Canon 20

LEVISTE VS. CA GR# L-29184

FACTS

* September 7, 1963: the petitioner, a practicing attorney, entered into a written agreement with the private
respondent Rosa del Rosario to appear as her counsel in a petition for probate of the holographic will of the late
Maxima C. Reselva. Under the will, a piece of real property at Sales Street, Quiapo, Manila, was bequeathed to Del
Rosario. It was agreed that petitioner's contigent fee would be thirty-five per cent (35%) of the property that Rosa
may receive upon the probate of the will

* August 20, 1965, Leviste received a letter from Ms. Del Rosario, informing him that she was terminating his
services as her counsel due to "conflicting interest." This consisted, according to the letter, in petitioner's moral
obligation to protect the interest of his brother-in-law, Gaudencio M. Llanes, whom Del Rosario and the other
parties in the probate proceeding intended to eject as lessee of the property which was bequeathed to Del Rosario
under the will

* November 23, 1965, petitioner filed a "Formal Statement of Claim for Attorney's Fees and Recording of
Attorney's Lien,

* August 28, 1967, the court disallowed the will, holding that the legal requirements for its validity were not
satisfied as only two witnesses testified that the will and the testatrix's signature were in the handwriting of
Maxima Reselva.

* The petitioner filed an appeal bond, notice of appeal, and record on appeal. The private respondents filed a
motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground that petitioner was not a party in interest.

* The petitioner opposed the motion to dismiss his appeal, claiming that he has a direct and material interest in
the decision sought to be reviewed. He also asked that he be substituted as party-petitioner, in lieu of his former
client, Ms. Del Rosario.

* March 28, 1968, the trial judge dismissed the appeal and denied petitioner's motion for substitution. The
petitioner filed in the Court of Appeals a petition for mandamus praying that the trial court be ordered to give due
course to his appeal and to grant his motion for substitution.

* On May 22, 1968, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for being insufficient in form and substance as the
petitioner did not appear to be the proper party to appeal the decision in Special Proceeding No. 58325

ISSUE

Whether or not an attorney who was engaged on a contingent fee basis may, in order to collect his fees, prosecute
an appeal despite his client's refusal to appeal the decision of the trial court?

HELD

Article 1052 of the Civil Code does not apply to this case. That legal provision protects the creditor of a repudiating
heir. Petitioner is not a creditor of Rosa del Rosario. The payment of his fees is contingent and dependent upon the
successful probate of the holographic will. Since the petition for probate was dismissed by the lower court, the
contingency did not occur. Attorney Leviste is not entitled to his fee.
LICUDAN VS. CA GR# 91958

PETITIONER: Wilfredo D. Licudan and Christina Licudan-Campos

RESPONDENT: Court of Appeals and Atty. Teodoro Dimalanta

FACTS

The respondent lawyer was retained as counsel by his brother-in-law and sister, the now deceased petitioners'
parents, spouses Aurelio and Felicidad Licudan. His services as counsel pertained to two related civil cases
docketed as Civil Case No. Q-12254 for partition and Civil Case No. Q-28655 for a sum of money in connection with
the redemption of the property subject matter of the two cases covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 818 of
the Register of Deeds of Quezon City. In both cases, the respondent lawyer obtained a judgment in favor of his
clients. On August 13,1979, the respondent lawyer filed a Petition for Attorney's Lien with Notification to his
Clients which substantially alleged that his clients executed two written contracts for professional services in his
favor which provided that: a) The undersigned counsel is entitled to own 97.5 square meters of the plaintiff's share
of the lot in question. b) The undersigned counsel shall have a usufructuary right for a period of ten (10) years of
plaintiffs' share of the lot in question. c) And that all damages accruing to plaintiffs to be paid by the defendant is
for the undersigned counsel. On September 19, 1979, the trial court handling Civil Case No. Q-12254 ordered the
annotation at the back of TCT No. 818 of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City of the respondent lawyer's Contract
for Professional Services dated August 30, 1979 signed by petitioner Wilfredo Licudan and Aurelio Licudanon his
own behalf and on behalf of his daughter, petitioner Cristina Licudan-Campos. On Appeal, the Court of Appeals
ruled in favor of the respondent lawyer by dismissing the appeal and the prayed for writ of preliminary injunction.
Their subsequent motion for reconsideration having been denied', the petitioners filed the instant petition. The
petitioners fault the respondent Court for its failure to exercise its inherent power to review and determine the
propriety of the stipulated attorney's fees in favor of the respondent lawyer and accuse the respondent lawyer of
having committed an unfair advantage or legal fraud by virtue of the Contract for Professional Services devised by
him after the trial court awarded him attorney's fees for P1,000.00only instead of respecting the trust and
confidence of the highest level reposed on him considering the close blood relationship between him and his
clients. The petitioners contend that under the award for professional services, they may have won the case but
would lose the entire property won in litigation to their uncle-lawyer. They would be totally deprived of their
house and lot and the recovered damages considering that of the 271.5 square meters of the subject lot, the
respondent lawyer is claiming 121.5 square meters and the remaining portion of 150square meters would also go
to attorney's fees since the said portion pertains to the lawyer's son by way of usufruct for ten (10) years.

ISSUE

Whether or not the award of attorney’s fees in this case is reasonable, being in the nature of contingent fees.

