1
RAQUEL G. KHO, Petitioner, v. REPUBLIC
OF THE PHILIPPINES AND VERONICA B.
KHO
FACTS
In May 31, 1972, Raquel Kho’s parents called
a clerk in the office of the municipal treasurer
to instruct him to arrange the necessary
papers for the intended marriage of their son,
Raquel Kho and Veronica Kho. In June 1, 1972,
the two were married at 3 in the morning at a
church.
Claiming that he has never gone to the office
of the Local Civil Registrar to apply for a
marriage license and had not seen nor signed
any papers in connection to the procurement
of a marriage license, and considering the ONE
DAY difference between the time the clerk was
told to obtain the papers to the actual moment
of the marriage, no marriage license could
have been validly issued, Raquel Kho filed an
action for the declaration of nullity of his
marriage.
The RTC ruled that the marriage was void due
to the lack of the requiresite marriage license
and ruled in favor of Raquel Kho.
Later, the Court of Appeals reversed the
judgment of the RTC and ruled in favor of
Veronica Kho.
Raquel Kho filed a petition for review on
certiorari with the Supreme Court.
ISSUES
1. Whether the issues presented by the
petitioner in the petition for review on
certiorari are factual in nature and whether it
is proper for the Supreme Court to delve into
these issues;
2. Whether the certification issued by the local
civil registrar which attests to the absence in
its records of a marriage license, must
categorically state that the document does not
exist in the said office despite diligent search;
3. Whether the CA erred in disregarding the
petitioner’s documentary evidences of the lack
of a marriage licence and giving weight to
unsupported presumptions in favor of the
respondent; and
4. Whether the CA erred in setting aside or
reversing the lower courts judgment declaring
the marriage a nullity for the absence of the
requisite marriage license.
RULING
1. No, the issues in the petition are not factual
in nature. However, the rule that a question of
fact is not appropriate for a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court is not without exceptions, which are the
following:
(a) when the conclusion is a finding grounded
entirely on speculation, surmises, and
conjectures;
(b) when the inference made is manifestly
mistaken, absurd or impossible;
(c) where there is a grave abuse of discretion;
(d) when the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts;
(e) when the findings of fact are conflicting;
(f) When the Court of Appeals, in making its
findings, when beyond the issues of the case
and the same is contrary to the admissions of
both appellant and appellee;
(g) when the findings are contrary to those of
the trial court;
2
(h) when the findings of fact are conclusions
without citation of specific evience on which
they are based;
(i) when the facts set forth in the petition as
well as in the petitioners’ main and reply briefs
are not disputed by the respondents; and
(j) when the findings of fact of the Court of
Appeals are premised on the supposed
absence of evidence and contradicted by the
evidence on record.
In the case, of the RTC and CA on the issue on
whether there was a marriage license obtained
by petitioner and respondent are conflicting.
Hence, it was proper for the Supreme Court to
review these findings.
2. No, in a previous case (Nicdao Carino vs.
Yee Carino), the Supreme Court considered
the certification issued by the local civil
registrar, that their office had no record of a
marriage license, was adequate to prove the
non-issuance of said license.
In the present case, the petitioner was able to
present a certification issued by the civil
registrar attesting that the Office of the local
civil registrar “has no record nor copy of any
marriage license ever issued between the
parties.”
3. Yes, the CA erred in disregarding the
petitioner’s documentary evidences of the lack
of a marriage licence and giving weight to
unsupported presumptions in favor of the
respondent because the certification issued by
the Civil Registrar coupled with the testimony
of the former Civil Registrar at the time of the
wedding is sufficient to prove the absence of
the subject marriage license.
Article 58 of the Civil Code (Note: at the time
of the marriage, the Family Code was not
effective yet) makes explicit that no marriage
shall be solemnized without a license first
issued by the local civil registrar. In addition,
Article 80(3) of the Civil Code makes it clear
that a marriage performed without a marriage
license is void.
4. Yes, the CA erred in setting aside or
reversing the lower courts judgment declaring
the marriage a nullity for the absence of the
requisite marriage license because the
petitioner has successfully overcome the
presumed validity of the marriage by
presenting the certification of the civil registrar
which was sufficient to prove the absence of
the marriage license. In addition, the
respondent was not able to prove that the
marriage as valid as it is she who alleges such
validity.
Based on the certification issued by the civil
registrar and the respondent’s failure to
produce a copy of the alleged marriage license
or of any evidence to show that such license
was ever issued, the only conclusion that can
be reached is that no valid marriage license
was issued. Hence, the marriage performed is
null and void.
*The decision of the CA was reversed and set
aside.
Noveras v Noveras GR No 188289
Facts:
David and Leticia Noveras are US citizens who
own properties in the USA and in the
Philippines. They have 2 children, Jerome and
Jena. Leticia states that sometime in 2003,
David abandoned his family to live with his
mistress. Further, she states that David
executed an affidavit where he renounced all
his rights and interest in the conjugal and real
properties in the Philippines. After learning of
the extra-marital affair, Leticia filed a petition
for divorce before the Superior Court of
California. Upon issuance of the judicial decree
3
of divorce in June 2005, the US properties
were awarded to Leticia. Leticia then filed a
petition for judicial separation of conjugal
property before the RTC of Baler, Aurora.
The RTC regarded the petition for judicial
separation of conjugal property as a petition
for liquidation of property since the spouses’
marriage has already been dissolved. It
classified their property relation as absolute
community because they did not execute a
marriage settlement before their marriage
ceremony. Then, the trial court ruled that in
accordance with the doctrine of processual
presumption, Philippine law should apply
because the court cannot take judicial notice
of the US law since the parties did not submit
any proof of their national law.
The court awarded the properties in the
Philippines to David, subject to the payment of
the children’s legitimes. Upon Leticia’s appeal
to the CA, the CA ruled that the Philippine
properties be divided equally between the
spouses and that both should pay their
children P520k. David argues that the Court
should have recognized the California
judgment that awarded him the Philippine
properties and that allowing Leticia to share in
the PH properties is tantamount to unjust
enrichment considering she already owns all
the US properties.
Issues
1. Whether the marriage between David and
Leticia has been dissolved
2. Whether the filing of the judicial separation
of property is proper
Held:
1. No. the trial court erred in recognizing the
divorce decree which severed the bond of
marriage between the parties. Under Section
24 of Rule 132, the record of public documents
of a sovereign authority or tribunal may be
proved by: (1) an official publication thereof or
(2) a copy attested by the officer having the
legal custody thereof. Such publication must
be authenticated by a seal of a consular
official. Section 25 of the same Rule states that
whenever a copy of a document or record is
attested for the purpose of evidence, the
attestation must state that the copy is a
correct copy of the original. The attestation
must be under the official seal of the attesting
officer. Based on the records, only the divorce
decree was presented in evidence. The
required certificates to prove its authenticity,
as well as the pertinent California law on
divorce were not presented. Absent a valid
recognition of the divorce decree, it follows
that the parties are still legally married in the
Philippines. The trial court thus erred in
proceeding directly to liquidation.
2. Yes. Art 135 of the Family Code provides
that: Art. 135. Any of the following shall be
considered sufficient cause for judicial
separation of property: xxxx (6) That at the
time of the petition, the spouses have been
separated in fact for at least one year and
reconciliation is highly improbable. Separation
in fact for one year as a ground to grant a
judicial separation of property was not tackled
in the trial court’s decision because, the trial
court erroneously treated the petition as
liquidation of the absolute community of
properties.
The records of this case are replete with
evidence that Leticia and David had indeed
separated for more than a year and that
reconciliation is highly improbable. First, while
actual abandonment had not been proven, it
is undisputed that the spouses had been living
4
separately since 2003 when David decided to
go back to the Philippines to set up his own
business. Second, Leticia heard from her
friends that David has been cohabiting with
Estrellita Martinez, who represented herself as
Estrellita Noveras. Editha Apolonio, who
worked in the hospital where David was once
confined, testified that she saw the name of
Estrellita listed as the wife of David in the
Consent for Operation form.
Third and more significantly, they had filed for
divorce and it was granted by the California
court in June 2005. Having established that
Leticia and David had actually separated for at
least one year, the petition for judicial
separation of absolute community of property
should be granted.
-------------------------------------------------------
VDA. DE CATALAN V. CATALAN-LEE
FACTS:
Petitioner Felicitas Amor-Catalan married
respondent Orlando on June 4, 1950 in Mabini,
Pangasinan. Thereafter, they migrated to the
United States of America and allegedly became
naturalized citizens thereof. After 38 years of
marriage, Felicitas and Orlando divorced in
April 1988. Two months after the divorce, or
on June 16, 1988, Orlando married respondent
Meropein Calasiao, Pangasinan.Contending
that said marriage was bigamous since Merope
had a prior subsisting marriage with
EusebioBristol, petitioner filed a petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage with
damages in the RTC of Dagupan City against
Orlando and Merope. Respondents filed a
motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of
cause of action as petitioner was allegedly not
a real party-in-interest, but it was denied. Trial
on the merits ensued. On October 10, 2000,
the RTC rendered judgment in favor of the
petitioner. A motion for reconsideration was
filed by the respondent before appellate court
and ruled in favor of her reversing the decision
of the trial court. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration but the same was dismissed
by the appellate court. Petitioner contends
that the bigamous marriage of the
respondents, which brought embarrassment
to her and her children, confers upon her an
interest to seek judicial remedy to address her
grievances and to protect her family from
further embarrassment and humiliation. She
claims that the Court of Appeals committed
reversible error in not declaring the marriage
void despite overwhelming evidence and the
state policy discouraging illegal and immoral
marriages.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner has the personality
to file a petition for the declaration of nullity of
marriage of the respondents on the ground of
bigamy.
HELD:
Without the divorce decree and foreign law as
part of the evidence, we cannot rule on the
issue of whether petitioner has the personality
to file the petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage. After all, she may have the
personality to file the petition if the divorce
decree obtained was a limited divorce
oramensaetthoro;or the foreign law may
restrict remarriage even after the divorce
decree becomes absolute.In such case, the
RTC would be correct to declare the marriage
of the respondents void for being bigamous,
there being already in evidence two existing
marriage certificates, which were both
obtained in the Philippines, one in Mabini,
Pangasinan dated December 21, 1959
between Eusebio Bristol and respondent
Merope,and the other, in Calasiao, Pangasinan
dated June 16, 1988 between the
respondents.However, if there was indeed a
5
divorce decree obtained and which, following
the national law of Orlando, does not restrict
remarriage, the Court of Appeals would be
correct in ruling that petitioner has no legal
personality to file a petition to declare the
nullity of marriage, thus:
Freed from their existing marital bond, each of
the former spouses no longer has any interest
nor should each have the personality to inquire
into the marriage that the other might
subsequentlycontract. x x x Viewed from
another perspective, Felicitas has no existing
interest in Orlando’s subsequent marriage
since the validity, as well as any defect or
infirmity, of this subsequent marriage will not
affect the divorced status of Orlando and
Felicitas.In fine, petitioner’s personality to file
the petition to declare the nullity of marriage
cannot be ascertained because of the absence
of the divorce decree and the foreign law
allowing it. Hence, a remand of the case to the
trial court for reception of additional evidence
is necessary to determine whether respondent
Orlando was granted a divorce decree and
whether the foreign law which granted the
same allows or restricts remarriage. If it is
proved that a valid divorce decree was
obtained and the same did not allow
respondent Orlando’s remarriage, then the
trial court should declare respondents’
marriage as bigamous and void ab initio but
reduce the amount of moral damages from
P300,000.00 to P50,000.00 and exemplary
damages from P200,000.00 to P25,000.00. On
the contrary, if it is proved that a valid divorce
decree was obtained which allowed Orlando to
remarry, then the trial court must dismiss the
instant case.
-------------------------------------------------------
Enrico vs. Heirs
G.R. No. 173614, September 28, 2007
FACTS:
The heirs of Spouses Eulogio and Trinidad
Medinaceli filed with the RTC, an action for
declaration of nullity of marriage of Eulogio
and petitioner Lolita D. Enrico, alleging that
Eulogio and Trinidad were married in June
1962 and begot seven children, herein
respondents. On May 1, 2004, Trinidad died.
On August 26, 2004, Eulogio married
petitioner before the Municipal Mayor of Lal-lo,
Cagayan without the requisite of a marriage
license. Eulogio passed away six months later.
They argued that Article 34 of the Family
Code, which exempts a man and a woman who
have been living together for at least five years
without any legal impediment from securing a
marriage license, was not applicable to
petitioner and Eulogio. Respondents posited
that the marriage of Eulogio to Trinidad was
dissolved only upon the latters death, or on 1
May 2004, which was barely three months
from the date of marriage of Eulogio to
petitioner. Therefore, petitioner and Eulogio
could not have lived together as husband and
wife for at least five years. To further their
cause, respondents raised the additional
ground of lack of marriage ceremony due to
Eulogios serious illness which made its
performance impossible.
In the Answer, petitioner maintained that she
and Eulogio lived together as husband and
wife under one roof for 21 years openly and
publicly; hence, they were exempted from the
requirement of a marriage license. She further
contended that the marriage ceremony was
performed in the Municipal Hall of Lal-lo,
Cagayan, and solemnized by the Municipal
Mayor. As an affirmative defense, she sought
the dismissal of the action on the ground that
it is only the contracting parties while living
who can file an action for declaration of nullity
of marriage.
ISSUES:
6
Whether of or not the heirs may validly file the
declaration of nullity of marriage between
Eulogio and Lolita
RULING:
No. Administrative Order No. A.M. No. 02-11-
10-SC, effective March 14, 2003, covers
marriages under the Family Code of the
Philippines does not allow it. The marriage of
petitioner to Eulogio was celebrated on August
26, 2004 which falls within the ambit of the
order. The order declares that a petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage
may be filed solely by the husband or the wife.
But it does not mean that the compulsory or
intestate heirs are already without any
recourse under the law. They can still protect
their successional right, for, as stated in the
Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of
Voidable Marriages and Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, Legal
Separation and Provisional Orders, compulsory
or intestate heirs can still question the validity
of the marriage of the spouses, not in a
proceeding for declaration of nullity, but upon
the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of the deceased
spouse filed in the regular courts.
-------------------------------------------------------
CARLOS V SANDOVAL
GR 179922, DECEMBER 16, 2008
Doctrine: ONLY a spouse can initiate an action
to sever the marital bond for marriages
solemnized during the effectivity of the Family
Code, except cases commenced prior to March
15, 2003. The nullity and annulment of a
marriage cannot be declared in a judgment on
the pleadings, summary judgment, or
confession of judgment.
FACTS:
· Spouses Felix Carlos and Felipa Elemia
died intestate. They left six parcels of land to
their compulsory heirs, Teofilo Carlos and
petitioner Juan De Dios Carlos.
· Teofilo died intestate. He was survived
by respondents Felicidad and their son. Upon
Teofilo’s death, Parcel Nos. 5 & 6 (registered
in the name of Teofilo) were registered in the
name of respondent Felicidad.
· In August 1995, petitioner commenced
an action against respondents for the
declaration of nullity of marriage. Petitioner
asserted that the marriage between his late
brother Teofilo and respondent Felicidad was
a nullity in view of the absence of the required
marriage license.
· On the grounds of lack of cause of
action and lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter, respondents prayed for the dismissal
of the case before the trial court. But before
the parties could even proceed to pre-trial,
respondents moved for summary judgment.
· Petitioner opposed the motion for
summary judgment and lodged his own
motion for summary judgment.
· RTC rendered judgment: defendants
(respondents) Motion for Summary Judgment
is hereby denied. Plaintiffs (petitioners)
Counter-Motion for Summary Judgment is
hereby granted and summary judgment is
hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff as follows:
Declaring the marriage between defendant
Felicidad Sandoval and Teofilo Carlos null and
void ab initio for lack of the requisite marriage
license.
· In the appeal, respondents argued that
the trial court acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction in rendering summary judgment
annulling the marriage of Teofilo, Sr. and
Felicidad.
· CA reversed and set aside the RTC
ruling.
7

ISSUES: By issuing said summary judgment, the trial

1) Whether a marriage may be declared
void ab initio through a judgment on the
pleadings or a summary judgment and without
the benefit of a trial. NO
2) Whether one who is not a spouse may
bring an action for nullity of marriage. Yes if
the marriage was celebrated prior to the
effectivity of the Family code and the plaintiff
is a real party-in-interest.
HELD:
I. The grounds for declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage must be proved. Neither
judgment on the pleadings nor summary
judgment is allowed. So is confession of
judgment disallowed.
court has divested the State of its lawful right
and duty to intervene in the case. The
participation of the State is not terminated by
the declaration of the public prosecutor that no
collusion exists between the parties. The State
should have been given the opportunity to
present controverting evidence before the
judgment was rendered.
Both the Civil Code and the Family Code ordain
that the court should order the prosecuting
attorney to appear and intervene for the State.
It is at this stage when the public prosecutor
sees to it that there is no suppression of
evidence. Concomitantly, even if there is no
suppression of evidence, the public prosecutor
has to make sure that the evidence to be
presented or laid down before the court is not
fabricated.

With the advent of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC,

known as Rule on Declaration of Absolute
To further bolster its role towards the
Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
preservation of marriage, the Rule on
Voidable Marriages, the question on the
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
application of summary judgments or even
Marriages reiterates the duty of the public
judgment on the pleadings in cases of nullity
prosecutor, viz.: SEC. 13. Effect of failure to
or annulment of marriage has been stamped
appear at the pre-trial. (b) x x x If there is no
with clarity. The significant principle laid down
collusion, the court shall require the public
by the said Rule, which took effect on March
prosecutor to intervene for the State during
15, 2003 is found in Section 17, viz.:
the trial on the merits to prevent suppression
or fabrication of evidence.

