Ancient Philosophy 20 (2000)

©Mathesis Publications 415

Souls

Joseph Sen

Plotinus is conspicuous in the history of Platonism for his rather lofty and opti-
mistic view of the soul. It never falls so low as to lose contact with Intellect, and
always keeps something of itself in reserve in the world of forms.l The positive
character of this appraisal can, however, hinder recognition of just how nuanced
and multifaceted Plotinus' thinking about the soul can be. His insistence on the
overriding metaphysical grandeur of the soul is tempered by awareness of the
discrepancy often found between souls as they really are and the states in which
they presently find themselves. Plotinus is far from being insensitive to the indi-
vidual differences which exist among human souls, something that can be forgot-
ten by looking at the doctrine of the unfallen soul in the abstract. It is to an
examination of this more neglected region of individual differences in Plotinus'
psychology that this article is dedicated. More precisely, the theme of individual
differences will be brought to light in connection with Plotinus' distinctive
understanding of soul-body relationships.

I. Soul, Body and Intellect

Plotinus does not always paint a rosy picture of the soul. Ideally, we should
consider it when it is purified and lit up, so to speak, by the presence of wisdom
and virtue. But souls are seldom found in this state:
if every man was like this, or there were a great number who
had souls like this, no one would be as unbelieving as not to
believe that what is soul in men is altogether immortal. But, as
it is, they see the soul in the majority damaged in many ways,
and do not think of it as if it was divine or immortal. (iv 7[2]
10.21-27)2
Plotinus' optimism about the overall metaphysical condition of the soul is here
toned down by the avowal that the greatness of the soul is largely obscured from
view in everyday life. The undescended soul may provide the archetype but is
certainly not the norm. The passage echoes a discussion in Republic 611c where
Plato, having previously argued for a tripartite psychology, expresses some doubt

I See i 1[53]8.5-6, 10.7-10; iv 8[6]8.1-6, 3[27]12.1-6, v 1[10]10.13-19. It should be said that

soul is for Plotinus both a kinetic and an axiological concept. At its tail end, so to speak, it is respon-
sible for the self-motion evident in all life whatsoever, good or bad. But at its upper end it is tinged
with a higher value through its unbroken connection to Intellect.
2 Translations from the Enneads follow those of Armstrong 1966-1988. Quotations from Ploti-
nus follow chapter and line numbers found in Henry and Schwyzer.
416

about its finality. We see the soul through a glass darkly at the moment rather like
Glaucus the sea god, full of the accretions which evil has brought to it. These
need to be removed before we can really see its true nature. Plotinus, however,
offers more of a statistical argument. Not only do we fail to see the soul optimally
but the recurrent experience of seeing the soul in a sorry state leads us to under-
estimate its nature and indeed its stature.
Still, Plotinus remains struck by cases which tell of another story. The soul
takes on a different complexion when seen in the light of the higher self situated
in Intellect. Excitement is then felt at its beauty,
you feel like this when you see, in yourself or in someone else,
greatness of soul, a righteous life, a pure rilOrality, courage
with its noble look, and dignity and modesty advancing in a
fearless, calm and unperturbed disposition, and the god-like
light ofIntellect shining upon all this. (i 6[1] 5.9-17)
Soul has here become truly soul,3 alive to its identity with Intellect and capable
of showing its greatness. Interesting is the ease with which Plotinus moves
between the perception of soul in oneself and in others.4 We find in Plotinus a
general reluctance to confine the inner life to a private vacuum, 'for my mind
only', as tends to be the case with Descartes. The soul is not inevitably hidden
behind the scenes and merely to be inferred from its bodily effects. Nor is its
invisibility a conceptual necessity. This may come as a surprise if we do not bear
in mind that the corporeal is not for Plotinus co-extensive with the perceptible.
Light provides the best example of an incorporeal reality which is at the same
time visible (ii 1[40] 7.26-28, iv 5[29] 7.41-42). The soul can be understood on
similar terms and it is notable that in other contexts Plotinus employs light
imagery to indicate its nature (see v 1[10] 2.17-23].
Of course, the goal for Plotinus is to turn within and contemplate the higher
reality of Intellect. But this is not the end of the story. The contemplative must
also become 'an object of vision to another who contemplates him shining out
with thoughts which come from there' (v 8[31] 11.18-19). Here the inward turn
in the first person, is more than a private retreat, inconsequential from without.
For what happens within has manifest consequences. Thus in response to the
Gnostics who anticipate Descartes in stringently dividing the inner and the outer,
Plotinus emphasises a much closer interplay:
But perhaps it is not really possible for anything to be beautiful
outwardly but ugly inwardly; for if the outside of anything is
wholly beautiful it is so by the domination of what is within
(](pa1:~O"av1:6~ 1:0U EVOOV). Those who are called beautiful and
are ugly within have an outward beauty, too, which is not gen-
uine. But if anyone is going to say that he has seen people who

3The expression is found in i 6[1]6.17-18.