HELD

The aforesaid submissions by the petitioners merit our consideration. It is a well-entrenched rule that attorney's
fees may be claimed in the very action in which the services in question have been rendered or as an incident of
the main action. The fees may be properly adjudged after such litigation is terminated and the subject of recovery
is at the disposition of the court.

It is an equally deeply-rooted rule that contingent fees are not per se prohibited by law. They are sanctioned by
Canon 13 of the Canons of Professional Ethics and Canon 20, Rule 20.01 of the recently promulgated Code of
Professional Responsibility. However, as we have held in the case of Tanhueco v. De Dumo (172 SCRA 760 [1989]):
 . . . When it is shown that a contract for a contingent fee was obtained by undue influence exercised by
the attorney upon his client or by any fraud or imposition, or that the compensation is clearly excessive, the Court
must and will protect the aggrieved party. (Ulanday v. Manila Railroad Co., 45 Phil. 540 [1923]; Grey v. Insular
Lumber Co.,97 Phil. 833 [1955]).

On the contrary, we rule that the questioned Orders dated September 19, 1979 and October 21, 1985cannot
become final as they pertain to a contract for a contingent fee which is always subject to the supervision of the
Court with regard to its reasonableness as unequivocally provided in Section 13 of the Canons of Professional
Ethics which reads:

13. Contingent Fees.

A contract for a contingent fee, where sanctioned by law, should be reasonable under all the
circumstances of the case including the risk and uncertainty of the compensation, but should always be
subject to the supervision of a court, as to its reasonableness

.Although the Contract for Professional Services dated August 30, 1979 was apparently voluntarily signed by the
late Aurelio Licudan for himself and on behalf of his daughter, petitioner Cristina Licudan-Campos and by the
petitioner Wilfredo Licudan who both manifested in open court that they gave their free and willing consent to the
said contract we cannot allow the said contract to stand as the law between the parties involved considering that
the rule that in the presence of a contract for professional services duly executed by the parties thereto, the same
becomes the law between the said parties is not absolute but admits an exception - that the stipulations therein
are not contrary to law, good morals, good customs, public policy or public order.

RETUYA VS. GORDUIZ AC# 1388

FACTS

Ana F. Retuya, a widow, filed a claim for worker’s compensation against Eastern Shipping Lines Inc., the employer
of her husband who died. Decision was made in favor of Retuya. The employer appealed and proposed a partial
compromise agreement. Retuya accepted. She also explained Atty. Gorduiz, her lawyer, did not signed the joint
motion to dismiss because he wanted 20% of the award as his attorney’s fee but she was willing for 10%.

When Retuya was about to pay Atty. Gorduiz, she was not able to contact Atty. Gorduiz and pay him. Later on
Retuya was served with a warrant of arrest. Apparently Atty. Goduiz made an affidavit of misappropriation of his
attorney’s fees against Retuya. Base on the affidavit led to the filing of estafa and arrest to Retuya. She made bail
afterwards and motioned to quash. The motion was denied but made an offer of a sum of money as settlement
and was accepted. The case was later dismissed as prosecution witnesses had allegedly become hostile and that he
was no longer interested in further prosecuting the case.

Aggrieved, Retuya filed for the disbarment or suspension of Atty. Gorduiz and Judge Eqipilag.

HELD

Judge Eqipilag was given a warning while Atty. Gorduiz’s investigation he was suspended 6 months. In the
testimony gather in the investigation, Retuya stated that she was willing to pay but Atty. Gorduiz demanded a
bigger amount. He lodged an estafa against her and was dismissed when she paid Gorduiz a sum of money. While
in the testimony of Atty. Gorduiz: he denied asking a bigger amount; in the estafa he thought he could not be paid
for attorney’s fees; and for the disbarment it was for evasion of payment of attorney’s fees.

Court finds that there is justification for suspension.

“Respondent acted precipitately in filing a criminal action against his client for the supposed misappropriation of
his attorney’s fees. It is not altogether clear that his client had swindled him and. Therefore, there is some basis for
concluding that, contrary to his lawyer’s oath, he had filed a suit against her and had harassed and embarrassed
her. “

“Paragraph 14 of the Canons of Legal Ethics prescribes that “controversies with clients concerning compensation
are to be avoided by the lawyer so far as shall be compatible with his self-respect and with his right to receive
reasonable recompense for his services; and lawsuits with clients should be resorted to only prevent injustice,
imposition or fraud.”

RAMOS VS. NGASEO AC#6210

FACTS:

Complainant Ramos went to respondent Atty. Ngaseo to engage his services as counsel in a case involving a piece
of land. After a CA decision became final and executor rendering a favorable judgment ordering the land to be
returned to Ramos and his siblings, Atty. Ngaseo sent a demand letter to Ramos asking the delivery of a piece of
the land which the complainant allegedly promised as payment for respondent’s appearance fee. As a result,
Ramos filed before the IBP a complaint charging Atty. Ngaseo for violating the CPR and Art.1491 of the Civil Code
for demanding the delivery of a parcel of land which was the subject of litigation. Respondent argues that he did
not violate Art.1491 of the Civil Code because when he demanded the delivery of the piece of land, the case has
already been terminated.

ISSUE:

WON respondent violated Art.1491 and Canon 20 of the CPR?