SEC. 17. Trial. (1) The presiding judge shall

personally conduct the trial of the case. No
Truly, only the active participation of the public
delegation of evidence to a commissioner shall
prosecutor or the Solicitor General will ensure
be allowed except as to matters involving
that the interest of the State is represented
property relations of the spouses.
and protected in proceedings for declaration of
nullity of marriages by preventing the
fabrication or suppression of evidence.
(2) The grounds for declaration of absolute
nullity or annulment of marriage must be
proved. No judgment on the pleadings,
II. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity
summary judgment, or confession of
of void marriage may be filed solely by the
judgment shall be allowed.
husband or wife. Exceptions: (1) Nullity of
marriage cases commenced before the
8

effectivity of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC; and (2)

Marriages celebrated during the effectivity of
Petitioner commenced the nullity of marriage
the Civil Code.
case against respondent Felicidad in 1995. The
marriage in controversy was celebrated on
May 14, 1962. Which law would govern
Under the Rule on Declaration of Absolute
depends upon when the marriage took place.
Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
The marriage having been solemnized prior to
Voidable Marriages, the petition for declaration
the effectivity of the Family Code, the
of absolute nullity of marriage may not be filed
applicable law is the Civil Code which was the
by any party outside of the marriage. The Rule
law in effect at the time of its celebration. But
made it exclusively a right of the spouses [Sec.
the Civil Code is silent as to who may bring an
2(a)]. The innovation incorporated in A.M. No.
action to declare the marriage void. Does this
02-11-10-SC sets forth a demarcation line
mean that any person can bring an action for
between marriages covered by the Family
the declaration of nullity of marriage? NO. The
Code and those solemnized under the Civil
absence of a provision in the Civil Code cannot
Code. The Rule extends only to marriages
be construed as a license for any person to
entered into during the effectivity of the Family
institute a nullity of marriage case. Such
Code which took effect on August 3, 1988. The
person must appear to be the party who
advent of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute
stands to be benefited or injured by the
Nullity of Void Marriages marks the beginning
judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to
of the end of the right of the heirs of the
the avails of the suit. Plaintiff must be the real
deceased spouse to bring a nullity of marriage
party-in-interest.
case against the surviving spouse.
-------------------------------------------------------
Ablaza v Republic, G.R. No. 158298, August
While A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC declares that a
11, 2010
petition for declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage may be filed solely by the husband FACTS:
or the wife, it does not mean that the
compulsory or intestate heirs are without any
recourse under the law. They can still protect On October 17, 2000, the petitioner filed in
their successional right, for, compulsory or RTC Cataingan, Masbate a petition for the
intestate heirs can still question the validity of declaration of the absolute nullity of the
the marriage of the spouses, not in a marriage contracted on December 26, 1949
proceeding for declaration of nullity but upon between his late brother Cresenciano Ablaza
the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the and Leonila Honato.
settlement of the estate of the deceased
The petitioner alleged that the marriage
spouse filed in the regular courts.
between Cresenciano and Leonila had been
celebrated without a marriage license, due to
such license being issued only on January 9,
It is emphasized, however, that the Rule does
1950. He insisted that his being the surviving
not apply to cases already commenced before
brother of Cresenciano who had died without
March 15, 2003 although the marriage
any issue entitled him to one-half of the real
involved is within the coverage of the Family
properties acquired by Cresenciano before his
Code. This is so, as the new Rule which
death, thereby making him a real party in
became effective on March 15, 2003 is
interest; and that any person, himself
prospective in its application.
included, could impugn the validity of the
9
marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila at
any time, even after the death of Cresenciano,
due to the marriage being void ab initio.
The RTC dismissed the petition for the
following reasons: 1) petition is filed out of
time (action had long prescribed) and 2)
petitioner is not a party to the marriage.
The CA affirmed the dismissal order of the
RTC, thus:
While an action to declare the nullity of a
marriage considered void from the beginning
does not prescribe, the law nonetheless
requires that the same action must be filed by
the proper party, which in this case should be
filed by any of the parties to the marriage.
xxxx
Certainly, a surviving brother of the
deceased spouse is not the proper party to file
the subject petition. More so that the surviving
wife, who stands to be prejudiced, was not
even impleaded as a party to said case.
ISSUE:
Whether the petitioner is a real party-in-
interest in the action to seek the declaration of
nullity of the marriage of his deceased brother
solemnized under the regime of the old Civil
Code
HELD: YES
A valid marriage is essential in order to create
the relation of husband and wife and to give
rise to the mutual rights, duties, and liabilities
arising out of such relation. The law prescribes
the requisites of a valid marriage. Hence, the
validity of a marriage is tested according to the
law in force at the time the marriage is
contracted. As a general rule, the nature of the
marriage already celebrated cannot be
changed by a subsequent amendment of the
governing law. Thus, a Civil Code marriage
remains void, considering that the validity of a
marriage is governed by the law in force at the
time of the marriage ceremony.
Before anything more, the Court has to clarify
the impact to the issue posed herein of
Administrative Matter (A.M.) No. 02-11-10-SC
(Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages), which took effect on March 15,
2003.
Section 2 (a), of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
explicitly provides the limitation that a petition
for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriage may be filed solely by the husband
or wife. Such limitation demarcates a line to
distinguish between marriages covered by the
Family Code and those solemnized under the
regime of the Civil Code. Specifically, A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC extends only to marriages
covered by the Family Code, which took effect
on August 3, 1988, but, being a procedural
rule that is prospective in application, is
confined only to proceedings commenced after
March 15, 2003.
Based on Carlos v. Sandoval the following
actions for declaration of absolute nullity of a
marriage are excepted from the limitation, to
wit:
1) Those commenced before March 15, 2003,
the effectivity date of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC;
and
2) Those filed in relation to marriages
celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil
Code and, those celebrated under the regime
of the Family Code prior to March 15, 2003.
Considering that the marriage between
Cresenciano and Leonila was contracted on
December 26, 1949, the applicable law was
10
the old Civil Code, the law in effect at the time
of the celebration of the marriage. Hence, the
rule on the exclusivity of the parties to the
marriage as having the right to initiate the
action for declaration of nullity of the marriage
under AM 02-11-10-SC had absolutely no
application to the petitioner.
The old and new Civil Codes contain no
provision on who can file a petition to declare
the nullity of a marriage, and when.
Accordingly, in Niñal v. Bayadog, the children
were allowed to file after the death of their
father a petition for the declaration of the
nullity of their father’s marriage to their
stepmother contracted on December 11, 1986
due to lack of a marriage license. There, the
Court distinguished between a void marriage
and a voidable one, and explained how and
when each might be impugned, thuswise:
Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that
no judicial decree is necessary in order to
establish the nullity of a marriage. “Under
ordinary circumstances, the effect of a void
marriage.......is as though no marriage had
ever taken place. And therefore, being good
for no legal purpose, its invalidity can be
maintained in any proceeding in which the fact
of marriage may be material, either direct or
collateral.” xxx
It is not like a voidable marriage which cannot
be collaterally attacked except in direct
proceeding instituted during the lifetime of the
parties so that on the death of either, the
marriage cannot be impeached, and is made
good ab initio. But Article 40 of the Family
Code expressly provides that there must be a
judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous
marriage, though void, before a party can
enter into a second marriage and such
absolute nullity can be based only on a final
judgment to that effect. For the same reason,
the law makes either the action or defense for
the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage
imprescriptible. Corollarily, if the death of
either party would extinguish the cause of
action or the ground for defense, then the
same cannot be considered imprescriptible.
However, other than for purposes of
remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to
declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For
other purposes......the court may pass upon
the validity of marriage even in a suit not
directly instituted to question the same so long
as it is essential to the determination of the
case.
However, that the absence of a provision in
the old and new Civil Codes cannot be
construed as giving a license to just any
person to bring an action to declare the
absolute nullity of a marriage. According to
Carlos v. Sandoval, the plaintiff must still be
the party who stands to be benefited by the
suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the
suit, for it is basic in procedural law that every
action must be prosecuted and defended in
the name of the real party in interest. Thus,
only the party who can demonstrate a “proper
interest” can file the action. Interest within the
meaning of the rule means material interest,
or an interest in issue to be affected by the
decree or judgment of the case, as
distinguished from mere curiosity about the
question involved or a mere incidental interest.
Here, the petitioner alleged himself to be the
late Cresenciano’s brother and surviving heir.
Assuming that the petitioner was as he
claimed himself to be, then he has a material
interest in the estate of Cresenciano that will
be adversely affected by any judgment in the
suit. Indeed, a brother like the petitioner,
albeit not a compulsory heir under the laws of
succession, has the right to succeed to the
estate of a deceased brother under the
conditions stated in Article 1001 and Article
1003 of the Civil Code, as follows:
11
Article 1001. Should brothers and sisters or
their children survive with the widow or
widower, the latter shall be entitled to one half
of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters
or their children to the other half.
Article 1003. If there are no descendants,
ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving
spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to
the entire estate of the deceased in
accordance with the following articles.
Necessarily, therefore, the right of the
petitioner to bring the action hinges upon a
prior determination of whether Cresenciano
had any descendants, ascendants, or children
(legitimate or illegitimate), and of whether the
petitioner was the late Cresenciano’s surviving
heir. Such prior determination must be made
by the trial court, for the inquiry thereon
involves questions of fact.
Nevertheless, we note that the petitioner did
not implead Leonila, who, as the late
Cresenciano’s surviving wife, stood to be
benefited or prejudiced by the nullification of
her own marriage. She was truly an
indispensable party who must be joined
herein. We take note, too, that the petitioner
and Leonila were parties in Heirs of
Cresenciano Ablaza, namely: Leonila G.
Ablaza, and Leila Ablaza Jasul v. Spouses
Isidro and Casilda Ablaza, an action to
determine who between the parties were the
legal owners of the property involved therein.
As a defendant in that action, the petitioner is
reasonably presumed to have knowledge that
the therein plaintiffs, Leonila and Leila, were
the wife and daughter, respectively, of the late
Cresenciano. As such, Leila was another
indispensable party whose substantial right
any judgment in this action will definitely
affect. The petitioner should likewise implead
Leila.
WHEREFORE, the case is reinstated, and its
records are returned to RTC Masbate, for
further proceedings, with instructions to first
require the petitioner to amend his initiatory
pleading in order to implead Leonila Honato
and her daughter Leila Ablaza Jasul as parties-
defendants.
-------------------------------------------------------
AURELIO V. AURELIO
G.R. No. 175367, [June 06, 2011]
DOCTRINE:
The following are the guidelines to aid the
courts in the disposition of cases involving
psychological incapacity: (1) Burden of proof
to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to
the plaintiff; (2) The root cause of the
psychological incapacity must be: (a)
medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in
the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by
experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision; (3) The incapacity must be proven to
be existing at “the time of the celebration” of
the marriage; (4) Such incapacity must also be
shown to be medically or clinically permanent
or incurable; (5) Such illness must be grave
enough to bring about the disability of the
party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage; (6) The essential marital obligations
must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to
71 of the Family Code as regards the husband
and wife, as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225
of the same Code in regard to parents and
their children. Such non-complied marital
obligation(s) must also be stated in the
petition, proven by evidence and included in
the text of the decision; (7) Interpretations
given by the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive,
should be given great respect by our courts;
12

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to
appear as counsel for the state. No decision
shall be handed down unless the Solicitor
General issues a certification, which will be
quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein
his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as
the case may be, to the petition.
immature; she cannot stand frustration or
disappointment. She cannot delay to gratify
her needs. She gets upset when she cannot
get what she wants. Self-indulgence lifts her
spirits immensely. Their hostility towards each
other distorted their relationship. Their
incapacity to accept and fulfill the essential
obligations of marital life led to the breakdown
of their marriage.

FACTS:
On November 8, 2002, petitioner filed a Motion
Petitioner Danilo A. Aurelio and respondent
to Dismiss the petition. Petitioner principally
Vida Ma. Corazon Aurelio were married on
argued that the petition failed to state a cause
March 23, 1988. They have two sons, namely:
of action and that it failed to meet the
Danilo Miguel and Danilo Gabriel.
standards set by the Court for the
interpretation and implementation of Article 36
of the Family Code.
On May 9, 2002, respondent filed with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City,
Branch 94, a Petition for Declaration of Nullity
RTC denied the petition. CA affirmed.
of Marriage. In her petition, respondent
alleged that both she and petitioner were
psychologically incapacitated of performing
ISSUE:
and complying with their respective essential
marital obligations. In addition, respondent Whether or not the marriage shall be declared
alleged that such state of psychological null and void?
incapacity was present prior and even during
the time of the marriage ceremony. Hence,
respondent prays that her marriage be HELD:
declared null and void under Article 36 of the
Petition denied. Marriage is null and void.
Family Code. It alleged among others that said
psychological incapacity was manifested by
lack of financial support from the husband; his
RATIO:
lack of drive and incapacity to discern the
plight of his working wife. The husband First, contrary to petitioner’s assertion, this
exhibited consistent jealousy and distrust Court finds that the root cause of psychological
towards his wife. His moods alternated incapacity was stated and alleged in the
between hostile defiance and contrition. He complaint. We agree with the manifestation of
refused to assist in the maintenance of the respondent that the family backgrounds of
family. both petitioner and respondent were discussed
in the complaint as the root causes of their
On the side of the wife on the other hand, is
psychological incapacity. Moreover, a
effusive and displays her feelings openly and
competent and expert psychologist clinically
freely. Her feelings change very quickly – from
identified the same as the root causes.
joy to fury to misery to despair, depending on
her day-to-day experiences. Her tolerance for
boredom was very low. She was emotionally
13
Second, the petition likewise alleged that the
illness of both parties was of such grave a
nature as to bring about a disability for them
to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. The psychologist reported that
respondent suffers from Histrionic Personality
Disorder with Narcissistic Features. Petitioner,
on the other hand, allegedly suffers from
Passive Aggressive (Negativistic) Personality
Disorder. The incapacity of both parties to
perform their marital obligations was alleged
to be grave, incorrigible and incurable.
Lastly, this Court also finds that the essential
marital obligations that were not complied with
were alleged in the petition. As can be easily
gleaned from the totality of the petition,
respondent’s allegations fall under Article 68 of
the Family Code which states that “the
husband and the wife are obliged to live
together, observe mutual love, respect and
fidelity, and render mutual help and support.”
-------------------------------------------------------
Republic v CA, G.R. No. 159594, November
12, 2012
Facts: Eduardo and Catalina were married on
March 16, 1977 in civil rites solemnized by the
Municipal Mayor of Lingayen, Pangasinan. The
couple was not blessed with a child due to
Catalinas hysterectomy following her second
miscarriage. On April 6, 1998, Eduardo filed a
petition for the declaration of nullity of their
marriage, citing Catalinas psychological
incapacity to comply with her essential marital
obligations. Catalina did not interpose any
objection to the petition, but prayed to be
given her share in the conjugal house and lot
located in Bacabac, Bugallon, Pangasinan.
After conducting an investigation, the public
prosecutor determined that there was no
collusion between Eduardo and Catalina.
Eduardo testified that Catalina always left their
house without his consent; that she engaged
in petty arguments with him; that she
constantly refused to give in to his sexual
needs; that she spent most of her time
gossiping with neighbors instead of doing the
household chores and caring for their adopted
daughter; that she squandered by gambling all
his remittances as an overseas worker in Qatar
since 1993; and that she abandoned the
conjugal home in 1997 to live with Bobbie
Castro, her paramour.
Issue: Whether or not the acts of Catalina
constitute psychological incapacity.
Held: No. Psychological incapacity under
Article 36 of the Family Code contemplates an
incapacity or inability to take cognizance of
and to assume basic marital obligations, and is
not merely the difficulty, refusal, or neglect in
the performance of marital obligations or ill
will. It consists of: (a) a true inability to commit
oneself to the essentials of marriage; (b) the
inability must refer to the essential obligations
of marriage, that is, the conjugal act, the
community of life and love, the rendering of
mutual help, and the procreation and
education of offspring; and (c) the inability
must be tantamount to a psychological
abnormality. Proving that a spouse failed to
meet his or her responsibility and duty as a
married person is not enough; it is essential
that he or she must be shown to be incapable
of doing so due to some psychological illness.
In Santos v. Court of Appeals, we decreed that
psychological incapacity should refer to a
mental incapacity that causes a party to be
truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants
such as those enumerated in Article 68 of the
Family Code and must be characterized by
gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability.
In an effort to settle the confusion that may
arise in deciding cases involving nullity of
marriage on the ground of psychological
14
incapacity, we then laid down the following
guidelines in the later ruling in Molina, viz:
The burden of proof to show the nullity of the
marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the existence
and continuation of the marriage and against
its dissolution and nullity.
The root cause of the psychological incapacity
must be (a) medically or clinically identified,
(b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently
proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in
the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code
requires that the incapacity must be
psychological not physical, although its
manifestations and/or symptoms may be
physical.
The incapacity must be proven to be existing
at “the time of the celebration” of the
marriage.
Such incapacity must also be shown to be
medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
Such illness must be grave enough to bring
about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. Thus, “mild
characteriological peculiarities, mood changes,
occasional emotional outbursts” cannot be
accepted as root causes.
The essential marital obligations must be
those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the
Family Code as regards the husband and wife
as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the
same Code in regard to parents and their
children. Such noncomplied marital
obligation(s) must also be stated in the
petition, proven by evidence and included in
the text of the decision.
Interpretations given by the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in
the Philippines, while not controlling or
decisive, should be given great respect by our
courts.
The trial court must order the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to
appear as counsel for the state.
The expert opinion of a psychiatrist arrived at
after a maximum of seven (7) hours of
interview, and unsupported by separate
psychological tests, cannot tie the hands of the
trial court and prevent it from making its own
factual finding on what happened in this case.
The probative force of the testimony of an
expert does not lie in a mere statement of his
theory or opinion, but rather in the assistance
that he can render to the courts in showing the
facts that serve as a basis for his criterion and
the reasons upon which the logic of his
conclusion is founded.
It is not enough that the respondent, alleged
to be psychologically incapacitated, had
difficulty in complying with his marital
obligations, or was unwilling to perform these
obligations. Proof of a natal or supervening
disabling factor an adverse integral element in
the respondents personality structure that
effectively incapacitated him from complying
with his essential marital obligations must be
shown. Mere difficulty, refusal or neglect in the
performance of marital obligations or ill will on
the part of the spouse is different from
incapacity rooted in some debilitating
psychological condition or illness;
irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or
perversion, emotional immaturity and
irresponsibility and the like, do not by
themselves warrant a finding of psychological
incapacity under Article 36, as the same may
only be due to a persons refusal or
unwillingness to assume the essential
obligations of marriage.
-------------------------------------------------------
Mendoza vs Republic of the Philippines
G.R. No. 157649 November 12, 2012
15
Facts: Petitioner and Dominic met in 1989
upon his return to the country from his
employment in Papua New Guinea. They had
been next-door neighbors in the appartelle
they were renting while they were still in
college she, at Assumption College while he,
at San Beda College taking a business
management course. After a month of
courtship, they became intimate and their
intimacy ultimately led to her pregnancy with
their daughter whom they named Allysa
Bianca. They got married on her eighth month
of pregnancy in civil rites solemnized in Pasay
City on June 24, 1991, after which they moved
to her place, although remaining dependent
on their parents for support. It was petitioner
who supported for the family’s financial needs
because Dominic’s job has unstable salary. It
was alleged in the evidence by the petitioner
that Dominic had an affair with his co-worker,
incurred debts and criminal charges which
forced petitioner to end their relationship and
move away from Dominic. A petition for
declaration of nullity was filed by herein
petitoner before the RTC on the ground of
article 36, psychological incapacity presenting
as evidence Dr. Samson, a psychiatrist. OSG
opposed the petition.
Issue: Whether or not the testimony of the
psychiatrist is sufficient to establish
psychological incapacity.
Held: No. The guidelines incorporate the three
basic requirements earlier mandated by the
Court in Santos v. Court of Appeals:
“psychological incapacity must be
characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) incurability.” The
foregoing guidelines do not require that a
physician examine the person to be declared
psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root
cause may be “medically or clinically
identified.” What is important is the presence
of evidence that can adequately establish the
party’s psychological condition. For indeed, if
the totality of evidence presented is enough to
sustain a finding of psychological incapacity,
then actual medical examination of the person
concerned need not be resorted to.
In light of the foregoing, even if the expert
opinions of psychologists are not conditions
sine qua non in the granting of petitions for
declaration of nullity of marriage, the actual
medical examination of Dominic was to be
dispensed with only if the totality of evidence
presented was enough to support a finding of
his psychological incapacity. This did not mean
that the presentation of any form of medical
or psychological evidence to show the
psychological incapacity would have
automatically ensured the granting of the
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage.
What was essential, we should emphasize
herein, was the “presence of evidence that can
adequately establish the partys psychological
condition.”
By the very nature of cases involving the
application of Article 36, it is logical and
understandable to give weight to the expert
opinions furnished by psychologists regarding
the psychological temperament of parties in
order to determine the root cause, juridical
antecedence, gravity and incurability of the
psychological incapacity. However, such
opinions, while highly advisable, are not
conditions sine qua non in granting petitions
for declaration of nullity of marriage. At best,
courts must treat such opinions as decisive but
not indispensable evidence in determining the
merits of a given case. In fact, if the totality of
evidence presented is enough to sustain a
finding of psychological incapacity, then actual
medical or psychological examination of the
person concerned need not be resorted to.
The trial court, as in any other given case
presented before it, must always base its
decision not solely on the expert opinions
16
furnished by the parties but also on the totality
of evidence adduced in the course of the
proceedings.
We have time and again held that
psychological incapacity should refer to no less
than a mental, not physical, incapacity that
causes a party to be truly incognitive of the
basic marital covenants that must
concomitantly be assumed and discharged by
the parties to the marriage that, as so
expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code,
include their mutual obligations to live
together, to observe love, respect and fidelity,
and to render help and support. We have also
held that the intendment of the law has been
to confine the meaning of psychological
incapacity to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of
an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage. To
qualify as psychological incapacity as a ground
for nullification of marriage, a persons
psychological affliction must be grave and
serious as to indicate an utter incapacity to
comprehend and comply with the essential
objects of marriage, including the rights and
obligations between husband and wife. The
affliction must be shown to exist at the time of
marriage, and must be incurable.
Accordingly, the RTCs findings that Dominic’s
psychological incapacity was characterized by
gravity, antecedence and incurability could not
stand scrutiny. The medical report failed to
show that his actions indicated a psychological
affliction of such a grave or serious nature that
it was medically or clinically rooted. His alleged
immaturity, deceitfulness and lack of remorse
for his dishonesty and lack of affection did not
necessarily constitute psychological
incapacity. His inability to share or to take
responsibility or to feel remorse over his
misbehavior or to share his earnings with
family members, albeit indicative of
immaturity, was not necessarily a medically
rooted psychological affliction that was
incurable. Emotional immaturity and
irresponsibility did not equate with
psychological incapacity. Nor were his
supposed sexual infidelity and criminal
offenses manifestations of psychological
incapacity. If at all, they would constitute a
ground only for an action for legal separation
under Article 55 of the Family Code.
-------------------------------------------------------
G.R. No. L-19671 (November 29, 1965)
Tenchavez vs. Escaño
FACTS:
Vicenta Escaño, 27, exchanged marriage vows
with Pastor Tenchavez, 32, on February 24,
1948, before a Catholic chaplain. The marriage
was duly registered with the local civil
registrar. However, the two were unable to live
together after the marriage and as of June
1948, they were already estranged. Vicenta
left for the United Stated in 1950. On the same
year she filed a verified complaint for divorce
against Tenchavez in the State of Nevada on
the ground of “Extreme cruelty, entirely
mental in character.” A decree of divorce,
“final and absolute” was issued in open court
by the said tribunal. She married an American,
lived with him in California, had several
children with him and, on 1958, acquired
American Citizenship.
On 30 July 1955, Tenchavez filed a complaint
in the Court of First Instance of Cebu, and
amended on 31 May 1956, against Vicenta F.
Escaño, her parents, Mamerto and Mena
Escaño whom he charged with having
dissuaded and discouraged Vicenta from
joining her husband, and alienating her
affections, and against the Roman Catholic
Church, for having, through its Diocesan
Tribunal, decreed the annulment of the
marriage, and asked for legal separation and
one million pesos in damages. Vicenta’s
17

