Philosophy of Operational Quantum Logic by Sonja Smets

VRIJE UNIVERSITEIT BRUSSEL
FACULTEIT DER LETTEREN EN WIJSBEGEERTE
The Logic of Physical Properties

in Static and Dynamic Perspective
Sonja Smets
Proefschrift ter verkrijging van de graad van Doctor in de Wijsbegeerte

Akademiejaar 2000-2001
Promotor: Jean Paul Van Bendegem
Copromotor: Dirk Aerts
The author is research assistant at Flanders’ Fund for Scientific Research

Contents
Preface v
Introduction 1
I Philosophy of Operational Quantum Logic 8

1 Operational Quantum Logic 9
2 Underlying Epistemology 13
2.1 Why Realism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.1.1 Scientific Realism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.1.2 Critical Realism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.1.3 Structural Realism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.2 EPR and The Criterion of Reality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.2.1 The Criterion of Reality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.2.2 EPR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
II Operational Quantum Logic 28

3 Physical and Operational Foundation 29
3.1 Physical Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
3.2 Questions and Preparations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
3.2.1 Yes-no Questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
3.2.2 Preparations of Physical Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
3.2.3 True questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
3.2.4 Impossible Questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
3.2.5 Not True Questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
3.2.6 Special Questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
3.3 Properties of Physical Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
3.4 States of Physical Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
i
4 Mathematical Framework 42
4.1 The Symbolism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
4.2 Questions and their structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
4.3 Properties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
4.3.1 Modeling Properties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
4.3.2 Properties and their structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
4.4 States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
4.4.1 Modeling States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
4.4.2 States and their structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
4.5 Fundamental Axioms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
4.6 Orthocomplements and Questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
4.7 Duality of States and Properties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
4.8 Classical and Non-classical Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
4.9 Compatibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
5 Probabilities and Ideal Measurements 63

5.1 Classical and Quantum Probabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
5.1.1 Classical Probabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
5.1.2 Quantum Probabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
5.1.3 Hidden Measurements and Aspects of Creation . . . . . . 65
5.2 Ideal Measurements of the First Kind . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
5.2.1 Measurements of the First Kind . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
5.2.2 Ideal Measurements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
5.2.3 Ideal Measurement of the First Kind . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
5.2.4 Perfect Measurements and Filters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
5.2.5 Probabilities Regained . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
6 Critiques and Critical points 78

6.1 In defense of Operational Quantum Logic . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
6.2 Questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
6.3 Properties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
6.4 Physical Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
III Is Operational Quantum Logic a Logic? 88

7 “Operational Quantum Logic” and Logic 89
8 Natural Deduction 93
8.1 Assumption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
8.2 Substitution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
8.3 Meet and Join . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
8.4 Weakening and Regularity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
8.5 Negation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
8.5.1 Excluded Middle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
8.5.2 Non Contradiction and Ex Falso . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
ii
8.5.3 Reductio Ad Absurdum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
8.6 Weak Modularity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
9 Semantical Realizations 107

9.1 Algebraic and Kripke Realizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
9.2 Logical Duality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
10 Modalities 113
10.1 Modal Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
10.2 History of Modality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
11 Logical Operations vs. Relations 121
IV Dynamic Operational Quantum Logic 130

12 Operational Foundation and Mathematical Framework 131
12.1 Inductions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
12.2 Inductions as Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
12.2.1 Inductions as Actions on Questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
12.2.2 Inductions as Actions on Properties . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
12.2.3 Inductions as Actions on States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
12.3 Causation and Propagation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
12.3.1 State Propagation and State Causation . . . . . . . . . . 138
12.3.2 Property Propagation and Property Causation . . . . . . 140
12.4 Resolutions and Induced Propagation
of Property Sets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
12.4.1 Operational Resolutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
12.4.2 Actuality Sets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
12.4.3 Property Set Propagation and Property Set Causation . . 147
12.5 Example: Perfect Measurement Induction . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
13 Construction of Dynamic Operational Quantum Logic 152

13.1 The Logic of Actuality Sets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
13.2 Static Implication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
13.3 Dynamic Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
13.3.1 Propagation-implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
13.3.2 Causation-implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
13.3.3 Bi-labeled Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
13.3.4 Subjunctive Implication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162
13.4 The Logical Description for Perfect Measurements . . . . . . . . 165
14 Comparison with Linear Logic 168

14.1 On Standard Linear Logic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168
14.2 On Non-commutative Linear Logic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173
14.3 Linear Logic and Dynamic Operational
Quantum Logic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
iii
Afterword 177
References 178
iv
Preface
First of all, I wish to thank Jean Paul Van Bendegem for taking up the task
of supervising this work, knowing his busy schedule at the university I am
very grateful for the time he was able to make free for discussing the subject
matter of this thesis and for commenting on early drafts. Secondly, I thank the
co-supervisor of this work, Dirk Aerts, for the discussions held at the time I
occupied an office at the Center Leo Apostel.
Of course, if it wasn’t for Bob Coecke I probably would never have become
interested in operational quantum logic in the first place. He pointed out the
interesting problems to me which actually led to the writing of this thesis.
Besides for the fact that he encouraged me while I wrote this thesis, I also
wish to thank him for answering the many (!) questions concerning physics and
mathematics which I posed. Also David Moore deserves to be specially thanked
for the many discussions which took place at various conferences and workshops;
and for the pleasure of working together on some joint papers with him and Bob.
Next I want to thank Frank Valckenborgh, Isar Stubbe, Steven Sourbron and
Karin Verelst for discussing topic-related matters and/or the helpful comments
which improved the writing of this thesis. I wish to take this opportunity to
thank also C. Piron for the kind hospitality and discussions held during my visit
in Geneva.
I am very grateful to Rebecca Lee for taking up the role to help me improve
my written English. Finally, I thank the members of the Center for Logic
and Philosophy of Science at the Free University of Brussels, my friends, and of
course my family, in particular my mother, father, sister and her future husband
for their encouragement.
v
Introduction
“If philosophy is interpreted as the quest for the most general and
comprehensive knowledge possible, it obviously becomes the mother
of all scientific inquiry. But it is just as true that the various branches
of science have in their turn exercised a strong influence on the sci-
entists concerned and, beyond that, have affected the philosophical
thinking of each generation.” Albert Einstein [Ein50, p.755]
Our work in this thesis concentrates on operational quantum logic. It is our

choice to focus mainly on the logical foundation of quantum physics, i.e. on
quantum logic, and not for instance, on the historical development of quantum
mechanics, its strange effects or its paradoxes. Although many technicalities will
be dealt with in this thesis, the background on which it rests is the interplay
between philosophy, mathematics and physics. Considering that the domains
of philosophy of science in general, philosophy of physics and mathematics in
particular, as well as the domain of contemporary physics are so wide-spread,
we should stress that the author’s opinions on many of the concerned topics
have been largely formed while working together with the group of theoretical
physicists, called FUND, at the Free University of Brussels locally and with
D.J. Moore abroad. Another important remark which should be made is that
simultaneous to the writing of this thesis, the author, together with B. Co-
ecke and D.J. Moore initiated a series of papers entitled “From Operationality
to Logicality”, [CoeMooSme(nd)a, CoeMooSme(nd)b, CoeMooSme(nd)c] com-
prising the philosophical-physical background and context of the Geneva School
approach to the logical foundation of (quantum) physics. Of course there is an
unavoidable overlap of several topics which are dealt with in [CoeMooSme(nd)a,
CoeMooSme(nd)b, CoeMooSme(nd)c] and in the present thesis, but these works
can, according to the present author, be seen as complementary. This then im-
plies that this thesis can also be placed within the line of thought inherited from
the Geneva School. The Geneva School developed what we call an “operational
quantum logic”. We intend to give our own view on the subject matter of op-
erational quantum logic, concentrating firstly on the “so-called” static part as
originally developed by the Geneva School and secondly on its dynamic exten-
sion as recently initiated. Although we like to think that we further the ideas
of the Geneva School approach, it may very well be the case that certain of its
originators may not agree on how we present several of the following topics.
1
Introduction 2
The present thesis is constructed in four parts. After introducing our object of
investigation against a philosophical background in part I, we give in part II
an overview of operational quantum logic as we mainly find it in the Geneva
School literature [Aer81, Jau68, JauPir63, JauPir69, Moo99, Pir64, Pir72, Pir76,
Pir77, Pir81, Pir85, Pir98, Pir91]. We deal with specific logical aspects in part
III and finally turn in part IV to the recently developed dynamic extension as
put forward in [AmiCoeStu98, Coe00, Coe(nd)b, Coe(nd)c, CoeMooSme(nd)c,
CoeMooStu00, CoeMooStu01, CoeSme00, CoeStu99a, CoeStu99b, Sou00]. In
that last part we elaborate on the construction of a dynamic operational quan-
tum logic.
In part I, chapter 1, we place operational quantum logic in the framework of

research on quantum logic in general and draw attention to the fact that we
work closely within the line of thought inherited from Birkhoff and von Neu-
mann in the sense that the properties of a physical system, the object of study,
are conceived to form a complete, so-called, property lattice. In chapter 2 we
turn to the philosophy of science and analyze the epistemological stance under-
lying the operational quantum logic of the Geneva School. The main point we
put forward is that, in the author’s opinion, the Geneva School subscribes to
a form of critical scientific realism tied to a weak form of conceptual idealism.
We will oppose critical scientific realism to its naive variant and oppose concep-
tual idealism to ontological idealism. It will become clear that physical systems,
conceived as idealized phenomena, can epistemologically be characterized by the
properties they have ontologically. The mechanism for such a characterization
is based on hypothetical measurements. Operationalism here says that each on-
tological property of a physical system has at least one associated measurement
which tests it. This association between properties and measurements does not
imply that they can be treated on the same semantical footing, properties have
their own extension in reality and their measurements are to be conceived as
physical procedures. Our operationalism is as such opposed to that of for in-
stance P.W. Bridgman’s. Furthermore, the properties of physical systems can
then be divided in actual and potential ones depending on our a priory certainty
concerning the positive response of the correlated hypothetical measurements.
Properties conceived in this way, are the candidate elements of reality men-
tioned in the famous 1935-paper of A. Einstein, B. Podolsky and N. Rosen.
Since the Geneva School approach adopts the EPR-criterion of reality, we will
analyze the content of [EinPodRos35] in detail. Moreover, in this context, we
will discuss how a completion of quantum mechanics in Einstein’s sense can be
made possible.
In part II we first focus on the physical-operational foundation in chapter 3. We

find it important to clarify all physical notions before they can be mathemati-
cally modeled in chapter 4 where the structure of a property lattice will become
clear. The distinction between these two chapters parallels the dualism between
the physical concrete and mathematical abstract levels underlying the Geneva
School formalism. Concretely we start with the notion of a physical system as
Introduction 3
an isolated part of reality. Next, specific measurements conceived as physical

procedures equipped with a rule which enables us to interpret the results in
terms of “yes” (and “no”), are analyzed as questions or definite experimental
projects. The distinction between true, impossible and not true questions is
made when considering hypothetical performances of the questions on particu-
lar physical systems. As such the notion of actual property will be clarified by
means of true questions and potential properties by means of not true questions.
These notions of actuality and potentiality will be analyzed against the back-
ground of Aristotle’s writings. Concentrating on Aristotle’s theory of movement
embedded within his teleological conception, we see that the Geneva School’s
use of actuality and of potentiality can be placed in accordance with Aristotle’s
use of the notions in case of an accidental change. We then point out that the
Geneva School follows Aristotle, in viewing every change as the passage between
what is actual and what is potential. We conclude the discussion on these basic
notions with an elaboration on the concept of state. Slightly shifting from how
states are perceived in the Geneva School literature, we believe that to be in
accordance with the form of operationalism it adopts, the states of a physical
system are abstract names encoding possible realizations. The difference be-
tween the state encoding an ontological realization and those states encoding
all other realizations in which the system can be but is not, comes to the surface.
As often stressed within the Geneva School literature, it is important to note
that states will not be given a statistical or ensemble interpretation here.
In chapter 4, rather a lot of technicalities are involved but we believe that they
are important to get a grip on the subject. It is impossible to say anything about
operational quantum logic without knowing the main axioms and theorems,
especially because the Geneva School approach is, from the abstract point of
view, an axiomatic one. This is to say:
“it (the Geneva School approach) is grounded on a system of prim-
itive notions, the choice of a set of specific axioms, and some inter-
pretation rules which translate the primitive notions into concepts
about a physical domain.” [CatNis91, p.1294]
It is further emphasized in [CatNis91], at the basis of such an axiomatic formal-
ized theory, we find a formal language in which all symbols, derived notions and
axioms are defined without reference to any concrete (mathematical) structure
as for instance Hilbert Space. Furthermore, C. Piron proved in [Pir64] that a
certain kind of property lattice satisfying certain axioms can be represented in
the form of the lattice of closed linear subspaces of a generalized Hilbert space.
This theorem proves the generality of the formalism with respect to the Hilbert
Space formalism and justifies operational quantum logic as an important phys-
ical theory. Limiting our exposition to the description of one physical system1
we will present operational quantum logic in a rather new way which differs
1 For an exposition on many physical (sub)systems concentrated on the problems with
separated systems in the non-classical case, we refer to [Aer81]. For a more recent, detailed,
exposition on subsystem recognition we refer to [Val01].
Introduction 4
slightly from the presentation given by C. Piron in [Pir76] where he still con-
centrated on the notion of proposition and propositional system instead of on
the notion of property and property lattice. Where confusion is possible, we will
insert concepts between brackets within citations of Piron’s earlier work. The
same will be done when we talk about questions and the new notion of definite
experimental projects. Concretely, we will model questions and concentrate on
their structure which is obtained by the introduction of a preorder relation with
respect to truth or certainty. Then we will model properties as corresponding
to equivalence classes of questions and concentrate on their structure given by
the partial order relation we obtain with respect to actuality. The collection
of all properties of a physical system will be the “working set” which, as will
be pointed out, forms a complete lattice. The meet of properties corresponds
to the “product of questions” while the join has no “direct” physical meaning.
After explaining how the join differs from a classical disjunction we turn to the
description of a physical system by means of modeling its states. The struc-
ture on states will be supplied by means of an orthogonality relation. Before
we characterize both descriptions of a physical system, by means of states and
by means of properties as dual, we first deal with the three basic axioms of
the Geneva School approach applying to every physical system. Those axioms
will be elaborated upon in a context where we trace some basic physical laws
back to Aristotle. Hereby we concentrate firstly on Aristotle’s conception of
“passing-away” and “coming-to-be” or generation and corruption and secondly
on contraries or opposites. The latter is placed in the discussion on orthocom-
plements of properties. Regarding orthocomplements of properties and their
link to inverse questions we make some specific remarks since that link is not as
straightforward as one would perhaps assume. Later on we deal with classical
and non-classical systems, classical and quantum questions and properties and
try to place all these notions in relation to each other. In this perspective it be-
comes clear which axioms have to be imposed to speak about classical systems
as opposed to pure quantum systems. The road is now open for the notion of
compatibility to be discussed. Here we make clear that the notion of compati-
bility has a mathematical meaning and not the oft-attributed physical meaning
which states that two properties are compatible if their associated questions
can be performed simultaneously without disturbing each other. The section on
compatible properties will prove useful for the discussion of ideal measurements
in the next chapter.
In chapter 5 we will allow a little shift in direction and incorporate an essay

on quantum and classical probabilities which we believe to be relevant. We,
hereby, clear the way for a discussion in which we can clarify how quantum
probabilities can be given a useful meaning within the framework of operational
quantum logic later on. The appearance of probabilities encountered in quantum
mechanics will be explained as due to a lack of knowledge of the interaction of
the system with its measurement context. Classical probabilities on the other
hand will be explained as due to a lack of knowledge of the exact state of the
system. The framework against which those ideas are formulated is called the
Introduction 5
hidden measurement approach. Now, in order to recover quantum probabilities

and to explain them in the non-statistical approach of operational quantum
logic, the Geneva School introduces the notion of an ideal measurement of the
first kind. We will elaborate on such measurements in detail, tracing the notion
of a measurement of the first kind back to W. Pauli. In the final chapter of this
part, we deal with some critical points and criticisms which should make the
reader aware of where the pitfalls in the theory of operational quantum logic
lay.
In part III, chapter 7, we enter into the old debate on whether quantum logic
can be regarded as a proper logic, and focus in particular on the question which
concerns us here the most namely, is operational quantum logic a logic? After
making clear what we consider to be a logic, we point out that operational quan-
tum logic gives rise to a logical system of which we provide a natural deduction
presentation in chapter 8. Here we focus especially on its infinitary character
which is linked to the fact that the Geneva School approach works with lattices
which are complete. In chapter 9, we focus on the straightforward algebraic se-
mantical realization for the logical system of operational quantum logic and show
what a Kripke realization looks like. A logical duality between both semantical
realizations can be established based on the underlying duality between states
and properties prevalent in the Geneva School approach. Linked to the idea
of working with possible worlds in a Kripke realization, the notion of modality
naturally emerges. After focusing on the well-known modal B-interpretation of
quantum logic in chapter 10, we approach the possibility of a modal extension
for the logical system of operational quantum logic. The chapter on modalities
will be concluded with a short exposition on the historical suspicion surrounding
modalities. Of course, in a chapter devoted to logical aspects, we cannot avoid
“the problem of an implication connective” in quantum logic . So in chapter
11, we deal with the difference between an implication relation and implication
operation. Focusing on the criteria an implication operation should satisfy, we
handle several candidates which emerge in the context of (orthomodular) quan-
tum logic. Hereby we pay special attention to the so-called Sasaki hook which
by G. Hardegree has been given an interpretation in terms of a Stalnaker condi-
tional. We close chapter 11 with a note on a less known implication-candidate
for quantum logic, called the central implication.
In part IV we will concentrate on the dynamic extension of operational quan-

tum logic. In chapter 12, we characterize the notion of induction as a physical
procedure against the background of questions discussed in part II. Contrary
to inductions which lead to the destruction of a physical system we will in this
thesis only focus on so-called soft inductions which preserve the very nature of
a system. What can happen to a system due to an induction is that a system’s
ontologically realized state is shifted within its state space or that actual prop-
erties have become potential and potential ones have become actual. Since the
possible changes a system can undergo are encrypted in its state space and prop-
erty lattice, we can focus on the special kind of questions, properties and states
Introduction 6
which emerge when we consider inductions respectively as actions on questions,

properties and states. Consequently it becomes possible to introduce a causal
relation on collections of questions expressing that the truth of a question before
the induction induces the truth of another question after the induction. The
same kind of relation will also be definable on sets of properties and powersets of
states. It is this relation which plays a central role in the formal characterization
of the duality between maps expressing propagations and maps expressing causal
assignments. Indeed, every induction on the physical-operational level leads to
the characterization of corresponding maps on the abstract-mathematical level,
for questions, properties and states. To extend this reasoning in order to express
propagations and causal assignments of sets of properties we need to introduce
the notions of property set and actuality set. A property set is conceived as a
specific kind of ideal taken within a property lattice, while an actuality set is a
set of properties of which at least one is actual. Why exactly we need to work
with the notion of a property set and not with arbitrary sets of properties, will
be explained in detail. We conclude chapter 12 with an example of a perfect
measurement induction which is an induction such that its performance yields
as a result the disjunction of Sasaki projections. For this example we present the
scheme expressing what the propagation-maps are on the levels of properties,
states and property sets.
In chapter 13 we concentrate on the logic of actuality sets as initiated in

[Coe(nd)a]. The propositions in this logic will be the property sets mentioned
above. Since in this thesis we work in the last part with sets of states which
are exactly the atoms of a property lattice where the latter is atomistic, we
see that the carrier of the logic of actuality sets is a complete boolean algebra.
We first intensively concentrate on the logical connectives present in this static
case. Focusing in particular on the static implication, we can then present a
basis for a dynamic extension of this logic by means of dynamic implications.
We present dynamic implications and conjunctions for the cases of propagations
and causations. The section on the subjunctive implication will clarify things
considerably. While it is known that a subjunctive implication on the level of
properties, under the condition of a Sasaki projection, yields a Sasaki hook; we
can now show that a subjunctive implication on the level of property sets, un-
der the condition of a map corresponding to a perfect measurement induction,
yields the conjunction of Sasaki hooks. Finally we analyze the logical descrip-
tion for perfect measurements given in [CoeSme00]. We show in detail that the
propagation-axiom we put forward in [CoeSme00] and in which we use a linear
logical implication, needs to be interpreted by means of a strong causal relation.
In chapter 14 we will construct “an implication operation”, within the context
of dynamic operational quantum logic, which matches the meaning of the linear
logical implication. Before we do so, we give first a short overview of the fun-
damental ideas of standard linear logic. Note that in the context of linear logic
formulas are conceived as finite resources; the idea is inherited from the char-
acterization of linear logic as being resource sensitive. Classical formulas can of
course also be encountered in a linear logical language, they will be conceived
Introduction 7
as eternal resources. On the formal level, resource sensitivity is made explicit

by controlling some Gentzen style structural rules. The consequence of this on
the formal level amounts to the emergence of connectives divided into additive
and multiplicative. Of course the linear logical implication deserves special at-
tention. We analyze in detail how the notions of consumption and production
of resources find a place in the interpretation of the linear implication. We go
beyond standard linear logic and focus as well on its non-commutative variant.
Briefly we explain what cyclic linear logic stands for and make the connection
with Girard quantales on a semantical level. Next we can shift our attention
to J. Lambek’s bilinear logic and V.M. Abrusci’s non-commutative linear logic
where in the latter the notions of linear postimplication and linear retroimpli-
cation become clear. This exposition of linear logic will suffice for our needs
and allows us to enter into a comparison with dynamic operational quantum
logic. Drawing the attention to the differences on the methodological level, we
conclude with the insight that the linear logical implication should not be the
first “natural” candidate to consider when building up a dynamic operational
quantum logic.
Part I
Philosophy of Operational
Quantum Logic
8
Chapter 1
Operational Quantum Logic
Standard Quantum Logic (SQL) originated with the work of G. Birkhoff and J.
von Neumann in [BirVNeu36]. It has to be mentioned though that the idea of
a logical calculus based on the relation between the properties of a physical sys-
tem and the projections1 defined on a Hilbert space is already present in J. von
Neumann’s earlier work [VNeu32]. In [BirVNeu36], G. Birkhoff and J. von Neu-
mann analyze why the logic underlying the formalism of quantum theory is not
a classical one. They explain that the equivalent experimental propositions or
physical qualities of any “classical mechanical” physical system are represented
by the subsets of its phase-space and that their structure is boolean, while the
mathematical representatives for propositions about quantum systems are not
just subsets of a phase-space. Moreover they conclude in the latter case that
the correct representatives of any experimental proposition are the closed linear
subspaces of a Hilbert space. Obviously such propositions could equivalently
be represented by the projections on a Hilbert space. The structure obtained
from these mathematical representatives is, since the failure of distributivity, not
boolean and called an orthomodular lattice. To be historically exact we have
to note that an orthomodular lattice is an orthocomplemented lattice satisfying
weak modularity2 and not the by G. Birkhoff and J. von Neumann proposed
stronger modular law3 . Anyhow, the failure of the distributivity law is due to
the fact that the logical operation of “quantum disjunction” cannot be repre-
sented in this case by the set-theoretical union. As explained in [DalGiu(nd)],
“for, generally, the union X ∪ Y of two closed subspaces is not a closed sub-
space.” Indeed, what we do have is “the smallest closed subspace including both
X and Y ”. Without going into any detail here about the difference between
classical and quantum structures we would like to stress with [DalGiu(nd)] that
this focus on the Hilbert space model forces some strong requirements on us.
That is to say that the structure of “all” closed subspaces in a Hilbert space,
1 Projections are idempotent and self-adjoint linear operators.
2 For a, b ∈ L, a ≤ b implies that b = a ∨ (b ∧ a! ) (see part II, chapter 4 for more details).
3 In accordance with part II, we can write this modular identity as follows: for a, b, c ∈ L,
if a ≤ c then a ∨ (b ∧ c) = (a ∨ b) ∧ c.
9
CHAPTER 1. OPERATIONAL QUANTUM LOGIC 10
closed under the logical conjunction, amounts to a complete orthomodular lat-

tice. As explained in [DalGiu(nd)], this is one of the struggles which the later
quantum logic community experienced with Birkhoff and von Neumann’s ap-
proach. They thought it would be too strong a requirement to consider such a
logical conjunction for every set of experimental propositions, since its physical
meaning would be underdefined in some cases based on the idea that, especially
for quantum systems, not any two experimental propositions can be tested at
the same time. Because of such difficulties the quantum logic community ab-
stracted more and more from this original paper and from the standard Hilbert
space framework. In general, one nowadays refers to quantum logic as the class
of orthomodular lattices and sometimes as the class of orthocomplemented lat-
tices (also called ortholattices) in which the original Birkhoff and von Neumann
condition of completeness has vanished.4 On the other hand, SQL is referred
to as quantum logic in Birkhoff and Von Neumann’s sense, i.e. as “a complete
orthomodular lattice based on the closed subspaces of a Hilbert space”. Ac-
tually, these — complete or not — lattices form the algebraic semantical basis
for several approaches to quantum logic. Roughly following the classifications
in [HolHoo83, Mit81] of different areas of work in quantum logic, we will con-
centrate in this thesis on the so-called (physical) Operational Approach. In
this approach one interprets a lattice of quantum (and classical) propositions
of physical systems by relating it directly to experimental situations. Quantum
logic is here not conceived as a “merely” abstract theory but is provided with
an operational dimension. Within Operational Quantum Logic (OQL) several
orientations emerge, e.g. the manual approach — nowadays manuals are called
test spaces — introduced in [FouRan74, RanFou79], the dialogic approach in
[Mit78, Sta76], and the Geneva School approach originated with the work done
in [Jau68, JauPir69, Pir64]. To make our position clear, we adopt the line of
thought of the Geneva School — linked to the work of J.M. Jauch, C. Piron, D.
Aerts and D.J. Moore on OQL. In this respect, OQL corresponds to the theory
of “Property Lattices” based on the point of view that the set of mathemat-
ical representatives of the properties of an arbitrary physical system forms a
complete lattice.5 The underlying motive is that every physical system can be
characterized by means of its properties. It will be clear by now that with this
approach we, even more than others, work closely in the line of ideas initiated
by Birkhoff and von Neumann. As we will show later on, a property lattice
will be a (distributive) boolean lattice when we are working with systems which
behave classically. It is therefore important to note that Operational Quantum
Logic as we understand it, is not a priori limited to deal only with “quantum”
physical systems.
4 As mentioned in [DalGiu(nd)]: “An interesting weakening can be obtained by giving up
the lattice condition: generally the infimum and the supremum are assumed to exist only for
countable sets of propositions that are pairwise orthogonal. In the recent quantum logical
literature an orthomodular partially ordered set that satisfies the above condition is simply
called a quantum logic.” Note however that we intend to stick to lattices in this thesis — in
part II, we will deal with their structure in detail.
5 When from now on we mention OQL, we mean OQL of the Geneva School unless it is
explicitly stated otherwise.

We have to be very careful with the notion of operationality used here. For
philosophers of science, operationality roughly means a collection of views about
how observations and scientific concepts are connected by means of operational
procedures. Such views vary on the ontological status connected to the oper-
ations and the status of the concepts (theoretical terms) which are defined by
them, or on the fact whether different operational procedures can define one
single concept. Operationalism as such was alive in the early thirties among
positivists and behaviorists for whom behavior, experience or operations were
given a leading position in their theories. Since we will be defending the posi-
tion of scientific realism in relation to OQL, operationality here points to the
underlying assumption that with every property of a physical system we can
associate experimental (operational) procedures — which can be performed —
and a well-defined result.6 However contrary to other views on operationalism,
our view differs essentially from those who express that what exists is limited
to what is directly measurable. On the epistemological level our knowledge of
what exists is based on what we could measure or observe — stated counter-
factually — while on the ontological level physical properties exist independent
of our possible observations. This leads us to the fact that our view also differs
essentially from operationalists such as P.W. Bridgman because here physical
properties have an extension in reality and are not just by means of definitions
reducible to sets of procedures. Hence we do not subscribe to [Bri61]:
“The concept of length is therefore fixed when the operations by
which length is measured are fixed: that is, the concept of length
involves as much as and nothing more than the set of operations by
which length is determined. In general, we mean by any concept
nothing more than a set of operations; the concept is synonymous
with the corresponding set of operations.” (p.5)7
So we can now already say that the notion of operationalism within the context
of OQL has to be conceived as an attitude and not as a doctrine. As such it
has nothing to do with empiricism, positivism or behaviorism, but points to the
fact that the role of operations or experiments has changed considerably from
what their function has been in the old quantum theories. It has to do with
the fact that in OQL, one takes the point of view of an engineer and not of an
astronomer, as said by Piron in [Pir91]:
“C’est pourquoi la physique décrite par ce type de propriétés est
plus la physique de l’ingénieur qui agit, que celle de l’astronome
qui ne fait que contempler. Les expériences dont il est question
6 The notion of property will be analyzed in more detail within the framework of OQL in
part II.
7 About this statement, P. W. Bridgman mentions years later in [Bri50] that it should not
be taken out of its context. He stresses that he does not want to set up any “theory” of
meaning and does not maintain that the meaning of a concept involves nothing more than
operations. The statement quoted, then implies that it is sufficient for a physicist to say that
“what a man means by a term is to be found by observing what he does with it, and not by
what he says about it” [Bri50, p.5].
ici ne sont pas les expériences idéales considérées dans l’ancienne

mécanique quantique, ce sont de vraies expériences bien réelles qui
brutalisent le système et durant un temps plus ou moins long selon
les circonstances.” (p.3)
Chapter 2
Underlying Epistemology
2.1 Why Realism

“It seems to me that the attack on realism, though intellectually
interesting and important, is quite unacceptable, especially after two
world wars and the real suffering — avoidable suffering — that was
wantonly produced by them; and that any argument against realism
which is based on modern atomic theory — on quantum mechanics
— ought to be silenced by the memory of the reality for the events
of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.” Karl R. Popper [Pop82, p.2]
We will defend the specific epistemological “stance”1 of realism in relation to

what we called the operational quantum logic of the Geneva School. It is within
the line of thought of J.M. Jauch and C. Piron, and in explicit defense of their
position, that we put forward our view on realism. We wish however to make
this philosophical position clear without in depth focusing on the old debate
between realists and antirealists — e.g. idealists, instrumentalists, empiricists,
positivists. This debate has now entered a degenerative phase according to J.
Earman in [Ear93] and A. Fine in [Fin86], whereby the latter goes even further
and suggests abandoning both positions. In the following subsection we will
first clarify what realism stands for and explain how we reconcile this stance
with operational quantum logic.
2.1.1 Scientific Realism

There are several forms of realism, we will however concentrate on what is
known as scientific realism, “the theory that the objects of scientific enquiry
1 We use the word “stance” according to B. van Fraassen [VFra99] as a cluster of beliefs,
attitudes, commitments, ideals or norms. Also A. Fine [Fin86], uses the word “stance” in this
sense, we cite: “For realism is not a matter of words (“external world”, “real state of affairs”,
etc.) but rather a matter of what beliefs and commitments we have in uttering those words.”
(p.107).
13
CHAPTER 2. UNDERLYING EPISTEMOLOGY 14
exist and act, for the most part, quite independently of scientists and their ac-
tivity” [Bha87, p.5]. Scientific realism is a form of what is called transcendental
or contemporary metaphysical realism, according to which there is a world, a
“Ding an Sich”, accessible to our knowledge, not through a special ability or
intuition but through science (see [Oge92]). It is a position within philosophy
of science and as such it concerns scientific theories, activity and explanation.
We believe that the ingredients of this realism involve at least: belief in the
approaching truth of scientific theories, the existence of a mind-independent
reality, belief in reality as discoverable and accurately predictable. In further
analysis and contrary to constructive empiricism2 , scientific realists accept a
theory if they believe that what it (literally) says about the world, is also the
case, or in other words, that it approaches truth.3 When such a belief is held,
it concerns not only the observable part of what a theory claims to be the case,
but also entails that non-observables have an existence in reality. Note that the
distinction between observables and non-observables has to be acknowledged by
the constructive empiricist as well as by the scientific realist, but that for the
latter this distinction is not as crucial because in his theories observables are
not treated any differently than non-observables [VFra99]. We like to think of
observables as described in [VFra80]:
“X is observable if there are circumstances which are such that, if

X is present to us under those circumstances, then we observe it.”
(p.16)
This characterization is not put forward by B. van Fraassen as an exact definition
of what observability is. Note, it is maybe not obvious from this statement, that
observables can indeed be changed or destroyed while being observed [VFra99].
In other words, even for empiricists, observables are not restricted to the do-
main of classically behaving systems, by which we mean that any “in principle”
unpredictable influence on the system due to the interaction between system
and observing-device is neglectable.
Referring to “scientific realism”, the qualification above clearly does not imply
that our scientific theories are to be based on what we can actually observe
[Pop82]. The oft-drawn conclusion from this namely: “existence independent
from any measurement or observation” holds also in our view. It is however
essential for our position, which may not be shared by every scientific realist,
that our knowledge of what exists is linked to what we could measure, stated
counterfactually. In the next section we will further elaborate on what this ac-
tually means. For now it is useful to note that in our view, the so-called existing
non-observables, as well as the observables, are linked to definite experimental
2 The anti-realist position of B. van Fraassen: “Science aims to give us theories which are
empirically adequate; and acceptance of a theory involves as belief only that it is empirically
adequate.”[VFra80, p.12].
3 The correct statement of realism according to B. van Fraassen in [VFra80] is that “science
aims to give us, in its theories, a literally true story of what the world is like; and acceptance
of a scientific theory involves the belief that it is true.” (p.8).
projects. We think of a definite experimental project — the notion was intro-

duced by D.J. Moore in [Moo99] and will be further elaborated in part II — as
a kind of measurement i.e. an experimental performable procedure and a rule
which allows us to interpret the obtained results in terms of what is and is not to
be called “the positive result”, if the procedure is carried out. We have to note
with [CoeMooSme(nd)a, Moo99] that the assignment of a well defined positive
result to any definite experimental project is somewhat idealized, we take for
granted the reductionist thesis that a statement has meaning in isolation and
ignore potential ambiguities due to vagueness. Let us give a straightforward ex-
ample: assume a piece of chalk is breakable. This property of “being breakable”
is however non-observable. Any possible experiment which would assure you of
the existence of this property will demolish the piece of chalk when it is being
performed. In other words, we have to break the chalk into pieces to know that
it indeed was breakable before the experiment.4 Breaking a piece of chalk is not
valid as a measure of the actual existence of the property “being breakable”.
We claim however that by means of the fact that it is sure or not that a positive
response would obtain, should we perform the involved experimental procedure,
we have found a way to decide on the actuality or potentiality of the associated
property.5 What we have in mind is the following:
If it is sure that a particular piece of chalk would break if we take

it in both hands and try with all our strength to snap it, then the
property “being breakable” exists actually for this piece of chalk.
If it is not sure that the particular piece of chalk would break if
we perform the experimental procedure, we say that the property is
potential.
In the former case of an actual property, the associated definite experimen-
tal project is named certain while in the latter case the definite experimental
project is named not certain. Obviously, for a scientific realist, if it is chalk, it
is breakable and this is a real existing property. It is important to note that
constructive empiricists do not agree on this point, they do not recognize objec-
tive modalities in nature. As stated by B. van Fraassen in [VFra80]: “empirical
adequacy concerns actual phenomena: what does happen, and not what would
happen under different circumstances”(p.60). For constructive empiricists, this
4 Itis important to note that in general, performing an experiment and obtaining a positive
result, does not count as a proof of the fact that some associated property was actual before
the experiment. For more details about this we refer to chapter 5.
5 Note that for every definite experimental project, performing the involving procedure
leads to a well defined, i.e. a positive or negative, result, where we a priori characterized
which possible outcome(s) count as the positive result — the negative result being all the
other possible outcome(s). As such it makes sense to state that: when it is a fact from
in advance that a positive result would obtain should we perform a definite experimental
project, we can say that “it is sure that a positive response would obtain” and “it is not sure”
otherwise. Note that by our use of expressions such as “it is sure” or even “it is certain”, we
do not mean “it is necessary” because indeed “at the very least one would have to assume that
no uncontrolled external agent could act on the system during the course of the experiment
in question” [Moo99, p.66].
excludes counterfactually described properties from what they suppose as being

“real”.
2.1.2 Critical Realism

We outline our approach as follows: from the moment we have a definite ex-
perimental project, which is certain or not as counterfactually stated above, we
know whether the associated property exists actually or is potential. As such,
the form of scientific realism which underlies the theory of OQL will here be pre-
sented in the first instance as a form of critical scientific realism, tied to a weak
form of conceptual idealism. This alliance between realism and idealism emerges
more and more in contemporary research in philosophy of science. We believe
that both contemporary critical realists and conceptual idealists are indebted
to the interplay between realism and idealism. To explain this in more detail we
will first focus on Rescher’s conceptual idealism as presented in [Res73], [Res87,
chapter 11] and revised in [Res95, chapter 8]. Rescher describes his conceptual
idealism as follows:
“..., it maintains that any adequate descriptive characterization of

physical (“material”) reality must involve an implicit reference to
mental operations — that some commerce with mental characteris-
tics and operations always occurs in any viable explanatory exposi-
tion of “the real world”.” [Res95, p.122]
This position is opposed to an ontological idealism in which the mind produces

the “real” objects, but is linked to an ontological realism in the sense that it
does not deny the mind-independent existence of real objects.
“The mind-untouched reality underlying the world of our experien-
tially grounded knowledge is something to whose existence (whose
that) we stand committed but about whose nature (whose what) we
neither do obtain nor can obtain any knowledge.” [Res95, p.128]
Indeed, Rescher adopts here a Kantian distinction between the realm of phe-
nomena and the realm of things-in-themselves. Of the latter he admits that
we can only say that it exists but not what it is like. It is in this light that
we should understand that for him, “the world we know” is “the world as we
perceive it”:
“The pivotal thesis of conceptual idealism is that we standardly
think of reality in mentalesque terms. It rests on two basic theses:
(1) That our world, the world as we know it, is — inevitably — the
world as we conceive it to be, and
(2) That the concepts (thought-instrumentalities) that we standard-
ly use in characterizing and describing the world contain in their
make-up, somewhere along the line, a reference to the operations of
mind.” [Res95, p.124]
Such a mind-involving factor has nothing to do with subjectivism in the sense

that “the items we characterize as “mind-dependent” can be perfectly inter-
personal and objective” [Res95, p.127]. Since in Rescher’s view we can always
discover more and more properties of the things in our world, the progress of
scientific inquiry is a process of conceptual innovation. It is crucial to realize
that conceptual innovation does not change real objects. As such the notion of
innovation is here linked to the thesis of fallibilism adopted by Rescher. The
thesis of fallibilism holds that our knowledge of reality is always in some ways
imperfect and capable of improvement. This position is close to that of C.S.
Peirce and stands against scepticism which maintains that no useful knowledge
about reality can be obtained. According to fallibilism, there is just no assur-
ance that scientific theories are definitely true. We will see that one of the main
converging points between conceptual idealism and critical scientific realism is
indeed the thesis of fallibilism.
The notion of “critical realism” has been used in several senses in the history of
philosophy and is nowadays often associated with the position of R. Bhaskar.
R. Bhaskar conceives of a transcendental realism linked with a critical natural-
ism with respect to social activity (see [ArcBhaColLawNor98, Bha87, Bha91]).
Bhaskar’s critical realism — the name is an elision of the two phrases “transcen-
dental realism” and “critical naturalism” [ArcBhaColLawNor98] — is more a
program in which he intends to combine ontological realism, epistemological rel-
ativism and judgmental rationality. Since Bhaskar’s theory is too general with
respect to the context of this thesis, it is according to us more appropriate to
focus in the remainder of this chapter on I. Niiniluoto’s critical scientific realism.
The stance of critical realism in the first instance means characterizing scien-
tific progress in terms of increasing truthlikeness [Nii99]. This kind of realism
distinguishes itself from others on several points. First it adopts an ontological
realism and a correspondence theory of truth. Contrary to naive realists, it also
adopts the thesis of fallibilism in which truth, as an essential aim of science, can
only be approached. This idea becomes clearer with the following citation of I.
Niiniluoto, [Nii87]:
“Another line of epistemological thought, critical realism, can also
be motivated in Kantian terms: Kant’s phenomena could be inter-
preted as expressions of our partial knowledge of the things as they
are “in themselves” in the mind-independent reality. This idea ac-
cepts “direct” realism and the correspondence theory of truth, but
it is not “naive”, since our knowledge of reality is always laden with
some conceptual framework and is never assumed to be completely
and exactly true. Still, this view rejects relativism and scepticism. If
we recognize that Kant’s categories are not fixed, but rather histor-
ically changing (Hegel) and bound to man-made languages (Peirce),
then each conceptual framework provides us with a perspective on
objective reality. By employing and enriching such frameworks, and
by empirically testing scientific theories formulated in these frame-
works, we have a rational method of approaching to the truth, i.e.,

finding deeper and deeper partial descriptions of the world.” (p.464)
Returning to the thesis of ontological realism it is crucial that the existence of
entities in a mind-independent realm refers to an ontological independence and
not to a causal independence, the latter entailing the exclusion of causal influ-
ence. Since the physical and mental are in constant causal interaction according
to Niiniluoto, causal dependence does not contradict ontological independence.
In other words, “the stone is ontologically independent of me, even though I
am able to interact causally with it”[Nii99, p.27]. Later on in his book Niinilu-
oto even stresses that the (ontologically) mind-independent world is a “lawlike
flux of causal processes” [Nii99, p.219]. Here, it should be made clear that the
existence of a mind-independent reality, the acceptance of ontological realism,
does not exclude physical objects having “non-physical, mind-involving proper-
ties which ontologically presuppose relations to consciousness or to cultural and
social institutions” [Nii99, p.33]. Regarding the Kantian distinction between the
realms of noumena and phenomena, Niiniluoto rejects — contrary to Rescher
— Kant’s concept of things-in-themselves:
“For a realist, our knowledge is uncertain, incomplete, and truthlike,
but it is “directly” about reality.” [Nii99, p.79]
From the above quotations it is clear that for a critical realist such as Niiniluoto,
reality can be captured in conceptual frameworks. To the question of whether
the diversity of such frameworks implies that we cannot say anything about
reality except maybe that it exists, Niiniluoto replies that THE WORLD or
reality is not changed — ontologically — by our descriptions:
“More generally, when we “structure” THE WORLD by our con-
cepts, it is not THE WORLD that changes, but rather our world
view. For these reasons, I do not think it is at all incoherent to
speak about the mind-independent WORLD. And we can even have
fallible rational beliefs about the features of this WORLD through
science.” [Nii99, p.219]
Niiniluoto stresses that his critical realism accepts a minimal ontological real-
ism which explicitly does not imply a conceptual or linguistic idealism. Now we
want to stress that our position of critical realism leans more closely to a con-
ceptual idealism than Niiniluoto’s. Note however that by conceptual idealism
we mean Rescher’s position and not a strong form of linguistic idealism such as
for instance J. Derrida’s deconstructionism.
We have already mentioned that Rescher’s conceptual idealism distinguishes

itself from ontological idealism or more concretely, in Niiniluoto’s terms, from a
subjective idealism where everything is composed by individual human minds, or
an objective idealism where everything is composed by a superhuman objective
mind. Furthermore it can be interpreted as the thesis that reality is knowable by
a possible mind or “some physically realizable (though not necessarily actual)
type of intelligent being” [Nii99, p.28]. And since conceptual idealism as such
is compatible with ontological realism and even materialism, Niiniluoto says of
it:
“I am inclined to think that it should not be called “idealism” at
all, since it does not attribute any constitutive role to the human or
superhuman mind.” [Nii99, p.28]
We agree with I. Niiniluoto, that the role attached to the mind in conceptual
idealism points mainly to the fact that reality can only be captured in “mind-
correlative terms of reference”. To explain our position, we adopt Niiniluoto’s
critical realism together with a weak form of conceptual idealism. We have
of course to be careful here and say immediately that we do not agree with
Rescher’s strict Kantian distinction between reality out there and reality as we
perceive it, and that we do not adopt a coherence theory of truth. According
to us, the objects of reality exist independent of actual or possible experience
but we know of them via hypothetical measurements. Furthermore, we cannot
escape the fact that in our theory we focus on isolated parts of reality, and that
these isolated parts of reality will be characterized as physical systems and their
physical properties will be identified according to the best of our ability. It is
obvious that hypothetical measurements, characterizations and identifications
are mind-involving activities. Note that Rescher also conceives of identification
as a mind-involving activity [Res95]. To be more explicit, the identification of
the physical properties and the characterization of the system correspond to a
certain belief of the physicist. His belief can be reinforced or it has to be re-
vised according to the availability of corresponding certain definite experimental
projects which assure him of the actual existence of the properties involved. In
[Sme01] we call these mind-involving activities idealizations. Observe that the
word “idealization” in this sense has nothing to do with ontological idealism.
While Rescher may not agree with us, we believe that our knowledge of reality
approaches the ontological world quite closely, at least close enough to omit
some form of Kantian transcendental idealism. More explicitly we wish to avoid
a “Ding an Sich” which is inaccessible to our knowledge and avoid the concep-
tion of a phenomenon as accessible to our knowledge though only perspective
dependent, as merely a reflection of a deeperlying inaccessible reality. In our
opinion, a part of the external world should be called phenomenon. This con-
cept of phenomenon is conceived to be strongly entangled with the concept of
a “Ding an Sich”. If there is such a thing as a “Ding an Sich” it is not ontolog-
ically nor in our perceivability different from a phenomenon. To recapitulate,
what we focus upon in our scientific activity are idealizations of some phenom-
ena conceived as parts of the external world. Reality itself is mind-independent,
although the process of description “involves” some mind-dependent character-
izations. This does not lead us away from our realism, but we have to take care
not to fall into the trap of essentialism. It is not because reality indicates the
most obvious way to isolate phenomena from their environment, that there is
a “unique ready-made ” structure of reality. There are several alternative ways
in which the world can be carved in pieces [Nii87].
The idea that it is by means of definite experimental projects that we discover

the ontological world, is linked to the operationalism we adopt. Therefore we
agree with C. Piron when he states in [Pir81] that a real physical property can
always be associated with some experiment and well-defined result. While in
our view certain definite experimental projects are a sufficient basis to determine
on the actual existence of properties, C. Piron also focuses on the idea that a
physicist who decides to test his beliefs can do this by performing experiments
in reality. Note that in Piron’s opinion, while a physicist’s assumption can be
“confirmed” or “refuted” by means of real experiments, it can never “proved”
to be true but only “proved” to be false. In this sense he adheres to the idea of
falsificationalism, [Pir81]:
“In other words we cannot and we never prove a theory, we only
have the possibility to falsify it.” (p.398)
His conceptions concerning this are related to the matter of the kind of knowl-
edge we can gather by performing the experiments in reality. We will deal with
this matter in detail in chapter 5 and stick for now to definite experimental
projects, certain or not. Obviously, the aim is to describe the properties of a
physical system and not just our (maybe false) beliefs. Let us concentrate on
an example in order to make our position clear. We agree that identifying the
thing on the table as an apple having certain properties such as green, round,
eatable, etc. is an idealization of a certain phenomenon. However, reality itself
handed us the way to isolate the apple from the table. The characterization of
the isolated phenomenon as an apple with specific properties is, in our view, at
first mind-dependent. Indeed, we can only say that there is “truly” an apple on
the table when there are definite experimental projects which allow us to state
the actuality (potentiality) of each of these assumed properties a fresh apple
actually (potentially) should have.
The fact that we focus on a world carved into pieces, i.e. isolated parts of reality,
refers in our opinion to the case that knowledge about the world as a whole is
approachable but not immediately attainable. This idea is linked to a critical
realism which expresses that our knowledge of reality is always laden with a
conceptual framework and is never assumed to be completely and exactly true.
In a similar way, once the isolated parts of reality have been “epistemologically”
characterized by means of their actual and potential properties corresponding to
definite experimental projects we discover or approach the “ontological” world
quite closely. Note finally that the fact that scientific activity focuses on the dis-
covery of reality, does not imply that we do not interfere with or act upon reality
as it is. We may want to describe for example the properties of a physical system
before and after we interfered with it. In both cases, before and after interfer-
ence, the properties are described if they correspond to specific (counterfactual)
definite experimental projects. Discovery does not imply that the physical sys-
tems we have in mind have to be necessarily static; we may as well focus on
the change or creation of properties brought about by a specific action upon the
system. To conclude this section we note that the position of the Geneva School,
according to our belief a combination of critical realism and weak conceptual

idealism, has been named experimental realism in [CoeMooSme(nd)a].
2.1.3 Structural Realism

The philosophical stance outlined above underlies the theory of OQL. In [Chr99],
the theory of OQL extended by the dynamic structures developed in Brussels-
Geneva (see part IV), is analyzed in detail as an example of what is called
Critical Naturalistic Realism. This position obviously ties in with R. Bhaskar’s
stance and is for example maintained by C.A. Hooker in [Hoo95], who con-
ceives reality as a natural unit in which human knowledge is itself a natural
phenomenon to be studied. According to him, philosophy should form a co-
herent unit together with science to hand out a self-consistent conception of
our cosmos and ourselves. Since it is also in this view the case that parts of
the current scientific image can be put into question, naturalism needs to be
combined with critical realism. Without going into any specific detail here, let
us just mention that the mind-dependent characterization is in [Chr99] outlined
as a causal connection while the observables and non-observables are character-
ized by causal structures — consider for instance state or property transitions of
physical systems. To maintain the stance of Critical Naturalistic Realism in this
respect, it is necessary to presume that reality is capturable in causal structures,
which points out the link with the contemporary stance of structural realism.
This position has been attested to J. Worrall who takes as a cornerstone for his
elaborations H. Poincaré’s position in “La science et l’hypothèse”. He describes
the basis for structural realism as the fact that what we discover in reality and
can capture in our scientific theories are the relationships between phenom-
ena. It is in this sense that we must understand the mathematical equations
in for instance Newton’s theory where he captured the relationships between
phenomena. The correlated theoretical terms such as action-at-a-distance or
gravity should be understood as genuine primitives. As we see it then, one such
primitive can have had several theoretical names attached to it in the history of
scientific theories. Therefore, according to a structural realist, they should not
be any further explained; we do not have to buy the explanations of for instance
apparently strange quantum effects just because one adheres to certain classi-
cal metaphysical assumptions or, in the case of action-at-a-distance, because
one adheres to a Cartesian style mechanics. Within Worrall’s interpretation,
structures and corresponding primitives are what they are, [Wor89]:
“... it is a mistake to think that we can ever “understand” the nature
of the basic furniture of the universe.”(122)
By means of structural realism it becomes possible to explain theory change in
science as further elaboration on the structural level combined with sometimes
even total refutation of previous ontological conceptions. For sure, old ideas are
often overthrown due to new experimental evidence leading to an unavoidable
change in our world view, as Worrall in [Wor89] describes it:
“The only claim is that ultimately evidence leads the way: if, despite
all efforts, no scientific theory can be constructed which incorporates
our favorite metaphysical assumptions, then no matter how firmly
entrenched those principles might be, and no matter how fruitful
they may have proved in the past, they must ultimately be given
up.” (p.123)
We have given our view of what structural realism stands for and intended to
show that in further research it could be promising to place the causal-dynamic
extension of OQL — cf. part IV — in that perspective. This does not how-
ever overthrow the kind of critical realism against which we placed the original
development of (static) OQL. Indeed, I. Niiniluoto labels structural realism as
a position that might even be characterized as critical “half-realism”; his own
version of critical scientific realism goes actually beyond structural realism:
“... my own favourite form of critical realism goes beyond both

structural and entity realism: it appeals to the idea that theoret-
ical statements in science — both universal ones expressing laws
and existential ones expressing ontological claims — may be strictly
speaking false but nevertheless “truthlike” or “approximately true”.”
[Nii99, p.12-13]
2.2 EPR and The Criterion of Reality