HELD:

Under Art.1491, lawyers are prohibited from acquiring either by purchase or assignment the property or rights
involved which are the objects of litigation in which they intervene. However, such prohibition applies on if the
sale or assignment of the property takes place during the pendency of the litigation involving the client’s property.
Consequently, where the property is acquired after the termination of the case, as in the instant case, no violation
of Art.1491(5) of the Civil Code attaches.

In the instant case, there was no actual acquisition of the property in litigation since the respondent only made a
written demand for its delivery which the complainant refused to comply with. Mere demand for delivery of the
litigated property does not cause the transfer of ownership. Hence, it is not a prohibited transaction within the
contemplation of Article 1491.

The Court however, in view of the foregoing circumstances found respondent guilty of conduct unbecoming of the
legal profession in violation of Rule 20.04 Canon 20 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and was duly
reprimanded.
DIRECTOR OF LANDS VS. ABABA GR# L-26096

FACTS
This is an appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Cebu dated March 19, 1966 denying the petition
for the cancellation of an adverse claim registered by the adverse claimant on the transfer certificate of title of the
petitioners.The adverse claimant, Atty. Alberto B. Fernandez was retained as counsel by petitioner, Maximo
Abarquez, in Civil Case No. R-6573 of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, entitled "Maximo Abarquez vs. Agripina
Abarquez", for the annulment of a contract of sale with right of repurchase and for the recovery of the land which
was the subject matter thereof. The Court of First Instance of Cebu rendered a decision adverse to the petitioner
and so he appealed to the Court of Appeals. Litigating as a pauper in the lower court and engaging the services of
his lawyer on a contingent basis, petitioner, liable to compensate his lawyer whom he also retained for his appeal
executed a document on June 10, 1961 in the Cebuano-Visayan dialect whereby he obliged himself to give to his
lawyer 1/2 of whatever he might recover from Lots 5600 and 5602 should the appeal prosper.
Contents of the Document: I Promise and will guarantee that I win give to said lawyer 1/2 of what I may recover
from the estate of my father in Lots No.5600 and 5602 which are located at Bulacao Pardo, City of Cebu. That with
respect to any money which may be adjudged to me from Agripina Abarquez, except 'Attorney's Fees', the same
shall pertain to me and not to said lawyer.IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have caused my right thumb mark to be affixed
However, Agripina Abarquez the share of her brother stating that the latter executed an instrument of pacto de
retro prior to the partition conveying to her any or all rights in the estate of their parents. Petitioner discovered
later that the claim of his sister over his share was based on an instrument he was believe all along to be a mere
acknowledgment of the receipt of P700.00 which his sister gave to him as a consideration for care of their father
during the latter's illness and never an instrument of pacto de retro. Hence, he instituted an action to annul the
alleged instrument of pacto de retro. The Court of Appeals in a decision promulgated on August 27, 1963 reversed
the decision of the lower court and annulled the dead of pacto de retro. Appellee Agripina Abarquez filed a motion
for reconsideration but the same was denied in a resolution.
These parcels of land later by the subject matter of the adverse claim filed by the claimant. The case having been
resolved and title having been issued to petitioner, adverse claimant waited for petitioner to comply with the
obligation under the document executed by him on by delivering the one-half (½) portion of the said parcels of
land. Petitioner refused to comply with his obligation and instead offered to sell the whole parcels of land to
petitioner-spouses Larrazabal. Upon being informed of the intention of the petitioner, adverse claimant
immediately took stops to protect his interest by filing with the trial court a motion to annotate Ins attorney's lien
but realizing later that the motion to annotate attorney's lien was a wrong remedy, as it was not within the
purview of Section 37, rule 138of the Revised Rule of Court, but before the same was by the trial
court..Notwithstanding the annotation of the adverse claim, petitioner-spouse Maximo Abarquez and Anastacia
Cabigas conveyed by deed of absolute sale two-thirds (2/3) of the lands to petitioner-spouses Larrazabal. When
the new transfer certificate of title No. 32996 was issued, the annotation of adverse claim on TCT No. 31841
necessarily had to appear on the new transfer certificate of title. This adverse claim on became the subject
of cancellation proceedings filed by herein petitioner-spouses. The adverse claimant, Atty. Alberto B. Fernandez,
filed his opposition to the petition for. The trial court resolved the issue, when it declared that: the petition to
cancel the adverse claim should be denied.Petitioner-spouses decided to appeal the order of dismissal to
this Court and correspondingly filed the notice.

ISSUE

whether or not the contract for a contingent fee, basis of the interest of Atty.Fernandez, is prohibited by the
Article 1491 of the New Civil Code and Canon 13 of the Canons of Professional Ethics.