parents denied that they had in any way discrimination and with having exerted efforts
influenced their daughter’s acts, and and pressured her to seek annulment and
counterclaimed for moral damages. divorce, unquestionably caused them unrest
and anxiety, entitling them to recover
ISSUE:
damages.
1. Whether or not the divorce sought by
-------------------------------------------------------
Vicenta Escaño is valid and binding upon
courts of the Philippines. VAN DORN vs. HON. ROMILLO and RICHARD
UPTON
2. Whether or not the charges against
Vicenta Escaño’s parents were sufficient in G.R. No. L-68470
form.
October 8, 1985
RULING:
1. No. Vicenta Escaño and Pastor Tenchavez’
FACTS: Petitioner Alice Van Dorn is a citizen of
marriage remain existent and undissolved
the Philippines while private respondent
under the Philippine Law. Escaño’s divorce
Richard Upton is a citizen of the USA. They
and second marriage cannot be deemed valid
were married in Hongkong in 1972 and begot
under the Philippine Law to which Escaño was
two children. The parties were divorced in
bound since in the time the divorce decree was
Nevada, USA in 1982. Alice has then re-
issued, Escaño, like her husband, was still a
married also in Nevada, this time to Theodore
Filipino citizen. The acts of the wife in not
Van Dorn.
complying with her wifely duties, deserting her
husband without any justifiable cause, leaving
for the United States in order to secure a
In 1983, Richard filed suit against Alice in the
decree of absolute divorce, and finally getting
RTC-Pasay, stating that Alice’s business in
married again are acts which constitute a
Ermita, Manila is conjugal property of the
willful infliction of injury upon the husband’s
parties, and asking that Alice be ordered to
feelings in a manner contrary to morals, good
render an accounting of that business, and
customs or public policy, thus entitling
that Richard be declared with right to manage
Tenchavez to a decree of legal separation
the conjugal property.
under our law on the basis of adultery.

Alice moved to dismiss the case on the ground

2. No. Tenchavez’ charge against Vicenta’s
that the cause of action is barred by previous
parents are not supported by credible
judgment in the divorce proceedings before
evidence. The testimony of Tenchavez about
the Nevada Court wherein respondent had
the Escaño’s animosity toward him strikes the
acknowledged that he and petitioner had “no
court to be merely conjecture and
community property” as of June 11, 1982.
exaggeration, and were belied by Tenchavez’
own letters written before the suit had begun. The Court below (presiding judge: Judge
An action for alienation of affections against Romillo) denied the MTD in the mentioned
the parents of one consort does not lie in the case on the ground that the property involved
absence of proof of malice or unworthy is located in the Philippines so that the Divorce
motives on their part. Decree has no bearing in the case. The denial
is now the subject of this certiorari proceeding.
Plaintiff Tenchavez, in falsely charging
Vicenta's aged parents with racial or social
18
ISSUE: What is the effect of the foreign
divorce on the parties and their alleged
conjugal property in the Philippines?
HELD: Petition is granted, and respondent
Judge is hereby ordered to dismiss the
Complaint…
For the resolution of this case, it is not
necessary to determine whether the property
relations between Alice and Richard, after their
marriage, were upon absolute or relative
community property, upon complete
separation of property, or upon any other
regime. The pivotal fact in this case is the
Nevada divorce of the parties.
The Nevada District Court, which decreed the
divorce, had obtained jurisdiction over
petitioner who appeared in person before the
Court during the trial of the case. It also
obtained jurisdiction over private respondent
who authorized his attorneys in the divorce
case to agree to the divorce on the ground of
incompatibility in the understanding that there
were neither community property nor
community obligations.
As explicitly stated in the Power of Attorney he
executed in favor of the law firm of KARP &
GRAD LTD. to represent him in the divorce
proceedings:
xxx xxx xxx
You are hereby authorized to accept service of
Summons, to file an Answer, appear on my
behalf and do all things necessary and proper
to represent me, without further contesting,
subject to the following:
1. That my spouse seeks a divorce on the
ground of incompatibility.
2. That there is no community of property to
be adjudicated by the Court.
3. That there are no community obligations to
be adjudicated by the court.
xxx xxx xxx
There can be no question as to the validity of
that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the
United States. The decree is binding on private
respondent as an American citizen. What he is
contending in this case is that the divorce is
not valid and binding in this jurisdiction, the
same being contrary to local law and public
policy.
It is true that owing to the nationality principle
embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only
Philippine nationals are covered by the policy
against absolute divorces the same being
considered contrary to our concept of public
police and morality. However, aliens may
obtain divorces abroad, which may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided they
are valid according to their national law. In this
case, the divorce in Nevada released private
respondent from the marriage from the
standards of American law, under which
divorce dissolves the marriage.
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private
respondent is no longer the husband of
petitioner. He would have no standing to sue
in the case below as petitioner’s husband
entitled to exercise control over conjugal
assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his
own country’s Court, which validly exercised
jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he
does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own
representation before said Court from
asserting his right over the alleged conjugal
property.
19

-------------------------------------------------------
Pilapil vs. Ibay-Somera Ruling: Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal
Code, the crime of adultery cannot be
174 SCRA 653
prosecuted except upon a sworn written
complaint filed by the offended spouse.
Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to
Facts: Article 26; On September 7, 1979,
the offended spouse to institute the action, it
petitioner Imelda Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and
necessarily follows that such initiator must
private respondent Erich Geiling, a German
have the status, capacity or legal
national, were married in the Federal Republic
representation to do so at the time of the filing
of Germany. The marriage started auspiciously
of the criminal action. Hence, Article 344 of the
enough, and the couple lived together for
Revised Penal Code thus presupposes that the
some time in Malate, Manila. Thereafter,
marital relationship is still subsisting at the
marital discord set in, followed by a separation
time of the institution of the criminal action for
de facto between them. After about three and
adultery. In the present case, the fact that
a half years of marriage, private respondent
private respondent obtained a valid divorce in
initiating a divorce proceeding against
his country, the Federal Republic of Germany,
petitioner in Germany. He claimed that there
is admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects
was failure of their marriage and that they had
may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as
been living apart since April 1982. On January
private respondent is concerned in view of the
15, 1986, Schoneberg Local Court
nationality principle in our civil law on the
promulgated a decree of divorce on the
matter of status of persons. Private
ground of failure of marriage of the spouses.
respondent, being no longer the husband of
The custody of the child was granted to
petitioner, had no legal standing to commence
petitioner. Petitioner, on the other hand, filed
the adultery case under the imposture that he
an action for legal separation, support and
was the offended spouse at the time he filed
separation of property before the Regional
suit.
Trial Court of Manila on January 23, 1983.
-------------------------------------------------------
FE D. QUITA, petitioner, VS. COURT OF
More than five months after the issuance of
APPEALS and BLANDINA DANDAN,
the divorce decree, private respondent filed
respondents
two complaints for adultery before the City
Fiscal of Manila alleging that, while still December 22, 1998
married to said respondent, petitioner "had an
Facts:
affair with a certain William Chia as early as
1982 and with yet another man named James Fe D. Quita and Arturo T. Padlan, both
Chua sometime in 1983". On October 27, Filipinos, were married in the Philippines on
1987, petitioner filed this special civil action for May 18, 1941. No children were born out of
certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for a their marriage. On July 23, 1954, petitioner
temporary restraining order, seeking the obtained a final judgment of divorce in San
annulment of the order of the lower court Francisco, California, U.S.A. On April 16, 1972,
denying her motion to quash. Arturo died leaving no will. On August 31,
1972, Lino Javier Inciong filed a petition with
the RTC for issuance of letters of
Issue: Whether or not the criminal cases filed administration concerning the estate of Arturo
by the German ex-spouse may prosper. in favor of the Philippine Trust Company.
20
Respondent Blandina Dandan, claiming to be
the surviving spouse of Arturo Dandan and the
surviving children, all surnamed Padlan,
opposed the petition. The RTC expressed that
the marriage between Antonio and petitioner
subsisted until the death of Arturo in 1972,
that the marriage existed between private
respondent and Arturo was clearly void since
it was celebrated during the existence of his
previous marriage to petitioner. The Court of
Appeals remanded the case to the trial court
for further proceedings.
Issues:
1. Should the case be remanded to the lower
court?
2. Who between the petitioner and private
respondent is the proper heir of the decedent?
Held:
If there is a controversy before the court as to
who are the lawful heirs of the deceased
person or as to the distributive shares to which
each person is entitled under the law, the
controversy shall be heard and decided as in
ordinary cases.
No dispute exists as to the right of the six
Padlan children to inherit from the decedent
because there are proofs that they have been
duly acknowledged by him and petitioner
herself even recognizes them as heirs of Arturo
Padlan, nor as to their respective hereditary
shares.
Private respondent is not a surviving spouse
that can inherit from him as this status
presupposes a legitimate relationship. Her
marriage to Arturo being a bigamous marriage
considered void ab inito under Articles 80 and
83 of the Civil Code renders her not a surviving
spouse.
The decision of the Court of Appeals ordering
the remand of the case is affirmed.
-------------------------------------------------------
PAULA T. LLORENTE, petitioner, VS. COURT
OF APPEALS and ALICIA F. LLORENTE,
respondents
November 23, 2000
FACTS:
Lorenzo Llorente and petitioner Paula Llorente
were married in 1937 in the Philippines.
Lorenzo was an enlisted serviceman of the US
Navy. Soon after, he left for the US where
through naturalization, he became a US
Citizen. Upon his visitation of his wife, he
discovered that she was living with his brother
and a child was born. The child was registered
as legitimate but the name of the father was
left blank. Llorente filed a divorce in California,
which later on became final. He married Alicia
and they lived together for 25 years bringing 3
children. He made his last will and testament
stating that all his properties will be given to
his second marriage. He filed a petition of
probate that made or appointed Alicia his
special administrator of his estate. Before the
proceeding could be terminated, Lorenzo died.
Paula filed a letter of administration over
Llorente’s estate. The trial granted the letter
and denied the motion for reconsideration. An
appeal was made to the Court of Appeals,
which affirmed and modified the judgment of
the Trial Court that she be declared co-owner
of whatever properties, she and the deceased,
may have acquired during their 25 years of
cohabitation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the National Law shall apply.
21

RULING: married. Respondent also contended that his

first marriage was dissolved by a divorce
Lorenzo Llorente was already an American
decree obtained in Australia in 1989 and
citizen when he divorced Paula. Such was also
hence, he was legally capacitated to marry
the situation when he married Alicia and
petitioner in 1994. The trial court declared that
executed his will. As stated in Article 15 of the
the first marriage was dissolved on the ground
civil code, aliens may obtain divorces abroad,
of the divorce issued in Australia as valid and
provided that they are validly required in their
recognized in the Philippines. Hence, this
National Law. Thus the divorce obtained by
petition was forwarded before the Supreme
Llorente is valid because the law that governs
Court.
him is not Philippine Law but his National Law
since the divorce was contracted after he
became an American citizen. Furthermore, his
National Law allowed divorce. ISSUES:
The case was remanded to the court of origin
for determination of the intrinsic validity of 1. Whether or not the divorce between
Lorenzo Llorente’s will and determination of respondent and Editha Samson was proven.
the parties’ successional rights allowing proof
of foreign law.
2. Whether or not respondent has legal
------------------------------------------------------- capacity to marry Grace Garcia.
GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-
RECIO, petitioner, VS. RODERICK A. RECIO,
respondent RULING:
October 2, 2001
The Philippine law does not provide for
FACTS:
absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot
The respondent, a Filipino was married to
grant it. In mixed marriages involving a Filipino
Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in Rizal
and a foreigner, Article 26 of the Family Code
in 1987. They lived together as husband and
allows the former to contract a subsequent
wife in Australia. In 1989, the Australian family
marriage in case the divorce is “validly
court issued a decree of divorce supposedly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse
dissolving the marriage. In 1992, respondent
capacitating him or her to remarry”.
acquired Australian citizenship. In 1994, he
married Grace Garcia, a Filipina, herein A divorce obtained abroad by two aliens, may
petitioner, in Cabanatuan City. In their be recognized in the Philippines, provided it is
application for marriage license, respondent consistent with their respective laws.
was declared as “single” and “Filipino”. Since Therefore, before our courts can recognize a
October 1995, they lived separately; and in foreign divorce, the party pleading it must
1996 while in Autralia, their conjugal assets prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate
were divided. In 1998, petitioner filed its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.
Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage In this case, the divorce decree between the
on the ground of bigamy, claiming that she respondent and Samson appears to be
learned of the respondent’s former marriage authentic, issued by an Australian family court.
only in November. On the other hand,
Although, appearance is not sufficient; and
respondent claims that he told petitioner of his
compliance with the rules on evidence
prior marriage in 1993, before they were
regarding alleged foreign laws must be
22
demonstrated, the decree was admitted on
account of petitioner’s failure to object
properly because he objected to the fact that
it was not registered in the Local Civil Registry
of Cabanatuan City, not to its admissibility.
Respondent claims that the Australian divorce
decree, which was validly admitted as
evidence, adequately established his legal
capacity to marry under Australian law.
However, there are two types of divorce,
absolute divorce terminating the marriage and
limited divorce merely suspending the
marriage. In this case, it is not known which
type of divorce the respondent procured.
Even after the divorce becomes absolute, the
court may under some foreign statutes, still
restrict remarriage.
Under the Australian divorce decree “a party
to a marriage who marries again before this
decree becomes absolute commits the offense
of bigamy”. This shows that the divorce
obtained by the respondent might have been
restricted. Respondent also failed to produce
sufficient evidence showing the foreign law
governing his status.
Together with other evidences submitted, they
don’t absolutely establish his legal capacity to
remarry according to the alleged foreign law.
Case remanded to the court a quo. The
marriage between the petitioner and
respondent can not be declared null and void
based on lack of evidence conclusively
showing the respondent’s legal capacity to
marry petitioner. With the lack of such
evidence, the court a quo may declare nullity
of the parties’ marriage based on two existing
marriage certificates.
-------------------------------------------------------
RP vs. Orbecido, G.R.No. 154380, Oct. 5,
2005
Facts:
Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M.
Villanueva at the United Church of Christ in the
Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City, on May 24,
1981. They were blessed with a with a son and
a daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz V. Orbecido
and Lady Kimberly V. Orbecido.
Lady Myros left for the United States bringing
along their son Kristoffer in 1986. After few
years, Cipriano discovered that his wife had
been naturalized as an American citizen.
Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had
obtained a divorce decree sometime in 2000
and then married a certain Innocent Stanley
and lived in California.
He then filed with the trial court a petition for
authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of
Article 26 of the Family Code. No opposition
was filed. Finding merit in the petition, the
court granted the same. The Republic, herein
petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), sought reconsideration but it
was denied. Orbecido filed a petition for review
of certiorari on the Decision of the RTC.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent Orbecido can
remarry under Article 26 of the Family Code.
Held:
Yes. The Court’s unanimous decision in
holding Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family
Code be interpreted as allowing a Filipino
citizen who has been divorced by a spouse
who had acquired a citizenship and remarried,
also to remarry under Philippine law.
The article should be interpreted to include
cases involving parties who, at the time of the
celebration of the marriage were Filipino
citizens, but later on,one of them became
naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtained a
divorce decree.
23
The instant case was one where at the time
the marriage was solemnized, the parties were
two Filipino citizens, but later on, the wife was
naturalized as an American citizen and
subsequently obtained a divorce granting her
capacity to remarry, and indeed, she
remarried an American citizen while residing in
the US. The Filipino spouse should likewise be
allowed to remarry as if the other party were
a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of
the marriage.
However, since Orbecido was not able to prove
as fact his wife’s naturalization, he was still
barred from remarrying.
-------------------------------------------------------
Corpus v Sto Tomas, G.R. No. 186571, August
11, 2010
Nature of the Case: Direct Appeal from RTC
decision, a petition for review on certiorari
Facts: Petitioner was a former Filipino
citizen who acquired Canadian citizenship
through naturalization. He was married to the
respondent but was shocked of the infidelity
on the part of his wife. He went back to
Canada and filed a petition for divorce and was
granted. Desirous to marry another woman he
now loved, he registered the divorce decree in
the Civil Registry Office and was informed that
the foreign decree must first be judicially
recognized by a competent Philippine court.
Petitioner filed for judicial recognition of
foreign divorce and declaration of marriage as
dissolved with the RTC where respondent
failed to submit any response. The RTC denied
the petition on the basis that the petitioner
lacked locus standi. Thus, this case was filed
before the Court.
Issues: WON the second paragraph of Art 26
of the FC extends to aliens the right to petition
a court of this jurisdiction fro the recognition
of a foreign divorce decree.
Decision: The alien spouse cannot claim
under the second paragraph of Art 26 of the
Family Code because the substantive right it
establishes is in favour of the Filipino spouse.
Only the Filipino spouse can invoke the second
par of Art 26 of the Family Code.
The unavailability of the second paragraph of
Art 26 of the Family Code to aliens does not
necessarily strip the petitioner of legal interest
to petition the RTC for the recognition of his
foreign divorce decree. The petitioner, being a
naturalized Canadian citizen now, is clothed by
the presumptive evidence of the authenticity
of foreign divorce decree with conformity to
alien’s national law.
The Pasig City Civil Registry acted out of line
when it registered the foreign decree of
divorce on the petitioner and respondent’s
marriage certificate without judicial order
recognizing the said decree. The registration
of the foreign divorce decree without the
requisite judicial recognition is void.
The petition for review on certiorari is granted,
the RTC decision is reversed and Court
ordered t6he remand of the case to the trial
court for further proceedings in light of the
ruling.
-------------------------------------------------------
LLAVE V. REPUBLIC
G.R. No. 169766, [March 30, 2011]
PROCEDURAL HISTORY:
24

