G.R. No.
160261 November 10, 2003 x---------------------------------------------------------x
ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR., petitioner,
NAGMAMALASAKIT NA MGA MANANANGGOL NG MGA
MANGGAGAWANG PILIPINO, INC., ITS OFFICERS AND
MEMBERS, petitioner-in-intervention,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE
PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY
SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, THE SENATE, REPRESENTED
BY SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON,
REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO C. TEODORO, JR. AND
REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA,
respondents.
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-Intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-
intervention.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160262 November 10, 2003
SEDFREY M. CANDELARIA, CARLOS P. MEDINA, JR. AND
HENEDINA RAZON-ABAD, petitioners,
ATTYS. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL AND PETE QUIRINO
QUADRA, petitioners-in-intervention,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE
PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER
OR ACTING SPEAKER OR PRESIDING OFFICER, SPEAKER
JOSE G. DE VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G.
TEODORO, JR., REPRESENTA-TIVE FELIX WILLIAM B.
FUENTEBELLA, THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
THROUGH ITS PRESIDENT, SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN
M. DRILON, respondents,
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-
intervention.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160263 November 10, 2003
ARTURO M. DE CASTRO AND SOLEDAD M. CAGAMPANG,
petitioners,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE
PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioners-in-intervention,
vs.
FRANKLIN M. DRILON, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SENATE
PRESIDENT, AND JOSE G. DE VENECIA, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY
AS SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
respondents,
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-
intervention.
G.R. No. 160277 November 10, 2003
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, petitioner,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE
PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention,
vs.
JOSE G. DE VENECIA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SPEAKER OF THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, FRANKLIN M. DRILON, IN HIS
CAPACITY AS PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE OF THE REPUBLIC
OF THE PHILIPPINES, GILBERT TEODORO, JR., FELIX
WILLIAM FUENTEBELLA, JULIO LEDESMA IV, HENRY LANOT,
KIM BERNARDO-LOKIN, MARCELINO LIBANAN, EMMYLOU
TALIÑO-SANTOS, DOUGLAS CAGAS, SHERWIN
GATCHALIAN, LUIS BERSAMIN, JR., NERISSA SOON-RUIZ,
ERNESTO NIEVA, EDGAR ERICE, ISMAEL MATHAY, SAMUEL
DANGWA, ALFREDO MARAÑON, JR., CECILIA CARREON-
JALOSJOS, AGAPITO AQUINO, FAUSTO SEACHON, JR.,
GEORGILU YUMUL-HERMIDA, JOSE CARLOS LACSON,
MANUEL ORTEGA, ULIRAN JUAQUIN, SORAYA JAAFAR,
WILHELMINO SY-ALVARADO, CLAUDE BAUTISTA, DEL DE
GUZMAN, ZENAIDA CRUZ-DUCUT, AUGUSTO BACULIO,
FAUSTINO DY III, AUGUSTO SYJUCO, ROZZANO RUFINO
BIAZON, LEOVIGILDO BANAAG, ERIC SINGSON, JACINTO
PARAS, JOSE SOLIS, RENATO MATUBO, HERMINO TEVES,
AMADO ESPINO, JR., EMILIO MACIAS, ARTHUR PINGOY, JR.,
FRANCIS NEPOMUCENO, CONRADO ESTRELLA III, ELIAS
BULUT, JR., JURDIN ROMUALDO, JUAN PABLO BONDOC,
GENEROSO TULAGAN, PERPETUO YLAGAN, MICHAEL
DUAVIT, JOSEPH DURANO, JESLI LAPUS, CARLOS
COJUANGCO, GIORGIDI AGGABAO, FRANCIS ESCUDERRO,
RENE VELARDE, CELSO LOBREGAT, ALIPIO BADELLES,
DIDAGEN DILANGALEN, ABRAHAM MITRA, JOSEPH
SANTIAGO, DARLENE ANTONIO-CUSTODIO, ALETA SUAREZ,
RODOLF PLAZA, JV BAUTISTA, GREGORIO IPONG, GILBERT
REMULLA, ROLEX SUPLICO, CELIA LAYUS, JUAN MIGUEL
ZUBIRI, BENASING MACARAMBON, JR., JOSEFINA JOSON,
MARK COJUANGCO, MAURICIO DOMOGAN, RONALDO
ZAMORA, ANGELO MONTILLA, ROSELLER BARINAGA,
JESNAR FALCON, REYLINA NICOLAS, RODOLFO ALBANO,
JOAQUIN CHIPECO, JR., AND RUY ELIAS LOPEZ,
respondents,
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-
intervention.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160292 November 10, 2003
HERMINIO HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., JOEL RUIZ BUTUYAN, MA.
CECILIA PAPA, NAPOLEON C. REYES, ANTONIO H. ABAD, JR.,
ALFREDO C. LIGON, JOAN P. SERRANO AND GARY S.
MALLARI, petitioners,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE
PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention,
vs.
HON. SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, JR. AND ROBERTO P.
NAZARENO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY GENERAL OF
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, AND THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, respondents,
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-
intervention.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160295 November 10, 2003
SALACNIB F. BATERINA AND DEPUTY SPEAKER RAUL M.
GONZALES, petitioners,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE
PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESEN-TATIVES, THROUGH THE
SPEAKER OR ACTING SPEAKER OR PRESIDING OFFICER,
SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO
G. TEODORO, JR., REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B.
FUENTEBELLA, THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
THROUGH ITS PRESIDENT, SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN
M. DRILON, respondents,
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-
intervention.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160310 November 10, 2003
LEONILO R. ALFONSO, PETER ALVAREZ, SAMUEL DOCTOR,
MELVIN MATIBAG, RAMON MIQUIBAS, RODOLFO
MAGSINO, EDUARDO MALASAGA, EDUARDO SARMIENTO,
EDGARDO NAOE, LEONARDO GARCIA, EDGARD SMITH,
EMETERIO MENDIOLA, MARIO TOREJA, GUILLERMO
CASTASUS, NELSON A. LOYOLA, WILFREDO BELLO, JR.,
RONNIE TOQUILLO, KATE ANN VITAL, ANGELITA Q.
GUZMAN, MONICO PABLES, JR., JAIME BOAQUINA, LITA A.
AQUINO, MILA P. GABITO, JANETTE ARROYO, RIZALDY
EMPIG, ERNA LAHUZ, HOMER CALIBAG, DR. BING ARCE,
SIMEON ARCE, JR., EL DELLE ARCE, WILLIE RIVERO, DANTE
DIAZ, ALBERTO BUENAVISTA, FAUSTO BUENAVISTA, EMILY
SENERIS, ANNA CLARISSA LOYOLA, SALVACION LOYOLA,
RAINIER QUIROLGICO, JOSEPH LEANDRO LOYOLA,
ANTONIO LIBREA, FILEMON SIBULO, MANUEL D. COMIA,
JULITO U. SOON, VIRGILIO LUSTRE, AND NOEL ISORENA,
MAU RESTRIVERA, MAX VILLAESTER, AND EDILBERTO
GALLOR, petitioners,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE
PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY HON.
SPEAKER JOSE C. DE VENECIA, JR., THE SENATE,
REPRESENTED BY HON. SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN
DRILON, HON. FELIX FUENTEBELLA, ET AL., respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160318 November 10, 2003
PUBLIC INTEREST CENTER, INC., CRISPIN T. REYES,
petitioners,
vs.
HON. SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, ALL MEMBERS,
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, HON. SENATE PRESIDENT
FRANKLIN M. DRILON, AND ALL MEMBERS, PHILIPPINE
SENATE, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160342 November 10, 2003
ATTY. FERNANDO P.R. PERITO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS A
MEMBER OF THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES,
MANILA III, AND ENGR. MAXIMO N. MENEZ JR., IN HIS
CAPACITY AS A TAXPAYER AND MEMBER OF THE
ENGINEERING PROFESSION, petitioners,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES REPRESENTED BY THE
83 HONORABLE MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE LED BY HON.
REPRESENTATIVE WILLIAM FUENTEBELLA, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160343 November 10, 2003
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES, THROUGH THE
SPEAKER OR ACTING SPEAKER OR PRESIDING OFFICER,
SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO
G. TEODORO, JR., REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B.
FUENTEBELLA, THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES THROUGH
ITS PRESIDENT, SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON,
respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160360 November 10, 2003
CLARO B. FLORES, petitioner,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES THROUGH THE SPEAKER,
AND THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH THE
SENATE PRESIDENT, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160365 November 10, 2003
U.P. LAW ALUMNI CEBU FOUNDATION, INC., GOERING G.C.
PADERANGA, DANILO V. ORTIZ, GLORIA C. ESTENZO-
RAMOS, LIZA D. CORRO, LUIS V. DIORES, SR., BENJAMIN S.
RALLON, ROLANDO P. NONATO, DANTE T. RAMOS, ELSA R.
DIVINAGRACIA, KAREN B. CAPARROS-ARQUILLANO, SYLVA
G. AGUIRRE-PADERANGA, FOR THEMSELVES AND IN
BEHALF OF OTHER CITIZENS OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, petitioners,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE
VENECIA, THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, SENATE
PRESIDENT FRANKLIN DRILON, HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES
FELIX FUENTEBELLA AND GILBERTO TEODORO, BY
THEMSELVES AND AS REPRESENTATIVES OF THE GROUP OF
MORE THAN 80 HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES WHO SIGNED
AND FILED THE IMPEACHMENT COMPLAINT AGAINST
SUPREME COURT CHIEF JUSTICE HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.
respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160370 November 10, 2003
FR. RANHILIO CALLANGAN AQUINO, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE, THE
HONORABLE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160376 November 10, 2003
NILO A. MALANYAON, petitioner,
vs.
HON. FELIX WILLIAM FUENTEBELLA AND GILBERT
TEODORO, IN REPRESENTATION OF THE 86 SIGNATORIES
OF THE ARTICLES OF IMPEACHMENT AGAINST CHIEF
JUSTICE HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR. AND THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES,
REPRESENTED BY ITS SPEAKER, HON. JOSE G. DE VENECIA,
respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160392 November 10, 2003
VENICIO S. FLORES AND HECTOR L. HOFILEÑA, petitioners,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH SPEAKER
JOSE G. DE VENECIA, AND THE SENATE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, THROUGH SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN
DRILON, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160397 November 10, 2003
IN THE MATTER OF THE IMPEACHMENT COMPLAINT
AGAINST CHIEF JUSTICE HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR., ATTY.
DIOSCORO U. VALLEJOS, JR., petitioner.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160403 November 10, 2003
PHILIPPINE BAR ASSOCIATION, petitioner,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER
OR PRESIDING OFFICER, HON. JOSE G. DE VENECIA,
REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR.,
REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELA, THE
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH SENATE
PRESIDENT, HON. FRANKLIN DRILON, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160405 November 10, 2003
DEMOCRITO C. BARCENAS, PRESIDENT OF IBP, CEBU CITY
CHAPTER, MANUEL M. MONZON, PRESIDING OF IBP, CEBU
PROVINCE, VICTOR A. MAAMBONG, PROVINCIAL BOARD
MEMBER, ADELINO B. SITOY, DEAN OF THE COLLEG EOF
LAW, UNIVERSITY OF CEBU, YOUNG LAWYERS
ASSOCAITION OF CEBU, INC. [YLAC], REPRSEENTED BY
ATTY. MANUEL LEGASPI, CONFEDERATION OF ACCREDITED
MEDIATORS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. [CAMP, INC],
REPRESENTED BY RODERIC R. POCA, MANDAUE LAWYERS
ASSOCIATION, [MANLAW], REPRESENTED BY FELIPE
VELASQUEZ, FEDERACION INTERNACIONAL DE ABOGADAS
[FIDA], REPRESENTED BY THELMA L. JORDAN, CARLOS G.
CO, PRESIENT OF CEBU CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AND
INDUSTRY AND CEBU LADY LAWYERS ASSOCIATION, INC.
[CELLA, INC.], MARIBELLE NAVARRO AND BERNARDITO
FLORIDO, PAST PRESIDENT CEBU CHAMBER OF
COMMERCE AND INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES,
CEBU CHAPTER, petitioners,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES, REPRESENTED BY REP.
JOSE G. DE VENECIA, AS HOUSE SPEAKER AND THE SENATE,
REPRESENTED BY SENATOR FRANKLIN DRILON, AS SENATE
PRESIDENT, respondents.
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
There can be no constitutional crisis arising from a conflict,
no matter how passionate and seemingly irreconcilable it
may appear to be, over the determination by the
independent branches of government of the nature, scope
and extent of their respective constitutional powers where
the Constitution itself provides for the means and bases for
its resolution.
Our nation's history is replete with vivid illustrations of the
often frictional, at times turbulent, dynamics of the
relationship among these co-equal branches. This Court is
confronted with one such today involving the legislature
and the judiciary which has drawn legal luminaries to chart
antipodal courses and not a few of our countrymen to vent
cacophonous sentiments thereon.
There may indeed be some legitimacy to the
characterization that the present controversy subject of
the instant petitions – whether the filing of the second
impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide, Jr. with the House of Representatives falls within
the one year bar provided in the Constitution, and whether
the resolution thereof is a political question – has resulted
in a political crisis. Perhaps even more truth to the view
that it was brought upon by a political crisis of conscience.
In any event, it is with the absolute certainty that our
Constitution is sufficient to address all the issues which this
controversy spawns that this Court unequivocally
pronounces, at the first instance, that the feared resort to
extra-constitutional methods of resolving it is neither
necessary nor legally permissible. Both its resolution and
protection of the public interest lie in adherence to, not
departure from, the Constitution.
In passing over the complex issues arising from the
controversy, this Court is ever mindful of the essential
truth that the inviolate doctrine of separation of powers
among the legislative, executive or judicial branches of
government by no means prescribes for absolute
autonomy in the discharge by each of that part of the
governmental power assigned to it by the sovereign
people.
At the same time, the corollary doctrine of checks and
balances which has been carefully calibrated by the
Constitution to temper the official acts of each of these
three branches must be given effect without destroying
their indispensable co-equality.
Taken together, these two fundamental doctrines of
republican government, intended as they are to insure that
governmental power is wielded only for the good of the
people, mandate a relationship of interdependence and
coordination among these branches where the delicate
functions of enacting, interpreting and enforcing laws are
harmonized to achieve a unity of governance, guided only
by what is in the greater interest and well-being of the
people. Verily, salus populi est suprema lex.
Article XI of our present 1987 Constitution provides:
ARTICLE XI
Accountability of Public Officers
SECTION 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and
employees must at all times be accountable to the people,
serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty,
and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead
modest lives.
SECTION 2. The President, the Vice-President, the
Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the
Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be
removed from office, on impeachment for, and conviction
of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery,
graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of
public trust. All other public officers and employees may
be removed from office as provided by law, but not by
impeachment.
SECTION 3. (1) The House of Representatives shall have the
exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment.
(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by
any Member of the House of Representatives or by any
citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member
thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business
within ten session days, and referred to the proper
Committee within three session days thereafter. The
Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its
Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty
session days from such referral, together with the
corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be
calendared for consideration by the House within ten
session days from receipt thereof.
(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the
House shall be necessary either to affirm a favorable
resolution with the Articles of Impeachment of the
Committee, or override its contrary resolution. The vote of
each Member shall be recorded.
(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of
impeachment is filed by at least one-third of all the
Members of the House, the same shall constitute the
Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall
forthwith proceed.
(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against
the same official more than once within a period of one
year.
(6) The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide
all cases of impeachment. When sitting for that purpose,
the Senators shall be on oath or affirmation. When the
President of the Philippines is on trial, the Chief Justice of
the Supreme Court shall preside, but shall not vote. No
person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two-
thirds of all the Members of the Senate.
(7) Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend
further than removal from office and disqualification to
hold any office under the Republic of the Philippines, but
the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject
to prosecution, trial, and punishment according to law.
(8) The Congress shall promulgate its rules on
impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of this
section. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Following the above-quoted Section 8 of Article XI of the
Constitution, the 12th Congress of the House of
Representatives adopted and approved the Rules of
Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings (House
Impeachment Rules) on November 28, 2001, superseding
the previous House Impeachment Rules1 approved by the
11th Congress. The relevant distinctions between these
two Congresses' House Impeachment Rules are shown in
the following tabulation:
11TH CONGRESS RULES
12TH CONGRESS NEW RULES
RULE II
INITIATING IMPEACHMENT
Section 2. Mode of Initiating Impeachment. –
Impeachment shall be initiated only by a verified complaint
for impeachment filed by any Member of the House of
Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of
endorsement by any Member thereof or by a verified
complaint or resolution of impeachment filed by at least
one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the House.
RULE V
BAR AGAINST INITIATION OF IMPEACHMENT
PROCEEDINGS AGAINST THE SAME OFFICIAL
Section 16. – Impeachment Proceedings Deemed Initiated.
– In cases where a Member of the House files a verified
complaint of impeachment or a citizen files a verified
complaint that is endorsed by a Member of the House
through a resolution of endorsement against an
impeachable officer, impeachment proceedings against
such official are deemed initiated on the day the
Committee on Justice finds that the verified complaint
and/or resolution against such official, as the case may be,
is sufficient in substance, or on the date the House votes to
overturn or affirm the finding of the said Committee that
the verified complaint and/or resolution, as the case may
be, is not sufficient in substance.
In cases where a verified complaint or a resolution of
impeachment is filed or endorsed, as the case may be, by
at least one-third (1/3) of the Members of the House,
impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated at the
time of the filing of such verified complaint or resolution of
impeachment with the Secretary General.
RULE V
BAR AGAINST IMPEACHMENT
Section 14. Scope of Bar. – No impeachment proceedings
shall be initiated against the same official more than once
within the period of one (1) year.
Section 17. Bar Against Initiation Of Impeachment
Proceedings. – Within a period of one (1) year from the
date impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated as
provided in Section 16 hereof, no impeachment
proceedings, as such, can be initiated against the same
official. (Italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a
Resolution,2 sponsored by Representative Felix William D.
Fuentebella, which directed the Committee on Justice "to
conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the
manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development
Fund (JDF)."3
On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed
an impeachment complaint4 (first impeachment
complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and
seven Associate Justices5 of this Court for "culpable
violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust
and other high crimes."6 The complaint was endorsed by
Representatives Rolex T. Suplico, Ronaldo B. Zamora and
Didagen Piang Dilangalen,7 and was referred to the House
Committee on Justice on August 5, 20038 in accordance
with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution which
reads:
Section 3(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be
filed by any Member of the House of Representatives or by
any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any
Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of
Business within ten session days, and referred to the
proper Committee within three session days thereafter.
The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all
its Members, shall submit its report to the House within
sixty session days from such referral, together with the
corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be
calendared for consideration by the House within ten
session days from receipt thereof.
The House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13,
2003 that the first impeachment complaint was "sufficient
in form,"9 but voted to dismiss the same on October 22,
2003 for being insufficient in substance.10 To date, the
Committee Report to this effect has not yet been sent to
the House in plenary in accordance with the said Section
3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution.
Four months and three weeks since the filing on June 2,
2003 of the first complaint or on October 23, 2003, a day
after the House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it,
the second impeachment complaint11 was filed with the
Secretary General of the House12 by Representatives
Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. (First District, Tarlac) and Felix
William B. Fuentebella (Third District, Camarines Sur)
against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the
alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-
mentioned House Resolution. This second impeachment
complaint was accompanied by a "Resolution of
Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least one-third
(1/3) of all the Members of the House of
Representatives.13
Thus arose the instant petitions against the House of
Representatives, et. al., most of which petitions contend
that the filing of the second impeachment complaint is
unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5 of
Article XI of the Constitution that "[n]o impeachment
proceedings shall be initiated against the same official
more than once within a period of one year."