4Plotinus' admissal of the public accessibility of souls should remind us of the differences
between his idea of 'soul' and its modern counterpart 'mind'. This issue cannot be addressed here, but
for a good general account see Wilkes in Nussbaum and Rorty 1991.
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are really beautiful but are ugly within, I think that he has not
really seen them, but thinks that beautiful people are other than
who they are. (ii 9[33] 17.40-46)
Interiority here makes its influence felt outwardly, which effectively means that
it is not just interiority.5 No compromises are offered to a merely exterior beauty,
for even this is only authentic in the overflowing of the inner life. It is a mistake
then to speak of someone being beautiful 'deep down' as though this were some-
thing different from simply being beautiful. Conversely, describing someone as
beautiful on the outside but ugly within concedes too much, for external beauty is
exposed as sham in the confession that it lacks an inner foundation. There is an
asymmetry here, for what is realised within can act and transform the external but
external appearances alone hardly suffice as a guide to the character of the sou1. 6
While physical appearances can conceal the soul, the predominance of the soul
rubs off, so to speak, on the body.
More shape is given to this thought elsewhere (vi 7[38] 22.5-7; 22ff.). For a
face to be truly eye-catching bone structure will not suffice, not unless there is
illumination by an inward grace (Xapll;).7 Generally, a living face is more beauti-
ful than a dead one, however well-proportioned the latter may be. It seems that
by the privation of life in the dead we come to recognise its beauty in the living.
In a sense, everything that shares in life already partakes in beauty though this
does not exclude a further participation just as we might say 'liveliness' both pre-
supposes and enhances 'being alive'. According to Plotinus the reason why life,
the defining property of soul, is so desirable is that it shares more in the form of
the Good, the ultimate source of all life. Moreover, in the light of the experience
of the Good, the soul not only receives greater life but even awakens and elevates
'what belongs to it', the body (vi 7[38] 22.34-36). This idea is crucial for under-
standing Plotinus' approach to the soul-body relation. We would be mistaken to
think that the soul's separating from the body involves a forsaking of the body.
Separation is incidental to a positive movement towards the higher reality. And
the illumination stemming from this level extends even further down than the
soul itself. 8 The language of wakefulness used in this context is also notable.
Elsewhere Plotinus describes true awakening as waking up 'from' rather than
'with' the body (iii 6[26] 6.71-72). But this adds an important detail. Whereas the
stirring of the body often leaves the full nature of soul dormant, the rising of the
soul in the light of the Good communicates a glow even to the body. There is a
generosity going up not found going down. Plotinus rules out any psycho-physi-

5 The claim of Charles-Saget 1985, 100 that there is for Plotinus a 'hard and fast separation
between the Within and the Without. the interior and the exterior' is made questionable by such pas-
sages.
6 This coheres with Plotinus' general reluctance to allow the body any power to affect the real
nature of the soul, though the reverse does not hold (see iv 4[28] 13.23-26).
7 For a very fine discussion of this aspect of Plotinus' thought, see Mortley 1998.
8 Proclus accounts for this phenomenon through the formal principle that the greater reality has
more extensive influence down the metaphysical chain (see Proclus Elements of Theology 57, 60).
418

cal identity but these passages certainly allow for psycho-physical continuity,
more perhaps than we are accustomed to think given Plotinus' reputation as a
precursor of Descartes.