This petition for review on certiorari assails the

Decision dated August 17, 2004 of the Court
HELD:
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 61762 and
its subsequent Resolution dated September Yes. The civil code governs the marriage of
13, 2005, which affirmed the Decision of the Zoraydaand late Sen. Tamano; their marriage
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, was never invalidated by PD 1083. Sen.
Branch 89 declaring petitioner Estrellita Tamano s subsequent marriage to Estrellita is
Juliano-Llave s (Estrellita) marriage to Sen. void ab initio.
Mamintal A.J. Tamano (Sen. Tamano) as void
ab initio.
RATIO:
The marriage between the late Sen. Tamano
FACTS:
and Zorayda was celebrated in 1958,
solemnized under civil and Muslim rites. The
only law in force governing marriage
Around 11 months before his death, Sen.
relationships between Muslims and non-
Tamanomarried Estrellita twice – initially
Muslims alike was the Civil Code of 1950,
under the Islamic laws and tradition on May
under the provisions of which only one
27, 1993 in Cotabato City and, subsequently,
marriage can exist at any given time. Under
under a civil ceremony officiated by an RTC
the marriage provisions of the Civil Code,
Judge at Malabang, Lanao del Sur on June 2,
divorce is not recognized except during the
1993. In their marriage contracts, Sen.
effectivity of Republic Act No. 394 which was
Tamano s civil status was indicated as
not availed of during its effectivity.
“divorced”. Since then, Estrellita has been
representing herself to the whole world as
Sen. Tamano s wife, and upon his death, his
As far as Estrellita is concerned, Sen. Tamano
widow.
s prior marriage to Zorayda has been severed
by way of divorce under PD 1083, the law that
codified Muslim personal laws. However, PD
On November 23, 1994, private respondents
1083 cannot benefit Estrellita. Firstly, Article
Haja Putri Zorayda A. Tamano (Zorayda) and
13(1) thereof provides that the law applies to
her son Adib Ahmad A. Tamano (Adib), in their
“marriage and divorce wherein both parties
own behalf and in behalf of the rest of Sen.
are Muslims, or wherein only the male party is
Tamano s legitimate children with Zorayda,
a Muslim and the marriage is solemnized in
filed a complaint with the RTC of Quezon City
accordance with Muslim law or this Code in
for the declaration of nullity of marriage
any part of the Philippines.” But Article 13 of
between Estrellita and Sen. Tamano for being
PD 1083 does not provide for a situation where
bigamous. The complaint alleged that Sen.
the parties were married both in civil and
Tamano married Zorayda on May 31, 1958
Muslim rites.”
under civil rites, and that this marriage
remained subsisting when he married Estrellita
in 1993.
HELD:The petition is DENIED.
-------------------------------------------------------
ISSUE:
Whether the marriage between Estrellita and Fujiki v. Marinay, G.R. No. 196049, Jun.
the late Sen. Tamano was bigamous. 26, 2013
25
Facts:
Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese
national who married respondent Maria Paz
Galela Marinay (Marinay) in the Philippines on
23 January 2004. The marriage did not sit well
with petitioner’s parents. Thus, Fujiki could not
bring his wife to Japan where he resides.
Eventually, they lost contact with each other.
In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese,
Shinichi Maekara (Maekara). Without the first
marriage being dissolved, Marinay and
Maekara were married on 15 May 2008 in
Quezon City, Philippines. Maekara brought
Marinay to Japan. However, Marinay allegedly
suffered physical abuse from Maekara. She left
Maekara and started to contact Fujiki.
Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were
able to reestablish their relationship. In 2010,
Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgment from
a family court in Japan which declared the
marriage between Marinay and Maekara void
on the ground of bigamy. On 14 January 2011,
Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC entitled:
“Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or
Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage).”
The decision of the lower courts (RTC):
dismissed the petition for "Judicial Recognition
of Foreign Judgment ·(or Decree of Absolute
Nullity of Marriage)" based on improper venue
and the lack of personality of petitioner,
Minoru Fujiki, to file the petition.
Issues:
1. Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) is
applicable.
2. Whether a husband or wife of a prior
marriage can file a petition to recognize a
foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent
marriage between his or her spouse and a
foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy.
3. Whether the Regional Trial Court can
recognize the foreign judgment in a
proceeding for cancellation or correction of
entries in the Civil Registry under Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court.
Held:
1. No. Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity
of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not
apply in a petition to recognize a foreign
judgment relating to the status of a marriage
where one of the parties is a citizen of a
foreign country. Moreover, in Juliano-Llave v.
Republic, this Court held that the rule in A.M.
No. 02- 11-10-SC that only the husband or
wife can file a declaration of nullity or
annulment of marriage “does not apply if the
reason behind the petition is bigamy.” While
the Philippines has no divorce law, the
Japanese Family Court judgment is fully
consistent with Philippine public policy, as
bigamous marriages are declared void from
the beginning under Article 35(4) of the Family
Code. Bigamy is a crime under Article 349 of
the Revised Penal Code. Thus, Fujiki can prove
the existence of the Japanese Family Court
judgment in accordance with Rule 132,
Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39,
Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.
2. Yes, the recognition of the foreign divorce
decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding
itself, as the object of special proceedings
(such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court)
is precisely to establish the status or right of a
party or a particular fact.”
 Rule 108, Section 1
of the Rules of Court states:
Sec. 1. Who may file petition. — Any person
interested in any act, event, order or decree
concerning the civil status of persons which
26

has been recorded in the civil register, may file
a verified petition for the cancellation or
correction of any entry relating thereto, with
the Regional Trial Court of the province where
the corresponding civil registry is located.
(Emphasis supplied)
There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a
personal and material interest in maintaining
the integrity of the marriage he contracted and
the property relations arising from it.
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party,
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
If there is neither inconsistency with public
policy nor adequate proof to repel the
judgment, Philippine courts should, by default,
recognize the foreign judgment as part of the
comity of nations.
-------------------------------------------------------
LEONILA G. SANTIAGO vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES , G.R. No. 200233 JULY 15, 2015

Facts: Four months after the solemnization of

3. Yes, there is neither circumvention of the their marriage on 29 July 1997, 3 Leonila G.
substantive and procedural safeguards of Santiago and Nicanor F. Santos faced an
marriage under Philippine law, nor of the Information 4 for bigamy. Petitioner pleaded
jurisdiction of Family Courts under R.A. No. "not guilty," while her putative husband
8369. A recognition of a foreign judgment is escaped the criminal suit. 5 The prosecution
not an action to nullify a marriage. It is an adduced evidence that Santos, who had been
action for Philippine courts to recognize the married to Estela Galang since 2 June 1974,
effectivity of a foreign judgment, which
presupposes a case which was already tried
and decided under foreign law. The RTC appreciated the undisputed fact that
petitioner married Santos during the
In the recognition of foreign judgments,
subsistence of his marriage to Galang. Based
Philippine courts are incompetent to substitute
on the more credible account of Galang that
their judgment on how a case was decided
she had already introduced herself as the legal
under foreign law. They cannot decide on the
wife of Santos in March and April 1997, the
“family rights and duties, or on the status,
trial court rejected the affirmative defense of
condition and legal capacity” of the foreign
petitioner that she had not known of the first
citizen who is a party to the foreign judgment.
marriage. It also held that it was incredible for
Thus, Philippine courts are limited to the
a learned person like petitioner to be easily
question of whether to extend the effect of a
duped by a person like Santos. 8
foreign judgment in the Philippines. In a
foreign judgment relating to the status of a
marriage involving a citizen of a foreign
The RTC declared that as indicated in the
country, Philippine courts only decide whether
Certificate of Marriage, "her marriage was
to extend its effect to the Filipino party, under
celebrated without a need for a marriage
the rule of lex nationalii expressed in Article 15
license in accordance with Article 34 of the
of the Civil Code.
Family Code, which is an admission that she
For this purpose, Philippine courts will only cohabited with Santos long before the
determine (1) whether the foreign judgment is celebration of their marriage." 9Thus, the trial
inconsistent with an overriding public policy in court convicted petitioner as follows: 10
the Philippines; and (2) whether any alleging
party is able to prove an extrinsic ground to
repel the foreign judgment, i.e. want of
27
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court
finds the accused Leonila G. Santiago GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Bigamy, defined and penalized under Article
349 of the Revised Penal Code and imposes
against her the indeterminate penalty of six (
6) months and one (1) day of Prision
Correctional as minimum to six ( 6) years and
one (1) day of Prision Mayor as maximum.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration. She
contended that her marriage to Santos was
void ab initio for having been celebrated
without complying with Article 34 of the Family
Code, which provides an exemption from the
requirement of a marriage license if the parties
have actually lived together as husband and
wife for at least five years prior to the
celebration of their marriage. In her case,
petitioner asserted that she and Santos had
not lived together as husband and wife for five
years prior to their marriage. Hence, she
argued that the absence of a marriage license
effectively rendered their marriage null and
void, justifying her acquittal from bigamy. The
RTC refused to reverse her conviction and held
thus: 11Accused Santiago submits that it is her
marriage to her co-accused that is null and
void as it was celebrated without a valid
marriage license x x x. In advancing that
theory, accused wants this court to pass
judgment on the validity of her marriage to
accused Santos, something this court cannot
do. The best support to her argument would
have been the submission of a judicial decree
of annulment of their marriage. Absent such
proof, this court cannot declare their marriage
null and void in these proceedings.
On appeal before the CA, petitioner claimed
that her conviction was not based on proof
beyond reasonable doubt. She attacked the
credibility of Galang and insisted that the
former had not known of the previous
marriage of Santos. Similar to the RTC, the CA
gave more weight to the prosecution
witnesses' narration. It likewise disbelieved
the testimony of Santos. Anent the lack of a
marriage license, the appellate court simply
stated that the claim was a vain attempt to put
the validity of her marriage to Santos in
question. Consequently, the CA affirmed her
conviction for bigamy. 12
ISSUES: petitioner reiterates that she cannot
be a co-accused in the instant case, because
she was not aware of Santos's previous
marriage. But in the main, she argues that for
there to be a conviction for bigamy, a valid
second marriage must be proven by the
prosecution beyond reasonable doubt.
Citing People v. De Lara, 13 she contends that
her marriage to Santos is void because of the
absence of a marriage license. She elaborates
that their marriage does not fall under any of
those marriages exempt from a marriage
license, because they have not previously lived
together exclusively as husband and wife for
at least five years. She alleges that it is extant
in the records that she married Santos in 1997,
or only four years since she met him in 1993.
Without completing the five-year requirement,
she posits that their marriage without a license
is void.
Held: In the crime of bigamy, both the first and
second spouses may be the offended parties
depending on the circumstances, as when the
second spouse married the accused without
being aware of his previous marriage. Only if
the second spouse had knowledge of the
previous undissolved marriage of the accused
could she be included in the information as a
co-accused. (Emphasis supplied)
Therefore, the lower courts correctly
ascertained petitioner's knowledge of Santos's
28
marriage to Galang. Both courts consistently
found that she knew of the first marriage as
shown by the totality of the following
circumstances: 19 (1) when Santos was
courting and visiting petitioner in the house of
her in-laws, they openly showed their
disapproval of him; (2) it was incredible for a
learned person like petitioner to not know of
his true civil status; and (3) Galang, who was
the more credible witness compared with
petitioner who had various inconsistent
testimonies, straightforwardly testified that
she had already told petitioner on two
occasions that the former was the legal wife of
Santos.
After a perusal of the records, it is clear that
the marriage between petitioner and Santos
took place without a marriage license. The
absence of this requirement is purportedly
explained in their Certificate of Marriage,
which reveals that their union was celebrated
under Article 34 of the Family Code. The
provision reads as follows:
No license shall be necessary for the marriage
of a man and a woman who have lived
together as husband and wife for at least five
years and without any legal impediment to
marry each other. The contracting parties shall
state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before
any person authorized by law to administer
oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also state
under oath that he ascertained the
qualifications of the contracting parties are
found no legal impediment to the marriage.31
Here, respondent did not dispute that
petitioner knew Santos in more or less in
February 1996 32 and that after six months of
courtship,33 she married him on 29 July 1997.
Without any objection from the prosecution,
petitioner testified that Santos had frequently
visited her in Castellano, Nueva Ecija, prior to
their marriage. However, he never cohabited
with her, as she was residing in the house of
her in-laws,34 and her children from her
previous marriage disliked him.35 On cross
examination, respondent did not question the
claim of petitioner that sometime in 1993, she
first met Santos as an agent who sold her
piglets.36
All told, the evidence on record shows that
petitioner and Santos had only known each
other for only less than four years. Thus, it
follows that the two of them could not have
cohabited for at least five years prior to their
marriage.
Santiago and Santos, however, reflected the
exact opposite of this demonstrable fact.
Although the records do not show that they
submitted an affidavit of cohabitation as
required by Article 34 of the Family Code, it
appears that the two of them lied before the
solemnizing officer and misrepresented that
they had actually cohabited for at least five
years before they married each other.
Unfortunately, subsequent to this lie was the
issuance of the Certificate of Marriage, 37 in
which the solemnizing officer stated under
oath that no marriage license was necessary,
because the marriage was solemnized under
Article 34 of the Family Code.
The legal effects in a criminal case of a
deliberate act to put a flaw in the marriage
The Certificate of Marriage, signed by Santos
and Santiago, contained the misrepresentation
perpetrated by them that they were eligible to
contract marriage without a license. We thus
face an anomalous situation wherein petitioner
seeks to be acquitted of bigamy based on her
illegal actions of (1) marrying Santos without
a marriage license despite knowing that they
29
had not satisfied the cohabitation requirement
under the law; and (2) falsely making claims
in no less than her marriage contract.
We chastise this deceptive scheme that hides
what is basically a bigamous and illicit
marriage in an effort to escape criminal
prosecution. Our penal laws on marriage, such
as bigamy, punish an individual's deliberate
disregard of the permanent and sacrosanct
character of this special bond between
spouses.38 In Tenebro v. Court of Appeals,39
we had the occasion to emphasize that the
State's penal laws on bigamy should not be
rendered nugatory by allowing individuals "to
deliberately ensure that each marital contract
be flawed in some manner, and to thus escape
the consequences of contracting multiple
marriages, while beguiling throngs of hapless
women with the promise of futurity and
commitment."
Thus, in the case at bar, we cannot
countenance petitioner's illegal acts of feigning
a marriage and, in the same breath, adjudge
her innocent of the crime. For us, to do so
would only make a mockery of the sanctity of
marriage. 40
Furthermore, it is a basic concept of justice
that no court will "lend its aid to x x x one who
has consciously and voluntarily become a
party to an illegal act upon which the cause of
action is founded." 41 If the cause of action
appears to arise ex turpi causa or that which
involves a transgression of positive law,
parties shall be left unassisted by the courts.
42 As a result, litigants shall be denied relief
on the ground that their conduct has been
inequitable, unfair and dishonest or
fraudulent, or deceitful as to the controversy
in issue. 43
Here, the cause of action of petitioner,
meaning her affirmative defense in this
criminal case of bigamy, is that her marriage
with Santos was void for having been secured
without a marriage license. But as elucidated
earlier, they themselves perpetrated a false
Certificate of Marriage by misrepresenting that
they were exempted from the license
requirement based on their fabricated claim
that they had already cohabited as husband
and wife for at least five years prior their
marriage. In violation of our law against illegal
marriages,44 petitioner married Santos while
knowing full well that they had not yet
complied with the five-year cohabitation
requirement under Article 34 of the Family
Code. Consequently, it will be the height of
absurdity for this Court to allow petitioner to
use her illegal act to escape criminal
conviction.
No less than the present Constitution provides
that "marriage, as an inviolable social
institution, is the foundation of the family and
shall be protected by the State." 45 It must be
safeguarded from the whims and caprices of
the contracting parties. 46 in keeping
therefore with this fundamental policy, this
Court affirms the conviction of petitioner for
bigamy
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on
Certiorari filed by petitioner Leonila G.
Santiago is DENIED. The Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR No. 33566 is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. As modified, petitioner
Leonila G. Santiago is hereby found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
bigamy as an accomplice. She is sentenced to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of six months
of arresto mayor as minimum to four years of
prision correctional as maximum plus
accessory penalties provided by law.
-------------------------------------------------------
30
Office of the Court Administrator v.
Necessario
FACTS:
Judge Jesus Matas and Eduardo Torres, the
OIC Clerk of Court, were accused of violating
RA 3019 which caused then Deputy Court
Administrator Ernani Cruz Pano to recommend
that the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA) to file administrative charges against
the two but said charges will be suspended
pending the out come of the criminal case. The
complaint alleged that Judge Matas and
Torres, in connivance with one George
Mercado, concealed from J.K. Mercado and
Sons Agricultural Enterprises his knowledge of
the petition for issuance of new owner’s
duplicate copies as well as taking cognizance
of the case which was allegedly outside of the
jurisdiction of his court, the land being in
Kapalong, Davao. Notwithstanding that the
land in question was owned by J.K. Mercado
and Sons, Judge Matas still ordered the posing
of the order and ultimately issued instructed
the Register of Deeds for the issuance a new
owner’s duplicate to George Mercado. Justice
Imperial was tasked with the investigations.
Hearing with the OCA commence but after
presenting two witnesses, it moved for
suspension of the proceedings to amend the
complaint adding the grounds of gross
inexcusable negligence and gross ignorance of
the law as well as modifying other portions of
the complaint. The complaint alleged that
Judge Matas and Torres acted with bad faith
and partiality in ruling in favour of George
Mercado.
ISSUE
1. Whether or not Judge Matas acted without
jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the case?
2. Whether or not Judge Matas acted with
gross inexcusable negligence and gross
ignorance of the law in ruling in favor of
George Mercado?
HELD
1. NO. The subject parcel of land was well
within the jurisdiction of the court of Judge
Matas. The so-called municipality of Sto Tomas
in Davao never legally existed because it was
created only by then President Carlos P. Garcia
and not by Congress. The land was actually
part of Kapalong which is within the coverage
of Branch 1 of the RTC of Davao del Norte
where Judge Matas sits. It was a mere
impropriety of venue which may be waived by
the parties.
2. NO. There was no gross inexcusable
negligence and gross ignorance of the law
given that Judge Matas actually ordered the
required posting to give notice. Also, he only
ordered the RD to issue a duplicate of copy
existing in record of the Registry and not issue
new ones in the name of George Mercado.
SIDE ISSUE WHICH SEEM TO BE RELATED TO
ADMIN LAW: The SC said that the
investigating Justice or Judge designated by
the Court to Conduct an investigation, submit
a report, and make the appropriate
recommendation does not have an authority
to grant or deny a motion to dismiss the case.
Also, the initial recommendation of the Court
Administrator regarding the suspension of the
administrative proceedings pending the
criminal case is inappropriate since
administrative cases must be resolved as
expeditiously as possible. There are different
quantum of evidence, procedure to be
followed and sanctions imposed, hence, the
finding of one shouldn’t be necessarily binding
on the other.
-------------------------------------------------------
31
MERLINDA CIPRIANO MONTAÑES v.
LOURDES TAJOLOSA CIPRIANO. G.R. No.
181089; October 22, 2012.
FACTS: On April 8, 1976, Lourdes Cipriano
(Lourdes) married Socrates Flores (Socrates).
On January 24, 1983, during the subsistence
of the said marriage, Lourdes married Silverio
V. Cipriano (Silverio). In 2001, Lourdes filed
with the RTC of Muntinlupa a Petition for the
Annulment of her marriage with Socrates on
the ground of the latter’s psychological
incapacity. The RTC rendered its decision
declaring the marriage of Lourdes with
Socrates null and void. Said decision became
final and executory on October 13, 2003.
On May 14, 2004, petitioner Merlinda
Montañez, Silverio’s daughter from the first
marriage, filed a complaint for bigamy against
Lourdes alleging that Lourdes failed to reveal
to Silverio that she was still married to
Socrates.
Lourdes moved to quash the information
alleging that her first marriage to Socrates had
already been declared void ab initio in 2003,
thus, there was no more marriage to speak of
prior to her marriage to Silverio on January 24,
1983. She also averred that she had
contracted her second marriage before the
effectivity of the Family Code; hence, the
existing law at that time did not require a
judicial declaration of absolute nullity as a
condition precedent to contracting a
subsequent marriage. Hence, the RTC granted
the motion to quash.
ISSUE: Was the RTC correct in quashing the
information for bigamy?
HELD: The elements of the crime of bigamy
are: (a) the offender has been legally married;
(b) the marriage has not been legally dissolved
or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the
absent spouse could not yet be presumed
dead according to the Civil Code; (c) that he
contracts a second or subsequent marriage;
and (d) the second or subsequent marriage
has all the essential requisites for validity. The
felony is consummated on the celebration of
the second marriage or subsequent marriage.
It is essential in the prosecution for bigamy
that the alleged second marriage, having all
the essential requirements, would be valid
were it not for the subsistence of the first
marriage.
In this case, it appears that when respondent
contracted a second marriage with Silverio in
1983, her first marriage with Socrates
celebrated in 1976 was still subsisting as the
same had not yet been annulled or declared
void by a competent authority. Clearly, the
annulment of respondent's first marriage on
the ground of psychological incapacity was
declared only in 2003.
In Mercado v. Tan, we ruled that the
subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of
the first marriage was immaterial, because
prior to the declaration of nullity, the crime of
bigamy had already been consummated.
As far back as 1995, in Atienza v. Brillantes,
Jr., the Court already made the declaration
that Article 40, which is a rule of procedure,
should be applied retroactively because Article
256 of the Family Code itself provides that said
"Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it
does not prejudice or impair vested or
acquired rights." The Court went on to explain,
thus: “The fact that procedural statutes may
somehow affect the litigants' rights may not
preclude their retroactive application to
32