In G.R. No. 160261, petitioner Atty. Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr.,
alleging that he has a duty as a member of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines to use all available legal remedies to
stop an unconstitutional impeachment, that the issues
raised in his petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and
Mandamus are of transcendental importance, and that he
"himself was a victim of the capricious and arbitrary
changes in the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment
Proceedings introduced by the 12th Congress,"14 posits
that his right to bring an impeachment complaint against
then Ombudsman Aniano Desierto had been violated due
to the capricious and arbitrary changes in the House
Impeachment Rules adopted and approved on November
28, 2001 by the House of Representatives and prays that
(1) Rule V, Sections 16 and 17 and Rule III, Sections 5, 6, 7,
8, and 9 thereof be declared unconstitutional; (2) this
Court issue a writ of mandamus directing respondents
House of Representatives et. al. to comply with Article IX,
Section 3 (2), (3) and (5) of the Constitution, to return the
second impeachment complaint and/or strike it off the
records of the House of Representatives, and to
promulgate rules which are consistent with the
Constitution; and (3) this Court permanently enjoin
respondent House of Representatives from proceeding
with the second impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160262, petitioners Sedfrey M. Candelaria, et.
al., as citizens and taxpayers, alleging that the issues of the
case are of transcendental importance, pray, in their
petition for Certiorari/Prohibition, the issuance of a writ
"perpetually" prohibiting respondent House of
Representatives from filing any Articles of Impeachment
against the Chief Justice with the Senate; and for the
issuance of a writ "perpetually" prohibiting respondents
Senate and Senate President Franklin Drilon from
accepting any Articles of Impeachment against the Chief
Justice or, in the event that the Senate has accepted the
same, from proceeding with the impeachment trial.
In G.R. No. 160263, petitioners Arturo M. de Castro and
Soledad Cagampang, as citizens, taxpayers, lawyers and
members of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, alleging
that their petition for Prohibition involves public interest as
it involves the use of public funds necessary to conduct the
impeachment trial on the second impeachment complaint,
pray for the issuance of a writ of prohibition enjoining
Congress from conducting further proceedings on said
second impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160277, petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, alleging
that this Court has recognized that he has locus standi to
bring petitions of this nature in the cases of Chavez v.
PCGG15 and Chavez v. PEA-Amari Coastal Bay
Development Corporation,16 prays in his petition for
Injunction that the second impeachment complaint be
declared unconstitutional.
In G.R. No. 160292, petitioners Atty. Harry L. Roque, et. al.,
as taxpayers and members of the legal profession, pray in
their petition for Prohibition for an order prohibiting
respondent House of Representatives from drafting,
adopting, approving and transmitting to the Senate the
second impeachment complaint, and respondents De
Venecia and Nazareno from transmitting the Articles of
Impeachment to the Senate.
In G.R. No. 160295, petitioners Representatives Salacnib F.
Baterina and Deputy Speaker Raul M. Gonzalez, alleging
that, as members of the House of Representatives, they
have a legal interest in ensuring that only constitutional
impeachment proceedings are initiated, pray in their
petition for Certiorari/Prohibition that the second
impeachment complaint and any act proceeding therefrom
be declared null and void.
In G.R. No. 160310, petitioners Leonilo R. Alfonso et al.,
claiming that they have a right to be protected against all
forms of senseless spending of taxpayers' money and that
they have an obligation to protect the Supreme Court, the
Chief Justice, and the integrity of the Judiciary, allege in
their petition for Certiorari and Prohibition that it is
instituted as "a class suit" and pray that (1) the House
Resolution endorsing the second impeachment complaint
as well as all issuances emanating therefrom be declared
null and void; and (2) this Court enjoin the Senate and the
Senate President from taking cognizance of, hearing, trying
and deciding the second impeachment complaint, and
issue a writ of prohibition commanding the Senate, its
prosecutors and agents to desist from conducting any
proceedings or to act on the impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160318, petitioner Public Interest Center, Inc.,
whose members are citizens and taxpayers, and its co-
petitioner Crispin T. Reyes, a citizen, taxpayer and a
member of the Philippine Bar, both allege in their petition,
which does not state what its nature is, that the filing of
the second impeachment complaint involves paramount
public interest and pray that Sections 16 and 17 of the
House Impeachment Rules and the second impeachment
complaint/Articles of Impeachment be declared null and
void.
In G.R. No. 160342, petitioner Atty. Fernando P. R. Perito,
as a citizen and a member of the Philippine Bar Association
and of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and petitioner
Engr. Maximo N. Menez, Jr., as a taxpayer, pray in their
petition for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order
and Permanent Injunction to enjoin the House of
Representatives from proceeding with the second
impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160343, petitioner Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, alleging that it is mandated by the Code of
Professional Responsibility to uphold the Constitution,
prays in its petition for Certiorari and Prohibition that
Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V and Sections 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 of
Rule III of the House Impeachment Rules be declared
unconstitutional and that the House of Representatives be
permanently enjoined from proceeding with the second
impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160360, petitioner-taxpayer Atty. Claro Flores
prays in his petition for Certiorari and Prohibition that the
House Impeachment Rules be declared unconstitutional.
In G.R. No. 160365, petitioners U.P. Law Alumni Cebu
Foundation Inc., et. al., in their petition for Prohibition and
Injunction which they claim is a class suit filed in behalf of
all citizens, citing Oposa v. Factoran17 which was filed in
behalf of succeeding generations of Filipinos, pray for the
issuance of a writ prohibiting respondents House of
Representatives and the Senate from conducting further
proceedings on the second impeachment complaint and
that this Court declare as unconstitutional the second
impeachment complaint and the acts of respondent House
of Representatives in interfering with the fiscal matters of
the Judiciary.
In G.R. No. 160370, petitioner-taxpayer Father Ranhilio
Callangan Aquino, alleging that the issues in his petition for
Prohibition are of national and transcendental significance
and that as an official of the Philippine Judicial Academy,
he has a direct and substantial interest in the unhampered
operation of the Supreme Court and its officials in
discharging their duties in accordance with the
Constitution, prays for the issuance of a writ prohibiting
the House of Representatives from transmitting the
Articles of Impeachment to the Senate and the Senate
from receiving the same or giving the impeachment
complaint due course.
In G.R. No. 160376, petitioner Nilo A. Malanyaon, as a
taxpayer, alleges in his petition for Prohibition that
respondents Fuentebella and Teodoro at the time they
filed the second impeachment complaint, were "absolutely
without any legal power to do so, as they acted without
jurisdiction as far as the Articles of Impeachment assail the
alleged abuse of powers of the Chief Justice to disburse the
(JDF)."
In G.R. No. 160392, petitioners Attorneys Venicio S. Flores
and Hector L. Hofileña, alleging that as professors of law
they have an abiding interest in the subject matter of their
petition for Certiorari and Prohibition as it pertains to a
constitutional issue "which they are trying to inculcate in
the minds of their students," pray that the House of
Representatives be enjoined from endorsing and the
Senate from trying the Articles of Impeachment and that
the second impeachment complaint be declared null and
void.
In G.R. No. 160397, petitioner Atty. Dioscoro Vallejos, Jr.,
without alleging his locus standi, but alleging that the
second impeachment complaint is founded on the issue of
whether or not the Judicial Development Fund (JDF) was
spent in accordance with law and that the House of
Representatives does not have exclusive jurisdiction in the
examination and audit thereof, prays in his petition "To
Declare Complaint Null and Void for Lack of Cause of
Action and Jurisdiction" that the second impeachment
complaint be declared null and void.
In G.R. No. 160403, petitioner Philippine Bar Association,
alleging that the issues raised in the filing of the second
impeachment complaint involve matters of transcendental
importance, prays in its petition for Certiorari/Prohibition
that (1) the second impeachment complaint and all
proceedings arising therefrom be declared null and void;
(2) respondent House of Representatives be prohibited
from transmitting the Articles of Impeachment to the
Senate; and (3) respondent Senate be prohibited from
accepting the Articles of Impeachment and from
conducting any proceedings thereon.
In G.R. No. 160405, petitioners Democrit C. Barcenas et.
al., as citizens and taxpayers, pray in their petition for
Certiorari/Prohibition that (1) the second impeachment
complaint as well as the resolution of endorsement and
impeachment by the respondent House of Representatives
be declared null and void and (2) respondents Senate and
Senate President Franklin Drilon be prohibited from
accepting any Articles of Impeachment against the Chief
Justice or, in the event that they have accepted the same,
that they be prohibited from proceeding with the
impeachment trial.
Petitions bearing docket numbers G.R. Nos. 160261,
160262 and 160263, the first three of the eighteen which
were filed before this Court,18 prayed for the issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order and/or preliminary injunction
to prevent the House of Representatives from transmitting
the Articles of Impeachment arising from the second
impeachment complaint to the Senate. Petition bearing
docket number G.R. No. 160261 likewise prayed for the
declaration of the November 28, 2001 House
Impeachment Rules as null and void for being
unconstitutional.
Petitions bearing docket numbers G.R. Nos. 160277,
160292 and 160295, which were filed on October 28, 2003,
sought similar relief. In addition, petition bearing docket
number G.R. No. 160292 alleged that House Resolution
No. 260 (calling for a legislative inquiry into the
administration by the Chief Justice of the JDF) infringes on
the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers and is a
direct violation of the constitutional principle of fiscal
autonomy of the judiciary.
On October 28, 2003, during the plenary session of the
House of Representatives, a motion was put forth that the
second impeachment complaint be formally transmitted to
the Senate, but it was not carried because the House of
Representatives adjourned for lack of quorum,19 and as
reflected above, to date, the Articles of Impeachment have
yet to be forwarded to the Senate.
Before acting on the petitions with prayers for temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction
which were filed on or before October 28, 2003, Justices
Puno and Vitug offered to recuse themselves, but the
Court rejected their offer. Justice Panganiban inhibited
himself, but the Court directed him to participate.
Without necessarily giving the petitions due course, this
Court in its Resolution of October 28, 2003, resolved to (a)
consolidate the petitions; (b) require respondent House of
Representatives and the Senate, as well as the Solicitor
General, to comment on the petitions not later than 4:30
p.m. of November 3, 2003; (c) set the petitions for oral
arguments on November 5, 2003, at 10:00 a.m.; and (d)
appointed distinguished legal experts as amici curiae.20 In
addition, this Court called on petitioners and respondents
to maintain the status quo, enjoining all the parties and
others acting for and in their behalf to refrain from
committing acts that would render the petitions moot.
Also on October 28, 2003, when respondent House of
Representatives through Speaker Jose C. De Venecia, Jr.
and/or its co-respondents, by way of special appearance,
submitted a Manifestation asserting that this Court has no
jurisdiction to hear, much less prohibit or enjoin the House
of Representatives, which is an independent and co-equal
branch of government under the Constitution, from the
performance of its constitutionally mandated duty to
initiate impeachment cases. On even date, Senator
Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., in his own behalf, filed a Motion
to Intervene (Ex Abudante Cautela)21 and Comment,
praying that "the consolidated petitions be dismissed for
lack of jurisdiction of the Court over the issues affecting
the impeachment proceedings and that the sole power,
authority and jurisdiction of the Senate as the
impeachment court to try and decide impeachment cases,
including the one where the Chief Justice is the
respondent, be recognized and upheld pursuant to the
provisions of Article XI of the Constitution."22
Acting on the other petitions which were subsequently
filed, this Court resolved to (a) consolidate them with the
earlier consolidated petitions; (b) require respondents to
file their comment not later than 4:30 p.m. of November 3,
2003; and (c) include them for oral arguments on
November 5, 2003.
On October 29, 2003, the Senate of the Philippines,
through Senate President Franklin M. Drilon, filed a
Manifestation stating that insofar as it is concerned, the
petitions are plainly premature and have no basis in law or
in fact, adding that as of the time of the filing of the
petitions, no justiciable issue was presented before it since
(1) its constitutional duty to constitute itself as an
impeachment court commences only upon its receipt of
the Articles of Impeachment, which it had not, and (2) the
principal issues raised by the petitions pertain exclusively
to the proceedings in the House of Representatives.
On October 30, 2003, Atty. Jaime Soriano filed a "Petition
for Leave to Intervene" in G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262,
160263, 160277, 160292, and 160295, questioning the
status quo Resolution issued by this Court on October 28,
2003 on the ground that it would unnecessarily put
Congress and this Court in a "constitutional deadlock" and
praying for the dismissal of all the petitions as the matter
in question is not yet ripe for judicial determination.
On November 3, 2003, Attorneys Romulo B. Macalintal and
Pete Quirino Quadra filed in G.R. No. 160262 a "Motion for
Leave of Court to Intervene and to Admit the Herein
Incorporated Petition in Intervention."
On November 4, 2003, Nagmamalasakit na mga
Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc. filed a
Motion for Intervention in G.R. No. 160261. On November
5, 2003, World War II Veterans Legionnaires of the
Philippines, Inc. also filed a "Petition-in-Intervention with
Leave to Intervene" in G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262, 160263,
160277, 160292, 160295, and 160310.
The motions for intervention were granted and both
Senator Pimentel's Comment and Attorneys Macalintal and
Quadra's Petition in Intervention were admitted.
On November 5-6, 2003, this Court heard the views of the
amici curiae and the arguments of petitioners, intervenors
Senator Pimentel and Attorney Makalintal, and Solicitor
General Alfredo Benipayo on the principal issues outlined
in an Advisory issued by this Court on November 3, 2003,
to wit:
Whether the certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
may be invoked; who can invoke it; on what issues and at
what time; and whether it should be exercised by this
Court at this time.
In discussing these issues, the following may be taken up:
a) locus standi of petitioners;
b) ripeness(prematurity; mootness);
c) political question/justiciability;
d) House's "exclusive" power to initiate all cases of
impeachment;
e) Senate's "sole" power to try and decide all cases of
impeachment;
f) constitutionality of the House Rules on Impeachment
vis-a-vis Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution; and
g) judicial restraint (Italics in the original)
In resolving the intricate conflux of preliminary and
substantive issues arising from the instant petitions as well
as the myriad arguments and opinions presented for and
against the grant of the reliefs prayed for, this Court has
sifted and determined them to be as follows: (1) the
threshold and novel issue of whether or not the power of
judicial review extends to those arising from impeachment
proceedings; (2) whether or not the essential pre-
requisites for the exercise of the power of judicial review
have been fulfilled; and (3) the substantive issues yet
remaining. These matters shall now be discussed in
seriatim.
Judicial Review
As reflected above, petitioners plead for this Court to
exercise the power of judicial review to determine the
validity of the second impeachment complaint.
This Court's power of judicial review is conferred on the
judicial branch of the government in Section 1, Article VIII
of our present 1987 Constitution:
SECTION 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one
Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether
or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the government.
(Emphasis supplied)
Such power of judicial review was early on exhaustively
expounded upon by Justice Jose P. Laurel in the definitive
1936 case of Angara v. Electoral Commission23 after the
effectivity of the 1935 Constitution whose provisions,
unlike the present Constitution, did not contain the
present provision in Article VIII, Section 1, par. 2 on what
judicial power includes. Thus, Justice Laurel discoursed:
x x x In times of social disquietude or political excitement,
the great landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be
forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated. In cases of
conflict, the judicial department is the only constitutional
organ which can be called upon to determine the proper
allocation of powers between the several departments and
among the integral or constituent units thereof.
As any human production, our Constitution is of course
lacking perfection and perfectibility, but as much as it was
within the power of our people, acting through their
delegates to so provide, that instrument which is the
expression of their sovereignty however limited, has
established a republican government intended to operate
and function as a harmonious whole, under a system of
checks and balances, and subject to specific limitations and
restrictions provided in the said instrument. The
Constitution sets forth in no uncertain language the
restrictions and limitations upon governmental powers and
agencies. If these restrictions and limitations are
transcended it would be inconceivable if the Constitution
had not provided for a mechanism by which to direct the
course of government along constitutional channels, for
then the distribution of powers would be mere verbiage,
the bill of rights mere expressions of sentiment, and the
principles of good government mere political apothegms.
Certainly, the limitations and restrictions embodied in our
Constitution are real as they should be in any living
constitution. In the United States where no express
constitutional grant is found in their constitution, the
possession of this moderating power of the courts, not to
speak of its historical origin and development there, has
been set at rest by popular acquiescence for a period of
more than one and a half centuries. In our case, this
moderating power is granted, if not expressly, by clear
implication from section 2 of article VIII of our
Constitution.
The Constitution is a definition of the powers of
government. Who is to determine the nature, scope and
extent of such powers? The Constitution itself has provided
for the instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational way.
And when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional
boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the
other departments; it does not in reality nullify or
invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the
solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the
Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority
under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in
an actual controversy the rights which that instrument
secures and guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is
involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which
properly is the power of judicial review under the
Constitution. Even then, this power of judicial review is
limited to actual cases and controversies to be exercised
after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and
limited further to the constitutional question raised or the
very lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could
only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to
sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its
function is in this manner, the judiciary does not pass upon
questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation.
More than that, courts accord the presumption of
constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only
because the legislature is presumed to abide by the
Constitution but also because the judiciary in the
determination of actual cases and controversies must
reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed
through their representatives in the executive and
legislative departments of the government.24 (Italics in the
original; emphasis and underscoring supplied)
As pointed out by Justice Laurel, this "moderating power"
to "determine the proper allocation of powers" of the
different branches of government and "to direct the course
of government along constitutional channels" is inherent in
all courts25 as a necessary consequence of the judicial
power itself, which is "the power of the court to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable."26
Thus, even in the United States where the power of judicial
review is not explicitly conferred upon the courts by its
Constitution, such power has "been set at rest by popular
acquiescence for a period of more than one and a half
centuries." To be sure, it was in the 1803 leading case of
Marbury v. Madison27 that the power of judicial review
was first articulated by Chief Justice Marshall, to wit:
It is also not entirely unworthy of observation, that in
declaring what shall be the supreme law of the land, the
constitution itself is first mentioned; and not the laws of
the United States generally, but those only which shall be
made in pursuance of the constitution, have that rank.
Thus, the particular phraseology of the constitution of the
United States confirms and strengthens the principle,
supposed to be essential to all written constitutions, that a
law repugnant to the constitution is void; and that courts,
as well as other departments, are bound by that
instrument.28 (Italics in the original; emphasis supplied)
In our own jurisdiction, as early as 1902, decades before its
express grant in the 1935 Constitution, the power of
judicial review was exercised by our courts to invalidate
constitutionally infirm acts.29 And as pointed out by noted
political law professor and former Supreme Court Justice
Vicente V. Mendoza,30 the executive and legislative
branches of our government in fact effectively
acknowledged this power of judicial review in Article 7 of
the Civil Code, to wit:
Article 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and
their violation or non-observance shall not be excused by
disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary.
When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the
Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall
govern.
Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations
shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws
or the Constitution. (Emphasis supplied)
As indicated in Angara v. Electoral Commission,31 judicial
review is indeed an integral component of the delicate
system of checks and balances which, together with the
corollary principle of separation of powers, forms the
bedrock of our republican form of government and insures
that its vast powers are utilized only for the benefit of the
people for which it serves.
The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our
system of government. It obtains not through express
provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each
department of the government has exclusive cognizance of
matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its
own sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the
three powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the
Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained
and independent of each other. The Constitution has
provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to
secure coordination in the workings of the various
departments of the government. x x x And the judiciary in
turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter,
effectively checks the other departments in the exercise of
its power to determine the law, and hence to declare
executive and legislative acts void if violative of the
Constitution.32 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In the scholarly estimation of former Supreme Court
Justice Florentino Feliciano, "x x x judicial review is
essential for the maintenance and enforcement of the
separation of powers and the balancing of powers among
the three great departments of government through the
definition and maintenance of the boundaries of authority
and control between them."33 To him, "[j]udicial review is
the chief, indeed the only, medium of participation – or
instrument of intervention – of the judiciary in that
balancing operation."34
To ensure the potency of the power of judicial review to
curb grave abuse of discretion by "any branch or
instrumentalities of government," the afore-quoted
Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution engraves, for the
first time into its history, into block letter law the so-called
"expanded certiorari jurisdiction" of this Court, the nature
of and rationale for which are mirrored in the following
excerpt from the sponsorship speech of its proponent,
former Chief Justice Constitutional Commissioner Roberto
Concepcion:
xxx
The first section starts with a sentence copied from former
Constitutions. It says:
The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court
and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
I suppose nobody can question it.