HELD

No. This contention is without merit. Article 1491 prohibits only the sale or assignment between the lawyer and
his client, of property which is the subject of litigation. As we have already stated. "The prohibition in said article a
only to applies " The prohibition applies only to a sale or assignment to the lawyer by his client of the property
which is the subject of litigation, for the prohibition to operate, the sale or t of the property must take place during
the pendency of the litigation involving the property.
Under American Law, the prohibition does not apply to "cases where after completion of litigation the
lawyer accepts on account of his fee, an interest the assets realized by the litigation”. A contract for a contingent
fee is not covered by Article 1491 because the transfer or assignment of the property in litigation takes effect only
after the finality of a favorable judgment. In the instant case, the attorney's fees of Atty. Fernandez, consisting of
one-half (1/2) of whatever Maximo might recover from his share in the lots in question, is contingent upon the
success of the appeal. The payment of the attorney's fees, that is, the transfer or assignment of 1/2 of the property
in litigation will take place only if the appeal prospers. Therefore, the transfer actually takes effect after the finality
of a favorable judgment rendered on appeal and not during the pendency of the litigation involving the property in
question and the contract for a contingent fee is not covered by Article 1491.
This type of a contract as early as the case of Ulanday vs. ManilaRailroad Co. where we held that "contingent fees
are not prohibited in the Philippines, and since impliedly sanctioned by law 'Should be under the supervision of the
court in order that clients may be protected from unjust, contingent fees are recognized in this i jurisdiction
(Canon 13 of CPE adopted by the Philippine Bar association, which contingent fees may be a portion of the
property in litigation).
Contracts of this nature are permitted because they redound to the benefit of the poor client and the lawyer
"especially in cases where the client has meritorious cause of action, but no means with which to pay for legal
services unless he can, with the sanction of law, make a contract for a contingent fee to be paid out of
the proceeds of the litigation" (Francisco, Legal Ethics. Oftentimes, contingent fees are the only means by which
the poor and helpless can redress for injuries sustained and have their rights vindicated. Thus: The reason for
allowing compensation for professional services based on contingent fees is that if a person could not secure
counsel by a promise of large fees in case of success, to be derived from the subject matter of the suit, it would
often place the poor in such a condition as to amount to a practical denial of justice. It not infrequently happens
that persons are injured through the negligence or willful misconduct of others, but by reason of poverty are
unable to employ counsel to assert their rights. In such event their only means of redress lies in gratuitous service,
which is rarely given, or in their ability to find someone who will conduct the case for a contingent fee.
A contingent fee contract is always subject to the supervision of the courts with respect to the stipulated amount
and may be reduced or nullified. So that in the event that there is any undue influence or fraud in the execution of
the contract or that the fee is excessive, the client is not without remedy because the court will amply protect him.
There is no proof to show that Atty. Fernandez had exerted any undue influence or had perpetrated fraud on, or
had in any manner taken advantage of his client, Maximo Abarquez. And, the compensation of one-half of the lots
in question is not excessive or unconscionable considering the contingent nature of the attorney's fees. With these
considerations the contingent fee in question is not violative of the CPE. Consequently, both under the provisions
of Article 1491 and Canons 10 and 13 of the Canons of Profession Ethics, a contract for a contingent fee is valid.
The contract for a contingent fee, being valid, vested in Atty Fernandez an interest over the lots in question to the
extent of 1/2 thereof. Said interest became vested in Atty. Fernandez after the case was won on appeal because
only then did the assignment of the 1/2 portion of the lots in question became effective and binding. So that when
he filed his affidavit of adverse claim his interest was already an existing one. There was therefore a valid interest
in the lots to be registered in favor of Atty.Fernandez adverse to Maximo. The ½ interest of Atty. Fernandez in the
lots in question should therefore be respected. Indeed, he has a better right than petitioner-spouses Larrazabal.
They purchased their 2/3 interest in the lots in question with the knowledge of the adverse claim of Atty.
Fernandez. The adverse claim was annotated on the old transfer certificate of title and was later annotated on the
new transfer certificate of title issued to them.
WHEREFORE, THE DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT DENYING THE PETITION FOR THE CANCELLATION OF THE
ADVERSE CLAIMSHOULD BE, AS IT IS HEREBY AFFIRMED, WITH COSTS AGAINST PETITIONER-APPELLANTS JUAN
LARRAZABAL AND MARTA C. DELARRAZABAL.SO ORDERED.
Canon 21

SUNTAY VS. SUNTAY ADM. CASE# 1890

FACTS

A complaint for disbarment was filed by Federico Suntay against his nephew Atty. Rafael Suntay. Complainant
alleged that respondent was his legal counsel, adviser and confidant who was privy to all his legal, financial, and
political affairs from 1956 to 1964. However, when they parted ways because of politics and respondent’s
overweening political ambitions in 1964, respondent had been filing complaints and cases against complainant,
making use of confidential information gained while their attorney-client relationship existed, and otherwise
harassing them at every turn. The OSG found two counts of malpractice against respondent, one count of violating
the confidentiality of client-lawyer relationship and one count of engaging in unethical conduct. This was affirmed
by the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline.

ISSUE

Whether or not respondent was guilty of violating the confidentiality of information obtained out of a client-
lawyer relationship.

RULING

Yes. As found by both the OSG and the IBP Investigating Commissioner, respondent Atty. Rafael Suntay acted as
counsel for clients in cases involving subject matters regarding which he had either been previously consulted by
complainant or which he had previously helped complainant to administer as the latter’s counsel and confidant
from 1956 to 1964. He violated Canon 21, Rule 21.01 of the CPR, “A lawyer shall not reveal the confidence or
secrets of his client except: a) when authorized by the client after acquainting him of the consequences of his
disclosure; b) when required by law; c) when necessary to collect his fees, his employees or associates or by
judicial action.” Further he violated Rule 21.02, “A lawyer shall not, to the disadvantage of his client, use
information acquired in the course of employment, nor shall he use the same to his own advantage or that of a
third person, unless his client with full knowledge of the circumstances consents thereto.” Lawyers shall preserve
the confidence and secrets of his clients even after the termination of the attorney-client relation. Thus, he was
suspended from the practice of law for two (2) years.