2.2.1 The Criterion of Reality
The outlined position of realism underlying the development of OQL has, as a
special cornerstone, the criterion of reality put forward in the 1935 EPR-paper
[EinPodRos35]. The criterion is the following:
“If, without in any way disturbing a system, we can predict with cer-
tainty (i.e., with probability equal to unity) the value of a physical
quantity, then there exists an element of physical reality correspond-
ing to this physical quantity” (p.777)
It is now known that although the content of this paper had been discussed by
all three authors, it was B. Podolsky who wrote it and that A. Einstein himself
would probably have expressed things differently. This was indeed admitted
by A. Einstein in a letter to E. Schrödinger (see [Fin86]). For this reason we
cannot be sure that A. Einstein would have formulated the criterion of reality
in the same way. As we may believe A. Fine in his analysis of the letters and
papers in the Einstein Archives, the reality criterion does not appear in any of
Einstein’s own published expositions of the EPR situation [Fin86, p.62]. Fine
also unravels two passages6 where Einstein may have stated something near to
the above version of the reality criterion, though he concludes that Einstein
6 The paper [Ein48] and a letter written to Tany Ehrenfest, October 12, 1938.
seems to have dropped the reality principle choosing to focus on real states
of affairs instead of on values of observables which are the essential ingredient
of the reality criterion. Indeed, Einstein’s own stance does not rely on the
criterion of reality as stated above. It is important to note here that Einstein
shifted away from positivism and empiricism — present in his early research —
to realism later on. We will not enter the discussion of what kind of realism
Einstein adopted, let us instead conclude with the opinion that the Geneva
School adopts the EPR-principle of reality, though from this we cannot and
indeed may not conclude that they rely on Einstein’s realist stance.
2.2.2 EPR
We believe that the Geneva School provides a completion of Quantum Mechanics
which Einstein would have approved of. Before we state exactly how Einstein
thought such a completion should be accomplished, we will first focus on the
conclusion of the EPR-paper and on Einstein’s own (although not put forward
as final) solution to the problem.
The argument in the EPR-paper points to the incompleteness of quantum me-

chanics. More specifically, the quantum mechanical description of reality given
by the wave function is shown to be incomplete. Where completeness means
the following, [EinPodRos35]:
“Every element of the physical reality must have a counterpart in
the physical theory” (p.138)
The argumentation given in the EPR-paper has the logical structure p ∨ q, ∼
p →∼ q % p where p and q stand for the following propositions in [EinPodRos35]:
p: “the quantummechanical description of reality given by the wave
function is not complete” (p.139)
q: “when the operators corresponding to two physical quantities do
not commute the two quantities cannot have simultaneous reality”
(p.139)
For this EPR-argument we give a deduction in 5 lines, in the EPR-paper only
the premises and the conclusion are given:
p ∨ q, ∼ p →∼ q % p
(1) p ∨ q (premise)
(2) ∼ p →∼ q (premise)
(3) q → p (transposition of implication on 2)
(4) p → p (identity)
(5) p (disjunction elimination on 1,3,4)
The premises used are carefully chosen, the first (1) is derived in the EPR-
paper and we believe it to be a translation of ∼ (∼ q& ∼ p) by the De Morgan
Laws. More precisely, the argument says that for two physical quantities to
have definite values and to be simultaneously real, they have to be described
that way according to the completeness condition. Further the argument goes,
“If then the wave function provides such a complete description of re-
ality, it would contain these values; these would then be predictable.
This not being the case, we are left with the alternatives stated.”
[EinPodRos35, p.139]
In our analysis this argument says: suppose ∼ q holds together with ∼ p. If
this would be the case and the wave function would provide such a description,
we would be able to predict the values (r) of these quantities. Translated, we
arrive at ∼ p & ∼ q → r. This however is not the case: we cannot predict the
values of these quantities, which means that we have ∼ r given and from that
immediately follows ∼ (∼ p & ∼ q). We give this analysis in detail because
we do not agree with A. Fine in [Fin86, p.33] who claims that the argument to
establish the disjunction in the EPR-paper (the first premise above), is shown
immediately via ∼ q → p.
The second premise (2) is shown to hold in the EPR-paper by means of the
famous EPR-example of two systems and the criterion of reality. More precisely
suppose the wave function gives a complete description of the physical reality
of the system: we presume ∼ p. Take as given, two systems of which we know
the states and let these systems interact for a while. After interaction we can
describe the state of the combined systems by means of the Schrödinger equation
but we cannot calculate the state of a single system. To do this, we need to
perform measurements. Suppose we measure a quantity on the first system, as
a consequence the wave function of the second system changes. The conclusion
drawn in the EPR-paper is that:
“We see therefore that, as a consequence of two different measure-

ments performed upon the first system, the second system may be
left in states with two different wave functions. ... Thus, it is possible
to assign two different wave functions to the same reality” (p.140)
As they continue to show, it is possible that the two wave functions of the second
system correspond to (are eigenfunctions of) two non-commuting operators rep-
resenting physical quantities. Take for example, momentum and position. By
measuring either one of them on the first system, we can predict with certainty,
and without in any way disturbing the second system, the value of the consid-
ered quantity. Due to the criterion of reality, if we measured the momentum,
then momentum is the quantity considered an element of reality. But, if we
measured the position, this would be the quantity to be an element of reality.
Since the wave functions of both these cases belong to the same reality “also the
quantities have a simultaneous reality”. By presuming non-commutative oper-
ators and arriving at the simultaneous reality of the corresponding quantities,
we obtain the conclusion ∼ q. We should mention that the words in quotation
marks above, namely “also the quantities have a simultaneous reality”, are not
explicitly to be found in the EPR-paper. It appears to follow logically however,
that since both quantities can be elements of reality, and since the connected
wave functions belong to the same reality, their quantities also belong to the
same reality. “Belonging to the same reality” means that they can be simultane-
ously real. How, otherwise, could they have arrived at the following statement:
“Starting then with the assumption that the wave function does give
a complete description of the physical reality, we arrived at the con-
clusion that two physical quantities, with noncommuting operators,
can have simultaneous reality.” (p.141)
For this reason we again do not agree with A. Fine in [Fin86], wherein he states:
“Finally it is by no means clear how, even with the stated criterion

of reality, the fact that one can assign either a definite position or a
definite momentum to the unmeasured particle establishes that the
particle has both properties at once.” (p.34)
We are in agreement however, when he draws attention to the fact that the
presupposed completeness is never actually mentioned in the original argument
in the EPR-paper to establish the above given second premise. Indeed, perhaps
the argumentation is made unnecessarily complex. We also believe that the
oft-drawn conclusion from the paper, namely that the incompleteness is due
to the fact that observables represented by noncommuting operators cannot
have simultaneous reality, leaves essential points out of the picture. For that
reason and to discover Einstein’s exact ideas on this matter we must concentrate
on his correspondence with Schrödinger and on the paper he wrote one year
after the publication of the EPR-paper. Einstein wrote a letter to Schrödinger
on June 19, 1935, one month after the publication of the EPR-paper.7 In
this letter Einstein introduces his “principle of separation” (Trennungsprinzip)8
which entails that the state of one of the two separated partial systems, cannot
depend on the particular measurement performed on the other partial system.
We will now show that it is exactly this principle of separation in Einstein’s sense
that causes quantum mechanics to be incomplete. Our line of argumentation
follows Einstein’s recapitulation of the EPR-problem in [Ein36]:
“Consider a mechanical system consisting of two partial systems A

and B which interact with each other only during a limited time.
Let the ψ function before their interaction be given. Then the
Schrödinger equation will furnish the ψ function after the interac-
tion has taken place. Let us now determine the physical state of the
partial system A as completely as possible by measurements. Then
quantum mechanics allows us to determine the ψ function of the
partial system B from the measurements made, and from the ψ func-
tion of the total system. This determination, however, gives a result
which depends upon which of the physical quantities (observables)
of A have been measured (for instance, coordinates or momenta).
Since there can be only one physical state of B after the interaction
7 We base our analysis on quotations from this letter, found in [Fin86].
8 [Fin86, p.36, 47].
which cannot reasonably be considered to depend on the particular

measurement we perform on the system A separated from B it may
be concluded that the ψ function is not unambiguously coordinated
to the physical state. This coordination of several ψ functions of the
same physical state of system B shows again that the ψ function
cannot be interpreted as a (complete) description of a physical state
of a single system. Here also the coordination of the ψ function to
an ensemble of systems eliminates every difficulty.”(p.317)
To clarify this argument, we enter into a situation where the physical state of
B at a certain moment seems to depend on the measurement performed on
A. As Einstein states in [Ein48], this is not necessarily a problem as long as
no more than one ψ-function is attached to one system at any given moment.
However, since there exists the presupposed “principle of separation”, there can
be no dependence of the state of B on the measurement performed on A. More
explicitly, as explained in [Ein48], the statements about B obtained by means
of measurements on A should also be valid independently of those measure-
ments on A. From this the simultaneous validity of such statements about B
follows. But if these statements are attached to different state-functions for
B we run into problems since then the quantum mechanical ψ-function is not
unique and not unambiguously coordinated to the physical state. All this means
that Einstein’s separation principle is wrong or that quantum mechanics is in-
complete.9 That said, Einstein never investigated further what could be wrong
with the separation principle in the quantum case. His conclusion rested on
the incompleteness of the quantum formalism. For he himself the problems
could be avoided by favoring an ensemble interpretation as put forward in his
argument given above. His picture is rather more complex and involves reduc-
tions of ensembles [Ein36]. We will however limit this discussion and not focus
on the details of his statistical-ensemble interpretation10 which has often been
regarded as a hidden variable interpretation, variables being introduced to com-
plete the theory. In Einstein’s case this involves treating the state function as
corresponding to an ensemble of systems [Fin86]. It is important to remember
that this fact was pointed out to him in a letter from Kupperman in 1954, and
that Einstein did not deny it [Fin86, p.57]. This discussion would further lead
into Bell’s argument, stating that additional variables introduced to restore the
problems of causality and locality (principle of separation in Einstein’s case) are
incompatible with the statistical predictions of quantum mechanics [Bel64].11
Let us return now to the incompatibility of Einstein’s principle of separation

9 See also A. Fine’s analysis on p.37 in [Fin86], not based on the argumentation of Einstein
in [Ein36] or [Ein48] but based on a similar argument given in Einstein’s letter to Schrödinger
of June 19, 1935.
10 “The standard construal of Einstein’s statistical interpretation, then, is to suppose that
for any quantum system in any state the quantum theoretical probabilities are to be obtained
from an ensemble representation.” [Fin86, p.44].
11 “can one make an ensemble representation for the quantum probabilities for any set of
observables in any state? The answer is “no”, and Bell’s theorem yields that negative answer
...” [Fin86, p.44].
and quantum mechanics. Precisely where the problems emerge with regard to
the separation principle in relation to quantum mechanics, has been analyzed
in the PhD-thesis of D. Aerts, [Aer81], where it is important to note that D.
Aerts works within the context of OQL against the background of Piron’s Rep-
resentation Theorem — cf. chapter 4. He points out in detail that two essential
quantum axioms (weak modularity and the covering law)12 are not fulfilled in
case we want to describe two “separated systems”, in Aerts’ sense, envisioned
as one system. The EPR-paradox is solved, at least if one accepts that A and
B cannot be regarded as separated and describable by quantum mechanics.
Not only the paradox is lost but also the incompleteness of quantum mechanics.
At least if one replaces quantum mechanics with OQL [Aer82]. OQL can de-
scribe classical situations as well as non-classical ones and is exactly constructed
to be a complete theory from the start. The criterion of reality is built into the
definition of counterfactually stated definite experimental projects, which are
elaborated on in part II, chapter 3. And indeed for every possible element of
reality we add the corresponding experimental projects to the theory [Aer82].
Note however that the incompleteness-problem of quantum mechanics disap-
pears with OQL in favor of a new conception of a physical system which throws
ensembles and statistical interpretations overboard. Obviously this is in direct
contrast with the statistical-ensemble interpretation of Einstein. So, what did
Einstein himself think would be a good solution to the incompleteness-problem?
First of all in a letter of November 14, 1954, to Kupperman, he says that he
does not see the possibility of getting rid of the statistical character of quantum
mechanics without changing the fundamental concepts of the whole structure
[Fin86, p.57]. As Fine sees it, Einstein thought that a completion of the theory
had to come from outside and not from within the theory, such as e.g. the so-
lution by means of hidden variables. A new theoretical framework is necessary,
of course the statistical predictions of quantum mechanics should be derivable
within this framework under special assumptions. He was himself not overly
convinced of his own proposed solution using ensembles. Fine refers for this
matter to a letter from Einstein to Born dated 3th of December, 1953. We be-
lieve that OQL provides a solution which obtains completeness from the outside,
proposes a new conceptual framework and no statistics at all. The remainder
of this thesis should make clear if OQL has succeeded in this task.
12 See part II, chapter 4.

Part II
28
Chapter 3
Physical and Operational

Foundation
3.1 Physical Systems

The theory of property lattices is founded on the basic notion of a particu-
lar physical system. As we already outlined above, within the tradition of the
Geneva School we perceive a physical system as an idealization of some phe-
nomenon — a part of the external phenomenal world.1 Isolating a phenomenon
from its environment means choosing what will count as a physical system and
what will not, while the interactions between phenomenon and environment
are either ignored or can be effectively incorporated. Contrary to the well-
characterizable physical system, the environment can only be described through
its interactions with the physical system. Idealizing a phenomenon in the sense
of characterizing it and isolating it from the rest of the universe is a mind-
dependent action. If, however, we are inclined to believe (by means of possible
experiments) that our idealized phenomenon is really out there, in other words,
if we may truly accept that the physical system exists, this does not change
anything on the fact that it remains an idealized phenomenon. The degree of
idealization can vary considerably, depending on the degree of isolation which
varies between complete ignorance of the interactions with the environment and
incorporation of as many interactions as possible. Note that by idealization we
do not mean modelization. For example, a model of the Eiffel Tower can be
a small toy model, a painting or the symbol α, while the system characterized
as “The Eiffel Tower” is an idealization of a part of the phenomenal world.
Models can be seen as structure preserving representations of physical systems
with variable degrees of abstraction. Of course, a model can itself be a physical
system as well. A small toy model of the Eiffel Tower is in itself a representation
of a physical system and an idealization of a phenomenon. Later on we will see
1 Note that Aerts in [Aer81] and his following papers, works with the notion of physical
entity which is to be thought of equivalently.
29
CHAPTER 3. PHYSICAL AND OPERATIONAL FOUNDATION 30
how physical systems can be mathematically modeled.
3.2 Questions and Preparations

3.2.1 Yes-no Questions
We already mentioned that experiments can be performed on physical systems.
We will now be more specific and analyze another foundational notion in detail,
namely the (yes-no) question or, as it has been called more recently by D.J.
Moore, the definite experimental project.2 The notion is specified in [Moo99] as
follows:
Definition 1.
We take “a definite experimental project (question) relative to a physical system
to be a real experimental procedure where we have defined in advance what would
be the positive response should we perform the experiment.” (p.65)
We can think of the experimental procedure as a list of concrete actions which
explicitly must or must not be performed in a specific way. Given that we
execute such a procedure and that the conditions defining a positive result are
known, we assign the response “yes” to the question if the conditions are satisfied
and the response “no” otherwise. To summarize we quote C. Cattaneo and G.
Nisticó, [CatNis91]:
“A question is both: (1) a description of an experiment to be carried
out on the physical system considered; (2) a rule enabling us to
interpret the possible results in terms of “yes” or “no”.” (p.1298)
Note however that we only defined an a priori condition for a positive response,
and not for a negative response. The negative result can be characterized as
what is “not positive”. By means of a typical example, we will try to clarify the
above notion of a question. As in [Moo99, Pir72, Pir91], we again take a piece
of chalk. A question would then be: “Take the piece of chalk in both hands and
try to snap it with all your strength, if it breaks the answer is “yes” and if not
“no””.
The difference between what we called a question and a “measurement” is that a

measurement can be described as an experimental procedure without necessarily
involving a rule enabling us to interpret the possible results in terms of yes or
no. The outcomeset of a measurement is not a priori restricted to the elements
“yes” and “no”. Hence, questions can be seen as a specific kind of measurements
with a restricted outcomeset.
2 We intend to use both equivalent notions, questions as well as definite experimental
projects, freely in this text. The latter will mainly be dominant when we cite parts of [Moo99].
3.2.2 Preparations of Physical Systems

A preparation is a repeatable experimental procedure which, when carried out,
prepares a specific physical system in a certain state in such a way that we are
able to submit it to a well-defined question. The procedure consists for example
of submitting a collection of identical physical systems, i.e. prepared in the same
way, to a question and, when we obtain the answer “yes” for all these systems
with certainty, we can rightly claim that a new physical system, prepared in the
same way, will give rise to the same result (see [Aer81, CatNis91]).
It has to be stressed that not every physical system — for example, the sun
— can be prepared and therefore not every physical experiment encompasses
a preparation procedure. If preparations are possible, different types of exper-
iments will demand different preparation procedures. An example given by C.
Piron in [Pir76] focuses on a beam of photons which, when dispatched one by
one, pass or are absorbed by a polarizer placed in the beam. A photon can be
prepared in a way that it will pass a polarizer orientated with angle φ, therefore
it is sufficient to consider those photons which already traversed a first polarizer
orientated in the same direction. With the same experiment it is obviously not
possible to prepare photons that will traverse with certainty the polarizer (angle
φ) as well as a polarizer orientated at φ! &= φ (modulo π).
3.2.3 True questions

The next notion we introduce is that of a true question or, as it recently has
been called, a certain definite experimental project in [Moo99]:
Definition 2.
“A given definite experimental project is certain (a question is true) for a par-
ticular system if it is sure that the positive response would obtain should we
perform the experiment.” (p.66)
Consider again the example of a piece of chalk: the given question is true if the
piece of chalk is breakable. This means, if we were to perform the question —
i.e. try to snap it — we would certainly succeed. Indeed, as C. Piron notes in
[Pir91], a breakable piece of chalk is not a broken piece. It is important to bear
in mind that the question is true also when the associated experiment has not
been performed. The piece of chalk is breakable even if we will never snap it.
In the earlier work of C. Piron, the definition of a true question encompassed

the preparation of the physical system, e.g. in [Pir76]:
Definition 3.
“When the physical system has been prepared in such a way that the physicist
may affirm that in the event of an experiment the result will be “yes”, we shall
say that the question is certain, or that the question is true.” (p.20)
The preparation procedure acts as an operational tool. A tool to obtain the

answer “yes” with certainty for a prepared, non-tested, physical system with re-
spect to a specific question. Since this operational tool is not explicitly modeled
in the mathematical theory of the Geneva School — cf. chapter 4 — we prefer
the first definition given. Although we intend to stick with the original Geneva
School theory, we wish to note that C. Cattaneo and G. Nisticó focused on a
syntactic scheme of the Jauch-Piron approach to the foundations of quantum
physics, in which they allow as well-formed formulas predicates expressing that
questions are true (respectively false) in a certain preparation [CatNis91].
3.2.4 Impossible Questions

In this section we focus on the notion of an impossible question or impossible
definite experimental project, defined as follows in [Moo99]:
Definition 4.
“A given definite experimental project is impossible (a question is impossible)
for a particular system if it is sure that the positive response would not obtain
should we perform the experiment.” (p.66)
Impossible then means that it is certain that we would obtain the negative
response “no”, should we perform the experiment (see also [Aer83a]) — the
positive response “yes” is not even a possible result.
3.2.5 Not True Questions

Another important notion, explicitly introduced by D. Aerts in [Aer83a], is that
of a not true question or not certain definite experimental project — not to be
confused with the impossible question,
Definition 5.
A given definite experimental project is not certain (a question is not true) for a
particular system if it is not sure that the positive response would obtain should
we perform the experiment.
Note that when we are not sure of a positive response, it is a sufficient condition
to state that the answer “no” is possible should we perform the experiment.
Obviously when “no” can be a possible answer, the question cannot be true,
and note that this is so, regardless of whether “yes” is possible or not — when
not, then the question is impossible. We can now claim that our notions are
built in such a way that the following implication holds a priori in one direction:
Proposition 1.
the question is impossible ⇒ the question is not true
The way in which these questions are constructed can lead to confusion. As C.
Piron states in [Pir72], “If the (positive) outcome for the question (called) β is
not certain, the statement “β is true” is false, but we do not say “β is false”.”3
Because “β is false” means that “β is impossible”. This issue will be dealt with
in section 3.2.6 and in chapter 6.
Summarizing the above, as in [Aer81], we say that there are three cases: 1) we
can predict the outcome of a question to be “yes” so the question “is” true;
2) we can predict the outcome of a question to be “no”, so the question “is”
impossible and 3) we are not able to predict the outcome to be “yes”, so the
question “is” not true.
3.2.6 Special Questions

There are some questions which will have a specific meaning in our mathematical
model. First take a look at the trivial question, defined as the following specific
definite experimental project in [Moo99]:
Definition 6.
Trivial question: “Do whatever you wish with the system and assign the response
“yes”.” (p.67)
This also encompasses doing nothing with the physical system. We call this
definite experimental project certain iff the system exists. Indeed, the trivial
question is true when we are certain to obtain the positive answer “yes” were
we to perform the question. The only condition of the trivial question is that
we have a physical system to begin with.
Next, consider the absurd question defined in [Moo99] as the following specific
definite experimental project:
Definition 7.
Absurd question:“Do whatever you wish with the system and assign the response
“no”.” (p.67)
The absurd question can never be a true question, since we would never obtain
the response “yes”. Furthermore, we can state that the absurd question is an
impossible question.
The product question is a question which consists of the product of a family of

questions. More specifically the product question is defined as a specific definite
experimental project in [Moo99], for a specific family of questions which we call
A and a question called α,
Definition 8.
Product question: “Choose an α from the family A as you wish, and effectuate
it.” (p.67)4
3 Our insertion of brackets.
4 Note that “choose an α as you wish” means “choose an α at random or arbitrarily”.
In the definitions given by C. Piron it is more explicitly stated that the answer
obtained from effectively performing the arbitrarily chosen question is the an-
swer attributed to the product question. We then say that the product question
is true if it is sure that the answer “yes” would obtain should we perform the
experiment. In other words, we follow [Moo99, p.67],
Proposition 2.
The product of a family of definite experimental projects called A is a “certain
definite experimental project” (the product question is true) for a particular
physical system iff each α ∈ A is certain (true) for the particular physical system.
The product question itself is always defined with respect to a specific family of
questions.
The inverse question is defined as follows:

Definition 9.
The inverse question is the inverse of a particular question, obtained by ex-
changing the responses “yes” and “no”.
Consider again the example of a piece of chalk : the inverse question then
corresponds to: “Take the piece of chalk in both hands and try to snap it with
all your strength, if it breaks the answer is “no” and “yes” otherwise”. We now
see that the absurd question is the inverse of the trivial question and vice versa.
The inverse of a product question with respect to a certain family of questions,
is then the product question with respect to the family of the inverse component
questions. In chapter 4, we will come back to this issue.
We call the inverse of a specific question, named α, true iff α is impossible and
the inverse of α is impossible iff α is true (see [Moo99]). Given the relationship
between impossible and not true questions, “impossible” is obviously not the
logical negation of “true” — it is not the same as “never certain” or “not true”.
When a question α is not true, this implies nothing with respect to its inverse
which can be either not true or true corresponding to the cases where α is or is
not also impossible.
3.3 Properties of Physical Systems

In the tradition of the Geneva School, the properties a physical system possesses
in reality have an objective existence. C. Piron states it thus in [Pir81]:
“The system is and it is what it is. It possesses different properties
and whether these are known or not by the physicist does not change
anything to the reality of the object itself. We have to describe
these properties and not to justify or to explain the knowledge of
the physicist about them.” (p.397)
As we analyzed it above, with each particular physical system the physicist

associates certain properties and analyzes their ontological value by means of
possible experiments. It was in this sense that we agree with [Pir81], where he
states that each property is to be associated with a question performable on a
physical system. We think that also on the epistemological level the physicist
who characterizes the properties of a particular physical system according to
his beliefs, will construct them as items corresponding to possible experiments.
More explicitly we follow [CoeMooSme(nd)a],
Properties are construed as candidate elements of reality correspond-
ing to the definite experimental projects defined for a particular
physical system.
Of course, several questions can be associated with the same property. And
as we already mentioned, we can classify properties as actual properties and
potential properties. It is very important to note that as long as we talk about
“the properties” of a physical system and “the associated questions”, we see
the system on an abstract level. What is meant by this is that only from the
moment we make the distinction between the actuality and potentiality of its
properties, and similarly between true, not true and impossible questions, is the
particular physical system inherently conceived to be in a specific state — this
notion will be elaborated on in the following section. In that way we can say:
Definition 10.
A property of a particular physical system is actual iff the questions which test
it are true and is potential otherwise.
We can be even more specific and state that if a question is not true, the
associated property is potential. In our example of a piece of chalk, the property
of being breakable is actual iff the question is true. And since it surely will
break if we try to snap it, we state that the physical system possesses the
actual property of being breakable. This example reminds us of the notion of
an element of reality in the famous EPR-paper — cf. part I, section 2.2. Given
the EPR criterion of reality and the definition of a true question, it is claimed
that a true question defines an element of reality. To the extent that we assign
an ontological value to the elements of reality, they correspond to what we
called actual properties. A little shift of position is noticed in [Moo99], where
the ontological value is assigned to the questions themselves instead of to the
properties which then count as their abstract counterparts.
The notions of actuality and potentiality can be traced back to Aristotle. We

will analyze in which way Aristotle used those notions and see if it in some
way matches the meaning given to them by the Geneva School. In [Ari95, On
Generation and Corruption] and especially in [Ari95, Metaphysics Book Θ and
Book ∆, 7] Aristotle explains that there are different modes of “being”, namely
being potential and being actual. The transition form being potential to actual
has to be placed within the context of his theory of movement and change,
which is embedded with his teleological conception of causality, more precisely,

[Ari95, Metaphysics Book Θ, 1050a 7-]:
“... everything that comes to be moves towards a principle, i.e. an
end. For that for the sake of which a thing is, is its principle, and
the becoming is for the sake of the end; and the actuality is the end,
and it is for the sake of this that the potentiality is acquired.”
As is well known, Aristotle criticised Plato about his conception of ideal forms
[Ari95, Metaphysics Book I(A)]. For him, forms — shapes — are always present
in the objects he considers; only in a theoretical sense may we speak of forms
without objects. One of Aristotle’s favorite examples is a house conceived as
“bricks and timbers in such and such a position” versus a pile of bricks and
timbers, [Ari95, Metaphysics Book H, 1043a 14-]:
“... those who define a house as stones, bricks, and timbers, are
speaking of the potential house, for these are the matter; but those
who define it as a covering for bodies and chattels, or add some other
similar differentia, speak of the actuality; and those who combine
both of these speak of the third kind of substance, which is composed
of matter and form.”
In this sense then, actuality can be interpreted as fulfillment of form while
potentiality can be seen as capability of form, [Ari95, Metaphysics Book Θ,
1050a 15-]:
“Further, matter exists in a potential state, just because it may
attain to its form; and when it exists actually, then it is in its form.”
Actuality means the existence of the thing [Metaphysics Book Θ, 1048a 30],
potentiality can be assigned to non-existent things, meaning not yet actualized
properties of a being, we quote [Ari95, Metaphysics Book Θ, 1047b 1-]:
“For of non-existent things some exist potentially; but they do not
exist, because they do not exist in fulfillment.”
Aristotle introduces potentiality and actuality to conceptualize movement and
change. As such he distinguishes different kinds of change, for instance change
of substances is called coming-to-be, change in qualities alteration, change in
magnitudes growth or diminution, and change in place locomotion.5 In [On
Generation and Corruption Book I] he deals with these different changes in
detail: coming-to-be is then just the transformation of a potential substance
(by no means realized) — which consists of matter and a potential form —
into an actual one. This change has been called substantial change. The other
kinds of change are accidental and differ from the former in the sense that they
need a formal carrier — substance — for the quality, magnitude or location to
5 In[Ari95, Categories, 15a 14-] Aristotle mentions six kinds of change, namely generation,
destruction, increase, diminution, alteration, change of place, where we see generation as
coming-to-be and destruction as passing-away.
be predicated of. In [On Generation and Corruption Book I] he gives several

examples which explain this difference more clearly: we may think of alteration
as a change from for example the musical man into the unmusical man since
(un)musicalness is a property, or as Aristotle also described it, an accident of
man. Without the given man, we would say that unmusicalness was a coming-
to-be while musicalness a passing-away. In another example he explains growing:
[Ari95, On Generation and Corruption Book I, 322a 10-]:
“And as fire lays hold of the inflammable, so the active principle of

growth, dwelling in the growing thing (i.e. in that which is actually
flesh), lays hold of an acceding food which is potentially flesh and
converts it into actual flesh. The acceding food, therefore, must be
together with the growing thing; for if it were apart from it, the
change would be a coming-to-be. For it is possible to produce fire
by piling logs on to the already burning fire. That is growth. But
when the logs themselves are set on fire, that is coming-to-be.”
We see that things can come to be in various ways such as by addition, change
of shape or by putting together as in case of a house [Physics Book I, 190b 5-
]. In all these cases it is clear that “the source of becoming”, as it is called
in [Metaphysics Book Θ, 1049a 12], is external. As such he says that there
is potentially a house if there is nothing in its matter which prevents it from
becoming so in actuality. In the same way when the source of becoming is
internal6 and those things are potentially something else, this something will
become actual by itself if nothing external blocks it.
We could indeed go into further detail about the four causes Aristotle describes
to know the being and becoming of things, but this would lead us too far away
from the subject in hand. In any case, we basically already dealt with three
of the four causes Aristotle considers: (1) the material cause is the material
substrate, (2) formal cause is the form to be realized, (3) the efficient cause
“represents the influences from the outside world that cause the process of mo-
tion towards realization of its true nature” [VerCoe99, p.171] — cf. the above
source of becoming — and (4) the final cause is then the endpoint of this process
or “that for the sake of which”. There still remains however one thing which,
according to us, is essential to understand Aristotle’s reasoning and that is his
introduction of a prime or first mover. This first mover is not to be conceived
of as a God who created the world but rather as the origin of all movement and
change which, in itself unmovable, has to be envisaged as pure actuality. The
main reason for introducing this first mover is firstly, as explained in [Meta-
physics Book Λ,1071b 12-], that if there is something capable of moving things
but which does not perform the act, there will be no movement at all. Secondly,
if everything which moves is itself being moved — called an intermediate mover
— we end up with an infinite causal regression which according to Aristotle has
6 Internal means present “in the very thing which suffers change” [Metaphysics Book Θ,
1049a 13]
to be stopped at some point [Metaphysics Book Λ, 1070a 3-, Physics Book VIII,
267b 1]. Thirdly, eternal movement, for instance the rotation of planets has to
be caused by an unmovable eternal substance [Metaphysics Book Λ, 1073a 27].
We quote [Metaphysics Book Λ, 1069b 36-]:
“For everything that changes is something and is changed by some-
thing and into something. That by which it is changed is the pri-
mary mover; that which is changed, the matter; that into which it
is changed, the form.”
Hereby we have captured the most essential of Aristotle’s theory involving ac-
tuality and potentiality for our needs. This should allow us now to explore the
“differences” of use by the Geneva School. There are some clear points of differ-
ence right from the start: the Geneva School does not adopt Aristotle’s causal
teleology — everything moves towards an end or the realization of its essence
— and neither poses the existence of a first mover.7 We can say however that in
a parallel way, actuality and potentiality are considered by the Geneva School
as modes of being. But we must be careful since in the latter those modes of
being are only assignable to predicable properties, conceived as characteristics
of physical systems. It should be clear that the Geneva School does not consider
substantial change, this reduces the comparison with Aristotle’s use of the above
mentioned notions to the cases of accidental change. Regarding actuality, an
actual property is conceived as an attribute which exists; it is some realization
in reality or in other words; an element of reality. A potential property on the
other hand does not exist in the same way as an actual one, it is conceived
merely as a capability with respect to an actualization since there is always a
chance that it could be realized after the system has been changed. Note that
an actual property is itself also a capability though not in the same sense as
a potential property, i.e. “being breakable” has also been viewed as the ca-
pability of “being broken” in the sense that it is certain that the system will
be broken, i.e. leads to the positive result, should we perform the experiment.
If “being breakable” is a potential property of a particular physical system, it
is not certain that it will be broken should we perform the experiment. In a
sense we may as such say that an actual property is an element of reality and a
“certain” capability, i.e. it is certain that a specific result would obtain should
we perform a well defined experimental project which may change the system
in a specific way; while a potential property is only a “not certain” capability,
i.e. it is not certain that a specific result would obtain should we perform a well
defined experimental project which may change the system in a specific way.
The notions of actuality and potentiality are set out thus by C. Piron in [Pir78]:
“Parmi les propriétés définies pour un système donné, il y a celles
que le système possède actuellement, c’est-à-dire en acte, et celles
7 Although parallels could be established between Aristotle’s notion of substance and the
notion of isolated physical system, this is on the first sight not straightforward and would lead
us to far away from the subject in hand. Henceforth we stick to a comparison with respect to
the notions of actuality and potentiality.
qu’il pourrait acquérir, soit de lui-même, soit sous des contraintes

extérieures, et qui, pour cette raison, sont dites potentielles.” (p.131)
Furthermore, C. Piron sees the potential properties as those which may be

actualized due to some deterministic or indeterministic change of the system.
He refers explicitly to Aristotle when he explains that any such change, which
involves a change of the system’s state8 , entails a shift between its actual and
potential properties, [Pir78]:
“Au cours de l’evolution, l’état change, certaines propriétés poten-
tielles se réalisent en acte, alors que d’autres disparaissent pour
n’être plus que potentielles.” (p.132)
Since the main point of the Geneva School is that every physical system can be
described by means of its properties, obviously any change of a physical system
can also be described by a change of its properties. It is in this sense that no
account is given of Aristotle’s substantial change. Also, contrary to Aristotle,
change should not necessarily be taken as an action in function of some telos. In
chapter 5, section 5.2 we deal with special kinds of measurements and in part IV
we further analyze deterministic and indeterministic changes a physical system
can undergo, but we wish to stress already now that a deterministic change will
not be seen as the realization of a system’s essence, and that an indeterministic
change can for instance be due to any measurement which may be performed
without the a priori aim of actualizing a specific potentiality. It is important
that despite this, we do not give up the idea that every change can be explained
as the passage between what is actual and potential. As C. Piron says, [Pir83]:
“Mais entendons nous bien, je ne désire pas puiser dans les résultats
et les conclusions de la physique d’Aristote qui sont bien sûr com-
plètement dépassés, mais reprendre certains de ses concepts de base
et adapter certains de ses arguments au problème tel que nous le
connaissons aujourd’hui.” (p.170)
3.4 States of Physical Systems

Traditionally the state of a physical system was defined as the collection of all its
actual properties (see e.g. [Pir72, JauPir69]). This definition is a translation of
the belief that the information which fully represents a particular physical sys-
tem in a singular realization is encrypted in its actual properties. Since we do not
adopt a kind of operationalism such as Bridgman’s, we reconsider the concept of
state as initiated in [Moo99] and further elaborated on in [CoeMooSme(nd)b],
States are construed as abstract names encoding the possible singu-
lar realizations of the given particular physical system.
8 The notion of state will be elaborated on in the next section.
From an ontological point of view a particular physical system is always in a

singular realization whilst from an epistemological point of view, a physicist
may test his belief that the system is in a certain state. It is crucial that
there is a difference between our epistemological construction and the ontological
realization itself. As such it could very well be the case that several (equivalent)
ontological realizations, in which a particular physical system can be found, will
(on an epistemological level) be labeled with the same abstract name, i.e. the
same state. To avoid confusion we will not pay too much attention to this fact
henceforth. It is more important that the concept of state is built up in such
a way that it can be the abstract name corresponding to the one ontological
realization of a particular system or, that it can be the name corresponding to
a realization in which the system “can be” but “is not”. This is an important
point, overlooked or unclear in [Moo99]. What we mean here is that we can for
instance say that a particular physical system, let’s say an apple, “can be” but
“is not” rotten, i.e. it can be in a certain state in which it has specific actual
properties, while in its ontological realization the apple “is” green and fresh,
i.e. it has other actual properties. In the same sense as we speak of potential
properties which are not realized and which are mere capabilities, we can speak
of states which are capable of being ontologically realized. Unlike properties,
which, when potential are not realized, and when actual are realized, we have
no similar conceptual distinction for the level of states. For this reason we
use the term of “ontologically realized state” to refer to that state in which
the system “is” in reality as opposed to those states in which the system “can
be” but “is not”. If however we speak of “the states” of a particular physical
system, we mean a collection of abstract names corresponding to “all” possible
singular realizations of the system, including naturally the one ontologically
realized state of that system. In the next chapter we will model the states,
“possible” realizations of physical systems, in a given mathematical language
and show how they can naturally be structured. It is important to pay attention
to the fact that for OQL the state is not an abstract statistical ensemble of
physical systems, nor does it involve ontological probabilities — we come back
to the issue of ontological probabilities in chapter 5. Note that there should
be no difference in the way in which we model the states of different physical
systems. This has been the case in the past when the distinction was made
between physical systems described by the theory of classical mechanics and
those described by the theory of orthodox quantum mechanics. In classical
mechanics, states assign precise values to all observables of a physical system,
whereas in orthodox quantum mechanics states make only statistical predictions
about the values of quantum observables [Wal84].
Since we have seen that the actual properties are those which are realized for a
physical system, and that it only makes sense to talk about actual or potential
properties if the system is conceived to be in a specific state, we should make
the link between actual properties and the state of a physical system explicit.
Indeed, it is so that the state stands in a correspondence relation to the system’s
actual properties, though contra C. Piron and D. Aerts the state will here not be
defined as equal to a set of actual properties. This point is crucial as it is linked

to the fundamental basis of our operationalism explained in the beginning. We
wish to stress that it still makes sense to use the expression: that a property is
actual in a certain state, which means the following,
A property is said to be actual in a specific state if it is actual in
case the particular physical system would be ontologically realized
in that state.
We also still assert that a maximum amount of information fully represents a

particular physical system in a singular realization. Although contra Piron and
Aerts we will not call this information the state, instead we introduce the new
notion of state set which we “define” as follows:
Definition 11.
The state set is the set of all properties which are actual in case the particular
physical system would be ontologically realized in a specified state.
From the moment that a physical system is conceived to be in a certain state

or has been prepared as such, there is always at least one actual property which
constitutes its state set with respect to that state. In the worst case, a state
set contains only the property associated with the trivial question — which is
always true. It is important to mention that the notion of state set is so defined
that one physical system can have several state sets; one for every of the states
in which it can possibly be. On the other hand, it should also be possible to
represent a state of a physical system by one property of the system. It is in
this sense that we understand C. Piron’s remark in [Pir81]:
“... the state of the actual system is completely defined by giv-
ing the proposition (property) p which is the strongest proposition
(property) which is true (actual).” (p.399)9
We will deal with the relationship between the state property — the notion is
a translation of C. Piron’s propriété-état introduced in [Pir98] — which is the
state-representative and the state set in the next chapter. To return to the
previous section, we now see that when a system’s ontologically realized state
changes, the property which represents it changes as well as its related state
set. And it is because of this that it is possible to conceive of any change as a
change of the attributes of a system.

Chapter 4
Mathematical Framework
4.1 The Symbolism

In some cases we already applied names/formulas to specific questions or collec-
tions of questions. Now we will only work further with such formulas as parts
of the mathematical language we use to describe the properties and states of
physical systems. We introduce the following mathematical symbols:
Questions, properties and states:
Questions: α, β, ... ∈ Q
Properties: a, b, ... ∈ L
Trivial question: I ∈ Q
Absurd question: O ∈ Q
Product question with respect to a family of questions αi : ΠJ αi
States: E, E ! , E !! , E1 , E2 , ... ∈ Σ
State property of state E : pE ∈ ΣL
State set related to E : S(E) ∈ P (L)
We can now define the following operations and relations where P (−) denotes
the powerset:
Definition
! 12.
Meet: ": P (L) → L
Join: : P (L) → L
Inverse: ∼ : Q → Q
Orthocomplementation: ! : L → L
Partial order relation: ≤⊆ L × L
Preorder relation: ≺⊆ Q × Q
4.2 Questions and their structure

We consider all possible questions which could be performed on a particular
physical system, and encounter a relation between questions by considering as
42
CHAPTER 4. MATHEMATICAL FRAMEWORK 43
in [Pir81] that,
Definition 13.
“A question α is said to be stronger than a question β, i.e. α ≺ β, if every time
α is true, β is true as well.” (p.399)
We call ≺ a preorder relation since it satisfies:

(1) Reflexive: α ≺ α,
(2) Transitive: α ≺ β and β ≺ γ ⇒ α ≺ γ.
Of any collection of questions equipped with such a preorder relation, I is the

maximal (top) element and O the minimal (bottom) element. Further, we call
two questions equivalent, written α ≈ β, iff α ≺ β and β ≺ α. As made explicit
in [JauPir69], this relation is an equivalence relation because it satisfies:
(1) Reflexive: α ≈ α,
(2) Symmetric: α ≈ β ⇒ β ≈ α,
(3) Transitive: α ≈ β and β ≈ γ ⇒ α ≈ γ.
When a question α is true then so are all questions equivalent to α. From this
it is evident that every true question is equivalent to I, the trivial question.
And every question α is equivalent with αΠI because αΠI is true iff α is true.1
Coming back to some issues concerning the product question we write:
ΠJ αi is true ⇔ αi is true ∀i ∈ J
(ΠJ αi )∼ = ΠJ (αi∼ )
4.3 Properties
4.3.1 Modeling Properties
About a property associated with a particular question we can say the following,
Proposition 3.
There is a one-to-one correspondence between the property a, associated with the
definite experimental project (question) α, and the equivalence class of questions
[α] which is the collection of all definite experimental projects β such that β ≈ α.
This correspondence is realized through the identification of a and [α].
In other words, to each equivalence class of questions there “corresponds” a
property. For our convenience we will introduce the following notion which
expresses that a is associated with α ∈ [α]:
ζ : Q → L : α 1→ a
1 Note that αΠI is another notation for Π(α, I).
Here we must add that in the Geneva School literature one originally defined a
as [α]. This however is a definitional coordination which for the sake of our form
of operationalism should be avoided at all costs. Just as the state of a physical
system is not merely a set of actual properties, a property is not merely a set
of equivalent questions. Furthermore we believe that equivalent questions are
not candidate elements of reality. Taking this into account we want to note the
fact that in his earlier work, C. Piron used the notion of “proposition” which
stands in a one-to-one relation to properties. Although we may not generalize
this utterance since in [JauPir69] only a true proposition2 is called a property.
We call the property expressing the existence of a physical system 1 = ζ(I) the
trivial property and 0 = ζ(O) the absurd property.
4.3.2 Properties and their structure

Consider the properties of a physical system as they are mathematically mod-
eled. Note that it is not possible to conceive of the set of all properties of a
given system. One could here follow the point of view taken in [Aer81, Pir72]
according to which one can only hope for a set which is large enough to contain
the useful ones with respect to what we want to do with the system. We however
will take it as a useful “working-hypothesis” that the collection of all properties
constitutes a set. Keep this in mind when further on in this thesis we use the
notion of a set of all properties. We now obtain a partial order relation on that
collection of properties. It is exactly the preorder relation on questions which
induces this partial order relation, (see for instance [Pir72, p.517]):
Definition 14.
a ≤ b iff α ≺ β with ζ(α) = a and ζ(β) = b.
a ≤ b states exactly that b is actual whenever a is actual. One easily verifies
that this partial order relation has the following properties:
Proposition 4.
(1) Reflexive: a ≤ a
(2) Transitive: if a ≤ b and b ≤ c then a ≤ c
(3) Antisymmetric: if a ≤ b and b ≤ a then a = b.
Theorem 1.
The collection of all properties of a physical system, noted as L, is a complete
lattice.
Quoting C. Piron, [Pir98], this means exactly:
2 “Hence we see that the proposition ā is true if and only if any (and therefore all) of the
α ∈ ā are true. If the proposition ā is true we shall call it a property of the system.” [JauPir69,
p.844]. We introduced the notation ā to distinguish propositions from properties and of course
in [JauPir69] the following holds: ā := [α].
“qu’à chaque famille de propriétés {ai ∈ L | i ∈ J}, J quelconque,

sont associés deux propriétés de L, ∧J ai et ∨J ai qui sont respec-
tivement la borne inférieure (le plus grand minorant):
x ≤ ai ∀i ∈ J ⇔ x ≤ ∧J ai
et la borne supérieure (le plus petit majorant):
ai ≤ x ∀i ∈ J ⇔ ∨J ai ≤ x.” (p.9)
Proof
We will analyze the proof that was worked out in [Pir72, Pir76].
First note that for any family of given properties ai there exists a greatest lower
bound or meet, which is provided by the product question, (see [Moo99, p.68]):
∧J ai = ζ(ΠJ αi ) with ζ(αi ) = ai
The meet3 then defines a new property which satisfies the following relations,
(see [Pir72, p.518]),
∧J ai ≤ aj ∀j ∈ J and b ≤ aj ∀j ∈ J ⇒ b ≤ ∧J ai
because “ΠJ αi is true” iff “αj is true” ∀j ∈ J, and if “β is true” implies “αj is
true” ∀j ∈ J, then “β is true” implies “ΠJ αi is true”. The operationally defined
product question attributes a physical meaning to the meet. This guarantees
that the poset of properties is a complete meet semilattice. The join or least
upper bound, on the other hand, cannot be attributed a direct physical meaning
in the same sense and is defined by means of Birkhoff’s theorem by which every
complete meet semilattice is a complete lattice, (see [Moo99, Pir72, Pir76]),
#
∨J ai = {b ∈ L | ∀i ∈ J : ai ≤ b}
It is written in [Pir76] that ∨J ai always exists because the set L always contains
the trivial property 1. !
When we review the use of meet and join, we see that the meet corresponds to
the classical conjunction whereas the join will not always correspond to the clas-
sical disjunction, due to the possibility of superpositions for quantum systems.
We will come back to this issue in part III.
Proposition 5.
“a ∧ b is actual” ⇔ “a is actual” and “b is actual” ∀a, b ∈ L
“a ∨ b is actual” ⇐ “a is actual” or “b is actual” ∀a, b ∈ L
As is proved in [Pir72], if the latter implication holds in both directions, L is a
distributive lattice.
3 Although ΠJ αi ∈ [ΠJ αi ] corresponds to ∧J ai , any other question in the equivalence class
[ΠJ αi ] need not have the form of ΠJ αi (cf. [FouRan84]).
4.4 States
4.4.1 Modeling States
Above we pointed out that the state set is the collection of all properties which
are actual if the system would be realized in a specified state. We now model
this as follows, the state set S(E) = {a | a ∈ L, a actual in E}, where E is
an element of Σ, the state space, which is the collection of all states which are
possible for a particular physical system. In [JauPir69, Pir72] it is stated that
if we have a complete lattice L, S(E) satisfies some specific properties:
(1) If a ∈ S(E), b ∈ L and a ≤ b then b ∈ S(E)
When a is actual and stronger than b, then b is actual and must
therefore be an element of S(E)
(2) If ai ∈ S(E), ∀i ∈ J then ∧J ai ∈ S(E)

The meet of any elements of S(E) is a member of S(E). Explicitly,
∧a∈S(E) a is contained in S(E)
(3) 0 &∈ S(E), 1 ∈ S(E) for every state set S(E)

The absurd property can never be actual, so can never be a member
of any state set S(E). The trivial property is always actual, given
that the system exists, and is always a member of any state set S(E).
We call pE = ∧a∈S(E) a the strongest property in L that is actual in the state
E. This means that for any other property a = ζ(α) which is actual in E and
is an element of S(E), α is a member of the family with respect to which the
product question ΠJ αi is defined so that ζ(ΠJ αi ) = pE . More explicitly we
follow, [Moo99, p.69],
Proposition 6.
a is actual in the state E if and only if pE ≤ a, and a ≤ b if and only if pE ≤ a
implies pE ≤ b.
Indeed as is pointed out in [JauPir69], suppose that pE is the strongest actual
property in state E and suppose there would exist an even stronger property
b ∈ L such that b ≤ pE and b &= 0. Since the actuality of pE is here implied by
the stronger property b, this means that there is a state E0 such that b ∈ S(E0 )
and S(E) ⊂ S(E0 ). From this follows that S(E), contrary to its definition, does
not contain all actual properties of a physical system in a certain state. We can
conclude that the only property stronger than pE ∈ L should be 0 which allows
us to see pE as an atom of L in the following sense:
Definition 15.
pE is an atom of L if it is different from 0 and is such that: if there is a property
a ∈ L and a ≤ pE ⇒ a = 0 or a = pE .
We are now in the position to redefine our notion of state set. Given the
strongest actual property pE = ∧a∈S(E) a in the state E, the state set S(E) has
the following form (see [Pir98]):

S(E) = {a ∈ L | pE ≤ a}
It is clear that such a property pE “represents” the state E completely within
L, therefore we call this kind of properties state properties. We will use the
notation pE ∈ ΣL where ΣL denotes the set of atoms of L.
4.4.2 States and their structure

Similar to how we handled the partial order relation on the set of properties of a
physical system, we will now deal with an orthogonality relation on the collection
of all states possible for a physical system. Following [Moo99, Pir85, Pir91]:
Definition 16.
“call E1 and E2 orthogonal, written E1 ⊥ E2 , if there exists a definite experi-
mental project α such that α is certain for E1 and impossible for E2 .” [Moo99,
p.69].
The orthogonality relation is trivially symmetric and antireflexive [Moo99]:
Proposition 7.
“If E1 ⊥ E2 then E2 ⊥ E1 and E1 &= E2 ” (p.69)
We call a question (definite experimental project) α true (certain) for a state E
in case the property a = ζ(α), is an element of S(E). A question α is impossible
for a state E in the case α∼ is true (certain) for E which implies that the property
a = ζ(α) is not an element of S(E).
Note that when E1 and E2 are represented by the state properties p and q
respectively, we represent E1 ⊥ E2 also by p ⊥ q. If T is a subset of Σ, we use
the notation T ⊥ for the set of all states orthogonal to those in T . Formally,
[Pir98]:
Definition 17.
“T ⊥ = {E ∈ Σ | E ⊥ η, η ∈ T }.” (p.22)
Note that such orthogonality relations were explored first by D. Aerts in [Aer81].
In a way this forms the cornerstone of a full “state space description” of a
physical system, parallel to its property lattice description — for details we
refer to the state-property duality treated in section 4.7.
4.5 Fundamental Axioms