The next provision is new in our constitutional law. I will
read it first and explain.
Judicial power includes the duty of courts of justice to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable and to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part or
instrumentality of the government.
Fellow Members of this Commission, this is actually a
product of our experience during martial law. As a matter
of fact, it has some antecedents in the past, but the role of
the judiciary during the deposed regime was marred
considerably by the circumstance that in a number of cases
against the government, which then had no legal defense
at all, the solicitor general set up the defense of political
questions and got away with it. As a consequence, certain
principles concerning particularly the writ of habeas
corpus, that is, the authority of courts to order the release
of political detainees, and other matters related to the
operation and effect of martial law failed because the
government set up the defense of political question. And
the Supreme Court said: "Well, since it is political, we have
no authority to pass upon it." The Committee on the
Judiciary feels that this was not a proper solution of the
questions involved. It did not merely request an
encroachment upon the rights of the people, but it, in
effect, encouraged further violations thereof during the
martial law regime. x x x
xxx
Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of
power of the agencies and offices of the government as
well as those of its officers. In other words, the judiciary is
the final arbiter on the question whether or not a branch
of government or any of its officials has acted without
jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so capriciously as
to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of
jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial
power but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this
nature.
This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which
means that the courts cannot hereafter evade the duty to
settle matters of this nature, by claiming that such matters
constitute a political question.35 (Italics in the original;
emphasis and underscoring supplied)
To determine the merits of the issues raised in the instant
petitions, this Court must necessarily turn to the
Constitution itself which employs the well-settled
principles of constitutional construction.
First, verba legis, that is, wherever possible, the words
used in the Constitution must be given their ordinary
meaning except where technical terms are employed.
Thus, in J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure
Administration,36 this Court, speaking through Chief
Justice Enrique Fernando, declared:
We look to the language of the document itself in our
search for its meaning. We do not of course stop there, but
that is where we begin. It is to be assumed that the words
in which constitutional provisions are couched express the
objective sought to be attained. They are to be given their
ordinary meaning except where technical terms are
employed in which case the significance thus attached to
them prevails. As the Constitution is not primarily a
lawyer's document, it being essential for the rule of law to
obtain that it should ever be present in the people's
consciousness, its language as much as possible should be
understood in the sense they have in common use. What it
says according to the text of the provision to be construed
compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts
to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and the
people mean what they say. Thus these are the cases
where the need for construction is reduced to a
minimum.37 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Second, where there is ambiguity, ratio legis est anima. The
words of the Constitution should be interpreted in
accordance with the intent of its framers. And so did this
Court apply this principle in Civil Liberties Union v.
Executive Secretary38 in this wise:
A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the
intention underlying the provision under consideration.
Thus, it has been held that the Court in construing a
Constitution should bear in mind the object sought to be
accomplished by its adoption, and the evils, if any, sought
to be prevented or remedied. A doubtful provision will be
examined in the light of the history of the times, and the
condition and circumstances under which the Constitution
was framed. The object is to ascertain the reason which
induced the framers of the Constitution to enact the
particular provision and the purpose sought to be
accomplished thereby, in order to construe the whole as to
make the words consonant to that reason and calculated
to effect that purpose.39 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
As it did in Nitafan v. Commissioner on Internal Revenue40
where, speaking through Madame Justice Amuerfina A.
Melencio-Herrera, it declared:
x x x The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with
the fundamental principle of constitutional construction
that the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the
people adopting it should be given effect. The primary task
in constitutional construction is to ascertain and thereafter
assure the realization of the purpose of the framers and of
the people in the adoption of the Constitution. It may also
be safely assumed that the people in ratifying the
Constitution were guided mainly by the explanation
offered by the framers.41 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
Finally, ut magis valeat quam pereat. The Constitution is to
be interpreted as a whole. Thus, in Chiongbian v. De
Leon,42 this Court, through Chief Justice Manuel Moran
declared:
x x x [T]he members of the Constitutional Convention
could not have dedicated a provision of our Constitution
merely for the benefit of one person without considering
that it could also affect others. When they adopted
subsection 2, they permitted, if not willed, that said
provision should function to the full extent of its substance
and its terms, not by itself alone, but in conjunction with
all other provisions of that great document.43 (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
Likewise, still in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive
Secretary,44 this Court affirmed that:
It is a well-established rule in constitutional construction
that no one provision of the Constitution is to be separated
from all the others, to be considered alone, but that all the
provisions bearing upon a particular subject are to be
brought into view and to be so interpreted as to effectuate
the great purposes of the instrument. Sections bearing on
a particular subject should be considered and interpreted
together as to effectuate the whole purpose of the
Constitution and one section is not to be allowed to defeat
another, if by any reasonable construction, the two can be
made to stand together.
In other words, the court must harmonize them, if
practicable, and must lean in favor of a construction which
will render every word operative, rather than one which
may make the words idle and nugatory.45 (Emphasis
supplied)
If, however, the plain meaning of the word is not found to
be clear, resort to other aids is available. In still the same
case of Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, this
Court expounded:
While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the
debates and proceedings of the constitutional convention
in order to arrive at the reason and purpose of the
resulting Constitution, resort thereto may be had only
when other guides fail as said proceedings are powerless
to vary the terms of the Constitution when the meaning is
clear. Debates in the constitutional convention "are of
value as showing the views of the individual members, and
as indicating the reasons for their votes, but they give us
no light as to the views of the large majority who did not
talk, much less of the mass of our fellow citizens whose
votes at the polls gave that instrument the force of
fundamental law. We think it safer to construe the
constitution from what appears upon its face." The proper
interpretation therefore depends more on how it was
understood by the people adopting it than in the framers's
understanding thereof.46 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
It is in the context of the foregoing backdrop of
constitutional refinement and jurisprudential application of
the power of judicial review that respondents Speaker De
Venecia, et. al. and intervenor Senator Pimentel raise the
novel argument that the Constitution has excluded
impeachment proceedings from the coverage of judicial
review.
Briefly stated, it is the position of respondents Speaker De
Venecia et. al. that impeachment is a political action which
cannot assume a judicial character. Hence, any question,
issue or incident arising at any stage of the impeachment
proceeding is beyond the reach of judicial review.47
For his part, intervenor Senator Pimentel contends that the
Senate's "sole power to try" impeachment cases48 (1)
entirely excludes the application of judicial review over it;
and (2) necessarily includes the Senate's power to
determine constitutional questions relative to
impeachment proceedings.49
In furthering their arguments on the proposition that
impeachment proceedings are outside the scope of judicial
review, respondents Speaker De Venecia, et. al. and
intervenor Senator Pimentel rely heavily on American
authorities, principally the majority opinion in the case of
Nixon v. United States.50 Thus, they contend that the
exercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedings
is inappropriate since it runs counter to the framers'
decision to allocate to different fora the powers to try
impeachments and to try crimes; it disturbs the system of
checks and balances, under which impeachment is the only
legislative check on the judiciary; and it would create a lack
of finality and difficulty in fashioning relief.51 Respondents
likewise point to deliberations on the US Constitution to
show the intent to isolate judicial power of review in cases
of impeachment.
Respondents' and intervenors' reliance upon American
jurisprudence, the American Constitution and American
authorities cannot be credited to support the proposition
that the Senate's "sole power to try and decide
impeachment cases," as provided for under Art. XI, Sec.
3(6) of the Constitution, is a textually demonstrable
constitutional commitment of all issues pertaining to
impeachment to the legislature, to the total exclusion of
the power of judicial review to check and restrain any
grave abuse of the impeachment process. Nor can it
reasonably support the interpretation that it necessarily
confers upon the Senate the inherently judicial power to
determine constitutional questions incident to
impeachment proceedings.
Said American jurisprudence and authorities, much less
the American Constitution, are of dubious application for
these are no longer controlling within our jurisdiction and
have only limited persuasive merit insofar as Philippine
constitutional law is concerned. As held in the case of
Garcia vs. COMELEC,52 "[i]n resolving constitutional
disputes, [this Court] should not be beguiled by foreign
jurisprudence some of which are hardly applicable because
they have been dictated by different constitutional settings
and needs."53 Indeed, although the Philippine
Constitution can trace its origins to that of the United
States, their paths of development have long since
diverged. In the colorful words of Father Bernas, "[w]e
have cut the umbilical cord."
The major difference between the judicial power of the
Philippine Supreme Court and that of the U.S. Supreme
Court is that while the power of judicial review is only
impliedly granted to the U.S. Supreme Court and is
discretionary in nature, that granted to the Philippine
Supreme Court and lower courts, as expressly provided for
in the Constitution, is not just a power but also a duty, and
it was given an expanded definition to include the power
to correct any grave abuse of discretion on the part of any
government branch or instrumentality.
There are also glaring distinctions between the U.S.
Constitution and the Philippine Constitution with respect
to the power of the House of Representatives over
impeachment proceedings. While the U.S. Constitution
bestows sole power of impeachment to the House of
Representatives without limitation,54 our Constitution,
though vesting in the House of Representatives the
exclusive power to initiate impeachment cases,55 provides
for several limitations to the exercise of such power as
embodied in Section 3(2), (3), (4) and (5), Article XI thereof.
These limitations include the manner of filing, required
vote to impeach, and the one year bar on the
impeachment of one and the same official.
Respondents are also of the view that judicial review of
impeachments undermines their finality and may also lead
to conflicts between Congress and the judiciary. Thus, they
call upon this Court to exercise judicial statesmanship on
the principle that "whenever possible, the Court should
defer to the judgment of the people expressed legislatively,
recognizing full well the perils of judicial willfulness and
pride."56
But did not the people also express their will when they
instituted the above-mentioned safeguards in the
Constitution? This shows that the Constitution did not
intend to leave the matter of impeachment to the sole
discretion of Congress. Instead, it provided for certain well-
defined limits, or in the language of Baker v. Carr,57
"judicially discoverable standards" for determining the
validity of the exercise of such discretion, through the
power of judicial review.
The cases of Romulo v. Yniguez58 and Alejandrino v.
Quezon,59 cited by respondents in support of the
argument that the impeachment power is beyond the
scope of judicial review, are not in point. These cases
concern the denial of petitions for writs of mandamus to
compel the legislature to perform non-ministerial acts, and
do not concern the exercise of the power of judicial review.
There is indeed a plethora of cases in which this Court
exercised the power of judicial review over congressional
action. Thus, in Santiago v. Guingona, Jr.,60 this Court ruled
that it is well within the power and jurisdiction of the Court
to inquire whether the Senate or its officials committed a
violation of the Constitution or grave abuse of discretion in
the exercise of their functions and prerogatives. In Tanada
v. Angara,61 in seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine
Senate on the ground that it contravened the Constitution,
it held that the petition raises a justiciable controversy and
that when an action of the legislative branch is seriously
alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not
only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle
the dispute. In Bondoc v. Pineda,62 this Court declared null
and void a resolution of the House of Representatives
withdrawing the nomination, and rescinding the election,
of a congressman as a member of the House Electoral
Tribunal for being violative of Section 17, Article VI of the
Constitution. In Coseteng v. Mitra,63 it held that the
resolution of whether the House representation in the
Commission on Appointments was based on proportional
representation of the political parties as provided in
Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution is subject to
judicial review. In Daza v. Singson,64 it held that the act of
the House of Representatives in removing the petitioner
from the Commission on Appointments is subject to
judicial review. In Tanada v. Cuenco,65 it held that although
under the Constitution, the legislative power is vested
exclusively in Congress, this does not detract from the
power of the courts to pass upon the constitutionality of
acts of Congress. In Angara v. Electoral Commission,66 it
ruled that confirmation by the National Assembly of the
election of any member, irrespective of whether his
election is contested, is not essential before such member-
elect may discharge the duties and enjoy the privileges of a
member of the National Assembly.
Finally, there exists no constitutional basis for the
contention that the exercise of judicial review over
impeachment proceedings would upset the system of
checks and balances. Verily, the Constitution is to be
interpreted as a whole and "one section is not to be
allowed to defeat another."67 Both are integral
components of the calibrated system of independence and
interdependence that insures that no branch of
government act beyond the powers assigned to it by the
Constitution.
Essential Requisites for Judicial Review
As clearly stated in Angara v. Electoral Commission, the
courts' power of judicial review, like almost all powers
conferred by the Constitution, is subject to several
limitations, namely: (1) an actual case or controversy
calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person
challenging the act must have "standing" to challenge; he
must have a personal and substantial interest in the case
such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a
result of its enforcement; (3) the question of
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible
opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be
the very lis mota of the case.
x x x Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to
actual cases and controversies to be exercised after full
opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited
further to the constitutional question raised or the very lis
mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only
lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile
conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its
function is in this manner, the judiciary does not pass upon
questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation.
More than that, courts accord the presumption of
constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only
because the legislature is presumed to abide by the
Constitution but also because the judiciary in the
determination of actual cases and controversies must
reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed
through their representatives in the executive and
legislative departments of the government.68 (Italics in the
original)
Standing
Locus standi or legal standing or has been defined as a
personal and substantial interest in the case such that the
party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result
of the governmental act that is being challenged. The gist
of the question of standing is whether a party alleges such
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to
assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court depends for
illumination of difficult constitutional questions.69
Intervenor Soriano, in praying for the dismissal of the
petitions, contends that petitioners do not have standing
since only the Chief Justice has sustained and will sustain
direct personal injury. Amicus curiae former Justice
Minister and Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza similarly
contends.
Upon the other hand, the Solicitor General asserts that
petitioners have standing since this Court had, in the past,
accorded standing to taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens,
legislators in cases involving paramount public interest70
and transcendental importance,71 and that procedural
matters are subordinate to the need to determine whether
or not the other branches of the government have kept
themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the
laws and that they have not abused the discretion given to
them.72 Amicus curiae Dean Raul Pangalangan of the U.P.
College of Law is of the same opinion, citing
transcendental importance and the well-entrenched rule
exception that, when the real party in interest is unable to
vindicate his rights by seeking the same remedies, as in the
case of the Chief Justice who, for ethical reasons, cannot
himself invoke the jurisdiction of this Court, the courts will
grant petitioners standing.
There is, however, a difference between the rule on real-
party-in-interest and the rule on standing, for the former is
a concept of civil procedure73 while the latter has
constitutional underpinnings.74 In view of the arguments
set forth regarding standing, it behooves the Court to
reiterate the ruling in Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato75 to clarify
what is meant by locus standi and to distinguish it from
real party-in-interest.
The difference between the rule on standing and real party
in interest has been noted by authorities thus: "It is
important to note . . . that standing because of its
constitutional and public policy underpinnings, is very
different from questions relating to whether a particular
plaintiff is the real party in interest or has capacity to sue.
Although all three requirements are directed towards
ensuring that only certain parties can maintain an action,
standing restrictions require a partial consideration of the
merits, as well as broader policy concerns relating to the
proper role of the judiciary in certain areas.
Standing is a special concern in constitutional law because
in some cases suits are brought not by parties who have
been personally injured by the operation of a law or by
official action taken, but by concerned citizens, taxpayers
or voters who actually sue in the public interest. Hence the
question in standing is whether such parties have "alleged
such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as
to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court so largely
depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions."
xxx
On the other hand, the question as to "real party in
interest" is whether he is "the party who would be
benefited or injured by the judgment, or the 'party entitled
to the avails of the suit.'"76 (Citations omitted)
While rights personal to the Chief Justice may have been
injured by the alleged unconstitutional acts of the House of
Representatives, none of the petitioners before us asserts
a violation of the personal rights of the Chief Justice. On
the contrary, they invariably invoke the vindication of their
own rights – as taxpayers; members of Congress; citizens,
individually or in a class suit; and members of the bar and
of the legal profession – which were supposedly violated
by the alleged unconstitutional acts of the House of
Representatives.
In a long line of cases, however, concerned citizens,
taxpayers and legislators when specific requirements have
been met have been given standing by this Court.
When suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner
assailing the constitutionality of a statute must be direct
and personal. He must be able to show, not only that the
law or any government act is invalid, but also that he
sustained or is in imminent danger of sustaining some
direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely
that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way. It must
appear that the person complaining has been or is about
to be denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully
entitled or that he is about to be subjected to some
burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act
complained of.77 In fine, when the proceeding involves the
assertion of a public right,78 the mere fact that he is a
citizen satisfies the requirement of personal interest.
In the case of a taxpayer, he is allowed to sue where there
is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed, or that
public money is being deflected to any improper purpose,
or that there is a wastage of public funds through the
enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law.79
Before he can invoke the power of judicial review, however,
he must specifically prove that he has sufficient interest in
preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by
taxation and that he would sustain a direct injury as a
result of the enforcement of the questioned statute or
contract. It is not sufficient that he has merely a general
interest common to all members of the public.80
At all events, courts are vested with discretion as to
whether or not a taxpayer's suit should be entertained.81
This Court opts to grant standing to most of the
petitioners, given their allegation that any impending
transmittal to the Senate of the Articles of Impeachment
and the ensuing trial of the Chief Justice will necessarily
involve the expenditure of public funds.
As for a legislator, he is allowed to sue to question the
validity of any official action which he claims infringes his
prerogatives as a legislator.82 Indeed, a member of the
House of Representatives has standing to maintain
inviolate the prerogatives, powers and privileges vested by
the Constitution in his office.83
While an association has legal personality to represent its
members,84 especially when it is composed of substantial
taxpayers and the outcome will affect their vital
interests,85 the mere invocation by the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines or any member of the legal profession of
the duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more,
although undoubtedly true, does not suffice to clothe it
with standing. Its interest is too general. It is shared by
other groups and the whole citizenry. However, a reading
of the petitions shows that it has advanced constitutional
issues which deserve the attention of this Court in view of
their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents.86 It,
therefore, behooves this Court to relax the rules on
standing and to resolve the issues presented by it.
In the same vein, when dealing with class suits filed in
behalf of all citizens, persons intervening must be
sufficiently numerous to fully protect the interests of all
concerned87 to enable the court to deal properly with all
interests involved in the suit,88 for a judgment in a class
suit, whether favorable or unfavorable to the class, is,
under the res judicata principle, binding on all members of
the class whether or not they were before the court.89
Where it clearly appears that not all interests can be
sufficiently represented as shown by the divergent issues
raised in the numerous petitions before this Court, G.R.
No. 160365 as a class suit ought to fail. Since petitioners
additionally allege standing as citizens and taxpayers,
however, their petition will stand.
The Philippine Bar Association, in G.R. No. 160403, invokes
the sole ground of transcendental importance, while Atty.
Dioscoro U. Vallejos, in G.R. No. 160397, is mum on his
standing.
There being no doctrinal definition of transcendental
importance, the following instructive determinants
formulated by former Supreme Court Justice Florentino P.
Feliciano are instructive: (1) the character of the funds or
other assets involved in the case; (2) the presence of a
clear case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory
prohibition by the public respondent agency or
instrumentality of the government; and (3) the lack of any
other party with a more direct and specific interest in
raising the questions being raised.90 Applying these
determinants, this Court is satisfied that the issues raised
herein are indeed of transcendental importance.
In not a few cases, this Court has in fact adopted a liberal
attitude on the locus standi of a petitioner where the
petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental
significance to the people, as when the issues raised are of
paramount importance to the public.91 Such liberality
does not, however, mean that the requirement that a party
should have an interest in the matter is totally eliminated.
A party must, at the very least, still plead the existence of
such interest, it not being one of which courts can take
judicial notice. In petitioner Vallejos' case, he failed to
allege any interest in the case. He does not thus have
standing.