pending actions. The retroactive application of marriage judicially declared void, the fact
procedural laws is not violative of any right of remains that the first and second marriage
a person who may feel that he is adversely were subsisting before the first marriage was
affected. The reason is that as a general rule, annulled, since Lea failed to obtain a judicial
no vested right may attach to, nor arise from, decree of nullity for her first marriage to
procedural laws.” GRANTED. Bautista before contracting her second
marriage with Renato.
-------------------------------------------------------
Castillo v. Castillo, G.R. No. 189607, April 18,
2016 CA reversed and set aside the RTC's Decision
and Order and upheld the validity of the
Facts:
parties' marriage. In reversing the RTC, the CA
said that since Lea's marriages were
solemnized in 1972 and in 1979, or prior to the
On 25 May 1972, respondent Lea P. De Leon
effectivity of the Family Code on 3 August
Castillo (Lea) married Benjamin Bautista
1988, the Civil Code is the applicable law since
(Bautista). On 6 January 1979, respondent
it is the law in effect at the time the marriages
married herein petitioner Renato A. Castillo
were celebrated, and not the Family Code.
(Renato).
Furthermore, the CA ruled that the Civil Code
does not state that a judicial decree is
necessary in order to establish the nullity of a
On 28 May 2001, Renato filed before the RTC
marriage.
a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage,
praying that his marriage to Lea be declared
void due to her subsisting marriage to
Bautista. Respondent opposed the Petition,
and contended that her marriage to Bautista Issue: W/N judicial declaration is necessary in
was null and void as they had not secured any order to establish the nullity of a marriage.
license therefor, and neither of them was a
member of the denomination to which the
solemnizing officer belonged.
Ruling: NO, under the Civil Code. Petition is
DENIED.
RTC declared the marriage between petitioner
and respondent null and void ab initio on the
ground that it was a bigamous marriage under
The Court held that the subsequent marriage
Article 41 of the Family Code. The RTC said
of Lea to Renato is valid in view of the
that the fact that Lea's marriage to Bautista
invalidity of her first marriage to Bautista
was subsisting when she married Renato on 6
because of the absence of a marriage license.
January 1979, makes her marriage to Renato
That there was no judicial declaration that the
bigamous, thus rendering it void ab initio. The
first marriage was void ab initio before the
lower court dismissed Lea's argument that she
second marriage was contracted is immaterial
need not obtain a judicial decree of nullity and
as this is not a requirement under the Civil
could presume the nullity of a prior subsisting
Code. Nonetheless, the subsequent Decision
marriage. The RTC stressed that so long as no
of the RTC declaring the nullity of Lea's first
judicial declaration exists, the prior marriage is
marriage only serves to strengthen the
valid and existing. Lastly, RTC also said that
even if respondent eventually had her first
33

conclusion that her subsequent marriage to a voidable marriage there must be a judicial
Renato is valid. decree.

Emphasizing the fifth difference, this Court has

held in the cases of People v. Mendoza, People
Ratio:
v. Aragon, and Odayat v. Amante, that the
Civil Code contains no express provision on the
necessity of a judicial declaration of nullity of
The validity of a marriage and all its incidents
a void marriage.
must be determined in accordance with the
law in effect at the time of its celebration. In
this case, the law in force at the time Lea
It must be emphasized that the enactment of
contracted both marriages was the Civil Code.
the Family Code rendered the rulings in
The children of the parties were also born
Odayat, Mendoza, and Aragon inapplicable to
while the Civil Code was in effect i.e. in 1979,
marriages celebrated after 3 August 1988. A
1981, and 1985. Hence, the Court must
judicial declaration of absolute nullity of
resolve this case using the provisions under
marriage is now expressly required where the
the Civil Code on void marriages, in particular,
nullity of a previous marriage is invoked for
Articles 80, 81, 82, and 83 (first paragraph);
purposes of contracting a second marriage. A
and those on voidable marriages are Articles
second marriage contracted prior to the
83 (second paragraph), 85 and 86.
issuance of this declaration of nullity is thus
considered bigamous and void.

Under the Civil Code, a void marriage differs -------------------------------------------------------

from a voidable marriage in the following
People of the Philippines vs Edgardo Odtuhan
ways:
1) a void marriage is nonexistent - i.e., there
was no marriage from the beginning - while in Facts:
a voidable marriage, the marriage is valid until
annulled by a competent court;
On July 2, 1980, respondent Edgardo Odtuhan
2) a void marriage cannot be ratified, while a
married Jasmin Modina. On October 28, 1993,
voidable marriage can be ratified by
he also married Eleanor Alagon. He later filed
cohabitation;
a petition for annulment of his marriage with
3) being nonexistent, a void marriage can be Modina. The RTC granted respondent’s
collaterally attacked, while a voidable marriage petition and declared his first marriage void ab
cannot be collaterally attacked; initio for lack of a valid marriage license. On
November 10, 2003, Alagon died. In the
4) in a void marriage, there is no conjugal
meantime, private complainant Evelyn Alagon
partnership and the offspring are natural
learned of respondent’s previous marriage
children by legal fiction, while in voidable
with Modina and thus filed a Complaint-
marriage there is conjugal partnership and the
Affidavit charging respondent with Bigamy.
children conceived before the decree of
annulment are considered legitimate; and Respondent moved to quash the information
on two grounds: (1) that the facts do not
5) "in a void marriage no judicial decree to
charge the offense of bigamy; and (2) that the
establish the invalidity is necessary," while in
34
criminal action or liability has been
extinguished.
The RTC held that the facts constitute the
crime of bigamy. There was a valid marriage
between respondent and Modina and without
such marriage having been dissolved,
respondent contracted a second marriage with
Alagon. It further held that neither can the
information be quashed on the ground that
criminal liability has been extinguished,
because the declaration of nullity of the first
marriage is not one of the modes of
extinguishing criminal liability.
Respondent appealed to the CA on certiorari
and it concluded that the RTC gravely abused
its discretion in denying respondent’s motion
to quash the information, considering that the
facts alleged in the information do not charge
an offense.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the motion to quash by
respondent is proper
2. Whether or not the court’s judgment
declaring respondent’s first marriage void ab
initio extinguished respondent’s criminal
liability
Held:
1. No. A motion to quash information is the
mode by which an accused assails the validity
of a criminal complaint or information filed
against him for insufficiency on its face in point
of law, or for defects which are apparent in the
face of the information. In this case however,
there is sufficiency of the allegations in the
information to constitute the crime of bigamy.
It contained all the elements of the crime as
provided for in Article 349 of the Revised Penal
Code: (1) that respondent is legally married to
Modina; (2) that without such marriage having
been legally dissolved; (3) that respondent
willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously contracted
a second marriage with Alagon; and (4) that
the second marriage has all the essential
requisites for validity.
Respondent’s evidence showing the court’s
declaration that his marriage to Modina is null
and void from the beginning should not be
considered because matters of defense cannot
be raised in a motion to quash. It is not proper,
therefore, to resolve the charges at the very
outset without the benefit of a full blown trial.
2. No. Respondent’s claim that there are more
reasons to quash the information against him
because he obtained the declaration of nullity
of marriage before the filing of the complaint
for bigamy against him is without merit.
Criminal culpability attaches to the offender
upon the commission of the offense and from
that instant, there is already liability. The time
of filing of the criminal complaint or
information is material only for determining
prescription.
It has been held in a number of cases that a
judicial declaration of nullity is required before
a valid subsequent marriage can be
contracted. Therefore, he who contracts a
second marriage before the judicial
declaration of nullity of the first marriage
assumes the risk of being prosecuted for
bigamy.
The petition on review on ceritorari is granted.
The CA’s decision is set aside and the case is
remanded to the RTC.
-------------------------------------------------------
35

Garcia-Quiazon v. Belen, taken place and it cannot be the source of

G.R. No. 189121, July 31, 2013 right, such that any interested party may
attach the marriage directly or collaterally
without prescription, which may be filed even
beyond the lifetime of the parties to the
FACTS marriage. Having successional rights that
would be prejudiced by her father’s marriage
Petitioner Elise Quiazon is the daughter of
to Amelia, Elise may without a doubt impugn
Eliseo Quiazon and Ma. Lourdes Belen, who
the existence of such marriage even after the
are common-law partners. When Eliseo died
death of her father. The said marriage may be
instestate, Elise through her mother filed a
questioned by filing an action attaching its
Petition for Letters of Administration before
validity, or collaterally by raising it as an issue
the RTC, claiming that she is a natural child of
in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate
Eliseo having conceived at the time when her
of the deceased spouse. As a compulsory heir,
parents were both capacitated to marry each
Elise has a cause of action for the declaration
other. Filiation was proven by her Birth
of nullity of the void marriage of Eliseo and
Certificate signed by Eliseo. Insisting on the
Amelia.
legal capacity of Eliseo and Lourdes, Elise
impugned the validity of Eliseo’s marriage to
Amelia Garcia-Quiazon by claiming it was
bigamous. Likewise, Elise who stands to be benefited by
the distribution of Eliseo’s estate is deemed to
be an interested part. An interested part is one
who would be benefited in the estate. Having
Respondent Amelia opposed the issuance of
a vested right in the distribution of Eliseo’s
the letters of administration asserting that the
estate, Elise can rightfully be considered as an
venue of the petition was improperly laid.
interested party.
However, the RTC rendered its decision in
favor of Elise. On appeal, the deicison was -------------------------------------------------------
affirmed. Hence, the petition was filed before
Aurelio v. Aurelio, G.R. No.
the SC raising the argument that Elise has not
175367, June 06, 2011
shown any interest in the petition for letters of
administration and that the CA erred in FACTS:
declaring that Eliseo and Amelia were no
legally married because Elise has no cause of
action on it. Petitioner Danilo A. Aurelio and respondent
Vida Ma. Corazon Aurelio were married on
March 23, 1988. They have two sons, namely:
ISSUE Danilo Miguel and Danilo Gabriel.

Whether or not Elise has a cause of action for

declaration of nullity of marriage despite the
death of his father, hence cannot be deemed
as an interested party.
RULING
Yes, Elise has a cause of action. The Court
ruled that in a void marriage, no marriage has
On May 9, 2002, respondent filed with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City,
Branch 94, a Petition for Declaration of Nullity
of Marriage. In her petition, respondent
alleged that both she and petitioner were
psychologically incapacitated of performing
and complying with their respective essential
marital obligations. In addition, respondent
36

alleged that such state of psychological Whether or not the marriage shall be declared
incapacity was present prior and even during null and void?
the time of the marriage ceremony. Hence,
respondent prays that her marriage be
declared null and void under Article 36 of the HELD:
Family Code. It alleged among others that said
Petition denied. Marriage is null and void.
psychological incapacity was manifested by
lack of financial support from the husband; his
lack of drive and incapacity to discern the
RATIO:
plight of his working wife. The husband
exhibited consistent jealousy and distrust First, contrary to petitioner’s assertion, this
towards his wife. His moods alternated Court finds that the root cause of psychological
between hostile defiance and contrition. He incapacity was stated and alleged in the
refused to assist in the maintenance of the complaint. We agree with the manifestation of
family. respondent that the family backgrounds of
both petitioner and respondent were discussed
in the complaint as the root causes of their
On the side of the wife on the other hand, is psychological incapacity. Moreover, a
effusive and displays her feelings openly and competent and expert psychologist clinically
freely. Her feelings change very quickly – from identified the same as the root causes.
joy to fury to misery to despair, depending on
Second, the petition likewise alleged that the
her day-to-day experiences. Her tolerance for
illness of both parties was of such grave a
boredom was very low. She was emotionally
nature as to bring about a disability for them
immature; she cannot stand frustration or
to assume the essential obligations of
disappointment. She cannot delay to gratify
marriage. The psychologist reported that
her needs. She gets upset when she cannot
respondent suffers from Histrionic Personality
get what she wants. Self-indulgence lifts her
Disorder with Narcissistic Features. Petitioner,
spirits immensely. Their hostility towards each
on the other hand, allegedly suffers from
other distorted their relationship. Their
Passive Aggressive (Negativistic) Personality
incapacity to accept and fulfill the essential
Disorder. The incapacity of both parties to
obligations of marital life led to the breakdown
perform their marital obligations was alleged
of their marriage.
to be grave, incorrigible and incurable.