Canon 22

MONTANO VS. IBP AM# 4215

FACTS

Atty. Dealca(respondent), in collaboration with Atty. Gerona, is a counsel for Felicisimo Montano. They agreed
upon the amount of P15, 000 as attorney’s fees, 50% of which is payable upon acceptance and the remaining
balance is payable upon the termination of the case. Even before respondent counsel had prepared the appellant’s
brief, atty. Dealca demanded an additional payment of P4, 000 which the complainant complied. Prior to the filing
of the appellant’s brief, the respondent demanded the remaining balance but the complainant was unable to do
so. With this, respondent withdrew his services for his client without prior knowledge and conformity. According
to the respondent, his client deliberately fails to pay him.
HELD

We find Atty Dealca’s conduct unbecoming of a member of the legal profession. Under Canon 22 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, a lawyer shall withdraw his services only for good cause and upon notice appropriate
in the circumstances. Although he may withdraw his services when client deliberately fails to pay the fees for the
services, under the circumstances of the present case, Atty. Dealca’s withdrawal was unjustified as complainant
did not deliberately fail to pay him the atty’s fees. Rule 20.4 of Canon 290, mandates that a lawyer shall avoid
controversies with clients concerning his compensation and shall resort to judicial action only to prevent
imposition, injustice or fraud. Sadly, for not so large a sum owed to him by complainant (P 3,500.00), respondent
lawyer failed to act in accordance with the demands of the Code. But only in a clear case of misconduct that
seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and member of the bar will
disbarment be imposed as penalty.

CANOY VS. ORTIZ AC#5485

FACTS

Canoy was among those low-income clients whom Atty. Ortiz deigned to represent. He claims having prepared the
position paper of Canoy, but before he could submit the same, the Labor Arbiter had already issued the order
dismissing the case. Atty. Ortiz admits though that the period within which to file the position paper had already
lapsed. He attributes this failure to timely file the position paper to the fact that after his election as Councilor
because he was too busy.” Eventually, he withdrew from his other cases and his free legal services. Complainant
filed this complaint but later on withdrew .

HELD

SUSPENDED: (1) month, with WARNING that a repetition of the same negligence will be dealt with more severely.

Still, the severance of the relation of attorney-client is not effective until a notice of discharge by the client or a
manifestation clearly indicating that purpose is filed with the court or tribunal, and a copy thereof served upon the
adverse party, and until then, the lawyer continues to be counsel in the case.

Assuming that Atty. Ortiz was justified in terminating his services, he, however, cannot just do so and leave
complainant in the cold unprotected. Indeed, Rule 22.02 requires that a lawyer who withdraws or is discharged
shall, subject to a lien, immediately turn over all papers and property to which the client is entitled, and shall
cooperate with his successor in the orderly transfer of the matter. Atty. Ortiz claims that the reason why he took
no further action on the case was that he was informed that Canoy had acquired the services of another counsel.
Assuming that were true, there was no apparent coordination between Atty. Ortiz and this new counsel.

“There are no good reasons that would justify a lawyer virtually abandoning the cause of the client in the midst of
litigation without even informing the client of the fact or cause of desertion. That the lawyer forsook his legal
practice on account of what might be perceived as a higher calling, election to public office, does not mitigate the
dereliction of professional duty. Suspension from the practice is the usual penalty, and there is no reason to
deviate from the norm in this case.”
Administrative Liabilities of Lawyers

IN RE: MAQUERA BM# 793

FACTS

In a Letter dated August 20, 1996 the District Court of Guam informed this Court of the suspension of Atty. Leon G.
Maquera(Maquera) from the practice of law in Guam. He was suspended from the practice of law in Guam for
misconduct, as he acquired his client's property as payment for his legal services, then sold it and as a
consequence obtained an unreasonably high fee for handling his client's case. Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the
Revised Rules of Court, the disbarment or suspension of a member of the Philippine Bar in a foreign jurisdiction,
where he has also been admitted as an attorney, is also a ground for his disbarment or suspension in this realm,
provided the foreign court's action is by reason of an act or omission constituting deceit, malpractice or other
gross misconduct, grossly immoral conduct, or a violation of the lawyer's oath. The case was referred by the Court
to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation report and recommendation. In its decision, the
Superior Court of Guam stated that Maquera was the counsel of a certain Castro. Benavente the creditor Castro,
obtained a judgement against Castro, thus Castro;s property was to be sold at a public auction in satisfaction of his
obligation to Benavente. However, Castro retains the right of redemption. In consideration of Maquera¶s legal
services, Castro entered into an oral agreement with Maquera and assigned his right of redemption in favor of the
latter. On January 8, 1988, Maquera exercised Castro's right of redemption by paying Benavente US$525.00 in
satisfaction of the judgment debt. Thereafter, Maquera had the title to the property transferred in his name. And
after, sold the property to C.S. Chang and C.C. Chang for Three Hundred Twenty Thousand U.S. Dollars
(US$320,000.00).The Guam Bar Ethics Committee filed a Petition in the Superior Court of Guam praying that
Maquera be sanctioned for violations of Rules 1.5 and 1.8(a) of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Model
Rules) in force in Guam. In its Petition, the Committee claimed that Maquera obtained an unreasonably high fee
for his services. The Committee further alleged that Maquera himself admitted his failure to comply with the
requirement in Rule 1.8 (a) of the Model Rules that a lawyer shall not enter into a business transaction with a
client or knowingly acquire a pecuniary interest adverse to a client unless the transaction and the terms governing
the lawyer's acquisition of such interest are fair and reasonable to the client, and are fully disclosed to, and
understood by the client and reduced in writing. On the basis of the Decision of the Superior Court of Guam, the
IBP concluded that although the said court found Maquera liable for misconduct, "there is no evidence to establish
that Maquera committed a breach of ethics in the Philippines."However, the IBP still resolved to suspend him
indefinitely for his failure to pay his annual dues as a member of the IBP since 1977, which failure is, in turn, a
ground for removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys under Section 10, Rule 139-
A of the Revised Rules of Court.

