwise, have the following meanings:

xxx

(e) Dependents — The dependent shall be the following:

(1) The legal spouse entitled by law to receive support from the member;

2) The legitimate, legitimated, or legally adopted, and illegitimate child who is

unmarried, not gainfully employed and has not reached twenty-one years (21)
of age, or if over twenty-one (21) years of age, he is congenitally or while still
a minor has been permanently incapacitated and incapable of self-support,
physically or mentally; and

Whoever claims entitlement to the benefits provided by law should

establish his or her right thereto by substantial evidence. Since petitioner is
disqualified to be a beneficiary and because the deceased has no legitimate
child, it follows that the dependent illegitimate minor children of the deceased
shall be entitled to the death benefits as primary beneficiaries. The SSS Law is
clear that for a minor child to qualify as a “dependent” the only requirements
are that he/she must be below 21 years of age, not married nor gainfully
employed.
In this case, the minor illegitimate children Ginalyn and Rodelyn were born on
13 April 1996 and 20 April 2000, respectively. Had the legitimate child of the
deceased and Editha survived and qualified as a dependent under the SSS Law,
Ginalyn and Rodelyn would have been entitled to a share equivalent to only
50% of the share of the said legitimate child. Since the legitimate child of the
deceased predeceased him, Ginalyn and Rodelyn, as the only qualified primary
beneficiaries of the deceased, are entitled to 100% of the benefits.

Camillo Borromeo vs. Antonietta Descallar

G.R. No. 159310 February 24, 2009

Topic:

Property Regime of Unions without marriage: Unions under FC 148

DOCTRINE:
Art. 148: only properties acquired by both through actual joint contribution
of money, property or industry shall be owned by them in common, in
proportion to their respective contributions. If a party’s contribution isn’t
proven, there will be no co- ownership and no presumption of equal shares.

FACTS:

Wilhelm Jambrich, an Austrian, met respondent Antonietta Opalla-Descallar.

They fell in love and live together. They bought a house and lot and an Absolute
Deed of Sale was issued in their names. However, when the Deed of Absolute
Sale was presented for registration, it was refused on the ground that Jambrich
was an alien and could not acquire alienable lands of the public domain.
Consequently, his name was erased but his signature remained and the
property was issued on the name of the Respondent alone. However their
relationship did not last long and they found new love.

Jambrich met petitioner Camila Boromeo who was engaged in business.

Jambrich indebted the petitioner for a sum of money and to pay his debt, he
sold some of his properties to the petitioner and a Deed of Absolute
Sale/Assignment was issued in his favor. However, when the Petitioner sought
to register the deed of assignment it found out that said land was registered in
the name of Respondent. Petitioner filed a complaint against respondent for
recovery of real property.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not Jambrich has no title to the properties in question and may
not transfer and assign any rights and interest in favor of the petitioner?

2. Whether or not the registration of the properties in the name of respondents

make his the owner thereof.

RULINGS:

1. The evidence clearly shows that as between respondent and Jambrich, it

was Jambrich who possesses the financial capacity to acquire the properties in
dispute. At the time of the acquisition of the properties, Jamrich was the source
of funds used to purchase the three parcels of land, and to construct the house.
Jambrich was the owner of the properties in question, but his name was deleted
in the Deed of Absolute Sale because of legal constraints. Nevertheless, his
signature remained in the deed of sale where he signed as a buyer. Thus,
Jambrich has all authority to transfer all his rights, interest and participation
over the subject properties to petitioner by virtue of Deed of Assignment.
Furthermore, the fact that the disputed properties were acquired during the
couple’s cohabitation does not help the respondent. The rule of co-ownership
applies to a man and a woman living exclusively with each other as husband
and wife without the benefit of marriage, but otherwise capacitated to marry
each other does not apply. At the case at bar, respondent was still legally
married to another when she and Jambrich lived together. In such an
adulterous relationship and no co-ownership exists between the parties. It is
necessary for each of the partners to prove his or her actual contribution to the
acquisition of property in order to able to lay claim to any portion of it. (Article
148 CC)

2. It is settled rule that registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership. It is

only a means of confirming the existence with notice to the world at large. The
mere possession of a title does not make one the true owner of the property.
Thus, the mere fact that respondent has the titles of the disputed properties in
her name does not necessarily, conclusively and absolutely make her the
owner.

Heirs of Loreto Maramag v. Maramag

G.R. No. 181132 June 5, 2009

Topic:

Property Regime of Unions without marriage

DOCTRINE:

Sec. 53 of the Insurance Code states: proceeds shall be applied

exclusively to the proper interest of the person in whose name or for whose
benefit it is made, unless otherwise specified in the policy.