On November 8, 2002, petitioner filed a Motion

to Dismiss the petition. Petitioner principally
argued that the petition failed to state a cause
of action and that it failed to meet the
standards set by the Court for the
interpretation and implementation of Article 36
of the Family Code.
RTC denied the petition. CA affirmed.
ISSUE:
Lastly, this Court also finds that the essential
marital obligations that were not complied with
were alleged in the petition. As can be easily
gleaned from the totality of the petition,
respondent’s allegations fall under Article 68 of
the Family Code which states that “the
husband and the wife are obliged to live
together, observe mutual love, respect and
fidelity, and render mutual help and support.”
-------------------------------------------------------
REPUBLIC V. GALANG
37

prepared their breakfast because Juvy did not

want to wake up early; Juvy often left their
G.R. No. 168335, [June 6, 2011]
child to their neighbors’ care; and Christopher
almost got lost in the market when Juvy
brought him there. He added that Juvy stole
DOCTRINE:
his ATM card and falsified his signature to
encash the check representing Nestor’s
father’s pension. He, likewise, stated that he
Psychological incapacity must be characterized
caught Juvy playing “mahjong” and “kuwaho”
by (a) gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and
three (3) times. Finally, he testified that Juvy
(c) incurability. The defect should refer to “no
borrowed money from their relatives on the
less than a mental (not physical) incapacity
pretense that their son was confined in a
that causes a party to be truly incognitive of
hospital.
the basic marital covenants that concomitantly
must be assumed and discharged by the
parties to the marriage.”
Nestor presented Anna Liza Guiang, a
psychologist, who testified that she conducted
a psychological test on Nestor. In her
FACTS:
Psychological Report, the psychologist made
the following findings:

In March 1994, Nestor and Juvy contracted

marriage in Pampanga and thereafter they
Psychological Test conducted on client Nestor
resided in the house of the Nestor’s father.
Galang resembles an emotionally-matured
Nestor worked as an artist-illustrator while
individual. He is well-adjusted to the problem
Juvy stayed at home. They had one child,
he meets, and enable to throw-off major
Christopher.
irritations but manifest[s] a very low
frustration tolerance which means he has a
little ability to endure anxiety and the client
In August 1999, Nestor filed with the RTC a
manifests suppressed feelings and emotions
petition for the declaration of nullity of his
which resulted to unbearable emotional pain,
marriage with Juvy, under Article 36 of the
depression and lack of self-esteem and gained
Family Code, as amended. He alleged that
emotional tensions caused by his wife’s
Juvy was psychologically incapacitated to
behavior.
exercise the essential obligations of marriage,
as she was a kleptomaniac and a swindler;
that Juvy suffers from “mental deficiency,
The incapacity of the defendant is manifested
innate immaturity, distorted discernment and
[in] such a manner that the defendant-wife:
total lack of care, love and affection [towards
(1) being very irresponsible and very lazy and
him and their] child.” He posited that Juvy’s
doesn’t manifest any sense of responsibility;
incapacity was “extremely serious” and
(2) her involvement in gambling activities such
“appears to be incurable.”
as mahjong and kuwaho; (3) being an
estafador which exhibits her behavioral and
personality disorders; (4) her neglect and
Having found no collusion between the parties,
show no care attitude towards her husband
the case was set for trial. In his testimony,
and child; (5) her immature and rigid behavior;
Nestor alleged that he was the one who
(6) her lack of initiative to change and above
38
all, the fact that she is unable to perform her
marital obligations as a loving, responsible and
caring wife to her family. There are just few
reasons to believe that the defendant is
suffering from incapacitated mind and such
incapacity appears to be incorrigible.
The RTC nullified the parties’ marriage in its
decision of January 22, 2001. The RTC Judge,
relying on the Santos Case, stated in the
decision that the psychological incapacity of
respondent to comply with the essential
marital obligations of marriage can be
characterized by (a) gravity because the
subject cannot carry out the normal and
ordinary duties of marriage and family
shouldered by any average couple existing
under ordinary circumstances of life
and work; (b) antecedence, because the root
cause of the trouble can be traced to the
history of the subject before marriage
although its overt manifestations appear over
after the wedding; and (c) incurability, if
treatments required exceed the ordinary
means or subject, or involve time and expense
beyond the reach of the subject – are all
obtaining in this case.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals, affirmed the
RTC decision in toto.
ISSUE:
Whether there is basis to nullify the
respondent’s marriage to Juvy on the ground
that at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, Juvy suffered from psychological
incapacity that prevented her from complying
with her essential marital obligations.
HELD:
None. The Supreme Court held that the totality
of Nestor’s evidence – his testimonies and the
psychologist, and the psychological report and
evaluation – insufficient to prove Juvy’s
psychological incapacity pursuant to Article 36
of the Family Code.
RATIO:
Psychological incapacity must be characterized
by
(a) gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and (c)
incurability. The defect should refer to “no less
than a mental (not physical) incapacity that
causes a party to be truly incognitive of the
basic marital covenants that concomitantly
must be assumed and discharged by the
parties to the marriage.” It must be confined
to “the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. [Louel Santos vs.
CA]
It is not absolutely necessary to introduce
expert opinion in a petition under Article 36 of
the Family Code if the totality of evidence
shows that psychological incapacity exists and
its gravity, juridical antecedence, and
incurability can be duly established. [Brenda
Marcos vs. Marcos]
Instead of serving as a guideline, Molina
Doctrine unintentionally became a
straightjacket; it forced all cases involving
psychological incapacity to fit into and be
bound by it. [Ngo Te vs. Yu-Te] In Ting vs.
Velez-Ting, far from abandoning Molina, the
39
Ngo Te case simply suggested the relaxation
of its stringent requirements; the Ngo Te case
merely stands for a more flexible approach in
considering petitions for declaration of nullity
of marriages based on psychological
incapacity.
In the present case, the psychologist did not
even identify the types of psychological tests
which she administered on Nestor and the root
cause of Juvy’s psychological condition. There
was no showing that any mental disorder
existed at the inception of the marriage. The
report failed to prove the gravity or severity of
Juvy’s alleged condition, specifically, why and
to what extent the disorder is serious, and how
it incapacitated her to comply with her marital
duties; the report did not even categorically
state the particular type of personality disorder
found. The report failed to establish the
incurability of Juvy’s condition. The report’s
pronouncements that Juvy “lacks the initiative
to change” and that her mental incapacity
“appears incorrigible” are insufficient to prove
that her mental condition could not be treated,
or if it were otherwise, the cure would be
beyond her means to undertake.
Petition was granted. Galang’s petition for the
declaration of nullity of his marriage to Juvy
Salazar under Article 36 of the Family Code
was dismissed.
-------------------------------------------------------
Republic of the Philippines, Petitioner vs. Cesar
Encelan, Respondent
G.R. No. 170022; January 09, 2013
Facts: Cesar Married Lolita, and they had
two children. To support the family, Cesar
went abroad and worked as an OFW in Saudi
Arabia. After two years of working abroad,
Cesar learned that Lolita is having an illicit
affair with Alvin Perez, and thereafter, left the
conjugal dwelling together with the two
children. But even with such circumstances,
Cesar never failed to send financial support for
the family. On June 1995, Cesar filed a petition
against Lolita for the declaration of the nullity
of his marriage based on Lolita’s psychological
incapacity. Cesar, during a hearing even
presented a psychological evaluation report on
Lolita with the finding that “Lolita was not
suffering from any form of psychiatric illness,
but had been unable to provide the
expectations expected of her for a good and
lasting marital relationship.... and her
transferring from one job to another depicts
some interpersonal problem with co-workers
as well as her impatience in attaining her
ambitions .... and her refusal to go with her
husband abroad signifies her reluctance to
work out a good marital and family
relationship...” Cesar found ally in RTC as it
gave him a favourable decision which declared
his marriage to Lolita null and void. The court
of Appeals also affirmed the decision of RTC,
and thereafter, the case was elevated to the
Supreme Court, thus, this case.
Issue: Whether or not psychological
incapacity is indeed present in the person of
Lolita as to nullify a valid marriage.
Ruling: No. Marriage is an inviolable social
institution protected by the State and any
doubt should be resolved in favour of its
existence and continuation against its
dissolution and nullity. In this case, sexual
infidelity and abandonment of the conjugal
dwelling do not necessarily constitute
psychological incapacity; these are simply
grounds for legal separation. To constitute
psychological incapacity, it must be shown that
the unfaithfulness and abandonment are
manifestations of a disordered personality that
actually prevented the erring spouse from
discharging the essential marital obligations,
40
which the court found not present in the
person of Lolita.
-------------------------------------------------------
CAMACHO- REYES V. REYES
G.R. No. 185286, [August 18, 2010]
FACTS:
Petitioner Maria Socorro Camacho-Reyes met
respondent Ramon Reyes at the University of
the Philippines (UP), Diliman, in 1972 when
they were both nineteen (19) years old. The
casual acquaintanceship quickly developed
into a boyfriend-girlfriend relationship.
At that time, respondent held a job in the
family business, the Aristocrat Restaurant.
Petitioner’s good impression of the respondent
was not diminished by the latter’s habit of
cutting classes, not even by her discovery that
respondent was taking marijuana.
Not surprisingly, only petitioner finished
university studies, obtaining a degree in AB
Sociology from the UP. By 1974, respondent
had dropped out of school on his third year,
and just continued to work for the Aristocrat
Restaurant.
In 1976, the year following petitioner’s
graduation and her father’s death, petitioner
and respondent got married. At that time,
petitioner was already five (5) months
pregnant and employed at the Population
Center Foundation. Thereafter, the newlyweds
lived with the respondent’s family in
Mandaluyong City. All living expenses were
shouldered by respondent’s parents, and the
couple’s respective salaries were spent solely
for their personal needs. Initially, respondent
gave petitioner a monthly allowance of
P1,500.00 from his salary. When their first
child was born on March 22, 1977, financial
difficulties started. Rearing a child entailed
expenses. A year into their marriage, the
monthly allowance of P1,500.00 from
respondent stopped. Further, respondent no
longer handed his salary to petitioner. When
petitioner mustered enough courage to ask the
respondent about this, the latter told her that
he had resigned due to slow advancement
within the family business. Respondent’s game
plan was to venture into trading seafood in the
province, supplying hotels and restaurants,
including the Aristocrat Restaurant. However,
this new business took respondent away from
his young family for days on end without any
communication. Petitioner simply endured the
set up, hoping that the situation will change.
To prod respondent into assuming more
responsibility, petitioner suggested that they
live separately from her in-laws. However, the
new living arrangement engendered further
financial difficulty. While petitioner struggled
to make ends meet as the single-income
earner of the household, respondent’s
business floundered. Thereafter, another
attempt at business, a fishpond in Mindoro,
was similarly unsuccessful. Respondent gave
money to petitioner sporadically.
Compounding the family’s financial woes and
further straining the parties’ relationship was
the indifferent attitude of respondent towards
his family. That his business took him away
from his family did not seem to bother
respondent; he did not exert any effort to
remain in touch with them while he was away
in Mindoro.
After two (2) years of struggling, the spouses
transferred residence and, this time, moved in
with petitioner’s mother. But the new set up
did not end their marital difficulties. In fact,
the parties became more estranged. Petitioner
continued to carry the burden of supporting a
family not just financially, but in most aspects
as well.
41
In 1985, petitioner, who had previously
suffered a miscarriage, gave birth to their third
son. At that time, respondent was in Mindoro
and he did not even inquire on the health of
either the petitioner or the newborn. A week
later, respondent arrived in Manila, acting
nonchalantly while playing with the baby, with
nary an attempt to find out how the hospital
bills were settled.
In 1989, due to financial reverses,
respondent’s fishpond business stopped
operations. Although without any means to
support his family, respondent refused to go
back to work for the family business. Not
surprisingly, the relationship of the parties
deteriorated.
Sometime in 1996, petitioner confirmed that
respondent was having an extra-marital affair.
Petitioner soon realized that respondent was
not only unable to provide financially for their
family, but he was, more importantly, remiss
in his obligation to remain faithful to her and
their family.
One of the last episodes that sealed the fate
of the parties’ marriage was a surgical
operation on petitioner for the removal of a
cyst. Although his wife was about to be
operated on, respondent remained
unconcerned and unattentive; and simply read
the newspaper, and played dumb when
petitioner requested that he accompany her as
she was wheeled into the operating room.
After the operation, petitioner felt that she had
had enough of respondent’s lack of concern,
and asked her mother to order respondent to
leave the recovery room.
Adolfo Reyes, respondent’s elder brother, and
his spouse, Peregrina, members of a marriage
encounter group, invited and sponsored the
parties to join the group. The elder couple
scheduled counseling sessions with petitioner
and respondent, but these did not improve the
parties’ relationship as respondent remained
uncooperative.
In 1997, Adolfo brought respondent to Dr.
Natividad A. Dayan for a psychological
assessment to “determine benchmarks of
current psychological functioning.” As with all
other attempts to help him, respondent
resisted and did not continue with the clinical
psychologist’s recommendation to undergo
psychotherapy. At about this time, petitioner,
with the knowledge of respondent’s siblings,
told respondent to move out of their house.
Respondent acquiesced to give space to
petitioner. With the de facto separation, the
relationship still did not improve. Neither did
respondent’s relationship with his children.
Finally, in 2001,5 petitioner filed (before the
RTC) a petition for the declaration of nullity of
her marriage with the respondent, alleging the
latter’s psychological incapacity to fulfill the
essential marital obligations under Article 36 of
the Family Code.
Traversing the petition, respondent denied
petitioner’s allegations that he was
psychologically incapacitated. After trial
(where the testimonies of two clinical
psychologists, Dr. Dayan and Dr. Estrella
Magno, and a psychiatrist, Dr. Cecilia Villegas,
were presented in evidence), the RTC granted
the petition and declared the marriage
between the parties null and void on the
ground of their psychological incapacity. The
CA reversed. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUES/HELD:
42

Whether the respondent was suffering from It is beyond the respondent’s impulse control.
psychological incapacity. –YES. In short, he is weaponless or powerless to
restrain himself from his consistent behaviors
simply because he did not consider the same
Whether the marriage should be declared null as wrongful. This is clearly manifested from his
and void under Art. 36. –YES. assertion that nothing was wrong in his
marriage with the petitioner and considered
their relationship as a normal one. In fact, with
RATIO: this belief, he lent deaf ears to counseling and
efforts extended to them by his original family
Taking into consideration the explicit
members to save his marriage. In short, he
guidelines in the determination of
was blind and too insensitive to the reality of
psychological incapacity in conjunction to the
his marital atmosphere. He totally disregarded
totality of the evidence presented, with
the feelings of petitioner who appeared to
emphasis on the pervasive pattern of
have been saturated already that she finally
behaviors of the respondent and outcome of
revealed her misfortunes to her sister-in-law
the assessment/diagnos[is] of expert
and willingly submitted to counseling to save
witnesses, Dra. Dayan, Dra. Mango and Dra.
their marriage. However, the hard position of
Villegas on the psychological condition of the
the respondent finally constrained her to ask
respondent, the Court finds that the marriage
respondent to leave the conjugal dwelling.
between the parties from its inception has a
Even the siblings of the respondent were
congenital infirmity termed “psychological
unanimous that separation is the remedy to
incapacity” which pertains to the inability of
the seriously ailing marriage of the parties.
the parties to effectively function emotionally,
Respondent confirmed this stand of his
intellectually and socially towards each other
siblings. As previously adverted to, the three
in relation to their essential duties to mutually
experts were one in diagnosing respondent
observe love, fidelity and respect as well as to
with a personality disorder, to wit:
mutually render help and support, (Art. 68
Family Code). In short, there was already a
fixed niche in the psychological constellation of
1. Dra. Cecilia C. Villegas
respondent which created the death of his
marriage. There is no reason to entertain any
slightest doubt on the truthfulness of the
Based on the clinical data presented, it is the
personality disorder of the respondent.
opinion of the examiner, that [petitioner]
manifested inadequacies along her affective
sphere, that made her less responsive to the
The three expert witnesses have spoken. They
emotional needs of her husband, who needed
were unanimous in their findings that
a great amount of it, rendering her relatively
respondent is suffering from personality
psychologically incapacitated to perform the
disorder which psychologically incapacitated
duties and responsibilities of marriage.
him to fulfill his basic duties to the marriage.
[Respondent], on the other hand, has
manifested strong clinical evidences (sic), that
he is suffering from a Personality Disorder, of
This psychological incapacity of the
the antisocial type, associated with strong
respondent, in the uniform words of said three
sense of Inadequacy along masculine strivings
(3) expert witnesses, is serious, incurable and
and narcissistic features that renders him
exists before his marriage and renders him a
psychologically incapacitated to perform the
helpless victim of his structural constellation.
43
duties and responsibilities of marriage. This is
characterized by his inability to conform to the
social norms that ordinarily govern many
aspects of adolescent and adult behavior. His
being a “free spirit” associated with no
remorse, no guilt feelings and no anxiety, is
distinctive of this clinical condition. His
prolonged drug intake [marijuana] and maybe
stronger drugs lately, are external factors to
boost his ego.
The root cause of the above clinical conditions
is due to his underlying defense mechanisms,
or the unconscious mental processes, that the
ego uses to resolve conflicts. His prolonged
and closed attachments to his mother
encouraged cross identification and developed
a severe
sense of inadequacy specifically along
masculine strivings. He therefore has to
camouflage his weakness, in terms of
authority, assertiveness, unilateral and
forceful decision making, aloofness and
indifference, even if it resulted to antisocial
acts. His narcissistic supplies rendered by his
mother was not resolved (sic).
It existed before marriage, but became
manifest only after the celebration, due to
marital demands and stresses. It is considered
as permanent in nature because it started
early in his psychological development, and
therefore became so engrained into his
personality structures (sic). It is considered as
severe in degree, because it hampered,
interrupted and interfered with his normal
functioning related to heterosexual
adjustments. (emphasis supplied)
2. Dr. Natividad A. Dayan
In his relationships with people, [respondent]
is apt to project a reserved, aloof and
detached attitude. [Respondent] exhibits
withdrawal patterns. He has deep feelings of
inadequacy. Due to a low self-esteem, he
tends to feel inferior and to exclude himself
from association with others. He feels that he
is “different” and as a result is prone to
anticipate rejections. Because of the
discomfort produced by these feelings, he is
apt to avoid personal and social involvement,
which increases his preoccupation with himself
and accentuates his tendency to withdraw
from interpersonal contact. [Respondent] is
also apt to be the less dominant partner. He
feels better when he has to follow than when
he has to take the lead. A self-contained
person[,] he does not really need to interact
with others in order to enjoy life and to be able
to move on. He has a small need of
companionship and is most comfortable alone.
He, too[,] feels uncomfortable in expressing
his more tender feelings for fear of being hurt.
Likewise, he maybe very angry within but he
may choose to repress this feeling.
[Respondent’s] strong need for social
approval, which could have stemmed from
some deep seated insecurities makes him
submissive and over [compliant]. He tends to
make extra effort to please people. Although
at times[, he] already feels victimized and
taken advantage of, he still tolerates abusive
behavior for fear of interpersonal conflicts.
Despite his [dis]illusion with people, he seeks
to minimize dangers of indifference and
disapproval [of] others. Resentments are
suppressed. This is likely to result in anger and
frustrations which is likewise apt to be
repressed.
There are indications that [respondent] is[,] at
the moment[,] experiencing considerable
tension and anxiety. He is prone to fits of
apprehension and nervousness. Likewise, he is
44

also entertaining feelings of hopelessness and Diagnosis for [petitioner]:

is preoccupied with negative thought. He feels
that he is up in the air but with no sound
foundation. He is striving [for] goals which he Axis I Partner Relational Problem
knows he will never be able to attain. Feeling
discouraged and distressed, he has difficulty
concentrating and focusing on things which he Axis II Obsessive Compulsive Personality Style
needs to prioritize. He has many plans but he with Self-Defeating features
can’t accomplish anything because he is
unable to see which path to take. This feeling
of hopelessness is further aggravated by the Axis III No diagnosis
lack of support from significant others.