With respect to the motions for intervention, Rule 19,
Section 2 of the Rules of Court requires an intervenor to
possess a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the
success of either of the parties, or an interest against both,
or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a
distribution or other disposition of property in the custody
of the court or of an officer thereof. While intervention is
not a matter of right, it may be permitted by the courts
when the applicant shows facts which satisfy the
requirements of the law authorizing intervention.92
In Intervenors Attorneys Romulo Macalintal and Pete
Quirino Quadra's case, they seek to join petitioners
Candelaria, et. al. in G.R. No. 160262. Since, save for one
additional issue, they raise the same issues and the same
standing, and no objection on the part of petitioners
Candelaria, et. al. has been interposed, this Court as earlier
stated, granted the Motion for Leave of Court to Intervene
and Petition-in-Intervention.
Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga
Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc., et. al. sought to join
petitioner Francisco in G.R. No. 160261. Invoking their right
as citizens to intervene, alleging that "they will suffer if this
insidious scheme of the minority members of the House of
Representatives is successful," this Court found the
requisites for intervention had been complied with.
Alleging that the issues raised in the petitions in G.R. Nos.
160261, 160262, 160263, 160277, 160292, 160295, and
160310 were of transcendental importance, World War II
Veterans Legionnaires of the Philippines, Inc. filed a
"Petition-in-Intervention with Leave to Intervene" to raise
the additional issue of whether or not the second
impeachment complaint against the Chief Justice is valid
and based on any of the grounds prescribed by the
Constitution.
Finding that Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga
Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc., et al. and World War II
Veterans Legionnaires of the Philippines, Inc. possess a
legal interest in the matter in litigation the respective
motions to intervene were hereby granted.
Senator Aquilino Pimentel, on the other hand, sought to
intervene for the limited purpose of making of record and
arguing a point of view that differs with Senate President
Drilon's. He alleges that submitting to this Court's
jurisdiction as the Senate President does will undermine
the independence of the Senate which will sit as an
impeachment court once the Articles of Impeachment are
transmitted to it from the House of Representatives.
Clearly, Senator Pimentel possesses a legal interest in the
matter in litigation, he being a member of Congress against
which the herein petitions are directed. For this reason,
and to fully ventilate all substantial issues relating to the
matter at hand, his Motion to Intervene was granted and
he was, as earlier stated, allowed to argue.
Lastly, as to Jaime N. Soriano's motion to intervene, the
same must be denied for, while he asserts an interest as a
taxpayer, he failed to meet the standing requirement for
bringing taxpayer's suits as set forth in Dumlao v.
Comelec,93 to wit:
x x x While, concededly, the elections to be held involve
the expenditure of public moneys, nowhere in their
Petition do said petitioners allege that their tax money is
"being extracted and spent in violation of specific
constitutional protection against abuses of legislative
power," or that there is a misapplication of such funds by
respondent COMELEC, or that public money is being
deflected to any improper purpose. Neither do petitioners
seek to restrain respondent from wasting public funds
through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional
law.94 (Citations omitted)
In praying for the dismissal of the petitions, Soriano failed
even to allege that the act of petitioners will result in illegal
disbursement of public funds or in public money being
deflected to any improper purpose. Additionally, his mere
interest as a member of the Bar does not suffice to clothe
him with standing.
Ripeness and Prematurity
In Tan v. Macapagal,95 this Court, through Chief Justice
Fernando, held that for a case to be considered ripe for
adjudication, "it is a prerequisite that something had by
then been accomplished or performed by either branch
before a court may come into the picture."96 Only then
may the courts pass on the validity of what was done, if
and when the latter is challenged in an appropriate legal
proceeding.
The instant petitions raise in the main the issue of the
validity of the filing of the second impeachment complaint
against the Chief Justice in accordance with the House
Impeachment Rules adopted by the 12th Congress, the
constitutionality of which is questioned. The questioned
acts having been carried out, i.e., the second impeachment
complaint had been filed with the House of
Representatives and the 2001 Rules have already been
already promulgated and enforced, the prerequisite that
the alleged unconstitutional act should be accomplished
and performed before suit, as Tan v. Macapagal holds, has
been complied with.
Related to the issue of ripeness is the question of whether
the instant petitions are premature. Amicus curiae former
Senate President Jovito R. Salonga opines that there may
be no urgent need for this Court to render a decision at
this time, it being the final arbiter on questions of
constitutionality anyway. He thus recommends that all
remedies in the House and Senate should first be
exhausted.
Taking a similar stand is Dean Raul Pangalangan of the U.P.
College of Law who suggests to this Court to take judicial
notice of on-going attempts to encourage signatories to
the second impeachment complaint to withdraw their
signatures and opines that the House Impeachment Rules
provide for an opportunity for members to raise
constitutional questions themselves when the Articles of
Impeachment are presented on a motion to transmit to
the same to the Senate. The dean maintains that even
assuming that the Articles are transmitted to the Senate,
the Chief Justice can raise the issue of their constitutional
infirmity by way of a motion to dismiss.
The dean's position does not persuade. First, the
withdrawal by the Representatives of their signatures
would not, by itself, cure the House Impeachment Rules of
their constitutional infirmity. Neither would such a
withdrawal, by itself, obliterate the questioned second
impeachment complaint since it would only place it under
the ambit of Sections 3(2) and (3) of Article XI of the
Constitution97 and, therefore, petitioners would continue
to suffer their injuries.
Second and most importantly, the futility of seeking
remedies from either or both Houses of Congress before
coming to this Court is shown by the fact that, as
previously discussed, neither the House of Representatives
nor the Senate is clothed with the power to rule with
definitiveness on the issue of constitutionality, whether
concerning impeachment proceedings or otherwise, as
said power is exclusively vested in the judiciary by the
earlier quoted Section I, Article VIII of the Constitution.
Remedy cannot be sought from a body which is bereft of
power to grant it.
Justiciability
In the leading case of Tanada v. Cuenco,98 Chief Justice
Roberto Concepcion defined the term "political question,"
viz:
[T]he term "political question" connotes, in legal parlance,
what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of
policy. In other words, in the language of Corpus Juris
Secundum, it refers to "those questions which, under the
Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their
sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary
authority has been delegated to the Legislature or
executive branch of the Government." It is concerned with
issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a
particular measure.99 (Italics in the original)
Prior to the 1973 Constitution, without consistency and
seemingly without any rhyme or reason, this Court
vacillated on its stance of taking cognizance of cases which
involved political questions. In some cases, this Court hid
behind the cover of the political question doctrine and
refused to exercise its power of judicial review.100 In other
cases, however, despite the seeming political nature of the
therein issues involved, this Court assumed jurisdiction
whenever it found constitutionally imposed limits on
powers or functions conferred upon political bodies.101
Even in the landmark 1988 case of Javellana v. Executive
Secretary102 which raised the issue of whether the 1973
Constitution was ratified, hence, in force, this Court
shunted the political question doctrine and took
cognizance thereof. Ratification by the people of a
Constitution is a political question, it being a question
decided by the people in their sovereign capacity.
The frequency with which this Court invoked the political
question doctrine to refuse to take jurisdiction over certain
cases during the Marcos regime motivated Chief Justice
Concepcion, when he became a Constitutional
Commissioner, to clarify this Court's power of judicial
review and its application on issues involving political
questions, viz:
MR. CONCEPCION. Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.
I will speak on the judiciary. Practically, everybody has
made, I suppose, the usual comment that the judiciary is
the weakest among the three major branches of the
service. Since the legislature holds the purse and the
executive the sword, the judiciary has nothing with which
to enforce its decisions or commands except the power of
reason and appeal to conscience which, after all, reflects
the will of God, and is the most powerful of all other
powers without exception. x x x And so, with the body's
indulgence, I will proceed to read the provisions drafted by
the Committee on the Judiciary.
The first section starts with a sentence copied from former
Constitutions. It says:

The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court
and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
I suppose nobody can question it.
The next provision is new in our constitutional law. I will
read it first and explain.
Judicial power includes the duty of courts of justice to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable and to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part or
instrumentality of the government.
Fellow Members of this Commission, this is actually a
product of our experience during martial law. As a matter
of fact, it has some antecedents in the past, but the role of
the judiciary during the deposed regime was marred
considerably by the circumstance that in a number of cases
against the government, which then had no legal defense
at all, the solicitor general set up the defense of political
questions and got away with it. As a consequence, certain
principles concerning particularly the writ of habeas
corpus, that is, the authority of courts to order the release
of political detainees, and other matters related to the
operation and effect of martial law failed because the
government set up the defense of political question. And
the Supreme Court said: "Well, since it is political, we have
no authority to pass upon it." The Committee on the
Judiciary feels that this was not a proper solution of the
questions involved. It did not merely request an
encroachment upon the rights of the people, but it, in
effect, encouraged further violations thereof during the
martial law regime. I am sure the members of the Bar are
familiar with this situation. But for the benefit of the
Members of the Commission who are not lawyers, allow
me to explain. I will start with a decision of the Supreme
Court in 1973 on the case of Javellana vs. the Secretary of
Justice, if I am not mistaken. Martial law was announced
on September 22, although the proclamation was dated
September 21. The obvious reason for the delay in its
publication was that the administration had apprehended
and detained prominent newsmen on September 21. So
that when martial law was announced on September 22,
the media hardly published anything about it. In fact, the
media could not publish any story not only because our
main writers were already incarcerated, but also because
those who succeeded them in their jobs were under
mortal threat of being the object of wrath of the ruling
party. The 1971 Constitutional Convention had begun on
June 1, 1971 and by September 21 or 22 had not finished
the Constitution; it had barely agreed in the fundamentals
of the Constitution. I forgot to say that upon the
proclamation of martial law, some delegates to that 1971
Constitutional Convention, dozens of them, were picked
up. One of them was our very own colleague,
Commissioner Calderon. So, the unfinished draft of the
Constitution was taken over by representatives of
Malacañang. In 17 days, they finished what the delegates
to the 1971 Constitutional Convention had been unable to
accomplish for about 14 months. The draft of the 1973
Constitution was presented to the President around
December 1, 1972, whereupon the President issued a
decree calling a plebiscite which suspended the operation
of some provisions in the martial law decree which
prohibited discussions, much less public discussions of
certain matters of public concern. The purpose was
presumably to allow a free discussion on the draft of the
Constitution on which a plebiscite was to be held
sometime in January 1973. If I may use a word famous by
our colleague, Commissioner Ople, during the
interregnum, however, the draft of the Constitution was
analyzed and criticized with such a telling effect that
Malacañang felt the danger of its approval. So, the
President suspended indefinitely the holding of the
plebiscite and announced that he would consult the
people in a referendum to be held from January 10 to
January 15. But the questions to be submitted in the
referendum were not announced until the eve of its
scheduled beginning, under the supposed supervision not
of the Commission on Elections, but of what was then
designated as "citizens assemblies or barangays." Thus the
barangays came into existence. The questions to be
propounded were released with proposed answers
thereto, suggesting that it was unnecessary to hold a
plebiscite because the answers given in the referendum
should be regarded as the votes cast in the plebiscite.
Thereupon, a motion was filed with the Supreme Court
praying that the holding of the referendum be suspended.
When the motion was being heard before the Supreme
Court, the Minister of Justice delivered to the Court a
proclamation of the President declaring that the new
Constitution was already in force because the
overwhelming majority of the votes cast in the referendum
favored the Constitution. Immediately after the departure
of the Minister of Justice, I proceeded to the session room
where the case was being heard. I then informed the Court
and the parties the presidential proclamation declaring
that the 1973 Constitution had been ratified by the people
and is now in force.
A number of other cases were filed to declare the
presidential proclamation null and void. The main defense
put up by the government was that the issue was a
political question and that the court had no jurisdiction to
entertain the case.
xxx
The government said that in a referendum held from
January 10 to January 15, the vast majority ratified the
draft of the Constitution. Note that all members of the
Supreme Court were residents of Manila, but none of them
had been notified of any referendum in their respective
places of residence, much less did they participate in the
alleged referendum. None of them saw any referendum
proceeding.
In the Philippines, even local gossips spread like wild fire.
So, a majority of the members of the Court felt that there
had been no referendum.
Second, a referendum cannot substitute for a plebiscite.
There is a big difference between a referendum and a
plebiscite. But another group of justices upheld the
defense that the issue was a political question.
Whereupon, they dismissed the case. This is not the only
major case in which the plea of "political question" was set
up. There have been a number of other cases in the past.
x x x The defense of the political question was rejected
because the issue was clearly justiciable.
xxx
x x x When your Committee on the Judiciary began to
perform its functions, it faced the following questions:
What is judicial power? What is a political question?
The Supreme Court, like all other courts, has one main
function: to settle actual controversies involving conflicts
of rights which are demandable and enforceable. There are
rights which are guaranteed by law but cannot be enforced
by a judiciary party. In a decided case, a husband
complained that his wife was unwilling to perform her
duties as a wife. The Court said: "We can tell your wife
what her duties as such are and that she is bound to
comply with them, but we cannot force her physically to
discharge her main marital duty to her husband. There are
some rights guaranteed by law, but they are so personal
that to enforce them by actual compulsion would be highly
derogatory to human dignity."
This is why the first part of the second paragraph of
Section I provides that:
Judicial power includes the duty of courts to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable or enforceable . . .
The courts, therefore, cannot entertain, much less decide,
hypothetical questions. In a presidential system of
government, the Supreme Court has, also another
important function. The powers of government are
generally considered divided into three branches: the
Legislative, the Executive and the Judiciary. Each one is
supreme within its own sphere and independent of the
others. Because of that supremacy power to determine
whether a given law is valid or not is vested in courts of
justice.
Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of
power of the agencies and offices of the government as
well as those of its officers. In other words, the judiciary is
the final arbiter on the question whether or not a branch
of government or any of its officials has acted without
jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so capriciously as
to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of
jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial
power but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this
nature.
This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which
means that the courts cannot hereafter evade the duty to
settle matters of this nature, by claiming that such matters
constitute a political question.
I have made these extended remarks to the end that the
Commissioners may have an initial food for thought on the
subject of the judiciary.103 (Italics in the original; emphasis
supplied)
During the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission,
Chief Justice Concepcion further clarified the concept of
judicial power, thus:
MR. NOLLEDO. The Gentleman used the term "judicial
power" but judicial power is not vested in the Supreme
Court alone but also in other lower courts as may be
created by law.
MR. CONCEPCION. Yes.
MR. NOLLEDO. And so, is this only an example?
MR. CONCEPCION. No, I know this is not. The Gentleman
seems to identify political questions with jurisdictional
questions. But there is a difference.
MR. NOLLEDO. Because of the expression "judicial power"?
MR. CONCEPCION. No. Judicial power, as I said, refers to
ordinary cases but where there is a question as to whether
the government had authority or had abused its authority
to the extent of lacking jurisdiction or excess of
jurisdiction, that is not a political question. Therefore, the
court has the duty to decide.
xxx
FR. BERNAS. Ultimately, therefore, it will always have to be
decided by the Supreme Court according to the new
numerical need for votes.
On another point, is it the intention of Section 1 to do
away with the political question doctrine?
MR. CONCEPCION. No.
FR. BERNAS. It is not.
MR. CONCEPCION. No, because whenever there is an
abuse of discretion, amounting to a lack of jurisdiction. . .
FR. BERNAS. So, I am satisfied with the answer that it is not
intended to do away with the political question doctrine.
MR. CONCEPCION. No, certainly not.
When this provision was originally drafted, it sought to
define what is judicial power. But the Gentleman will
notice it says, "judicial power includes" and the reason
being that the definition that we might make may not
cover all possible areas.
FR. BERNAS. So, this is not an attempt to solve the
problems arising from the political question doctrine.
MR. CONCEPCION. It definitely does not eliminate the fact
that truly political questions are beyond the pale of judicial
power.104 (Emphasis supplied)
From the foregoing record of the proceedings of the 1986
Constitutional Commission, it is clear that judicial power is
not only a power; it is also a duty, a duty which cannot be
abdicated by the mere specter of this creature called the
political question doctrine. Chief Justice Concepcion
hastened to clarify, however, that Section 1, Article VIII was
not intended to do away with "truly political questions."
From this clarification it is gathered that there are two
species of political questions: (1) "truly political questions"
and (2) those which "are not truly political questions."
Truly political questions are thus beyond judicial review,
the reason for respect of the doctrine of separation of
powers to be maintained. On the other hand, by virtue of
Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, courts can review
questions which are not truly political in nature.
As pointed out by amicus curiae former dean Pacifico
Agabin of the UP College of Law, this Court has in fact in a
number of cases taken jurisdiction over questions which
are not truly political following the effectivity of the
present Constitution.
In Marcos v. Manglapus,105 this Court, speaking through
Madame Justice Irene Cortes, held:
The present Constitution limits resort to the political
question doctrine and broadens the scope of judicial
inquiry into areas which the Court, under previous
constitutions, would have normally left to the political
departments to decide.106 x x x
In Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee,107 through
Justice Teodoro Padilla, this Court declared:
The "allocation of constitutional boundaries" is a task that
this Court must perform under the Constitution. Moreover,
as held in a recent case, "(t)he political question doctrine
neither interposes an obstacle to judicial determination of
the rival claims. The jurisdiction to delimit constitutional
boundaries has been given to this Court. It cannot abdicate
that obligation mandated by the 1987 Constitution,
although said provision by no means does away with the
applicability of the principle in appropriate cases."108
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
And in Daza v. Singson,109 speaking through Justice Isagani
Cruz, this Court ruled:
In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection
becomes even less tenable and decisive. The reason is
that, even if we were to assume that the issue presented
before us was political in nature, we would still not be
precluded from resolving it under the expanded
jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers, in proper
cases, even the political question.110 x x x (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied.)
Section 1, Article VIII, of the Court does not define what
are justiciable political questions and non-justiciable
political questions, however. Identification of these two
species of political questions may be problematic. There
has been no clear standard. The American case of Baker v.
Carr111 attempts to provide some:
x x x Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a
political question is found a textually demonstrable
constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate
political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable
and manageable standards for resolving it; or the
impossibility of deciding without an initial policy
determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion;
or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent
resolution without expressing lack of the respect due
coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need
for questioning adherence to a political decision already
made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from
multifarious pronouncements by various departments on
one question.112 (Underscoring supplied)
Of these standards, the more reliable have been the first
three: (1) a textually demonstrable constitutional
commitment of the issue to a coordinate political
department; (2) the lack of judicially discoverable and
manageable standards for resolving it; and (3) the
impossibility of deciding without an initial policy
determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion.
These standards are not separate and distinct concepts but
are interrelated to each in that the presence of one
strengthens the conclusion that the others are also
present.
The problem in applying the foregoing standards is that the
American concept of judicial review is radically different
from our current concept, for Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution provides our courts with far less discretion in
determining whether they should pass upon a
constitutional issue.
In our jurisdiction, the determination of a truly political
question from a non-justiciable political question lies in the
answer to the question of whether there are
constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions
conferred upon political bodies. If there are, then our
courts are duty-bound to examine whether the branch or
instrumentality of the government properly acted within
such limits. This Court shall thus now apply this standard to
the present controversy.
These petitions raise five substantial issues:
I. Whether the offenses alleged in the Second
impeachment complaint constitute valid impeachable
offenses under the Constitution.
II. Whether the second impeachment complaint was filed
in accordance with Section 3(4), Article XI of the
Constitution.
III. Whether the legislative inquiry by the House
Committee on Justice into the Judicial Development Fund
is an unconstitutional infringement of the constitutionally
mandated fiscal autonomy of the judiciary.
IV. Whether Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the Rules on
Impeachment adopted by the 12th Congress are
unconstitutional for violating the provisions of Section 3,
Article XI of the Constitution.
V. Whether the second impeachment complaint is barred
under Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution.
The first issue goes into the merits of the second
impeachment complaint over which this Court has no
jurisdiction. More importantly, any discussion of this issue
would require this Court to make a determination of what
constitutes an impeachable offense. Such a determination
is a purely political question which the Constitution has left
to the sound discretion of the legislation. Such an intent is
clear from the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission.113
Although Section 2 of Article XI of the Constitution
enumerates six grounds for impeachment, two of these,
namely, other high crimes and betrayal of public trust,
elude a precise definition. In fact, an examination of the
records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission shows that
the framers could find no better way to approximate the
boundaries of betrayal of public trust and other high
crimes than by alluding to both positive and negative
examples of both, without arriving at their clear cut
definition or even a standard therefor.114 Clearly, the issue
calls upon this court to decide a non-justiciable political
question which is beyond the scope of its judicial power
under Section 1, Article VIII.