In order to motivate the duality between states and properties which will be ex-
posed in section 4.7, we need to introduce three fundamental axioms. Following
C. Piron in [Pir98], these axioms seem to be well examined and satisfied for all
known physical systems and, it is stressed, not only for the classical systems.
We quote D.J. Moore in [Moo99], who provided slightly refined versions of the
standard proofs presented in [Pir98]:
Axiom 1.
“Let pE1 and pE2 be state properties. If pE1 ≤ pE2 then pE1 = pE2 .” (p.71)
One state property can never imply the actuality of another state property.
This axiom is already insinuated above in 4.4.1, where we pointed out by means
of an example that two different state sets can never be subsets of one another.
Although several properties can be actual in two different states in which the
system can be ontologically realized, there is always at least one property which
is actual in one state but not in the other. More explicitly as said by C. Piron
in [Pir98]:
“C’est là une loi physique déjà formulée par Aristote: si le système
change, passe de l’état E1 à l’état E2 , il s’enrichit de propriétés nou-
velles qui s’actualisent, mais du même coup, il en perd nécessaire-
ment d’autres qui passent en potentialité, ce qui n’est pas possible
si E1 est entièrement contenu dans E2 .” (p.21)
We traced this physical law as C. Piron calls it, back to Aristotle’s [Ari95, On
Generation and Corruption Book I, 318a 23-; Book II, 336b 23-] where it is made
clear that a “passing-away” of this is a “coming-to be” of something else, and
the “coming-to be” of this is a “passing-away” of something else. In a certain
sense, movement is to be conceived as becoming something and being corrupted
of something else, or, when we start with something, it can be seen as obtaining
some qualifications while losing others. It is in this light that Aristotle explains
that there are three principles which underlie any change that takes place: form,
privation and matter [Ari95, Metaphysics Book Λ, 1070b 18-]. As an example
Aristotle deals with colour: here the form is white, the privation is black and the
matter is a surface. In [Ari95, Metaphysics Book Z, 1033a 8-] another example
is given: the matter is a man which becomes healthy — the form — when he is
deprived of being invalid. So we see that becoming healthy goes hand-in-hand
with the passing away of being invalid.
From this first axiom, immediately follows that all state properties of a physical
system are the atoms of the property lattice — for more details see Th.2 below.
Indeed, it is pointed out in [Pir72, Pir98] that each state can be represented
by an atom and every atom represents a state. We can go even further with
the atomistic property lattice as stated in the following theorem, where it then
becomes possible to characterize each property in L by means of its underlying
state properties, [Moo99]:
Theorem 2. "
“Each property lattice L is atomistic: a = {p ≤ a | p an atom } for each
a ∈ L.” (p.71)
Proof
We go over the proof given in [Moo99] in detail.
We have to show that each property lattice is atomistic, or in other words that
the state properties are the atoms of the lattice and that each property can be
written as the join of underlying atoms. Take pE to be a state property. Since

pE is actual in E, it is different from 0. If we take a property a ≤ pE , there has to
be a state E ! such that pE ! ≤ a ≤ pE holds. But due to the first axiom, pE ! = pE
and pE ≤ a ≤ pE . Hence a = pE and pE is an atom. If further p is an atom in E,
different from 0, such that pE ≤ p. Then we have to conclude" pE = p since pE &= 0
and p is an atom. It still remains to prove that a = {p ≤ a | p an atom }
for each a ∈ L. First we denote {ai } = {p ≤ a | p an atom }. So {ai } is the
collection of all state properties or atoms such that when they are actual they
imply the actuality of a. Since p ≤ " a for every p in {ai }, we say that a is an
upper"bound of {ai }. And since {ai } is the"least upper bound of {ai }, we
have" {ai } ≤ a. If we can also prove that a ≤ {ai } we obtain the result that
a = {ai }. We proceed as follows, take pE ≤ a. In other words we presuppose
that if the physical system is in a"state E, then a is an actual property. From
this follows that pE ∈"{ai }. Since {ai } is still"an upper bound of {ai } we have
the result that pE ≤ {ai }. This means that {ai } is an actual property " if the
system is in the state E. Hence from our presupposition follows: a ≤ {ai }. !
As we will show, the next axiom allows us to postulate the existence of “oppo-
site” properties.
Axiom 2.
“For each possible state E there exists at least one definite experimental project
(question) α such that α is certain (true) in the possible state E ! if and only if
E ⊥ E ! .” [Moo99, p.72]
Stated otherwise, for every state property p in ΣL , there exists a property p! ∈ L
which is actual iff the state is orthogonal to the one represented by p. As we
will show in the following theorem, the property p! is the opposite of the state
property p. The opposite of any other property of L is then defined by means
of the meet of such opposite properties p! . Following [Moo99], we represent the
opposite of a property by means of the map:
!
!
: L → L : a 1→ {p! | p ≤ a}.
which indicates in [Aer81] the following,
Proposition 8.
a! is actual ⇔ p! is actual for every p ≤ a
a! is actual ⇔ the system is in a state q ⊥ p
We can now look at the properties of ! , which are stated in [Moo99],
Theorem 3.
(1) p! = p!
(2) If a ≤ b then b! ≤ a!
(3) a ∧ a! = 0 for any a
(4) a ≤ a!! and a!!! = a! for any a
(5) (∨J ai )! = ∧J (a!i )
Proof
We go over the proof given in [Moo99], although we add comments and details.
!
(1) If we start from p! = {q ! | q ≤ p} where both q and p are state properties
then these state properties have to be equal. ! This means that there is only one
orthogonal state to consider, since p! = {p! } = p! .
(2) Suppose a ≤ b holds, then b is actual in at least all states in which a is
actual. For every possible state represented by p in which b is actual, we have
a property p! which is actual in the orthogonal state. The same holds for a, for
every possible state represented by p in which a is actual we have a property p!
which is actual in the orthogonal state. Since there may be possible states in
which b!is actual and a ! not, we have: {p! | p ≤ a} ⊆ {p! | p ≤ b}. This results
in b! = {p! | p ≤ b} ≤ {p! | p ≤ a} = a! .
(3) We first suppose that a ∧ a! &= 0 holds. This implies that 0 ≤ pE ≤ a ∧ a!
holds. Hence we obtain: pE ≤ a! and pE ≤ a, which implies pE ≤ a! ≤ p!E = p!E
!
due to a! = {p!E | pE ≤ a} ≤ p!E . Note that pE ≤ p!E is just another notation
for E ⊥ E, which expresses an impossibility since the orthogonality relation is
antireflexive. Hence we conclude with a ∧ a! = 0.
(4) From the definition of our orthogonality relation we see that E ⊥ E ! holds
iff also E ! ⊥ E holds, which means for the state properties that pE ⊥ ! pE ! iff
pE ! ⊥ pE . In
! other words: p E ≤ p !
E ! iff p E ! ≤ p !
E . Hence we know that p ≤ {q ! |
p ≤ q ! } = {q ! | q ≤ p! } = p!! — here we used the fact that if p is less than
or equal to any element of a given set, it is less than or equal to the greatest
lower bound of that set. Let us now concentrate on the first part of what we
have to prove. Suppose p ≤ a then, following Th.3.2, a! ≤ p! holds and further
by applying Th.3.2 again we obtain p ≤ p!! ≤ a!! . This results in: a ≤ a!! and
a!!! ≤ a! . However since a! ≤ a! holds and when we apply the first part of this
proof we obtain a! ≤ a!!! which together with a!!! ≤ a! gives the result a!!! = a! .
(5) We have ai ≤ ∨J ai for each i ∈ J and so — applying Th.3.2 — (∨J ai )! ≤ a!i
for all i ∈ J. Since we know that ∧J (a!i ) ≤ a!i for every i ∈ J we have (∨J ai )! ≤
∧J (a!i ). And reversely, if p ≤ ∧J (a!i ) then p ≤ a!i for all i ∈ J and so ai ≤ a!!i ≤ p!
for all i ∈ J. Hence by definition of the join ∨J ai ≤ p! , by Th.3.2 and Th.3.4
p ≤ p!! ≤ (∨J ai )! and so ∧J (a!i ) ≤ (∨J ai )! . !
The final fundamental axiom insures that each property is the opposite of an-
other one:
Axiom 3.
“The map ! : L → L is surjective.” [Moo99, p.72]
Recall that a map f : M1 → M2 is called surjective or onto when ∀y ∈ M2 ∃x ∈
M1 : y = f (x). A map f : M1 → M2 is called injective or one-to-one when
∀x ∈ M1 , ∀y ∈ M1 : x &= y ⇒ f (x) &= f (y). As such we see that due to this
axiom, for each property a ∈ L there exists a property b ∈ L such that a = b!
[Moo99]. Furthermore we can state that ! is an orthocomplementation, which
satisfies [Pir98]:
(1) a!! = a
(2) a ∧ a! = 0
(3) a ≤ b ⇒ b! ≤ a!
We concentrate only on the first step as the other steps have been proved above.
In [Moo99] it is stated that if for each a ∈ L there exists a property b ∈ L such
that a = b! , we have a = b! = b!!! = a!! .
Returning to the last two axioms we can say with the words of C. Piron in
[Pir83] that they find their origin in Aristotle’s work:
“Un autre principe enseigné également par Aristote affirme que cha-
que propriété a son contraire. Ceci nous conduit à postuler que le
sous-ensemble des états de Σ orthogonaux à tous ceux d’un sous-
ensemble représentant une propriété, représente toujours également
une propriété, la propriété contraire. Enfin, dans le même ordre
d’idées, nous supposerons aussi que toute propriété peut être con-
sidérée comme le contraire d’une autre.”
The closest we get to this when reading Aristotle, is his saying in [Ari95, Meta-
physics Book Γ, 1005a 3-]:
“For all things are either contraries or composed of contraries, and
unity and plurality are the starting-points of all contraries.”
In [Physics Book I, 188b 25-] this idea is extended in the way that everything
that comes to be by a natural process is said to be a contrary or product of
contraries. We assume that with the product of contraries Aristotle means an
intermediate, derived and composed from contraries such as a colour which is
derived from black and white (see [Ari95, Physics Book I, 188b 21-]). The idea
is then that a thing alters “towards” contrary qualifications [Ari95, Categories,
15b 15-]. With respect to axiom 3, we can even say that Aristotle in [Ari95,
Categories, 11b 34-] explains that a pair of contraries are said to be contraries of
one another:
“Things opposed as contraries, however, are never called just what
they are, in relation to one another, though they are called contraries
of one another. For the good is not called good of the bad, but the
contrary of it; and the white not white of the black, but its contrary.”
Opposites are then characterized as, among other things, contraries or as the
attributes that cannot be present at the same time in that which is receptive of
both [Ari95, Metaphysics Book ∆, 1018a 20-]. Note however that with Aristotle
the idea is given that while two contraries cannot belong at the same moment
to the same thing, it is possible that neither of them belongs when there is an
intermediate, [Ari95, Metaphysics Book I, 1056a 35-]:
“For the combined denial of opposites applies when there is an in-
termediate and a certain natural interval; ...”
We have to take into account that there is not an intermediate in all cases,
for instance Aristotle gives the example of a shoe and a hand, there is nothing
intermediate in that case. As such an intermediate is impossible between things
that are not opposite [Ari95, Metaphysics Book I, 1057a 31-]. On the other hand,
for contraries between which there is nothing intermediate, it is necessarily so
that only one of them belongs to the things in which they naturally occur
or are predicated of [Ari95, Categories, 12b 26-]. The latter case comes quite
close to the “classical situation” considered by the Geneva School in which a
property or its opposite will always be actual. The fact that it is possible in
non-classical systems for both a property and its opposite to be potential, in
a way corresponds to the idea of an intermediate situation. We deal in more
detail with classical and non-classical systems in section 4.8. A final remark is
necessary since for Aristotle it is not so that all qualifications (quality’s) admit of
a contrary one. Aristotle mentions in [Ari95, Categories, 10b 15-] that “... there
is no contrary to red or yellow or such colours though they are qualifications.”.
As such we tried to be more careful than C. Piron - cf. his above utterance -
and explained in detail what Aristotle meant by contraries and changement of
things towards their contraries.
4.6 Orthocomplements and Questions

Although it is not often explicit as such in the Geneva School literature, there is
a straightforward link between questions and orthocomplements of properties.
Though this link is not what one would expect, [CoeMooSme(nd)a]:
“Note, however, that the inverse operation is not congruent under
equivalence and so does not lift to a pure operation on properties. In
particular, the orthocomplementation admits of no direct physical
meaning.”
In other words, as explained by D.J. Foulis and C.H. Randall in [FouRan84]:
“Notwithstanding the interpretation of α∼ as an operational nega-
tion (inverse) of α, it is still a careless misinterpretation of the facts
to suppose that the property (corresponding to) [α∼ ] need be — in
any sense — a negation or complement of (the property correspond-
ing to) [α] in L.” (p.69)4
We can now put forward the following propositions:
Proposition 9.
From α ≈ β one cannot always infer α∼ ≈ β ∼ .
Proof
Suppose as given that α ≈ αΠI then α∼ &≈ (αΠI)∼ since (αΠI)∼ = α∼ ΠO
which can never be a true question while α∼ can be. And conversely when we
have α∼ ≈ α∼ ΠI then α &≈ αΠO. !
Proposition 10.
a! is not necessarily tested by questions in the equivalence class [α∼ ], hence a!
is not necessarily equal to ζ(α∼ ).
Given a = ζ(α), it is easy to see that when the property b = ζ(α∼ ) is actual,
a! is not necessarily an actual property and vice versa. So if b is actual then
α∼ is a true question and this is so when α is impossible and when a = ζ(α) is
potential. And when a is potential this does not always imply that its opposite
should be actual, except in the classical case as we will see later on. Conversely,
if a! is actual then a = ζ(α) is potential and α is then not a true question.
However, since we do not know whether α is impossible we cannot claim that
α∼ is true or that b = ζ(α∼ ) is actual.
We could avoid this little inconvenience and follow D. Aerts in [Aer81, Aer82,
Aer83a] who by definition introduces primitive questions. As for example in
[Aer82] a primitive question is described as follows:
“If α is a question testing the property a such that α∼ tests the
property b, then α is a primitive question iff whenever the entity is
in a state orthogonal to a, then α∼ is true and whenever the entity is
in a state orthogonal to b, then α is true. If α is a primitive question
then also α∼ is a primitive question.” (p.1144)
Where we conceive a state to be orthogonal to a property a iff it is orthogonal
to every state E in which a is actual. As such for primitive questions it can then
be proved that if α ≈ β then α∼ ≈ β ∼ [Aer82]. Furthermore it is possible to
define primitive properties as those testable by primitive questions and where it
can be assumed that a! is the property tested by α∼ . As in [CoeMooSme(nd)a]
we think that such primitive questions are maybe a convenient heuristic, but
we are not inclined to accept them as the building blocks of the formalism
— in [Aer82] it are the primitive questions which form the generating set of
questions for a property lattice. We agree however that in axiom 2, it would
be nice to see the mentioned question as the inverse of another question. This
could then even be linked to the definition of the orthogonality relation on
states — see def.16. As such an orthocomplement of a property could then be
associated with the inverse question which is the product of certain component
inverse questions. We will however not adopt this approach since, as mentioned
above, there is no direct physical-operational meaning to be attributed to an
orthocomplement of a property. Coming back to how an orthocomplement is
defined, we draw the following link between orthocomplements of properties and
questions, [CoeMooSme(nd)a]:
!
“... the condition a! = {p! | p ≤ a} implies that a! is generated as
the product of those βp with p majorised by a.”
where βp is then exactly such a question as mentioned in axiom 2. Note also
that in a similar way as we conceive every property of L as the join of under-
lying atoms, we can see every property of L as an orthocomplement of another
property built up by means of coatoms.
Although we do not follow the approach starting with primitive questions to

generate our property lattices, it is still very important to see that any given
property lattice which is complete, atomic and orthocomplemented can be in-
terpreted as if it would have been constructed from such a given set of questions
and states, well chosen, and satisfying axioms 1,2 and 3 — for more details we
refer to [Pir98].
4.7 Duality of States and Properties

It is explicit in [Moo99] that, physically, the notions of state and property are
dual. To begin with, this duality is already encrypted in how the order relation
≤ has been interpreted — cf. also the above proposition 6 — [Moo99]:
“... the physical lattice partial order is encoded in the duality be-
tween states and properties: a ≤ b iff pE ≤ a implies that pE ≤ b.”
Furthermore we follow D.J. Moore in [Moo99]:
“to each state E we associate the family S(E) of all of its actual
properties; and to each property a we associate the family µ(a) of
all states in which it is actual.” (p.69)5
As is shown in [Pir98], let Σ be the set of states possible for a physical system,
µ(a) = {E | a ∈ S(E) and E ∈ Σ}
where µ : L → P (Σ) is the so-called Cartan map. In [Pir98], “L’application µ

est appelée le morphisme de cartan et l’image de L dans P (Σ), la représentation
de Cartan”. Note that µ can also be written in case we work with atoms as the
map L → P (ΣL ) : a 1→ {p ∈ ΣL | p ≤ a} [CoeMooSme(nd)a]. The following
theorem is given by C. Piron in [Pir98, p.10],
Theorem 4.
The Cartan map µ is injective, order preserving and meet-preserving:
(1) a ≤ b ⇔ µ(a) ⊆ µ(b)
(2) µ(∧J ai ) = ∩J µ(ai )
Proof
We follow the proof given in [Pir98]. Note first that µ is indeed injective since
every property of L corresponds to a subset of Σ but P (Σ) can be so that not
every subset of Σ (or element of P (Σ)) will necessarily correspond to a property
of L.6 Let us now concentrate on (1). µ(a) ⊆ µ(b) iff the states in which a
is actual are at least the states in which b is actual iff a is actual implies that
b is actual. Further (1) holds since the order relation is via its construction
5 Our notation S(E).
6 As has been explained in [Aer81], “In general it is not possible to find for an arbitrary
subset T of Σ a test (question) α on the entity (system) such that α is true iff the entity is in
a state p ∈ T ” (p.28, our insertion of brackets).
equivalent with an inclusion relation. To prove (2) we first note that ∧J ai is

actual iff every ai (i ∈ J) is actual. So, the collection of states in which “every”
ai (i ∈ J) is actual is exactly the set of states in which ∧J ai is actual namely
µ(∧J ai ). To obtain that exact collection of states in which “every” ai (i ∈ J)
is actual we take the intersection of all µ(ai ) ∀i ∈ J. Which comes down to
$
{E | ai ∈ S(E), ∀i ∈ J}. !
Let us stress that given the Cartan map, a property is actual in a certain state
if the point representing that state of the system is an element of µ(a); if not
the property is potential [Pir98]. This then allows us to rewrite S(E) = {a |
a ∈ L, a actual in E} as S(E) = {a | a ∈ L, E ∈ µ(a)}. The interpretation of
actual and potential properties by means of the Cartan map remains the same
for classical and non-classical systems. The difference between classical and
non-classical cases lies in the fact that the Cartan map µ is an injective map
in general — for both the non-classical and classical systems — though is said
to be also surjective in the classical case. We will come back to the difference
between non-classical and classical systems in the next section and will for the
moment concentrate on a theorem stating that the Cartan map is also in the
general case a surjective map if we limit the range of µ to the biorthogonal
closed subsets of Σ.7 The theorem is given in [Moo99]:
Theorem 5.
“The property images µ(a) are exactly the biorthogonal subsets of Σ” (p.73)
Proof
To prove this we follow [Moo99] explicitly and add some comments.
First we have to show that µ(a)⊥⊥ = µ(a), and for this it suffices to show that
µ(a! ) = µ(a)⊥ since then µ(a)⊥⊥ = µ(a!! ) = µ(a). According to definition 17,
we know that µ(a)⊥ = {E ! | (∀E)(E ∈ µ(a) ⇒ E ⊥ E ! )}. Hence E ! ∈ µ(a)⊥ iff
(∀E)(pE ≤ a ⇒ pE ≤ p!E ! ). However, since we know that if a, b ∈ L, then a ≤ b
iff whenever p ∈ ΣL , p ≤ a then p ≤ b cf. proposition 6, we obtain a ≤ p!E ! .
But a ≤ p!E ! iff pE ! ≤ a! , and since pE ! is a state property this implies that a! is
actual in state E ! so E ! ∈ µ(a! ). Henceforth µ(a! ) = µ(a)⊥ .
Secondly, we have to show that every biorthogonal subset of Σ is the image of
some property. Note firstly that µ(pE ) = {E ! | pE ! ≤ pE } = {E}, which means
that when pE is the state property representing E, it is actual in the state E and
so pE ! = pE . Similarly we have µ(p!E ) = µ(pE )⊥ = {E}⊥ . Secondly we note that
the states in which ∧J ai is an actual property, is exactly the intersection of all
those states
! in which the ai (i ∈ J) are actual. Now, if T ⊆ Σ, biorthogonal
and a = {pE | E ∈ T ⊥ }, then we see that T is the set of states in which a is
!
actual because:
$
$ =! {µ(pE ) |⊥E ∈ T$ } where µ(a) = µ(∧{p!E | E ∈ T ⊥ }) and
! ⊥
µ(a)
{µ(pE ) | E ∈ T } = {{E}⊥ | E ∈ T ⊥ } = {E ! | (∀E ∈ T ⊥ )E ! ⊥ E} = T ⊥⊥ =
T. !
7 We take subsets of Σ such as T ⊆ Σ which satisfy: T ⊥⊥ = T .
We have shown that every biorthogonal subset of Σ is the image of some property
(&= 0). Henceforth, for every property (&= 0) there is always at least one state in
which it is actual, and via the Cartan map we have found a way to indicate the
exact subset of the state space Σ in which that is the case. Summarizing the
above we can say with [Moo99] that:
“each physical system can be characterized by: its property lattice,
a complete, atomistic and orthocomplemented lattice; and its state
space, a set together with an antireflexive, symmetric, and separat-
ing relation.” (p.73)8
The physical duality between states and properties has been extended to a cat-
egorical equivalence [Moo99, Stu99]. Quite recently, category theory in relation
to OQL seemed to increase in importance, in particular with respect to the
dynamic extension on which we will focus in part IV. The reader will probably
agree that the use of another mathematical language at this stage would lead
to unnecessary confusion.
4.8 Classical and Non-classical Cases

We have already used the notions of classical and non-classical systems without
being very specific about their meaning. In this section we will concentrate on
these notions along with the notions of classical and quantum questions and
properties. We start with the axiom of a classical system, also called le préjugé
classique by C. Piron in [Pir98]:
Axiom 4.
“Nous dirons qu’une question α ∈ Q est classique si, pour chaque E ∈ Σ, ou
bien α est vraie, ou bien α∼ est vraie. Et nous dirons qu’un système satisfait le
préjugé classique si, pour chaque propriété a ∈ L, il existe une question classique
α ∈ a.” (p.10)
Note that Q is the collection of all questions relative to a given physical system
and that we do not approve the specific notation α ∈ a for reasons stated
earlier. This axiom then says that a system is classical if for every property
a = ζ(α) ∈ L, there is at least one α which gives a result (yes or no) that is
certain a priori from the moment on that the system is realized in a specific
state [Pir98]. C. Piron attaches the principle of determinism to this “préjugé
classique” as a possible justification. He explains this in [Pir98] as follows:
if the system and the (measuring) devices are given and if the experiment is
properly conducted, then the evolution as well as the result of the experiment
are completely determined, the result is certain even in advance. Although we
have to be careful, the principle of determinism maybe holds in an absolute
way, but may not be stated as a true justification since the “préjugé classique”
8 The orthogonality relation is called a separating relation in the sense that “orthogonality
is a condition of strong distinguishability” [Moo99, p.69]. It follows from this that we, in
chapter 9, consider two states accessible if they are not orthogonal.
imposes also that for every property an associated question or the inverse is
true, a priori, even before we have decided to perform any experiment (even
when the measuring devices are not given).
According to C. Piron in [Pir98] we can state that if we have a classical system,

its state space and property lattice are isomorphic:
Theorem 6.
“Si le système statisfait l’axiome 4, alors le morphisme de Cartan est surjectif
et L et P (Σ) sont isomorphes.” (p.11)
Proof
See Th.1.5.15. in [Pir98]. !
Continuing with the state space, we see that classical systems have a maximal
orthogonality relation whereas for quantum systems this relation is minimal
[Moo99]. A maximal orthogonality relation defined on a state space means
that the state space is classical in the sense that any two distinct states are
orthogonal. This leads us to conclude that for classical systems, the given
axiom 2 can be reformulated similarly as in [Aer81, p.35],
For each possible state E there exists at least one definite experi-
mental project α such that α is certain in the possible state E ! iff E !
is different from E.
We will now deal with the notion of a classical property as defined in [Pir98]:
Definition 18.
“Une propriété a ∈ L est appelée une propriété classique si, quel que soit l’état
du système, ou bien a est actuelle ou bien a! est actuelle” (p.24)
C. Piron adds to the definition of classical properties in [Pir85] that “a is classical

if a and a! are never both potential at the same time”. We also see that the
trivial properties 0 and 1 are always classical properties because one of them,
namely 1, will always be actual and 0! = 1. Although nowhere in the literature
do we find an explicit characterization of a quantum property, we would like
to define it as a non-classical property, which means that it can be potential
together with its orthocomplement at the same time. The properties considered
in previous sections were conceived as quantum or classical properties. In the
same sense the questions we considered were conceived as quantum or classical
questions. We call a question α quantum when it is not necessarily the case that
α or α∼ is certain in every possible state of a particular system. A quantum
question and its inverse can both be uncertain in a specific state.
Let us now draw the relation between classical properties, classical questions
and classical systems — cf. axiom 4. If α is classical and when ζ(α) = a then
ζ(α∼ ) = a! and we may say that a is classical.9 Since a classical system is

defined so that for every a = ζ(α) ∈ L, there is at least one classical α, we
obtain the following:
Proposition 11.
If the system is classical then all its properties are classical.
But let’s take a look at the converse: if a is classical, the existence of a classical
α such that ζ(α) = a is not guaranteed in general (see [Pir98]). Indeed we can
consider an example where for a given complete boolean property lattice in every
state c ∧ d = ζ(αΠβ) ∈ L is actual or c! ∨ d! ∈ L is actual but where it is not the
case that in every state αΠβ is true or α∼ Πβ ∼ is true. A comparable situation
has — in a somewhat different context — been elaborated on in [Aer81, p.39]
and points to the fact that even when the property lattice is boolean, the system
is not necessarily classical in the sense of axiom 4. Similarly we can say that if
every property of a system is classical it still can be the case that the system is
not classical. This leads us to pose the following in general:
Proposition 12.
The existence of classical properties does not guarantee that the system is clas-
sical.
Of course, a physical system will in general have classical and non-classical
properties [Pir88]. Now we will concentrate on a! . Taking the same case in
which α is a classical question such that ζ(α) = a, we see that ζ(α∼ ) = a! and
since a is classical, also a! is classical. This is obvious since in an arbitrary state
E when a classical question is true or its inverse is true then at the same moment
a classical property has to be actual or its opposite has to be actual.
Note that the set of classical properties of a property lattice L is called the
center ZL of L. As such we can say that classical properties coincide with
central elements, where we characterize central elements as [Moo99]:
“an element c of a bounded lattice X is called central if there exists
c! ∈ X such that for each a ∈ X we have that a = (a ∨ c) ∧ (a ∨ c! ) =
(a ∧ c) ∨ (a ∧ c! ).” (p.75)
The center ZL of central elements of L can be proved to form a complete
boolean sublattice equipped with the same orthocomplementation and with its
own atoms. For more details on this we refer to [Pir98, Th.1.7.6] and [Moo99,
p.75]. Let
! us just note that the atoms of this boolean sublattice have the form
Z(p) = {a ∈ ZL | p ≤ a} [Stu99] — where p itself has been taken as an atom
of L. What we learn from this is that it is possible to give only the classical
description of a physical system. An experimenter can for instance concentrate
only on the classical properties which will lead him to the boolean property
9 For a classical question the property b = ζ(α∼ ) is an orthocomplement of a = ζ(α). The
reason is that for a classical question we must have a ∨ b = 1 and so b = a! (see [FouRan84]).
lattice ZL . However, if the system also has non-classical properties, a full char-
acterization of the system should lead to L of which ZL is a sublattice. If the
experimenter insists on concentrating on the classical part, he will identify in
his description two different atoms p, q of L in case those atoms determine the
same atom of ZL — where Z(p) = Z(q). The experimenter cannot distinguish
between states that are macroscopically equivalent as C. Piron calls them in
[Pir98]. From the physical point of view, C. Piron states it as follows, [Pir98]:
“si l’expérimentateur ne distingue pas deux états macroscopique-
ment équivalents, il décrira le système à l’aide d’un treillis classique,
c’est-à-dire un treillis isomorphe aux sous-ensembles d’un ensem-
ble. Nous comprenons alors le rôle de la physique classique comme
ébauche de toute théorie.” (p.25)
When we go a little step further in this reasoning we see that if the only classical
properties of a property lattice are 1 and 0, then we can conclude that any
two
! states will always
! be macroscopically equivalent. Obviously here Z(p) =
{1 | p ≤ 1} = {1 | q ≤ 1} = Z(q) for any p, q in L. In this case we call
the property lattice purely quantum [Pir98]. If the system possesses quantum
and classical properties it is said to be a non-classical system that possesses
superselection rules and can be described by a lattice as follows, [Pir98]:
“Dans le cas général, ..., le treillis du système peut être décrit par
la donnée d’une famille de treillis purement quantiques indexés par
les états macroscopiques du système. Pour des raisons purement
historiques on dit alors que le système possède des règles de super-
sélection.” (p.25)
We have talked already about several kinds of physical systems, and all of them
can be described by means of a property lattice which fulfill axioms 1,2, and
3. The classical axiom 4 is indeed very strong and not always valid — cf. the
example given in [Pir98] of a Stern-Gerlach experiment on a silver atom. There
is now one extra axiom which needs to be satisfied if we want to conceive OQL
as a genuine quantum theory with super selection rules. For this, we need to
drop axiom 4 and introduce another one on top of axioms 1,2 and 3. See for
instance [Aer83a, Pir76],
Axiom 5.
Suppose L is a complete and orthocomplemented lattice, then:
(5.1) L is weak modular iff for a, b ∈ L and a ≤ b we have b = a ∨ (b ∧ a! )
(5.2) L satisfies the covering law iff for L atomic (which means that for every
a ∈ L there exists an atom p of L such that p ≤ a) and a, x ∈ L and p is an
atom of L whenever we have a ∧ p = 0 and a ≤ x ≤ (a ∨ p) then holds: x = a
or x = a ∨ p.
This quantum axiom as we will call it, has a very mathematical nature according
to D. Aerts in [Aer81]. As already mentioned in part I, it is this axiom which
makes it impossible to describe separated systems by means of a quantum the-

ory. It is important to notice that the property lattice which is weak modular
and orthocomplemented will be called orthomodular. The fact that with axiom
5, OQL can be seen as covering quantum theory is an important result and
forms the core of Piron’s work under the name of his Representation Theorem.
With this theorem he proved in [Pir76] that:
“apart from some exceptional cases, every irreducible propositional
system can be realized by the lattice L(H) of closed linear varieties
of a generalized Hilbert Space H. An arbitrary propositional system,
being the direct union of irreducible systems, could thus be realized
by a family of such spaces.” (p.57)
Note that in Piron’s terminology a propositional system corresponds to a prop-
erty lattice which is complete, atomic, orthomodular and satisfies the covering
law.10 And the notion “irreducible” means that the property lattice is purely
quantum. When we talk of a generalized Hilbert space H, the complete atom-
istic ortholattice L(H) of biorthogonal subspaces need not be orthomodular
[CoeMooWil00]. Since the complexity of the proof, which involves quite some
projective geometry we refer to [Pir76] or to [Val00] for a recent concise analy-
sis. Although other concrete realizations of property lattices are possible, this
link with Hilbert Space is clearly the most important [Pir76]. We finish off this
section with the following important proposition:
Proposition 13.
In case L is a complete orthocomplemented lattice, weak modularity implies that
if a, b ∈ L and a ≤ b then a = b ∧ (b! ∨ a)
Proof
If a ≤ b then b! ≤ a! . Via the axiom of weak modularity we know that b = a∨(b∧
a! ) implies a! = b! ∨ (b ∧ a! ). Since a = a!! in the case of orthocomplementation,
we obtain: a = a!! = (b! ∨ (b ∧ a! ))! = b ∧ (b! ∨ a). !
4.9 Compatibility
In the literature one encounters the notion of commutativity in the context of
abstract algebraic structures where the notion of compatibility is more often
used in the specific context of the properties of physical systems or propositions
of physical systems as it used to be called earlier (see [BelCas84]). It will become
clear in this section that the existence of noncompatible properties indicates a
difference between classical and non-classical cases. This has been stated more
general in [BelCas84]:
“The occurrence of noncommutative algebraic structure marks a
branching point between classical and quantum mechanics.” (p.125)
10 Note that a property lattice which is complete, atomic, orthomodular and satisfies the
covering law has been called in [Aer81] and [Val00] a Piron lattice.
The meaning of this will become apparent if we examine the formal definition
of compatible properties as given in [Pir76]:
Definition 19.
“In a CROC (complete, orthocomplemented and weakly modular property lattice)
two propositions (properties) b and c are said to be compatible if the sublattice
generated by {b, b! , c, c! } is distributive, a property we shall denote by b ↔ c.”
(p.25)11
We stress that the notion of compatibility has this rather mathematical meaning.
As stressed in [Aer83b], the common claim that two properties are compatible
if their associated questions could actually be performed simultaneously with-
out disturbing each other — see for instance also [JauPir63] — does not hold
in general. This is clear when we refer again to the example in [Aer81, p.39]
of a complete boolean lattice in which every property is classical and compat-
ible, but where it is definitely not the case that any pair of properties can be
simultaneously tested without each measurement disturbing the other.
The following definitions occur in [Pir76], and will be used to prove Th.7:
Definition 20.
“A sublattice of L is a subset S of L: b, c ∈ S ⇒ b ∨ c, b ∧ c ∈ S.” (p.23)
Definition 21.
“The sublattice generated by a family of properties is the intersection of all the
sublattices containing this family.” (p.23)
If we have a property lattice L which is orthomodular, we can state the following

theorem which is related to [Pir76, Th.2.10, p.24],
Theorem 7.
Given two properties b, c in L, complete and orthomodular, if b ≤ c and b! is an
orthocomplement for b and c! is and orthocomplement for c, then the sublattice
generated by {b, b! , c, c! } is distributive.
Proof
Because of the orthocomplementation of L, b ≤ c ⇒ c! ≤ b! holds. If we add
weak modularity, we obtain: b ≤ c ⇒ c∧(c! ∨b) = b and c! ≤ b! ⇒ b! ∧(b∨c! ) = c!
— cf. proposition 13. These relations are necessary and sufficient for a sublattice
of L, generated by {b, b! , c, c! } to be distributive12 . Given the definition of
a generated sublattice, we see that if b, b! , c, c! are its elements, then so are
b ∧ b! , b ∧ c, b ∧ c! , b ∨ b! , b ∨ c, b ∨ c! , b! ∧ c, b! ∧ c! , b! ∨ c, b! ∨ c! , c! ∧ c, c! ∨ c. By the
orthocomplementation, b ∧ b! = c! ∧ c = 0 and c! ∨ c = b ∨ b! = 1 holds. If b ≤ c
12 Recall the definition of a distributive lattice, [Pir76], “A lattice B is called distributive if
for any triplet (b, c, d) of elements of B one has the relation: b ∧ (c ∨ d) = (b ∧ c) ∨ (b ∧ d)”
(p.8). Note that when then the lattice is distributive, complete and orthocomplemented, the
infinite distributivity holds: b ∧ (∨J ci ) = ∨J (b ∧ ci ), this is proved in [Pir76, p.9].
1
then b∧c = b and b∨c = c. If c! ≤ b! then b! ∧c! = c!
and b! ∨ c! = b! . By the two weak modularity rela-
tions, b ∧ c! = b ∧ b! ∧ (b ∨ c! ) = 0 ∧ (b ∨ c! ) = 0
b' c d' and b! ∨ c = [c ∧ (c! ∨ b)]! ∨ c = c! ∨ (c!! ∧ b! ) ∨ c =
c! ∨ (c ∧ b! ) ∨ c = 1 ∨ (c ∧ b! ) = 1 holds. This then
results in the sublattice formed by the set of eight
b
c' d elements: 0, b, b! ∧c, c, c! , b∨c! , b! , 1, which is distribu-
tive in Fig 1 with b ∨ c! = d! and b! ∧ c = d. Note, in
[Kal83] this kind of diagram is given as an example
0
of a distributive lattice. !
Fig 1: Hasse diagram of a distributive
sublattice
This theorem is only a small part of Th.2 in [Kal83,
p.22], due to Foulis, Holland and Nakamura. Given the definition of compatible
properties and Th.7 we reach the following proposition,
Proposition 14.
Given two properties b, c in L, complete and orthomodular, if b ≤ c then b ↔ c
In [JauPir63], proposition 14 is proposed as a replacement axiom for the dis-
tributivity law for quantum systems. Focusing further on certain properties of
the compatibility relation, we see that while we presuppose an orthomodular lat-
tice L when b ↔ c, then also b ↔ c! , b ↔ b! and b ↔ b, [Pir76]. More precisely in
that case any two properties of c, b, c! , b! commute [BelCas84, Th.12.1.4., p.126].
This indicates that the compatibility relation ↔ is reflexive and symmetric13
but, as pointed out in [Pir77], not transitive. In [Pir76], several theorems con-
cerning compatible properties are proved, from which we take the one which
will be of use later on,
Theorem 8.
“In a CROC (complete, orthomodular lattice), if b ↔ ci , ∀i, then b ↔ ∨i ci and
b ↔ ∧i ci ” (provided the index set is not empty). (p.28)
Proof
We refer for the proof to [Pir76, p.28], because it is based on theorems (2.21)
and (2.15) in [Pir76], which we did not treat explicitly in this thesis. !
What we can conclude from this section is that in the case that properties
are represented by projection operators in a Hilbert Space, the compatibility
relation is equivalent with the property that the projections commute with one
another [JauPir63]. Contrary to quantum systems, for classical systems any pair
of properties is compatible [JauPir69]. As is mentioned in [BelCas84], the fact
that we talk about pairs of compatible properties in this case is only essential
when we are working within the weaker structure of an orthomodular poset. For
more details on this matter we refer to [BelCas84, p.127]. Note, this section on
compatible properties will be useful when we treat ideal measurements in the
next chapter.
13 See also Th.2 in [Kal83, p.22].
Chapter 5
Probabilities and Ideal

Measurements
5.1 Classical and Quantum Probabilities

At the fifth Solvay Conference in Brussels, during the sessions “Ein-
stein said hardly anything beyond presenting a very simple objection
to the probability interpretation. ... Then he fell back into silence”
De Broglie, [DBro62, p.150]
We already mentioned in part I that OQL does not adhere to any ensemble or
statistical interpretation of quantum mechanics. Indeed, until now we talked
about the properties and states of classical and non-classical physical systems,
without using any probabilistic description. To indicate that it is not only
theoretically possible to omit ensembles, we refer to the neutron interferometry
experiments performed by H. Rauch and his collaborators in the seventies (see
for instance [Rau83]). This kind of experiment has often been analyzed to
explain the strange effect of non-locality (see also [AerBroSme99]). Besides non-
locality, these experiments show that it is possible to isolate one single neutron
within a perfect silicium crystal. Therefore, even from the practical point of
view we may leave the ensemble interpretations behind. Of course OQL would
not be as meaningful as it is, were it not the case that quantum probabilities
can be given a meaning within its framework. How this works will be analyzed
later on in this section, but for now we will stick to the general conception of
quantum probabilities in the Geneva School:
“The occurrence of probability is not inherent to the description of
the system but to the lack of information on the measuring apparatus
itself, as long as the experimentalist has still the possibility to choose
between to perform or not to perform the experiment.” [Pir85]
In accordance with this point of view, we would like to offer a possible explana-
tion for the appearance of the probabilities encountered in quantum mechanics.
63
CHAPTER 5. PROBABILITIES AND IDEAL MEASUREMENTS 64
We intend to follow [AerCoeSme99] quite closely in this section and will show
how quantum probabilities can be explained as being due to a lack of knowledge
of the interaction between the system and its measurement context. Contrary
to classical probabilities, they are not due to a lack of knowledge of the exact
state of the system. That quantum probabilities are of a different nature than
classical probabilities has been shown by the failure of hidden variable theo-
ries indicated by many theorems (e.g. von Neumann’s no-go theorem [VNeu32]
or the elaborations in [Bel64, KocSpe67, JauPir63]). The search for hidden
variables was a search for a (deterministic) classical underlying reality. But if
quantum probabilities are not due to a lack of knowledge of the precise state, are
they then ontologically or objectively present in reality itself, as many physicists
have thought? The answer we propose is no, and to defend our position we will
first analyze what classical probabilities actually are.
5.1.1 Classical Probabilities

Let us concentrate on how the notion of probability occurs in classical physics.
As we already saw, a classical physical system is in principle represented by
classical questions for all its properties and of every pair of opposite properties
there is exactly one actual in every state. Let us now attach a value “true”
or “false” to every property respectively corresponding with the property being
actual or potential. As such it can of course occur that we do not know of every
property of a classical physical system whether it is true or false. This then does
not mean that those properties do not have definite values, it means that we
have a lack of knowledge about them. It can occur for instance when we have
not considered all the definite experimental projects, necessary to characterize a
system correctly. The mathematical tool provided to deal with such a situation
of a lack of knowledge on a classical system is a probability measure. More
specifically in such a probabilistic representation, if something is true to our
knowledge we attach a value 1 to it, and if it is false to our knowledge it receives
a value 0. In case of a lack of knowledge, we deal with values between (and
not equal to) 0 and 1. The example given in [AerCoeSme99] illustrates a lack
of knowledge situation by means of a statistical ensemble. One focuses on a
quantity of a liquid in a barrel, for every individual molecule in this liquid, we
know that it is located within the barrel, but we do not know where exactly in
the barrel; as a consequence, the properties related to the individual molecules
are not exactly known; nevertheless, we do know which ones are very probable
and which are not.
5.1.2 Quantum Probabilities

Contrary to what the classical picture presents, there are systems in nature
for which we cannot give definite values to all physical quantities, necessary
and sufficient to fully represent the physical system, not even in principle. For
example, in the case of quantum systems which we want to observe, it is usually
thought that probability assignments are the most a theory can say about them.
In fact, one can prove that for every possible preparation we could perform
when we want to check if a system has a well defined property, there are always
other properties about which we cannot be certain. Think back for instance
on the incompatible properties one encounters in the quantum case but not in
the classical case. When we use the standard quantum formalism to describe
quantum systems, one is almost forced to accept that there do exist probabilities
that do not merely describe a lack of knowledge of the exact situation of the
system, but are also a priori linked to the quantum world. What we have in
mind here is the so-called formula of Born, the standard statistical algorithm
for the quantum state description in case of discrete spectra:
P robΨ (ai : A) =|| Pai Ψ ||2 =| 9αi | Ψ: |2
In other words, the probability according to quantum state Ψ that an observ-
able A obtains the (eigen)value ai is given by the square of the magnitude of
the component of Ψ in the direction of eigenvector αi [Wal84].1 In many inter-
pretations of quantum mechanics, these probability assignments are the most
the theory can say in state Ψ about the system, and exactly this leads to the
position that quantum states are ontologically statistical since only statistical
predictions about the values of quantum observables can be made. We however
do not accept these interpretations since it would imply that the existence of a
system can be asserted only with a certain level of probability. For the remain-
der of this section we will explain in brief our position which does not rely on
objective probabilities.
5.1.3 Hidden Measurements and Aspects of Creation

The position to which we subscribe, has been called the hidden measurement
approach (see for instance [Aer86, Coe97a, Coe97b]), and assumes that quan-
tum probabilities are caused by a lack of knowledge, though different from the
kind encountered in the classical case. Within this picture, a lack of knowl-
edge of the state of the system gives rise to a classical probability model while
a lack of knowledge concerning the measuring process itself introduces a non-
classical model. The core idea is that the presence of quantum probabilities is
due to the fact that before the measurement process is started, it is not deter-
mined which of the hidden measurement processes shall take place. By means
of hidden measurements — which have nothing to do with the, in the liter-
ature so-called, hidden variables — we are able to explain the appearance of
quantum probabilities. Before we go into more detail, we would like to ex-
amine a related topic namely the creation-discovery view as put forward in
1 Note that we use here for a moment the language of standard quantum mechanics, different
from OQL. Ψ = Σi &αi | Ψ'αi since Ψ is the linear combination of its basisvectors αi . We
also know that || Ψ ||2 = Σi || Pai Ψ ||2 where Pai is a linear self-adjoint projector. Note that
we used the fact that the components of the vector Ψ in the given basis can be expressed by
means of projections, where &αi | Ψ'αi = Pai Ψ is a component represented by the projection
of Ψ into the subspace associated with ai . Further || Pai Ψ ||2 =|| &αi | Ψ'αi ||2 = &&αi | Ψ'αi |
&αi | Ψ'αi ' = &αi | Ψ'&αi | Ψ'&αi | αi ' = &αi | Ψ'&αi | Ψ' =| &αi | Ψ' |2 . Where the overlined
symbols represent adjoints of complex numbers and &. | .' stands for the inner product.
[Aer93, Aer98, AerCoeSme99]. This view comes down to the fact that during
a non-destructive measurement two different types of processes can take place,
creations and discoveries. Whereas discoveries are mostly associated with classi-
cal observation measurements and do not change the state of a system, creations
do change the state of a system. We will show that creations hold a special po-
sition with respect to quantum probabilities. Let us concentrate on an example
given in [Aer93, AerCoeSme99] which makes this view a bit clearer. It concerns
a survey to determine the opinions of a randomly selected group of persons on
nuclear energy. A few interviewers have to investigate who is ‘for’ and who
‘against’ nuclear energy. The situation can be analyzed as follows. Some mem-
bers of the survey group will already have a fixed opinion (for or against) on the
matter before the interviewer asks any questions, while other members will not
yet have made their mind up. By asking his questions the interviewer will dis-
cover the opinions of those members who had a fixed opinion in advance, and he
will create the situation in which those who were still doubting can give a for or
against answer. This act of creation can manifest itself as e.g. the presentation
of persuasive information by the interviewer on the pro’s and con’s of nuclear
energy. What happens here is that persons are pulled out of a “doubtful”-state
into a “for or against”-state and that this change of state — caused by the
act of creation — depends on the influence of the measurement context (of the
interviewer). When we are only dealing with a discovery, there is almost no
influence of the measurement context. Regarding the probabilities in this ex-
ample, when an interviewer first encounters a member of the survey group, he
does not know his/her opinion and can only make a probabilistic prediction.
We make the following probabilistic assumption characteristic of the interaction
between the interviewer and the doubtful person: the interviewer meeting such
a member of the survey has a 40 % chance of meeting a person who will be
for nuclear energy and a 60 % chance of meeting one against. Suppose that
after he has asked the question, of all the 1000 members he finds 400 for and
600 against. There are now several possible initial distributions which yield this
result, take for example: (i) in advance, 400 are for and 600 are against, (ii) in
advance, all 1000 have no definite opinion, (iii) n are for (we choose n between
0 and 400), 32 n are against, and 1000 − 52 n have no opinion. We want to stress
the fact that the result of the survey depends both on the initial distribution of
the members of the survey and on the probabilistic assumption. Let us analyze
this in more detail. We see that all example cases (i), (ii) and (iii) yield the
same result, but that this result emerged from situations each of a different
nature. In (i) there was no act of creation making this a classical situation. In
the other example cases, the result is partially due to our probabilistic assump-
tion. The probabilities attributed to the change of state of a doubtful person,
cannot be attributed to a lack of knowledge of a more complete specification
of the real state of that person, because a complete specification simply does
not exist. Probabilities about the states in which the other persons with a fixed
opinion will find themselves, can indeed be attributed to a lack of knowledge of
a more complete specification of the real states of those persons. We see that
the creation-discovery view gives a very natural explanation for the existence of
two kinds of probabilities, attributed on the one hand to the lack of knowledge
concerning the measurement process, and on the other to the lack of knowl-
edge of the state of the system. The first kind of probabilities are quantum
probabilities and the motivation for this statement is given below.
In [AerCoeSme99] we justified our picture of quantum probabilities by means of

a model called the quantum machine. This model has first been introduced in
[Aer86], while the idea of such kind of modeling can be traced back to [GisPir81].
What we have in mind is a special kind of measurement — a “gedanken” exper-
iment — for a spin- 12 quantum system. In particular, the “lack of knowledge”
of the measurement process will be presented by the param-
eter λ ∈ [0, 1]. The physical system represented in Fig 2
` is a point particle on the surface of a sphere with center 0
and radius 1. We gave the point particle the coordinates v
and denote its state as pv . A measurement eu on the entity
in state pv is defined as follows: Take a straight line seg-
Fig 2: Illustration of ment [−u, u] between the point u and antipodal point −u
a measurement eu
on a spin- 12 entity of the sphere. Project v orthogonally on [−u, u] and obtain
the point v ! . This point defines two segments [−u, v ! ] and
[v ! , u] (see Fig 2). Consider now a random variable λ defined on the segment
[−u, u], and suppose that the relative frequency of appearance of the possible
λ is uniformly distributed on [−u, u]. If we find λ ∈ [−u, v ! ], we say that the
particle moves to u along [v ! , u] into the state pu . If λ ∈]v ! , u], the particle
moves to −u along [−u, v ! ] into the state p−u . The two possible outcome states
for this measurement eu are: pu and p−u . Let us now give a more mechanical
interpretation of this measurement eu . We see the segment [−u, u] as a uniform
“elastic”, which can break at every point of [−u, u] with the same probability.
The measurement then consists of the fact that the particle falls and sticks to
the elastic causing the elastic to break and tear the particle into one of the
endpoints u or −u. The lack of knowledge consists of the fact that before we
measure, we do not know at which specific point the elastic will break. Let us
now for eu calculate the probability that the particle will end up in u. We know
that this will happen if the elastic breaks within [−u, v ! ]. If we divide the length
of [−u, v ! ] by the total length of the elastic 2 we have the probability of a change
into u:
1 + cosβ β
P rob(v → u) = = cos2
2 2
For the probability that the entity ends up in −u we know that this will happen
if the elastic breaks within ]v ! , u]. The length of ]v ! , u] divided by 2 gives the
probability of a change into −u:
1 − cosβ β
P rob(v → −u) = = sin2
2 2
These probabilities are the same as one obtains in a Stern-Gerlach measurement
on spin- 12 quantum systems. Which means that this model does in fact generate
quantum probabilities. We see explicitly in our model that the probabilities are
due to a lack of knowledge about where precisely the elastic will break. We
took all possible breakingpoints of the elastic with respect to a specified result
into account. Suppose now that for each possible breakingpoint of the elastic,
there is a corresponding classical experiment. Think of a classical experiment
in the exact way as we presented our model, but replace the elastic with one
that has only one fixed breakingpoint. From this we conclude that when we
perform eu , what happens is that one classical experiment is being performed
but we do not know which one. We called it the hidden measurement, it is the
classical measurement which creates the final state of the system. The presence
of the lack of knowledge of the precise act of creation, lies at the heart of the
so-called indeterministic nature of quantum measurements. And this is exactly
one of the starting-points of a further dynamic elaboration of OQL — see the
example given in part IV, section 12.5. But indeed also in the standard theory
of OQL, C. Piron has concentrated on a special kind of measurements which
enable us to recover quantum probabilities and explain them within this non-
statistical approach. We will concentrate on these special measurements in the
next section.
5.2 Ideal Measurements of the First Kind