Axis IV Psychosocial Stressors-Pervasive

Diagnostic Impression Family Discord (spouse’s immaturity, drug
abuse, and infidelity)

Axis I : Drug Dependence

Severity: 4-severe

Axis II : Mixed Personality Disorder

Diagnosis for [respondent]

[Schizoid, Narcissistic and Antisocial

Personality Disorder] Axis I Partner Relational Problem

Axis III : None Axis II Antisocial Personality Disorder with

marked narcissistic, aggressive sadistic and
dependent features
Axis IV : Psychosocial and Environmental
Problems:
Axis III No diagnosis

Severe He seems to be very good at planning

and starting things but is unable to accomplish Axis IV Psychosocial Stressors-Pervasive
anything; unable to give priority to the needs Family Discord (successful wife)
of his family; in social relationships.

Axis V : Global Assessment of Functioning –
Fair (Emphasis supplied)
3. Dr. Estrella T. Tiongson-Magno
Severity: 4 (severe)
[Respondent], diagnosed with an antisocial
personality disorder with marked narcissistic
features and aggressive sadistic and
dependent features, is psychologically
incapacitated to fulfill the essential obligations
45
of marriage: to love, respect and render
support for his spouse and children. A
personality disorder is not curable as it is
permanent and stable over time.
From a psychological viewpoint, therefore,
there is evidence that the marriage of
[petitioner] and [respondent is] null and void
from the very beginning. (emphasis supplied)
The recent case of Lim v. Sta. Cruz-Lim, citing
The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition (DSM IV),
instructs us on the general diagnostic criteria
for personality disorders:
A. An enduring pattern of inner experience and
behavior that deviates markedly from the
expectations of the individual’s culture. This
pattern is manifested in two (2) or more of the
following areas:
(1) cognition (i.e., ways of perceiving and
interpreting self, other people, and events)
(2) affectivity (i.e., the range, intensity,
liability, and appropriateness of emotional
response)
(3) interpersonal functioning
(4) impulse control
B. The enduring pattern is inflexible and
pervasive across a broad range of personal
and social situations.
C. The enduring pattern leads to clinically
significant distress or impairment in social,
occupational or other important areas of
functioning.
D. The pattern is stable and of long duration,
and its onset can be traced back at least to
adolescence or early adulthood.
E. The enduring pattern is not better
accounted for as a manifestation or a
consequence of another mental disorder.
F. The enduring pattern is not due to the direct
physiological effects of a substance (i.e., a
drug of abuse, a medication) or a general
medical condition (e.g., head trauma).
Within their acknowledged field of expertise,
doctors can diagnose the psychological make
up of a person based on a number of factors
culled from various sources. A person afflicted
with a personality disorder will not necessarily
have personal knowledge thereof. In this case,
considering that a personality disorder is
manifested in a pattern of behavior, self-
diagnosis by the respondent consisting only in
his bare denial of the doctors’ separate
diagnoses, does not necessarily evoke
credence and cannot trump the clinical
findings of experts.
In the case at bar, however, even without the
experts’ conclusions, the factual antecedents
(narrative of events) alleged in the petition
and established during trial, all point to the
inevitable conclusion that respondent is
psychologically incapacitated to perform the
essential marital obligations.
46
In the instant case, respondent’s pattern of
behavior manifests an inability, nay, a
psychological incapacity to perform the
essential marital obligations as shown by his:
(1) sporadic financial support; (2) extra-
marital affairs; (3) substance abuse; (4) failed
business attempts; (5) unpaid money
obligations; (6) inability to keep a job that is
not connected with the family businesses; and
(7) criminal charges of estafa.
In fine, given the factual milieu of the present
case and in light of the foregoing disquisition,
we find ample basis to conclude that
respondent was psychologically incapacitated
to perform the essential marital obligations at
the time of his marriage to the petitioner.
-------------------------------------------------------
DIÑO V. DIÑO
G.R. No. 178044, [January 19, 2011]
DOCTRINE:
Article 50 of the Family Code does not apply to
marriages which are declared void ab initio
under Article 36 of the Family Code, which
should be declared void without waiting for the
liquidation of the properties of the parties. In
this case, petitioner’s marriage to respondent
was declared void under Article 36 of the
Family Code and not under Article 40 or 45.
Thus, what governs the liquidation of
properties owned in common by petitioner and
respondent are the rules on co-ownership.
FACTS:
Alain M. Diño (petitioner) and Ma. Caridad L.
Diño(respondent) got married on 14 January
1998 before Mayor Vergel Aguilar of Las Piñas
City.
On 30 May 2001, petitioner filed an action for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against
respondent, citing psychological incapacity
under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Dr. Nedy L. Tayag (Dr. Tayag) submitted a
psychological report establishing that
respondent was suffering from Narcissistic
Personality Disorder which was incurable and
deeply ingrained in her system since her early
formative years.
The trial court granted the petition on the
ground that respondent was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations at the time of the
celebration of the marriage and declared their
marriage void ab initio. It ordered that a
decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall
only be issued upon compliance with Articles
50 and 51 of the Family Code.
Trial court, upon motion for partial
reconsideration of petitioner, modified its
decision holding that a decree of absolute
nullity of marriage shall be issued after
liquidation, partition and distribution of the
parties’ properties under Article 147 of the
Family Code.
ISSUE:
Whether the trial court erred when it ordered
that adecree of absolute nullity of marriage
shall only be issued after liquidation, partition,
47
and distribution of the parties’ properties
under Article 147 of the Family Code.
HELD:
Yes. The trial court’s decision is affirmed with
modification. Decree of absolute nullity of the
marriage shall be issued upon finality of the
trial court’s decision without waiting for the
liquidation, partition, and distribution of the
parties’ properties under Article 147 of the
Family Code.
RATIO:
The Court has ruled in Valdes v. RTC that in a
void marriage, regardless of its cause, the
property relations of the parties during the
period of cohabitation is governed either by
Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code.
Article 147 of the Family Code applies to union
of parties who are legally capacitated and not
barred by any impediment to contract
marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless
void, such as petitioner and respondent in the
case before the Court.
For Article 147 of the Family Code to apply, the
following elements must be present:
The man and the woman must be capacitated
to marry each other;
They live exclusively with each other as
husband and wife; and
Their union is without the benefit of marriage,
or their marriage is void.
All these elements are present in this case and
there is no question that Article 147 of the
Family Code applies to the property relations
between petitioner and respondent.
The trial court erred in ordering that a decree
of absolute nullity of marriage shall be issued
only after liquidation, partition and distribution
of the parties’ properties under Article 147 of
the Family Code. The ruling has no basis
because Section 19(1) of the Rule does not
apply to cases governed under Articles 147
and 148 of the Family Code. Section 19(1) of
the Rule provides:
Sec. 19. Decision. – (1) If the court renders a
decision granting the petition, it shall declare
therein that the decree of absolute nullity or
decree of annulment shall be issued by the
court only after compliance with Articles 50
and 51 of the Family Code as implemented
under the Rule on Liquidation, Partition and
Distribution of Properties.
It is clear from Article 50 of the Family Code
that Section 19(1) of the Rule applies only to
marriages which are declared void ab initio or
annulled by final judgment under Articles 40
and 45 of the Family Code. In short, Article 50
of the Family Code does not apply to marriages
which are declared void ab initio under Article
36 of the Family Code, which should be
declared void without waiting for the
liquidation of the properties of the parties.
In both instances under Articles 40 and 45, the
marriages are governed either by absolute
community of property or conjugal partnership
of gains unless the parties agree to a complete
separation of property in a marriage
settlement entered into before the marriage.
Since the property relations of the parties is
governed by absolute community of property
or conjugal partnership of gains, there is a
need to liquidate, partition and distribute the
48
properties before a decree of annulment could
be issued. That is not the case for annulment
of marriage under Article 36 of the Family
Code because the marriage is governed by the
ordinary rules on co-ownership.
In this case, petitioner’s marriage to
respondent was declared void under Article 36
of the Family Code and not under Article 40 or
45. Thus, what governs the liquidation of
properties owned in common by petitioner and
respondent are the rules on co-ownership. In
Valdes, the Court ruled that the property
relations of parties in a void marriage during
the period of cohabitation is governed either
by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family
Code. The rules on co-ownership apply and
the properties of the spouses should be
liquidated in accordance with the Civil Code
provisions on co-ownership. Under Article 496
of the Civil Code, “[p]artition may be made by
agreement between the parties or by judicial
proceedings. x x x.” It is not necessary to
liquidate the properties of the spouses in the
same proceeding for declaration of nullity of
marriage.
-------------------------------------------------------
YU V. JUDGE REYES-CARPIO AND YU
G.R. No. 189207, [June 15, 2011]
DOCTRINE:
It is more proper to rule first on the declaration
of nullity of marriage on the ground of each
party’s psychological incapacity to perform
their respective marital obligations. If the
Court eventually finds that the parties’
respective petitions for declaration of nullity of
marriage is indeed meritorious on the basis of
either or both of the parties’ psychological
incapacity, then the parties shall proceed to
comply with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family
Code before a final decree of absolute nullity
of marriage can be issued. Pending such ruling
on the declaration of nullity of the parties’
marriage, the Court finds no legal ground, at
this stage, to proceed with the reception of
evidence in regard the issues on custody and
property relations, since these are mere
incidents of the nullity of the parties’ marriage.
FACTS:
Eric Yu filed a petition for declaration of nullity
of marriage against Caroline T. Yu with the
RTC of Pasig. Judge Suarez on May 30, 2006
issued an order stating that Eric’s partial offer
of evidence dated April 18, 2006 would be
submitted for resolution after certain exhibits
have been remarked. But the exhibits were
only relative to the issue of the nullity of the
marriage of Eric and Caroline. On September
12, 2006, Caroline moved to submit the case
for resolution, considering that the incidents
on custody, support, and property relations
(incidental issues) were mere consequences of
the declaration of nullity of the parties’
marriage.
Eric opposed this motion saying that the
incident on declaration of nullity cannot be
resolved without presentation of evidence for
the incidents on custody, support, and
property relations. Eric added that the
incidental issues and the issue on declaration
of nullity can both proceed and be
simultaneously resolved. RTC ruled in favour
of Eric’s opposition.
Caroline caused the inhibition of Judge Suarez,
so that the case was re-raffled to another
branch presided by Judge Reyes-Carpio. While
the case was being tried by Judge Reyes-
Carpio, Caroline filed an Omnibus Motion
49
seeking the strict observation by the said
judge of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriage as codified in A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC, and that the case on the
declaration on nullity be already submitted for
resolution ahead of the incidental issues, and
not simultaneously. Eric opposed this motion.
Judge Reyes-Carpio granted the Omnibus
Motion, saying that the main cause of action is
the declaration of nullity of the marriage and
the incidental issues are merely ancillary
incidents thereto. Eric moved for
reconsideration, which was denied by Judge
Reyes-Carpio. Eric then filed for certiorari with
the CA under Rule 65. CA affirmed the
judgment of the trial court.
ISSUES/HELD:
Whether the main issue of nullity of marriage
must be submitted for resolution first before
the reception of evidence on custody, support,
and property relations (incidental issues) –
NO.
RATIO:
It appears in the records that the Orders in
question, or what are alleged to have been
exercised with grave abuse of discretion, are
interlocutory orders. An interlocutory order is
one which “does not finally dispose of the
case, and does not end the Court’s task of
adjudicating the parties’ contentions and
determining their rights and liabilities as
regards each other, but obviously indicates
that other things remain to be done by the
Court. Eric Yu to prove that the assailed orders
were issued with grave abuse of discretion and
that those were patently erroneous.
Considering that the requisites that would
justify certiorari as an appropriate remedy to
assail an interlocutory order have not been
complied with, the proper recourse for
petitioner should have been an appeal in due
course of the judgment of the trial court on the
merits, incorporating the grounds for assailing
the interlocutory orders.
It must be noted that Judge Reyes-Carpio did
not disallow the presentation of evidence on
the incidents on custody, support, and
property relations. It is clear in the assailed
orders that the trial court judge merely
deferred the reception of evidence relating to
custody, support, and property relations. And
the trial judge’s decision was not without
basis. Judge Reyes-Carpio finds support in the
Court En Banc Resolution in A.M. No. 02-11-
10-SC or the Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages. Particularly, Secs. 19 and
21 of the Rule clearly allow the reception of
evidence on custody, support, and property
relations after the trial court renders a decision
granting the petition, or upon entry of
judgment granting the petition:
Section 19. Decision. – (1) If the court renders
a decision granting the petition, it shall declare
therein that the decree of absolute nullity or
decree of annulment shall be issued by the
court only after compliance with Articles 50
and 51 of the Family Code as implemented
under the Rule on Liquidation, Partition and
Distribution of Properties.
Section 21. Liquidation, partition and
distribution, custody, support of common
children and delivery of their presumptive
legitimes. – Upon entry of the judgment
granting the petition, or, in case of appeal,
upon receipt of the entry of judgment of the
appellate court granting the petition, the
Family Court, on motion of either party, shall
50
proceed with the liquidation, partition and
distribution of the properties of the spouses,
including custody, support of common children
and delivery of their presumptive legitimes
pursuant to Articles 50 and 51 of the Family
Code unless such matters had been
adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings.
Evidently, Judge Reyes-Carpio did not deny
the reception of evidence on custody, support,
and property relations but merely deferred it,
based on the existing rules issued by this
Court, to a time when a decision granting the
petition is already at hand and before a final
decree is issued. Conversely, the trial court, or
more particularly the family court, shall
proceed with the liquidation, partition and
distribution, custody, support of common
children, and delivery of their presumptive
legitimes upon entry of judgment granting the
petition. And following the pertinent provisions
of the Court En Banc Resolution in A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC, this act is undoubtedly
consistent with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family
Code, contrary to what petitioner asserts.
Particularly, Arts. 50 and 51 of the Family Code
state:
Article 50. The final judgment in such cases
shall provide for the liquidation, partition and
distribution of the properties of the spouses,
the custody and support of the common
children, and the delivery of their presumptive
legitimes, unless such matters had been
adjudicated in the previous judicial
proceedings.
Article 51. In said partition, the value of the
presumptive legitimes of all common children,
computed as of the date of the final judgment
of the trial court, shall be delivered in cash,
property or sound securities, unless the
parties, by mutual agreement judicially
approved, had already provided for such
matters.
Also, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC clearly allows the
deferment of the reception of evidence on
custody, support, and property relations.
Conversely, the trial court may receive
evidence on the subject incidents after a
judgment granting the petition but before the
decree of nullity or annulment of marriage is
issued. And this is what Judge Reyes-Carpio
sought to comply with in issuing the assailed
orders. As correctly pointed out by the CA, Eric
Yu’s assertion that ruling the main issue
without receiving evidence on the subject
incidents would result in an ambiguous and
fragmentary judgment is certainly speculative
and, hence, contravenes the legal
presumption that a trial judge can fairly weigh
and appraise the evidence submitted by the
parties.
Therefore, it cannot be said at all that Judge
Reyes-Carpio acted in a capricious and
whimsical manner, much less in a way that is
patently gross and erroneous, when she
issued the assailed orders deferring the
reception of evidence on custody, support, and
property relations. To reiterate, this decision is
left to the trial court’s wisdom and legal
soundness. Consequently, therefore, the CA
cannot likewise be said to have committed
grave abuse of discretion in upholding the
Orders of Judge Reyes-Carpio and in
ultimately finding an absence of grave abuse
of discretion on her part.
-------------------------------------------------------
Republic v. Narceda, G.R. No. 182760, April 10,
2013
Robert married Marina on 22 July 1987. A
reading of the Marriage Contract he presented
will reveal that at the time of their wedding,
Marina was only 17 years and 4 months old.
51
According to respondent, Marina went to
Singapore sometime in 1994 and never
returned since.There was never any
communication between them. He tried to look
for her, but he could not find her. Several
years after she left, one of their town mates in
Luna, La Union came home from Singapore
and told him that the last time she saw his
wife, the latter was already living with a
Singaporean husband.
In view of her absence and his desire to
remarry, respondent filed with the RTC on 16
May 2002 a Petition for a judicial declaration
of the presumptive death and/or absence of
Marina.
Will the petition for a judicial declaration of the
presumptive death and/or absence of Robert’s
spouse be given due course?
Yes. Article 41 of the Family Code provides:
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person
during the subsistence of a previous marriage
shall be null and void, unless before the
celebration of the subsequent marriage, the
prior spouse had been absent for four
consecutive years and the spouse present has
a well-founded belief that the absent spouse
was already dead. In case of disappearance
where there is danger of death under the
circumstances set forth in the provisions of
Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of
only two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent
marriage under the preceding paragraph, the
spouse present must institute a summary
proceeding as provided in this Code for the
declaration of presumptive death of the
absentee, without prejudice to the effect of
reappearance of the absent spouse.
-------------------------------------------------------
In Republic v. Jose B. Sareñogon, Jr.,
G.R. No. 199194, February 10, 2016, Del
Castillo, J, there was a petition for declaration
of presumptive death of a spouse. In his
testimony, he said that he first met Netchie in
Clarin, Misamis Occidental in 1991. They later
became sweethearts and on August 10, 1996,
they got married in civil rites at the Manila City
Hall. However, they lived together as husband
and wife for a month only because he left to
work as a seaman while Netchie went to
Hongkong as a domestic helper.
For three months, he did not receive any
communication from Netchie. He likewise had
no idea about her whereabouts. While still
abroad, he tried to contact Netchie’s parents,
but failed, as the latter had allegedly left
Clarin, Misamis Occidental. He returned home
after his contract expired.
He then inquired from Netchie’s relatives and
friends about her whereabouts, but they also
did not know where she was. Because of
these, he had to presume that his wife Netchie
wasalready dead. He filed the Petition before
the RTC so he could contract another
marriagepursuant to Article 41 of the Family
Code.
The RTC declared the spouse presumptively
death having disappeared for more thanfour
(4) years. The OSG filed a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 which the CA held asan error
saying that misappreciation of evidence could
not translate into excess or lack ofjurisdiction
amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
Reversing the CA, the SC
Held:
In the 2005 case of Republic v. Bermudez-
Lorino, 489 Phil. 761 [2005], it was held that
52
the RTC’s Decision on a Petition for declaration
of presumptive death pursuant to Article41 of
the Family Code is immediately final and
executory. Thus, the CA has no jurisdiction to
entertain a notice of appeal pertaining to such
judgment. The correct remedy to challenge
the RTC Decision was to institute a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65, and not a petition for
review under Rule 45. (Republic v. Granada,
687 Phil. 403 [2012], citing Republic
v.Bermudez-Bermudez-Lorino; See: Rep. v.
Cantor; Republic v. Narceda, G.R. No.
182760,April 10, 2013, 695 SCRA 483)
The “well-founded belief” requisite under
Article 41 of the Family Code is complied with
only upon a showing that sincere honest-to-
goodness efforts had indeed been made to
ascertain whether the absent spouse is still
alive or is already dead.
Article 41 of the Family Code pertinently
provides that:
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person
during the subsistence of a previous marriage
shall be null and void, unless before the
celebration of the subsequent marriage, the
prior spouse had been absent for four
consecutive years and the spouse present had
a well-founded belief that the absent spouse
was already dead. In case of disappearance
where there is danger of death under the
circumstances set forth in the provisions of
Article 391 ofthe Civil Code, an absence of only
two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the
subsequent marriage under the preceding
paragraph the spouse present must institute a
summary proceeding as provided in this Code
for the declaration of presumptive death of the
absentee, without prejudice to the effect of
reappearance of the absent spouse. (83a)
In Republic v. Cantor, it was further held that:
Before a judicial declaration of presumptive
death can be obtained, it mustbe shown that
the prior spouse had been absent for four
consecutive yearsand the present spouse had
a well-founded belief that the prior spouse
wasalready dead. Under Article 41 of the
Family Code, there are four essential requisites
for the declaration of presumptive death:
1. That the absent spouse has been missing
for four consecutive years, ortwo consecutive
years if the disappearance occurred where
there is danger of death under the
circumstances laid down in Article 391 of the
Civil Code;
2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry;
3. That the present spouse has a well-founded
belief that the absentee isdead; and,
4. That the present spouse files a summary
proceeding for the declaration of presumptive
death of the absentee.
With respect to the third element (which
seems to be the element that in this case
invites extended discussion), the holding is
that the – mere absence of the spouse (even
for such period required by the law), or lack of
news that such absentee is still alive, failure to
communicate [by the absentee spouse or
invocation of the] general presumption on
absence under the Civil Code [would] not
suffice. This conclusion proceeds from the
premise that Article 41 of the Family Code
places upon the present spouse the burden of
proving the additional and more stringent
requirement of “well-founded belief” which
can only be discharged upon a due showing of
proper and honest-to- goodness inquiries and
efforts to ascertain not only the absent
spouse’s whereabouts but, more importantly,
that the absent spouse is [either] still alive or
is already dead.
xxxx
The law did not define what is meant by “well-
founded belief.” It depends upon the
circumstances of each particular case. Its
determination, so to speak, remains on a case-
to-case basis. To be able to comply with this
53
requirement, the present spouse must prove
that his/her belief was the result of diligent
and reasonable efforts and inquiries to locate
the absent spouse and that based on these
efforts and inquiries, he/she believes that
under the circumstances, the absent spouse is
already dead. It requires exertion of active
effort (not a mere passive one).
In the case at bar, the RTC ruled that Jose had
“well-founded belief” that Netchie was already
dead but there were passive efforts to locate
the absent spouse.
-------------------------------------------------------
Republic vs Tampus GR 214243
FACTS: Respondent Nilda B. Tampus was
married to Dante L. Del Mundo on November
29, 1975. Three days thereafter, or on
December 2, 1975, Dante, a member of the
AFP, left respondent, and went to Jolo, Sulu
where he was assigned. The couple had no
children. Since then, Nilda heard no news from
Dante. She tried everything to locate him, but
her efforts proved futile. On April 14, 2009,
she filed before the RTC a petition to declare
Dante as presumptively dead for the purpose
of remarriage, alleging that after the lapse of
thirty-three (33) years without any kind of
communication from him, she firmly believes
that he is already dead.
ISSUE: W/N Dante should be declared
presumptively dead
RULING: NO. Before a judicial declaration of
presumptive death can be obtained, it must be
shown that the prior spouse had been absent
for four consecutive years and the present
spouse had a well-founded belief that the prior
spouse was already dead. Under Article 4119
of the Family Code of the Philippines (Family
Code), there are four (4) essential requisites
for the declaration of presumptive death: (1)
that the absent spouse has been missing for
four (4) consecutive years, or two (2)
consecutive years if the disappearance
occurred where there is danger of death under
the circumstances laid down in Article 391 of
the Civil Code; (2) that the present spouse
wishes to remarry; (3) that the present spouse
has a well-founded belief that the absentee is
dead; and (4) that the present spouse files a
summary proceeding for the declaration of
presumptive death of the absentee.
The "well-founded belief in the absentee's
death requires the present spouse to prove
that his/her belief was the result of diligent
and reasonable efforts to locate the absent
spouse and that based on these efforts and
inquiries, he/she believes that under the
circumstances, the absent spouse is already
dead. It necessitates exertion of active effort,
not a passive one. As such, the mere absence
of the spouse for such periods prescribed
under the law, lack of any news that such
absentee spouse is still alive, failure to
communicate, or general presumption of
absence under the Civil Code would not
suffice.
In this case, Nilda testified that after Dante's
disappearance, she tried to locate him by
making inquiries with his parents, relatives,
and neighbors as to his whereabouts, but
unfortunately, they also did not know where to
find him. Other than making said inquiries,
however, Nilda made no further efforts to find
her husband. She could have called or
proceeded to the AFP headquarters to request
information about her husband, but failed to
do so. She did not even seek the help of the
authorities or the AFP itself in finding him.
Considering her own pronouncement that
Dante was sent by the AFP on a combat
mission to Jolo, Sulu at the time of his
disappearance, she could have inquired from
the AFP on the status of the said mission, or
from the members of the AFP who were
54