II. Soul-Body Relationships

The soul awake to Intellect illustrates the kind of transformation in the typical
soul-body relation that Plotinus is prepared to allow. The soul-body relation is
neither static nor uniform from individual to individual. In this respect Plotinus
does not have a single view ofthe soul-body relationship but views, depending on
the particular case we are considering.
'Dualism' can therefore be a problematic term here, especially when it
involves taking the soul-body relation horizontally as an interchange between
two coeval substances. This would be misleading since the relation for Plotinus is
invariably hierarchical. Put simply, either soul rules body or body rules soul. The
latter holds in the majority of cases with the body occupying the centre of atten-
tion at the expense of the greater reality of the soul (see iv 8[6] 3.10-22),9 The sit-
uation here is more body/soul than soul/body. But there is another, ideal
interaction in which the life of soul is central and the body peripheral which is
exemplified by the sage (iv 8[6] 2.24-30).!0 This interaction is a possibility
because the soul not only gives life but has a life, a content of its own at the level
of Intellect.!! When oriented to this, the soul automatically maintains a distance
from the body, ruling regally 'from above' without being affected (iv 8[6J 2.24-
26; 45-53).12 The soul manages the body more effectively from this level in
accordance with Plotinus' tenet that the less narrowly conscious we are of an
activity, the more smoothly it proceeds (see i 4[46] 10.21-34). But on the other

9 Plotinus mentions two main drawbacks arising from this predominance of the body: the body
hinders thought and also fills the soul with pleasures, griefs, and desires. Both can be avoided if the
soul does not sink so far into the body as to belong to it but regards the body instead as belonging to it
(see iv 8[6] 2.42-49). This, however, is impossible unless the soul has an alternative reality to which
to tum, namely, Intellect. It seems that for Plotinus the only way to avoid descent is by ascent and
attention to a higher principle.
10 The point is that the relationship remains. The goal is not the complete separation of the terms
involved. Gurtler 1997, 224-225 has given due recognition to this 'overcoming the alienation is not
ending the relationship of body and soul, but eliminating the unpleasant side effects associated with
it. The desires to be avoided are those that come from an excessive involvement with body; the affec-
tions to be purged are those that drag the soul further into material dependency. They are in other
words those things that emphasise the weakening of the soul's powers and the control of its activities
by material principles. The soul can escape the alien nature and abide in itself while still in the body.
Overcoming the alienation is not a reversal of the ontological going out, but rather of the psychologi-
cal consequences of this outward movement in the peculiar instance of the human soul' ( my italics).
II This is one reason why Plotinus has problems with definitions which confine the soul to being
merely the 'harmony' or 'form' of the body, (see generally iv 7[2] 8.4 and 8.5) . These views fail to
recognise that the soul is itself a cosmos (see iii 4[15] 3.22,6.22), and that it has access to a richer life
than that given to the senses, one which is, moreover, no less universal for being reached inwardly.
12 The soul can thus order and regulate the life of the body even with its attention on 'higher'
things. Indeed, when the soul has to tend the body consciously this is a sign that something has gone
wrong. Plotinus goes as far as to liken this preoccupation with the body to illness (iv 3[27]4.33-37).
 419

scenario the soul gets over-involved by coming into contact (auvcx<pfD with the
body and being infected by its activities (iv 8[6] 2.30, 3[27] 14.14-15).
The Stoic is a case in point. According to Plotinus he is, so to speak, up to his
neck in matter. This is evinced by his tendency to reduce everything to matter in
his philosophical speculation. But who is making this pronouncement?
Matter, then, says this and understands it. And if it talked
sense, it would be surprising how it thinks and does the works
of soul, when it is neither intellect nor soul... But, as things
are, matter does not speak, but the speaker speaks with a large
contribution from matter, to which he entirely belongs; even if
he has a bit of soul, he speaks in ignorance of himself and of
the power which is able to speak the truth about such things.
(vi 1[42] 29.27-36)
This is rather harsh. Surely the Stoic is not so fallen as Plotinus would have us
believe? After all, he is less subject to moral evil given the pursuit of virtue so
central to the Stoic way of life. 13 But it would appear that the Stoic's avoidance
of moral evil does not preclude his involvement in the more originary metaphys-
ical evil of conflating soul with body (see v 9[5] 14.10-16).
The implication of this is that in spite of his reputation as a dualist Plotinus is
willing to countenance cases where soul is practically identical with body. While
offering no arguments for an identity theory Plotinus thus offers a psychological
explanation as to why some people might be inclined to accept one. Plotinus dis-
cusses the situation elsewhere in more narrative mode (vi 4[22] 14.2516fO.
Originally, we were the true self living in Intellect. But then another man
approached us and ever since we have become twofold-a mixture of good self
and evil other. 14 The problem is that the mixture is not necessarily one of equal
portions. Plotinus suggests the prospect of the higher selfs becoming so inactive
and inconspicuous that we become just the additional other (vi 4[22] 14.30-31).
In this case the soul passes over into complete identification with the body. On
this issue, commentators on Plotinus tend to approach the soul-body relation too
one-sidedly in terms of the ideal model mentioned earlier (see Emilson 1994,
O'Meara 1990, 26-27) . This is a variant on the Platonic understanding of the