5.2.1 Measurements of the First Kind
In the previous sections, we only dealt with properties being actual or potential
regardless of whether or not the associated questions — definite experimental
projects — were actually going to be performed. In this section, we will intro-
duce some special kinds of measurements which allow us to deal with properties
— being actual or potential — after the questions have been performed. It is
important to note that the true, not true or impossible questions were indeed
only counterfactually defined. In case we want to perform those questions in
reality, we can in general only say of the properties the system had before we
performed the questions, that a negative response proves the tested property
was not actual beforehand while a positive response does not prove anything.
In the latter case the property may or may not have been actual before the ques-
tion was performed.2 It is also a fact that when we do perform the questions, we
may disturb or even destroy the given physical system. Return for a moment to
the given example of a piece of chalk. If we break a piece of chalk with all our
strength, we end up with broken segments and our physical system is severely
damaged. One might wonder if questions which destroy the system when being
performed, may still count as measurements. If we destroy the physical system,
we can only say something about the physical property when the system was in
the state before we tried to measure it, afterwards it is not actual nor potential
2 We believe however that this is not the case for classical systems since then a positive
response does prove the former actual existence of the associated property. For this reason we
added the expression “in general”.
any more. For this reason we will concentrate on the notion of a measurement
of the first kind as introduced by W. Pauli in [Pau58] as follows:
“The method of measurement ... has the property that a repetition

of measurement gives the same value for the quantity measured as
in the first measurement. In other words, if the result of using the
measuring apparatus is not known, but only the fact of its use is
known ..., the probability that the quantity measured has a certain
value is the same, both before and after the measurement. We shall
call such measurements the measurements of the first kind.” (p.75)
Clearly such a measurement does not destroy the system and if one carries out
the measurement a second time, one obtains the same result [Pir76]. Following
now the definition of a first kind measurement as given in [Pir76]:
Definition 22.
“A question β is called a measurement of the first kind if, every time the answer
is “yes”, one can state that the proposition (property) b defined by β is true
(actual) immediately after the measurement.” (p.68)
In other words, a question β is a measurement of the first kind if “yes” implies
the actuality of the property b = ζ(β) associated with the measurement. So in
case we perform such a measurement, and the positive response obtains, then
this is a measurement which;
1) did not destroy or severely damage the physical system, and
2) did not alter the resulting property in case this property was
already actual before we performed the experiment
Let us analyze these two points. 1) exactly states that in order to be able to
obtain an actual property afterwards, the system should be somehow preserved.
2), if the question β is a measurement of the first kind and if β is true before we
perform the experimental project, obviously the answer “yes” will obtain when
we perform the experiment. Since in this case, b = ζ(β) was actual before the
performance of the experiment, and if the answer “yes” obtains, it is still actual
immediately afterwards while the question β is true immediately afterwards.
It should be noted that only when we obtain a positive response for such a
measurement, it makes sense to characterize it as first kind. When we perform
a measurement which does not give a positive response, we deal with a situation
in which the measurement;
1) did destroy or severely damage the physical system or;
2) did not destroy or severely damage the physical system. In this
case β was not true before we performed the measurement. The
property β = ζ(β) was definitely not actual beforehand, since if it
were, β would have been true beforehand from which follows that
the result of performing β should have been positive. Given the fact
that we do not obtain a positive response, either β is impossible or

not true afterwards and b is not actual. Repeating the performance
of β can yield a positive or a negative response.
Clearly 2) points out that repeating the measurement will not with certainty
give the same result and that explains why the situation of a negative response
has nothing to do with a first kind measurement in Pauli’s sense. This implies
of course 1), a measurement β, of the first kind, is only a non-demolition exper-
iment with certainty in the case of a positive response. It is a subtle point as
to whether first kind measurements defined as above with respect to situations
in which they yield a positive response, can still be called first kind when they
yield a negative response. Our answer would be “no” but in the Geneva School
literature there is some ambiguity on this point since we read in [Pir77]:
“An experiment of the first kind must permit one to conclude whe-
ther a certain proposition (property) is true (actual) or not imme-
diately after the experiment.” (p.84)
Indeed, it says literally that a certain property is actual or not afterwards, and
the latter case is only possible if we obtain “a negative response for a first
kind measurement”. Another ambiguity on this point in the Geneva School
literature arises when we think for example of such properties as “not being
breakable” or “not being mortal”. The experiments testing such properties
preserve the system every time the response is positive and destroy it otherwise.
These kinds of measurements are examples of what Piron calls filters. Given
the definition of a filter in section 5.2.4, we see that this are measurements
which are called “first kind” and can have a negative response. We believe that
it would certainly have been less confusing if in the Geneva School literature
one would have attached another name to such “first kind measurements with
a negative response”. Clearly a non-demolition measurement with a negative
response gives us some information about the associated property before the
measurement was performed. This being the case, this situation could have
been linked to the notion of a measurement of the second kind, following W.
Pauli in [Pau58]:
“On the other hand it can also happen that the system is changed
but in a controllable fashion by the measurement — even when, in
the state before the measurement, the quantity measured had with
certainty a definite value. In this method, the result of a repeated
measurement is not the same as that of the first measurement. But
still it may be that from the result of this measurement, an un-
ambiguous conclusion can be drawn regarding the quantity being
measured for the concerned system before the measurement. Such
measurements, we call the measurements of the second kind.” (p.75)
5.2.2 Ideal Measurements

Measurements of the first kind with a positive response, cannot guarantee that
the system has not altered during the course of action. Some potential properties
might have become actual and vice versa. Let us show this with an example —
following the line of examples given in [Aer81]. Take a piece of dry wood with
the property a = ζ(α): it burns well and b = ζ(β): it floats on water. Both
properties are actual since for every one of the associated experiments, if we
would perform it, we would obtain a positive result. Suppose now that we do
perform β and so we let the piece of wood float on water. The result is that
although after this experiment b is still actual, a will have become potential.
What we see here is that our piece of wood, which is not a classical system in
the sense of the fourth axiom3 , can be changed by performing a measurement
of the first kind β. We stress that α (set first the system on fire and assign
“yes” in case that it then burns well) is not a first kind measurement since if
a positive response would obtain, the system will be severely damaged.4 The
construction of the lattice for this piece of wood in [Aer81], makes this example
not really fit for further discussion on ideal measurements.
Now we wish to focus on measurements which are such that they perturb the sys-
tem as little as possible. In this sense we want to consider measurements which
leave actual properties as much as possible intact when they are compatible
with the property associated with the measurement. This means immediately
that measurements which are associated with compatible properties but which
cannot be performed together without disturbing each other’s result will not
count as the candidate measurements we have in mind. Still it will be possible
that a system is changed when the properties actual in the initial state of the
system are not compatible with the property associated with the experiment
we want to perform (see also [Pir77]). Besides this natural cause of a system’s
change due to incompatibilities, there is still another possible cause. A system
can also be perturbed due to imperfections of the measuring apparatus. One
could indeed calculate the exact influence of a particular measuring apparatus
on the physical system, but in order to allow a more general description inde-
pendent of any particular apparatus, we need to idealize the situation so that
the system is indeed as little perturbed as possible. In an ideal case we presume
that the apparatus itself does not have those imperfections which lead to per-
turbations and so we demand that all initial actual properties compatible with
the property associated with the measurement remain actual. Note that in real
life such an ideal case is only reachable by approximation. Let us now introduce
3 Of course to see this you have to know that we followed D. Aerts in [Aer81] and have taken
L = {0, 1, a, b, a! , b! , a ∧ b, a! ∧ b, a ∧ b! , a! ∧ b! } where ζ(α) = a, ζ(α∼ ) = a! , ζ(αΠβ) = a ∧ b,

ζ(α∼ Πβ) = a! ∧ b, ζ(αΠβ ∼ ) = a ∧ b! , ζ(α∼ Πβ ∼ ) = a! ∧ b! and that the set of states is
Σ = {a ∧ b, a ∧ b! , a! ∧ b, a! ∧ b! }.
4 One could argue here that performing β can destroy the system as well, e.g. in the case
we leave the piece of wood floating on water until it is rotten. Since in such examples the
demolition-nature of β is very weak, at least compared to the demolition-nature of α, we deal
with β as a non-demolition measurement in the above exposition.
the formal definition of an ideal measurement, found in [Pir76]:

Definition 23.
“A question β is said to be ideal if every proposition (property), compatible with
the proposition (property) b defined by β, which is true (actual) beforehand is
again true (actual) afterwards when the response of the system is “yes”.” (p.68)
If we perform an ideal measurement β and obtain a positive response, then we
are dealing with a measurement which ;
1) did not destroy or severely damage the physical system

2) did not alter ζ(β) = b nor its compatible actual properties in case
β was true before we performed it.
3) did not alter the actual properties, compatible with ζ(β) = b, in
case β was not true before we performed it.
Note in case 3) that of course, even when β was not true beforehand, it can still
give a positive response when we actually perform the measurement.
Consider now the case in which we perform an ideal measurement β and we do

not obtain a positive response. This might sound awkward at first, but following
the above definition, a measurement is ideal when “yes” implies that a certain
condition is fulfilled, and this can easily be so even when the measurement
gives sometimes a negative response (or no response at all when the system
is destroyed).5 If we do not obtain a positive response then we deal with a
measurement about which we can say that;
1) it did destroy or severely damage the physical system; or
2) it did not destroy or severely damage the physical system and β
cannot have been true before performance.
Let us recapitulate: if β is ideal and the result is “yes”, we know that the state
afterwards consists of actual properties among which we find those properties
which are compatible with ζ(β) = b and actual in the state before we performed
β. In other words, all questions attached to the system which, when performed
together with that ideal measurement, were true beforehand, remain true after-
wards. If on top of this, the property associated with the ideal measurement
was already actual before, we know that the initial state is not perturbed at
all by performance of that measurement [Pir76]. Note that by means of the
compatibility-claim of an ideal measurement we indeed maximally limited the
perturbation of the system as much as it lies in our power to do so in case of a
positive response.
5.2.3 Ideal Measurement of the First Kind

We will now combine both given definitions in the following sense,
5 Also here one might query whether such questions may still genuinely be called “ideal”.
Definition 24.
An ideal measurement of the first kind of a property a is an experimental project
α which satisfies the following three conditions [Moo99, Pir98]:
(i) a = ζ(α) and a! = ζ(α∼ )
(ii) if the positive response is obtained then a is actual immediately after the
measurement;
(iii) if the positive response is obtained then the perturbation suffered by the
system is minimal.
In the case of a classical system, an ideal measurement of the first kind6 is
a classical question which does not change the system, at least when the re-
sponse is positive [Pir98]. This needs some further explanation. We know that
for a change to take place some potential property has to become actual and
vice versa. Since the system is classical it is precisely so that when a poten-
tial property becomes actual, its opposite should become potential. We know
that every pair of properties is compatible in this classical case and that all
actual properties remain actual after a positive response from the ideal, first
kind measurement. This is due to the fact that for a classical system and a
classical question α which in every state (also in the initial state) is true or
impossible, we see that when we perform α and obtain a positive response this
implies that ζ(α) = a was actual beforehand and when we obtain a negative
response this implies that a was potential and a! was actual beforehand. Since
when no actual property has changed into a potential one, no potential prop-
erty can change into an actual one and therefore any change of the system is
excluded. In the case of a quantum system, in general, the ideal measurement
of the first kind perturbs the system [Pir81]. This is due to the possibility of
incompatible properties. Now, in general if a property which is being measured
is not compatible with every property actual in the initial state, then the result
of the measurement is impossible to predict exactly, but for the case where we
deal with an ideal first kind measurement the final state is determined imme-
diately after the measurement if the response is “yes” [Pir72]. More precisely,
in the case we deal with a non-classical system, an ideal measurement of the
first kind allows us to calculate the perturbation suffered by the system in the
course of action [Pir76]. This is exactly what the following theorem in [Pir76]
is about (our brackets):
Theorem 9.
“If a question β is an ideal measurement of the first kind and if the answer is
“yes”, then the state of the system immediately after the experiment is (rep-
resented by) (p ∨ b! ) ∧ b, where p is (represents) the state before, and b is the
proposition (property) defined by β.” (p.68)
6 Because it is quite confusing, we want to note that in some of his work C. Piron calls an
ideal measurement of the first kind just an ideal measurement or sometimes just a measurement
(as done for instance in [Pir98]).
Proof
We extend the proof given in [Pir76, Pir77] with more details. First notice that
p ≤ (p ∨ b) ∧ (p ∨ b! ) because obviously p ≤ (p ∨ b) and p ≤ (p ∨ b! ). Now, we call
c = (p ∨ b) ∧ (p ∨ b! ) actual before the measurement since it is greater than or
equal to p which is the state property before the measurement. Moreover, c is
compatible with b. This follows from the theorems and definition in the section
on compatibility. In more detail, we prove this in 5 steps7 ,
(1) b ≤ p ∨ b ⇒ b ↔ (p ∨ b) (proposition 14)
(2) b ↔ (p ∨ b) ⇒ b ↔ b! ([BelCas84, Th.12.1.4., p.126])
(3) b! ≤ (p ∨ b! ) ⇒ b! ↔ (p ∨ b! ) (proposition 14)
(4) b! ↔ (p ∨ b! ) ⇒ b ↔ (p ∨ b! ) ([BelCas84, Th.12.1.4., p.126])
(5) b ↔ (p ∨ b! ) ∧ (p ∨ b) (theorem 8 applied on (1),(4))
Since β is ideal, any property compatible with b which is actual before the
measurement is again actual afterwards if the answer for β is “yes”, this holds for
c. We state that every other property x, actual beforehand and also compatible
with b, is greater or equal than c. In detail:
(1) x = x ∧ 1 and x = x ∨ 0
(2) Let 1 = b ∨ b! and 0 = b ∧ b! then x = x ∧ (b ∨ b! ) and x = x ∨ (b ∧ b! )
(3) Since b ↔ x, the sublattice generated by {b, b! , x, x! } is distributive.
(4a) Hence x = x ∧ (b ∨ b! ) = (x ∧ b) ∨ (x ∧ b! ) and8
(4b) x = x ∨ (b ∧ b! ) = (x ∨ b) ∧ (x ∨ b! )
(5) With (4b) and p ≤ x, we have:
c = (p ∨ b) ∧ (p ∨ b! ) ≤ (x ∨ b) ∧ (x ∨ b! ) = x
We know that b has to be immediately actual if the performance of β gives
“yes”, since this is a measurement of the first kind. We also know that c is
actual afterwards if the answer is “yes” and in that case, every property greater
then c ∧ b is actual afterwards. Since c ∧ b = (p ∨ b) ∧ (p ∨ b! ) ∧ b and because
obviously (p ∨ b) ∧ b = b, we have (p ∨ b) ∧ (p ∨ b! ) ∧ b = (p ∨ b! ) ∧ b as the strongest
actual property afterwards, it is the final state because the covering law points
out that this is an atom of the property lattice. This completes the proof.
As it is crucial in this proof, let us focus on the fact that (p ∨ b! ) ∧ b is an atom

(see also [Pir76, p.24, 25]). The covering law states that if p ∧ b! = 0 and p is
an atom, then p ∨ b! covers b! . From this follows that (p ∨ b! ) ∧ b is an atom,
because if it where not an atom there should exist some element y ∈ L such that
y ≤ (p ∨ b! ) ∧ b. From this follows that b! ≤ y ∨ b! ≤ (p ∨ b! ) ∧ b ∨ b! = (p ∨ b! ).
Since the covering law holds, and so p ∨ b! has to cover b! , we know that there
7 Note that step (4) which shows b ↔ (p ∨ b! ), could also have been obtained by first
applying theorem 8 on step (1) and (2) so that we obtain b ↔ b! ∧ (b ∨ p). By means of weak
modularity and by presupposing that p ≤ b! we then obtain b! ∧ (b ∨ p) = p. From this follows
b ↔ p which together with b ↔ b! gives us step (4) by applying theorem 8. The disadvantage
with this alternative step is that we had to presuppose p ≤ b! which as we will see later on in
this section leads to problems.
8 In [Pir76, p.26], it is stated as a theorem and proved that when two properties are com-
patible in a complete orthocomplemented lattice this relation holds between them and vice
versa.
are only two possibilities namely: y ∨ b! = b! or y ∨ b! = p ∨ b! . Suppose first

that y ∨ b! = b! then y = y ∨ b! ∧ b = b! ∧ b = 0 and in the second case when
y ∨ b! = p ∨ b! , then y = y ∨ b! ∧ b = (p ∨ b! ) ∧ b. This points out that there lies
no element of L in between 0 and (p ∨ b! ) ∧ b which makes (p ∨ b! ) ∧ b an atom.
!
Coming back to a case we already dealt with before, suppose b, the property
associated with the ideal, first kind measurement β was already actual in the
initial state. Here we see that the initial state will not have been changed by
performing the associated ideal, first kind measurement because: b ∧ (p ∨ b! ) = p
iff p ≤ b (see [Pir76, p.69]). It is obvious that when p represents the initial
state, and p ≤ b then p ≤ (p ∨ b) ∧ (p ∨ b! ) implies p ≤ b ∧ (p ∨ b! ). And because
b ∧ (p ∨ b! ) is an atom it is equal to p.
In the case b! was actual before we perform an ideal, first kind measurement
β, we know that β cannot give a positive response, because if it did, b = ζ(β)
as well as b! would be actual afterwards which is impossible ! Formally this
factually impossible situation comes down to the statement (p ∨ b! ) ∧ b = 0 iff
p ≤ b! , proved in [Pir76, p.69, 70].
The change of state which takes place due to an ideal measurement of the first
kind β can be seen as a map ϕb from the initial state into the final state:
p 1→ (p ∨ b! ) ∧ b. Analyzing the final state we see immediately that b = ζ(β)
is actual and that the initial state has gotten weaker because p ∨ b! is actual
afterwards. This weakening of the initial state is due to the (smallest possi-
ble) perturbation of the system and counts as a loss of information which we
cannot avoid in general when we perform a measurement of this kind. With
Piron’s representation theorem in mind, we see that a purely quantum (com-
plete, atomistic, orthomodular) property lattice has as a possible realization the
set of closed subspaces L(H) of a Hilbert space. As such we can now say with
[Pir76] that it are exactly the projectors such as Pb , which orthogonally project
the vectors of H onto the subspace b, which induce the maps such as ϕb for
quantum systems. And indeed in [Pir76] the map ϕb is proven to have all the
formal properties of a projector. Furthermore, ϕb (p) = (p ∨ b! ) ∧ b is a special
kind of projector namely the so-called Sasaki projection. To the notion of Sasaki
projection we come back in part III and part IV. All this demonstrates that
the idea of ideal first kind measurements in the quantum case has proven its
importance.
5.2.4 Perfect Measurements and Filters

In this section we will deal with special kinds of measurements. First we concen-
trate on filters. As we already mentioned in the section on first kind measure-
ments, there are experiments which preserve the system every time a certain
response is obtained, but which destroy the system otherwise. These experi-
ments are of course quite useful when we want to prepare a system such that it
will certainly possess a specific property afterwards. What we have in mind are
the following questions, [Pir76]:
Definition 25.
“A question β is called a filter if it is an ideal measurement of the first kind and
if, furthermore, the system is destroyed when the answer is “no”. ” (p.71)
Where the answer “no” in Piron’s terminology means that we do not obtain a
positive response. In our terminology above we already hinted at the fact that
we would like to call situations of demolitions those in which the measurement
gives no response at all. The notion of filter is well chosen, these measurements
filter out systems with a certain actual property (afterwards).
Another kind of measurement to which we want to pay special attention is the

perfect measurement. Given an ideal measurement of the first kind β, what can
we say about the inverse question β ∼ ? It is argued in [Pir76] that it is not often
the case that β and β ∼ are ideal measurements of the first kind. If that would
be the case we know that after performing β and obtaining a positive response,
ζ(β) = b is actual while a measurement β ∼ with a positive response would have
led to the actuality of ζ(β ∼ ) = b! . So if β and β ∼ are ideal and of the first
kind, we know that if we perform β and do obtain a negative response (when
the system is not destroyed) then it is exactly as if we did perform β ∼ which
gave a positive response. Note that β ∼ is defined by interchanging the roles of
“yes” and “no” of β. This then leads us to the conclusion that when β gives
“no”, β ∼ gives “yes” and b! = ζ(β ∼ ) is actual afterwards. And when β ∼ gives
“no”, β gives “yes” and b = ζ(β) is actual afterwards. With β and β ∼ ideal
and first kind, we know that afterwards always b = ζ(β) or b! = ζ(β ∼ ) is actual.
This then leads us to the definition of a perfect measurement, [Pir76]:
Definition 26.
“A question is called a perfect measurement if β and β ∼ are both ideal measure-
ments of the first kind.” (p.71)
This is a measurement β such as we have indicated, immediately afterwards
property b or b! is actual according to whether the answer is “yes” or “no”
[Pir76].
5.2.5 Probabilities Regained

It will come as no surprise that by means of ideal measurements of the first
kind, we are able to recover the usual probabilities in quantum mechanics. Note
that the whole approach of the Geneva School is built up without any use of
standard quantum probabilities. However, we quote [Pir81]:
“Nevertheless, in the case of a lattice described by a family of Hilbert
spaces, it is possible to calculate the probability W (p, α) to obtain
the answer “yes” by measuring α in the state p with the following
hypothesis. The probability W (p, α) depends only on p and on the
proposition (property) a which contains in its equivalence class α or

α∼ and W (p, α) can be calculated as if to each proposition (property)
at least one ideal measurement were associated. In this way we
recover the usual formula for probabilities in Quantum Mechanics.”
(p.400)
For details we refer to [Moo99, Pir72, Pir76, Pir77].
Chapter 6
Critiques and Critical

points
In the literature many critiques, which are in some cases rather clear misun-
derstandings, have been formulated on the OQL of the Geneva School. The
approach has been compared with those of for instance Randall and Foulis,
Ludwig and of Mackie. It is not our intention to go into any detail about
the differences and similarities of those different approaches with respect to
OQL, we instead refer to [CatNis91, CatMarNis94, CatNis93, CoeMooWil00,
FouPirRan83, RanFou83] for some relevant papers. In this chapter we want to
pay specific attention to those points of the theory which easily lead to misin-
terpretations. We will go over remarks and critiques aimed at OQL itself and
try to highlight our own critical points. We conclude the chapter with what we
believe to be some weaknesses of OQL as we have reviewed it above.
6.1 In defense of Operational Quantum Logic

There exist some papers [Bal81, EssZou81, HadThiMug80, ThiHadMug81] in
which the work of C. Piron has been criticised. Many of these criticisms were
merely misunderstandings. D.J. Foulis and C.H. Randall in [FouRan84] replied
explicitly to the criticisms formulated in [HadThiMug80, ThiHadMug81].1 In
their replies they exhibited a lot of possible pitfalls one might fall into when
learning about OQL. Since we do not have the intention just to go over all the re-
marks Foulis and Randall made with respect to [HadThiMug80, ThiHadMug81],
we find it more amusing to concentrate on two other papers, namely, [Bal81,
1 To [FouRan84] N. Hadjisavvas and F. Thieffine replied with [HadThi84] though their
paper does not add anything interesting to the discussion. Indeed, we agree with R. Piziak
who reviewed [HadThi84] for the AMS’ MathSciNet and states: “It is right and proper for
any scientific work to be scrutinized and criticized according to its merits. Indeed, this is a
main impetus to progress. But if mathematics is to be used as a tool for criticism, let it be
used properly.”
78
CHAPTER 6. CRITIQUES AND CRITICAL POINTS 79
EssZou81].
In [EssZou81] we witness some confusion concerning Piron adhering to the stance

of realism, we quote:
“His (Piron’s) epistemological or metaphysical position is unclear.
He adapts a realistic position without telling whether this realism
— nowadays called “physicalism” in order to distinguish it from
ontological or “Platonic” realism — is an absolute (or naive) or
hypothetical (or critical) one.” (p.411)
First of all, we would like to object to the point of view that the realistic position
of the Geneva School would be some kind of physicalism or materialism — the
view in which reality is reducible to, or emergent from, the realm of physical
things and processes [Nii87].2 We strongly object to any position in which
scientific research in physics would be some kind of bible for practicing any
more empirically oriented science. Our realistic position also is not naive in
the sense that certified truth is believed to be easily accessible [Nii87]. As we
explained in the beginning, the metaphysical stance of the Geneva School lies
in the nature of critical realism. W.K. Essler and G. Zoubek are not the only
ones who thought Piron’s realistic position to be somewhat unclear. In [Bal81]
we see some confusion concerning realism and the EPR-principle of reality:
“By a realistic interpretation he (Piron) means an interpretation

under which the objects of the theory can be described completely
by their actual properties.” (p.403-404)
It is obvious that W. Balzer who wrote this comment in 1981, was mainly
focusing on Piron’s earlier work. We think that in the meantime things have
been put in a larger perspective. But it is indeed so that the state of a physical
system has been conceived by C. Piron as the collection of its actual properties
which describe the system completely. It is important however to see that the
actual properties of a physical system only count as a complete description of
it in Piron’s sense when we see it relative to a specific “singular realization” of
that system. We mean this exactly in the sense that we can conceive a state
set to describe a physical system. A more general and complete description
of a physical system is however given by its property lattice consisting of all
its properties. If we want to focus on states instead of properties, the closest
we get to obtain a complete description of the system in general is by taking
into account all possible states of the system, in other words, its state space.
So we have to disagree with Balzer if he means that the realistic approach
of the Geneva School only allows us to focus on actual properties to describe a
2 Although one will nowadays perhaps not anymore put the thesis of physicalism forward in
the same strong terms, we still adopt its “old” meaning, i.e. “Physicalism asserts that every
term of the language of science — including beside the physical language those sub-languages
which are used in biology, in psychology, and in social science — is reducible to terms of the
physical language.” [Car36, p.467].
physical system. We do retain the criterion of reality as put forward in the EPR-
paper, though this does not exclude potential properties. There is a difference
between the lattice of all properties which characterizes the system in general
and the set of actual properties which describes the system in a certain state!
We think this may be the major misconception in [Bal81]. In his analysis of
Piron’s work, he also tries to see properties and questions as sets of physical
systems. This is obviously a picture which will not work, there is no need
to give another interpretation of properties than the one we gave above. A
property corresponds to an equivalence class of questions and a question is
operationally defined. Contrary to what is often thought, a question is not
something vague but rather very-well specified. There is another misconception
concerning properties and questions in [EssZou81], we quote:
“Since he (Piron) presupposes an absurd question 0 he has to assume
an absurd property 0 also which has then to be, according to his
distinction, either an actual or a potential property. But obviously
0 is neither an actual nor a potential property of an object. He
therefore has to distinguish the impossible properties both from the
actual and from the potential properties.” (p.412)
In the sense that potentiality of a property is defined within OQL, 0 is and will
always be a potential property. Especially because “0 is potential” only means:
“not actual”. If one thinks it would improve the theory it is of course possible
to introduce the notion of an impossible property. In that case an impossible
property could correspond to an equivalence class of impossible questions and
an impossible property then implies that the property is potential, but not vice
versa. Concerning the concept of a question, defined in [Pir81] as an experiment
leading to a well defined alternative of which the terms are “yes” or “no”, the
“yes” corresponding to the expected result and the “no” to all the others; there
also exists some confusion. It has maybe not been very clear in [Pir81] but as we
analyzed it above, using [Moo99], it concerns an experimental procedure which
is performable and is such that we can interpret the outcome of it in terms of
yes and no — exactly which outcome corresponds to “yes” is decided upon in
advance. There is even no need to specify which outcome of the experiment we
interpret as “no” since it will be everything not leading to the response “yes”. If
we concentrate on the possible confusion which arises here, we quote [EssZou81]:
“Other concepts of his approach are ambiguous and vague, espe-
cially his central concept of an “experiment leading to an alterna-
tive”. This concept of an experiment may be understood in at least
three different ways:
(1) An experiment is a device that tells the scientist how to handle
things by observing them and especially how to use an apparatus
for this purpose.
(2) An experiment is a single performance of such an experimental
device together with its result.
(3) An experiment is a basic (or minimal covering) law that general-
izes inductively the connections between performance and result of

that device.” (p.412)
Firstly note that there is more to a question than just performing an experi-
ment. In any case, we believe that for C. Piron an experiment is similar to a
procedure which we can perform. OQL clearly distinguishes an experiment and
its performance, this means indeed that something along the lines of (1) is the
case and not (2). However, W.K. Essler and G. Zoubek think that a reconstruc-
tion of Piron’s theory along the lines of (1) would make no sense of Piron’s use
of the terms “actual” and “potential” and therefore they exclude interpretation
(1) as a possibility. This seems to be a mistake, regarding questions we first of
all do not use the terminology of actuality and potentiality which is reserved for
properties. But if Essler and Zoubek have the terminology of “true” and “not
true” questions in mind, we still do not think there is a problem with accepting
interpretation (1). A question is true if in case we would perform it, “yes” is a
sure answer. Since this is a counterfactual definition, it is not in disaccordance
with disconnecting experiments from their performance. However Essler and
Zoubek are convinced that (3) is the case, questions are strict laws and there-
fore properties too are identified with a law or a theory [EssZou81, p.413-414].
One of their arguments concerns the counterfactual definition of a true question,
[EssZou81]:
“The statement “If we performed the question the answer “yes”
would be certain” cannot be justified by referring to some few ex-
periments and its results but only either to some law inductively
based on those results or gained by other laws or to some inductive
method expressing the belief in uniformity of the performances of
this experiment.” (p.414)
We agree with Essler and Zoubek if their statement points to the connection
between the lawlike character of utterances and the decidability of those coun-
terfactual stated utterances. Indeed, when some kind of question is always true
on some kind of physical systems, the question is connected to some law-like
behavior of the system. The same is the case for impossible questions, but not
true questions are then linked to utterances which are definitely not law-like.
Now, we still have to be careful with such generalizations here, for between
utterances with an explicit law-like character and those without there is still a
whole gray-scale left. We do not intend to enter the debate on the status of
laws in connection with counterfactuals within philosophy of science, let us just
mention instead that “experiments” are certainly not laws. We also do not be-
lieve one can so easily generalize and say that any question or property is a law.
Maybe Essler and Zoubek have a small point here but according to us it will
only involve true or impossible questions. Note that this also does not exclude
that experiments can be interpreted as disconnected from their performances.
Another critical point concerns the product question. We quote [EssZou81]:

“In his book [Pir76, p.20] he (Piron) tells us: “... one measures
an arbitrary one of the αi and attributes to Πi αi the answer thus
obtained ... By starting from the definitions it is easy to verify
the following rule: (Πi αi )∼ = Πi (αi∼ )”. The equation “(Πi αi )∼ =
Πi (αi∼ )” holds only in very few degenerate lattices, e.g. if the lattice
contains only the elements I and 0; in every other case we obtain:
“(Πi αi )∼ = Σi (αi∼ )”. So Piron obviously takes “Πi (αi∼ ) = Σi (αi∼ )”
to be true.” (p.415)
It is not evident what Essler and Zoubek are getting at here; perhaps they have
something like the De Morgan Laws in mind which of course are not applicable
here. But since we are talking about operational definitions, what is their
interpretation of the Σ of a family of questions? Especially taking into account
that it has to be operationally defined ! The product questions are operationally
precisely defined and therefore “(ΠJ αi )∼ = ΠJ (αi∼ )” does make sense. Essler
and Zoubek try to analyze their confusion and assume two possible cases. One
in which the members of the family on which a product is defined have to be
questions of a similar kind and one in which they can be different. In the first
case they use their previous law-argumentation which does not take them very
far and in the second case they say that “Piron’s rule of handling a product
is of course wrong since a product may be false even if the arbitrary chosen
member is true, namely, if one of the remaining members is false” [EssZou81,
p.415]. Here we believe they pretty well mix up some fundamental ideas. There
is a difference between obtaining the answer “yes” for a question and a “true”
question. A product question gives the result “yes” if we perform it, this means
exactly that the arbitrarily chosen question gives “yes” if we perform it. So,
even when all questions of a specific family are impossible except for one, the
product can give the result “yes”. It is something different to say that a product
question is true or not true. It is true when every question which we could pick
out of the specific family — relative to which the product is defined — is true.
And a product question is not true when not every question which we could pick
out of the specific family is true; it is impossible when every question which we
could pick is impossible. This leads us to conclude that Essler and Zoubek’s
analysis is simply wrong, a product question can never be “false” (impossible)
when the arbitrary chosen member is true. A product question is “not true” in
case the one chosen member is true and if at least one of the remaining members
is not true. The main point here is that we cannot claim in the latter case that
any “arbitrarily chosen” member is true. Truth and falseness — where false
means impossible — of a product question does not have anything to do with
the truth or falseness of one chosen member, but has to do with the status
of the arbitrarily chosen member, in other words, with every member in the
family. We agree that a product of questions is a confusing concept, being
constructed such that we can still talk about the product of two questions even
if their performances wouldn’t be possible together. Let us now concentrate on
(ΠJ αi )∼ = ΠJ (αi∼ ). A few possible situations indicate this equality:
1) Suppose we have a family of questions {αi ∈ Q | i ∈ J} with J given. If now
every αi we could select, gives “yes” if we would perform it, then ΠJ αi is true
and (ΠJ αi )∼ impossible (or false). If every arbitrary question we could pick
out of {αi∼ | αi ∈ Q, i ∈ J} gives “no” if we would perform it, then we say that
ΠJ (αi∼ ) is impossible (or false).
2) If on the other hand not every αi we could select gives “yes”, ΠJ αi is not true
and so is (ΠJ αi )∼ not true. If every αi which we could choose gives “no”, ΠJ αi
is impossible and so (ΠJ αi )∼ is true. If any arbitrary αi∼ which we could have
selected gives “yes”, then we say that ΠJ (αi∼ ) is true. If not every arbitrary αi∼
which we could have selected gives “yes”, then we say that ΠJ (αi∼ ) is not true.
Essler and Zoubek clearly did not understand that the product question has an
operational definition and gives rise to a property called the meet. Contrary
to what is claimed in [EssZou81], in order to test the affirmation “a is actual
and b is actual” we do not have to “perform” two experiments on the same
system! We only have to consider the product question αΠβ with ζ(α) = a
and ζ(β) = b. On the other hand it is clear that the join, defined by means of
Birkhoff’s theorem, admits of no direct physical meaning [CoeMooSme(nd)a].
More explicitly,
∨J ai = ζ(Π{β ∈ Q | ∀i ∈ J : αi ≺ β}) with ζ(αi ) = ai .
When we look at the disjunction, the classical “or”, we see that a OR b is a
property of a physical system iff it is possible to construct a question that tests
this property [Aer81] — something which will in general not be the case.
Finally we want to say something with respect to ideal, first kind measurements.
In [Bal81, p.405] W. Balzer thinks that C. Piron in his definition of such kind
of measurements uses basic concepts which are new relative to the underlying
theory he starts with. Especially the notion of a question which is “true af-
terwards” seems to be confusing. Note that C. Piron in [Pir81] talked about
properties which were actual or not afterwards, but we could indeed consider
questions as well. There is however nothing special going on here; what seems
to be forgotten by Balzer is the fact that when we consider a question to be
true, not true or impossible, the physical system is always in a certain singular
realization. And it is of course always with respect to a certain state of the sys-
tem that we can say that the property associated with a question is (potential)
actual. As such, given a particular physical system we can ask whether a certain
question is true or not and it makes sense to ask the question again after the
state of the system has changed. Indeed it also makes sense to ask whether a
question is still true after the system has been submitted to an ideal first kind
measurement. So actually we are puzzled by W. Balzer’s remark where he says:
“...I think the basic vocabulary must be enlarged in a nontrivial way
and new axioms must be adduced. If this is not done I find it difficult
to prove assertions like the following (compare also [Pir76]):
If a system is in state q, if question α is compatible with p and if α is
performed and yields the answer “yes” then the state of the system
after the experiment is (p ∨ a! ) ∧ a where a is the proposition defined
by α.” (p.406)
Since this “assertion” is quite badly formulated we can only ponder what Balzer
means. Is p actual in state q or how are p and q related? What kind of question
is α and what does it mean for questions to be compatible? We only talked
about compatible properties and reproduced the proof of the well formulated
theorem 4.3 in [Pir76, p.68]!
Finally we may affirm what we have insinuated all along: W.K. Essler and G.
Zoubek did not understand Piron’s work, [EssZou81]:
“As long as Piron does not answer these and similar questions in a
way satisfactory to logicians and especially as long as he does not
determine the logical structure of the elements of his class Q of all
questions his attempt remains as obscure as Heidegger’s approach to
a new ontology: he is able then to immunize his theory against any
critique by pretending that he has been misinterpreted, and no one
will then be able to prove the interpretation’s correctness.” (p.417)
6.2 Questions
First of all we will handle our own critical points of view concerning questions.
It is crucial to understand that questions — contrary to properties — do not
form a complete lattice. Firstly we only have a preorder relation on questions
and secondly, [Aer83a]:
“For a given family αi of questions the infimum (supremum) must
not be unique. However if two questions are both an infimum (supre-
mum) of the same family of questions, then they are equivalent”
(p.74)
And it is for that reason that we think the expression “the set of questions is a
complete lattice” used by D. Aerts in [Aer83a] causes too much confusion.
Concerning equivalent questions, in the sense equivalence has been defined ear-
lier, any question α is equivalent to the product with the trivial question αΠI.
The same holds for inverse questions: α∼ ≈ α∼ ΠI. The situation is however
completely different if we take the inverse questions of α and of αΠI, where
α∼ &≈ (αΠI)∼ . We see that contrary to α∼ , (αΠI)∼ can never give a posi-
tive answer since (αΠI)∼ = α∼ Π0 is equivalent to the absurd question — cf.
proposition 9.
Another point which may cause some confusion concerns the differences between
true, not true and impossible questions. We already addressed the fact that a not
true question differs from an impossible question which in [CatNis91] is called
a false question. Now, in [CatNis91] the notion of an indeterminate question is

introduced:
“When the physical system has been prepared in such a way that
in the event of an experiment neither the result “yes” nor the result
“no” is certain, we shall say that the question is indeterminate.”
(p.1300)
In order to clear up the possible misunderstandings in relation to the now in-
troduced notion of indeterminate questions, which according to us may be cut
loose from the preparation procedures, we put forward the following relations:
α is indeterminate ⇒ α is not true

α is impossible ⇒ α is not true
α is impossible or α is indeterminate ⇔ α is not true
α is impossible &⇐ α is indeterminate

α is impossible &⇒ α is indeterminate
α is impossible ⇔ α∼ is true
α is indeterminate ⇔ α∼ is indeterminate
α is not true ⇔ α∼ is indeterminate or α∼ is true
Note that a question and its inverse can never both be true or both be impossible,
but can both be indeterminate. As shown in [Moo99], the product question of
the trivial and absurd questions IΠ0 and its inverse 0ΠI are both not true and
even more, both are indeterminate. We cannot be sure to always obtain “no”,
neither can we be sure to always obtain “yes”, should we perform those questions
because we are allowed to choose arbitrarily between the trivial and absurd
questions. Note also that a question and its inverse are always performable
together, the experimental procedures are for both questions exactly the same,
the only thing which differs between them is the rule interpreting the result in
terms of “yes” and “no”.
Although questions can be true, impossible (false), and indeterminate — as

in [CatNis91] — or not true — as in [Aer83a, Moo99] -, they only have two
truthvalues. Not being able to predict a specific outcome, does not define a new
truthvalue or a value gap. The only truthvalues are yes and no and not our
predictions of them.
6.3 Properties
Concerning properties, there are also some critical points to keep in mind. To
every question on a particular physical system there corresponds a property of
the physical system. By means of a question on a particular physical system,
there is no way of ever claiming that the associated property does not pertain to
that particular physical system. What we mean is that a property, associated
with a question, always pertains to the physical system in consideration, but

can be actual or potential. The only crucial thing worth noting again is the
fact that ζ(α)! is not always equal to ζ(α∼ ) unless we are dealing with classical
systems in which case,
a is actual ⇔ a! is potential
a! is actual ⇔ a is potential.
In general, for the non-classical and classical cases with a and a! given, we can
only claim the following due to the fact that: a ∧ a! = 0,
a is actual ⇒ a! is potential
a! is actual ⇒ a is potential
We see here that when a is actual, a! has to be potential because if it were
actual then a ∧ a! would also be actual meaning that 0 would be actual, which
leads to a contradiction. For non classical systems we cannot say that α “or”
α∼ is true in every state and therefore, when a! is not actual, it does not imply
anything with respect to a.
The notion of compatibility may also be a difficult one. We claimed that if L

satisfies certain axioms, b ≤ c implies that b ↔ c. Because the compatibility
relation is symmetric we can also say that if the same axioms are satisfied and
if b ≤ c then c ↔ b. It is however not so that the converse holds; in other words:
b ↔ c does not imply b ≤ c or c ≤ b. Starting from two compatible properties,
we cannot claim anything about the actuality-relation between the two.
6.4 Physical Systems

We used the notion of classical, non-classical and quantum physical systems.
Since in general a particular physical system will have quantum and classical
properties, such a system is rightly named non-classical instead of quantum. It
will be clear that the notion of a quantum system has been used in the sense
that is was described by a purely quantum property lattice. In the sense that
OQL can describe all these types of physical systems, it is more general then
both classical and quantum mechanics. Because quantum mechanics without
superselection rules is only capable of describing pure quantum systems (see
[Aer81]).
Although we limited our exposition of OQL to the overall case of one physical
system described by one property lattice, it should be noted that the same con-
cept of a physical system has in the OQL-literature also been applied to the cases
in which a system consists of subsystems. We believe however that as such the
concept of a physical system together with the related conceptions of separation,
forms an actual limitation of static OQL. As noted in [CoeMooWil00]:
“In particular, a system consisting of two “‘separated” systems, in

the sense of Aerts, each of which individually obeys Piron’s axioms,
will as a whole conform to these axioms if and only if one of the
systems is classical.” (p.14)
This has been proved by Aerts in [Aer81]. Although we see this as a definite
limitation of static OQL, it has to be stressed that this limitation also holds for
Hilbert Space formalism. What we mean is that the combination of separated
subsystems3 cannot be described by a Hilbert space. This has been summarized
clearly in [Isc(nd)]:
“In quantum mechanics, closed subspaces of H (or projectors) repre-

sent the physical properties of the system. The set of all properties
forms a complete lattice, called the property lattice. But when two
systems are separated, there exist properties that do not correspond
to any projector of a Hilbert space.”
However, as argued in [Coe00], in the passage from static OQL to its dynamic
extension — cf. part IV — the mentioned limitation vanishes since both the
tensor product states and separation prove to be different modes of so-called
“compoundness”.
3 “Separated means that any experiment performed on one system does not alter the other
system (does not change its state)” [Isc(nd)].
Part III
Is Operational Quantum
Logic a Logic?
88
Chapter 7
“Operational Quantum
Logic” and Logic
First of all we want to make explicit that from now on we consider OQL as
satisfying only axioms 1,2,3, unless explicitly stated otherwise. In the tradition
of the Geneva School, J.M. Jauch and C. Piron have repeatedly insisted on not
calling OQL or a property lattice a “logic”. In their opinion, if logic is only
occupied with the study of valid inferences there is no room for any operational
content as explicitly present in OQL. On top of that, they take the well known
problems with implication as an overwhelming reason for why we should not
characterize OQL as a logic [JauPir70]. We believe however that these problems
are not longer a burden to using the label of “logic”, because even besides SQL
— the algebraic structure of closed subspaces in a Hilbert space — also abstract
ortho(modular)logic deals with the same implication problems and is nowadays
conceived as a “real logic” [Dal86, Dal81a]. We quote M.L. Dalla Chiara in
[Dal86]:
“today it is very clear that quantum logic is a “real logic”, at least
in the sense that it possesses a logical status completely similar to
that of other well-accepted logics, which are weaker than classical
logic (like for instance, intuitionistic logic).” (p.427)
It is in this sense that we believe that OQL can give rise to a logical system
which is then of course abstracted from its operational dimension. What we
have in mind is the abstract system of propositions connected to the properties
in a property lattice. Note however that this logical system emerges from OQL
though is in itself quite different from it. To deepen what we mean by the logic
of OQL we will concentrate in the next paragraph on the question “What is
logic?”.
In our opinion, an answer to the question demands a definition, although we

agree with I. Hacking in [Hac79] and P. Aczel in [Acz94] that a generally-
accepted characterization of logic does not exist. H. Putnam maybe did not
89
CHAPTER 7. “OPERATIONAL QUANTUM LOGIC” AND LOGIC 90
state it in these words, but he recognized “the difficulty of getting any univer-
sally acceptable statement of the general principles that all logicians somehow
seem to recognize” [Put71, p.9]. According to him our approach of focusing on
the definition(s) of logic, would probably not be the right one, since he states
in [Put71]:
“The various extant definitions of “logic” manage to combine circu-
larity with inexactness in one way or another.” (p.3)
This might have been the case in 1971, but today we would not support this
utterance, quite on the contrary, there exist some good definitions that approach
the subject clearly. H. Putnam’s own approach to the question “what is logic?”
consisted of looking at logic itself. Although this can be a good approach,
we doubt it answers the question well enough without taking into account the
whole historical development of logic, which partly means reproducing the work
of e.g. W. Kneale and M. Kneale in [KneKne84].1 Among the several possible
definitions now available, we highlight J. van Benthem’s, [VBen95]:
“Logic is the study of reasoning — encompassing many aspects of
cognition and of rational thinking — both in the sense of description
of reasoning practice and the sense of design of reasoning systems.
And as such, it is a discipline in its own right, without being a
handmaiden to any special employer.” (p.271)
The italics are added to van Benthem’s statement as has been suggested by I.
Németi and H. Andréka in [NemAnd94, p.393]. We follow Németi and Andréka
[NemAnd94] in their opinion that the old definitions screening logic as the sci-
ence or study of valid inferences2 are too narrow to cover the subject matter of
logic nowadays. And as the above definition points out, we cite [NemAnd94]:
“So, there is a subject matter of logic which is “out there in the
world” and, roughly speaking, this subject matter is the phenomenon
of reasoning, cognition and rational thinking (or at least many as-
pects of these).” (p.393)
In this respect Németi and Andréka attribute to logical studies a greater di-
versity, besides the central topic of inference and consequence, logic also deals
with other aspects and mechanisms of cognition and reasoning. The way a logi-
cian approaches the subject matter of logic is by mathematically modeling the
phenomena of reasoning, cognition and rational thinking [NemAnd94]. As such
we are convinced that very specific aspects of the subject matter of logic can
be modeled mathematically in such a way that the result is what we called the
logical system of OQL. To be a bit more explicit, we first have to highlight the
1 This is not a critic to the address of H. Putnam in [Put71] because 1) he never had the
aim in the mentioned essay to give a full survey of opinions and 2) his answer to “what logic
is” existed only in pointing out that “there is a body of “permanent doctrine” in logic; but it
just does not carry one very far, at least when it comes to getting an exact and universally
acceptable statement of the general principles.” [Put71, p.7].
2 “Validity of inferences” being the (semantical) study of consequence relations.
difference between a logical system and a logic [NemAnd94]. In particular, a

logic has to account for revisional and updating processes of logical systems —
seen as parts of logic — whereby we further adopt the thesis put forward by J.
Barwise and E. Hammer in [BarHam94] that “a logical system is a mathematical
model of some pretheoretic notion of consequence and an existing (or possible)
inferential practice that honors it.”3 A logical system then consists of the usual
syntax (language, set of formulas and provability relation) and semantics (class
of models, meaning function and validity-consequence relation) while a model
of knowledge acquisition falls under the label of logic. In [NemAnd94] such a
model of knowledge acquisition is built as follows:
We start with an idealized thinker — not necessarily one individual — and

an idealized environment. This environment is “the subject of the thinking
process”, “what that the thinker is thinking about”. Secondly we consider
the thinker’s thoughts. Those have to be such that they are representable as
“syntactical entities”. In this way all the “possible thoughts” constitute “the
thinker’s language”. The thinker — capable of cognitive, rational, reasoning
processes — has “inference mechanisms or other processes which manipulate its
thoughts”. A mathematical model consists then of
0) The thinker is thinking “about something”.
1) A kind of formal language (syntax) represents the thinker’s language of
thought.
2) “Calculi, rewrite rules, turing machines and similar algorithmic or finitistic
mathematical objects” represent the thinker’s inference mechanisms or other
thought-manipulating processes.
3) A mathematical (semantical) model represents the environment which is one
element of the class of mathematical models of possible environments of the
thinker. We can reduce the class of all mathematical models to the class of
models which are compatible with the thinker’s knowledge at some specific
point in time. Note that the thinker’s knowledge (thoughts) at some specific
point in time are manifested as “syntactical entities”. The bigger the class of
its models, the higher the uncertainty of the thinker about its environment. In
a model of knowledge acquisition the class of models which are compatible with
the thinker’s knowledge may change over time.
4) “There is a mathematical representation of the connection between expres-
sions of the thinker’s language and the environment”. Here we think about a
meaning-assignment function and validity or satisfaction relation.
We will now work out the given scheme for knowledge acquisition for the struc-
ture of physical properties :
0) The objects of thought are the properties of a physical system
3 J. Barwise and E. Hammer defend a modest position towards their thesis in the sense that
they do not claim that it will encompass “everything” called a logical system. They wanted
to provide “a useful way to understand work on logical systems”.
1) These objects of thought manifest themselves as experimental propositions.