Lis Mota
It is a well-settled maxim of adjudication that an issue
assailing the constitutionality of a governmental act should
be avoided whenever possible. Thus, in the case of Sotto v.
Commission on Elections,115 this Court held:
x x x It is a well-established rule that a court should not
pass upon a constitutional question and decide a law to be
unconstitutional or invalid, unless such question is raised
by the parties and that when it is raised, if the record also
presents some other ground upon which the court may
rest its judgment, that course will be adopted and the
constitutional question will be left for consideration until a
case arises in which a decision upon such question will be
unavoidable.116 [Emphasis and underscoring supplied]
The same principle was applied in Luz Farms v. Secretary of
Agrarian Reform,117 where this Court invalidated Sections
13 and 32 of Republic Act No. 6657 for being confiscatory
and violative of due process, to wit:
It has been established that this Court will assume
jurisdiction over a constitutional question only if it is
shown that the essential requisites of a judicial inquiry into
such a question are first satisfied. Thus, there must be an
actual case or controversy involving a conflict of legal rights
susceptible of judicial determination, the constitutional
question must have been opportunely raised by the proper
party, and the resolution of the question is unavoidably
necessary to the decision of the case itself.118 [Emphasis
supplied]
Succinctly put, courts will not touch the issue of
constitutionality unless it is truly unavoidable and is the
very lis mota or crux of the controversy.
As noted earlier, the instant consolidated petitions, while
all seeking the invalidity of the second impeachment
complaint, collectively raise several constitutional issues
upon which the outcome of this controversy could possibly
be made to rest. In determining whether one, some or all
of the remaining substantial issues should be passed upon,
this Court is guided by the related cannon of adjudication
that "the court should not form a rule of constitutional law
broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is
applied."119
In G.R. No. 160310, petitioners Leonilo R. Alfonso, et al.
argue that, among other reasons, the second
impeachment complaint is invalid since it directly resulted
from a Resolution120 calling for a legislative inquiry into
the JDF, which Resolution and legislative inquiry petitioners
claim to likewise be unconstitutional for being: (a) a
violation of the rules and jurisprudence on investigations in
aid of legislation; (b) an open breach of the doctrine of
separation of powers; (c) a violation of the constitutionally
mandated fiscal autonomy of the judiciary; and (d) an
assault on the independence of the judiciary.121
Without going into the merits of petitioners Alfonso, et.
al.'s claims, it is the studied opinion of this Court that the
issue of the constitutionality of the said Resolution and
resulting legislative inquiry is too far removed from the
issue of the validity of the second impeachment complaint.
Moreover, the resolution of said issue would, in the Court's
opinion, require it to form a rule of constitutional law
touching on the separate and distinct matter of legislative
inquiries in general, which would thus be broader than is
required by the facts of these consolidated cases. This
opinion is further strengthened by the fact that said
petitioners have raised other grounds in support of their
petition which would not be adversely affected by the
Court's ruling.
En passant, this Court notes that a standard for the
conduct of legislative inquiries has already been
enunciated by this Court in Bengzon, Jr. v. Senate Blue
Ribbon Commttee,122 viz:
The 1987 Constitution expressly recognizes the power of
both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation. Thus, Section 21, Article VI thereof provides:
The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its
respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of
procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected
by such inquiries shall be respected.
The power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries
in aid of legislation is not, therefore absolute or unlimited.
Its exercise is circumscribed by the afore-quoted provision
of the Constitution. Thus, as provided therein, the
investigation must be "in aid of legislation in accordance
with its duly published rules of procedure" and that "the
rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries
shall be respected." It follows then that the right rights of
persons under the Bill of Rights must be respected,
including the right to due process and the right not be
compelled to testify against one's self.123
In G.R. No. 160262, intervenors Romulo B. Macalintal and
Pete Quirino Quadra, while joining the original petition of
petitioners Candelaria, et. al., introduce the new argument
that since the second impeachment complaint was verified
and filed only by Representatives Gilberto Teodoro, Jr. and
Felix William Fuentebella, the same does not fall under the
provisions of Section 3 (4), Article XI of the Constitution
which reads:
Section 3(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of
impeachment is filed by at least one-third of all the
Members of the House, the same shall constitute the
Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall
forthwith proceed.
They assert that while at least 81 members of the House of
Representatives signed a Resolution of
Endorsement/Impeachment, the same did not satisfy the
requisites for the application of the afore-mentioned
section in that the "verified complaint or resolution of
impeachment" was not filed "by at least one-third of all
the Members of the House." With the exception of
Representatives Teodoro and Fuentebella, the signatories
to said Resolution are alleged to have verified the same
merely as a "Resolution of Endorsement." Intervenors
point to the "Verification" of the Resolution of
Endorsement which states that:
"We are the proponents/sponsors of the Resolution of
Endorsement of the abovementioned Complaint of
Representatives Gilberto Teodoro and Felix William B.
Fuentebella x x x"124
Intervenors Macalintal and Quadra further claim that what
the Constitution requires in order for said second
impeachment complaint to automatically become the
Articles of Impeachment and for trial in the Senate to
begin "forthwith," is that the verified complaint be "filed,"
not merely endorsed, by at least one-third of the Members
of the House of Representatives. Not having complied with
this requirement, they concede that the second
impeachment complaint should have been calendared and
referred to the House Committee on Justice under Section
3(2), Article XI of the Constitution, viz:
Section 3(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be
filed by any Member of the House of Representatives or by
any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any
Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of
Business within ten session days, and referred to the
proper Committee within three session days thereafter.
The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all
its Members, shall submit its report to the House within
sixty session days from such referral, together with the
corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be
calendared for consideration by the House within ten
session days from receipt thereof.
Intervenors' foregoing position is echoed by Justice
Maambong who opined that for Section 3 (4), Article XI of
the Constitution to apply, there should be 76 or more
representatives who signed and verified the second
impeachment complaint as complainants, signed and
verified the signatories to a resolution of impeachment.
Justice Maambong likewise asserted that the Resolution of
Endorsement/Impeachment signed by at least one-third of
the members of the House of Representatives as endorsers
is not the resolution of impeachment contemplated by the
Constitution, such resolution of endorsement being
necessary only from at least one Member whenever a
citizen files a verified impeachment complaint.
While the foregoing issue, as argued by intervenors
Macalintal and Quadra, does indeed limit the scope of the
constitutional issues to the provisions on impeachment,
more compelling considerations militate against its
adoption as the lis mota or crux of the present controversy.
Chief among this is the fact that only Attorneys Macalintal
and Quadra, intervenors in G.R. No. 160262, have raised
this issue as a ground for invalidating the second
impeachment complaint. Thus, to adopt this additional
ground as the basis for deciding the instant consolidated
petitions would not only render for naught the efforts of
the original petitioners in G.R. No. 160262, but the efforts
presented by the other petitioners as well.
Again, the decision to discard the resolution of this issue as
unnecessary for the determination of the instant cases is
made easier by the fact that said intervenors Macalintal
and Quadra have joined in the petition of Candelaria, et.
al., adopting the latter's arguments and issues as their
own. Consequently, they are not unduly prejudiced by this
Court's decision.
In sum, this Court holds that the two remaining issues,
inextricably linked as they are, constitute the very lis mota
of the instant controversy: (1) whether Sections 15 and 16
of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules adopted by the
12th Congress are unconstitutional for violating the
provisions of Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution; and
(2) whether, as a result thereof, the second impeachment
complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI of the
Constitution.
Judicial Restraint
Senator Pimentel urges this Court to exercise judicial
restraint on the ground that the Senate, sitting as an
impeachment court, has the sole power to try and decide
all cases of impeachment. Again, this Court reiterates that
the power of judicial review includes the power of review
over justiciable issues in impeachment proceedings.
On the other hand, respondents Speaker De Venecia et. al.
argue that "[t]here is a moral compulsion for the Court to
not assume jurisdiction over the impeachment because all
the Members thereof are subject to impeachment."125
But this argument is very much like saying the Legislature
has a moral compulsion not to pass laws with penalty
clauses because Members of the House of Representatives
are subject to them.
The exercise of judicial restraint over justiciable issues is
not an option before this Court. Adjudication may not be
declined, because this Court is not legally disqualified. Nor
can jurisdiction be renounced as there is no other tribunal
to which the controversy may be referred."126 Otherwise,
this Court would be shirking from its duty vested under
Art. VIII, Sec. 1(2) of the Constitution. More than being
clothed with authority thus, this Court is duty-bound to
take cognizance of the instant petitions.127 In the august
words of amicus curiae Father Bernas, "jurisdiction is not
just a power; it is a solemn duty which may not be
renounced. To renounce it, even if it is vexatious, would be
a dereliction of duty."
Even in cases where it is an interested party, the Court
under our system of government cannot inhibit itself and
must rule upon the challenge because no other office has
the authority to do so.128 On the occasion that this Court
had been an interested party to the controversy before it,
it has acted upon the matter "not with officiousness but in
the discharge of an unavoidable duty and, as always, with
detachment and fairness."129 After all, "by [his]
appointment to the office, the public has laid on [a
member of the judiciary] their confidence that [he] is
mentally and morally fit to pass upon the merits of their
varied contentions. For this reason, they expect [him] to be
fearless in [his] pursuit to render justice, to be unafraid to
displease any person, interest or power and to be
equipped with a moral fiber strong enough to resist the
temptations lurking in [his] office."130
The duty to exercise the power of adjudication regardless
of interest had already been settled in the case of Abbas v.
Senate Electoral Tribunal.131 In that case, the petitioners
filed with the respondent Senate Electoral Tribunal a
Motion for Disqualification or Inhibition of the Senators-
Members thereof from the hearing and resolution of SET
Case No. 002-87 on the ground that all of them were
interested parties to said case as respondents therein. This
would have reduced the Tribunal's membership to only its
three Justices-Members whose disqualification was not
sought, leaving them to decide the matter. This Court held:
Where, as here, a situation is created which precludes the
substitution of any Senator sitting in the Tribunal by any of
his other colleagues in the Senate without inviting the
same objections to the substitute's competence, the
proposed mass disqualification, if sanctioned and ordered,
would leave the Tribunal no alternative but to abandon a
duty that no other court or body can perform, but which it
cannot lawfully discharge if shorn of the participation of its
entire membership of Senators.
To our mind, this is the overriding consideration — that the
Tribunal be not prevented from discharging a duty which it
alone has the power to perform, the performance of which
is in the highest public interest as evidenced by its being
expressly imposed by no less than the fundamental law.
It is aptly noted in the first of the questioned Resolutions
that the framers of the Constitution could not have been
unaware of the possibility of an election contest that
would involve all Senators—elect, six of whom would
inevitably have to sit in judgment thereon. Indeed, such
possibility might surface again in the wake of the 1992
elections when once more, but for the last time, all 24
seats in the Senate will be at stake. Yet the Constitution
provides no scheme or mode for settling such unusual
situations or for the substitution of Senators designated to
the Tribunal whose disqualification may be sought.
Litigants in such situations must simply place their trust
and hopes of vindication in the fairness and sense of
justice of the Members of the Tribunal. Justices and
Senators, singly and collectively.
Let us not be misunderstood as saying that no Senator-
Member of the Senate Electoral Tribunal may inhibit or
disqualify himself from sitting in judgment on any case
before said Tribunal. Every Member of the Tribunal may, as
his conscience dictates, refrain from participating in the
resolution of a case where he sincerely feels that his
personal interests or biases would stand in the way of an
objective and impartial judgment. What we are merely
saying is that in the light of the Constitution, the Senate
Electoral Tribunal cannot legally function as such, absent
its entire membership of Senators and that no amendment
of its Rules can confer on the three Justices-Members
alone the power of valid adjudication of a senatorial
election contest.
More recently in the case of Estrada v. Desierto,132 it was
held that:
Moreover, to disqualify any of the members of the Court,
particularly a majority of them, is nothing short of pro
tanto depriving the Court itself of its jurisdiction as
established by the fundamental law. Disqualification of a
judge is a deprivation of his judicial power. And if that
judge is the one designated by the Constitution to exercise
the jurisdiction of his court, as is the case with the Justices
of this Court, the deprivation of his or their judicial power
is equivalent to the deprivation of the judicial power of the
court itself. It affects the very heart of judicial
independence. The proposed mass disqualification, if
sanctioned and ordered, would leave the Court no
alternative but to abandon a duty which it cannot lawfully
discharge if shorn of the participation of its entire
membership of Justices.133 (Italics in the original)
Besides, there are specific safeguards already laid down by
the Court when it exercises its power of judicial review.
In Demetria v. Alba,134 this Court, through Justice Marcelo
Fernan cited the "seven pillars" of limitations of the power
of judicial review, enunciated by US Supreme Court Justice
Brandeis in Ashwander v. TVA135 as follows:
1. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of
legislation in a friendly, non-adversary proceeding,
declining because to decide such questions 'is legitimate
only in the last resort, and as a necessity in the
determination of real, earnest and vital controversy
between individuals. It never was the thought that, by
means of a friendly suit, a party beaten in the legislature
could transfer to the courts an inquiry as to the
constitutionality of the legislative act.'
2. The Court will not 'anticipate a question of constitutional
law in advance of the necessity of deciding it.' . . . 'It is not
the habit of the Court to decide questions of a
constitutional nature unless absolutely necessary to a
decision of the case.'
3. The Court will not 'formulate a rule of constitutional law
broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is
to be applied.'
4. The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question
although properly presented by the record, if there is also
present some other ground upon which the case may be
disposed of. This rule has found most varied application.
Thus, if a case can be decided on either of two grounds,
one involving a constitutional question, the other a
question of statutory construction or general law, the
Court will decide only the latter. Appeals from the highest
court of a state challenging its decision of a question under
the Federal Constitution are frequently dismissed because
the judgment can be sustained on an independent state
ground.
5. The Court will not pass upon the validity of a statute
upon complaint of one who fails to show that he is injured
by its operation. Among the many applications of this rule,
none is more striking than the denial of the right of
challenge to one who lacks a personal or property right.
Thus, the challenge by a public official interested only in
the performance of his official duty will not be
entertained . . . In Fairchild v. Hughes, the Court affirmed
the dismissal of a suit brought by a citizen who sought to
have the Nineteenth Amendment declared
unconstitutional. In Massachusetts v. Mellon, the challenge
of the federal Maternity Act was not entertained although
made by the Commonwealth on behalf of all its citizens.
6. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of a
statute at the instance of one who has availed himself of
its benefits.
7. When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in
question, and even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is
raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first
ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly
possible by which the question may be avoided (citations
omitted).
The foregoing "pillars" of limitation of judicial review,
summarized in Ashwander v. TVA from different decisions
of the United States Supreme Court, can be encapsulated
into the following categories:
1. that there be absolute necessity of deciding a case
2. that rules of constitutional law shall be formulated only
as required by the facts of the case
3. that judgment may not be sustained on some other
ground
4. that there be actual injury sustained by the party by
reason of the operation of the statute
5. that the parties are not in estoppel
6. that the Court upholds the presumption of
constitutionality.
As stated previously, parallel guidelines have been adopted
by this Court in the exercise of judicial review:
1. actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of
judicial power
2. the person challenging the act must have "standing" to
challenge; he must have a personal and substantial interest
in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain,
direct injury as a result of its enforcement
3. the question of constitutionality must be raised at the
earliest possible opportunity
4. the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota
of the case.136
Respondents Speaker de Venecia, et. al. raise another
argument for judicial restraint the possibility that "judicial
review of impeachments might also lead to embarrassing
conflicts between the Congress and the [J]udiciary." They
stress the need to avoid the appearance of impropriety or
conflicts of interest in judicial hearings, and the scenario
that it would be confusing and humiliating and risk serious
political instability at home and abroad if the judiciary
countermanded the vote of Congress to remove an
impeachable official.137 Intervenor Soriano echoes this
argument by alleging that failure of this Court to enforce
its Resolution against Congress would result in the
diminution of its judicial authority and erode public
confidence and faith in the judiciary.
Such an argument, however, is specious, to say the least.
As correctly stated by the Solicitor General, the possibility
of the occurrence of a constitutional crisis is not a reason
for this Court to refrain from upholding the Constitution in
all impeachment cases. Justices cannot abandon their
constitutional duties just because their action may start, if
not precipitate, a crisis.
Justice Feliciano warned against the dangers when this
Court refuses to act.
x x x Frequently, the fight over a controversial legislative or
executive act is not regarded as settled until the Supreme
Court has passed upon the constitutionality of the act
involved, the judgment has not only juridical effects but
also political consequences. Those political consequences
may follow even where the Court fails to grant the
petitioner's prayer to nullify an act for lack of the
necessary number of votes. Frequently, failure to act
explicitly, one way or the other, itself constitutes a decision
for the respondent and validation, or at least quasi-
validation, follows." 138
Thus, in Javellana v. Executive Secretary139 where this
Court was split and "in the end there were not enough
votes either to grant the petitions, or to sustain
respondent's claims,"140 the pre-existing constitutional
order was disrupted which paved the way for the
establishment of the martial law regime.
Such an argument by respondents and intervenor also
presumes that the coordinate branches of the government
would behave in a lawless manner and not do their duty
under the law to uphold the Constitution and obey the
laws of the land. Yet there is no reason to believe that any
of the branches of government will behave in a precipitate
manner and risk social upheaval, violence, chaos and
anarchy by encouraging disrespect for the fundamental law
of the land.
Substituting the word public officers for judges, this Court
is well guided by the doctrine in People v. Veneracion, to
wit:141
Obedience to the rule of law forms the bedrock of our
system of justice. If [public officers], under the guise of
religious or political beliefs were allowed to roam
unrestricted beyond boundaries within which they are
required by law to exercise the duties of their office, then
law becomes meaningless. A government of laws, not of
men excludes the exercise of broad discretionary powers
by those acting under its authority. Under this system,
[public officers] are guided by the Rule of Law, and ought
"to protect and enforce it without fear or favor," resist
encroachments by governments, political parties, or even
the interference of their own personal beliefs.142
Constitutionality of the Rules of Procedure
for Impeachment Proceedings
adopted by the 12th Congress
Respondent House of Representatives, through Speaker De
Venecia, argues that Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the
House Impeachment Rules do not violate Section 3 (5) of
Article XI of our present Constitution, contending that the
term "initiate" does not mean "to file;" that Section 3 (1) is
clear in that it is the House of Representatives, as a
collective body, which has the exclusive power to initiate
all cases of impeachment; that initiate could not possibly
mean "to file" because filing can, as Section 3 (2), Article XI
of the Constitution provides, only be accomplished in 3
ways, to wit: (1) by a verified complaint for impeachment
by any member of the House of Representatives; or (2) by
any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any
member; or (3) by at least 1/3 of all the members of the
House. Respondent House of Representatives concludes
that the one year bar prohibiting the initiation of
impeachment proceedings against the same officials could
not have been violated as the impeachment complaint
against Chief Justice Davide and seven Associate Justices
had not been initiated as the House of Representatives,
acting as the collective body, has yet to act on it.
The resolution of this issue thus hinges on the
interpretation of the term "initiate." Resort to statutory
construction is, therefore, in order.
That the sponsor of the provision of Section 3(5) of the
Constitution, Commissioner Florenz Regalado, who
eventually became an Associate Justice of this Court,
agreed on the meaning of "initiate" as "to file," as
proffered and explained by Constitutional Commissioner
Maambong during the Constitutional Commission
proceedings, which he (Commissioner Regalado) as amicus
curiae affirmed during the oral arguments on the instant
petitions held on November 5, 2003 at which he added
that the act of "initiating" included the act of taking initial
action on the complaint, dissipates any doubt that indeed
the word "initiate" as it twice appears in Article XI (3) and
(5) of the Constitution means to file the complaint and take
initial action on it.