13 There may be inconsistency here. Plotinlls after all has taken the presence of virtue as evincing
the true stature of the soul. Surely this can be witnessed in the Stoic for whom virtue is so vita]" Or
might it be possible to see the virtue of the Stoic as token of soul in spite of the Stoic's own advocacy
of materialism? For dualist implications in Stoic thought, see Long 1991, 119-120.
14 The problem with this account is that if body literally foists itself upon the soul, the soul can-
not then be held responsible for its fall. Plotinus, as we shall see, resists this conclusion. I take this
kind of language to be figurative as does Atkinson 1983, 32 who underlines that bodies can never lit-
erally come to souls since there never was a time when they were not ensouled (iv 3[27]9.\5-16). It
does, however, make sense to speak of the individual soul separating from body though here the sep-
arating is not spatial (see v 1[10] 10.24-31). Still, the reason why Plotinus uses this language needs
explaining. Perhaps body approaching soul is a way of expressing the metaphysical dependence of
body on soul.
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relation between the intelligible and the sensible as ultimately separate. IS Less
attention has been given to cases like the Stoic's where the model breaks down
and the soul seems to become the property of matter.
The Stoic may represent an extreme, but his case is telling. There is little room
for the universal quantifier when discussing the soul-body relation, for it lacks
existential uniformity from individual to individual. There is a spectrum of
involvement and indeed detachment (see iv 3[27] 6.27-34, 8.10-17). Some souls
sink further into their bodies, and these may even compose a majority. Others
keep their composure and remain above, while still maintaining their bodies. We
must therefore not only examine the soul-body relation statistically in terms of
what it is presently but also in terms of what it can be. There is clearly in most
cases an ideal to achieve which might, from the soul's side, be put in terms of
extrication from a one-sided relationship.
Whatever the individual case, Plotinus would refrain from employing a two-
substance model to elucidate the soul-body relation. If substance is taken to
imply ontological independence, body and soul are not substances in any
unequivocal sense (see vi 3[44] 2.1-5, iv 7[2] 8.45-46). The soul possesses a
steady reality that is absent from the fluctuating nature of the body (see iv 7[2],
8[4] 11-14,8[5] 40-43, 11.10-11). And the body always remains causally depen-
dent on the soul for its veneer of stability. In order to clarify this Plotinus opts for
a different model of explanation (i 1[53] 7.1-6). The soul is likened to a light
which, like the Good, spontaneously generates an image of itself. 16 When the
soul is on its best behaviour it lets the image be but busies itself looking up-and
within-to its superior, Intellect. Archetype and image in this case are not con-
fused, and the soul remains distinct from its reflection. This is the ideal form of
interaction. The other-more decadent and typical-belongs to those souls who
do not keep their attention above and instead become more interested in what

15 Even Annstrong 1940,90 has an overly-romantic view of Plotinus on this point: 'There is, I
think, no passage in the Enneads where Soul or souls are said to be spoilt or thwarted by DAI1 ... It is
in body, but independent of it and transcending it in its highest activity, never simply its form or actu-
ality, and so liable to be affected by it'. This goes too far. Plotinus also speaks of an ugly soul whose
'ugliness carne to it from outside, injuring, and making it impure' (i 6[1] 5.31-33). This soul is pol-
luted 'with a great deal of bodily stuff mixed into it, consorting much with matter and receiving a
form other than its own it has changed by a mixture which makes it worse' (i 6[1] 5.39-43, my ital-
ics). To call this 'affection' would be putting it mildly. Again Plotinus speaks of this kind of soul as
'not outside matter or by itself. So it is mixed with unrneasuredness and without a share in lhe form
which brings order and reduces to measure, since it is fused with a body which has matter' (i 8[51]
4.14-17). Of course, interpretations that perceive the soul through tinted spectacles often spring from
a laudable intention to make Plotinus' account of the soul uniform-an extremely difficult undertak-
ing! There is a tension in his thought between metaphysical truth concerning the soul's ultimate,
unspoilt nature and the recognition of the existential diversity of souls in eonereturn . The romantic
note can be preserved while taking the latter into account if we bear in mind the possibility of the
existentially fallen soul eventually regaining a better state. This hope has to be one of the root .. sources
for Plotinus' philosophical activity.
16 This accords with a general principle holding for soul along with Intellect and the One, that
each has both an endemic as well as an outgoing activity (see iv 3[27]10.29-31, v 4[7]228-29)
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they have created. These souls become somewhat over-attached to what they
give. Moreover, they can make light of the substantial deficiency of their product
given the fact that it is their product. In this case the soul is attracted by non-
being-so long as this is of its own making (iii 9[ 13] 3.7-16). There are two
stages to its creation. In the first the soul makes an image (£lowAov) of itself
which is indefinite, dark and devoid of reason and intelligence. 17 Up to this point
the soul remains at the level of Intellect. But on looking at the image again the
soul informs it and happily enters into it. It seems then to be a matter of love at
second sight. 18 There is an interesting gap here between the acts of creation and
identification. They do not entail one another, since it is only the 'second look'
that ties them together. It is from this point on that problems begin. Interestingly,
on this picture we do not receive our bodies from without as gifts from the gods
as in Plato's Timaeus but create them ourselves before taking up residence. 19 An
astonishing level of creativity is here assigned to the soul.
In this way Plotinus offers a kind of reverse epiphenomenalism. The body is a
projection of and remains causally dependent on the soul (see iv 3[27] 10.20-22,
7[2] 3.18-22). Here the body is not a substance in its own right but gains, we
might say, apparent substantiality by becoming the chief object of the soul's
regard. The body here is less a thing than an activity,20 an ongoing concern with
which the soul can become preoccupied to the exclusion of all else. 21 Elsewhere
Plotinus speaks of this in terms of the soul's being drawn more to what it illumi-