Article 2012. Any person who is forbidden from receiving any donation
 under article 739 cannot be named beneficiary of a life insurance policy by
the person who cannot make any donation to him, according to said article.
(n)

Article 739.The following donations shall be void:

1. Those made between persons who were guilty of adultery or
concubinage at the time of the donation;
2. Those made between persons found guilty of the same criminal
offense, in consideration thereof;
3. Those made to a public officer or his wife, descendants and
ascendants, by reason of his office.
In the case referred to in No. 1, the action for declaration of nullity may be
brought by the spouse of the donor or donee; and the guilt of the donor and
donee may be proved by preponderance of evidence in the same action. (n)

FACTS:

Petitioners were the legitimate wife and children of Loreto Maramag (Loreto),
while respondents were Loretos illegitimate family. Loreto designated
respondents as beneficiaries in his life insurance policies from Insular Life and
Great Pacific Life (Grepalife).

Petitioners insituted in the RTC a petition for revocation and/or reduction of

insurance proceeds for being void and/or inofficious, with prayer for a
temporary restraining order (TRO) and a writ of preliminary injunction. They
claim that Eva de Guzman Maramag (Eva) was a concubine of Loreto and a
suspect in the killing of the latter, thus, she is disqualified to receive any
proceeds from his insurance policies; the illegitimate children of Loreto were
entitled only to one-half of the legitime of the legitimate children, thus, the
proceeds released to them were inofficious and should be reduced; and
petitioners could not be deprived of their legitimes, which should be satisfied
first.
Petitioners allege that the designation of a beneficiary is an act of liberality or
a donation and, therefore, subject to the provisions of Articles 752[8] and
772[9] of the Civil Code.

The trial court held that the petitioners cannot invoke the law on donations or
the rules on testamentary succession in order to defeat the right of herein
defendants to collect the insurance indemnity. The beneficiary in a contract of
insurance is not the donee spoken in the law of donation. The rules on
testamentary succession cannot apply here, for the insurance indemnity does
not partake of a donation.

It also stated that the proceeds to the Life Insurance Policy belongs exclusively
to the defendant as his individual and separate property, and not to the estate
of the person whose life was insured.

The RTC disqualifed Loreto’s concubine, Eva, from being a beneficiary pursuant
to Art. 2012: Any person who is forbidden from receiving any donation under
Article 739 cannot be named beneficiary of a life insurance policy of the person
who cannot make any donation to him, but stated that the insurance contract
will still remain valid, but the indemnity must go to the legal heirs and not to
the concubine, for evidently, what is prohibited under Art. 2012 is the naming
of the improper beneficiary.

ISSUE:

Are the members of the legitimate family entitled to the proceeds of the
insurance for the concubine?

RULING:
No. Sec. 53 of the Insurance Code states: proceeds shall be applied exclusively
to the proper interest of the person in whose name or for whose benefit it is
made, unless otherwise specified in the policy.

Pursuant thereto, it is obvious that the only persons entitled to claim the
insurance proceeds are either the insured, if still alive; or the beneficiary, if the
insured is already deceased, upon the maturation of the policy. The exception
to this rule is a situation where the insurance contract was intended to benefit
third persons who are not parties to the same in the form of favorable
stipulations or indemnity. In such a case, third parties may directly sue and
claim from the insurer.

Petitioners are third parties to the insurance contracts with Insular and
Grepalife and, thus, are not entitled to the proceeds thereof.

The revocation of Eva as a beneficiary in one policy and her disqualification as

such in another are of no moment considering that the designation of the
illegitimate children as beneficiaries in Loretos insurance policies remains valid.
Because no legal proscription exists in naming as beneficiaries the children of
illicit relationships by the insured, the shares of Eva in the insurance proceeds
must be awarded to the said illegitimate children, the designated beneficiaries,
to the exclusion of petitioners. It is only in cases where the insured has not
designated any beneficiary, or when the designated beneficiary is disqualified
by law to receive the proceeds, that the insurance policy proceeds shall redound
to the benefit of the estate of the insured.

BETTY B. LACBAYAN VS. BAYANI S. SAMOY, JR.

G.R. No. 165427. March 21, 2011

Topic:
Property Regime of Unions without marriage
DOCTRINE:

While it is true that the complaint involved here is one for partition, the
same is premised on the existence or non-existence of co-ownership between
the parties.

FACTS:

During Betty Lacbayan and Bayani Samoy’s illicit relationship, they,

together with three more incorporators, were able to establish a manpower
services company, by which they acquired 5 parcels of land, registered in their
names, ostensibly as husband and wife.

Having parted ways eventually, both of them agreed to divide the said
properties and terminate their business partnership by executing a Partition
Agreement. Initially, Samoy agreed to Lacbayan's proposal that the properties
in Malvar St. and Don Enrique Heights be assigned to the latter, while the
ownership over the three other properties will go to Samoy. However, when
Lacbayan wanted additional demands, Samoy refused.