"Initiate" of course is understood by ordinary men to
mean, as dictionaries do, to begin, to commence, or set
going. As Webster's Third New International Dictionary of
the English Language concisely puts it, it means "to
perform or facilitate the first action," which jibes with
Justice Regalado's position, and that of Father Bernas, who
elucidated during the oral arguments of the instant
petitions on November 5, 2003 in this wise:
Briefly then, an impeachment proceeding is not a single
act. It is a comlexus of acts consisting of a beginning, a
middle and an end. The end is the transmittal of the
articles of impeachment to the Senate. The middle consists
of those deliberative moments leading to the formulation
of the articles of impeachment. The beginning or the
initiation is the filing of the complaint and its referral to the
Committee on Justice.
Finally, it should be noted that the House Rule relied upon
by Representatives Cojuangco and Fuentebella says that
impeachment is "deemed initiated" when the Justice
Committee votes in favor of impeachment or when the
House reverses a contrary vote of the Committee. Note
that the Rule does not say "impeachment proceedings" are
initiated but rather are "deemed initiated." The language is
recognition that initiation happened earlier, but by legal
fiction there is an attempt to postpone it to a time after
actual initiation. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
As stated earlier, one of the means of interpreting the
Constitution is looking into the intent of the law.
Fortunately, the intent of the framers of the 1987
Constitution can be pried from its records:
MR. MAAMBONG. With reference to Section 3, regarding
the procedure and the substantive provisions on
impeachment, I understand there have been many
proposals and, I think, these would need some time for
Committee action.
However, I would just like to indicate that I submitted to
the Committee a resolution on impeachment proceedings,
copies of which have been furnished the Members of this
body. This is borne out of my experience as a member of
the Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good
Government which took charge of the last impeachment
resolution filed before the First Batasang Pambansa. For
the information of the Committee, the resolution covers
several steps in the impeachment proceedings starting
with initiation, action of the Speaker committee action,
calendaring of report, voting on the report, transmittal
referral to the Senate, trial and judgment by the Senate.
xxx
MR. MAAMBONG. Mr. Presiding Officer, I am not moving
for a reconsideration of the approval of the amendment
submitted by Commissioner Regalado, but I will just make
of record my thinking that we do not really initiate the
filing of the Articles of Impeachment on the floor. The
procedure, as I have pointed out earlier, was that the
initiation starts with the filing of the complaint. And what
is actually done on the floor is that the committee
resolution containing the Articles of Impeachment is the
one approved by the body.
As the phraseology now runs, which may be corrected by
the Committee on Style, it appears that the initiation starts
on the floor. If we only have time, I could cite examples in
the case of the impeachment proceedings of President
Richard Nixon wherein the Committee on the Judiciary
submitted the recommendation, the resolution, and the
Articles of Impeachment to the body, and it was the body
who approved the resolution. It is not the body which
initiates it. It only approves or disapproves the resolution.
So, on that score, probably the Committee on Style could
help in rearranging these words because we have to be
very technical about this. I have been bringing with me The
Rules of the House of Representatives of the U.S. Congress.
The Senate Rules are with me. The proceedings on the
case of Richard Nixon are with me. I have submitted my
proposal, but the Committee has already decided.
Nevertheless, I just want to indicate this on record.
xxx
MR. MAAMBONG. I would just like to move for a
reconsideration of the approval of Section 3 (3). My
reconsideration will not at all affect the substance, but it is
only in keeping with the exact formulation of the Rules of
the House of Representatives of the United States
regarding impeachment.
I am proposing, Madam President, without doing damage
to any of this provision, that on page 2, Section 3 (3), from
lines 17 to 18, we delete the words which read: "to initiate
impeachment proceedings" and the comma (,) and insert
on line 19 after the word "resolution" the phrase WITH
THE ARTICLES, and then capitalize the letter "i" in
"impeachment" and replace the word "by" with OF, so that
the whole section will now read: "A vote of at least one-
third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary
either to affirm a resolution WITH THE ARTICLES of
Impeachment OF the Committee or to override its contrary
resolution. The vote of each Member shall be recorded."
I already mentioned earlier yesterday that the initiation, as
far as the House of Representatives of the United States is
concerned, really starts from the filing of the verified
complaint and every resolution to impeach always carries
with it the Articles of Impeachment. As a matter of fact,
the words "Articles of Impeachment" are mentioned on
line 25 in the case of the direct filing of a verified
compliant of one-third of all the Members of the House. I
will mention again, Madam President, that my amendment
will not vary the substance in any way. It is only in keeping
with the uniform procedure of the House of
Representatives of the United States Congress. Thank you,
Madam President.143 (Italics in the original; emphasis and
udnerscoring supplied)
This amendment proposed by Commissioner Maambong
was clarified and accepted by the Committee on the
Accountability of Public Officers.144
It is thus clear that the framers intended "initiation" to
start with the filing of the complaint. In his amicus curiae
brief, Commissioner Maambong explained that "the
obvious reason in deleting the phrase "to initiate
impeachment proceedings" as contained in the text of the
provision of Section 3 (3) was to settle and make it
understood once and for all that the initiation of
impeachment proceedings starts with the filing of the
complaint, and the vote of one-third of the House in a
resolution of impeachment does not initiate the
impeachment proceedings which was already initiated by
the filing of a verified complaint under Section 3,
paragraph (2), Article XI of the Constitution."145
Amicus curiae Constitutional Commissioner Regalado is of
the same view as is Father Bernas, who was also a member
of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, that the word
"initiate" as used in Article XI, Section 3(5) means to file,
both adding, however, that the filing must be accompanied
by an action to set the complaint moving.
During the oral arguments before this Court, Father Bernas
clarified that the word "initiate," appearing in the
constitutional provision on impeachment, viz:
Section 3 (1) The House of Representatives shall have the
exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment.
xxx
(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against
the same official more than once within a period of one
year, (Emphasis supplied)
refers to two objects, "impeachment case" and
"impeachment proceeding."
Father Bernas explains that in these two provisions, the
common verb is "to initiate." The object in the first
sentence is "impeachment case." The object in the second
sentence is "impeachment proceeding." Following the
principle of reddendo singuala sinuilis, the term "cases"
must be distinguished from the term "proceedings." An
impeachment case is the legal controversy that must be
decided by the Senate. Above-quoted first provision
provides that the House, by a vote of one-third of all its
members, can bring a case to the Senate. It is in that sense
that the House has "exclusive power" to initiate all cases of
impeachment. No other body can do it. However, before a
decision is made to initiate a case in the Senate, a
"proceeding" must be followed to arrive at a conclusion. A
proceeding must be "initiated." To initiate, which comes
from the Latin word initium, means to begin. On the other
hand, proceeding is a progressive noun. It has a beginning,
a middle, and an end. It takes place not in the Senate but
in the House and consists of several steps: (1) there is the
filing of a verified complaint either by a Member of the
House of Representatives or by a private citizen endorsed
by a Member of the House of the Representatives; (2)
there is the processing of this complaint by the proper
Committee which may either reject the complaint or
uphold it; (3) whether the resolution of the Committee
rejects or upholds the complaint, the resolution must be
forwarded to the House for further processing; and (4)
there is the processing of the same complaint by the
House of Representatives which either affirms a favorable
resolution of the Committee or overrides a contrary
resolution by a vote of one-third of all the members. If at
least one third of all the Members upholds the complaint,
Articles of Impeachment are prepared and transmitted to
the Senate. It is at this point that the House "initiates an
impeachment case." It is at this point that an impeachable
public official is successfully impeached. That is, he or she
is successfully charged with an impeachment "case" before
the Senate as impeachment court.
Father Bernas further explains: The "impeachment
proceeding" is not initiated when the complaint is
transmitted to the Senate for trial because that is the end
of the House proceeding and the beginning of another
proceeding, namely the trial. Neither is the "impeachment
proceeding" initiated when the House deliberates on the
resolution passed on to it by the Committee, because
something prior to that has already been done. The action
of the House is already a further step in the proceeding,
not its initiation or beginning. Rather, the proceeding is
initiated or begins, when a verified complaint is filed and
referred to the Committee on Justice for action. This is the
initiating step which triggers the series of steps that follow.
The framers of the Constitution also understood initiation
in its ordinary meaning. Thus when a proposal reached the
floor proposing that "A vote of at least one-third of all the
Members of the House shall be necessary… to initiate
impeachment proceedings," this was met by a proposal to
delete the line on the ground that the vote of the House
does not initiate impeachment proceeding but rather the
filing of a complaint does.146 Thus the line was deleted
and is not found in the present Constitution.
Father Bernas concludes that when Section 3 (5) says, "No
impeachment proceeding shall be initiated against the
same official more than once within a period of one year,"
it means that no second verified complaint may be
accepted and referred to the Committee on Justice for
action. By his explanation, this interpretation is founded on
the common understanding of the meaning of "to initiate"
which means to begin. He reminds that the Constitution is
ratified by the people, both ordinary and sophisticated, as
they understand it; and that ordinary people read ordinary
meaning into ordinary words and not abstruse meaning,
they ratify words as they understand it and not as
sophisticated lawyers confuse it.
To the argument that only the House of Representatives as
a body can initiate impeachment proceedings because
Section 3 (1) says "The House of Representatives shall have
the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment,"
This is a misreading of said provision and is contrary to the
principle of reddendo singula singulis by equating
"impeachment cases" with "impeachment proceeding."
From the records of the Constitutional Commission, to the
amicus curiae briefs of two former Constitutional
Commissioners, it is without a doubt that the term "to
initiate" refers to the filing of the impeachment complaint
coupled with Congress' taking initial action of said
complaint.
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act
of filing and referral or endorsement of the impeachment
complaint to the House Committee on Justice or, by the
filing by at least one-third of the members of the House of
Representatives with the Secretary General of the House,
the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear.
Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated,
another impeachment complaint may not be filed against
the same official within a one year period.
Under Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House
Impeachment Rules, impeachment proceedings are
deemed initiated (1) if there is a finding by the House
Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or
resolution is sufficient in substance, or (2) once the House
itself affirms or overturns the finding of the Committee on
Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is not
sufficient in substance or (3) by the filing or endorsement
before the Secretary-General of the House of
Representatives of a verified complaint or a resolution of
impeachment by at least 1/3 of the members of the House.
These rules clearly contravene Section 3 (5) of Article XI
since the rules give the term "initiate" a meaning different
meaning from filing and referral.
In his amicus curiae brief, Justice Hugo Gutierrez posits
that this Court could not use contemporaneous
construction as an aid in the interpretation of Sec.3 (5) of
Article XI, citing Vera v. Avelino147 wherein this Court
stated that "their personal opinions (referring to Justices
who were delegates to the Constitution Convention) on
the matter at issue expressed during this Court's our
deliberations stand on a different footing from the properly
recorded utterances of debates and proceedings." Further
citing said case, he states that this Court likened the former
members of the Constitutional Convention to actors who
are so absorbed in their emotional roles that intelligent
spectators may know more about the real meaning
because of the latter's balanced perspectives and
disinterestedness.148
Justice Gutierrez's statements have no application in the
present petitions. There are at present only two members
of this Court who participated in the 1986 Constitutional
Commission – Chief Justice Davide and Justice Adolf
Azcuna. Chief Justice Davide has not taken part in these
proceedings for obvious reasons. Moreover, this Court has
not simply relied on the personal opinions now given by
members of the Constitutional Commission, but has
examined the records of the deliberations and proceedings
thereof.
Respondent House of Representatives counters that under
Section 3 (8) of Article XI, it is clear and unequivocal that it
and only it has the power to make and interpret its rules
governing impeachment. Its argument is premised on the
assumption that Congress has absolute power to
promulgate its rules. This assumption, however, is
misplaced.
Section 3 (8) of Article XI provides that "The Congress shall
promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry
out the purpose of this section." Clearly, its power to
promulgate its rules on impeachment is limited by the
phrase "to effectively carry out the purpose of this
section." Hence, these rules cannot contravene the very
purpose of the Constitution which said rules were
intended to effectively carry out. Moreover, Section 3 of
Article XI clearly provides for other specific limitations on
its power to make rules, viz:
Section 3. (1) x x x
(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by
any Member of the House of Representatives or by any
citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member
thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business
within ten session days, and referred to the proper
Committee within three session days thereafter. The
Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its
Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty
session days from such referral, together with the
corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be
calendared for consideration by the House within ten
session days from receipt thereof.
(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the
House shall be necessary to either affirm a favorable
resolution with the Articles of Impeachment of the
Committee, or override its contrary resolution. The vote of
each Member shall be recorded.
(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of
impeachment is filed by at least one-third of all the
Members of the House, the same shall constitute the
Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall
forthwith proceed.
(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against
the same official more than once within a period of one
year.
It is basic that all rules must not contravene the
Constitution which is the fundamental law. If as alleged
Congress had absolute rule making power, then it would by
necessary implication have the power to alter or amend
the meaning of the Constitution without need of
referendum.
In Osmeña v. Pendatun,149 this Court held that it is within
the province of either House of Congress to interpret its
rules and that it was the best judge of what constituted
"disorderly behavior" of its members. However, in Paceta v.
Secretary of the Commission on Appointments,150 Justice
(later Chief Justice) Enrique Fernando, speaking for this
Court and quoting Justice Brandeis in United States v.
Smith,151 declared that where the construction to be
given to a rule affects persons other than members of the
Legislature, the question becomes judicial in nature. In
Arroyo v. De Venecia,152 quoting United States v. Ballin,
Joseph & Co.,153 Justice Vicente Mendoza, speaking for
this Court, held that while the Constitution empowers each
house to determine its rules of proceedings, it may not by
its rules ignore constitutional restraints or violate
fundamental rights, and further that there should be a
reasonable relation between the mode or method of
proceeding established by the rule and the result which is
sought to be attained. It is only within these limitations
that all matters of method are open to the determination
of the Legislature. In the same case of Arroyo v. De
Venecia, Justice Reynato S. Puno, in his Concurring and
Dissenting Opinion, was even more emphatic as he
stressed that in the Philippine setting there is even more
reason for courts to inquire into the validity of the Rules of
Congress, viz:
With due respect, I do not agree that the issues posed by
the petitioner are non-justiciable. Nor do I agree that we
will trivialize the principle of separation of power if we
assume jurisdiction over he case at bar. Even in the United
States, the principle of separation of power is no longer an
impregnable impediment against the interposition of
judicial power on cases involving breach of rules of
procedure by legislators.
Rightly, the ponencia uses the 1891 case of US v Ballin (144
US 1) as a window to view the issues before the Court. It is
in Ballin where the US Supreme Court first defined the
boundaries of the power of the judiciary to review
congressional rules. It held:
"x x x
"The Constitution, in the same section, provides, that each
house may determine the rules of its proceedings." It
appears that in pursuance of this authority the House had,
prior to that day, passed this as one of its rules:
Rule XV
3. On the demand of any member, or at the suggestion of
the Speaker, the names of members sufficient to make a
quorum in the hall of the House who do not vote shall be
noted by the clerk and recorded in the journal, and
reported to the Speaker with the names of the members
voting, and be counted and announced in determining the
presence of a quorum to do business. (House Journal, 230,
Feb. 14, 1890)
The action taken was in direct compliance with this rule.
The question, therefore, is as to the validity of this rule,
and not what methods the Speaker may of his own motion
resort to for determining the presence of a quorum, nor
what matters the Speaker or clerk may of their own
volition place upon the journal. Neither do the advantages
or disadvantages, the wisdom or folly, of such a rule
present any matters for judicial consideration. With the
courts the question is only one of power. The Constitution
empowers each house to determine its rules of
proceedings. It may not by its rules ignore constitutional
restraints or violate fundamental rights, and there should
be a reasonable relation between the mode or method of
proceedings established by the rule and the result which is
sought to be attained. But within these limitations all
matters of method are open to the determination of the
House, and it is no impeachment of the rule to say that
some other way would be better, more accurate, or even
more just. It is no objection to the validity of a rule that a
different one has been prescribed and in force for a length
of time. The power to make rules is not one which once
exercised is exhausted. It is a continuous power, always
subject to be exercised by the House, and within the
limitations suggested, absolute and beyond the challenge
of any other body or tribunal."
Ballin, clearly confirmed the jurisdiction of courts to pass
upon the validity of congressional rules, i.e, whether they
are constitutional. Rule XV was examined by the Court and
it was found to satisfy the test: (1) that it did not ignore
any constitutional restraint; (2) it did not violate any
fundamental right; and (3) its method had a reasonable
relationship with the result sought to be attained. By
examining Rule XV, the Court did not allow its jurisdiction
to be defeated by the mere invocation of the principle of
separation of powers.154
xxx
In the Philippine setting, there is a more compelling reason
for courts to categorically reject the political question
defense when its interposition will cover up abuse of
power. For section 1, Article VIII of our Constitution was
intentionally cobbled to empower courts "x x x to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
government." This power is new and was not granted to
our courts in the 1935 and 1972 Constitutions. It was not
also xeroxed from the US Constitution or any foreign state
constitution. The CONCOM granted this enormous power
to our courts in view of our experience under martial law
where abusive exercises of state power were shielded from
judicial scrutiny by the misuse of the political question
doctrine. Led by the eminent former Chief Justice Roberto
Concepcion, the CONCOM expanded and sharpened the
checking powers of the judiciary vis-à-vis the Executive and
the Legislative departments of government.155
xxx
The Constitution cannot be any clearer. What it granted to
this Court is not a mere power which it can decline to
exercise. Precisely to deter this disinclination, the
Constitution imposed it as a duty of this Court to strike
down any act of a branch or instrumentality of government
or any of its officials done with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Rightly or
wrongly, the Constitution has elongated the checking
powers of this Court against the other branches of
government despite their more democratic character, the
President and the legislators being elected by the
people.156
xxx
The provision defining judicial power as including the 'duty
of the courts of justice. . . to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government' constitutes the
capstone of the efforts of the Constitutional Commission to
upgrade the powers of this court vis-à-vis the other
branches of government. This provision was dictated by
our experience under martial law which taught us that a
stronger and more independent judiciary is needed to
abort abuses in government. x x x
xxx
In sum, I submit that in imposing to this Court the duty to
annul acts of government committed with grave abuse of
discretion, the new Constitution transformed this Court
from passivity to activism. This transformation, dictated by
our distinct experience as nation, is not merely
evolutionary but revolutionary. Under the 1935 and the
1973 Constitutions, this Court approached constitutional
violations by initially determining what it cannot do; under
the 1987 Constitution, there is a shift in stress – this Court
is mandated to approach constitutional violations not by
finding out what it should not do but what it must do. The
Court must discharge this solemn duty by not resuscitating
a past that petrifies the present.
I urge my brethren in the Court to give due and serious
consideration to this new constitutional provision as the
case at bar once more calls us to define the parameters of
our power to review violations of the rules of the House.
We will not be true to our trust as the last bulwark against
government abuses if we refuse to exercise this new power
or if we wield it with timidity. To be sure, it is this
exceeding timidity to unsheathe the judicial sword that has
increasingly emboldened other branches of government to
denigrate, if not defy, orders of our courts. In Tolentino, I
endorsed the view of former Senator Salonga that this
novel provision stretching the latitude of judicial power is
distinctly Filipino and its interpretation should not be
depreciated by undue reliance on inapplicable foreign
jurisprudence. In resolving the case at bar, the lessons of
our own history should provide us the light and not the
experience of foreigners.157 (Italics in the original
emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Thus, the ruling in Osmena v. Pendatun is not applicable to
the instant petitions. Here, the third parties alleging the
violation of private rights and the Constitution are
involved.
Neither may respondent House of Representatives' rely on
Nixon v. US158 as basis for arguing that this Court may not
decide on the constitutionality of Sections 16 and 17 of the
House Impeachment Rules. As already observed, the U.S.
Federal Constitution simply provides that "the House of
Representatives shall have the sole power of
impeachment." It adds nothing more. It gives no clue
whatsoever as to how this "sole power" is to be exercised.
No limitation whatsoever is given. Thus, the US Supreme
Court concluded that there was a textually demonstrable
constitutional commitment of a constitutional power to
the House of Representatives. This reasoning does not hold
with regard to impeachment power of the Philippine
House of Representatives since our Constitution, as earlier
enumerated, furnishes several provisions articulating how
that "exclusive power" is to be exercised.