17 For body as an 'image' of soul. see also iv 3(27) 10.38-41, 12.1-4)

18 These stages in the creation of body from soul repeat those found in the generation of Intellect
from the One. Plotinus describes the way Intellect first emerges in an inchoate, material condition
before receiving form and definition by looking back to its source (see ii 4[12]4.17-20, 34-39, v
3(49)11.11-16).
19 As so often happens, it turns out to be a lot worse once inside than it seemed from without. In
another place Plotinus speaks of the way souls see their images (ei/)(J)Aa) as if in the mirror of Diony-
sus and come down to their level with a leap from above (see iv 3[27]12.1-4). Charles-Saget 1985,
99 takes the image pursued here to be that of the sensible world in general rather than a specific image
of self. This smacks of incorrectness, for it is precisely the construction of an individual self-image
that brings the soul down to the sense world to begin with. The subsequent pursuit of images on a
more general level mentioned in i 6[1] 8.8-16 is a consequence of the obliviousness to reality that the
first construction brings. Plotinus does therefore have an idea of the individual self; it is just not the
be-all and end-all of his thinking.
20 For the body as the province of the soul's partial activity, see especially vi 4[22] 16. Gurtler
1997,227-229 emphasises that one discrepancy between Plotinus and Descartes can be seen in their
view of the body which Plotinus understands more in terms of motion than extension. For more posi-
tive connections between Plotinus and Descartes, see Menn 1998, 140-144,216-218,288-292.393-
400.
21 As Aubin 1953,368 remarks 'Ce qui est mal pourl'fune n'est pas d'avoir un corps, mais faire
attention a ce corps.' I agree with Armstrong 1977,62 that descent means 'forgetting one's true
nature in egocentric concentration on one's empirical ego and obsession with its particular, limited
needs and desires' but would add that on Plotinus' view the locus for this narrow preoccupation is the
body itself. Egoism needs such a locus to fix upon. In the eyes of the sage, however, the body
assumes a less ominous veneer, and comes to be seen as a faithful musical instrument, see Rich 1971,
635.
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nates rather than to what illuminates it (see iv 3[27] 17.20-21,4.23-25).

This is a dangerous attraction. Perhaps we are familiar with arguments likening
the soul to a captain in a ship.22 But on the Plotinian scenario the soul is in the
precarious position of a captain in a shipwreck (iv 3[27] 17.24-26) . The relation-
ship is not therefore smooth-sailing but stormy. Indeed the captain is so over-
whelmed by what's happening to the ship that he forgets he is going down with
the wreckage. 23
At this point an inconsistency might show up in view of Plotinus' claim that
contrary to popular usage, body is in soul, not soul in body (see iv 3[27] 20.7-13).
How can this hold true of a shipwrecked soul? We have certainly seen cases
where the soul identifies itself with the body to such an extent that it really does
seem appropriate to speak of soul being in body rather than body in soul. But this
need not undermine the causal dependence of body on soul since even a soul,
damaged and oblivious to its higher nature, continues to perform its role as sup-
plier of life to the body.24 And if we seek further understanding of the kind of
subservience the shipwrecked soul has to the body it must be said that this is seen
by Plotinus as peculiarly psychological and self-imposed. The body does not
foist itself upon the soul. Rather the soul is dragged down by its own thoughts
(yvc.O~m) of the body (iv 3[27] 6.25-27). Put otherwise, the soul becomes what it
looks at (iv 3 [27] 8.13-16), so that, broadly speaking, some kind of activity on its
part precipitates the sense of embodiment. The tension in this case is not between
soul and body but between soul and the conflicting thoughts that can take it up
and down the metaphysical hierarchy.25 While serving as a terminus for the
soul's descent, the body hardly drags the soul down against its will. The soul is
active in its fall and its relation to the body remains intentional which, illciden-
tally, preserves for the soul the prerogative of changing its terms.