ISSUE

Whether or not Maquera, who was suspended from the practice of law in Guam, be suspended as member of the
Philippine Bar on the same ground of his suspension in Guam.

HELD

The power of the Court to disbar or suspend a lawyer for acts or omissions committed in a foreign jurisdiction is
found in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended by Supreme Court Resolution dated
February 13, 1992, which states: Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds
therefor.²A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court
for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before
admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as attorney for a party to a case without authority to
do so. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or
brokers, constitutes malpractice
RULE 139

DISBARMENT OR SUSPENSION OF ATTORNEYS

SECTION 1. Motion or complaint.—Proceedings for the removal or suspension of attorneys may be taken by
the Supreme Court on its own motion or upon the complaint under oath of another in writing. The complaint shall
set out distinctly, clearly, and concisely the facts complained of, supported by affidavits, if any, of persons having
personal knowledge of the facts therein alleged and shall be accompanied with copies of such documents as may
substantiate said facts.
SEC. 2. Service or dismissal.—If the complaint appears to merit action, a copy thereof shall be served upon
the respondent, requiring him to answer the same within ten (10) days from the date of service. If the complaint
does not merit action, or if the answer shows to the satisfaction of the Supreme Court that the complaint is not
meritorious, the same shall be dismissed.
SEC. 3. Investigation by Solicitor General.—Upon the issues raised by the complaint and answer, or upon
failure of the respondent to answer, the case shall be referred to the Solicitor General for investigation to
determine if there is sufficient ground to proceed with the prosecution of the respondent. In the investigation
conducted by the Solicitor General, the respondent shall be given full opportunity to defend himself, to produce
witnesses on his own behalf, and to be heard by himself and counsel. However, if upon reasonable notice, the
respondent fails to appear, the investigation shall proceed ex parte.
SEC. 4. Report of the Solicitor General.—Based upon the evidence adduced at the hearing, if the Solicitor
General finds no sufficient ground to proceed against the respondent, he shall submit a report to the Supreme
Court containing his findings of fact and conclusion, whereupon the respondent shall be exonerated unless the
court orders differently.
SEC. 5. Complaint of the Solicitor General. Answer of respondent.—If the Solicitor General finds sufficient
ground to proceed against the respondent, he shall file the corresponding complaint, accompanied with all the
evidence introduced in his investigation, with the Supreme Court, and the respondent shall be served by the clerk
of the Supreme Court with a copy of the complaint with direction to answer the same within fifteen (15) days.
SEC. 6. Evidence produced before Solicitor General available.—The evidence produced before the Solicitor
General in his investigation may be considered by the Supreme Court in the final decision of the case, if the
respondent had an opportunity to object and cross-examine. If in the respondent's answer no statement is made
as to any intention of introducing additional evidence, the case shall be set down for hearing, upon the filing of
such answer or upon the expiration of the time to file the same.
SEC. 7. Commissioner to investigate and recommend. Rules of evidence.—Upon receipt of the respondent's
answer, wherein a statement is made as to his desire to introduce additional evidence, the case shall be referred
to a commissioner who, in the discretion of the court, may be the clerk of the Supreme Court, a judge of the
Regional Trial Court, or an attorney-at-law for investigation, report, and recommendation. The Solicitor General or
his representative shall appear before the commissioner to conduct the prosecution. The respondent shall be
given full opportunity to defend himself, to produce additional evidence in his own behalf, and to be heard by
himself and counsel. However, if upon reasonable notice the respondent fails to appear, the investigation shall
proceed ex parte. The rules of evidence shall be applicable to proceedings of this nature.
SEC. 8. Report of commissioner and hearing.—Upon receipt of the report of the commissioner, copies of
which shall be furnished the Solicitor General and the respondent, the case shall be set down for hearing before
the court, following which the case shall be considered submitted to the court for its final determination.
SEC. 9. Procedure in Court of Appeals or Regional Trial Court.—As far as may be applicable, the procedure
above outlined shall likewise govern the filing and investigation of complaints against attorneys in the Court of
Appeals or in Regional Trial Court. In case of suspension of the respondent, the judge of Regional Trial Court or
Justice of the Court of Appeals shall forthwith transmit to the Supreme Court a certified copy of the order of
suspension and a full statement of the facts upon which same is based.
 SEC. 10. Confidential.—Proceedings against attorneys shall be private and confidential, except that the final
order of the court shall be made public as in other cases coming before the court.