assigned thereto. To the Court's mind, role as the breadwinner of her family. This role
therefore, Nilda failed to actively look for her allegedly inflated Malyn’s ego to the point that
missing husband, and her purported earnest her needs became priority, while her kids’ and
efforts to find him by asking Dante's parents, husband’s needs became secondary.
relatives, and friends did not satisfy the strict
standard and degree of diligence required to
create a "well-founded belief of his death. ISSUE: Whether Tyrone has sufficiently
proven that Malynsuffers from psychological
-------------------------------------------------------
incapacity
Kalaw v. Fernandez, G.R. No. 166357,
September 19, 2011
HELD: No. He presented the testimonies of
FACTS: Tyrone Kalaw and Malyn Fernandez
two supposed expert witnesses who concluded
got married in 1976. After the birth of their 4th
that respondent is psychologically
child, Tyrone had an affair with Jocelyn
incapacitated, but the conclusions of these
Quejano. In May 1985, Malyn left the conjugal
witnesses were premised on the alleged acts
home and her four children with Tyrone.
or behavior of respondent which had not been
Meanwhile, Tyrone started living with Jocelyn,
sufficiently proven. No proof whatsoever was
and they had three more children. In 1990,
presented to prove her visits to beauty salons
Tyrone went to the United States (US) with
or her frequent partying with friends. Malyn’s
Jocelyn and their children. On July 6, 1994,
sexual infidelity was also not proven because
nine years since the de facto separation from
she was only dating other men. Even
his wife, Tyrone filed a petition for declaration
assuming that she had an extramarital affair
of nullity of marriage based on Article 36 of the
with another man, sexual infidelity cannot be
Family Code. He alleged that Malyn was
equated with obsessive need for attention
psychologically incapacitated to perform and
from other men. Sexual infidelity per se is a
comply with the essential marital obligations at
ground for legal separation, but it does not
the time of the celebration of their marriage.
necessarily constitute psychological
He alleged that 1) She leaves the children
incapacity.
without proper care and attention as she
played mahjong all day and all night; 2) She -------------------------------------------------------
leaves the house to party with male friends
Lapuz-Sy vs. Eufemio
and returned in the early hours of the following
day; and 3) She committed adultery on June 43 SCRA 177
9, 1985 in Hyatt Hotel with one Benjie whom
he saw half-naked in the hotel room. Tyrone
presented a psychologist, Dr. Cristina Gates FACTS:
(Dr. Gates), and a Catholic canon law expert,
Fr. Gerard Healy, S.J. (Fr. Healy), to testify on
Malyn’s psychological incapacity. Dr. Gates Carmen Lapuz-Sy filed a petition for legal
explained that Malyn suffers from Narcissistic separation against Eufemio Eufemio on August
Personalityu Disorder and that it “may have 1953. They were married civilly on September
been evident even prior to her marriage” 21, 1934 and canonically after nine days. They
because it is rooted in her family background had lived together as husband and wife
and upbringing. Fr. Healy concluded that continuously without any children until 1943
Malyn was psychologically incapacitated to when her husband abandoned her. They
perform her marital duties. He explained that acquired properties during their marriage.
her psychological incapacity is rooted in her Petitioner then discovered that her husband
55

cohabited with a Chinese woman named Go radical and definitive separation; and the
Hiok on or about 1949. She prayed for the expected consequential rights and claims
issuance of a decree of legal separation, which would necessarily remain unborn.
among others, would order that the defendant
The petition of Eufemio for declaration of
Eufemio should be deprived of his share of the
nullity is moot and academic and there could
conjugal partnership profits.
be no further interest in continuing the same
after her demise, that automatically dissolved
the questioned union. Any property rights
Eufemio counterclaimed for the declaration of
acquired by either party as a result of Article
nullity of his marriage with Lapuz-Sy on the
144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines 6 could
ground of his prior and subsisting marriage
be resolved and determined in a proper action
with Go Hiok. Trial proceeded and the parties
for partition by either the appellee or by the
adduced their respective evidence. However,
heirs of the appellant.
before the trial could be completed,
respondent already scheduled to present -------------------------------------------------------
surrebuttal evidence, petitioner died in a
Matubis v. Praxedes 109 Phil 789
vehicular accident on May 1969. Her counsel
duly notified the court of her death. Eufemio
moved to dismiss the petition for legal
FACTS:
separation on June 1969 on the grounds that
the said petition was filed beyond the one-year
period provided in Article 102 of the Civil Code
Socorro Matubis (Petitioner) filed with the
and that the death of Carmen abated the
CFI of Camarines Sur a complaint for Legal
action for legal separation. Petitioner’s
Separation and change of surname against her
counsel moved to substitute the deceased
husband Zoilo Praxedes (Respondent) as she
Carmen by her father, Macario Lapuz.
alleges abandonment and concubinage.

ISSUE: Whether the death of the plaintiff,

before final decree in an action for legal
separation, abate the action and will it also
apply if the action involved property rights.
HELD:
An action for legal separation is abated by the
death of the plaintiff, even if property rights
are involved. These rights are mere effects of
decree of separation, their source being the
decree itself; without the decree such rights do
not come into existence, so that before the
finality of a decree, these claims are merely
rights in expectation. If death supervenes
during the pendency of the action, no decree
can be forthcoming, death producing a more
Praxedes denies the allegations. He alleged
that it was Matubis who left the conjugal
home.
Matubis gave documentary and
testamentary evidence that after they were
legally married, they failed to agree to live
together as husband and wife which led them
to live separately.
They entered into an agreement which
included:
(1) They can get another mate and live with
them as husband and wife without prosecuting
one another for adultery or concubinage;
(2) Matubis is no longer entitled for support
from Praxedes; and
56
(3) Neither can claim anything from one
another.
Praxedes cohabited with one Asuncion
Rebolado who gave birth to their child.
Without Praxedes giving evidence, CFI held
that his acts constitute concubinage and is a
ground for legal separation. However, CFI
dismissed the complaint on two grounds:
(1) Under Art. 102 of the New Civil Code, an
action for legal separation cannot be filed
except within one year from and after the date
on which the plaintiff became cognizant of the
cause and within five years from and after the
date when the cause occurred. Matubis
became aware of the illegal cohabitation of her
husband with Asuncion Rebulado in January,
1955. The complaint was filed on April 24,
1956. The present action was, therefore, filed
out of time and for that reason the action is
barred.
(2) Art. 100 of the New Civil Code provides
that the legal separation may be claimed only
by the innocent spouse, provided there has
been no condonation of or consent to the
adultery or concubinage. In the case, they
gave consent to one another.
ISSUE(S):
Did CFI err in ruling that the period to bring
the action has already elapsed and that there
was consent on the part of the plaintiff to the
concubinage?
HELD: No. Affirmed the decision of the lower
court.
RATIO:
The complaint was filed outside the periods
provided for by Art. 102 of the New Civil Code.
By the very admission of plaintiff, she came to
know the ground (concubinage) for the legal
separation in January, 1955. She instituted the
complaint only on April 24, 1956.
The condonation and consent on the part of
Matubis are seen in the agreement. The
condonation and consent here are not only
implied but expressed.
-------------------------------------------------------
Bugayong vs Ginez Case Digest
Bugayong vs. Ginez
G.R. No. L-10033 December 28, 1956
Facts: Benjamin Bugayong, serviceman in the
US Navy was married to defendant Leonila
Ginez in Pangasinan, while on furlough leave.
After marriage, the couples live with the sisters
of the husband, before the latter left to report
back to duty, the couple came to an
agreement that Leonila would stay with
Benjamin’s sisters.
Leonila left the dwelling of her sisters-in-law
which she informed her husband by letter that
she had gone to reside with her mother in
Pangasinan. Early in July 1951, Benjamin
receive letters from his sister Valeriana
Polangco that her wife informing him of
alleged acts of infidelity. Benjamin went to
Pangasinan and sought for his wife whom he
met in the house of Leonila’s godmother. They
lived again as husband and wife and stayed in
the house of Pedro Bugayong, cousin of the
plaintiff-husband. On the second day, he tried
to verify from his wife the truth of the
information he received but instead of
answering, Leonila packed up and left him
which Benjamin concluded as a confirmation
of the acts of infidelity. After he tried to locate
57

her and upon failing he went to Ilocos Norte.

Benjamin filed in CIF of Pangasinan a
Brown prayed for confirmation of the
complaint for legal separation against Leonila,
liquidation agreement; for custody of the
who timely filed an answer vehemently
children issued of the marriage; that the
denying the averments of the complaint.
defendant be declared disqualified to succeed
the plaintiff; and for their remedy as might be
just and equitable.
Issue: Whether or not the acts charged in line
with the truth of allegations of the commission
of acts of infidelity amounting to adultery have
The court subsequently declared Juanita
been condoned by the plaintiff-husband.
Yambao in default, for failure to answer in due
time, despite service of summonsand directed
the City Fiscal or his representatives to
Ruling: Granting that infidelities amounting to
investigate, in accordance with Article 101 of
adultery were commited by the wife, the act of
the Civil Code, if collusion exists between the
the husband in persuading her to come along
parties.
with him and the fact that she went with him
and together they slept as husband and wife
deprives him as the alleged offended spouse
During the cross-examination of the plaintiff
of any action for legal separation against the
by Assistant City Fiscal Rafael Jose, it was
offending wife because his said conduct comes
found out that after the liberation,Brown had
within the restriction of Article 100 of Civil
lived maritally with another woman and had
Code.
begotten children by her. Thereafter, the court
rendered judgment denying the legal
separation asked, on the ground that, while
the wife’s adultery was established, Brown had
Brown v. Yambao incurred in a misconduct of similar nature that
barred his right of action under Article 100 of
G.R. No. L-10699, 18 October 1957 the new Civil Code.

FACTS: ISSUE:

On July 14, 1955, William H. Brown filed suit Whether or not the petition for legal
in the Court of First Instance of Manila to separation should be granted?
obtain legal separation from his lawful wife
Juanita Yambao. He alleged under oath that
while interned by the Japanese invaders, from RULING:
1942 to 1945, at the University of Sto. Tomas
internment camp, his wife engaged in
adulterous relations with one Carlos Field of
No.The court below correctly held that the
whom she begot a baby girl that Brown
appellant’s action was already barred, because
learned of his wife’s misconduct only in 1945,
Brown did not petition for legal separation
upon his release from internment and that
proceedings until ten years after he learned of
they have lived separately thereafter.
his wife’s adultery, which was upon his release
58
from internment in 1945.Appellant’s brief does
not even contest the correctness of such
findings and conclusion.
Article 100 of the Civil Code provides that:“The
legal separation may be claimed only by the
innocent spouse, provided there has been no
condonation of or consent to the adultery or
concubinage. Where both spouses are
offenders, a legal separation cannot be
claimed by either of them. Collusion between
the parties to obtain legal separation shall
cause the dismissal of the petition.”
In the case at bar, it is pursuant to the second
sentence of the aforementioned law, wherein
Brown and Yumbao are both offenders, hence,
a legal separation cannot be granted.
Article 102 of the Civil Code provides that:“An
action for legal separation cannot be filed
except within one year from and after the date
on which the plaintiff became cognizant of the
cause and within five years from and after the
date when such cause occurred.”
In the case at bar, Brown did not petition for
legal separation proceedings until ten years
after he learned of his wife’s adultery.
It is true that the wife has not interposed
prescription as a defense. Nevertheless, the
courts can take cognizance thereof, because
actions seeking a decree of legal separation,
or annulment of marriage, involve public
interest and it is the policy of our law that no
such decree be issued if any legal obstacles
thereto appear upon the record.
Hence, there being at least two well
established statutory grounds for denying the
remedy sought (commission of similar offense
by petitioner and prescription of the action), it
becomes unnecesary to delve further into the
case and ascertain if Brown’s inaction for ten
years also evidences condonation or
connivance on his part. Even if it did not, his
situation would not be improved. It is thus
needless to discuss the second assignment of
error.
The third assignment of error being a mere
consequence of the others must necessarily
fail with them. The decision appealed from is
affirmed, with costs against appellant. So
ordered.
Mendoza v. Republic, G.R. No. 157854,
November 12, 2012
Facts:
Arabelle and Dominic Mendoza got married
while Arabelle was eight months pregnant.
They lived together but depended on their
parents for financial support. Arabelle had
different jobs to support the needs of the
family. When Dominic got employed for
Toyota in Bel-Air Makati in 1994, he spent his
first salary celebrating with his friends.
September of the same year, Arabelle found
out of Dominic’s illicit relationship with Zaida,
his co-employee. Communication between
them became rare and they started sleeping in
separate rooms. In November 1995, Dominic
gave her a car as a birthday present only to
find out that he did not pay for it, forcing her
to rely on her father-in-law for the payment of
the car. Dominic eventually got fired from his
job because of he ran away with P164,000
belonging to his employer. He was charged
with estafa. Petitioner also found out that he
swindled many of his clients some of them
threatening her and their family. On October
15, 1997, Dominic abandoned the conjugal
59

abode because petitioner asked him for “time

and space to think things over.” A month later,
she refused his attempt at reconciliation,
causing him to threaten to commit suicide. She
and her family immediately left the house to
live in another place concealed from him. On
August 5, 1998, petitioner filed in the RTC her
petition for the declaration of the nullity of her
marriage with Dominic based on his
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the
Family Code. The RTC found that all the
characteristics of psychological incapacity
which are gravity, antecedence and
incurability, were attendant, establishing
Dominic’s psychological incapacity. The
Republic appealed to the CA, arguing that
there was no showing that Dominic’s
personality traits either constituted
psychological incapacity existing at the time of
the marriage or were of the nature
contemplated by Article 36 of the Family Code;
that the testimony of the expert witness was
not conclusive upon the court, and that the
real reason for the parties’ separation had
been their frequent quarrels over financial
matters and the criminal cases brought against
Dominic. CA reversed the decision of RTC.
Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: W/N psychological incapacity of

Dominic was established
HELD:
No. Findings of Dr. Samson were one-sided,
because Dominic was not himself subjected to
an actual psychiatric evaluation by petitioner’s
expert. He also did not participate in the
proceedings. And that the findings and
conclusions on his psychological profile by her
expert were solely based the testimonies of
the petitioner.