III. Conclusion
In closing, two related conclusions can be drawn. First, there are some implica-
tions regarding the question of individuality in Plotinus' thought. Despite efforts

22 The analogy is found in Aristotle De Anima 406a5-7, 413a8-9. Descartes Meditation VI 81

and Plotinus iv 3[27)21.6-21 use it reservedly.
23 For soul 'sinking' into body, see iv 4[28) 18.14-19. For an analogy more suited to the ideal
interaction, we would be better off looking over board: on a universal level, body is in soul like a net
in the sea (iv 3[27) 9.36-44).
24 For dependence of this kind see especially iv 3[27].20.46-51. According to Corrigan 1985,
40 I Plotinus precedes Aquinas in recognising that 'if the soul is that by which the human body exists,
then the human soul is the cause and form of the human body'. However, this way of putting things is
too wide to convey the real difference between Plotinus and Aristotle on this question. Plotinlls' argu-
ment rests on the premise that a cause may be like but not identical with its effect. In this case, the fact
that soul is the cause of body entails its independence from body, the fact that soul gives form to body
entails a substantial difference between the giver and what it gives (see iv 3[27] 20.36-39).
25 Who we are or take ourselves to be is for Plotinus largely a matter of where we direct our
attention (see esp. i 1[53] 11.5-8, ii 9[33] 2.5-10). Of course, on some metaphysical level we are
always the true self living in Intellect, but perhaps more realistically the self is also defined in terms
of its present, existential whereabouts.
 423

to argue the contrary, individuality remains highly nebulous at the level of Intel-
lect and the One. It is very difficult to pick out individuals here, however virtual
their presence may be. A soul can only become aware of its separate individuality
through having a particular body.26 But the preceding ref1ections suggest another
way in which souls can be comparatively individuated, namely, through their dif-
fering relationships to their bodies. It is not just having a body but how one has a
body that distinguishes one soul from another. Plotinus here reminds us that peo-
ple live the soul-body relation in different ways and in spite of the strivings of
philosophical theories for a single overview. There is, to be sure, an ideal at
which to aim, but Plotinus is well aware of how often this remains a dormant pos-
sibility. Second, the varying relationhips between souls and their bodies remain
incomprehensible if we do not remember Intellect as a third term other than soul
and body themselves. For it is the effective presence or absence of Intellect that
determines the kind of soul-body interaction found in any particular case.27 It
needs emphasising that Intellect is for Plotinus a reality in its own right, a distinc-
tive level of consciousness, hence and crucially a kind of experience. 28 It is pre-
cisely on account of this that Intellect can offer a real alternative to an experience
narrowly centred on the body. Plotinus here transcends another dualism-of
thought and experience-so central to the dispute between rationalism and
empiricism in modern philosophy.29
Department of Philosophy
City University, London
London UK EC I V OHB

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26 This conclusion has been argued for in detail in Sen 1997,48-65.

27 Plotinus himself seems to revel in bringing to our notice the grandeur and glory of the kind of
soul which is alive to its greater reality at the level of Intellect. Certainly, descriptions of such souls
are among the things which linger most in the mind after reading the Enneads. They can help explain
why so many, including the later Neoplatonists, latch on to the positive dimension of Plotinus' psy-
chology. On a general level, it is the sense of what souls can be that ultimately overrides any realism
about their actual conditions, making Plotinus' psychology optimistic in mood, if not in detail.
28 Por consciousness and life in Intellect, see Lloyd 1990, 182-184. The experiential dimension
of Intellect is well brought out by Wallis 1976.
29 I am grateful to the Editor of Ancient Philosophy and to two anonymous referees for their
careful comments on an earlier version of this article.
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