RULE 139-B

DISBARMENT AND DISCIPLINE OF ATTORNEYS

SECTION 1. How Instituted.—Proceedings for the disbarment, suspension, or discipline of attorneys may be
taken by the Supreme Courtmotu proprio, or by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) upon the verified
complaint of any person. The complaint shall state clearly and concisely the facts complained of and shall be
supported by affidavits of persons having personal knowledge of the facts therein alleged and/or by such
documents as may substantiate said facts.
The IBP Board of Governors may, motu proprio or upon referral by the Supreme Court or by a Chapter Board
of Officers, or at the instance of any person, initiate and prosecute proper charges against any erring attorneys
including those in the government service: Provided, however,That all charges against Justices of the Court of
Appeals and the Sandiganbayan, and Judges of the Court of Tax Appeals and lower courts, even if lawyers are
jointly charged with them, shall be filed with the Supreme Court: Provided, further, That charges filed against
Justices and Judges before the IBP, including those filed prior to their appointment in the Judiciary, shall
immediately be forwarded to the Supreme Court for disposition and adjudication. (As amended by Bar Matter No.
1960, May 1, 2000.)
Six (6) copies of the verified complaint shall be filed with the Secretary of the IBP or the Secretary of any of its
chapters who shall forthwith transmit the same to the IBP Board of Governors for assignment to an investigator.

A. PROCEEDINGS IN THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES

SEC. 2. National Grievance Investigators.—The Board of Governors shall appoint from among IBP members an
Investigator or, when special circumstances so warrant, a panel of three (3) investigators to investigate the
complaint. All Investigators shall take an oath of office in the form prescribed by the Board of Governors. A copy of
the Investigator's appointment and oath shall be transmitted to the Supreme Court.
An Investigator may be disqualified by reason of relationship within the fourth degree of consanguinity or
affinity to any of the parties or their counsel, pecuniary interest, personal bias, or his having acted as counsel for
either party, unless the parties sign and enter upon the record their written consent to his acting as such
Investigator. Where the Investigator does not disqualify himself, a party may appeal to the IBP Board of Governors,
which by majority vote of the members present, there being a quorum, may order his disqualification.
Any Investigator may also be removed for cause, after the hearing, by the vote of at least six (6) members of
the IBP Board of Governors. The decision of the Board of Governors in all cases of disqualification or removal shall
be final.
SEC. 3. Duties of the National Grievance Investigator.—The National Grievance Investigators shall investigate
all complaints against members of the Integrated Bar referred to them by the IBP Board of Governors.
SEC. 4. Chapter assistance to complainant.—The proper IBP Chapter may assist the complainants) in the
preparation and filing of his complaint(s).
SEC. 5. Service or dismissal.—If the complaint appears to be meritorious, the Investigator shall direct that a
copy thereof be served upon the respondent, requiring him to answer the same within fifteen (15) days from the
date of service. If the complaint does not merit action, or if the answer shows to the satisfaction of the Investigator
that the complaint is not meritorious, the same may be dismissed by the Board of Governors upon his recom-
mendation. A copy of the resolution of dismissal shall be furnished the complainant and the Supreme Court which
may review the case motu proprio or upon timely appeal of the complainant filed within 15 days from notice of the
dismissal of the complaint.
No investigation shall be interrupted or terminated by reason of the desistance, settlement, compromise,
restitution, withdrawal of the charges, or failure of the complainant to prosecute the same.
SEC. 6. Verification and service of answer.—The answer shall be verified. The original and five (5) legible
copies of the answer shall be filed with the Investigator, with proof of service of a copy thereof on the complainant
or his counsel.
SEC. 7. Administrative counsel.—The IBP Board of Governors shall appoint a suitable member of the
Integrated Bar as counsel to assist the complainant or the respondent during the investigation in case of need for
such assistance.
SEC. 8. Investigation.—Upon joinder of issues or upon failure of the respondent to answer, the Investigator
shall, with deliberate speed, proceed with the investigation of the case. He shall have the power to issue
subpoenas and administer oaths. The respondent shall be given full opportunity to defend himself, to present
witnesses on his behalf, and be heard by himself and counsel. However, if upon reasonable notice, the respondent
fails to appear, the investigation shall proceed ex parte.
The Investigator shall terminate the investigation within three (3) months from the date of its
commencement, unless extended for good cause by the Board of Governors upon prior application.
Willful failure to refusal to obey a subpoena or any other lawful order issued by the Investigator shall be dealt
with as for indirect contempt of court. The corresponding charge shall be filed by the Investigator before the IBP
Board of Governors which shall require the alleged contemnor to show cause within ten (10) days from notice. The
IBP Board of Governors may thereafter conduct hearings, if necessary, in accordance with the procedure set forth
in this Rule for hearings before the Investigator. Such hearing shall as far as practicable be terminated within
fifteen (15) days from its commencement. Thereafter, the IBP Board of Governors shall within a like period of
fifteen (15) days issue a resolution setting forth its findings and recommendations, which shall forthwith be
transmitted to the Supreme Court for final action and if warranted, the imposition of penalty.
SEC. 9. Depositions.—Depositions may be taken in accordance with the Rules of Court with leave of the
investigators).
Within the Philippines, depositions may be taken before any member of the Board of Governors, the
President of any Chapter, or any officer authorized by law to administer oaths.
Depositions may be taken outside the Philippines before a diplomatic or consular representative of the
Philippine Government or before any person agreed upon by the parties or designated by the Board of Governors.
Any suitable member of the Integrated Bar in the Place where a deposition shall be taken may be designated
by the Investigator to assist the complainant or the respondent in taking a deposition.
SEC. 10. Report of Investigator.—Not later than thirty (30) days from the termination of the investigation, the
Investigator shall submit a report containing his findings of fact and recommendations to the IBP Board of
Governors, together with the stenographic notes and the transcript thereof, and all the evidence presented during
the investigation. The submission of the report need not await the transcription of the stenographic notes, it being
sufficient that the report reproduce substantially from the Investigator's personal notes any relevant and pertinent
testimonies.
SEC. 11. Defects.—No defect in a complaint, notice, answer, or in the proceeding or the Investigator's Report
shall be considered as substantial unless the Board of Governors, upon considering the whole record, finds that
such defect has resulted or may result in a miscarriage of justice, in which event the Board shall take such remedial
action as the circumstances may warrant, including invalidation of the entire proceedings.
SEC. 12. Review and decision by the Board of Governors.—
 (a) Every case heard by an investigator shall be reviewed by the IBP Board of Governors upon the
record and evidence transmitted to it by the Investigator with his report. The decision of the Board upon such
review shall be in writing and shall clearly and distinctly state the facts and the reasons on which it is based. It
shall be promulgated within a period not exceeding thirty (30) days from the next meeting of the Board
following the submittal of the Investigator's Report.
(b) If the Board, by the vote of a majority of its total membership, determines that the respondent
should be suspended from the practice of law or disbarred, it shall issue a resolution setting forth its findings
and recommendations which, together with the whole record of the case, shall forthwith be transmitted to
the Supreme Court for final action.
(c) If the respondent is exonerated by the Board or the disciplinary sanction imposed by it is less
than suspension or disbarment (such as admonition, reprimand, or find) it shall issue a decision exonerating
respondent or imposing such sanction. The case shall be deemed terminated unless upon petition of the
complainant or other interested party filed with the Supreme Court within fifteen (15) days from notice of
the Board's resolution, the Supreme Court orders otherwise.
(d) Notice of the resolution or decision of the Board shall be given to all parties through their
counsel. A copy of the same shall be transmitted to the Supreme Court.