All the possible experimental propositions linked to possible objects of thought,
define the formal language of our logical system.
2) The syntactical calculus can be represented by for example a natural deduc-
tion system or a sequent calculus. We can talk here about those laws of thought
that constitute specific connections between the syntactical representatives of
the objects of thought.
3) The mathematical model of the environment is the abstract lattice-theoretical
model of OQL.
4) A mathematical representation of the link between syntax and semantics can
be established.
If we elaborate 3) such that model-building and revision is possible by means

of the operational dimension in the sense that the thinker is able to act and
perform questions, we come very close to calling even OQL a logic. Without
the operational dimension and revision-processes the logical system of OQL has
a syntax and semantics. In the following chapters we will first concentrate on
the logical system of OQL restricted to describe quantum systems4 which we
abbreviate as ls-OQL. The elaboration of ls-OQL has partly been initiated in
[CoeMooSme(nd)b] and will be concentrated upon in full detail in the next
chapters.
4 In that sense 0 and 1 will be the only classical propositions/properties we will consider.
Chapter 8
Natural Deduction
Among all possible ways of axiomatizing logical systems, the most popular meth-
ods without doubt are the Gentzen style sequent calculi and natural deduction
systems. In the history and development of ortho(modular)logic we encounter
several kinds of axiomatizations with/without an implication connective. For
natural deduction systems and Gentzen style sequent calculi we refer to the work
done in [CutGib82, Dal86, DalGiu(nd), Gib85, Gib87, Gol74, Nis80, Nis94a,
Nis94b, Tak95, Tam88]. Note that the paper of R.I. Goldblatt appeared before
the others and is seen as a milestone in this development however we want to
note that R.I. Goldblatt himself used the notion of binary logic by which he
conceived logic not as a set of well-formed formulas (wff’s) but as a collection
of ordered pairs of wff’s as indicator for which wff’s are inferable from which
others. In the tradition of Hilbert-style axiomatizations we may place the im-
plication algebra of P.D. Finch and R. Piziak [Piz74] and further in this line
also the work of I.D. Clark in [Cla73] who uses negation and implication as his
basic connectives.
In what follows, we will focus on a natural deduction presentation of sequents

for ls-OQL. Sequents are ordered pairs of well-formed formulas of the form
A → a where a, the succedent, can be inferred from A (possibly empty, possibly
infinite), the antecedent. Note that we will omit an implication connective in
ls-OQL and will deal with the specific implication problems in chapter 11. The
language for the “propositional” ls-OQL, is built up by means of the following
symbols: the propositional variables p, q, r, ...; the propositional constants 1, 0,
the connectives meet ∧, join ∨, ∼ and the → for sequents. The well-formed
formulas are then straightforwardly defined corresponding to the properties of
a complete L. Recursively, all the propositional variables are formulas and if
a is a formula, then so is ∼ a and if {ai | i ∈ J} is a set of formulas then
∧J ai , ∨J ai are formulas. It will be clear that given axioms 1,2 and 3 for L,
every well-formed formula of ls-OQL should be equal to the join of specifically
chosen propositional variables,
"
a = {p | p % a}
93
CHAPTER 8. NATURAL DEDUCTION 94
Where propositional variables correspond to atomic properties in L and syn-

tactic consequence % will be defined later on in this chapter. We do recognize
propositional variables due to the fact that p ∧ q % 0 for any two different propo-
sitional variables p and q corresponding to atomic properties. Note that it is
with a slight abuse of notation that we use the same symbols a, b, c, ... for well-
formed formulas of our language as for the properties in L — the context of
their use should make clear whether we are talking about syntax or semantics.
We will represent the set of all wff’s as +. Given the fact that we allow ∧J ai
and ∨J ai as formulas where the set {ai | i ∈ J} is not necessarily finite or
even denumerable, we would like to conceive of ls-OQL as a kind of infinitary
proposition logic.
There are several ways to deal with so-called infinitary operations or infinite
long conjunctions and disjunctions on a syntactical level. First note the fact
that for classical first-order logic with one-place predicates on a finite domain,
every formula is equivalent to a formula without quantifiers in the following way
[Gri85, p.322]:
(∀x)A(x) = A(a1 ) ∧ ... ∧ A(an );
(∃x)A(x) = A(a1 ) ∨ ... ∨ A(an );
Immediately the idea presents itself to consider an infinite domain of range for
predicates. This then implies crossing the edges of first-order logic which is only
occupied with the study of finite expressions. Indeed the idea of defining the
universal and existential quantifiers in terms of infinite conjunctions and dis-
junctions respectively, can be traced back at least to Charles Saunders Peirce
[Bar81]. This onset of what is now called infinitary logic which began in the
late nineteenth century, did not last very long and fell into disrepute for a while
due to the logic community which was heavily influenced by Hilbert’s Program.
As J. Barwise mentioned it in [Bar81], Gödels incompleteness theorem of 1931
changed things considerably. As is well known, his second incompleteness theo-
rem points out that Hilbert’s idea of searching for a consistency-proof for large
axiomatic systems — such as arithmetic — by finitistic and meta-mathematical
means was quite unprobable.1 Gödel first showed the limitation of the axiomatic
method in the sense that an axiomatic system large enough to encompass arith-
metic is, assuming its consistency, fundamentally incomplete and secondly that
its consistency cannot be proved by means of meta-mathematical propositions
which can be mapped into mathematical ones of this system. More explicitly,
Gödels incompleteness theorem produced a tautology expressible in finite terms
though not finitely provable, namely “..., a statement of the form (∀x)A(x)
about natural numbers such that each of A(0), A(1), A(2), ... is provable from
the first-order axioms about natural numbers, but such that there is no fi-
nite proof of (∀x)A(x) from the same axioms.” [Bar81, p.99]. This indicates
that Gödel actually said that arithmetic is ω-inconsistent, which means that if
1 We want to mention that although Hilbert’s program is limited, it is successful for con-
sistency proofs of arithmetical systems that allow for instance only the addition of cardinal
numbers (but not the multiplication) [NagNew58, p.52].
(∃x)A(x) is provable, also every member of the infinite set of formulas ∼ A(0),
∼ A(1), ∼ A(2), etc. is provable — to derive inconsistency also (∀x) ∼ A(x)
needs to be provable [NagNew58, p.106]. Eventually, we may say that after
1931 infinitary logic very slowly found its way through the logical landscape
with some help in the fifties by A. Tarski’s school of model theory in Berkeley
[Bar81]. As such, we now in the literature encounter several kinds of infini-
tary logics, introduced as extensions of first-order logic which allow infinite long
conjunctions, disjunctions and/or infinite quantifier sequences.
Without intending to conduct a full survey on the topic of infinitary logic, we

mention that because it would be too restrictive to assume that the property
lattice of a physical system has countably many elements we are obliged to look
at infinitary languages such as Lα for at least uncountable or even arbitrary
α which in the latter case equals ∞. In L∞ , ∞ stands for the fact that con-
junctions and disjunctions of any set of its formulas are allowed, but that we
omit quantifications. Due to the difficulties of obtaining a complete axiomati-
zation of classical infinitary logic with cardinality > ω1 , it would indeed have
been nice if we could stick to the countable cardinality case though this is not
very plausible. The states of physical systems could then be represented by
real numbers and we know that the set of real numbers is uncountable. Recall
that a set which is infinite enumerable is called denumerable and a set is called
countable if it is either finite or denumerable of which the latter means that it
is equipollent to the set of natural numbers (see for instance [Sto79, Sup72]).
Furthermore it is proved by means of Cantor’s diagonal method that there are
sets which are not enumerable or denumerable, in [Sup72, p.191], the proof is
reproduced to show that the set of real numbers is not denumerable, while in
[BooJef98] the proof is given to show that the powerset of a denumerable set
is not denumerable. As is briefly explained in [Sto79], Cantor’s diagonal proce-
dure, “is a process for deriving, under the assumption that an enumeration of
a set is given, a member different from all those in the enumeration. This, of
course, renders it absurd that the given enumeration is one of all members of
the set.” (p.92). The problem which we expect to encounter in ls-OQL is that
besides the failure of compactness and the upward Löwenheim-Skolem theorem,
in its usual form, for every infinite logic, there does not exist a complete formal
or axiomatic system for this logic. We base this belief on C. R. Karp’s result for
classical propositional infinitary logic. Only when α = ω (the first-order logic
case) or when α = ω1 (the countable case) is a completeness proof straightfor-
ward; when α > ω1 a completeness proof can be obtained only in certain cases
— for instance when α is strong inaccessible — and when an additional scheme
is added to the basic α-propositional calculus. As is noted, the completeness
for a propositional calculus with α = (2γ )+ extended with some extra distribu-
tive law and with more than γ propositional symbols is doubtful.2 For any
further technical details or for the completeness problems in classical infinitary
2 Recallthat if α is a cardinal, α+ is the least cardinal greater than α and αγ denotes the
cardinal exponentiation where 2γ is the cardinal of the set of all subsets of a set of cardinal
γ. For more details see for instance [Dev93].
predicate logic we refer to [Kar64] and [Dic75, appendix C].
Of course problems with completeness often occur with extensions of first-order

logic, an example we want to remind of is J. Hintikka’s Independence-Friendly
Logic built further on the idea of “Henkin” or branching quantifiers. This logic
has indeed more expressive power since it allows formulas to be expressed by
means of dependencies and indepedencies of quantifiers which are not expressible
in first-order logic. Hintikka’s main example in [Hin98, p.49-51] is:
(∀x)(∀z)(∃y/∀z)(∃u/∀x)S[x, y, z, u]
which in second-order logic is easily to be understood as:
(∃f )(∃g)(∀x)(∀z)S[x, f (x), z, g(z)]
The most well known example of a logic which causes problems on the com-
pleteness level is perhaps second-order logic. Contrary to its first-order sister,
this logic allows quantification over, for instance, relations or predicate-symbols
and function-symbols as we just saw. Finally we want to remind the reader of
the logic with generalized quantifiers first introduced by A. Mostowski in 1948.
The extension of classical first-order logic by a generalized quantifier is often
called the system LQ where Q is the added quantifier such that the formula
QxA(x) may stand for the expression “there are uncountably many x satisfying
A” [EbbFluTho78, chapter IX]. As is shown for instance in [EbbFluTho78], the
gained expressive power of LQ is compensated with a completeness theorem
which only holds for countable sets of LQ -formulas. Given this situation we still
think it is necessary and fruitful to have logical rules for infinite conjunctions
and disjunctions because, without any doubt, it smoothes the way for formal-
izing statements or arguments about properties of quantum physical systems.
Indeed the same argument as given in [EbbFluTho78] for second-order logic
rules also applies to our case of ls-OQL, namely the fact that the choice of the
following rules is made from a pragmatic point of view and not with the aim of
attaining completeness. We will therefore introduce the rules for each junctor
according to the lattice operations of OQL, and will even define the provability
relation in correspondence with the a priori given algebraic satisfaction relation
of actuality — see also section 9.1 on algebraic realizations. A detailed analysis
of each rule follows.
First of all, one should notice that the meet or conjunction obtained its mean-
ing through the operationally defined product question:
! ∧i ai = ζ(Πi αi ) with
ζ(αi ) = ai where we will now also use the notation A for a property which is
actual iff each a ∈ A is actual. This takes us to the definition of the provability
relation for sequents — or the syntactical consequence relation:
Definition 27. !
The provability relation %⊆ P (+) × + is defined by A % b ⇔ A ≤ b, where A % b
means that b is derivable from A or that the sequent A → b is provable. We say
that A % b iff there is a (possible infinite) derivation using the ls-OQL inference
rules such that A → b is the last derived sequent.
The following rules emerge immediately from OQL and have the following form:
A→a1 ...A→an
A→a where the top sequents are the premises from which the bottom
sequent follows as a conclusion. We will write A, a → b instead of A ∪ {a} → b
and a → b instead of {a} → b. In cases where confusion is possible, we will
explicitly use ai for the set {ai | i ∈ J}:
A→a A! ,a→b
(as) A,a→a (sub) A,A! →b
∀i∈J:(A→ai )
(∧E, ∀j ∈ J) A→∧J ai
A→aj (∧I) A→∧J ai
A→∨J ai ∀i∈J:(ai →b) A→aj

(∨E) A→b (∨I, ∀j ∈ J) A→∨J ai
A,ai →b
(w) A→a
A,A! →a (r) A,∧J ai →b
In case of orthocomplementation, we add:
(∼∼ E) A→∼∼a
A→a (∼∼ I) A→a
A→∼∼a
(∼ I) a→b∧∼b
→∼a (tp) a→b
∼b→∼a
In case of weak modularity, we add:

∼b→∼a ∼a,b→c∧∼c
(OM ) ∼a→∼b
The proofs given in the following sections contain sequents of the form A →
which are notational abbreviations of A → e∧ ∼ e. As we already mentioned in
the first chapter, the quantum logical join differs from the classical disjunction
with, as a consequence, the partial failure of the distributivity of meet and join.
The join of two states encompasses also the possibly generated superposition
states while the classical disjunction is nothing more than the settheoretical
union — for an example in Hilbert space see for instance [Gib87, p.94-95]. Note
that this explains why we limit the use of contexts in the rules (∼ I) and (∨E) —
classically those rules have also been called reductio ad absurdum and dilemma
respectively. More specifically for (∨E) we may say that “what follows from a
together with some true statement c, and also follows from b together with c,
need not follow from “a or b” together with c” [Dum78, p.276].
We explicitly give the proof of (a ∧ b) ∨ (a ∧ c) → a ∧ (b ∨ c) in ls-OQL below,

though first we will show explicitly why the converse fails. Consider for instance
as a model a property lattice of a photon, [Pir78]:
“Le système physique considéré est un photon polarisé linéairement

se déplaçant sur une droite. Une question αφ est défini par:
1) L’appareil: un polariseur d’angle φ et un compteur placé derrière.
2) Le mode d’emploi: On place le polariseur et son compteur sur le
passage du photon.
3) Si on enregistre le passage du photon à travers le polariseur, la
réponse est “oui” si non la réponse est “non”.
L’expérience montre que si un photon a déjà traversé un polariseur
d’angle φ, il possède alors la propriété correspondant à “αφ est
vrai”. De plus, on ne peut jamais affirmer avec certitude qu’un
même photon traverserait aussi bien un polariseur d’angle φ qu’un
autre d’angle φ! si | φ! − φ |&= 0 ou π.” (p.11-12).
For this example we can draw the following diagram (see Fig 3) where we only
1
consider some properties explicitly: a cor-
responds to αφ , b to αφ! , a! to αφ + π\2
and b! to αφ! + π\2. Clearly this lattice for
a photon is not boolean, more specifically:
a b a' b'
a∧(b∨a! ) = a∧1 = a while (a∧b)∨(a∧a! ) =
0∨0 = 0 (see also [JauPir70]). Note that for
such non-boolean lattices we have (a ∧ b) ∨
0 (a ∧ a! ) ≤ a ∧ (b ∨ a! ) while also the converse
Fig 3: The lattice for a photon a ∧ (b ∨ a! ) ≤ (a ∧ b) ∨ (a ∧ a! ) holds when we
consider boolean property lattices. Return-
ing to ls-OQL, we can now say that indeed a proof of a∧(b∨c) → (a∧b)∨(a∧c)
can be established when we use the classical (∨E) with unrestricted contexts
(the first of following proofs can also be found in [Gib87] where it is given in
the context of general quantum logic and with a different style of notation):
(as)
a, b → b a, c → c(as)
(as) (r) (r)
a, b → a a∧b→b a, c → a(as) a∧c→c
(r) (∨I) (c) (∨I)
a∧b→a a∧b→b∨c a∧c→a a∧c→b∨c
(as) (∧I) (∧I)
(a ∧ b) ∨ (a ∧ c) → a∧b→ a∧c→
(a ∧ b) ∨ (a ∧ c) a ∧ (b ∨ c) a ∧ (b ∨ c)
(∨E)
(a ∧ b) ∨ (a ∧ c) → a ∧ (b ∨ c)
(as) (as)
a, b → a a, b → b a, c → a(as) a, c → c(as)
(∧I) (∧I)
a, b → a ∧ b a, c → a ∧ c
(as) (∨I) (∨I)
a, (b ∨ c) → b ∨ c a, b → (a ∧ b) ∨ (a ∧ c) a, c → (a ∧ b) ∨ (a ∧ c)
(classical ∨E)
a, (b ∨ c) → (a ∧ b) ∨ (a ∧ c)
(r)
a ∧ (b ∨ c) → (a ∧ b) ∨ (a ∧ c)
We will now discuss why exactly we adopt the above inference rules as the most
primitive ones, and will show how other rules can be derived from them.
8.1 Assumption
The assumption rule (as) expresses that A, a % a is always
! derivable!since by the
operational definition underlying the meet we have (A ∪ {a}) = ( A) ∧ a ≤ a.
This rule further express the reflexivity of “%” in analogy with the reflexivity of
“≤” (in case A is empty).
8.2 Substitution
The substitution rule (sub) expresses
! the !transitivity of “%”! which!in OQL
corresponds
! to !
the fact that
! if! A ≤ a and ( A )∧a ≤ b then ( A)∧( A ) ≤ b
! !
since ( A) ∧ ( A ) ≤ ( A ) ∧ a ≤ b. The substitution rule — cf. [GouMac97]

!
— resembles one representation of the cut rule used in Gentzen style sequent
calculi for quantum logic. As we show, the (sub)-rule is derivable from the other
rules in ls-OQL in the case we allow a classical (∨E) with unrestricted contexts.
(prem)
A→a
(w) (as)
A, ∼ a → a A, ∼ a →∼ a
(∧I)
A, ∼ a → a∧ ∼ a
(ex f also) (prem)
A, ∼ a → b A! , a → b
(w) (w)
A! , A, ∼ a → b A! , A, a → b
(classical ∨E)
A! , A → b
Note that to apply the classical rule (∨E), we did not make A! , A → a∨ ∼ a
explicit because it is derivable through weakening and the excluded middle which
can be introduced from an empty set of premises.
8.3 Meet and Join

Given the introduction and elimination rules for join and meet, we point out
that they correspond exactly to the following algebraic characterizations given
in OQL. Remember that ∨J ai is the least upper bound of all ai (or equally of
all aj ) which satisfies that ∀j ∈ J : aj ≤ ∨J ai and ∀j ∈ J : aj ≤ b implies
∨J ai ≤ b while ∧J ai is the greatest lower bound of all ai (or equally of all aj )
which satisfies that ∀j ∈ J : ∧J ai ≤ aj and ∀j ∈ J : b ≤ aj implies b ≤ ∧J ai .
The meet was operationally introduced while the ! join was obtained by means
of Birkhoff’s theorem which states that ∨J ai = {a ∈ L | ∀i ∈ J : ai ≤ a}.
By the definition of the meet as a lower bound, ∀j ∈ J : ∧J ai ≤ aj holds and

corresponds exactly to (∧E). Note that ∧J ai → aj is always derivable ∀j ∈ J
because the premise of ∧J ai →∧J ai

∧J ai →aj , ∀j ∈ J can always be introduced by means
of the assumption rule.
Starting from the meet !

as a lower bound where ∀j ∈ J : ∧J ai ≤ aj holds
together with ∀j ∈ J :! A ≤ aj we obtain by the definition of the meet as
greatest lower bound: A ≤ ∧J ai . Correspondingly we introduced the rule
(∧I).
By the definition of the join as upper bound, we have ∀j ∈ J : aj ≤ ∨J ai which

corresponds to (∨I). Note here that ∧J ai → ∨J ai is always derivable because
∧ ai →aj
as we said before, the premise of ∧J Jai →∨J ai
, ∀j ∈ J is always derivable.
Starting from the join as an upper bound where ∀j ∈ J : aj ≤ ∨J ai holds
together with ∀j ∈ J : aj ≤ b we obtain by the definition of the join as least
upper bound: ∨J ai ≤ b. Correspondingly we introduced the rule (∨E). With
this rule we see that the following holds a ∨ b % c iff a % c and b % c because of
the derivations:
a∨b→a∨b a→c b→c

a∨b→c
a→a∨b a∨b→c b→a∨b a∨b→c

a→c b→c
If, however, we extend the left sides of the turnstile with contexts we see that
if A, a ∨ b % c then also A, a % c and A, b % c. The converse only holds when the
system consists of classical properties — see subsection 8.5.3 and the algebraical
proof given in [CoeMooSme(nd)b]. It is for precisely this reason that the context
in (∨E) has been restricted. So, it comes as no surprise that the classical rule
known as disjunctive syllogism is not derivable in ls-OQL since its derivation is
based on the classical (∨E)-rule. Even when a ∨ b is a true wff in ls-OQL, we
know that a as well as b can both be false, this implies ∼ a, a ∨ b &% b in ls-OQL.
(as) (as) (ex f also)

∼ a, a ∨ b → a ∨ b ∼ a, b → b ∼ a, a → b
(classical ∨E)
∼ a, a ∨ b → b
8.4 Weakening and Regularity

Weakening (w) is understood as an explicit “structural” rule as is also the case
in Genzen ! style sequent calculi.
! We derive its meaning immediately from OQL
where if A ≤ b then also A ∧ c ≤ b by definition of the meet as the greatest
lower bound. The structural rule of contraction expresses in OQL: a ∧ a ≤ c
implies a ≤ c and is implicitly present in ls-OQL by the fact that we work with
sets of formula at the left side of the turnstile.
Regularity of a Gentzen style sequent calculus would come

! down " to the fact that
for finite A and B; A → B is a derivable sequent
! iff A → B is a derivable "
sequent, which translates itself into A → B iff A → B and A → B iff A → B
[CutGib82]. Note that the sequent calculi developed for quantum logic are not
all regular, see for instance [Nis80]. And indeed, if a sequent calculus is regular
it allows us to derive the following rules given in [CutGib82, p.228-229]:
A,a,b→B A,a∧b→B
A,a∧b→B A,a,b→B
A→B,a,b A→B,a∨b
A→B,a∨b A→B,a,b
As explained in [CutGib82], regularity — and especially the derivation of a∨b →

a, b — in combination with a full cut-rule:
A→B,a a,C→D
A,C→B,D
gives rise to a classical calculus because the classical reductio ad absurdum

then becomes derivable. In our natural deduction approach we avoid these
difficulties by restricting the succedent of sequents to at most one wff as in
sequent calculi for intuitionistic logic. Such sequents are called normal sequents
in [CutGib82, Nis80]. We however still want to hold ! on to the idea of regularity,
which for normal sequents reduces to A → b iff A → b. Translated into our
natural deduction system, we need the following rules:
A,∧J ai →b A,ai →b
A,ai →b
(r) A,∧ J ai →b
The first of these rules is derivable within ls-OQL while the last one is an
a →b
explicitly introduced inference rule. Note also that ∧Jjai →b is derivable for any
j ∈ J within ls-OQL while (r) is not. We give the derivations:
(as)
∀i ∈ J : (ai → ai )
(∧I) (prem)
ai → ∧J ai A, ∧J ai → b
(sub)
A, ai → b
(prem, j∈J)
aj → b
(tp, j∈J)
∼ b →∼ aj
(∨I)
∼ b → ∨J ∼ ai
(as) (tp)
∧J ai → ∧J ai ∼ (∨J ∼ ai ) →∼∼ b
(DM 2) (∼∼E)
∧J ai →∼ (∨J ∼ ai ) ∼ (∨J ∼ ai ) → b
(sub)
∧J a i → b
We used (DM 2) which is a De Morgen rule, for more details of which we refer
to the following section. We see that “A, ∧J ai → b implies A, ai → b” ! can be
written as A, ai → ∧J ai for b = ∧J ai which in OQL corresponds to ( A) ∧
(∧ai ) ≤ ∧J ai . And
! for (r), we see that ! “A, ai → b implies A, ∧J ai → b”
corresponds to: “ (A ∪ ai ) ≤ b implies ( A) ∧ (∧J ai ) ≤ b” in OQL. Note that
with respect to the join we can derive within ls-OQL the following rule:
A,∨J ai →b
A,ai →b
ai → aj (as, j∈J)
(∨I) (prem)
ai → ∨J ai A, ∨J ai → b
(sub)
A, ai → b
The difference between the use of ai → b and ∀i : (ai → b) becomes clear

when we see that ∨aJ ia→b
i →b
is in general not derivable in ls-OQL — except when
∀i∈J:(ai →b)
∧J ai = ∨J ai — whereas we know that ∨J ai →b is a version of the (∨E) rule.
8.5 Negation
The quantum logical negation, corresponding to orthocomplementation, differs
from the classical negation which corresponds to a settheoretical complement
(see also [BelHal82]). Within our operational approach we may say that the
non-classical feature of the quantum logical negation lies in the fact that when
a property is not actual this does not imply that the orthocomplement should
be actual. The above rules (∼∼ I), (∼∼ E) and (tp) then correspond exactly to
a!! = a and a ≤ b ⇒ b! ≤ a! in the algebraic definition of an orthocomplemen-
tation as we introduced it earlier. The existence of the topelement (maximum)
a ∨ a! = 1 and bottomelement (minimum) a ∧ a! = 0 in any complete lat-
tice corresponds in ls-OQL to the existence of the law of excluded middle and
non-contradiction.
8.5.1 Excluded Middle

Naturally we can obtain the excluded middle rule only when we work with an
orthocomplemented logic. It can also be shown that the De Morgan rules - of
which we will display some - are derivable in that case and can be used in the
derivation of a∨ ∼ a. First we give the derivation of “∼∼ elimination” in the
antecedent of sequents, to which we refer as (n):
a → a(as)
(prem)
A, ∼∼ a → b a →∼∼ a(∼∼I)
(sub)
A, a → b
DM1:
(as)
∀j ∈ J : (∼ ai →∼ aj )
(r)
∀j ∈ J : (∧J ∼ ai →∼ aj )
(tp)
∀j ∈ J : (∼∼ aj →∼ (∧J ∼ ai ))
(prem) (n)
A → ∨J ai ∀j ∈ J : (aj →∼ (∧J ∼ ai ))
(∨E)
A →∼ (∧J ∼ ai )
DM2:
(as)
∀j ∈ J : (ai → aj )
(r)
∀j ∈ J : (∧J ai → aj )
(as) (tp)
∨J ∼ ai → ∨J ∼ ai ∀j ∈ J : (∼ aj →∼ (∧J ai ))
(∨E)
∨J ∼ ai →∼ (∧J ai )
(tp)
∼∼ (∧J ai ) →∼ (∨J ∼ ai )
(n) (prem)
∧J ai →∼ (∨J ∼ ai ) A → ∧J a i
(sub)
A →∼ (∨J ∼ ai )
Note that DM3 and DM4 will be derived from the primitive rules and by using
DM1 and DM2:
DM3:
(prem)
A →∼ (∧J ∼ ai )
(DM 2)
A →∼ (∼ (∨J ∼∼ ai ))
(∼∼E)
A → ∨J ∼∼ ai
(∼∼E)
A → ∨J ai
DM4:
(prem)
A →∼ (∨J ∼ ai )
(DM 1)
A →∼ (∼ (∧J ∼∼ ai ))
(∼∼E)
A → ∧J ∼∼ ai
(∼∼E)
A → ∧J ai
Excluded Middle:
(as)
a∧ ∼ a → a∧ ∼ a
(∼I)
→∼ (a∧ ∼ a)
(DM 2)
→∼ (∼ (∼ a∨ ∼∼ a))
(∼∼E)
→∼ a ∨ a
Although the excluded middle holds, it cannot be given the classical semantical
meaning which states that either a is true or ∼ a is true [Dal81a]. Quoting
[BelCas84] we may say that “in a sense, the nonclassical features of the quan-
tum negation and the quantum disjunction compensate each other, giving rise,
formally, to the excluded-middle law”. The nonclassical features are exactly
those which we encounter on the semantical level: as we already mentioned, the
join of two formulas may be true even when none of its components are and
when a is false, this does not imply that ∼ a has necessarily to be true. For the
exact definition of the truth of a formula in a semantical realization we refer to

section 9.1.
In most of the papers written on standard quantum logic one makes use of the
De Morgan rules to define the join, given the meet. We will show that within
an orthocomplemented logic indeed (∨E) and (∨I) are immediately derivable
by use of (∧E),(∧I) and the DM-rules.
(prem)
∀i ∈ J : (ai → b)
(tp)
∀i ∈ J : (∼ b →∼ ai )
(∧I)
∼ b → ∧J ∼ ai
(tp) (as)
∼ (∧J ∼ ai ) →∼∼ b ∨J ai → ∨J ai
(∼∼E) (DM 1)
∼ (∧J ∼ ai ) → b ∨J ai →∼ (∧J ∼ ai )
(prem) (sub)
A → ∨J ai ∨J a i → b
(sub)
A→b
For (∨I) we obtain the following:

(as)
∧J ∼ ai → ∧J ∼ ai
(∧E, j∈J)
∧J ∼ ai →∼ aj
(tp, j∈J)
∼∼ aj →∼ (∧J ∼ ai )
(prem) (n, j∈J)
A → aj aj →∼ (∧J ∼ ai ) (sub)
A →∼ (∧J ∼ ai )
(DM 3)
A → ∨J ai
8.5.2 Non Contradiction and Ex Falso

As in the case of the excluded middle, we see here also that the non contradiction
rule (N C) is derivable from an empty set of premises:
(N C):
(as)
a∧ ∼ a → a∧ ∼ a
(∼I)
→∼ (a∧ ∼ a)
The Ex Falso-rule had not to be introduced explicitly since it is directly deriv-

able from the other rules. We give the proof and start from the derivable non
contradiction rule:
(as)
a∧ ∼ a → a∧ ∼ a
(∼I)
→∼ (a∧ ∼ a)
(w)
∼ b →∼ (a∧ ∼ a)
(tp)
∼∼ (a∧ ∼ a) →∼∼ b
(n,∼∼E)
a∧ ∼ a → b
(w)
A, a∧ ∼ a → b
8.5.3 Reductio Ad Absurdum

Finally it remains to mention why we altered the classical reductio ad absurdum
rule. A classical and unrestricted (∼ I) is written as A,∼a→
A→a and is exactly one
of the so-called separation rules, which we try to avoid since it allows us to prove
in ls-OQL the classical (∨E)-rule which is responsible for the distributivity of
∧ and ∨. We will show this explicitly, though first we sketch the derivation in
ls-OQL of what has been called a transfer rule (tr) in [FagSam98]:
Transfer Rule (tr):

(N C)
→∼ (a∧ ∼ a)
(tp)
a, ∼ a → a(as) a, ∼ a →∼ a(as) ∼∼ (a∧ ∼ a) →
(∧I) (n)
a, ∼ a → a∧ ∼ a a∧ ∼ a →
(prem) (sub)
A →∼ a a, ∼ a →
(sub)
A, a →
It is now our intention to show that given the premises a, b → d and a, c → d

we can derive a, (b ∨ c) → d by using the classical (∼ I) and (tr) rule.
(prem) (prem)
a, b → d a, c → d
(tr) (tr)
a, b, ∼ d → a, c, ∼ d →
(classical ∼I) (classical ∼I)
a, ∼ d →∼ b a, ∼ d →∼ c
(∧I) (as)
a, ∼ d →∼ b∧ ∼ c b∨c→b∨c
(tr) (DM 3)
a, ∼ d, ∼ (∼ b∧ ∼ c) → b ∨ c →∼ (∼ b∧ ∼ c)
(sub)
a, ∼ d, b ∨ c →
(classical ∼I)
a, b ∨ c → d
8.6 Weak Modularity

The rule (OM ) we gave above, corresponds in OQL to one of the possible ways
of defining orthomodularity ∀a, b ∈ L: if a ≤ b and a! ∧ b = 0 then a = b [Kal83].
The interpretation of a = b — in L defined by means of a ≤ b and b ≤ a — in
our axiomatization, comes down to the fact that given among others ∼ b →∼ a
we derive ∼ a →∼ b. Note that our (OM )-rule could also have been written
as a∧(∼a∨(a∧b))→b which then corresponds immediately to another possible way
of defining weak modularity in L namely as a ∧ (∼ a ∨ (a ∧ b)) ≤ b. We will
now show that a ∧ (∼ a ∨ (a ∧ b)) → b can be derived from an empty set of
premises when we allow the (OM )-rule. This derivation has been proven in a
Gentzen style sequent calculus3 by Nishimura in [Nis80], though we will present
3 Note that the so-called left and right rules in a sequent calculus are translatable into
natural deduction elimination and introduction rules respectively, see for instance [GouMac97,
Mor94].
it slightly differently within our natural deduction system. We will first give
some straightforward derivations which will be used in the main proof below:
subproof1:
(as) (as)
(∼ (a ∧ b) ∧ a), (∼ (a ∧ b) ∧ a),
(∼ a ∨ (a ∧ b)) → (∼ a ∨ (a ∧ b)) →
(∼ a ∨ (a ∧ b)) (∼ (a ∧ b) ∧ a)
(∧I) (N C, tp, n)
(∼ (a ∧ b) ∧ a), (∼ a ∨ (a ∧ b)) → (∼ (a ∧ b) ∧ a)∧
(∼ (a ∧ b) ∧ a) ∧ (∼ a ∨ (a ∧ b)) (∼ a ∨ (a ∧ b)) →
(sub)
(∼ (a ∧ b) ∧ a), (∼ a ∨ (a ∧ b)) →
subproof2:
(as) (as)
∼ (a ∧ b), a → a ∼ (a ∧ b), a →∼ (a ∧ b) ...
(subproof 1)
∼ (a ∧ b), a →∼ (a ∧ b) ∧ a
(∧I) (∼ (a ∧ b) ∧ a),
(∼ a ∨ (a ∧ b)) →
(sub)
∼ (a ∧ b), a, (∼ a ∨ (a ∧ b)) →
(r)
∼ (a ∧ b), a ∧ (∼ a ∨ (a ∧ b)) →
subproof3:
(as)
a, ∼ a∨ ∼ b →∼ a∨ ∼ b
(r) (as)
a ∧ (∼ a∨ ∼ b) →∼ a∨ ∼ b a∧b→a∧b
(tp) (DM 2)
∼ (∼ a∨ ∼ b) → a∧b→
∼ (a ∧ (∼ a∨ ∼ b)) ∼ (∼ a∨ ∼ b)
(as) (sub)
a, b → a a ∧ b →∼ (a ∧ (∼ a∨ ∼ b))
(r) (DM 3, DM 4)
a∧b→a a ∧ b →∼ a ∨ (a ∧ b)
(∧I)
a ∧ b → a ∧ (∼ a ∨ (a ∧ b))
proof
... ...
(subproof 3) (subproof 2)
a∧b→ ∼ (a ∧ b),
a ∧ (∼ a ∨ (a ∧ b)) a ∧ (∼ a ∨ (a ∧ b)) →
(OM ) (as, r)
a ∧ (∼ a ∨ (a ∧ b)) → a ∧ b a∧b→b
(sub)
a ∧ (∼ a ∨ (a ∧ b)) → b
Note that subproof 1 could also have been directly written down using the rule
(tr).
After this exposition of the “syntax” of ls-OQL we need to concentrate on its

“semantics”. In the next chapter, we will besides the straightforward algebraic
semantics for ls-OQL (cf. the property lattice), focus on a Kripkian semantics.
Chapter 9
Semantical Realizations
In the first chapter of this thesis we mentioned that what nowadays is called
quantum logic is a kind of logic which has in a way abstracted itself from the
original structure of the closed subspaces of a Hilbert Space which represent
quantum-propositions. Such logics have often been characterized by their al-
gebraic semantical structure which is that of a not-necessarily complete or-
tho(modular) lattice. Given such a structure, it is possible to associate to the
formulas in a given formal language, a particular semantical realization or model.
This allows us then to characterize, given a specific model, when a formula is
true or a valid consequence of others. Besides this kind of algebraical semantical
realization, a kind of Kripke semantics was also proposed in the seventies, first
for minimal quantum logic (orthologic), by Dishkant [Dis72]. Both semantical
realizations for minimal quantum logic as well as for orthomodular quantum
logic have shown to be equivalent in the sense that they characterize the same
logic [Dal86, DalGiu(nd)]. It is now our intention to show that for the above
given syntactical language of ls-OQL, we have besides the straightforward alge-
braic semantical realization - based on a property lattice - also a kind of Kripke
semantical realization. Both realizations will be shown to be dual. We want to
point out as well that this duality emerges naturally from the duality of states
and properties mentioned above in 4.7. In the same way the state space Σ and
the property lattice L both describe the same physical system, a semantical
realization based on L and a realization based on Σ will both characterize the
same logic. Finally we will conclude this section with a note on the link between
the previously given syntax and the Kripke semantics. By means of the dual-
ity of the algebraic and Kripke semantics in ls-OQL, a minimal correspondence
proof between the syntactical consequence relation and Kripkian consequence
relation is then straightforward, based on the fact that the provability
! relation
A % a was defined in accordance with the algebraic relation A ≤ a.
107
CHAPTER 9. SEMANTICAL REALIZATIONS 108
9.1 Algebraic and Kripke Realizations

To elaborate on the semantical realizations we take [Dal86, DalGiu(nd)] as a
leading example:
Definition 28.
An algebraic realization for the logical language of ls-OQL is a pair A = 9L, v:
consisting of a (atomic, complete, orthocomplemented) property lattice L and
valuation-function v which associates with any formula a of the language an
element in L, and satisfies the following conditions:
v(a ∈ +) = a ∈ L; v(∼ a ∈ +) = a! ∈ L; v(∧J ai ∈ +) = ∧J ai ∈ L and
v(∨J ai ∈ +) = ∨J ai ∈ L
As we mentioned earlier, the use of a, b, c, ... in its context should make clear if
we deal with a wff in + or an element of L. As usual A will be referred to as a
model and the consequence relation will be defined as follows:
Definition 29.
A |= a iff for any A and any element c ∈ L holds that: if for all b ∈ A, c ≤ v(b)
then c ≤ v(a). We say that |= a iff v(a) = 1 for any A.
Since the algebraic relation a ≤ b means that the actuality of b is implied by

the actuality of a, we can give the following meaning to A |= a,
A |= !a iff for any property of L whose actuality implies the actuality
of v( A), also implies ! the actuality of v(a). Otherwise stated, A |=
a iff the actuality of v( A) implies the actuality of v(a).1
!
Note that if c ≤ b, ∀b ∈ A then c ≤ A, by definition of the meet. Note also
that the meet is defined for all subsets of L, since L is complete.
We can give the following meaning to |= a,
|= a iff a is a true formula, or in other words, v(a) is an actual
property regardless the state in which the system is realized.
We saw above that |= a holds in case v(a) = 1 and we know that the top el-
ement of L is the property which is always actual, i.e. the top element is the
only element which is always actual regardless the state in which the system is
realized. Since we extensively discussed that any other property of a physical
system is actual relative to a certain state, we can now claim that the truth-
value of a wff is always relative to the truthvalue of at least one propositional
variable. Here we have to be very careful since we should not allow two propo-
sitional variables to be simultaneous true, as mentioned in [CoeMooSme(nd)b]
this would imply that the meet of those two propositional variables, namely 0,
would be true. Given this argument together with the considerable size of the
1 We can easily see that indeed when we can find a c which fulfills the relation: c ≤ v(b)
!
for any b ∈ A then c ≤ v(a); it also fulfills: c ≤ v( A) implies c ≤ v(a) or in other words:
!
v( A) ≤ v(a).
above given valuation-space inherently leading to an “infinitary” valued logic,

it might be nicer to look at a Kripke semantics for ls-OQL.
A Kripke semantics for ls-OQL is based not on the idea of a valuefunction

or v-function associated with L in order to interpret a given language, but
is based on the idea of determining the worlds - and correlated accessibility-
relation - in which any sentence (formula) of the language holds (see also [Dal86,
DalGiu(nd)]). The worlds will in our elaboration be the states of the state space
Σ which characterize the physical system and referring back to chapter 4 we
already saw that the state space is equipped with an antireflexive, symmetric
orthogonality relation which can be interpreted as a separating relation. As
such we can state that two states are accessible to each other when they are
not orthogonal. Formally we characterize the reflexive, symmetric accessibility
relation as E1 RE2 ⇔ pE1 &≤ p!E2 ⇔ pE1 ∧ p!E2 = 0. A Kripke realization will be
defined as follows where we use the notion of orthoframe 9Σ, R: instead of the
standard notion of Kripke frame - used in case the accessibility relation is also
transitive.2
Definition 30.
A Kripke realization for the language of ls-OQL is a system K = 9Σ, R, Σ⊥⊥ , µ:
where Σ is the state space, R the accessibility relation, Σ⊥⊥ the set of biorthogo-
nal closed subsets of Σ and µ is the Cartan map. µ is a function which associates
with any formula a ∈ +, or equivalently with every property of L, an element of
Σ⊥⊥ and satisfies the following conditions:
µ(∼ a) = µ(a)⊥ ; µ(∧i ai ) = ∩i µ(ai )
The conditions which are satisfied for the Cartan map were proved in chapter
4, section 4.7. We did not explicitly state it before, but Σ⊥⊥ is a complete
ortholattice with inclusion as its order relation, infinitary intersection gives the
meet while the orthogonal is responsible for orthocomplementation (see also
[CoeMooSme(nd)a]). As such it is evident that we can define the orthocomple-
ment T ⊥ of T ∈ Σ⊥⊥ in an orthoframe as T ⊥ = {E | (∀η)(η ∈ T ⇒ η ⊥ E)} -
cf. the definition in chapter 4, subsection 4.4.2.
Also here K is seen as a model and |=⊆ Σ × +, the semantical consequence
relation, will be defined as follows:
Definition 31.
E |= a iff for any K: E ∈ µ(a).
A |= b iff for any K and state E, if ∀a ∈ A E |= a, then E |= b.
We write |= a iff µ(a) = Σ for any K.
Similarly to the algebraic realization truth of a formula corresponds to the
actuality of the property regardless the state of the system. As such we claim,
2 The notion of an orthoframe as introduced in the relational semantics given by R.I. Gold-
blatt in [Gol74] and further used in [Nis80], is slightly different in the sense that it is defined
by &Σ, ⊥'.
|= a iff formula a is true in all possible states of the system or in

other words, property a is actual in all possible states of the system.
A |= b, is given the following meaning,
A |= b iff when every property (formula) of A is actual (true) in a
certain state then also b is actual (true) in that state.
It is possible to express that for any K, E |= a, by means of the accessibility
relation between states. First note that given the fact that the elements of Σ⊥⊥
are biorthogonal closed subsets of Σ, we have: A = A⊥⊥ = {η | (∀E)(E ∈ A⊥ ⇒
E ⊥ η)}. P. Suppes reminds us of what this abstract notation exactly means in
[Sup72, p.34] - where the disjunction is considered classical:
Definition 32.
{x | ϕ(x)} = Y ⇔ [(∀x)(x ∈ Y ⇔ ϕ(x))∧Y is a set] ∨ [Y = ∅∧ ∼ (∃B)(∀x)(x ∈
B ⇔ ϕ(x))]
As P. Suppes states it clearly, “The point of the second member of the disjunc-
tion of the definiens is to put {x | ϕ(x)} equal to the empty set if there is no
non-empty set having as members just those entities with property ϕ.”[Sup72,
p.34]. Concentrating on the definition of A = A⊥⊥ , we obtain the following,
Proposition 15.
{η | (∀E)(E ∈ A⊥ ⇒ E ⊥ η)} = A ⇔ [(∀η)(η ∈ A ⇔ (∀E)(E ∈ A⊥ ⇒ E ⊥
η)) ∧ A is a set] ∨ [A = ∅ ∧ ∼ (∃B)(∀η)(η ∈ B ⇔ (∀E)(E ∈ A⊥ ⇒ E ⊥ η))]
Given the above, it is obvious that for A, a non-empty set,
Proposition 16.
(∀η)[η ∈ A ⇔ (∀E)(E ∈ A⊥ ⇒ E ⊥ η)} and by transposition of the implication,
(∀η)[η ∈ A ⇔ (∀E)(E &⊥ η ⇒ E &∈ A⊥ )}
Proposition 17.
Given (∀η)[η ∈ A ⇐ (∀E)(E ∈ A⊥ ⇒ E ⊥ η)}, by transposition of the impli-
cation we obtain immediately: (∀η)[η &∈ A ⇒∼ ((∀E)(E ∈ A⊥ ⇒ E ⊥ η))} =
(∀η)[η &∈ A ⇒ ((∃E)(E ∈ A⊥ and E &⊥ η))} (see [Dal86, DalGiu(nd), Gol74]).
We are now able to prove the following theorem given in [Dal86, DalGiu(nd)],
Theorem 10.
For any Kripke-realization K and any formula a, E1 |= a iff (∀E2 )[(E2 RE1 ) ⇒
(∃E3 ) (E3 RE2 and E3 |= a)].
Proof
The proof has been given in [Dal86, DalGiu(nd)]. Note that (⇒) is proved
trivially by means of the symmetrical accessibility relation and, that for (⇐) we
concentrate on: E1 &∈ µ(a) implies ∼ ((∀E2 )[(E2 RE1 ) ⇒ (∃E3 )(E3 RE2 and E3 ∈
µ(a))]) = (∃E2 )[(E2 RE1 ) and (∀E3 )(E3 RE2 ⇒ E3 &∈ µ(a))]. Supposing that E1 &∈
µ(a), by proposition 17, there is a E2 : E2 RE1 and E2 ∈ µ(a)⊥ . Take now E3 RE2
and E3 ∈ µ(a) by contradiction. Because E2 ∈ µ(a)⊥ and E3 ∈ µ(a), we obtain
E2 ⊥ E3 which contradicts E3 RE2 , this completes the proof. !
Theorem 11.
(i) E |= ∧J ai ⇔ ∀i ∈ J : E |= ai
(ii) E |= ∨J ai ⇐ ∃i ∈ J : E |= ai
(iii) E |=∼ a ⇔ (∀E ! ) (E ! RE ⇒ E ! &|= a)
Proof
(i) E |= ∧J ai iff E ∈ µ(∧J ai ) iff E ∈ ∩J µ(ai ) iff ∀i ∈ J : E ∈ µ(ai ) iff ∀i ∈ J :
E |= ai .
(ii) ∃i ∈ J : E |= ai iff ∃i ∈ J : E ∈ µ(ai ) iff E ∈ ∪J µ(ai ). Since it is proved in
[Aer81, p.27]3 that ∪J µ(ai ) ⊆ µ(∨J ai ) we obtain E ∈ µ(∨J ai ) or equivalently
E |= ∨J ai .
(iii) E |=∼ a iff E ∈ µ(∼ a) iff (∀E ! )(E ! RE ⇒ E ! &∈ µ(∼ a)⊥ ) iff (∀E ! )(E ! RE ⇒
E ! &∈ (µ(a)⊥⊥ = µ(a))) iff (∀E ! )(E ! RE ⇒ E ! &|= a). !
Note that the accessibility and orthogonality relations between states are also
important when we want to analyze the difference between two distinct states.
More explicitly we can prove the following theorem in OQL, [Moo99]:
Theorem 12.
“If E1 &= E2 then there exists E3 such that E1 ⊥ E3 and E2 RE3 .” (p.73)
Proof
We add details to the proof in [Moo99],
First we write E1 ⊥ E3 as pE3 ≤ p!E1 and E2 RE3 as pE3 &≤ p!E2 . Now we will
try to prove that if there is no E3 such that pE3 ≤ p!E1 and pE3 &≤ p!E2 then it
is not so that E1 &= E2 . The case in which we cannot find such an E3 is when
p!E1 ≤ p!E2 (since this would imply that pE3 ≤ p!E2 ). So given p!E1 ≤ p!E2 , we have
pE2 = p!!E2 ≤ p!!E1 = pE1 and also pE2 = pE1 since pE1 is an atom and pE2 &= 0. We
then obtained the converse of E1 &= E2 and this completes the proof. !
9.2 Logical Duality

In [Dal86, DalGiu(nd)] it is shown for minimal quantum logic and orthomod-
ular logic that if a is a consequence of A in the algebraic semantics it is also
a consequence of A in the Kripke semantics and vice versa. The proofs for
minimal quantum logic are based on the fact that the algebraic realization can
be canonically transformed into a Kripke realization and vice versa. We will
show that the transformations used to prove that A |= a in any A iff A |= a
in any K for the particularly case of ls-OQL, are based on the state-property
duality. With each property we can associate the set of states in which it is
actual by means of the map µ(−) and with each state we can associate the set
of properties which are actual when the system would be realized in that state.
That the Kripke realization can be transformed into an algebraic realization is
3 The proof is given in [Aer81], in our notation: ∀j ∈ J : µ(aj ) ⊆ µ(∨J ai ) and ∀j ∈
J : µ(aj ) ⊆ ∪J µ(ai ) implies ∪J µ(ai ) ⊆ µ(∨J ai ). Note that ∀j ∈ J : µ(aj ) ⊆ µ(∨J ai ) iff
∀j ∈ J : aj ≤ ∨J ai .
straightforward by means of the fact that Σ⊥⊥ forms a complete ortholattice,

the transformation just means that the elements of the lattice are equal to the
elements µ(−) of Σ⊥⊥ , the order-relation is defined as the inclusion-relation, the
top element is Σ while the bottom element is the empty-set, an orthocomple-
ment of an element of this lattice would then correspond to µ(−)⊥ . Before we
tackle the transformation of an algebraic realization into a Kripke realization,
we first want to recall the fact that every possible state of a physical system is
represented by a state property which is exactly an atom of the property lattice.
The transformed algebraic realization has then as a set of worlds or states —
call it Σ — the set which is in bijective correspondence with all the atoms of L.
The set of biorthogonal closed subsets of Σ corresponds to {µ(a) | ∀a ∈ L} and
has as its elements, for example µ(a) which is the set of states represented by the
atoms underlying property a. More explicitly µ(a) corresponds to {E | pE ≤ a}.
The accessibility relation on states E1 RE2 = E1 &⊥ E2 corresponds to pE1 &≤ p!E2 .
Based on the work done in [DalGiu(nd), Dal86], it is now clear for ls-OQL that
given any Kripke realization K in which |= a holds, we can construct an algebraic
realization in which |= a holds and vice versa. Furthermore, with respect to the
semantical consequence in a Kripke realization, A |= b, we can construct an
algebraic realization in which also A |= b holds and vice versa.
Theorem 13.
A |= b in any K iff A |= b in any A.
Proof
A |= b in K!iff (∀a ∈$A)(E |= a) ⇒ (E |= b) iff (∀a ∈ A)(E ∈ µ(a)) ⇒ (E ∈ µ(b))
iff (E ∈ (µ(
! A)) = µ(A)) ⇒ (E ∈ µ(b)) iff there is a Kripke realization
! K in
which µ( A) ⊆ µ(b) iff there is an algebraic realization A in which A ≤ b iff
A |= b in A. !
The relationship between syntax and semantics — between provability and va-
lidity — can be established by means of what is known as soundness and com-
pleteness. In particular the soundness and completeness theorems state: A % a
iff A |= a. As we already mentioned, due to the infinitary operations, complete-
ness causes difficulties for ls-OQL. If we would restrict ourselves to the countable
part of this logic, we obtain a similar calculus as the one for ortho(modular)
logic in [DalGiu(nd)] for which a completeness proof has been given. However,
since we defined our probability relation as exactly corresponding to the alge-
braic semantics, the following is stated as a theorem in [CoeMooSme(nd)b] but
will here just be a corollary,
Corollary 1.
A % b iff A |= b
Proof !
A % b iff A ≤ b iff A |= b. !
Chapter 10
Modalities
Given the above Kripkian style semantics where we interpreted possible states
as possible worlds, the question of a modal ls-OQL immediately arises. We
know that quantum logic can been given a so-called modal B-interpretation as
is shown in [Dal81b, Dal86, DalGiu(nd), Gol74]. The advantages of a modal
interpretation, as M.L. Dalla Chiara stresses in [Dal86], lie in the fact that it
“permits us to reinterpret with “classical eyes” the behavior and the meaning
of a system of non-classical logical constants”. The reason why a modal in-
terpretation of quantum logic remained for a long while in the marginal area
of quantum logic research has two probable origins: firstly, quantum logicians
have concentrated mostly on the standard algebraic semantics and even more
on the algebra itself and secondly, maybe we are not yet fully freed from the
suspicion surrounding modalities which we encounter in the history of the de-
velopment of logic. In the ensuing paragraphs we will elaborate on the existing
modal interpretation of quantum logic as well as on a modal ls-OQL which is
to be conceived not as a modal re-interpretation but as an extension of ls-OQL.
We then want to close this section with a slight elaboration on the mentioned
“historical” suspicion surrounding modalities.
10.1 Modal Language