The provisions of Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the
House Impeachment Rules which state that impeachment
proceedings are deemed initiated (1) if there is a finding by
the House Committee on Justice that the verified
complaint and/or resolution is sufficient in substance, or
(2) once the House itself affirms or overturns the finding of
the Committee on Justice that the verified complaint
and/or resolution is not sufficient in substance or (3) by the
filing or endorsement before the Secretary-General of the
House of Representatives of a verified complaint or a
resolution of impeachment by at least 1/3 of the members
of the House thus clearly contravene Section 3 (5) of
Article XI as they give the term "initiate" a meaning
different from "filing."
Validity of the Second Impeachment Complaint
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act
of filing of the impeachment complaint and referral to the
House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken
thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes
clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated
in the foregoing manner, another may not be filed against
the same official within a one year period following Article
XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution.
In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint,
was filed by former President Estrada against Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices of
this Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House
Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second
impeachment complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto
C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella against the
Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the
constitutional prohibition against the initiation of
impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable
officer within a one-year period.
Conclusion
If there is anything constant about this country, it is that
there is always a phenomenon that takes the center stage
of our individual and collective consciousness as a people
with our characteristic flair for human drama, conflict or
tragedy. Of course this is not to demean the seriousness of
the controversy over the Davide impeachment. For many
of us, the past two weeks have proven to be an
exasperating, mentally and emotionally exhausting
experience. Both sides have fought bitterly a dialectical
struggle to articulate what they respectively believe to be
the correct position or view on the issues involved.
Passions had ran high as demonstrators, whether for or
against the impeachment of the Chief Justice, took to the
streets armed with their familiar slogans and chants to air
their voice on the matter. Various sectors of society - from
the business, retired military, to the academe and
denominations of faith – offered suggestions for a return
to a state of normalcy in the official relations of the
governmental branches affected to obviate any perceived
resulting instability upon areas of national life.
Through all these and as early as the time when the
Articles of Impeachment had been constituted, this Court
was specifically asked, told, urged and argued to take no
action of any kind and form with respect to the
prosecution by the House of Representatives of the
impeachment complaint against the subject respondent
public official. When the present petitions were knocking
so to speak at the doorsteps of this Court, the same clamor
for non-interference was made through what are now the
arguments of "lack of jurisdiction," "non-justiciability," and
"judicial self-restraint" aimed at halting the Court from any
move that may have a bearing on the impeachment
proceedings.
This Court did not heed the call to adopt a hands-off stance
as far as the question of the constitutionality of initiating
the impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Davide is
concerned. To reiterate what has been already explained,
the Court found the existence in full of all the requisite
conditions for its exercise of its constitutionally vested
power and duty of judicial review over an issue whose
resolution precisely called for the construction or
interpretation of a provision of the fundamental law of the
land. What lies in here is an issue of a genuine
constitutional material which only this Court can properly
and competently address and adjudicate in accordance
with the clear-cut allocation of powers under our system of
government. Face-to-face thus with a matter or problem
that squarely falls under the Court's jurisdiction, no other
course of action can be had but for it to pass upon that
problem head on.
The claim, therefore, that this Court by judicially entangling
itself with the process of impeachment has effectively set
up a regime of judicial supremacy, is patently without basis
in fact and in law.
This Court in the present petitions subjected to judicial
scrutiny and resolved on the merits only the main issue of
whether the impeachment proceedings initiated against
the Chief Justice transgressed the constitutionally imposed
one-year time bar rule. Beyond this, it did not go about
assuming jurisdiction where it had none, nor
indiscriminately turn justiciable issues out of decidedly
political questions. Because it is not at all the business of
this Court to assert judicial dominance over the other two
great branches of the government. Rather, the raison
d'etre of the judiciary is to complement the discharge by
the executive and legislative of their own powers to bring
about ultimately the beneficent effects of having founded
and ordered our society upon the rule of law.
It is suggested that by our taking cognizance of the issue of
constitutionality of the impeachment proceedings against
the Chief Justice, the members of this Court have actually
closed ranks to protect a brethren. That the members'
interests in ruling on said issue is as much at stake as is
that of the Chief Justice. Nothing could be farther from the
truth.
The institution that is the Supreme Court together with all
other courts has long held and been entrusted with the
judicial power to resolve conflicting legal rights regardless
of the personalities involved in the suits or actions. This
Court has dispensed justice over the course of time,
unaffected by whomsoever stood to benefit or suffer
therefrom, unfraid by whatever imputations or
speculations could be made to it, so long as it rendered
judgment according to the law and the facts. Why can it
not now be trusted to wield judicial power in these
petitions just because it is the highest ranking magistrate
who is involved when it is an incontrovertible fact that the
fundamental issue is not him but the validity of a
government branch's official act as tested by the limits set
by the Constitution? Of course, there are rules on the
inhibition of any member of the judiciary from taking part
in a case in specified instances. But to disqualify this entire
institution now from the suit at bar is to regard the
Supreme Court as likely incapable of impartiality when one
of its members is a party to a case, which is simply a non
sequitur.
No one is above the law or the Constitution. This is a basic
precept in any legal system which recognizes equality of all
men before the law as essential to the law's moral
authority and that of its agents to secure respect for and
obedience to its commands. Perhaps, there is no other
government branch or instrumentality that is most zealous
in protecting that principle of legal equality other than the
Supreme Court which has discerned its real meaning and
ramifications through its application to numerous cases
especially of the high-profile kind in the annals of
jurisprudence. The Chief Justice is not above the law and
neither is any other member of this Court. But just because
he is the Chief Justice does not imply that he gets to have
less in law than anybody else. The law is solicitous of every
individual's rights irrespective of his station in life.
The Filipino nation and its democratic institutions have no
doubt been put to test once again by this impeachment
case against Chief Justice Hilario Davide. Accordingly, this
Court has resorted to no other than the Constitution in
search for a solution to what many feared would ripen to a
crisis in government. But though it is indeed immensely a
blessing for this Court to have found answers in our
bedrock of legal principles, it is equally important that it
went through this crucible of a democratic process, if only
to discover that it can resolve differences without the use
of force and aggression upon each other.
WHEREFORE, Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of
Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings which were
approved by the House of Representatives on November
28, 2001 are unconstitutional. Consequently, the second
impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide, Jr. which was filed by Representatives Gilberto C.
Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella with the Office
of the Secretary General of the House of Representatives
on October 23, 2003 is barred under paragraph 5, section 3
of Article XI of the Constitution.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 83896 February 22, 1991
CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, petitioner,
vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, respondent.
G.R. No. 83815 February 22, 1991
ANTI-GRAFT LEAGUE OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. and
CRISPIN T. REYES, petitioners,
vs.
PHILIP ELLA C. JUICO, as Secretary of Agrarian Reform;
CARLOS DOMINGUEZ, as Secretary of Agriculture;
LOURDES QUISUMBING, as Secretary of Education,
Culture and Sports; FULGENCIO FACTORAN, JR., as
Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources;
VICENTE V. JAYME, as Secretary of Finance; SEDFREY
ORDOÑEZ, as Secretary of Justice; FRANKLIN N. DRILON,
as Secretary of Labor and Employment; LUIS SANTOS, as
Secretary of Local Government; FIDEL V. RAMOS, as
Secretary of National Defense; TEODORO F. BENIGNO, as
Press Secretary; JUANITO FERRER, as Secretary of Public
Works and Highways; ANTONIO ARRIZABAL, as Secretary
of Science and Technology; JOSE CONCEPCION, as
Secretary of Trade and Industry; JOSE ANTONIO
GONZALEZ, as Secretary of Tourism; ALFREDO R.A.
BENGZON, as Secretary of Health; REINERIO D. REYES, as
Secretary of Transportation and Communication;
GUILLERMO CARAGUE, as Commissioner of the Budget;
and SOLITA MONSOD, as Head of the National Economic
Development Authority, respondents.
Ignacio P. Lacsina, Luis R. Mauricio, Antonio R. Quintos and
Juan T. David for petitioners in 83896.
Antonio P. Coronel for petitioners in 83815.
FERNAN, C.J.:p
These two (2) petitions were consolidated per resolution
dated August 9, 19881 and are being resolved jointly as
both seek a declaration of the unconstitutionality of
Executive Order No. 284 issued by President Corazon C.
Aquino on July 25, 1987. The pertinent provisions of the
assailed Executive Order are:
Sec. 1. Even if allowed by law or by the ordinary
functions of his position, a member of the Cabinet,
undersecretary or assistant secretary or other appointive
officials of the Executive Department may, in addition to
his primary position, hold not more than two positions in
the government and government corporations and receive
the corresponding compensation therefor; Provided, that
this limitation shall not apply to ad hoc bodies or
committees, or to boards, councils or bodies of which the
President is the Chairman.
Sec. 2. If a member of the cabinet, undersecretary or
assistant secretary or other appointive official of the
Executive Department holds more positions than what is
allowed in Section 1 hereof, they (sic) must relinquish the
excess position in favor of the subordinate official who is
next in rank, but in no case shall any official hold more
than two positions other than his primary position.
Sec. 3. In order to fully protect the interest of the
government in government-owned or controlled
corporations, at least one-third (1/3) of the members of
the boards of such corporation should either be a
secretary, or undersecretary, or assistant secretary.
Petitioners maintain that this Executive Order which, in
effect, allows members of the Cabinet, their
undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other
government offices or positions in addition to their
primary positions, albeit subject to the limitation therein
imposed, runs counter to Section 13, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution,2 which provides as follows:
Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of
the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not,
unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any
other office or employment during their tenure. They shall
not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly practice any
other profession, participate in any business, or be
financially interested in any contract with, or in any
franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government
or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof,
including government-owned or controlled corporations or
their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of
interest in the conduct of their office.
It is alleged that the above-quoted Section 13, Article VII
prohibits public respondents, as members of the Cabinet,
along with the other public officials enumerated in the list
attached to the petitions as Annex "C" in G.R. No.
838153 and as Annex "B" in G.R. No. 838964 from holding
any other office or employment during their tenure. In
addition to seeking a declaration of the unconstitutionality
of Executive Order No. 284, petitioner Anti-Graft League of
the Philippines further seeks in G.R. No. 83815 the
issuance of the extraordinary writs of prohibition and
mandamus, as well as a temporary restraining order
directing public respondents therein to cease and desist
from holding, in addition to their primary positions, dual or
multiple positions other than those authorized by the 1987
Constitution and from receiving any salaries, allowances,
per diems and other forms of privileges and the like
appurtenant to their questioned positions, and compelling
public respondents to return, reimburse or refund any and
all amounts or benefits that they may have received from
such positions.
Specifically, petitioner Anti-Graft League of the Philippines
charges that notwithstanding the aforequoted "absolute
and self-executing" provision of the 1987 Constitution,
then Secretary of Justice Sedfrey Ordoñez, construing
Section 13, Article VII in relation to Section 7, par. (2),
Article IX-B, rendered on July 23, 1987 Opinion No. 73,
series of 1987,5 declaring that Cabinet members, their
deputies (undersecretaries) and assistant secretaries may
hold other public office, including membership in the
boards of government corporations: (a) when directly
provided for in the Constitution as in the case of the
Secretary of Justice who is made an ex-officio member of
the Judicial and Bar Council under Section 8, paragraph 1,
Article VIII; or (b) if allowed by law; or (c) if allowed by the
primary functions of their respective positions; and that on
the basis of this Opinion, the President of the Philippines,
on July 25, 1987 or two (2) days before Congress convened
on July 27, 1987: promulgated Executive Order No. 284.6
Petitioner Anti-Graft League of the Philippines objects to
both DOJ Opinion No. 73 and Executive Order No. 284 as
they allegedly "lumped together" Section 13, Article VII
and the general provision in another article, Section 7, par.
(2), Article I-XB. This "strained linkage" between the two
provisions, each addressed to a distinct and separate group
of public officers –– one, the President and her official
family, and the other, public servants in general ––
allegedly "abolished the clearly separate, higher, exclusive,
and mandatory constitutional rank assigned to the
prohibition against multiple jobs for the President, the
Vice-President, the members of the Cabinet, and their
deputies and subalterns, who are the leaders of
government expected to lead by example."7 Article IX-B,
Section 7, par. (2)8 provides:
Sec. 7. .....
Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary
functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold
any other office or employment in the government or any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries.
The Solicitor General counters that Department of Justice
DOJ Opinion No. 73, series of 1987, as further elucidated
and clarified by DOJ Opinion No. 129, series of 19879 and
DOJ Opinion No. 155, series of 1988,10 being the first
official construction and interpretation by the Secretary of
Justice of Section 13, Article VII and par. (2) of Section 7,
Article I-XB of the Constitution, involving the same subject
of appointments or designations of an appointive
executive official to positions other than his primary
position, is "reasonably valid and constitutionally firm,"
and that Executive Order No. 284, promulgated pursuant
to DOJ Opinion No. 73, series of 1987 is consequently
constitutional. It is worth noting that DOJ Opinion No. 129,
series of 1987 and DOJ Opinion No. 155, series of 1988
construed the limitation imposed by E.O. No. 284 as not
applying to ex-officio positions or to positions which,
although not so designated as ex-officio are allowed by the
primary functions of the public official, but only to the
holding of multiple positions which are not related to or
necessarily included in the position of the public official
concerned (disparate positions).
In sum, the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 284 is
being challenged by petitioners on the principal
submission that it adds exceptions to Section 13, Article VII
other than those provided in the Constitution. According to
petitioners, by virtue of the phrase "unless otherwise
provided in this Constitution," the only exceptions against
holding any other office or employment in Government are
those provided in the Constitution, namely: (1) The Vice-
President may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet
under Section 3, par. (2), Article VII thereof; and (2) the
Secretary of Justice is an ex-officio member of the Judicial
and Bar Council by virtue of Section 8 (1), Article VIII.
Petitioners further argue that the exception to the
prohibition in Section 7, par. (2), Article I-XB on the Civil
Service Commission applies to officers and employees of
the Civil Service in general and that said exceptions do not
apply and cannot be extended to Section 13, Article VII
which applies specifically to the President, Vice-President,
Members of the Cabinet and their deputies or assistants.

There is no dispute that the prohibition against the
President, Vice-President, the members of the Cabinet and
their deputies or assistants from holding dual or multiple
positions in the Government admits of certain exceptions.
The disagreement between petitioners and public
respondents lies on the constitutional basis of the
exception. Petitioners insist that because of the phrase
"unless otherwise provided in this Constitution" used in
Section 13 of Article VII, the exception must be expressly
provided in the Constitution, as in the case of the Vice-
President being allowed to become a Member of the
Cabinet under the second paragraph of Section 3, Article
VII or the Secretary of Justice being designated an ex-
officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council under
Article VIII, Sec. 8 (1). Public respondents, on the other
hand, maintain that the phrase "unless otherwise provided
in the Constitution" in Section 13, Article VII makes
reference to Section 7, par. (2), Article I-XB insofar as the
appointive officials mentioned therein are concerned.
The threshold question therefore is: does the prohibition in
Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution insofar as
Cabinet members, their deputies or assistants are
concerned admit of the broad exceptions made for
appointive officials in general under Section 7, par. (2),
Article I-XB which, for easy reference is quoted anew, thus:
"Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary
functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold
any other office or employment in the Government or any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporation or their
subsidiaries."
We rule in the negative.
A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the
intention underlying the provision under consideration.
Thus, it has been held that the Court in construing a
Constitution should bear in mind the object sought to be
accomplished by its adoption, and the evils, if any, sought
to be prevented or remedied. A doubtful provision will be
examined in the light of the history of the times, and the
condition and circumstances under which the Constitution
was framed. The object is to ascertain the reason which
induced the framers of the Constitution to enact the
particular provision and the purpose sought to be
accomplished thereby, in order to construe the whole as to
make the words consonant to that reason and calculated
to effect that purpose.11
The practice of designating members of the Cabinet, their
deputies and assistants as members of the governing
bodies or boards of various government agencies and
instrumentalities, including government-owned and
controlled corporations, became prevalent during the time
legislative powers in this country were exercised by former
President Ferdinand E. Marcos pursuant to his martial law
authority. There was a proliferation of newly-created
agencies, instrumentalities and government-owned and
controlled corporations created by presidential decrees
and other modes of presidential issuances where Cabinet
members, their deputies or assistants were designated to
head or sit as members of the board with the
corresponding salaries, emoluments, per diems,
allowances and other perquisites of office. Most of these
instrumentalities have remained up to the present time.
This practice of holding multiple offices or positions in the
government soon led to abuses by unscrupulous public
officials who took advantage of this scheme for purposes
of self-enrichment. In fact, the holding of multiple offices
in government was strongly denounced on the floor of the
Batasang Pambansa.12 This condemnation came in
reaction to the published report of the Commission on
Audit, entitled "1983 Summary Annual Audit Report on:
Government-Owned and Controlled Corporations, Self-
Governing Boards and Commissions" which carried as its
Figure No. 4 a "Roaster of Membership in Governing
Boards of Government-Owned and Controlled
Corporations as of December 31, 1983."
Particularly odious and revolting to the people's sense of
propriety and morality in government service were the
data contained therein that Roberto V. Ongpin was a
member of the governing boards of twenty-nine (29)
governmental agencies, instrumentalities and
corporations; Imelda R. Marcos of twenty-three (23); Cesar
E.A. Virata of twenty-two (22); Arturo R. Tanco, Jr. of fifteen
(15); Jesus S. Hipolito and Geronimo Z. Velasco, of fourteen
each (14); Cesar C. Zalamea of thirteen (13); Ruben B.
Ancheta and Jose A. Roño of twelve (12) each; Manuel P.
Alba, Gilberto O. Teodoro, and Edgardo Tordesillas of
eleven (11) each; and Lilia Bautista and Teodoro Q. Peña of
ten (10) each.13
The blatant betrayal of public trust evolved into one of the
serious causes of discontent with the Marcos regime. It
was therefore quite inevitable and in consonance with the
overwhelming sentiment of the people that the 1986
Constitutional Commission, convened as it was after the
people successfully unseated former President Marcos,
should draft into its proposed Constitution the provisions
under consideration which are envisioned to remedy, if not
correct, the evils that flow from the holding of multiple
governmental offices and employment. In fact, as keenly
observed by Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz during the
deliberations in these cases, one of the strongest selling
points of the 1987 Constitution during the campaign for its
ratification was the assurance given by its proponents that
the scandalous practice of Cabinet members holding
multiple positions in the government and collecting
unconscionably excessive compensation therefrom would
be discontinued.
But what is indeed significant is the fact that although
Section 7, Article I-XB already contains a blanket
prohibition against the holding of multiple offices or
employment in the government subsuming both elective
and appointive public officials, the Constitutional
Commission should see it fit to formulate another
provision, Sec. 13, Article VII, specifically prohibiting the
President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their
deputies and assistants from holding any other office or
employment during their tenure, unless otherwise
provided in the Constitution itself.
Evidently, from this move as well as in the different
phraseologies of the constitutional provisions in question,
the intent of the framers of the Constitution was to impose
a stricter prohibition on the President and his official family
in so far as holding other offices or employment in the
government or elsewhere is concerned.
Moreover, such intent is underscored by a comparison of
Section 13, Article VII with other provisions of the
Constitution on the disqualifications of certain public
officials or employees from holding other offices or
employment. Under Section 13, Article VI, "(N)o Senator or
Member of the House of Representatives may hold any
other office or employment in the Government . . .". Under
Section 5(4), Article XVI, "(N)o member of the armed
forces in the active service shall, at any time, be appointed
in any capacity to a civilian position in the Government,
including government-owned or controlled corporations or
any of their subsidiaries." Even Section 7 (2), Article IX-B,
relied upon by respondents provides "(U)nless otherwise
allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position,
no appointive official shall hold any other office or
employment in the Government."