B. PROCEEDINGS IN THE SUPREME COURT

SEC. 13. Supreme Court Investigators.—In proceedings initiated motu proprio by the Supreme Court or in
other proceedings when the interest of justice so requires, the Supreme Court may refer the case for investigation
to the Solicitor General or to any officer of the Supreme Court or judge of a lower court, in which case the
investigation shall proceed in the same manner provided in sections 6 to 11 hereof, save that the review of the
report of investigation shall be conducted directly by the Supreme Court.
SEC. 14. Report of the Solicitor General or other Court designated Investigator.—Based upon the evidence
adduced at the investigation, the Solicitor General or other Investigator designated by the Supreme Court shall
submit to the Supreme Court a report containing his findings of fact and recommendations together with the
record and all the evidence presented in the investigation for the final action of the Supreme Court.

C. COMMON PROVISIONS
SEC. 15. Suspension of attorney by Supreme Court.—After receipt of respondent's answer or lapse of the
period therefor, the Supreme Court, motu proprio, or at the instance of the IBP Board of Governors upon the
recommendation of the Investigators, may suspend an attorney from the practice of his profession for any of the
causes specified in Rule 138, Section 27, during the pendency of the investigation until such suspension is lifted by
the Supreme Court.
SEC. 16. Suspension of attorney by the Court of Appeals or a Regional Trial Court.—The Court of Appeals or
Regional Trial Court may suspend an attorney from practice for any of the causes named in Rule 138, Section 27,
until further action of the Supreme Court in the case.
SEC. 17. Upon suspension by Court of Appeals or Regional Trial Court, further proceedings in Supreme Court.—
Upon such suspension, the Court of Appeals or a Regional Trial Court shall forthwith transmit to the Supreme
Court a certified copy of the order of suspension and a full statement of the facts upon which the same was based.
Upon receipt of such certified copy and statement, the Supreme Court shall make a full investigation of the case
and may revoke, shorten or extend the suspension, or disbar the attorney as the facts may warrant.
SEC. 18. Confidentiality.—Proceedings against attorneys shall be private and confidential. However, the final
order of the Supreme Court shall be published like its decisions in other cases.
SEC. 19. Expenses.—All reasonable and necessary expenses incurred in relation to disciplinary and disbarment
proceedings are lawful charges for which the parties may be taxed as costs.
 SEC. 20. Effectivity and Transitory Provision.—This Rule shall take effect on June 1, 1988 and shall supersede
the present Rule 139 entitled "DISBARMENT OR SUSPENSION OF ATTORNEYS." All cases pending investigation by
the Office of the Solicitor General shall be transferred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors
for investigation and disposition as provided in this Rule except those cases where the investigation has been
substantially completed. (Bar Matter No. 356, Resolution April 13, 1988.)
Source: http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/rulesofcourt

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