As explained in [Dal81b, Dal86, DalGiu(nd), Gol74], the language of an ortho-
logic can be translated into a modal language while the corresponding Kripkian
style realization can then be translated into a modal realization. The modal lan-
guage appropriate for this purpose is the logic B, named after Brouwer and its
B-realizations. What especially characterizes this modal logic B is the fact that
on the semantical level, its accessibility relation is only reflexive and symmetric
and not transitive. On the syntactical level reflexivity translates itself into the
axiom expressing !a −→ a while symmetricality expresses itself as ♦!a −→ a,
which together with !(a −→ b) −→ (!a −→ !b) and the necessitation-rule
(from a infer !a) added to the classical proposition-logic rules, form B. As
113
CHAPTER 10. MODALITIES 114
generally accepted, dropping the symmetricality-axiom and adding an axiom

for transitivity namely, !a −→ !!a results in the logical system known as S.4.
while B together with S.4. gives the logic called S.5. [VBen94]. A B-realization
is built up from an orthoframe — or B-frame if we follow R.I. Goldblatt — con-
sisting of a set Σ and R, together with a set Σ⊥⊥ 1 , closed under set-theoretic
complement, intersection and modal operation !, and a map which associates
formulas of the language of B with elements of Σ⊥⊥ . A modal translation is
then defined as a map τ from the language of a given orthologic into the lan-
guage of B. More explicitly for atomic formula p and wff’s a, b, ... we then have
τ (p) = !♦p; τ (∼ b) = ! ∼ τ (b); τ (a ∧ b) = τ (a)&τ (b) with the standard defi-
nition in mind ♦a =∼ ! ∼ a. Given the transformation on the semantical level
of any orthologic realization into a B-realization in [DalGiu(nd)] and the usual
definitions of truth and valid consequence in a B-realization we can state with
[DalGiu(nd)]:
For any a and T of orthologic and τ (T ) = {τ (b) | b ∈ T }: T |= a in
orthologic iff τ (T ) |= τ (a) in B.
For the proof we refer to [Dal86, DalGiu(nd)], where it is further explained
that since this straightforward translation, orthologic inherits some metalogical
properties of B such as the finite-model property and decidability. A modal
translation for the orthomodular case can however also be given, though this
does not give rise to “a familiar modal system with well-behaved metalogical
properties” [DalGiu(nd)].
In this paragraph we will analyze a modal extension of ls-OQL. We conceive

of this in the sense of a logical system of OQL without the restriction to de-
scribe quantum systems only. First one should notice that a so-called modal-
intensional logic distinguishes itself from standard extensional logics in its ex-
plicit usage of contextuality.2 Certain utterances or propositions can then be
valid in certain contexts. In the case of a modal ls-OQL such contexts stand for
the sets of states in which a property is actual or not. As such we should be able
to specify when a formula is valid in all/an accessible context(s). Restricting
ourselves to a set of accessible states (contexts) expresses a gradual shift from
the classical case where in any state a classical property or its orthocomplement
is actual. As explained in [CoeMooSme(nd)b], “it is then reasonable to define
modal operators by considering the weakest classical property implying a given
a ∈ L and the strongest classical property implied by that a.”. Before we can
elaborate here on modal operators such as ! and ♦, we need to introduce the
notion of a Galois adjunction. For our needs it suffices to follow the summary
given in [Coe(nd)c]:
“Two maps f : M1 → M2 and g : M2 → M1 between partially
ordered sets M1 and M2 are Galois adjoint if f (a) ≤ b ⇔ a ≤ g(b)
1 This map as specified more explicitly in [DalGiu(nd)] is a subset of the power-set of Σ.
2 Although we follow the contemporary literature — see for instance [VBen95] — in calling
all logics with modalities intensional, this can be a point of debate especially when we analyze
the history of notions such as intention vs. extension as done in [CoeMooSme(nd)b].
for all a ∈ M1 and b ∈ M2 , and we denote this as f = g. If M1

and M2 are complete lattices then existence of such an adjunction
implies that f preserves joins and g preserves meets. In particular
has any meet preserving map between complete lattices a unique
join preserving left adjoint
#
f : M1 → M2 : a 1→ {b ∈ M2 | a ≤ g(b)}
M2
and has any join preserving map between complete lattices a unique
meet preserving right adjoint.”
Let us return now to the modal operators. More explicitly — referring back
to chapter 4, section 4.8 where ZL stands for the set of classical properties of
L — in [CoeMooSme(nd)b], the modal operators ! and ♦ have obtained their
meaning in the following way:
The inclusion called iz : ZL → L : z 1→ z has map P as its left

adjoint and N as its right adjoint — written P = iz = N — with
P : L → ZL : a 1→ ∧{b ∈ ZL | a ≤ iz (b)} and N : L → ZL : a 1→
∨{b ∈ ZL | iz (b) ≤ a}. It can then be proved that N (a! ) = P (a)! —
or that N (a) = P (a! )! — by the fact that for z ∈ ZL we have z ≤
N (a! ) ⇔ z ≤ a! ⇔ a ≤ z ! ⇔ P (a) ≤ z ! ⇔ z ≤ P (a)! . Continuing we
then define ♦ = iz ◦ P = iz ◦ N = ! with obviously by the use of the
definitions of meet and join, we obtain: !(a) ≤ a ≤ ♦(a) and also
♦(a! ) = iz ◦ N (a! ) = iz ◦ P (a)! = !(a)! .
Since each property lattice then has a ZL , it can be equipped with modal
operators ! and ♦ on L which can be given the usual meaning of necessity
and possibility respectively. This allows us to define the following syntactical
hierarchy3 :
Definition 33.
p % !a ⇔ p ≤ !(a) and p % ♦a ⇔ p ≤ ♦(a).
The semantic realization for the language of ls-OQL extended with modal oper-
ators such that ♦a =∼ ! ∼ a, is then an extension of the above given Kripkian-
style realization, where Σ⊥⊥ is also closed under the modal operation !. The
operation ! on sets of states is defined as follows, [DalGiu(nd)]:
Definition 34.
“For any A ⊆ Σ, !A := {E | ∀η : E &⊥ η ⇒ η ∈ A}”
Where we add that ♦A := (!A⊥ )⊥ and µ(!a) = !(µ(a)). As such we can
prove the following semantical hierarchy:
3 In[CoeMooSme(nd)b] the hierarchy is defined by focusing explicitly on the necessity
and possibility of provability instead of on the provability of the necessity or possibility of a
formula: p -#" a ⇔ p ≤ !(a) and p -' a ⇔ p ≤ ♦(a).
Theorem 14.
1) E1 |= !a ⇔ ∀E2 : E1 RE2 implies E2 |= a
2) E1 |= ♦a ⇔ ∃E2 : E1 RE2 and E2 &|=∼ a
Proof
1) E1 |= !a ⇔ E1 ∈ µ(!a) ⇔ ∀E2 : E1 RE2 implies E2 ∈ µ(a) ⇔ ∀E2 : E1 RE2
implies E2 |= a.
2) E1 |= ♦a ⇔ E1 |=∼ ! ∼ a ⇔ E1 &|= ! ∼ a ⇔ ∃E2 : E2 RE1 and E2 |& =∼ a. !
We will conclude this paragraph with a theorem, stated in terms of modal

consequence relations in [CoeMooSme(nd)b], which gives some more insight into
the use of modalities. It shows how the lattice partial order can be characterized
by means of semantic possibility; how syntactical and semantical modalities
relate to each other and, in the latter case, we more explicitly show the condition
required for the semantical and syntactical construals of possibility operators to
coincide. Note first that it is important for the proofs of the following (1.4) and
(1.6) that E1 |= ♦a ⇔ ∃E2 : E1 RE2 and E2 |= a is taken to hold a priori,
Theorem 15.
(1.1) p % !a ⇔ ♦p ≤ a
(1.2) p &% !a ⇔ p % ♦a!
(1.3) p &% ♦a ⇔ p % !a!
(1.4) p |= ♦a ⇔ p &≤ a!
(1.5) [p |= ♦a ⇒ p |= ♦b] ⇔ a ≤ b
(1.6) p % !a ⇒ p |= !a ⇒ p ≤ a ⇒ p |= ♦a ⇒ p % ♦a with p % ♦a ⇒ p |= ♦a
for fixed a if and only if a ∈ ZL and for fixed p if and only if p ∈ ZL
Proof
The proof similar to the one given in [CoeMooSme(nd)b]. !
10.2 History of Modality

Hereby we will place modalities in a more historical-philosophical perspective.
First of all, we want to stress that modal logic is here regarded as an inten-
sional logic. And in that sense, it is well-known that Quine did not really favor
intensionality and intensional logics. Quine’s attitude can be placed within the
more general context of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century with
the rise of mathematical logic and the technical development of logicism — the
main idea of which goes back to Leibniz. Obviously, also for Frege logic could
then only be extensional, as according to him, notions such as necessity and
possibility concerned the psychological grounds of our judgments and were cast
out his logic and into the realms of psychology or epistemology (see [Haa88])4 .
Partly this suspicion of modalities goes back to “the empiricist orientation of
early twentieth-century analytic philosophy, which embraced a kind of skep-
ticism about the modalities” (see [Lou79, p.16]). All this indicates that the
4 L. Haaparanta notes that Frege did not exclude all intensional contexts.
study of modal concepts was abandoned for some time in the history of modern
logic and had to wait for C.I. Lewis to pick up the lead again. Perhaps this is
not so surprising, considering a saying from medieval times “De modalibus non
gustabit asinus” which according to W. Kneale in [Kne62] means that modal
logic is difficult and unappetizing. Even when we look back at Aristotle’s work,
traditionally viewed as a milestone in theories on modal conception, there are
quite a few confusions and inconsistencies which gave “modal logic” not such a
great onset.
Aristotle worked out a theory of modal statements and subsequently a theory

of modal syllogisms in his writings which have been collected under the name
Organon. The starting point being his conception in [Ari95, De Interpretatione,
19a 24-] of:
“What is, necessarily is, when it is; and what is not, necessarily
is not, when it is not. But not everything that is, necessarily is;
and not everything that is not, necessarily is not. For to say that
everything that is, is of necessity, when it is, is not the same as
saying unconditionally that it is of necessity.”
We should actually place this thought in the wide picture of chapter 9 in [De
Interpretatione] where Aristotle questions the principle of bivalence. Indeed,
future contingents form an exception to that rule. The well known example
Aristotle uses to support his point, is a future sea-battle, [Ari95, De Interpre-
tatione, 19a 30-, our brackets and italics]:
“... it is necessary for there to be or not to be a sea-battle tomorrow;

but it is not necessary (now) for a sea-battle to take place tomorrow,
nor for one not to take place — though it is necessary for one to take
place or not to take place.”
Note that our main focus-point here is the fact that we may not be able to
say with respect to future contingents which of a pair of alternatives must come
about. Exactly this leads Aristotle to conclude that, [Ari95, De Interpretatione,
19b 1-]:
“... it is not necessary that of every affirmation and opposite nega-

tion one should be true and the other false. For what holds for things
that are does not hold for things that are not but may possibly be
or not be; ...”
His conclusion obviously expresses the failure of the general validity of the prin-
ciple of bivalence, though as is stressed in [KneKne84], it is Aristotle’s mistake
that he then still wants to hold on to the law of excluded middle — for which
we refer to the use of italics in the above quotation of the sea-battle example.
Leaving the principle of bivalence and the law of excluded middle aside and re-
turning to future contingents, we want to note that Aristotle’s point is repeated
in [Ari95, Nicomachean Ethics VI, 1139b 7-], where he notices that:
“... no one deliberates about the past, but about what is future and
contingent, while what is past is not capable of not having taken
place; ...”
Of course not only contingency is a mode of attribution — the notion is used
in [Pie80] — considered by Aristotle. First the distinctions are drawn between
possibility, contingency, impossibility and necessity before he then in [Ari95,
Interpretatione, chapter 12] starts the analyses of the relations between their
affirmations and denials. Besides the theory of modal statements, also in his the-
ory of modal syllogisms he distinguishes between premises which are apodeictic
(assert necessity), assertoric (assert actuality), or problematic (assert possibil-
ity). More explicitly, [Ari95, Prior Analytics, 29b 29-]:
“Since there is a difference according as something belongs, nec-
essarily belongs, or may belong (for many things belong, but not
necessarily, others neither necessarily nor indeed at all, but it is
possible for them to belong), it is clear that there will be different
deductions for each of these, and deductions with differently related
terms, one concluding from what is necessary, another from what is,
a third from what is possible”
The notion of deduction is here used for syllogism. As such it is now clear
that Aristotle included his theory of modality in his theory of arguments; the
notions of possibility and necessity have the generality that any statement on
any theme may be qualified by it while also the distinction between necessary
and non-necessary predication is basic in his theory of predicables [KneKne84,
p.82]. Of course we cannot avoid the fact that Aristotle’s theory of modal
statements is difficult and confusing — cf. [De Interpretatione, chapter 13] —
while his theory of modal syllogisms contains some explicit mistakes5 — cf.
[KneKne84, p.87-91] and [Luk51] where J. Lukasiewicz for that reason attaches
a greater importance to Aristotle’s modal logic of statements. As is explained
in [CoeMooSme(nd)b], some of the difficulties arise from the definition of the
notion of possibility:
“while it is probably inevitable that Aristotle should focus on a bi-
valent notion of the possible which is opposed to both necessity and
impossibility, the distinction between the necessary and the merely
factual being central to his metaphysics, strict adherence to a uni-
valent notion would undoubtedly have rendered his system more
elegant and less prone to confusion.”
Similarly, some difficulties may emerge from his use of modality sometimes as
de dicto and at other times as de re. Indeed, attempts were made to explain the
inconsistencies in Aristotle’s modal syllogistics by means of these two distinct
methods of interpreting modalities — we trace this distinction back at least
5 We quote W. Kneale and M. Kneale in [KneKne84, p.92],“... he develops his theory
of syllogism with two apodeictic premises, the only undoubtedly correct part of his modal
syllogistic.”.
to Abelard and later to Peter of Spain and St. Thomas Aquinas (see [Kne62]).
This distinction involves the scope of the modalities, either the modality applies
to the dictum (proposition itself) or to the thing to which is referred. J.M. Loux
in [Lou79] gives the following explanation of de dicto and de re modalities:
“Whereas de dicto modality attaches to propositions, an ascription
of de re modality specifies the modal status of an object’s exempli-
fication of an attribute”
Loux notes that the two kinds of modalities are not wholly unconnected (see
[Lou79, p.32]). This distinction has indeed been valuable — as is noted in
[Pie80], changing the scope of a modality changes its meaning — though perhaps
did not really serve to explain Aristotle’s inconsistencies because he used both
kinds of modalities in an inconsistent way (see [Pat95, p.8]). What may be
said of de dicto and de re modalities is that Frege made a distinction in the
same line where de dicto modalities correspond to the senses of signs and de re
modalities correspond to their references (see [Kne62]). Whatever the cause of
these inconsistencies, we agree with W. Kneale and M. Kneale in [KneKne84]
that we shouldn’t be too harsh on Aristotle who, with his modal theory, broke
completely fresh ground and we cannot ignore his great merits, one being the
first use of propositional variables6 in connection with modal logic.
We already mentioned that contemporary modal logic found its axiomatic form
in the beginning of the twentieth century with Lewis, though it took some
decades before any decent semantical model theory could be given for it. Lewis
is well known for his contribution to propositional modal logic, he introduced
a new strict implication — vs. the classical material implication —, though
it has to be noted that a definition of a strict implication in Lewis’ sense had
already been introduced by Sextus Empiricus 7 . It was when one picked up
the old Leibnizian strategy of considering more than one world, that our topic
was raised to a new perspective. The strategies of Hintikka, Kanger, Kripke
and some earlier attempts of Carnap merged into a possible world semantics for
modal logic and other intensional logics such as e.g. tense logic, epistemic logic,
deontic logic. If we look further into this possible world semantics for modal
logic, we enter into the philosophical debate on possible worlds. This debate
is of course connected to the debate on counterfactual discourse of which it is
claimed that by analyzing it we refer to some possible worlds namely those as
closely as possible to the actual one. Following Loux in [Lou79, p.33], we stress
that the difference with modal discourse lies in the fact that it involves quan-
tification over all possible worlds. We will not handle the details of the kinds
of discourses which appeal to possible worlds, in the remainder of this chapter
it is more interesting to draw some lines within the whole area of debate. Us-
ing the analysis of [Lou79], we can discern two main topics, namely transworld
6 As explained in [KneKne84, p.91], propositional variables are understood as “letters which
may be replaced by propositional signs and not by terms, ...”.

7 [Pie80, p.15] quotes Sextus Empiricus: “A conditional holds whenever the denial of its
consequent is incompatible with its antecedent”.

identity and possible nonactual objects. In the first case one concentrates on
the question of whether the inhabitants of the possible and actual worlds are
world-bound or transworld individuals. By following the line of transworld in-
dividuals and talking about identical individuals in different worlds, we end up
in the discussion on the properties of identity — especially the principle of in-
discernability and the property of transitivity. On the other hand, following
the path of world-bound individuals leads us to extreme essentialism especially
when we assume that things could not have been different in some world. A
possible escape from this essentialism is offered by David Lewis’ counterpart
theory in which individuals are world-bounded but have counterparts in other
worlds. By accepting this we obviously also escape the problems of the proper-
ties of identity. The objection here is that it maybe does not stick to our modal
intuitions.
Turning to the second topic, the ontology of nonactual objects. We distinguish
some main parties in the debate, the possibilists, the modal or nonmodal actu-
alists, conceptualists and combinatorialists. As opposed to the actualists, David
Lewis — an extreme possibilist — assigns to all possible objects (counterparts
or not) a real ontology. For an actualist, existing objects are present in the
actual world, as such they associate to possible worlds an actual existence from
their identification with — or construction from — actual objects. As Loux
puts it: “the contents of the actual world cannot be characterized in nonmodal
terms”. Those sceptical about modal actualism as Loux calls it, tried to pro-
pose a nonmodal approach. Conceptualism then gives the answer that possible
worlds may exist but only as a result of a mental construction — we think here
of Nicholas Rescher. Combinatorialists would answer that possible worlds are
just different combinations of the basic entities out of which the actual world is
constructed, whatever those entities might be. All the pro’s and con’s of these
approaches are in detail explained in [Lou79] where Loux himself favors a modal
actualist approach.
Chapter 11
Logical Operations vs.

Relations
We already mentioned that there are certain problems with the implication in
ls-OQL or quantum logic in general. We fail to define a philonian conditional
or material implication as it has been called by Whitehead and Russell and
is now generally used in classical proposition or predicate logic. Note that the
partial order relation ≤ of OQL is an implication relation and not an implication
operation or logical connective [Har79, JauPir70, Pir64]. Although not stated
in exactly those terms, this point was already noted by G. Birkhoff and J. von
Neumann in 1936, [BirVNeu36]:
“The following point should be mentioned in order to avoid misun-
derstanding: If a, b are two physical qualities, then a ∪ b, a ∩ b and a!
... are physical qualities too ... But a ⊂ b is not a physical quality;
it is a relation between physical qualities.”1 (p.25)
Indeed, the difference between an operation and a relation consists of the fact
that, contrary to what we would expect from an operation, if a and b are ele-
ments of an arbitrary property lattice; a ≤ b does not express a new property.
This of course depends on how we defined ≤, i.e. as a natural consequence of
the preorder on questions and on that level an experimental arrangement cor-
responding to a material implication is in general not so straightforward. Note
that the problem reduces itself to that of a disjunction by the definition of a
material implication. It is however intriguing to note that G. Emch and J.M.
Jauch argued in 1965 that a ≤ b is what they called a literally material impli-
cation — encoding an empirical fact — and not a logical implication expressing
a linguistic meaning [EmcJau65]. Bearing this in mind, the notion of material
used by Emch and Jauch, is according to us, perhaps more suited as label for
1 Note that in [BirVNeu36], physical qualities stand in a one-one relation with the closed
linear subspaces of a Hilbert space — which are, as we understand it, their mathematical rep-
resentatives — and can be interpreted as well as sets of equivalent experimental propositions.
121
CHAPTER 11. LOGICAL OPERATIONS VS. RELATIONS 122
the logical implication relation than for the logical implication operation.2 A
second reason might be that a nested implication relation in the sense of for
example a ≤ (b ≤ c) does not make much sense [Pir64]. Besides such difficulties
in OQL, which can maybe be avoided by not using the label of “logic” for prop-
erty lattices, naturally the problem of finding a material implication operation
also is present in quantum logic (=ortho-(modular)-logic) conceived as an ab-
stract logical theory. Since for the latter quantum logic, the problem was quite
intriguing and led to a search for adequate implication operations, we feel that
it is necessary to broaden our spectrum and analyze this problem in our context
of ls-OQL — the abstract study of operational quantum logic.
G.M. Hardegree analyzes in [Har79] the criteria of an implication operation

satisfied for classical (boolean) lattices and for ortho(modular) lattices. The
implicative condition:
a ∧ x ≤ b ⇔ x ≤ a −→ b (11.1)
is equivalent to the so-called law of exportation (a ∧ x ≤ b ⇒ x ≤ a −→ b )

taken together with modus ponens (a ∧ (a −→ b) ≤ b) and is used to charac-
terize classical implicative lattices as they are confusingly called in [Har79] or
implicative lattices as they are mostly known and called in for instance [Cur77].3
Note that condition 11.1 is exactly the relation which follows immediately from
the adjunction known in the definition of a Heyting algebra (see for instance
[Bor94]) — by which is meant a non-classical or absolutely implicative lattice
in H.B. Curry’s sense or a relatively pseudo-complemented lattice as it also has
sometimes been called. A classical implicative lattice in Curry’s sense is then an
implicative lattice which satisfies condition 11.1 along with two extra classical
conditions: a ∨ (a −→ b) = 1 and (a −→ b) −→ a ≤ a [Cur77].4 From this it is
clear that implicative lattices cover the cases of both classical and intuitionistic
logic. However they do not comprise the case of quantum logic because similar
to the fact that every Heyting algebra is a distributive lattice, also every im-
plicative lattice is distributive. More explicitly, we refer to a theorem proved by
Skolem (see also [Cur77]) and which states that, [HerMar75]:
Theorem 16.
“Any lattice with a binary connective satisfying 11.1 is necessarily distributive.
2 We will avoid confusion and stick to the notion of material implication as philonian con-
ditional.
3 The law of exportation holds in the reverse direction by applying modus ponens x ∧ a ≤
a ∧ (a −→ b) ≤ b.
4 First we want to note that in [Cur77] there is theorem stating that a classical implicative
lattice with zero and negation such that A! = A −→ 0 is a boolean algebra. Further, we find
it interesting to note that the dual of “b −→ a”, as used in any implicative lattice, is “a − b”,
where the operation “−” called subtraction is basic in the characterization of the so-called
subtractive lattices. The conditions a ≤ b ∨ (a − b) and a ≤ b ∨ c ⇒ a − c ≤ b, together then
characterize these subtractive lattices and merge into the condition a ≤ b ∨ c ⇔ a − c ≤ b by
means of a ≤ c ∨ (a − c) ≤ b ∨ c. In [Cur77] subtractive and implicative lattices taken together
are called Skolem lattices.
Moreover, a −→ b is the maximal solution for x in the inequality x ∧ a ≤ b”

(p.308)
Given the definition of an orthocomplement versus that of a pseudo-comple-

ment5 which holds in the intuitionistic case, and since distributivity holds, it is
obvious that every implicative ortholattice is boolean [Har79]. More explicitly,
in the boolean case we work with the classical material implication a −→ b = a! ∨
b. And since every boolean algebra is a Heyting algebra, [Bor94], we naturally
obtain the following: if we have given a ∧ x ≤ b we can obtain a! ∨ (a ∧ x) ≤ a! ∨ b
and by distributivity a! ∨ (a ∧ x) = a! ∨ x, so we obtain x ≤ a! ∨ x ≤ a! ∨ b.
Reversely, given x ≤ a! ∨ b implies a ∧ x ≤ a ∧ (a! ∨ b) and by distributivity we
obtain a ∧ (a! ∨ b) = a ∧ b which gives a ∧ x ≤ a ∧ b ≤ b [CoeMooSme(nd)b].
For ortho(modular) lattices a straightforward generalization of the implicative

condition 11.1 by means of residual conditionals is given in [Har79, Har81]. To
avoid confusion we will elaborate further on this generalization without using
the specific notion of residuation, preferring the notion of Galois adjunction
as introduced in chapter 10, section 10.1. Remember that on a pair of maps
between posets f : L → L+ and g : L+ → L an adjunction f = g holds if
f (x) ≤ x+ ⇔ x ≤ g(x+ ). The implicative condition 11.1 gives then rise to the
adjunction f = g with f : L → L+ : x 1→ (a∧x) and g : L+ → L : x+ 1→ (a −→ x+ ).
In order to consider implications besides the classical and intuitionistic ones,
there are two possibilities for a generalization: either we restrict the domain of
residuation — we take some special subset — or we allow that the left adjoints
are not necessarily defined by the meet. Concentrating on the latter,
Definition 35.
Given an adjunction fa = ga on a pair of isotone maps between posets fa :
L → L+ and ga : L+ → L, an adjunctive implication condition is fa (x) ≤ x+ iff
x ≤ ga (x+ ) = a −→f x+ .
In other words, the implicative condition is seen as a special case of the adjunc-
tive implication condition. The most common example of an adjunctive im-
plication definable on an orthomodular lattice is the Sasaki arrow, also named
Sasaki hook and called quasi-implication by P. Mittelstaedt. Formally,
Proposition 18.
The Sasaki hook is defined by ϕ∗a : L+ → L : x+ 1→ a! ∨ (a ∧ x+ ) and is the right
adjoint of the so-called Sasaki projection defined by ϕa : L → L+ : x 1→ a∧(a! ∨x).
More explicitly, ϕa (x) ≤ x+ iff x ≤ ϕ∗a (x+ ).
5 See for instance [Bor94] where ∼ b is the pseudo-complement of b if in a Heyting algebra
we put ∼ b = b −→ 0, which yields the greatest element such that b∧ ∼ b = 0, i.e. ∼ b =

∨{a | a ∧ b = 0} and ∼ b ∧ b = 0. As such the pseudo-complement satisfies certain conditions,
of which we name some: ∼ a =∼∼∼ a; ∼ 0 = 1; ∼ 1 = 0; a ≤ b ⇒∼ b ≤∼ a; ∼ (a ∨ b) =∼
a∧ ∼ b; ∼ a ∨ b ≤ a −→ b; a ≤∼∼ a (for proofs we refer to [Bor94, p.7-8]).
Proof
For the proof of a ∧ (a! ∨ x) ≤ x+ ⇔ x ≤ a! ∨ (a ∧ x+ ) we concentrate first
on ⇐: since x ≤ a! ∨ (a ∧ x+ ) and we know that a! ≤ a! ∨ (a ∧ x+ ) we obtain
x ∨ a! ≤ a! ∨ (a ∧ x+ ) from which follows a ∧ (x ∨ a! ) ≤ a ∧ (a! ∨ (a ∧ x+ )). Since
a ∧ x+ ≤ a we obtain by orthomodularity that a ∧ x+ = a ∧ (a! ∨ (a ∧ x+ )) which
then implies that a ∧ (x ∨ a! ) ≤ a ∧ x+ ≤ x+ .
For ⇒ we start from a ∧ (a! ∨ x) ≤ x+ and a ∧ (a! ∨ x) ≤ a which implies that
a ∧ (a! ∨ x) ≤ x+ ∧ a from which we can obtain a! ∨ (a ∧ (a! ∨ x)) ≤ a! ∨ (x+ ∧ a).
Since a! ≤ x ∨ a! and by orthomodularity we obtain a! ∨ x = a! ∨ (a ∧ (a! ∨ x))
it follows x ≤ a! ∨ x ≤ a! ∨ (x+ ∧ a). !
To discover exactly how the Sasaki projections emerge in OQL we refer back to
chapter 5, subsection 5.2.3. The Sasaki hook however is an operation defined as
a two-variable lattice polynomial. A full proof is given in [Kal83] of the fact that
among the distinct two-variable polynomials which emerge from the elements of
the free orthomodular lattices generated by a two-element set, the Sasaki hook
is one of the following five polynomials:
p1 (a, b) = (a! ∧ b) ∨ (a! ∧ b! ) ∨ (a ∧ (a! ∨ b))
p2 (a, b) = (a! ∧ b) ∨ (a ∧ b) ∨ ((a! ∨ b) ∧ b! )
p3 (a, b) = a! ∨ (a ∧ b)
p4 (a, b) = b ∨ (a! ∧ b! )
p5 (a, b) = (a! ∧ b) ∨ (a ∧ b) ∨ (a! ∧ b! ),
which satisfy the following strengthened law of entailment:
p(a, b) = 1 if f a ≤ b. (11.2)
The law of entailment a ≤ b ⇒ p(a, b) = 1 together with modus ponens, yields

this strengthened law of entailment.6 In [DalGiu(nd)], condition 11.2 is con-
ceived as a sufficient condition for a connective to be called an implication-
connective for it satisfies the two necessary conditions of identity and modus
ponens in the following way:
We may say that p(a, a) is always true since a ≤ a is always the
case and “if a is true and p(a, b) is true then b is true” always holds
because if a = 1 and a ≤ b then b = 1.
We also believe that an implication connective should allow us to express the
logical inference scheme of modus ponens. This logical inference scheme has
been a basic cornerstone in logic and the reason behind this is that at all
times, a vast majority of logicians, highly valued Aristotle’s opinion of logic as
the inquiry which provides insight into the structure of demonstration [Jam74].
Therefore, in order to formalize logical inference we need an implication or “if
then”-operation and in case an implication-relation expressing for instance that
“if a is valid, then b is valid” is already present, it is highly desirable to link the
6 Note that p(−, −) denotes “an” implication while − −→ − will only be used against the
background of the implicative condition.
implication operation to that relation. While this is exactly what 11.2 stands
for, we are hesitant about calling this condition the “Birkhoff-von Neumann ’36
requirement” as is done in [Kal83]. More explicitly, for experimental proposi-
tions P and Q the following conditions are said to be equivalent in [BirVNeu36]:
“(a) The mathematical representative of P is a subset of the math-
ematical representative of Q.
(b) P implies Q — that is, whenever one can predict P with cer-
tainty, one can predict Q with certainty.
...” (p.5)
We believe however that what this statement is saying is that “P ⊂ Q iff

Sp ⊂ Sq ” and not “p(P, Q) = 1 iff P ⊂ Q” — where ⊂ resembles our ≤ and
S is the symbol for a mathematical representative in [BirVNeu36]. Since G.
Birkhoff and J. von Neumann tried to build a propositional calculus of physical
qualities which is “formally indistinguishable from the calculus of linear sub-
spaces with respect to set products, linear sums and orthogonal complements”
they needed three corresponding operations and an implication-relation corre-
sponding to set-theoretical inclusion. They actually did not pay attention to
implication-operations and therefore we do not think it is completely justifiable
to ascribe condition 11.2 to their name. Furthermore, against the background
of the meaning attached to the notion of actuality we see that P ⊂ Q with
its suggested interpretation as “whenever one can predict P with certainty, one
can predict Q with certainty” comes very close to the neighborhood of a ≤ b
interpreted as “whenever a is actual, then b is actual”.
The classical material implication is not one of the above given five orthomodular
1
lattice polynomials satisfying condition 11.2, it
is well-known that there are counterexamples of
orthomodular lattices for which we have a! ∨ b =
1 but not a ≤ b, see for instance (Fig 4) in
a' a b b'
which we present the orthomodular lattice called
M02 or Chinese Lantern with atoms a, a! , b, b!
[Kal74, Kal83]. We want to stress as well that
0 the five polynomials we mention here are not
Fig 4: Hasse diagram of MO2 implication-connectives for the non-weakly mod-
ular case. A proof in [Dal86, DalGiu(nd)] shows
that for the case of the Sasaki hook, if a ≤ b then a! ∨(a∧b) = 1 iff a∧(a∨b)! = 0
which holds only in case of orthomodularity, the proofs for the other four poly-
nomials are similar. Coming back to the adjunctive implication condition, we
can say with [CoeMooSme(nd)b] that −→f is only correctly called an implica-
tion in the sense of condition 11.2, in case a −→f b = 1 iff fa (1) ≤ b which
translates into the condition fa (1) = a. Note that fa (1) = a is obviously sat-
isfied in the case of the Sasaki projection by ϕa (1) = a ∧ (a! ∨ 1) = a ∧ 1 = a.
The reason we paid more attention to the Sasaki hook then to the other four
polynomials, is because it approaches the material implication of classical logic
more closely than the other candidates. It is made explicit in [DalGiu(nd)] that
for all five polynomials (1 ≤ i ≤ 5) we have pi (a, b) = a −→ b in condition
11.1 iff the lattice is boolean. However the Sasaki hook also satisfies a weaker
condition namely,
a ∧ x ≤ b ⇔ x ≤ p(a, b) if a and b are compatible. (11.3)
This condition is called the weak import-export condition in [DalGiu(nd)] and

has been written as:
p(a, b) = a! ∨ b if a ↔ b (11.4)
in [Har79] where it is called the locally boolean-condition. Furthermore, in

[Har79, Har75] it is pointed out that the Sasaki hook — similar as the coun-
terfactual or subjunctive conditional — in the non-boolean orthomodular case
falls short of certain laws namely strong transitivity p(a, b) ∧ p(b, c) ≤ p(a, c),
weakening p(b, c) ≤ p((a ∧ b), c) and contraposition p(a, b) = p(b! , a! ).7 As such
Hardegree tries to give an interpretation of the Sasaki hook in terms of a Stal-
naker conditional. In a way this is quite interesting for us since Hardegree links
this interpretation to OQL, [Har79]:
“I now wish to argue that this interpretation is not a mere formal
exercise, but is in fact intimately related to the usual operational
characterization of quantum propositions in terms of binary (yes-
no) experiments.” (p.72)
His main point in [Har75] is built up by means of his notion of a filter, where
an a-filter is to be interpreted as a yes-no question which gives a positive result
in case the system possesses the property a or, as Hardegree puts it, in case
the system passes the a-filter. These filters are used to express the conditional
property c(a, b) as follows:
“If s were to pass the a-filter, would it then (with certainty) pass the
b-filter? A system s in state E for which the answer to this question
is affirmative is said to have property c(a, b), ...” (p.416)8
As such he can now give a counterfactual interpretation to p3 (a, b) by means of

the conditional property c(a, b), [Har75]:
7 The failure in strong transitivity and contraposition of the Sasaki hook is pointed out
explicitly by means of an example of a non-boolean orthomodular lattice in [HerMar75]. And
due to the fact that weakening p(b, c) ≤ p((a ∧ b), c) can be obtained from strong transitivity
p(a, b) ∧ p(b, c) ≤ p(a, c) by exchanging the a for a ∧ b, in Herman, Marsden and Piziak’s
example also weakening fails for the Sasaki hook.
8 Note that we slightly changed Hardegree’s notations for properties so that it fits with our
symbolism.
“Thus if (and only if) a system s is in state E, which satisfies p3 (a, b),
then s has property c(a, b) to the effect that if s were to pass an a-
filter, then it would also pass a b-filter. Whether a given system has
this property usually depends on its state;...” (p.416)
And we go further with, [Har79]:
“In certain well specified circumstances, however, s will have prop-
erty c(a, b) regardless of its state. This is to say that no matter what
initial state s is prepared in, if s passes an a-filter, it is certain to
pass any immediately subsequent b-filter. This corresponds to the
customary operational characterization of the relation of implication
among binary experiments pertaining to system s; ...” (p.74)
We will now investigate exactly what these quotes mean in the context of OQL.
Referring back to part II, we saw that α ≺ β stands for the declaration “if α
is true then β is true”. Since the truth of a question is inherently linked to a
certain state of the system we can be more precise and say that α ≺ β means
the following:
For every possible initial state p of a system, if p would be trans-

formed in a state such that α is true, then β is true.
It should be clear that when we mention here the notion of “transforming one
state into another” we mean this in a hypothetical sense, i.e. we make an
abstraction from the fact that actually one state can only be transformed into
another state when the latter is accessible (not orthogonal) to it. However if
we look at p3 (a, b) this kind of abstraction is not sustainable anymore. Indeed,
p3 (a, b) is valid in at least those states Ei which are such that they can actually
be transformed in a state E2 in which a is actual and b is actual. Otherwise
worded, the states in which p3 (a, b) is actual are at least those in which b is actual
after a positive response is obtained in case the system would be submitted to
an ideal first kind measurement α with ζ(α) = a. The idea of taking an ideal
first kind measurement comes from the use of the words “minimally different”
by Hardegree in the following, [Har79]:
“The basic intuition is fairly clear: in deciding the truth of a coun-
terfactual conditional (A > B) in a given situation x, we consider
(envisage) a particular situation y which makes A true and which is
in some relevant sense minimally different from x. The conditional
(A > B) is then true in situation x exactly if B is true in situation
y.” (p.68)9
9 Note that Hardegree works here with the algebra of subsets of a state space, where x and
y denote states or worlds and A and B denote elementary sentences. An elementary sentence
has the form “magnitude ... has value in (Borel set) ...”. (A > B) denotes the so-called
Stalnaker conditional which is: “the sentence — provided it exists — which is true at any
state x exactly if B is true at the nearest A-state to x.” [Har79, p.68].
Against the background of condition 11.2, we see that p3 (a, b) is valid in every
possible state of the system when a ≤ b. In other words, when a ≤ b then
µ(p3 (a, b)) = Σ and this is exactly the case Hardegree refers to when he says
that “in certain circumstances, s will have property c(a, b) regardless of its
state”. This however leads to a small problem when, given pE ≤ a ≤ b, E is
not accessible to every other state of the system. Unless we solve this problem,
it renders the given operational interpretation of p3 (a, b) inadequate. Of course
the problem of inaccessible states can also occur when a &≤ b. Note that in
the latter case it can still be so that p3 (a, b) is actual in certain states though
in general this will not be so in all possible states of a system. Let us now
concentrate on solving the problem of inaccessible states. Take the example of
p3 (a, b) in a complete orthomodular lattice, the system will not give a positive
response to an ideal first kind measurement of α with ζ(α) = a if a! is actual
in the initial state and, as we saw earlier in section 5.2.3, the state afterwards
will then be (p ∨ a! ) ∧ a = 0. But since it can well be that µ(a! ) ⊆ µ(p3 (a, b)),
Hardegree defines for the consistency of his counterfactual interpretation of the
Sasaki hook an absurd world (state) 0. He then treats the absurd world as the
nearest world in which sentence A is true if and only if there are no worlds
accessible in which sentence A is true. Following his definition in [Har75]:
“We also define the absurd world 0 to be the world which satisfies
every sentence, including contradictions.” (p.413)
Indeed if we see 0 as an absurd state in Hardegree’s sense, we have found a
way to avoid the problem which may arise due to inaccessible states. And as a
consequence we can say that for a complete orthomodular lattice: if a! is actual
in the initial state p, then p3 (a, .) is actual in p, or more generally, [Har79]:
“As an immediate consequence of these considerations, if a sentence
A is impossible relative to x, then x satisfies every conditional of
the form (A > B). A fortiori, if A is contravalid (true nowhere
except 0), then every conditional of the form (A > B) is valid (true
everywhere).” (p.69)
Furthermore, Hardegree gave the formal analysis in the lattice of closed sub-
spaces of a Hilbert space of what it means for p3 (a, b) to be valid in a state E1
[Har75, Har79]. While we will avoid the technicalities, we follow [DalGiu(nd),
Dal86] in the interpretation of E1 |= p3 (a, b):
p3 (a, b) is true in a state E1 iff either a is impossible for E1 or b is

true in the state into which E1 has been transformed after a positive
a-question, and which verifies a.
Where the notion of “a is impossible for E1 ” may here be interpreted as: the
state in which a is actual is inaccessible for E1 .
We want to finish this chapter with a note on the analysis of L. Herman, E.L.
Marsden and R. Piziak in [HerMar75] which shows that contrary to the Sasaki
hook there do exist implication connectives in orthomodular logic which do sat-

isfy the contraposition condition. Firstly they analyze p5 (−, −) which satisfies
the contraposition condition though not strong transitivity. Secondly an adjunc-
tive implication is given in [HerMar75] which satisfies contraposition as well as
strong transitivity. This special implication connective is called the central im-
plication in [CoeMooSme(nd)b]. Given the center of a complete orthomodular
lattice L, the central implication a −→c b is then defined as follows, [HerMar75]:
Definition 36. "

“For a and b in L, define a −→c b = {c ∈ ZL | c ∧ a ≤ b}” (p.314)
In [CoeMooSme(nd)b], the technicalities of this central implication as well as of

other adjunctive implications have been analyzed in depth within the context
of a more general approach towards implications. As such it can be shown that
the set of all implication connectives definable on a meet semilattice L is itself
a meet semilattice. And if L is also orthocomplemented then each implication
has besides an internal negation also a dual implication p(a, b)D = p(b! , a! ) since
indeed p(b! , a! ) = 1 iff b! ≤ a! iff a ≤ b. The internal negation of an implication
p(a, b)! = p(p(a, b), 0) will be dually defined with respect to the following internal
modification which in [CoeMooSme(nd)b] is conceived as follows:
“following D. Scott in [Sco71], each implication admits the internal

modification induced by ν : L → L : a 1→ p(1, a)”.
Here we see that ν(p(a, b)) = p(1, p(a, b)) = 1 iff p(a, b) = 1 while p(a, b)! =
p(p(a, b), 0) = 1 iff p(a, b) = 0. In the boolean case we then obtain that p(a, b)! =
p(a, b)! or otherwise stated, (a −→ b)! = (a −→ b) −→ 0 = (a −→ b)! ∨ 0 =
(a −→ b)! .
Part IV
Dynamic Operational
Quantum Logic
130
Chapter 12
Operational Foundation and

Mathematical Framework
12.1 Inductions
Recall that a question or a definite experimental project can be regarded as
an experimental procedure with an evaluation-rule allowing us to interpret the
results. Moreover, we can distinguish among all experimental procedures per-
formable on a physical system, those which can lead to the destruction of the
system and those which cannot. It is now our aim to focus first on experimental
procedures independently from the questions to which they might pertain, i.e.
by abstracting over the evaluation. We will concentrate on the notion of an
induction, originally introduced in [AmiCoeStu98] though we refine it here as
follows,
Definition 37.
An induction e ∈ εs is a physical procedure that can be effectuated on a particular
physical system s. This procedure, when carried out, might change s, modify the
collection of its actual properties and its realized state1 or even destroy s. In
case an induction cannot lead to the destruction of s, we call the induction soft
and otherwise hard.
In [AmiCoeStu98] the notion of induction has been introduced as “an externally
imposed change of a particular physical system”. We find this characterization
a little too ambiguous since it does not refer explicitly to the notion of a physical
procedure.
Because there is a difference between the specification of a procedure and its

performance it is useful to introduce the notion of a particular act of induction.
An act of induction can for instance impose a state/property-transition on the
1 Note, in this part the notion of “realized state” is used to express the “ontologically
realized state”.
131
CHAPTER 12. OPERATIONAL FOUNDATION & MATH. FRAME 132
system in case of a measurement, may assure free evolution or in case we would

consider several physical (sub)systems, as in [Coe00], the interaction of those
subsystems can be seen as an induction of one subsystem on the other. Referring
to the latter, “it may be the case that one system provokes (“induces”) a change
of the other” [CoeMooStu00]. Concentrating further on “one physical system”,
we can be more explicit about the notion of evolution. In [Dan82] an evolution
of a physical system is conceived as follows:
“Evolution of the system is an alteration of state in time. This means
that the set of actually true propositions (properties) i.e. “elements
of reality” changes: certain properties become actual, and other
disappear in potentiality.2 ” (p.330)
As we see it, in this case an induction would for instance be “let the system
evolve”. An act of such an induction assures that the system can evolve freely
and will for instance block certain disturbances. More specifically, the act of
induction can be the imposing of a context in which the system can evolve. In
the particular case of soft inductions, an induction can then be described as “let
the system smoothly evolve”, where a smooth evolution is to be conceived as
an evolution which preserves the very nature of the system [FauMooPir95].
Given the collection εs of all inductions performable on a physical system s;

some inductions will have the form of an arbitrary choice of inductions while
others might have the form of a concatenation of inductions. As such it makes
sense to say explicitly that εs is straightforwardly equipped with two operations,
[CoeMooStu01]:
1) Finite concatenation of soft inductions:
The finite concatenation of soft inductions e1 , e2 , ..., en ∈ εs is the
induction e1 &e2 &...&en which consists of first performing e1 then
e2 , then ... until en .
2) Arbitrary choice of soft inductions:
The arbitrary choice of soft inductions in {ei | i ∈ J} ⊆ εs is the
induction ∨J ei “consisting of performing one of the ei , chosen in any
possible way.” [AmiCoeStu98, p.556].
As noted in [CoeMooStu01], it is reasonable to assume that εs is a set instead
of a collection when we focus on the actions which the physical procedures
encrypted in the inductions can establish.
A representation theory for deterministic evolutions, explicitly for OQL-quantum

systems, is given in [FauMooPir95] under the name of Schrödinger flows. Only
recently have these ideas been further elaborated to cover also the indeterminis-
tic cases. As such the theory which we call dynamic OQL has been initiated in
2 W. Daniel refers here to the lecture of C. Piron entitled: “Ideal measurement and proba-
bility in quantum mechanics”, June 1979.
[AmiCoeStu98, Coe00, Coe(nd)b, Coe(nd)c, CoeMooSme(nd)c, CoeMooStu00,

CoeMooStu01, CoeSme00, CoeStu99a, CoeStu99b, Sou00]. We intend to ana-
lyze carefully what dynamic OQL stands for whereby we will follow and elabo-
rate further on the ideas in the mentioned literature while focusing only on soft
inductions. We will pay special attention in section 12.5 to an example of a per-
fect measurement induction. Note that by means of inductions we can now look
further into the dynamic aspects of OQL, it will enable to give us more insight
on a system’s property-structure. As we will show in the this chapter, it will for
instance become possible to consider the propagation of actual properties and
the assignment of their causes of actuality.
12.2 Inductions as Actions

An act of soft induction does not change the nature of a physical system,
whereby we mean that what can happen is that a system’s realized state is
shifted within the given initial state space or that the actuality and potentiality
of the properties in the initial property lattice is changed. As such, the de-
scription of a physical system by means of its state space or property lattice
encompasses the states/properties which would be realized/actual after per-
forming the inductions with respect to that system. Elaborating further on the
idea explained in [FauMooPir95], that the possibility of choosing an evolution
for the system generates a particular type of experimental projects, we can now
say that the possibility of choosing an induction for a physical system generates
a particular type of questions and of course also a particular type of properties.
First we will focus on that particular type of questions.
12.2.1 Inductions as Actions on Questions

To know exactly how those questions appear, we follow the reasoning in [Dan89]
where the description of a physical system is considered when time is taken into
account. More explicitly W. Daniel makes the assumption that “at any moment
the system under consideration is described by a property lattice Lt ” where Lt
is “the set of properties which a system may have at the moment t” [Dan89,
p.945]. Furthermore, the system is then conceived to be at every moment t in a
specific state pt ∈ Σt and every property at ∈ Lt has a corresponding question
αt ∈ Qt . As such we then see that, [Dan89]:
“... for any r ≥ t and any ar ∈ Lr there exists a question in Qt
which we shall denote by ϕt,r αr , ζ(αr ) = ar , and which is defined
by the project of the following experiment: Let the system evolve in
the given conditions between the moments t and r and then perform
the question αr ; the result of this experiment is the result of αr
obtained at the moment r.” (p.946)3
3 Notethat we changed Daniel’s use of symbols slightly so that it is consistent with our use
of symbols in previous parts.
This idea of W. Daniel to see ϕt,r αr as a particular type of question, generated

by an evolution and the question αr , can of course be elaborated on in the
more general context of inductions. While making abstraction of those time
coordinates, in [CoeMooStu00, CoeMooStu01] those questions are generated
by considering inductions as actions on questions. What we mean is that the
particular type of questions we have in mind, have the form which indicates an
action: e.α ∈ Q, defined as follows, [CoeMooStu01]:
Definition 38.
e.α is the question consisting of “first executing the induction e and then per-
forming the question α”, the outcome of the question e.α being the one thus
obtained for α.
Given this definition we see that e.α is a true question for a system in a cer-
tain realization if it is sure that we would obtain the positive response should
we perform the following experiment: “first execute the induction e and then
perform the question α”. And since a positive response of this experiment can
only be obtained when after performing e, α also gives a positive response, we
can say that:
e.α is true if it is sure that α would be true should we perform
induction e.
More specifically, from “e.α is true for a system in a certain realization” imme-
diately follows that “α is true for that system after performing e”. And it is
exactly the latter expression which forms the underlying idea of introducing a
e
formal causal relation # with respect to an induction e on questions. Before
e
we give the formal definition of #, let us explain its meaning in the following
specific case,
e e
The relation # allows us to express for every e.α that e.α # α
holds, with the attached meaning “if e.α is true then α is true after
performing e”.
Generalizing this idea, we will first label the questions performable on a physical
system with 1 and 2 relatively to a specific induction e. As such Q1 denotes the
questions “before performing induction e” and Q2 denotes the questions “after
e
performing induction e”. Now # can be defined on any couple of questions in
Q1 × Q2 as follows, [CoeMooStu00]:
Definition 39.
e
α # β := truth of α before e induces truth of β after e.
Given definition 38, we immediately obtain the following proposition:
e
Proposition 19. α # β ⇔ α ≺ e.β
e
In particular we can now say that α # β points at β ∈ Q1 as that question
which will be true in Q2 after performing induction e at least when α ∈ Q1 is
true from in advance. We see here that for the case of soft inductions on which
we focus, β is an element of Q1 as well as of Q2 . It is important that only in
e
the case of soft inductions do we immediately obtain I1 # I2 with I1 ∈ Q1 and
I2 ∈ Q2 since when e cannot change the nature of the system we have I1 ≺ e.I2 .
Let us now focus on a specific induction denoted by 0 and called “freeze the
system”. An act of freezing the system implies that the system’s properties
remain as they were before this action was performed.4 In particular we obtain
the following proposition:
Proposition 20.
(1) 0.α ≈ α
%
(2) α # β ⇔ α ≺ 0.β ≈ β
%
In proposition 20.(2) we see that for # ⊆ (Q1 × Q2 ), where 0 leaves the system
intact, Q1 is equal to Q2 with respect to the truth of the questions.
Concerning the finite concatenation of inductions we obtain the following propo-

sition, [CoeMooStu00, CoeMooStu01],
Proposition 21.
(1) e1 .(e2 .α) ≈ (e1 &e2 ).α
Recall that the product question has been defined such that it is the arbitrary
choice of questions. This immediately leads us to state that the arbitrary choice
of a set of inductions {ei ∈ ε | i ∈ J} as an action on a question α ∈ Q is
equivalent to the arbitrary choice of the actions of each induction ei , i ∈ J on
the question α . And similarly we can say that the action of an induction e ∈ ε
on the arbitrary choice of questions {αi ∈ Q | i ∈ J} is equivalent with the
arbitrary choice of the actions of induction e on each question αi , i ∈ J. This
leads us to state the following proposition with [CoeMooStu00, CoeMooStu01],
Proposition 22.
(1) e.(ΠJ αi ) ≈ ΠJ (e.αi )
(2) (∨J ei ).α ≈ ΠJ (ei .α)
12.2.2 Inductions as Actions on Properties