Thus, Lacbayan filed a complaint for judicial partition of the said

properties before the Quezon City RTC. In his Answer, however, Samoy denied
Lacbayan's claim of cohabitation and said that the properties were acquired out
of his own personal funds without any contribution from her.

ISSUES:

Does an action for partition preclude a settlement on the issue of

ownership?
RULING:

No. While it is true that the complaint involved here is one for partition,
the same is premised on the existence or non-existence of co-ownership
between the parties. Petitioner insists she is a co-owner pro indiviso of the five
real estate properties based on the TCTs covering the subject properties.
Respondent maintains otherwise. Indubitably, therefore, until and unless this
issue of co-ownership is definitely and finally resolved, it would be premature
to effect a partition of the disputed properties. More importantly, the complaint
will not even lie if the claimant, or petitioner in this case, does not even have
any rightful interest over the subject properties.

A careful perusal of the contents of the so-called Partition Agreement

indicates that the document involves matters which necessitate prior settlement
of questions of law, basic of which is a determination as to whether the parties
have the right to freely divide among themselves the subject properties.
Moreover, to follow petitioner's argument would be to allow respondent not
only to admit against his own interest but that of his legal spouse as well, who
may also be lawfully entitled co-ownership over the said properties. Respondent
is not allowed by law to waive whatever share his lawful spouse may have on
the disputed properties. Petitioner herself admitted that she did not assent to
the Partition Agreement after seeing the need to amend the same to include
other matters. Petitioner does not have any right to insist on the contents of
an agreement she intentionally refused to sign.

Ventura Jr. vs.Sps Paulino and Evangeline Abuda

G.R. NO: 202932

Topic:
Property Regime of Unions without marriage
DOCTRINE:

While it is true that the complaint involved here is one for partition, the
same is premised on the existence or non-existence of co-ownership between
the parties.

FACTS:

Socorro Torres and Esteban Abletes were married and both of them had
children from prior marriages. Esteban had a daughter named Evangeline
Abuda and Socorro had a son, who was the father of Edilberto U. Ventura, Jr.
the petitioner in this case. In 1978, Evangeline and Esteban operated small
business establishments located at Delpan Street, Tondo, Manila.

In 1997, Esteban sold the Vitas and Delpan properties to Evangeline

and her husband, Paulino Abuda. According to Edilberto, when Esteban was
diagnosed with colon cancer sometime in 1993, he decided to sell the Delpan
and Vitas properties to Evangeline. Evangeline continued paying the
amortizations on the two (2) properties situated in Delpan Street.

Esteban passed away on 11 September 1997, while Socorro passed

away on 31 July 1999. Leonora Urquila, the mother of Edilberto, discovered the
sale. Edilberto filed a Petition for Annulment of Deeds of Sale before the RTC-
Manila.

Edilberto alleged that the sale of the properties was fraudulent because
Esteban’s signature on the deeds of sale was forged. Respondents, on the other
hand, argued that because of Socorro’s prior marriage to Crispin, her
subsequent marriage to Esteban was null and void. Thus, neither Socorro nor
her heirs can claim any right or interest over the properties purchased by
Esteban and respondents.
ISSUE:

W/O/N there was actual contribution from Esteban in the Delpan property

RULING:

Edilberto claims that Esteban’s actual contribution to the purchase of

the Delpan property was not sufficiently proven since Evangeline shouldered
some of the amortizations. Thus, the law presumes that Esteban and Socorro
jointly contributed to the acquisition of the Delpan property. We cannot sustain
Edilberto’s claim. Both the RTC-Manila and the CA found that the Delpan
property was acquired prior to the marriage of Esteban and Socorro.
Furthermore, even if payment of the purchase price of the Delpan property was
made by Evangeline, such payment was made on behalf of her father. Article
1238 of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 1238. Payment made by a third person who does not intend to be
reimbursed by the debtor is deemed to be a donation, which requires the
debtor’s consent. But the payment is in any case valid as to the creditor who
has accepted it.

Thus, it is clear that Evangeline paid on behalf of her father, and the
parties intended that the Delpan property would be owned by and registered
under the name of Esteban. During trial, the Abuda spouses presented receipts
evidencing payments of the amortizations for the Delpan property. On the other
hand, Edilberto failed to show any evidence showing Socorro s alleged
monetary contributions. As correctly pointed out by the

CA: settled is the rule that in civil cases x x x the burden of proof rests
upon the party who, as determined by the pleadings or the nature of the case,
asserts the affirmative of an issue. x x x. Here it is Appellant who is duty bound
to prove the allegations in the complaint which undoubtedly, he miserably failed
to do so.