Until now we only focused on inductions as actions on questions. In what follows
we will turn to inductions conceived as actions on properties. More explicitly
we introduce properties such as e.a which stand for “guaranteeing the actuality
of a” as follows:
ε × Lop → Lop : (e, a) 1→ e.a = ζ(e.α)
4 Inthe sense that freeze leaves the system intact it has to be conceived as the induction
which defines a referential frame. As such some inductions will be isomorphic with freeze in
a particular frame of reference while not in another.
Why we need Lop — which is L with a reversed order so that all meets become
joins and vice versa — will be explained below and we should also admit that it
is through a slight abuse of notation that the property ζ(e.α) equals to e.ζ(α).
Against the background of definition 38 we can say that
e.a is an actual property for a system in a certain realization if it
is sure that a would be an actual property of the system should we
perform induction e.
This explains that if e.a is actual it indeed “guarantees the actuality of a” with
respect to e, while if e.a is potential it does not. Also here we can say that “e.a is
actual” implies that “a is actual after performing e”. Again it is this expression
e
which forms the underlying idea of introducing a formal causal relation # with
respect to an induction e on properties. Here we can say the following:
e e
The relation # allows us to express for every e.a that e.a # a
holds, with the attached meaning that “the actuality of e.a, before
performing e guarantees the actuality of a after performing e”.
e
In the same way we can define # ⊆ (L1 × L2 ) as follows:
Definition 40.
e
a # b := the actuality of a before e induces the actuality of b after e.
This definition gives us the following proposition:
Proposition 23.
e
a # b ⇔ a ≤ e.b
Obviously we now obtain the same kind of propositions as we have stated before,
although we change the equivalences into equalities since we can imagine the
situation in which ζ(0.α) = ζ(α) = a:
Proposition 24.
(1) ∀a ∈ L : 0.a = a
%
(2) ∀a, b ∈ L : a # b iff a ≤ b
(3) ∀e1 , e2 ∈ ε, a ∈ L : (e1 &e2 ).a = e1 .(e2 .a)
(4) ∀e ∈ ε, ai ∈ L : e.(∧J ai ) = ∧J (e.ai )
(5) ∀ei ∈ ε, a ∈ L : (∨J ei ).a = ∧J (ei .a)
Proposition 24.(5) explains exactly why we used Lop earlier. Since we know
that to each equivalence class of questions there corresponds a property, we
obtain against the background of proposition 22.(2) the situation in which
ζ((∨J ei ).α) = (∨J ei ).a corresponds to ζ(ΠJ (ei .α)) = ∧J (ei .a). This implies
that “∀a, the map −.a : ε → L turns ε − joins5 into L-meets” [CoeMooStu00].
And here lies the inspiration for turning L-meets into L-joins by the introduc-
tion of Lop in order to obtain a formal preservation of the join rather than an
antitone map.
5 When ε is conceived as a set, the arbitrary choice of inductions corresponds to the join of
inductions.
12.2.3 Inductions as Actions on States

Until now we only focused on inductions as actions on questions or on properties,
where we followed explicitly the ideas in [CoeMooStu00, CoeMooStu01]. What
now still remains is to conceive inductions as actions on states in ΣL . More
explicitly we introduce states such as e.T as follows:
ε × P (ΣL )op → P (ΣL )op : (e, T ) 1→ e.T
The reason why we need P (ΣL )op instead of P (ΣL ) is similar to the explanation
in the previous subsection. Against the background of the previous subsections
we can say that
if e.T contains the realized state, it is the set of states we initially

have to consider in order to guarantee that T contains the realized
state after performing e.
e
Again this forms the underlying idea of introducing a formal causal relation #
with respect to an induction e on states. Here we can say the following for
T ∈ P (ΣL ):
e e
The relation # allows us to express for every e.T that e.T # T holds,
with the attached meaning that “if e.T contains the realized state,
it is the set of initial states, before performing e, which guarantees
that T contains the realized state after performing e”.
e
In the same way we can define # ⊆ P (ΣL )1 × P (ΣL )2 as follows:
Definition 41.
e
T # T ! := if T contains the realized state before e, T induces that T ! contains
the realized state after e.
And thus we put forward:
Proposition 25.
e
T # T ! ⇔ T ⊆ e.T !
Also here we obtain the same kind of propositions as we have stated before in
the case of inductions as actions on properties:
Proposition 26.
(1) ∀T ∈ P (ΣL ) : 0.T = T
%
(2) ∀T, T ! ∈ P (ΣL ) : T # T ! iff T ⊆ T !
(3) ∀e1 , e2 ∈ ε, T ∈ P (ΣL ) : (e1 &e2 ).T = e1 .(e2 .T )
(4) ∀e ∈ ε, Ti ∈ P (ΣL ) : e.(∩J Ti ) = ∩J (e.Ti )
(5) ∀ei ∈ ε, T ∈ P (ΣL ) : (∨J ei ).T = ∩J (ei .T )
12.3 Causation and Propagation

12.3.1 State Propagation and State Causation
First note that every induction e ∈ εs performable on a physical system in a
particular realization can be associated with its corresponding state/property-
transition. The maps expressing these state/property-transitions are however
quite generally conceived in [AmiCoeStu98]. More precisely in [AmiCoeStu98]
a state-transition associated with an induction e ∈ εs is envisaged as follows:
ẽ : P (ΣL ) → P (ΣL ) : T 1→ ẽ(T ) = ∪{ẽ! (p) | p ∈ ΣL ∩ T }
where ẽ! : ΣL → P (ΣL ) : p 1→ ẽ! (p) is “the set of possible outcome-states when
performing the induction e on s in state p” [AmiCoeStu98, p.556]. Note that
ẽ(T ) is the union of the sets of possible outcome-states which we obtain when
we consider performing e on s in every possible initial state in T . The fact
that we may consider a “set” T of possible initial states will become relevant in
section 12.4.1. Further we should note that while considering soft inductions,
an induction preserves the system which implies that ∀T ∈ P (ΣL ) : ẽ(T ) = ∅ iff
T = ∅ [AmiCoeStu98].
It seems reasonable to elaborate further on this idea of a state-transition in order

to express how states propagate. The idea of a causation-propagation duality
has been worked out in the context of inductions as actions on properties in
[Coe00, CoeMooStu00, CoeMooStu01] — we will concentrate on this in detail
below — and can be extended into a context of inductions as actions on states.
As such we redefine ẽ as the map called state propagation which describes the
assignment of smallest sets of possible outcome-states as those propagated by
fixed sets of initial states; and we introduce a map ẽ∗ called state causation
which assigns causes, i.e. it describes the assignment of the maximal sets of
initial states necessary to guarantee given sets as those of possible outcome-
states,
1) State Causation:
% e
ẽ∗ : P (ΣL )2 → P (ΣL )1 : T2 1→ e.T2 = {T1 ∈ P (ΣL )1 | T1 # T2 }
2) State Propagation:
& e
ẽ : P (ΣL )1 → P (ΣL )2 : T1 1→ {T2 ∈ P (ΣL )2 | T1 # T2 }
Given those mappings where ẽ∗ (T ) = {p ∈ ΣL | ẽ({p}) ⊆ T }, we see more

clearly that ẽ∗ (T2 ) is the largest set of states that assures that the realized
state is after e in T2 whenever before e it is in ẽ∗ (T2 ); and ẽ(T1 ) is the smallest
set of states in which the realized state after the induction will be if it before
the induction is in T1 . Note that in order to justify the use of the names
“propagation” and “causation” where ẽ(T1 ) is a propagation set while ẽ∗ (T2 )
is a causation set, it is necessary to work with P (ΣL )1 and P (ΣL )2 . Let us

explain this by focusing on the intended meaning of a map such as ẽ∗ in case
it is considered from P (ΣL ) → P (ΣL ). Indeed, this would imply that ẽ∗ (T ) is
the largest set of states which, if it contains the realized state, assures that the
realized state would be in T should we perform e. And this is a much weaker
interpretation than the one given above.
From the way in which we conceived the maps expressing state causation and
state propagation follows that we obtain the following proposition:
Proposition 27.
e
ẽ(T ) ⊆ T ! ⇔ T # T ! ⇔ T ⊆ ẽ∗ (T ! )
This proposition points out that ẽ = ẽ∗ . More precisely we see that ẽ∗ preserves
intersections — see also 26.(4) — while ẽ preserves unions.
We will close this subsection with a note on the structure which arises by con-
sidering such state propagation and state causation maps. We introduce the no-
tation JL(P (ΣL )1 , P (ΣL )2 ) for the collection of all union-preserving maps from
P (ΣL )1 to P (ΣL )2 and the notation of M L(P (ΣL )2 , P (ΣL )1 ) for the collection
of all intersection-preserving maps from P (ΣL )2 to P (ΣL )1 . By considering
P (ΣL )1 as equal to P (ΣL )2 and abstracting over the indices 1 and 2, we can
follow the idea in [AmiCoeStu98] and introduce the following sets:
ε̃∗ = {ẽ∗ | e ∈ εs } ⊆ M L(P (ΣL ), P (ΣL ))

ε̃ = {ẽ | e ∈ εs } ⊆ JL(P (ΣL ), P (ΣL ))
We define now the following operations on elements of ε̃ and ε̃∗ respectively
Definition 42.
ẽ1 ◦ ẽ2 = e!
2 &e1 (12.1)
∨J ẽi = ∨'J ei (12.2)
∗
e˜1 ∗ ◦ e˜2 ∗ = e!
1 &e2 (12.3)
∗
∧J e˜i ∗
= ∨'J ei (12.4)
We give the definition of a unital quantale as encountered for instance in [Ros96],

Definition 43. A quantale is a complete lattice Q together with an associative
binary operation ◦ satisfying: a ◦ (∨J bi ) = ∨J (a ◦ bi ) and (∨J bi ) ◦ a = ∨J (bi ◦ a)
for all a ∈ Q. Q is unital iff it has an element 1 such that 1 ◦ a = a = a ◦ 1 for
all a ∈ Q.
Now we can finally show that (ε̃, ∨, ◦) is a unital quantale and that (ε̃∗ , ∧, ◦) is
a unital co-quantale, i.e. where ◦ distributes over ∧:
Firstly, we show that (ε̃, ∨) is a complete lattice. We define a pointwise ordering

of the maps ẽ as follows:
ẽ1 ≤ ẽ2 ⇔ ∀T ∈ P (ΣL ) : ẽ1 (T ) ⊆ ẽ2 (T )
And we introduce a pointwise computable join as follows:

(
∨J ẽi : P (ΣL ) → P (ΣL ) : T 1→ J (ẽi (T ))
Since(∨J ei expresses the arbitrary choice of inductions, under which ε is closed,

and J (ẽi (T )) expresses the arbitrary choice with respect to maps correspond-
ing to inductions, it is justified to claim that the pointwise computable join
as introduced, corresponds exactly the one defined above as ∨ "J ei . The join
semi-lattice we as such obtain is a complete lattice.
Secondly, we show that (ẽ, ∨, ◦) is a unital quantale. Since ε is closed under
finite concatenation, & induces a quantale product ◦ by means of definition
(12.1). Note that ◦ by its construction as standard “composition” is associative.
The following distribution laws are straightforward proved given the fact that
operationally e&(∨J ei ) = ∨J (e&ei ) and (∨J ei )&e = ∨J (ei &e) hold:
∀ẽi , ẽ ∈ ε̃ : ẽ ◦ (∨J ẽi ) = ∨J (ẽ ◦ ẽi ) and (∨J ẽi ) ◦ ẽ = ∨J (ẽi ◦ ẽ)
Note that 0̃ can then be conceived as a unit element for the quantale (ε̃, ∨, ◦) ⊆
JL(P (ΣL ), P (ΣL )).
Thirdly, by means of the notion of a Galois adjunction it is well known, see for
example [CoeMoo00], that we obtain the following so-called quantaloidal iso-
morphism: JL(P (ΣL ), P (ΣL )) ∼ = M L(P (ΣL ), P (ΣL ))coop , where coop means
that the lattice-order and the quantale product-order are reversed. Given this
quantaloidal isomorphism we obtain the causal duality: ε̃ ∼ = (ε̃∗ )coop . Hence-
forth it follows that (ε̃ )
∗ coop
⊆ M L(P (ΣL ), P (ΣL )) coop
. Given the fact that
pointwise joins translate into pointwise meets, we can say that indeed ε̃∗ ⊆
M L(P (ΣL ), P (ΣL )) gives (ε̃∗ , ∧, ◦) as a co-quantale. It is a unital co-quantale
since ◦ defined in (12.3) distributes over arbitrary ∧ — defined in (12.4) — as
follows:
∀e˜i ∗ , ẽ∗ ∈ ε̃∗ : ẽ∗ ◦ [∧J (e˜i ∗ )] = ∧J [(ẽ∗ ) ◦ (e˜i ∗ )] and
[∧J (e˜i ∗ )] ◦ (ẽ∗ ) = ∧J [(e˜i ∗ ) ◦ (ẽ∗ )]
and the unit element is given by 0̃∗ .
12.3.2 Property Propagation and Property Causation

The idea of a property-transition associated with an induction is expressed in
[AmiCoeStu98] by following a similar kind of reasoning as the one exposed
above for a state-transition. Against the background of the state-property du-
ality, the state-transitions are just translated into maps on ∨-closed subsets
of ΣL . Again the idea of such transition-maps can be elaborated on within a
causation-propagation context. Following the ideas in [Coe00, CoeMooStu00,
CoeMooStu01] we can indeed say something more about property transitions.

With every induction e ∈ εs we can associate a map called property propagation
which expresses the propagation of strongest actual properties and a map called
property causation which assigns causes, i.e. weakest properties which guarantee
actuality,
1) Property Causation:
" e
ē∗ : L2 → L1 : a2 1→ e.a2 = {a1 ∈ L1 | a1 # a2 }
2) Property Propagation:
! e
ē : L1 → L2 : a1 1→ {a2 ∈ L2 | a1 # a2 }
Given those mappings, ē∗ (a2 ) is the weakest property whose actuality guaran-
tees the actuality of a2 and ē(a1 ) is the strongest property whose actuality is
induced by that of a1 . As such, we have ē(ē∗ (a2 )) ≤ a2 while a1 ≤ ē∗ (ē(a1 )).
Consequently, since this defines an adjunction [CoeMoo00], we immediately ob-
tain the following propositions proved in [CoeMooStu01]:
Proposition 28.
(1) a ≤ b ⇒ ē∗ (a) ≤ ē∗ (b)
(2) a ≤ b ⇒ ē(a) ≤ ē(b)
e
(3) a ≤ ē∗ (b) ⇔ a # b ⇔ ē(a) ≤ b
Especially proposition 28.(3) shows that property causation is adjoint to prop-

erty propagation: ē = ē∗ where ē∗ preserves meets — cf. proposition 24.(4) —
and ē preserves joins [Coe00, CoeMooStu00, CoeMooStu01]. We now introduce
the notation JL(L1 , L2 ) for the collection of all join-preserving maps from L1 to
L2 and the notation M L(L2 , L1 ) for the collection of all meet-preserving maps
from L2 to L1 . An abstraction from time-coordinates on property lattices L1
and L2 amounts to one and the same lattice L. As such we now introduce with
[CoeMooStu00, CoeMooStu01] the following sets:
ε̄∗ = {ē∗ | e ∈ εs } ⊆ M L(L, L)
ε̄ = {ē | e ∈ εs } ⊆ JL(L, L)
We can define the following operations on elements of ε̄ and ε̄∗ respectively:

Definition 44.
ē1 ◦ ē2 = e2 &e1 (12.5)

∨J ēi = ∨J ei (12.6)
∗
ē∗1 ◦ ē∗2 = (e1 &e2 ) (12.7)
∗
∧J e¯i ∗ = (∨J ei ) (12.8)
Given the definition of a unital quantale above, we will show that (ε̄, ∨, ◦) is a
unital quantale and that (ε̄∗ , ∧, ◦) is a unital co-quantale.
Firstly, we show that (ε̄, ∨) is a complete lattice. We define a pointwise ordering
of the maps ē as follows:
ē1 ≤ ē2 ⇔ ∀a ∈ L : ē1 (a) ≤ ē2 (a)
And we introduce a pointwise computable join as follows:

"
∨J ēi : L → L : a 1→ J (ēi (a))
It has been proved in [AmiCoeStu98] that this pointwise computable join cor-
responds exactly to the one defined above as ∨J ei . The join semi-lattice we as
such obtain is a complete lattice.
Secondly, we show that (ē, ∨, ◦) is a unital quantale. Since ε is closed under finite
concatenation, & induces a quantale product ◦ by means of definition (12.5).
Note that ◦ by its construction as standard “composition” is associative. The
following distribution laws are straightforward proved:
∀ēi , ē ∈ ε̄ : ē ◦ (∨J ēi ) = ∨J (ē ◦ ēi ) and (∨J ēi ) ◦ ē = ∨J (ēi ◦ ē)
Note that 0̄ can then be conceived as a unit element for the quantale (ε̄, ∨, ◦) ⊆
JL(L, L).
Thirdly, by means of the notion of a Galois adjunction it is well known, see
for example [CoeMoo00], that we obtain the following “so-called” quantaloidal
isomorphism: JL(L, L) ∼ = M L(L, L)coop . Given this quantaloidal isomorphism
we obtain the causal duality: ε̄ ∼
= (ε̄∗ )coop . Henceforth it follows that (ε̄∗ )coop ⊆
M L(L, L) coop
. Given the fact that pointwise joins translate into pointwise
meets, we can declare that indeed ε̄∗ ⊆ M L(L, L) gives (ε̄∗ , ∧, ◦) as a co-
quantale. It is a unital co-quantale since ◦ defined in (12.7) distributes over
arbitrary ∧, defined in (12.8), as follows:
∀e¯i ∗ , ē∗ ∈ ε̄∗ : (ē∗ ) ◦ [∧J (e¯i ∗ )] = ∧J [(ē∗ ) ◦ (e¯i ∗ )] and
[∧J (e¯i ∗ )] ◦ (ē∗ ) = ∧J [(e¯i ∗ ) ◦ (ē∗ )]
and the unit element is given by 0̄∗ .
We have reached the level on which the duality between property causation and
property propagation translates itself in a causal duality between ε̄ and (ε̄∗ )coop ,
for more details we refer to [Coe00, CoeMooStu00].
12.4 Resolutions and Induced Propagation

of Property Sets
As we saw, every soft induction corresponds to maps expressing state and
property-transitions. We have been more specific and attached to every soft
induction the maps expressing state causation, state propagation, property cau-
sation and property propagation. It is crucial now to note that only when we
have one initial property given, is it possible to consider the strongest propaga-
tion with respect to actuality; and only when we have a final property given, is
it possible to consider the cause, i.e. the weakest property that guarantees actu-
ality. In this section we will introduce the notion of an actuality set of properties
and the notion of a property set which allow us to extend our reasoning from the
level of states and properties to the level of sets of properties. As such we will
be able to introduce the maps expressing property set propagation and prop-
erty set causation. Further on, we will firstly explain the relation between these
maps expressing state propagation and property set propagation. Secondly, we
will focus on the kind of property propagations which can be linked to any state
propagation. Note that when we consider a state propagation it is possible that
we are dealing with a situation in which we have a lack of knowledge of the pre-
cise “initial” and “final” realized state, which makes it impossible to pinpoint
the corresponding property propagations immediately. We therefore first need
to introduce the notion of an operational resolution.
12.4.1 Operational Resolutions

If we want to assign to any subset of the state space T ⊆ Σ of a system, the
strongest property in L which is definitely actual in case the system would be
realized in an arbitrary state E ∈ T , we introduce a map called operational
resolution [CoeStu99a, CoeStu99b]. The reason why we initially like to consider
subsets of a state space, is simply because it can very well be the case that
we have a lack of knowledge of the precise state of the system and that the
only thing we can say with certainty is that the system is realized in “a state”
contained in T ⊆ Σ. Let us now focus on the exact definition as given in
[CoeStu99a]6 :
Definition 45.
“For a given set Σ, an “operational resolution” is defined as a map Cr : P (Σ) →
L with as domain the powerset of Σ and as codomain a poset (L, ≤), such that
for all T, T ! , Ti ∈ P (Σ):”
T ⊆ T ! ⇒ Cr (T ) ≤ Cr (T ! ) (12.9)
∀i : Cr (Ti ) ≤ Cr (T ) ⇒ Cr (∪i Ti ) ≤ Cr (T ) (12.10)
T &= ∅ ⇒ Cr (T ) &= Cr (∅) (12.11)
The given conditions imply that Cr can be interpreted as already suggested, by
the map that assigns to a collection of possible states T the strongest property
which is always actual if the system is realized in a state of T . The idea of taking
the strongest (or smallest) definitely actual property is expressible by means of
a conjunction, the existence of which follows from the fact that the image of Cr
is a complete lattice.7 We can be more explicit concerning the meaning of Cr in
case L is atomistic and Σ = ΣL , the set of atoms in L:
6 Note that in [CoeStu99a] the codomain of C is a poclass instead of a poset, we however
r
will stick to a poset.
7 This has been pointed out in [CoeStu99a, CoeStu99b, Stu99]: the image of C — imC
r r
— is a set of properties: {Cr (T ) | T ⊆ Σ} and more explicitly a subset of L which inherits the
Proposition 29. !
Cr : P (Σ) → L : T 1→ Cr (T ) = {a | pE ≤ a (∀E ∈ T )} = ∨(E∈T ) pE
Proof
We start from the fact that we have the following join: for any {Ti }i ⊆ P (Σ) :
∨i Cr (Ti ) = Cr (∪i Ti ) [CoeStu99a, CoeStu99b, Stu99]. From this follows that:
∨(E∈T ) Cr ({E}) = Cr (∪(E∈T ) {E}). Since Cr (∪(E∈T ) {E}) = Cr (T ), also ∀T ∈
P (Σ) : ∨(E∈T ) Cr ({E}) = Cr (T ). !When L is atomistic we have Cr ({E}) = pE
and obtain Cr (T ) = ∨(E∈T ) pE = {a | pE ≤ a (∀E ∈ T )}.8 !
Note here that ∨(E∈T ) pE has to be interpreted as the join of atoms corresponding
to all possible states in T . Since ∀E ∈ T : pE ≤ ∨(E∈T ) pE , we reach the point
that ∨(E∈T ) pE is always actual in any realized state of T . In the above proof
of proposition 29, we expressed that if there is only one possible state such that
T = {E} then Cr (T ) = pE , which means that when we have a physical system
realized in a state E, the strongest actual property!which we can attach to it is
the corresponding state property in L since pE = {a | pE ≤ a}.
The above exposition is only a special case within a more general approach to
operational resolutions and corresponds to the given example in [CoeStu99a,
CoeStu99b] where Σ is considered to be a subset of L without the bottom
element, L is atomistic and Σ is the full set of states. In general, the resolution-
map Cr still attaches to a set of possible states the strongest property which
is definitely actual but this strongest actual property is not necessarily the
join of corresponding state-properties. For a detailed exposition we refer to
[CoeStu99a], but let us just note that in this general case “it is not true that for
any subset T of Σ there is a property that is actual if and only if the state of the
system is in T ” [Stu99] unless every subset T of Σ is closed. For that reason there
exists a theorem which states that any operational resolution factors uniquely
into a closure operator9 on Σ, C : P (Σ) → F(Σ) ⊆ P (Σ), for which C(∅) =
∅ and an order-preserving embedding θ : F(Σ) → L — where F(Σ) is the
collection of C-closed subsets of Σ — such that the image of the embedding θ is
isomorphic to F(Σ) as a complete lattice [CoeStu99a, CoeStu99b, Stu99]. It is
not our intention to handle all technicalities involved, though referring back to
proposition 29 we can say the following. As is explicitly shown in [Stu99], when
Σ ⊂ L without bottom element we have: C : P (Σ) → F(Σ) : T 1→ {E | E ≤ ∨T }
and θ : F(Σ) → L : F 1→ ∨F where θ−1 : L → F(Σ) : a 1→ {E | a ∈
S(E) and E ∈ Σ} is exactly a Cartan map — cf. chapter 4, section 4.7. In
partial order of L, (imCr , ≤) is a join semilattice where the join is given by: ∀{Ti }i ⊆ P (Σ):
∨i Cr (Ti ) := Cr (∪i Ti ) and has as top element Cr (Σ) and as bottom element Cr (∅). Since any
join semilattice is a complete lattice by means of Birkhoffs’ theorem the claim is valid.
8 The last part of this proof will become clear by the end of this section.
9 C is a closure operator on Σ if for all T, T ! ∈ P (Σ): T ⊆ C(T ), T ⊆ T ! ⇒ C(T ) ⊆ C(T ! ),
C(C(T )) = C(T ). This closure is called T0 if in addition the following conditions are satisfied:
C(∅) = ∅ and C({E1 }) = C({E2 }) ⇒ E1 = E2 for any E1 , E2 ∈ Σ; or is called T1 if in addition
the following conditions are satisfied C(∅) = ∅ and C({E}) = {E} for any E ∈ Σ. As such
T1 stands for “all points are closed”. A set T ⊆ Σ is closed if C(T ) = T . See for instance
[CoeStu99a, CoeStu99b] for more details on the use of the closure in relation to operational
resolutions.
[Stu99] it is further noticed that because we find the Cartan representation as

an inverse of the embedding part of Cr , the operational resolution generalizes
the state/property duality of OQL. When Σ = ΣL and when L is also atomistic
we see that C(T ) = {E | E ≤ ∨T } = {pE | E ∈ T } and since " Cr can now
also be written as Cr = θ ◦ C : P (Σ) → L we see that Cr (T ) = {pE | E ∈
T } = ∨(E∈T ) pE . As such it is obvious that Cr ({E}) = pE which points out that
the C-closure in this case is T1 . Note that we here recovered the equivalence
of complete atomistic lattices and T1 -closure spaces, established in the Geneva
School, [CoeStu99b].
12.4.2 Actuality Sets

Given the notion of operational resolution, we wish to consider the case where
in
" Cr : P (Σ) → L we set Σ = L \ 0. The result will be called the join map:
: P (L) → L. As the elements of P (L) we take actuality sets. We follow the
definition of an actuality set as it has been introduced in [CoeSme00]:
Definition 46.
An actuality set is a set of properties of which we are certain that at least one
property is actual.
In the same sense that we may have a lack of knowledge of the precise state
of the system so that the only thing we can say with certainty is that the
system is realized in “a state” contained in T ⊆ Σ; we might also have a lack
of knowledge of the precise properties of a physical system which are actual so
that the only thing we can say with certainty is that the system has at least
one actual property contained in A ⊆ L. Such kinds of lacking knowledge of
the actuality of properties are not expressible on the level of L since we lack the
notion of a classical disjunction in L. On the level of P (L) we have the union
which fulfills the roll of classical disjunction. Since the join map assigns to each
actuality set A the strongest property whose actuality is implied by all elements
of A, it can also be"interpreted as the map"which translates unions " into joins.
More explicitly, if : P (L) → L : A 1→ A = ∨(a∈A) a, then A is always
actual, since as we saw in chapter 4, section 4.3.2, the following implication is
secured in one direction:
∃aj ∈ {ai | i ∈ J} : aj is actual ⇒ ∨J ai is actual.
"
We will be more explicit and call this “join” of an actuality set, A, or in other
words “the strongest property of which A implies actuality” a definite actual
property of an actuality set [CoeSme00].
Against the background of property propagations/causations and the link be-

tween the level of P (L) and L by means of the join map, we can now think of
propagations of actuality sets. Although we will elaborate further on this in the
next section, we need to declare already that it does not makes sense to consider
the propagations of every subset of L but we must instead restrict our domain
and codomain to the collection of certain ideals taken in L. Following here the
recent work of B. Coecke in [Coe(nd)a]10 , a motivation for this restriction results
also from the fact that the intersection of two sets of properties on the level of
P (L) gives in the case when a ≤ b the following {a} ∧P (L) {b} = {a} ∩ {b} = ∅.
As explicitly noted in [Coe(nd)a] this clearly does not encode the kind of con-
junction we would like in order to develop a logic of actuality sets. For this
reason we will work with the collection DI(L) of distributive ideals taken in L.
While we will explain below what distributive ideals are, we now introduce our
notion of property set:
Definition 47. The elements of DI(L) ⊆ P (L), i.e. the distributive ideals of
L, are named “property sets”.
An ideal is distributive if it’s an order ideal, i.e. a ≤ b ∈ I ⇒ a ∈ I and
I &= ∅,
" closed under distributive joins, i.e. if A ⊆ I has a distributive join
then A ∈ I [BruLak70, Coe(nd)a]. Referring to " the latter, a subset A of
a (meet-semi) lattice L has a distributive join or A is called distributive if,
[BruLak70, Coe(nd)a],
1) Its supremum" exists,
"
2) ∀b ∈ L : b ∧ A = {b ∧ a | a ∈ A}
Let us now be a little more specific. In the case we work with L atomistic and
ΣL , i.e. the set of atoms of L, we can give the following operational motivation
for the mentioned restriction to DI(L):
ρ : P (ΣL ) → DI(L) ⊆ P (L) : T 1→ {a ∈ L | µ(a) ⊆ T }

ρ−1 : DI(L) → P (ΣL ) : I 1→ I ∩ Σ
"
If we consider ρ and ρ−1 as given and if {p ∈ ΣL | p ≤ a} is distributive, it
can be shown " that L 3→ DI(L) ∼
= P (ΣL ). Firstly it is proved in [Coe(nd)a] that
"
∀b ∈ L : b ∧ ( L µ(a)) = p∈µ(a) (b ∧ p) indeed holds. Secondly we know from
chapter 4, section 4.7, that µ : L → P (ΣL ) is in general injective, order and
meet preserving. Implicitly we now assume that µ(0) = ∅. Given µ with the
mentioned properties, it is pinpointed as a balanced inf-embedding in [Coe(nd)a]
and as such it is responsible for L 3→ P (Σ). Thirdly we still have to show that
DI(L) ∼ = P (ΣL ), which comes down to pointing out that ρ and ρ−1 define a
bijection11 . Analyzing the proof given in [Coe(nd)a], and assuming that ρ and
ρ−1 hold, we see that for I ∈ DI(L):
a ∈ I ⇒ ∀p ≤ a :"p ∈ I ⇒ µ(a) ⊆ I
µ(a) ⊆ I ⇒ a = L µ(a) ∈ I
10 In his construction B. Coecke uses a purely mathematical result on injective hulls for meet
semi-lattices [BruLak70].
11 A map is a bijection or a one-to-one correspondence if it is injective and surjective. For
f , a bijection, there is an inverse f −1 defined such that f −1 (b) = a iff f (a) = b, which is also
a bijection. With a slight abuse of concepts we can say that f and f −1 define “a bijection”.
From which follows:
a ∈ I ⇔ µ(a) ⊆ I ⇔ µ(a) ⊆ I ∩ ΣL
So we obtain:
ρ(ρ−1 (I)) = {a ∈ L | µ(a) ⊆ I ∩ ΣL } = I
And reversely:
ρ−1 (ρ(T )) = {a ∈ L | µ(a) ⊆ T } ∩ ΣL = T
As such we showed that ρ and ρ−1 are inverse, so they are bijective, and since
they are isotone12 , they are isomorphisms of complete lattices.
Analyzing the above, L 3→ DI(L) indicates that every property a ∈ L is an

element
" of at least one property set in DI(L) and since every element a ∈ L =
L µ(a), we can now rewrite ρ as follows:
"
ρ : P (ΣL ) → DI(L) : T 1→ { L T ! | T ! ⊆ T }
Furthermore, DI(L) ∼ = P (ΣL ) indicates that for every property set in DI(L)
there exists a corresponding T ∈ P (ΣL ). Of course this implies that for every
union and intersection of elements of P (ΣL ) there is a corresponding element
in DI(L). On a more abstract level — not restricted to the L-atomistic case —
the language of DI(L) is in [Coe(nd)a] equipped with logical connectives such
that the logic of actuality sets is obtained. In chapter 13 we will deal with this
logic in detail. For now it is our intention to finish this chapter with a section
on property set propagation and property set causation and an example of what
we consider to be perfect measurement inductions.
12.4.3 Property Set Propagation and Property Set Cau-

sation
Assuming again that Σ ⊆ L, atomistic, we are finally in the position to consider
property set propagation and property set causation.13 Note firstly that we can
lift proposition 27 to the level of DI(L) by means of the above explained fact
e
that DI(L) ∼ = P (ΣL ), as such introducing the causal relation # on DI(L):
e
ρ(ẽ(T )) ⊆ ρ(T ! ) ⇔ ρ(T ) # ρ(T ! ) ⇔ ρ(T ) ⊆ ρ(ẽ∗ (T ! ))
More explicitly we can now introduce % $

e as the map called property set propa-
gation, induced via ρ and ρ−1 from underlying state propagations, expressing
the propagation of smallest actuality sets. We introduce %
$
e ∗ as the induced map
12 For ρ: if T ⊆ T ! then ρ(T ) ⊆ ρ(T ! ).
13 The notion of property set has been defined in section 12.4.2 and is as such not just any
set of properties.
called property set causation assigning causes, i.e. largest property sets which
guarantee an actuality set.
1) Property Set Propagation:

$
#
e $
#
e $ e
DI(L)1 −→ DI(L)2 : A1 1−→ %
$
e (A1 ) = {A2 ∈ DI(L) | A1 # A2 }
↑ ↑
∼
= ∼
=
↓ ↓
ẽ ẽ
P (ΣL )1 −→ P (ΣL )2 : T 1−→ ẽ(T )
2) Property Set Causation:

$
#
e∗ $
#
e∗ ( e
DI(L)2 −→ DI(L)1 : A2 1−→ %
$
e ∗ (A2 ) = C( {A1 ∈ DI(L) | A1 # A2 })
↑ ↑
∼
= ∼
=
↓ ↓
ẽ∗ ẽ∗
P (ΣL )2 −→ P (ΣL )1 : T 1−→ ẽ∗ (T )
Note firstly that we used C as the following closure, [Coe(nd)a],

&
C : P (L) → P (L) : A 1→ {B ∈ DI(L) | B ⊇ A}
( "
where C( (−)) = DI(L) . Given those mappings, % $
e ∗ (A2 ) is the largest property
set which, if it is an actuality set, guarantees that A2 is an actuality set and
%
$e (A1 ) is the smallest property set which is an actuality set after e if A1 is an
actuality set before e.
Given the propagation-causation duality ẽ = ẽ∗ for states, and our construction
of property set propagation and causation given above, we also have % $e =%$e ∗.
e
As such we can now be more specific about # on DI(L), and say that:
Proposition 30.
e
%
$
e (A1 ) ⊆ A2 ⇔ A1 # A2 ⇔ A1 ⊆ %
$
e ∗ (A2 )
e
Here A1 # A2 expresses that “if the property set A1 is an actuality set before
e, A1 induces that A2 is an actuality set after e”.
The following scheme will explain how each map expressing an induced property
set propagation gives us by means of an operational resolution an associated map
expressing a property propagation of actual properties.
ē " ē " "
L1 −→ L2 : A1 1−→ ē( A1 ) = ($ %e (A1 ))
↑
" ↑
" ↑
" ↑
"
| | ⊥ ⊥
$
#
e $
#
e
DI(L)1 −→ DI(L)2 : A1 1−→ %
$
e (A1 )
Without being very specific we can of course use the fact that in general the
operational resolution Cr and the Cartan map µ are adjoint, to obtain a trans-
lation of this scheme into the case of causation-maps. For this reason we will
use the Cartan map as follows — for specific details we refer to [Coe(nd)c]:
ē∗
L2 −→ L1
| |
µ µ
↓ ↓
ẽ∗
P (ΣL )2 −→ P (ΣL )1
↑ ↑
∼
= ∼
=
↓ ↓
$
#
e∗
DI(L)2 −→ DI(L)1
As is proved in [CoeMooSme(nd)c], these constructions allow us to state the
following proposition:
Proposition 31.
1) [ẽ(µ(a1 )) ⊆ µ(a2 )] ⇔ [µ(ē(a1 )) ⊆ µ(a2 )]
%
2) [ẽ(ρ−1 (A1 )) ⊆ ρ−1 (A2 )] ⇔ [($e (A1 )) ⊆ A2 ]
Finally we can say something of the structure of maps % $e . Note firstly that
for DI(L) ⊆ P (L), % $
e preserves disjunctions. Secondly we can say that the
preservation of the join for ē imposes a continuity condition on %
$
e:
) ) ) )
A= B⇒ %$
e (A) = %
$e (B) (12.12)
We will call the collection of %

$
e -maps induced by state-transitions on a physical
system, %
$ε;
) )
%
$ %
ε = {$e : DI(L) → DI(L) |$ %
e( Ai ) = %
$
e (Ai ), %
$
e meets (12.12)}
DI(L),J DI(L),J
Since ε̃ ∼
=%$ε, also ($
%ε, ∨, ◦) is a unital quantale. Similarly as in the case of ε̃,
we see that %$ε is a join-complete lattice with the order pointwise obtained as
follows:
%
$
e1 ≤ %
$
e 2 ⇔ ∀I ∈ DI(L) : %
$
e 1 (I) ⊆ %
$
e 2 (I)
This yields a pointwise computable join as follows,
"
∨J %
$ %
e i : DI(L) → DI(L) : I 1→ DI(L),J ($
e i (I))
Again here ∨J % $
e i expresses the propagation map on DI(L) corresponding to the
induction expressing an arbitrary choice. The quantale product is here similarly
definable as follows:
%
$
e 1◦ %
$
e 2 :=|e2 &e1|
From the above follows that we obtain the following map indicating a quantale
morphism, it preserves ◦ and ∨:
)
∨[−] : %
$
ε → ε̄ : %
$
e 1→ [L → L : a 1→ %
$
e (↓ a)]
Remember that the join-preserving maps ε̄ ⊆ JL(L1 , L2 ) and that their Ga-
lois adjoints ε̄∗ ⊆ M L(L2 , L1 ). In the same line of thought we could lift the
above discussion from the operational to a more theoretical level and discuss
the relations between JL(L1 , L2 ), M L(L2 , L1 ) and the collection of “all” maps
on DI(L) satisfying the continuity condition and disjunction preservance, for
this we refer to [CoeMooStu00].
12.5 Example: Perfect Measurement Induction

Let us now explain the above terminology by considering as an example a stan-
dard quantum measurement which is an imposed induction on a physical system
and which has an associated map expressing a property set propagation. More
specifically, we will take the case of a perfect measurement induction as discussed
in [CoeSme00]. Against the background of chapter 5 section 5.2.4,
Definition 48.
A perfect measurement induction is the induction of “a or its orthocomplement
a! ” on a physical system such that its performance yields as a result the disjunc-
tion of Sasaki projections expressing exactly the endo-determinism in quantum
theory.
As we saw before, inducing — performing — a perfect measurement β on a
physical system causes b to be actual afterwards in case a positive response is
obtained and b! to be actual otherwise. This is exactly the situation where we
perform β with ζ(β) = b “or” β ∼ with ζ(β ∼ ) = b! , both ideal first kind measure-
ments, on a physical system. We now also know that in the case of a quantum
system, the performance of a perfect measurement, causes an initial realization
p to be minimally perturbed such that afterwards ϕb (p) or ϕb! (p) will be ac-
tual. In order to assure that those Sasaki projections of b or b! yield states, we
assume that Σ ⊆ L where the latter is atomistic, complete, orthocomplemented
and satisfies the covering law.
Let us recapitulate, due to an induction of “b or b! ” on a physical entity with

initial state property p, we will obtain the result that state property ϕb (p) =
b ∧ (p ∨ b! ) or state property ϕb! (p) = b! ∧ (p ∨ b) is actual afterwards but that in
general neither ϕb (p) nor ϕb! (p) will be actual with certainty. This disjunction
with respect to actuality is a classical one, meaning that if we want to lift those
state transitions corresponding to perfect measurement inductions to property
set propagations (describing the propagation of smallest actuality sets), we will
need to introduce disjunctions by embedding L in DI(L). Focusing on the
property set propagation in DI(L) induced from the level of maps on P (ΣL ),
we obtain the following scheme in case of a perfect measurement induction of b

or b! :
∨[ρ[ϕ{b,b! } ]] : L1 → L2
↑
" ↑
"
| |
ρ[ϕ{b,b! } ] : DI(L)1 → DI(L)2
↑ ↑
∼
= ∼
=
↓ ↓
ϕ{b,b! } : P (ΣL )1 → P (ΣL )2
Where we take
ϕ{b,b! } (T ) = {ϕb (p) !
{ϕb! (p) | p ∈ T, p &≤ b}
" | p ∈ T, p &≤ b } ∪ −1
ρ[ϕ{b,b! } ](A) = { L" B | B ⊆ ϕ{b,b! } (ρ (A))}
∨[ρ[ϕ{b,b! } ]](∨A) = ρ[ϕ{b,b! } ](A)
Of course, in case A = ρ(T ), we obtain the following:

"
ρ[ϕ{b,b! } ](A) = ρ({ϕb (p) | p ∈ T, p &≤ b! }) DI(L) ρ({ϕb! (p) | p ∈ T, p &≤ b})
Which immediately translates into:

"
ρ[ϕ{b,b! } ](A) = {ϕb (a) | a ∈ A, a &≤ b! } DI(L) {ϕb
! (a) | a ∈ A, a &≤ b}
In this way a perfect measurement induction of a property or its opposite,

associates to every set of possible initial states a set of possible outcome-states,
or isomorphically; to every initial property set, a final property set or through
the glasses of an operational resolution: to every initial definite actual property
a final definite actual property, in case the property sets are actuality sets.
Chapter 13
Construction of Dynamic
In this chapter we present recent work under development for which we refer
to [Coe(nd)c, CoeMooSme(nd)c, CoeMooSme(nd)d]. In the first instance we
pay attention to the logic of actuality sets as a static basis which can then be
extended by dynamic implications and conjunctions allowing us explicitly to deal
with notions such as propagation and causation. We will conclude this chapter
with a reinterpretation of the logical description for perfect measurements as
presented in [CoeSme00].
13.1 The Logic of Actuality Sets

We concentrate on the logic of actuality sets as initiated in [Coe(nd)a], though
continue to work within the specific case where DI(L) ∼ = P (ΣL ). Noting first
that the elements of DI(L) are seen as the equivalence classes of sets of prop-
erties, [Coe(nd)a]:
“... It makes as such sense to consider the distributive ideals DI(L)
as the suprema, with respect to inclusion, of equivalence classes of
[sets of properties] for the following relation: Since DI(L) is closed
under intersections we can define the closure,
&
C : P (L) → P (L) : A 1→ {B ∈ DI(L) | B ⊇ A}
and an equivalence relation ∼⊆ P (L) × P (L) by A ∼ B ⇔ C(A) =

C(B). The logical connectives on propositions then translate into a
logic of actuality sets ...”1
1 With our brackets we replaced the notion of actuality sets by sets of properties which is
more clear in this context. Furthermore we have to mention that Coecke’s notion of proposition
is exactly our notion of property set.
152
CHAPTER 13. CONSTRUCTION OF DYNAMIC OQL 153
Among the connectives with which the logic of actuality sets is equipped, we
consider first the disjunction and conjunction as follows, [Coe(nd)a],
! $
DI(L) : P (DI(L)) → DI(L) : A 1→ A
" (
DI(L) : P (DI(L)) → DI(L) : A 1→ C( A)
Here C indicates the closure under intersections which ( appoints the smallest
distributive ideal in which a set such as for " example A is embedded. Note
that it has been proved in [Coe(nd)a] that DI(L) is indeed distributive, i.e.
" !
DI(L) (A) is an ! actuality set iff ∃A ∈ A is an actuality set; while DI(L) is
conjunctive, i.e. DI(L) (A) is an actuality set iff ∀A ∈ A is an actuality set:
" (
“For A ⊆ DI(L) we then have that DI(L) (A) = C( A) is an
(
actuality set "if and only if at least one a ∈ A is actual, this since
all elements L B in the disjunctive closure are distributive, and as
such
" if and only if at least!one A ∈ A is an actuality set. Thus,
DI(L) is$disjunctive ... If DI(L) A is an actuality set then at least
one a ∈ A is actual so all A ∈ A are actuality sets. Conversely,
if all A ∈ A are actuality sets ! then for all A ∈ A at least one
aA !∈ A is actual such $ that L {aA | A ∈ A} $ is actual
! and thus
↓ ( L {aA | A ∈ A}) = {↓ aA | A ∈ A} ⊆ A = DI(L) A is an
!
actuality set. Thus, DI(L) is conjunctive ... ”
Given the idea of an operational resolution, it now becomes possible to elaborate

on a two-layered logic — the layers being DI(L) and L. What we have in
mind is the fact that to each actuality set we can attach the property which is
definite actual. As such the introduction of a “resolution-connective” allows us
to recuperate the logical structure of properties on the level of property sets,
[Coe(nd)a]:
)
RDI(L) : DI(L) → DI(L) : A →↓ ( A)
L
The introduction of a negation ¬DI(L) is linked to the kind of static implication

which is adopted, [Coe(nd)a],
"
→DI(L) : DI(L) × DI(L) → DI(L) : (B, C) 1→ DI(L) {A ∈ DI(L) | A ∩ B ⊆ C}
¬DI(L) : DI(L) → DI(L) : A 1→ (A →DI(L) ↓ 0)
It is now our intention to take a closer look into this static implication and
to analyze some candidates for a dynamic implication. In the following sec-
tions on implication-connectives, we will follow the ideas presented in [Coe(nd)c,
CoeMooSme(nd)c, CoeMooSme(nd)d].
13.2 Static Implication

Note that the above given static implication →DI(L) is constructed as an internal
implication. Where we call an implication connective internal in the sense that
it can be derived by purely algebraic means on a syntactical level. Conversely we
call an implication connective external when it is induced from purely relational
considerations on a semantical level. The five lattice polynomials which exist on
an ortholattice L, mentioned in chapter 11, are as such internal implications. To
be more explicit on what an external implication stands for, we refer to [Dal83]
where it is noted that any atomistic lattice admits a class of relativised external
implications E |= a →F b ⇔ F (E, a) ∩ µ(a) ⊆ µ(b) for F : Σ × L → P (Σ). As is
noted in [CoeMooSme(nd)b], in the case of a classical material implication we
see that F (E, a) = {E} since the following holds:
E |= a −→ b ⇔ {E} ∩ µ(a) ⊆ µ(b)

⇔ E ∈ µ(a) ⇒ E ∈ µ(b)
⇔ E |= a ⇒ E |= b
Note that we can define µ(a −→ b) = {E ∈ Σ | E |= a −→ b} as a subset of

Σ, or more generally: µ(a →F b) = {E ∈ Σ | E |= a →F b} ⊆ Σ. Here it is
important to note that µ(a →F b) will in general not be a subset of Σ⊥⊥ (the
biorthogonal closed subsets of Σ) and as such will in the context of OQL in
general not correspond to an element in L [CoeMooSme(nd)b]. Of course also
this external implication satisfies the strengthened law of entailment 11.2:
µ(a −→ b) = Σ ⇔ µ(a) ⊆ µ(b)

⇔ a≤b
Looking back at →DI(L) we can give, based on DI(L) ∼

= P (ΣL ), the following
semantical interpretation:
p |= (A →DI(L) B) ⇔ {p} ∩ µ(A) ⊆ µ(B)

⇔ p ∈ µ(A) ⇒ p ∈ µ(B)
⇔ p |= A ⇒ p |= B
Here we exchanged E (
∈ Σ for p ∈ ΣL and extended µ to DI(L) — where µ = ρ−1
— to allow µ(A) := µ[A] ⊆ ΣL . And given the fact that p |= (A →DI(L) B)
iff p ∈ µ(A →DI(L) B), we can now state that:
µ(A →DI(L) B) = {p ∈ ΣL | (p |= A) ⇒ (p |= B)}
With this information we can reformulate the given static implication →DI(L)
in the following way:
A →DI(L) B = {c ∈ L | (c |= A) ⇒ (c |= B)}
where (c |= A) ⇔ [∀p ∈ µ(c) : p ∈ µ(A)]. Note that (A →DI(L) B) is clearly an

order ideal since if b ≤ c ∈ (A →DI(L) B) then b ∈ (A →DI(L) B) based on the
fact that if b ≤ c then ∀p : p ∈ µ(b) ⇒ p ∈ µ(c).
We can now generalize this formulation of →DI(L) in the following way:

)
A →DI(L) B = {C ∈ DI(L) | (C |= A) ⇒ (C |= B)}
DI(L)
where (C |= A) ⇔ [∀p ∈ µ(C) : p ∈ µ(A)].
Referring back to chapter 11, it is advisable for an implication connective to

satisfy the strengthened law of entailment 11.2. In the case of DI(L) this comes
down to the following proposition:
Proposition 32.
%
A →DI(L) B = L ⇔ A # B
Proof
%
A#B ⇔ A⊆B
⇔ ∀c ∈ L : c ∈ A ⇒ c ∈ B
⇔ A →DI(L) B = L
!
This naturally leads to the following proposition:
Proposition 33.
%
µ(A →DI(L) B) = ΣL ⇔ A ⊆ B ⇔ A # B
For this construction of the static implication on DI(L) it is straightforward,

since →DI(L) is a complete boolean algebra, that we have a conjunction as
adjoint-operation. What me mean is the following:
#
(A −) = (A →DI(L) −)
DI(L)
The proof of this adjunction is implied by µ(A ∩ −) = µ(A →DI(L) −); explicitly
i.e. (µ(A) ∩ µ(B)) ⊆ µ(C) ⇔ µ(B) ⊆ µ(A →DI(L) C) and has been worked out
in [Coe(nd)c].
13.3 Dynamic Implications

13.3.1 Propagation-implications
e
In the previous chapter we introduced a causal relation # on DI(L). Against
the background of proposition 30 we can now wonder if it is possible to construct
a dynamic implication on DI(L) for which the following proposition holds:
Proposition 34.
e e
A → B = L iff A # B
e
The natural candidate for → to consider is defined as follows:
e
µ(A → B) := {p ∈ ΣL | (p |= A) ⇒ (ẽ({p}) |= B)}
where (ẽ({p}) |= B) ⇔ [∀p ∈ ẽ({p}) : p ∈ µ(B)]. This insinuates that

e
µ(A → B) = c (µ(A)) ∪ ẽ∗ (µ(B))
with ẽ∗ (µ(B)) = {p ∈ ΣL | ẽ({p}) ⊆ µ(B)}.

e
Similar to the previous section, we can write (A → B) ∈ DI(L) as follows,
[Coe(nd)c, CoeMooSme(nd)c, CoeMooSme(nd)d]:
e
%
(A → B) := {c ∈ L | (c |= A) ⇒ ($
e (↓ c) |= B)}
Or we can of course generalize it as follows:

e
)
(A → B) := %
{C ∈ DI(L) | (C |= A) ⇒ ($
e (C) |= B)}
DI(L)
e
We will now prove that →, as defined above, is indeed a good candidate to
e
satisfy proposition 34. First note that A # B iff %
$ %
e (A) ⊆ B iff µ($
e (A)) ⊆ µ(B)
since µ = ρ−1 is on DI(L) even as on L injective and order-preserving, i.e.
isotone.
Proposition 35.
e
%
µ(A → B) = ΣL iff µ($
e (A)) ⊆ µ(B)
Proof:
e
µ(A → B) = ΣL ⇔ c (µ(A)) ∪ ẽ∗ (µ(B))
⇔ µ(A) ⊆ ẽ∗ (µ(B)) = {p ∈ ΣL | ẽ({p}) ⊆ µ(B)}
⇔ ∀p ∈ µ(A) : ẽ({p}) ⊆ µ(B)
⇔ ẽ(µ(A)) ⊆ µ(B)
%
It remains to show now that ẽ(µ(A)) ⊆ µ(B) iff µ($
e (A)) ⊆ µ(B), for which we
refer to proposition 31. !
e
Given the definition of µ(A → B), it is obvious that in case e = 0 this dynamic
implication is reduced to the static implication. Using our notations, we express
this as follows:
Proposition 36.
%
(A → B) = (A →DI(L) B)
And against the background of proposition 34, we can also prove:
Proposition 37.
e
(A →$%
e (A)) = L
Proof
e e
Since (A →$%
e (A)) = L ⇔ µ(A →$%
e (A)) = ΣL , a proof can be established based
∗
%
on µ(A) ⊆ ẽ (µ($
e (A))):
e
%
e (A))
µ(A →$ %
= {p ∈ ΣL |(p |= A) ⇒ (ẽ({p}) |=$
e (A))}
%
= c (µ(A)) ∪ ẽ∗ (µ($
e (A))
= ΣL
!
The last mentioned implication will always be valid. As such we can say that
e
when A → B is valid — i.e. equal to L — it explains that if A is an actuality
set it guarantees that B is an actuality set after we perform induction e. In
e
other words, the “causal relation” # extends into a propagation-implication on
property sets.
Similar to the case of a static implication on DI(L) we can find a conjunction-

e
adjoint for →. What we have in mind is:
e
(A ⊗e −) = (A → −)
Indeed, for µ(A ⊗e B) := ẽ(µ(A) ∩ µ(B)), the following has been proved in
[Coe(nd)c],
e
ẽ(µ(A) ∩ µ(B)) ⊆ µ(C) ⇔ µ(B) ⊆ c (µ(A)) ∪ ẽ∗ (µ(C)) = µ(A → C)
It is important to note that µ(A⊗e B) = µ(B ⊗e A) which implies commutativity

of ⊗e on DI(L). And of course we also obtain the following:
Proposition!38.
A ⊗% B = A DI(L) B
In particular we see that (− ⊗e L) is the smallest property set which is an

actuality set after e if (−) is an actuality set before e.
Proposition 39.
%
(− ⊗e L) =$
e (−)
Proof
µ(− ⊗e L) = ẽ(µ(L) ∩ µ(−)) = ẽ(µ(−))
Before we turn to the structure which such dynamic propagation-implications

additionally impose on the logic of actuality sets, we wish to say something
more about the dynamic negation which we obtain on DI(L). Let us define this
negation as follows:
e
¬e (−) := (− →↓ 0)
Now we see that:

e %
µ(− →↓ 0) = c (µ(−)) = µ(− →↓ 0)
which obviously implies the existence of a unique negation: ¬e (−) = ¬DI(L) (−).
e
As is mentioned in [Coe(nd)c, CoeMooSme(nd)c] if we equip DI(L) with →
and ⊗e for each e ∈ ε, we obtain a collection of commutative
" quantales. More
explicitly, for each induction e, we obtain that (DI(L), DI(L) , ⊗e ) is a commu-
tative quantale but in general not a locale2 . Following [Coe(nd)c], this is shown
as follows:
) )
A ⊗e ( B) = {A ⊗e B | B ∈ B}
DI(L) DI(L)
Proof
" "
µ(A ⊗e ( DI(L) B)) = ẽ(µ(A)) ∩ µ( DI(L) B)
(
= ( B∈B (µ(A) ∩ µ(B)))
ẽ(
= " ẽ(µ(A) ∩ µ(B))
B∈B
= µ( DI(L) {A ⊗e B | B ∈ B})
! " ! !
Note that in case e = 0 we obtain a locale (DI(L), DI(L) , DI(L) ) since DI(L)
"
and DI(L) are distributive [CoeMooSme(nd)c].
Let us focus on DI(L) as

! being "
equipped with the in the beginning of this chap-
ter mentioned RDI(L) , DI(L) , DI(L) , ¬DI(L) and for every e, a propagation-
e
implication → and a corresponding conjunction ⊗e . Given the fact that in our
approach DI(L) ∼ = P (ΣL ), we stress that DI(L) is a complete boolean algebra.3
And it is this boolean algebra which functions as a left quantale module over %
$ε
— for the general definition, see also [Res00, Ros96]:
Definition 49.
Let %
$
ε be a unital quantale.
A left quantale module DI(L) over % $ε or a left %
$
ε-module, is a sup-lattice with a
binary operation
−(−) :$%ε × DI(L) → DI(L) which satisfies:
1) 0(A) = A
%
e 1◦ %
2) ($ $ %
e 2 )(A) =$
" %
e 1 ($
e 2 (A))
3) (∨J %$e )(A) = DI(L) {$ %
e i (A) | i ∈ J}
" i "
4) %
$
e ( DI(L),J Ai ) = DI(L) {$ %e (Ai ) | i ∈ J}
2 A locale is a quantale with as quantale product the meet-operation of the complete lattice.
For details, see for instance [Bor94].

3 In case we do not work with atomicity we will in general not obtain a complete Boolean
algebra but a complete Heyting algebra. For details we refer to [Coe(nd)a].

To conclude this subsection we say that the dynamic algebra we obtain is the
complete boolean algebra of property sets DI(L) which functions as a left quan-
tale module over %$
ε equipped with extra “propagation”-related connectives. In
the next section we will first analyze the implication for causations and then
look at the structure which is obtained.
13.3.2 Causation-implications
Besides the propagation-implications which, when valid, express that the (for-
ward) causal relation holds between property sets, it is reasonable to look at
causation-implications which, when valid, express that a so-called backward re-
lation holds between property sets. This backward relation is defined on DI(L)
as follows, [Coe(nd)c, CoeMooSme(nd)c, CoeMooSme(nd)d]
Definition
e
50.
A & B := if B is an actuality set after e then was A an actuality set before e.
This leads us to the following proposition:
Proposition 40.
e
A & B ⇔$%e ∗ (B) ⊆ A
e
Let us now introduce the so-called causation-implication ← as follows:
e
µ(A ← B) := {p ∈ ΣL | (p |= A) ⇐ (ẽ({p}) |= B)}
e
(A ← B) %
:= {c ∈ L | (c |= A) ⇐ ($
e (↓ c) |= B)}
or we could define it alternatively as:

e "
(A ← B) := %
DI(L) {C ∈ DI(L) | (C |= A) ⇐ ($
e (C) |= B)}
For which we then can say:

e
µ(A ← B) := µ(A) ∪ c (ẽ∗ (µ(B)))
And as such we can prove:

Proposition 41.
e e
A ← B = L iff A & B
Proof
e e
Based on A ← B = L iff µ(A ← B) = ΣL we obtain:
e
µ(A ← B) = ΣL ⇔ c (ẽ∗ (µ(B)) ∪ µ(A) = ΣL
⇔ ẽ∗ (µ(B)) ⊆ µ(A)
⇔ %
$e ∗ (B) ⊆ A
e
⇔ A&B
!
e
As such we can say that when A ← B is valid — i.e. equal to L — it explains
that if B is an actuality set after e then was A an actuality set before we
e
perform induction e. In other words, the “backward relation” & extends into a
causation-implication on property sets. In particular this suggests that we can
prove the following proposition:
Proposition 42.
e
%
($
e ∗ (A) ← A) = L
Proof
e e
%
Since ($ %
e ∗ (A) ← A) = L ⇔ µ($
e ∗ (A) ← A) = ΣL , we can establish a proof:
e
%
e ∗ (A) ← A)
µ($ %
= {p ∈ ΣL | (ẽ({p}) |= A) ⇒ (p |=$
e ∗ (A))}
%
= µ($e ∗ A) ∪ c (ẽ∗ (µ(A)))
= ΣL
!
%
When we define A ← B := A ←DI(L) B, we obtain:
Proposition 43.
(A →DI(L) B) = (B ←DI(L) A)
Similar as we saw earlier, it has been proved in [Coe(nd)c] that we can find a
e
conjunction-adjoint for ←,
e
(−e ⊗B) = (− ← B)
against the background of the following definition: µ(Ae ⊗B) := µ(A)∩ẽ∗ (µ(B)).
Again we can now interpret (Le ⊗−) as the largest property set which, if it is an
actuality set, guarantees that (−) is an actuality set. In other words, (Le ⊗−)
assigns causes with respect to induction e:
Proposition 44.
(Le ⊗−) = ẽ∗ (µ(−))
Proof
µ(Le ⊗−) = µ(L) ∩ ẽ∗ (µ(−)) = ẽ∗ (µ(−))
!
It is in this case important to note that while µ(A ⊗e B) = µ(B ⊗e A) we have
µ(Ae ⊗B) &= µ(B e ⊗A) unless e = 0.
Before we turn to the structure which such dynamic causation-implications ad-

ditionally impose on the logic of actuality sets, we can say something more
about the dynamic negations which we now obtain on DI(L). Let us define the
“causation related” dynamic negation, i.e. linked to the causation-implication,
as follows:
e e
¬ (−) := (↓ 0 ← −)
Thus we see that:

e
µ(↓ 0 ← −) = c (ẽ∗ (µ(−)))
which clearly does not imply a unique negation. As such ¬e is quite different
e
from ¬.
e
If we equip DI(L) with ← and e ⊗ for each e ∈ ε, we obtain a collection of
non-commutative co-quantales — ! cf. [Coe(nd)c]. More explicitly, for each in-
duction e, we have that (DI(L), DI(L) , e ⊗) is a non-commutative co-quantale.
Note that
! we obtain a co-quantale since e ⊗ distributes at both sides over ar-
bitrary DI(L) . Just as before, in case e = 0 we obtain a “commutative”
" ! ! "
frame (DI(L), DI(L) , DI(L) ) since then DI(L) and DI(L) are distributive
[CoeMooSme(nd)c].
To conclude this subsection we mention that the dynamic algebra we obtain is

the complete boolean algebra of actuality sets DI(L) which functions as a left
quantale module over % $ε equipped with extra dynamic connectives to express
causations and propagations such that the result is:
) # e e e
(DI(L), RDI(L) , , , {⊗e , e ⊗, →, ←, ¬| e ∈ ε}, ¬DI(L) )
DI(L) DI(L)
It is of course possible to implement other kinds of implications. In particular,

in [CoeMooSme(nd)c] other possible extensions of DI(L) are considered. As we
will show briefly in the next section, we can for instance extend DI(L) with bi-
labeled families of non-commutative quantales rendering bi-labeled implications.
13.3.3 Bi-labeled Implications

Let us define the following bi-labeled implication on DI(L), [CoeMooSme(nd)c]:
:= {p ∈ ΣL | (f˜({p}) |= A) ⇒ (ẽ({p}) |= B)}

e|f
µ(A → B)
e|f
(A → B) %
:= {c ∈ L | ($ %
f (↓ c) |= A) ⇒ ($
e (↓ c) |= B)}
or, we could define it alternatively as:

e|f "
(A → B) := DI(L) {C %
∈ DI(L) | ($ %
f (C) |= A) ⇒ ($
e (C) |= B)}
We see here that µ(A → B) = c (f˜∗ (µ(A))) ∪ ẽ∗ (µ(B)) and as such we can
e|f
e %|e e e|%
recover A ← B as B → A and A → B as A → B. As expected, we find a
non-commutative conjunction operator which is defined on DI(L) as follows in
[CoeMooSme(nd)c]:
µ(A ⊗e|f B) := ẽ(f˜∗ (µ(A)) ∩ µ(B))

Similarly for ⊗, we now recover A ⊗e B as A ⊗e|% B and Ae ⊗B as B ⊗%|e A.

e|e
In the next section we will see that implications such as A → B prove their
importance when we focus on the subjunctive implication. Let us now just
consider one other kind of bi-labeled implications, defined as follows:
:= {p ∈ ΣL | (p |= f˜(µ(A))) ⇒ (ẽ({p}) |= B)}

e◦f
µ(A → B)
e◦f
(A → B) %
:= {c ∈ L | (c |=$ %
f (A)) ⇒ ($
e (↓ c) |= B)}
or; we could define it alternatively as:

e◦f "
(A → B) := DI(L) {C %
∈ DI(L) | (C |=$ %
f (A)) ⇒ ($
e (C) |= B)}
Note that µ(A → B) = c (f˜(µ(A))) ∪ ẽ∗ (µ(B)). Again we recover (A → B)

e◦f e
e◦%
as (A → B). The adjoint action, namely the non-commutative conjunction
operator is in this case the following:
µ(A ⊗e◦f B) := ẽ(f˜(µ(A)) ∩ µ(B))
Also here we then see that (A ⊗e B) can be recovered as (A ⊗e◦% B). A variation
on this second kind of bi-labeled implications will prove its importance later on
for which we now introduce some useful definitions:
e
µ(A →
→ B) := {p ∈ ΣL | (p |= ẽ(µ(A))) ⇒ (p |= B)}
%◦e
= (A → B)
= c
(ẽ(µ(A))) ∪ µ(B)
e
← B) :=
µ(A ← {p ∈ ΣL | (p |= ẽ(µ(A))) ⇐ (p |= B)}
= ẽ(µ(A)) ∪ c (µ(B))
13.3.4 Subjunctive Implication

Against the background of chapter 11, it is natural to look for an implication
which expresses in our context of the logic of actuality sets a subjunctive condi-
tional. Based on the analysis put forward in [Dal83], a subjunctive implication
has in the context of OQL in [CoeMooSme(nd)b] been envisaged as follows:
For a ∈ L, let the partially defined map fa : Σ\Ka → Σ satisfy the
following conditions:
(1) fa (p) = p if p |= a
(2) fa (p)R(p)
Then p |= (a −→sub b) iff [{fa (p)}(p &∈ Ka ); ∅(p ∈ Ka )] ∩ µ(a) ⊆ µ(b)
or otherwise stated:
p |= (a −→sub b) iff p ∈ Ka or fa (p) |= (a −→ b)
Note that R expresses the accessibility relation on states while a −→ b expresses

a classical, i.e. material, implication. Referring back to the previous section, we
can now define the following implication:
fa |fa
µ(a → b) := {p ∈ ΣL | (fa (p) |= a) ⇒ (fa (p) |= b)}
This allows us to prove that:

Proposition 45.
fa |fa
fa (p) |= (a −→ b) ⇔ p |= (a → b)
Proof
fa (p) |= (a −→ b) ⇔ fa (p) ∩ µ(a) ⊆ µ(b)

⇔ fa (p) ∈ µ(a) ⇒ fa (p) ∈ µ(b)
⇔ fa (p) |= a ⇒ fa (p) |= b
fa |fa
⇔ p |= (a → b)
!
As explained in [CoeMooSme(nd)b], we can consider the subjunctive condition-
als as encoding the implicative process where we first modify the state to render
it compatible with the antecedent before testing the subsequent. Referring back
to chapters 5 and 11, the Sasaki projections which are the maps corresponding
to ideal measurements of the first kind are specific examples of what fa can
be. Hence we are now in the position to show more explicitly what Hardegree’s
interpretation of the Sasaki hook as a Stalnaker conditional means. We will
show that µ(a −→sub b), under the conditions 1) and 2) for a Sasaki projection
ϕa , yields the set of states in which the Sasaki hook ϕ∗a (b) is an actual property.
ϕa
p |= (a −→sub b) ⇔ p ∈ Ka or [ϕa (p) |= (a −→ b)]
⇔ p ∈ Ka or [ϕa (p) |= a ⇒ ϕa (p) |= b]
⇔ p ∈ Ka or ϕa (p) &|= a or ϕa (p) ≤ b
⇔ p ∈ Ka or ϕa (p) &|= a or p ≤ ϕ∗a (b)
⇔ p ∈ Ka or ϕa (p) &|= a or p ≤ a! ∨ (a ∧ b)
If we want to generalize this subjunctive implication in the context of impli-

cations on DI(L) we have to be careful when interpreting the map fa as a
map corresponding to an induction. Indeed, the above conditions imply that
it only makes sense to consider such an implication if we restrict our attention
to acts of inductions corresponding to measurements. For this reason we will
work out the subjunctive conditional for the specific case of a perfect measure-
ment induction. First recall that the property set propagation due to a perfect
measurement induction of b or b! has been presented as:
"
ρ[ϕ{b,b! } ](A) = {ϕb (a) | a ∈ A, a &≤ b! } DI(L)
{ϕb! (a) | a ∈ A, a &≤ b}
Note that now we will use the notation e{b,b! } to express that we induce b or b! on
a physical system, and as before we will use ϕ{b,b! } to express the corresponding
map on P (ΣL ). It has to be noted that K{b,b! } expresses in this case the set of
states p for which ϕb (p) or ϕb! (p) would yield 0.
e{b,b! }
µ(A −→ sub B) = {p ∈ ΣL | p ∈ K{b,b! } or (ϕ{b,b! } ({p}) |= A −→ B)}
= {p ∈ ΣL | p ∈ K{b,b! } or
(ϕ{b,b! } ({p}) |= A ⇒ ϕ{b,b! } ({p}) |= B)}
= K{b,b! } ∪ c (ϕ∗{b,b! } (µ(A))) ∪ ϕ∗{b,b! } (µ(B))
And where ϕ{b,b! } (T ) yields the union of sets of Sasaki projections, ϕ∗{b,b! } (T )
yields the intersection of sets of Sasaki hooks. Let us explain this in more detail.
Since we know that the sasaki hook ϕ∗b is the adjoint of the sasaki projection
ϕb , i.e.,
∀p1 ∈ T1 : p1 &≤ b! , ∀p2 ∈ T2 : b ∧ (b! ∨ p1 ) ≤ p2 ⇔ p1 ≤ b! ∨ (b ∧ p2 )
we have by means of the covering law:
∀p1 ∈ T1 , ∀p2 ∈ T2 : ϕb (p1 ) = p2 or ϕb (p1 ) = 0 ⇔ ϕ∗b (p2 ) = p1
Now we can prove that ϕ{b,b⊥ } = ϕ∗{b,b! } . In order to do so we first need the
following proposition:
Proposition 46.
ϕb (T1 ) = {b ∧ (b! ∨ p1 )|p1 ∈ T1 }\{0} ⊆ T2 ⇔ T1 ⊆ {b! ∨ (b ∧ p2 )|p2 ∈ T2 } = ϕ∗b (T2 )
Proof
⇒: If ϕb (T1 ) ⊆ T2 then ∀p1 ∈ T1 ∃p2 ∈ T2 such that ϕb (p1 ) = p2 or ϕb (p1 ) = 0
hence ϕ∗b (p2 ) = p1 and as such T1 ⊆ ϕb (T2 ).
⇐: If T1 ⊆ ϕ∗b (T2 ) then ∀p1 ∈ T1 ∃p2 ∈ T2 such that p1 = ϕ∗b (p2 ) hence
ϕb (p1 ) = p2 or ϕb (p1 ) = 0 and as such ϕb (T1 ) ⊆ T2
!
We prove that ϕ{b,b⊥ } = ϕ∗{b,b! } :
ϕ{b,b! } (T1 ) = {b ∧ (b! ∨ p1 )|p1 ∈ T1 }\{0} ∪ {b! ∧ (b ∨ p1 )|p1 ∈ T1 }\{0} ⊆ T2

⇔
T1 ⊆ ϕ∗{b,b! } = {b! ∨ (b ∧ p2 )|p2 ∈ T2 } ∩ {b ∨ (b! ∧ p2 )|p2 ∈ T2 }
Proof
{b ∧ (b! ∨ p1 )|p1 ∈ T1 }\{0} ∪ {b! ∧ (b ∨ p1 )|p1 ∈ T1 }\{0} ⊆ T2
⇔
{b ∧ (b! ∨ p1 )|p1 ∈ T1 }\{0} ⊆ T2 and {b! ∧ (b ∨ p1 )|p1 ∈ T1 }\{0} ⊆ T2
⇔
T1 ⊆ {b! ∨ (b ∧ p2 )|p2 ∈ T2 } and T1 ⊆ {b ∨ (b! ∧ p2 )|p2 ∈ T2 }
⇔
T1 ⊆ {b! ∨ (b ∧ p2 )|p2 ∈ T2 } ∩ {b ∨ (b! ∧ p2 )|p2 ∈ T2 }
!
Of course we can also express now what ρ[ϕ{b,b! } ]∗ (A) ∈ DI(L) means:
#
ρ[ϕ{b,b! } ]∗ (A) = {ϕ∗b (a) | a ∈ A} {ϕ∗b! (a) | a ∈ A}
DI(L)
Given the fact that we also have: ϕb ∨ ϕb! = ϕ∗b ∧ ϕ∗b! on the level of L; we
immediately obtain the “adjoint” of the scheme represented in section 12.5.
13.4 The Logical Description for Perfect Mea-

surements
In this section we intend to analyze the logical description of perfect mea-
surements given in [CoeSme00] against the background of section 12.5. In
[CoeSme00] we initiated the construction of a language to express the properties
of Ls \{0} for physical entity s, as property-terms (constants and variables) of
a predicate In and to express inductions of ε as terms for a predicate IN D:4
IN D(e) := the physical entity is placed within
the context of induction e
In(a) := a is an actual property
By means of these predicates we presented “the content” of a specific map
ρ[ϕ{b,b! } ] by means of a propagation-axiom. Since in [CoeSme00] we worked
with singletons as actuality sets, we can now present this axiom in the case
where we consider any actuality set A:
% ∀A : IN D(ϕ{b,b! } ) ⊗ ⊕a∈A In(a) ' ⊕c∈ϕ{b,b! } (A) In(c) (13.1)
Analyzing this axiom, we see that there are two different kinds of predicates,
IN D(−) has induction terms in its range while In(−) has property terms in its
range. Exactly by using these predicates we can distinguish different levels in
our logic. The property terms themselves are wff’s of ls-OQL, which has been
analyzed in chapter 8, and as such they allow us to express for instance In(∨J ai )
or In(∧J ai ). Similarly, it is also possible for the induction terms to express for
instance the arbitrary choice of two inductions IN D(e ∨ f ) or the concatenation
of two inductions IN D(e&f ). Since of course an actuality set A ∈ DI(L) can
contain more than one property, they are represented by means of ⊕a∈A In(a)
which expresses the disjunction with respect to the actuality of a specific set of
properties. Note that ⊕a∈A In(a) differs from the formula In(∨A) in that the
latter expresses a definite actual property. Contrary to this way of dealing with
actuality sets, we could also have introduced a predicate ranging over actuality
sets but that would divert us from using the explicit level of ls-OQL. Note that
⊕ expresses a classical disjunction. For ⊗ and ' things are more complicated
than first thought and will be analyzed in detail below.
4 Assuming that we work with one physical system we will drop the index s.
In [CoeSme00] we used ' as a linear logical connective and can show now that
its usage was correct to express the content of a map ρ[ϕ{b,b! } ], but not correct
to express any propagation of “actuality sets” in case of a perfect measurement
e
induction. If we want to express the latter we should of course use → with for
instance e = ϕ{b,b! } . Let us now analyze the usage of ' in the former case. The
content of the map ρ[ϕ{b,b! } ] expresses that ρ[ϕ{b,b! } ] as an action on an actu-
ality set A yields ρ[ϕ{b,b! } ](A). Based on ideas used in linear logic — see next
chapter — we need a causal implication which exactly expresses the consump-
tion of initial resources and simultaneously the production of final resources.
Analyzing this statement precisely, it says that the initially given actuality set
must after performing an induction have been transformed into a final actuality
set. Concretely this means that we cannot work with an implication based on
e
the causal relation # as introduced earlier. Instead we need a much stronger
relation which attaches to a “final” property set, if it is an actuality set after e,
exactly the needed “initial” actuality set before e. Let us now introduce such a
relation:
Definition 51.
e
A## B ⇔ ($%e (A) = B)
%
Having the connective ⊗e in mind and since we know that (A ⊗e L) =$
e (A) we
can now immediately say the following:
e
A#
# B ⇔ (A ⊗e L) = B
With this relation we are equipped to give an interpretation of our propagation

axiom 13.1 as we intended, i.e. the consumption of initial resources should match
the production of final resources. Therefore we first translate our formulas as
follows:
IN D(ϕ{b,b! } ) ⊗ ⊕a∈A In(a) := A ⊗ϕ{b,b! } L
⊕c∈ϕ{b,b! } (A) In(c) := ϕ{b,b! } (A)
Where IN D(ϕ{b,b! } ) ⊗ ⊕a∈A In(a) is seen as: “the induction ϕ{b,b! } forms an
action on actuality set A”. Next we then see that axiom 13.1 expresses the
following:
(A ⊗ϕ{b,b! } L) = ϕ{b,b! } (A)
Or in other words:
ϕ{b,b! }
A #
# ϕ{b,b! } (A)
Which can be written as:

%
(A ⊗ϕ{b,b! } L) #
# ϕ{b,b! } (A)
−
Of course here #
# has been the interpretation behind our usage of ' and should
maybe better be used instead, since we are restricting ourself to a very specific
kind of “propagations” of actuality sets. With this in mind we can wonder

whether it is possible to give an interpretation to the causal implication ' we
used in this paragraph, by means of the dynamic implications mentioned above.
This would allow us to see with what kind of “propagations” of actuality sets
we are actually dealing with here. Indeed, a specific dynamic implication within
the context of dynamic OQL, which matches the meaning behind ' in linear
logic, can be constructed and will be analyzed in the next chapter in which we
first give a small overview of what linear logic stands for.
Chapter 14
Comparison with Linear

Logic
In the context of our analysis we want to analyze how a logical language is

built up in which one is able to deal with actions. Our attention has fallen
on linear logic as introduced by J.Y. Girard1 in [Gir87, Gir89], and which is
nowadays often used in situations handling dynamic processes mostly in the
domain of computer science. For our purpose we will first concentrate on the
dynamic aspects behind “standard” linear logic and will later on concentrate on
a specific fragment of its non-commutative variant.
14.1 On Standard Linear Logic

The main advantage linear logic has with respect to classical/intuitionistic logic,
is that it allows us to deal with actions versus situations in the sense of stable
truths [Gir89]. This should be understood in the sense that linear logic is often
called a resource sensitive logic. The linear logical formulas can be conceived
as expressing finite resources while the classical formulas are then conceivable
as unlimited or eternal resources. In the sense that linear logic is a refinement
of classical/intuitionistic logic, it is made possible to express those eternal re-
sources within the linear logical framework by means of special modalities called
exponentials. Allowing ourself to be a bit more formal on this matter, resource
sensitivity is linked to the explicit control of the weakening and contraction
rules. As structural rules, weakening and contraction, will be discarded in the
general linear logical framework though they are allowed to re-enter into the pic-
ture when using the exponentials. Note that in non-commutative linear logic, to
which we will come back later, the exchange-rule will also be dropped. We use
A, B for sequences of wff’s and a, b for wff’s. Sequents are conceived as usual:
1 Following J.Lambek’s remark in [Lam93], Grishin already wrote a paper in 1983 which
antedates the invention of Girard’s linear logic.
168
CHAPTER 14. COMPARISON WITH LINEAR LOGIC 169
(weakeningL) A→B
A,a→B (weakeningR) A→B
A→B,a
A,a,a→B A→a,a,B
(contractionL) A,a→B (contractionR) A→a,B
A1 ,a,b,A2 →B A→B1 ,a,b,B2

(exchangeL) A1 ,b,a,A2 →B (exchangeR) A→B1 ,b,a,B2
Indeed, dropping weakening and contraction implies that linear formula cannot
be duplicated or contracted at random, in other words, our resources are re-
stricted. As an example we can say that we do not eat the same apple twice or
demolish the same piece of chalk twice. Though there is another consequence
of importance, dropping those two structural rules leads to two kinds of dis-
junctions and conjunctions. We will obtain a so-called additive disjunction ⊕
and additive conjunction & and a so-called multiplicative disjunction ℘ and
multiplicative conjunction ⊗. The following left and right rules will make their
differences clear. Although we further on prefer introduction and elimination
rules, the left and right-rules are used here because they give a more explicit view
on the symmetry of ⊗ with ℘ and ⊕ with & — for more details on symmetry
we refer to [Sam00].
A→a,B A→b,B A,a→B A,b→B

(& R) A→a&b,B (⊕ L) A,a⊕b→B
A,a→B A,b→B A→a,B A→b,B

(& L) A,a&b→B A,a&b→B (⊕ R) A→a⊕b,B A→a⊕b,B
A1 →a,B1 A2 →b,B2 A1 ,a→B1 A2 ,b→B2

(⊗ R) A1 ,A2 →a⊗b,B1 ,B2 (℘ L) A1 ,A2 ,a℘b→B1 ,B2
A,a,b→B A→a,b,B
(⊗ L) A,a⊗b→B (℘ R) A→a℘b,B
We will show the well known result that by allowing the structural rules and by
using (⊗) we can express the (&)-rules and vice versa:
For & R:
(prem) (prem)
A → a, B A → b, B
(⊗R)
A, A → a ⊗ b, B, B
(exchanges R and contractions L,R)
A → a ⊗ b, B
For ⊗ R:
(prem)
A2 → b, B2
(prem) (weakenings L,R)
A1 → a, B1 A2 , A1 → b, B2 , B1
(weakenings L,R) (exchanges L,R)
A1 , A2 → a, B1 , B2 A1 , A2 → b, B1 , B2
(&R)
A1 , A2 → a&b, B1 , B2
For ⊗ L:
(prem)
A, a, b → B
(&L)
A, a&b, b → B
(&L)
A, a&b, a&b → B
(contraction L)
A, a&b → B
For & L:
(prem)
A, a → B
(weakening L)
A, a, b → B
(⊗L)
A, a ⊗ b → B
We obtain a similar result for the ⊕ and ℘-rules:
For ⊕ R:
(prem)
A → a, B
(weakening R, exchanges R)
A → a, b, B
(℘R)
A → a℘b, B
For ℘ R:
(prem)
A → a, b, B
(⊕R)
A → a ⊕ b, b, B
(⊕R)
A → a ⊕ b, a ⊕ b, B
(contraction R)
A → a ⊕ b, B
For ⊕ L:
(prem) (prem)
A, a → B A, b → B
(℘L)
A, A, a℘b → B, B
(exchanges L and contractions L,R)
A, a℘b → B
For ℘ L:
(prem) (prem)
A1 , a → B1 A2 , b → B2
(weakenings L,R) (weakenings L,R)
A1 , a, A2 → B1 , B2 A2 , b, A1 → B2 , B1
(exchanges L) (exchanges L,R)
A1 , A2 , a → B1 , B2 A1 , A2 , b → B1 , B2
(⊕L)
A1 , A2 , a ⊕ b → B1 , B2
To understand linear logic, it is necessary to take a look at the intuitive meaning

of the mentioned additives and multiplicatives derived from their use by the
above rules. First it is important to note that to obtain ⊗ in a conclusion, no
sharing of resources is allowed, while the contrary is the case for &. Similarly,
there is a difference between ℘ and ⊕. More specifically we see that while

% a&b → a is provable even as % a&b → b, these derivations make little sense
when we replace & with ⊗. In the line of thought exposed in [Gir89], the
meanings to be attached to the connectives are the following:
a ⊗ b means that both resources, a and b are given simultaneously.

a&b means that we may choose between a and b.
a ⊕ b means that one of both resources, a or b, is given though we
have lack of knowledge concerning the exact one.
a℘b expresses a constructive disjunction.
The meaning of ℘ is not that clear in the linear logical literature, but will become
clearer when we follow J.Y. Girard in his construction that every atomic formula
of his linear logical language has by definition a negation (−)⊥ . Running a bit
ahead of our story, the meaning of a℘b will now come down to the situation
where “if” not a is given “then” b is given and “if” not b is given “then” a is
given. Of course this explanation is linked to the commutative case where a
linear logical implication is defined as a⊥ ℘b := a ' b which by transposition
equals b⊥ ' a⊥ . In the same sense, only in the commutative case where a ⊗ b
equals b ⊗ a, does it make sense to say that a ⊗ b comes down to simultaneous
given resources.
We will be a little more specific on the linear logical implication and analyze
the underlying philosophical ideas as presented in [Gir89] where of course ' is
defined by means of ℘. What is important is that the linear implication should
mimic exactly what happens when a non-iteratable action is being performed.
Where we conceive a non-iteratable action to be such that after its performance
the initial resources are not available any more as initial resources. The linear
implication should as such express the consumption of initial resources and
simultaneously the production of final resources. Indeed, as stated in [Gir95],
the linear implication ' expresses a form of causality: a ' b is to be conceived
as “from a get b”. More explicitly, [Gir89]:
“A causal implication cannot be iterated since the conditions are
modified after its use; this process of modification of the premises
(conditions) is known in physics as reaction.” (p.72)
If we understand this correctly, the act of consumption and production is called
a non-iteratable action while the process of modification of initial conditions,
the deprivation of resources, is called reaction. The idea of relating action
and reaction is in a sense metaphorically based on Newton’s action-reaction
principle in physics. Girard uses this metaphor also when he explains why
every formula has by definition a linear negation which expresses a duality or
change of standpoint, [Gir89]:
“action of type A = reaction of type A⊥ .” (p.77)
In [Gir89] the notion of a reaction of type A⊥ , as dual to an action of type A, is

quite mysterious and not further elaborated. The only thing Girard mentions is
that it should come down to an “inversion of causality, i.e. of the sense of time”
[Gir89]. It is also not clear to us what this duality would mean in a commutative
linear logic context when we consider the case of an action of type a ' b (or
b⊥ ' a⊥ ) and a reaction of type a⊗b⊥ (or b⊥ ⊗a) — where a ' b = a⊥ ℘b and
(a⊥ ℘b)⊥ = a ⊗ b⊥ . Thus we tend to agree with Girard in [Gir89] where he says
that this discussion involves not standard but non-commutative linear logic.
Indeed, against the background of the causation-propagation duality conceived
earlier, if Girard has something similar to causation in mind, we know that what
is necessary is an implication and “non-commutative” conjunction which allow
us to express causation. As we will show further on, switching from standard
to non-commutative linear logic effects the meanings of the linear implication
and linear negation.
Leaving this action-reaction debate aside, we can now explain why our given
interpretation of non-iterability is quite subtle. First note that in Girard’s
standard linear logic, % a ' a is provable from an empty set of premises. As
such ' represents in a ' a the identity-action which does not really change
resources, but only translates initial ones into final ones. And although we could
perform the action twice in the following sense: a1 ' a2 ' a3 — for convenience
we labeled the resources —, this still does not count as an iteratable action since
a1 is to be conceived as an initial resource, different from a2 , the final resource
of the first action. But we can go further in this discussion and follow Girard in
stipulating the fact that we may still encounter situations in which the picture of
“consuming all initial resources”, does not hold. Linear logic henceforth allows
also the expression of those actions which deal with stable situations and which
are iteratable. In the latter case the use of exponentials is necessary. As such it
becomes possible to define the intuitionistic implication ⇒ as follows a ⇒ b =!a
' b [Gir89], where ! expresses the linear exponential called of course which
gives !a the meaning that a’s use as a resource is unlimited.
In [Gir89], Girard reveals the link between states, transitions and linear im-
plication. In particular it is the following statement which places the linear
implication in a for us interesting context, thinking of course about the above
discussed dynamic extension of OQL, [Gir89]:
“In fact, we would like to represent states by formulas, and transi-
tions by means of implications of states, in such a way that the state
S ! is accessible from S exactly when S ' S ! is provable from the
transitions, taken as axioms” (p.74)
In [Gir89] this statement applies to for instance systems such as Petri nets, Tur-
ing machines, chessboard games, lists of molecules, lists of beliefs, etc. Focusing
“in this sense” on physical systems, and using ' for transitions of states, we
will further on investigate how ' can be conceived in the context of our logic of
actuality sets. Before we enter into that discussion we will first say something
about non-commutative linear logic. Note as well that there is much more to
standard linear logic than our short exposition of its syntax and some of its
underlying dynamic ideas.
14.2 On Non-commutative Linear Logic

In the literature on non-commutative linear logic, two main directions emerge.
In a first direction one introduces non-commutativity of the multiplicatives by
restricting the exchange-rule to circular permutations while in a second direction
one completely drops all structural rules. Concentrating on the first direction,
here linear logic with a cyclic exchange rule is called cyclic linear logic and has
mainly been developed by D.N Yetter in [Yet90], though we have to note that
Girard already makes some remarks on cyclic exchanges in [Gir89]. More explic-
itly we see that the restriction to cyclic permutations means that we consider
the sequents as written on a circle [Gir89]. This then should come down to the
fact that a1 ⊗ ... ⊗ an−1 ⊗ an % an ⊗ a1 ⊗ ... ⊗ an−1 is provable in cyclic linear
logic. Of course the meaning of ⊗ with respect to the standard case changes
in the sense that it expresses now “and then” [Yet90] or when following Girard
in [Gir89] it means that “in the product b ⊗ a, the second component is done
before the first one”. Actually it does not really matter if we interpret b ⊗ a as
“first b and then a” or as “first a and then b” as long as we stick to one and
the same interpretation consistently. As such we attach to b ⊗ a from now on
the meaning “first a and then b”. As we will explain in the next paragraph on
Girard quantales it is exactly the difference between − ⊗ a and a ⊗ −, which
leads to the introduction of two different implication-connectives in cyclic linear
logic: ' and ◦− .
Given a unital quantale (Q, ∨, ⊗), with 1 as the neutral element with respect to
⊗, we can state the following straightforward proposition, [ConMir96, Ros90a,
Yet90]:
Proposition 47.
The endomorphisms a ⊗ −, − ⊗ a : Q → Q have right adjoints, a ' − and
− ◦− a respectively:
a ⊗ c ≤ b"iff c ≤ a ' b c ⊗ a ≤ b iff c ≤ b ◦− a
a ' b =" {c ∈ Q : a ⊗ c ≤ b}
b ◦− a = {c ∈ Q : c ⊗ a ≤ b}
We know that in the standard linear logic as presented by Girard, the following
holds a ' b = a⊥ ℘b = (a ⊗ b⊥ )⊥ = (b⊥ ⊗ a)⊥ = b℘a⊥ = b⊥ ' a⊥ . In cyclic
linear logic where we have now two implications, things change in the sense that
we obtain now:
(a ⊗ b)⊥ = b⊥ ℘a⊥ (a℘b)⊥ = b⊥ ⊗ a⊥
a ' b = a⊥ ℘b b ◦− a = b℘a⊥
To be more explicit, the linear negation can be interpreted in the unital quantale
(Q, ∨, ⊗) by means of a cyclic dualizing element, which can be defined as follows,
[ConMir96, Ros90a, Ros90b, Yet90]
Definition 52.
An element ⊥∈ Q is dualizing if:
⊥ ◦− (a '⊥) = a = (⊥ ◦− a) '⊥, for every a ∈ Q
Definition 53.
An element ⊥∈ Q is cyclic if:
a '⊥=⊥ ◦− a, for every a ∈ Q
Here the operation − '⊥ or similar ⊥ ◦− − is called the linear negation and
can be written as (−)⊥ . Note that a unital quantale with a cyclic dualizing
element ⊥ is called a Girard quantale, the notion has been introduced by Yetter
in [Yet90]. These Girard quantales can be equipped with modal operators to
interpret the linear logical exponentials and form as such a straightforward
semantics for the cyclic as well as standard linear logical syntax. In the latter
case a ' b = b ◦− a. The disadvantage cyclic linear logic offers is that it “is
still not non-commutative enough to properly express time’s arrow” [Yet90].
Indeed, where ' is conceived as a causal implication it would have been nice
to conceive ◦− as expressing past causality, though this interpretation is too
misleading according to [Gir89]. In a way we agree with him since in cyclic
linear logic a ' b and a⊥ ◦− b⊥ are the same — in the sense that they are both
equal to a⊥ ℘b.
Focusing on the second direction in the non-commutative linear logical liter-

ature, we first have to mention the work of J. Lambek. Lambek’s syntactic
calculus originated with [Lam58] in 1958 and as Girard admits, is the non-
commutative ancestor of linear logic. However it has to be mentioned that
Lambek’s syntactic calculus, as originally developed against a linguistic back-
ground, is essentially multiplicative and intuitionistic. Where the latter means
that sequents have at most one formula as their conclusion. Later on Lambek
extended his syntactic calculus with additives and recently renamed his formal
calculus bilinear logic. In the same direction we can place the work of V.M.
Abrusci who developed a non-commutative version of the intuitionistic linear
propositional logic in [Abr90] and of the classical linear propositional logic in
[Abr91]. Specific to Abrusci’s work however is the fact that a full removal of
the exchange rule has the introduction of two different negations and two dif-
ferent implications as a consequence. To explain this in detail we switch to
the semantical level of quantales; where we want to note that Abrusci works in
[Abr90, Abr91] with the more specific structure of phase spaces which as proved
in [Ros90a] are examples of quantales. This then leads to the fact that for
a ∈ Q: ⊥ ◦− (a '⊥) &= (⊥ ◦− a) ' a. Here we can follow Abrusci and define
⊥ ◦− (a '⊥) = ⊥ (a⊥ ) and (⊥ ◦− a) '⊥= (⊥ a)⊥ , where on the syntactical
level a⊥ is called the linear postnegation, ⊥ a the linear retronegation, a ' b
the linear postimplication and b ◦− a the linear retroimplication. Further on the
syntactical level we obviously have a⊥ ℘b = a ' b while b℘⊥ a = b ◦− a. This

work has now been extended to the first-order cases, for instance for the se-
quent calculus of non-commutative first-order intuitionistic linear logic we refer
to [ConMir96].
There is also here much more to say about non-commutative linear logic, espe-
cially since research on it is now in full development and expansion, though we
feel that our overview suffices for our needs.
14.3 Linear Logic and Dynamic Operational

Quantum Logic
As we already mentioned before, the meaning against which the linear logical
implication is constructed, is very restrictive since such an implication would
e
be valid if − ## − holds for a given e. However, it has been possible to find a
candidate which expresses this idea behind a linear implication within the logic
of actuality sets. What we have in mind is the following:
e
µ(A '· B) := {p ∈ ΣL | (p |= ẽ(µ(A))) ⇔ (p |= B)}
e
A '· B %
:= {c ∈ L | (c |=$
e (A)) ⇔ (c |= B)}
or in other words:
e "
A '· B := %
DI(L) {C ∈ DI(L) | (C |=$
e (A)) ⇔ (C |= B)}
e ! e
:= (A →
→ B) DI(L) (A ← ← B)
e
In particular we see that µ(A '· B) = [c (ẽ(µ(A)) ∪ µ(B)] ∩ [c (µ(B)) ∪ ẽ(µ(A))];
this allows us to prove the following proposition:
e e
Proposition 48. A '· B = L ⇔ A #
#B
Proof
e e
A '· B = L ⇔ µ(A '· B) = ΣL
⇔ [c (ẽ(µ(A)) ∪ µ(B)] ∩ [c (µ(B)) ∪ ẽ(µ(A))] = ΣL
⇔ ẽ(µ(A)) = µ(B)
⇔ %
$e (A) = B
e
⇔ A# #B
e
Note that we constructed A '· B in such a way that it can express the same
e e ! e
thing as A⊗e L = B. We see as well that if B ◦−
· A := (A ←
← B) DI(L) (A →
→ B),
we obtain:
e e
A '· B = B ◦−
· A
More specifically we can also consider the case where e = 0:

% #
A '· B = (A →DI(L) B) (B →DI(L) A)
DI(L)
%
Indeed, if no action is performed then A '· B = L iff A = B.
e
We explicitly constructed this implication '· against the underlying idea of
e
the relation ##. We could of course also have followed another direction. What
we mean is that instead of concentrating on A ⊗e L = B we could also have
concentrated on Le ⊗B = A. While in the first case one focuses on a condition
with respect to propagation, the latter yields a condition with respect to causa-
tion. Since those two approaches can yield different implications and since we
think that the ideas behind the standard linear logical implication touch on a
propagation-condition more closely than on a causation-condition, we worked
out the first possibility.
Another point which deserves our attention is the difference between the ap-
proach of dynamic OQL and the linear logical approach. Contrary to dynamic
OQL, it should be well understood that linear logic is not a temporal logic, no
preconceptions of time or processes is built into it. More explicitly, [Gir89]:
“Linear logic is eventually about time, space and communication,
but is not a temporal logic, or a kind of parallel language: such
approaches try to develop preexisting conceptions about time, pro-
cesses, etc.. In those matters, the general understanding is so low
that one has good chances to produce systems whose aim is to avoid
the study of their objects ... The main methodological commitment
is to refuse any a priori intuition about these objects of study, and
to assume that (at least part of) the temporal, the parallel features
of computation are already in Gentzen’s approach, but are simply
hidden by taxonomy.” (p.104)
As such dynamic OQL started out with a different methodology. The objects
of study are well-known as physical systems and their properties just as the in-
ductions performable on physical systems. In a sense this information has been
encrypted in the formulas we used. All dynamic propagation- and causation-
implications, have been labeled by inductions, and this is different from the
linear logical implications which are used to express any (non-specified) transi-
tion. Exactly this forms quite an argument against applying the linear logical
implications in a context of dynamic OQL. Even though it is formally possible
to construct a kind of implication which expresses the intuitive ideas behind
the linear logical implication, the natural “dynamic operational quantum logic”
e
which needs to be further developed, should in the first instance not use '· or
e e e
· but rather the more naturally arising → and ←.
◦−
Afterword
After analyzing the Geneva formalism for OQL in detail, we elaborated on

dynamic OQL. Contrary to what we called “static” OQL, dynamic OQL is still
in full development and expansion. Since we have contributed bits and pieces
to this development, we will now finish this thesis with a small recapitulation
on the state of affairs. First we have shown that the constituting ideas of linear
logic yield more an argument contra than pro their application in a context of
operational quantum logic. As we have shown, an implication with the intended
meaning of consuming resources and producing resources is very restrictive.
This means that contrary to the proposed “idea” of Pratt in [Pra93] of adding
linear logical connectives as an extension to quantum logic, we need to focus
on the development of a new logical syntax which provides all the axioms for
a dynamic OQL. The novelty, if we succeed, will be that we will truly end
up with a two-layered logic because our syntax will be equipped with axioms
expressing the shift between the level of property sets and the level of properties.
In concrete terms this means that we will end up with axioms dealing with
the operational resolution, axioms expressing the relations between all dynamic
implications we mentioned, all dynamic conjunctions and negations besides the
axioms of classical or intuitionistic logic. Of course it has been clearly stated
that we focused on soft inductions, performable on one physical system only.
The idea now naturally presents itself to extend the logic of actuality sets in such
a way as to incorporate what we called hard inductions, i.e. those which may
also destroy the system, and to incorporate the case of subsystem interactions
for instance due to entanglement. This leaves the road open for further research.
177
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VRIJE UNIVERSITEIT BRUSSEL

FACULTEIT DER LETTEREN EN WIJSBEGEERTE

The Logic of Physical Properties

Proefschrift ter verkrijging van de graad van Doctor in de Wijsbegeerte

The author is research assistant at Flanders’ Fund for Scientific Research

I Philosophy of Operational Quantum Logic 8

II Operational Quantum Logic 28

5 Probabilities and Ideal Measurements 63

6 Critiques and Critical points 78

III Is Operational Quantum Logic a Logic? 88

9 Semantical Realizations 107

11 Logical Operations vs. Relations 121

IV Dynamic Operational Quantum Logic 130

13 Construction of Dynamic Operational Quantum Logic 152

14 Comparison with Linear Logic 168

Our work in this thesis concentrates on operational quantum logic. It is our

In part I, chapter 1, we place operational quantum logic in the framework of

In part II we first focus on the physical-operational foundation in chapter 3. We

an isolated part of reality. Next, specific measurements conceived as physical

In chapter 5 we will allow a little shift in direction and incorporate an essay

hidden measurement approach. Now, in order to recover quantum probabilities

In part IV we will concentrate on the dynamic extension of operational quan-

which emerge when we consider inductions respectively as actions on questions,

In chapter 13 we concentrate on the logic of actuality sets as initiated in

as eternal resources. On the formal level, resource sensitivity is made explicit

Operational Quantum Logic

closed under the logical conjunction, amounts to a complete orthomodular lat-

explicitly stated otherwise.

ici ne sont pas les expériences idéales considérées dans l’ancienne

2.1 Why Realism

We will defend the specific epistemological “stance”1 of realism in relation to

2.1.1 Scientific Realism

“X is observable if there are circumstances which are such that, if

projects. We think of a definite experimental project — the notion was intro-

If it is sure that a particular piece of chalk would break if we take

excludes counterfactually described properties from what they suppose as being

2.1.2 Critical Realism

“..., it maintains that any adequate descriptive characterization of

This position is opposed to an ontological idealism in which the mind produces

Such a mind-involving factor has nothing to do with subjectivism in the sense

works, we have a rational method of approaching to the truth, i.e.,

We have already mentioned that Rescher’s conceptual idealism distinguishes

The idea that it is by means of definite experimental projects that we discover

according to our belief a combination of critical realism and weak conceptual

2.1.3 Structural Realism

“... my own favourite form of critical realism goes beyond both

2.2 EPR and The Criterion of Reality

The argument in the EPR-paper points to the incompleteness of quantum me-

“We see therefore that, as a consequence of two different measure-

“Finally it is by no means clear how, even with the stated criterion

“Consider a mechanical system consisting of two partial systems A

which cannot reasonably be considered to depend on the particular

Let us return now to the incompatibility of Einstein’s principle of separation

12 See part II, chapter 4.

Operational Quantum Logic

Physical and Operational

3.1 Physical Systems

entity which is to be thought of equivalently.

how physical systems can be mathematically modeled.

3.2 Questions and Preparations

The difference between what we called a question and a “measurement” is that a

3.2.2 Preparations of Physical Systems

3.2.3 True questions