It is quite notable that in all these provisions on
disqualifications to hold other office or employment, the
prohibition pertains to an office or employment in the
government and government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries. In striking contrast is the
wording of Section 13, Article VII which states that "(T)he
President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet,
and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise
provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or
employment during their tenure." In the latter provision,
the disqualification is absolute, not being qualified by the
phrase "in the Government." The prohibition imposed on
the President and his official family is therefore all-
embracing and covers both public and private office or
employment.
Going further into Section 13, Article VII, the second
sentence provides: "They shall not, during said tenure,
directly or indirectly, practice any other profession,
participate in any business, or be financially interested in
any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege
granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries." These
sweeping, all-embracing prohibitions imposed on the
President and his official family, which prohibitions are not
similarly imposed on other public officials or employees
such as the Members of Congress, members of the civil
service in general and members of the armed forces, are
proof of the intent of the 1987 Constitution to treat the
President and his official family as a class by itself and to
impose upon said class stricter prohibitions.
Such intent of the 1986 Constitutional Commission to be
stricter with the President and his official family was also
succinctly articulated by Commissioner Vicente Foz after
Commissioner Regalado Maambong noted during the floor
deliberations and debate that there was no symmetry
between the Civil Service prohibitions, originally found in
the General Provisions and the anticipated report on the
Executive Department. Commissioner Foz Commented,
"We actually have to be stricter with the President and the
members of the Cabinet because they exercise more
powers and, therefore, more cheeks and restraints on
them are called for because there is more possibility of
abuse in their case."14
Thus, while all other appointive officials in the civil service
are allowed to hold other office or employment in the
government during their tenure when such is allowed by
law or by the primary functions of their positions,
members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants may
do so only when expressly authorized by the Constitution
itself. In other words, Section 7, Article I-XB is meant to lay
down the general rule applicable to all elective and
appointive public officials and employees, while Section
13, Article VII is meant to be the exception applicable only
to the President, the Vice- President, Members of the
Cabinet, their deputies and assistants.
This being the case, the qualifying phrase "unless
otherwise provided in this Constitution" in Section 13,
Article VII cannot possibly refer to the broad exceptions
provided under Section 7, Article I-XB of the 1987
Constitution. To construe said qualifying phrase as
respondents would have us do, would render nugatory and
meaningless the manifest intent and purpose of the
framers of the Constitution to impose a stricter prohibition
on the President, Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet,
their deputies and assistants with respect to holding other
offices or employment in the government during their
tenure. Respondents' interpretation that Section 13 of
Article VII admits of the exceptions found in Section 7, par.
(2) of Article IX-B would obliterate the distinction so
carefully set by the framers of the Constitution as to when
the high-ranking officials of the Executive Branch from the
President to Assistant Secretary, on the one hand, and the
generality of civil servants from the rank immediately
below Assistant Secretary downwards, on the other, may
hold any other office or position in the government during
their tenure.
Moreover, respondents' reading of the provisions in
question would render certain parts of the Constitution
inoperative. This observation applies particularly to the
Vice-President who, under Section 13 of Article VII is
allowed to hold other office or employment when so
authorized by the Constitution, but who as an elective
public official under Sec. 7, par. (1) of Article I-XB is
absolutely ineligible "for appointment or designation in
any capacity to any public office or position during his
tenure." Surely, to say that the phrase "unless otherwise
provided in this Constitution" found in Section 13, Article
VII has reference to Section 7, par. (1) of Article I-XB would
render meaningless the specific provisions of the
Constitution authorizing the Vice-President to become a
member of the Cabinet,15 and to act as President without
relinquishing the Vice-Presidency where the President shall
not nave been chosen or fails to qualify.16 Such absurd
consequence can be avoided only by interpreting the two
provisions under consideration as one, i.e., Section 7, par.
(1) of Article I-XB providing the general rule and the other,
i.e., Section 13, Article VII as constituting the exception
thereto. In the same manner must Section 7, par. (2) of
Article I-XB be construed vis-a-vis Section 13, Article VII.
It is a well-established rule in Constitutional construction
that no one provision of the Constitution is to be separated
from all the others, to be considered alone, but that all the
provisions bearing upon a particular subject are to be
brought into view and to be so interpreted as to effectuate
the great purposes of the instrument.17 Sections bearing
on a particular subject should be considered and
interpreted together as to effectuate the whole purpose of
the Constitution18 and one section is not to be allowed to
defeat another, if by any reasonable construction, the two
can be made to stand together.19
In other words, the court must harmonize them, if
practicable, and must lean in favor of a construction which
will render every word operative, rather than one which
may make the words idle and nugatory.20
Since the evident purpose of the framers of the 1987
Constitution is to impose a stricter prohibition on the
President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their
deputies and assistants with respect to holding multiple
offices or employment in the government during their
tenure, the exception to this prohibition must be read with
equal severity. On its face, the language of Section 13,
Article VII is prohibitory so that it must be understood as
intended to be a positive and unequivocal negation of the
privilege of holding multiple government offices or
employment. Verily, wherever the language used in the
constitution is prohibitory, it is to be understood as
intended to be a positive and unequivocal negation.21 The
phrase "unless otherwise provided in this Constitution"
must be given a literal interpretation to refer only to those
particular instances cited in the Constitution itself, to wit:
the Vice-President being appointed as a member of the
Cabinet under Section 3, par. (2), Article VII; or acting as
President in those instances provided under Section 7,
pars. (2) and (3), Article VII; and, the Secretary of Justice
being ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council by
virtue of Section 8 (1), Article VIII.
The prohibition against holding dual or multiple offices or
employment under Section 13, Article VII of the
Constitution must not, however, be construed as applying
to posts occupied by the Executive officials specified
therein without additional compensation in an ex-officio
capacity as provided by law and as required22 by the
primary functions of said officials' office. The reason is that
these posts do no comprise "any other office" within the
contemplation of the constitutional prohibition but are
properly an imposition of additional duties and functions
on said officials.23 To characterize these posts otherwise
would lead to absurd consequences, among which are: The
President of the Philippines cannot chair the National
Security Council reorganized under Executive Order No.
115 (December 24, 1986). Neither can the Vice-President,
the Executive Secretary, and the Secretaries of National
Defense, Justice, Labor and Employment and Local
Government sit in this Council, which would then have no
reason to exist for lack of a chairperson and members. The
respective undersecretaries and assistant secretaries,
would also be prohibited.
The Secretary of Labor and Employment cannot chair the
Board of Trustees of the National Manpower and Youth
Council (NMYC) or the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA), both of which are attached to his
department for policy coordination and guidance. Neither
can his Undersecretaries and Assistant Secretaries chair
these agencies.
The Secretaries of Finance and Budget cannot sit in the
Monetary Board.24 Neither can their respective
undersecretaries and assistant secretaries. The Central
Bank Governor would then be assisted by lower ranking
employees in providing policy direction in the areas of
money, banking and credit.25
Indeed, the framers of our Constitution could not have
intended such absurd consequences. A Constitution,
viewed as a continuously operative charter of government,
is not to be interpreted as demanding the impossible or
the impracticable; and unreasonable or absurd
consequences, if possible, should be avoided.26
To reiterate, the prohibition under Section 13, Article VII is
not to be interpreted as covering positions held without
additional compensation in ex-officio capacities as
provided by law and as required by the primary functions
of the concerned official's office. The term ex-officio means
"from office; by virtue of office." It refers to an "authority
derived from official character merely, not expressly
conferred upon the individual character, but rather
annexed to the official position." Ex-officio likewise
denotes an "act done in an official character, or as a
consequence of office, and without any other appointment
or authority than that conferred by the office."27 An ex-
officio member of a board is one who is a member by
virtue of his title to a certain office, and without further
warrant or appointment.28 To illustrate, by express
provision of law, the Secretary of Transportation and
Communications is the ex-officio Chairman of the Board of
the Philippine Ports Authority,29 and the Light Rail Transit
Authority.30
The Court had occasion to explain the meaning of an ex-
officio position in Rafael vs. Embroidery and Apparel
Control and Inspection Board,31 thus: "An examination of
section 2 of the questioned statute (R.A. 3137) reveals that
for the chairman and members of the Board to qualify they
need only be designated by the respective department
heads. With the exception of the representative from the
private sector, they sit ex-officio. In order to be designated
they must already be holding positions in the offices
mentioned in the law. Thus, for instance, one who does not
hold a previous appointment in the Bureau of Customs,
cannot, under the act, be designated a representative from
that office. The same is true with respect to the
representatives from the other offices. No new
appointments are necessary. This is as it should be,
because the representatives so designated merely perform
duties in the Board in addition to those already performed
under their original appointments."32
The term "primary" used to describe "functions" refers to
the order of importance and thus means chief or principal
function. The term is not restricted to the singular but may
refer to the plural.33 The additional duties must not only
be closely related to, but must be required by the official's
primary functions. Examples of designations to positions
by virtue of one's primary functions are the Secretaries of
Finance and Budget sitting as members of the Monetary
Board, and the Secretary of Transportation and
Communications acting as Chairman of the Maritime
Industry Authority34 and the Civil Aeronautics Board.
If the functions required to be performed are merely
incidental, remotely related, inconsistent, incompatible, or
otherwise alien to the primary function of a cabinet
official, such additional functions would fall under the
purview of "any other office" prohibited by the
Constitution. An example would be the Press
Undersecretary sitting as a member of the Board of the
Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation. The same
rule applies to such positions which confer on the cabinet
official management functions and/or monetary
compensation, such as but not limited to chairmanships or
directorships in government-owned or controlled
corporations and their subsidiaries.
Mandating additional duties and functions to the
President, Vice-President, Cabinet Members, their
deputies or assistants which are not inconsistent with
those already prescribed by their offices or appointments
by virtue of their special knowledge, expertise and skill in
their respective executive offices is a practice long-
recognized in many jurisdictions. It is a practice justified by
the demands of efficiency, policy direction, continuity and
coordination among the different offices in the Executive
Branch in the discharge of its multifarious tasks of
executing and implementing laws affecting national
interest and general welfare and delivering basic services
to the people. It is consistent with the power vested on the
President and his alter egos, the Cabinet members, to have
control of all the executive departments, bureaus and
offices and to ensure that the laws are faithfully
executed.35 Without these additional duties and functions
being assigned to the President and his official family to sit
in the governing bodies or boards of governmental
agencies or instrumentalities in an ex-officio capacity as
provided by law and as required by their primary functions,
they would be supervision, thereby deprived of the means
for control and resulting in an unwieldy and confused
bureaucracy.
It bears repeating though that in order that such additional
duties or functions may not transgress the prohibition
embodied in Section 13, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution, such additional duties or functions must be
required by the primary functions of the official concerned,
who is to perform the same in an ex-officio capacity as
provided by law, without receiving any additional
compensation therefor.
The ex-officio position being actually and in legal
contemplation part of the principal office, it follows that
the official concerned has no right to receive additional
compensation for his services in the said position. The
reason is that these services are already paid for and
covered by the compensation attached to his principal
office. It should be obvious that if, say, the Secretary of
Finance attends a meeting of the Monetary Board as an ex-
officio member thereof, he is actually and in legal
contemplation performing the primary function of his
principal office in defining policy in monetary and banking
matters, which come under the jurisdiction of his
department. For such attendance, therefore, he is not
entitled to collect any extra compensation, whether it be in
the form of a per them or an honorarium or an allowance,
or some other such euphemism. By whatever name it is
designated, such additional compensation is prohibited by
the Constitution.
It is interesting to note that during the floor deliberations
on the proposal of Commissioner Christian Monsod to add
to Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-B, originally found as
Section 3 of the General Provisions, the exception "unless
required by the functions of his position,"36 express
reference to certain high-ranking appointive public officials
like members of the Cabinet were made.37 Responding to
a query of Commissioner Blas Ople, Commissioner Monsod
pointed out that there are instances when although not
required by current law, membership of certain high-
ranking executive officials in other offices and corporations
is necessary by reason of said officials' primary functions.
The example given by Commissioner Monsod was the
Minister of Trade and Industry.38
While this exchange between Commissioners Monsod and
Ople may be used as authority for saying that additional
functions and duties flowing from the primary functions of
the official may be imposed upon him without offending
the constitutional prohibition under consideration, it
cannot, however, be taken as authority for saying that this
exception is by virtue of Section 7, par. (2) of Article I-XB.
This colloquy between the two Commissioners took place
in the plenary session of September 27, 1986. Under
consideration then was Section 3 of Committee Resolution
No. 531 which was the proposed article on General
Provisions.39 At that time, the article on the Civil Service
Commission had been approved on third reading on July
22, 1986,40 while the article on the Executive Department,
containing the more specific prohibition in Section 13, had
also been earlier approved on third reading on August 26,
1986.41 It was only after the draft Constitution had
undergone reformatting and "styling" by the Committee on
Style that said Section 3 of the General Provisions became
Section 7, par. (2) of Article IX-B and reworded "Unless
otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of
his position. . . ."
What was clearly being discussed then were general
principles which would serve as constitutional guidelines in
the absence of specific constitutional provisions on the
matter. What was primarily at issue and approved on that
occasion was the adoption of the qualified and delimited
phrase "primary functions" as the basis of an exception to
the general rule covering all appointive public officials. Had
the Constitutional Commission intended to dilute the
specific prohibition in said Section 13 of Article VII, it could
have re-worded said Section 13 to conform to the wider
exceptions provided in then Section 3 of the proposed
general Provisions, later placed as Section 7, par. (2) of
Article IX-B on the Civil Service Commission.
That this exception would in the final analysis apply also to
the President and his official family is by reason of the legal
principles governing additional functions and duties of
public officials rather than by virtue of Section 7, par. 2,
Article IX-B At any rate, we have made it clear that only the
additional functions and duties "required," as opposed to
"allowed," by the primary functions may be considered as
not constituting "any other office."
While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the
debates and proceedings of the constitutional convention
in order to arrive at the reason and purpose of the
resulting Constitution, resort thereto may be had only
when other guides fail42 as said proceedings are
powerless to vary the terms of the Constitution when the
meaning is clear.1âwphi1 Debates in the constitutional
convention "are of value as showing the views of the
individual members, and as indicating the reasons for their
votes, but they give us no light as to the views of the large
majority who did not talk, much less of the mass of our
fellow citizens whose votes at the polls gave that
instrument the force of fundamental law. We think it safer
to construe the constitution from what appears upon its
face."43 The proper interpretation therefore depends
more on how it was understood by the people adopting it
than in the framers's understanding thereof.44
It being clear, as it was in fact one of its best selling points,
that the 1987 Constitution seeks to prohibit the President,
Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies or
assistants from holding during their tenure multiple offices
or employment in the government, except in those cases
specified in the Constitution itself and as above clarified
with respect to posts held without additional
compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law
and as required by the primary functions of their office,
the citation of Cabinet members (then called Ministers) as
examples during the debate and deliberation on the
general rule laid down for all appointive officials should be
considered as mere personal opinions which cannot
override the constitution's manifest intent and the people'
understanding thereof.
In the light of the construction given to Section 13, Article
VII in relation to Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-B of the 1987
Constitution, Executive Order No. 284 dated July 23, 1987
is unconstitutional. Ostensibly restricting the number of
positions that Cabinet members, undersecretaries or
assistant secretaries may hold in addition to their primary
position to not more than two (2) positions in the
government and government corporations, Executive
Order No. 284 actually allows them to hold multiple offices
or employment in direct contravention of the express
mandate of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution
prohibiting them from doing so, unless otherwise provided
in the 1987 Constitution itself.
The Court is alerted by respondents to the impractical
consequences that will result from a strict application of
the prohibition mandated under Section 13, Article VII on
the operations of the Government, considering that
Cabinet members would be stripped of their offices held in
an ex-officio capacity, by reason of their primary positions
or by virtue of legislation. As earlier clarified in this
decision, ex-officio posts held by the executive official
concerned without additional compensation as provided
by law and as required by the primary functions of his WHEREFORE, subject to the qualification above-stated, the
office do not fall under the definition of "any other office" petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 284 is hereby
within the contemplation of the constitutional prohibition. declared null and void and is accordingly set aside.
With respect to other offices or employment held by virtue
of legislation, including chairmanships or directorships in SO ORDERED.
government-owned or controlled corporations and their
subsidiaries, suffice it to say that the feared impractical
consequences are more apparent than real. Being head of
an executive department is no mean job. It is more than a
full-time job, requiring full attention, specialized
knowledge, skills and expertise. If maximum benefits are to
be derived from a department head's ability and expertise,
he should be allowed to attend to his duties and
responsibilities without the distraction of other
governmental offices or employment. He should be
precluded from dissipating his efforts, attention and energy
among too many positions of responsibility, which may
result in haphazardness and inefficiency. Surely the
advantages to be derived from this concentration of
attention, knowledge and expertise, particularly at this
stage of our national and economic development, far
outweigh the benefits, if any, that may be gained from a
department head spreading himself too thin and taking in
more than what he can handle.

Finding Executive Order No. 284 to be constitutionally

infirm, the court hereby orders respondents Secretary of
Environment and Natural Resources Fulgencio Factoran, Jr.,
Secretary of Local Government45 Luis Santos, Secretary of
National Defense Fidel V. Ramos, Secretary of Health
Alfredo R.A. Bengzon and Secretary of the Budget
Guillermo Carague to immediately relinquish their other
offices or employment, as herein defined, in the
government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations and their subsidiaries. With respect to the
other named respondents, the petitions have become
moot and academic as they are no longer occupying the
positions complained of.

During their tenure in the questioned positions,

respondents may be considered de facto officers and as
such entitled to emoluments for actual services
rendered.46 It has been held that "in cases where there is
no de jure, officer, a de facto officer, who, in good faith has
had possession of the office and has discharged the duties
pertaining thereto, is legally entitled to the emoluments of
the office, and may in an appropriate action recover the
salary, fees and other compensations attached to the
office. This doctrine is, undoubtedly, supported on
equitable grounds since it seems unjust that the public
should benefit by the services of an officer de facto and
then be freed from all liability to pay any one for such
services.47 Any per diem, allowances or other emoluments
received by the respondents by virtue of actual services
rendered in the questioned positions may therefore be
retained by them.

[G.R. No. 122156. February 3, 1997]
MANILA PRINCE HOTEL, petitioner, vs. GOVERNMENT
SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL
CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION and
OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL,
respondents.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
The Filipino First Policy enshrined in the 1987 Constitution,
i.e., in the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions
covering the national economy and patrimony, the State
shall give preference to qualified Filipinos,[1] is invoked by
petitioner in its bid to acquire 51% of the shares of the
Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC) which owns the historic
Manila Hotel. Opposing, respondents maintain that the
provision is not self-executing but requires an
implementing legislation for its enforcement. Corollarily,
they ask whether the 51% shares form part of the national
economy and patrimony covered by the protective mantle
of the Constitution.
The controversy arose when respondent Government
Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the
privatization program of the Philippine Government under
Proclamation No. 50 dated 8 December 1986, decided to
sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and
outstanding shares of respondent MHC. The winning
bidder, or the eventual strategic partner, is to provide
management expertise and/or an international
marketing/reservation system, and financial support to
strengthen the profitability and performance of the Manila
Hotel.[2] In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995
only two (2) bidders participated: petitioner Manila Prince
Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to
buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per
share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-
Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same
number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than
the bid of petitioner.
Pertinent provisions of the bidding rules prepared by
respondent GSIS state -
I. EXECUTION OF THE NECESSARY CONTRACTS WITH
GSIS/MHC -
1. The Highest Bidder must comply with the conditions set
forth below by October 23, 1995 (reset to November 3,
1995) or the Highest Bidder will lose the right to purchase
the Block of Shares and GSIS will instead offer the Block of
Shares to the other Qualified Bidders:
a. The Highest Bidder must negotiate and execute with the
GSIS/MHC the Management Contract, International
Marketing/Reservation System Contract or other type of
contract specified by the Highest Bidder in its strategic plan
for the Manila Hotel x x x x
b. The Highest Bidder must execute the Stock Purchase and
Sale Agreement with GSIS x x x x
K. DECLARATION OF THE WINNING BIDDER/STRATEGIC
PARTNER -
The Highest Bidder will be declared the Winning
Bidder/Strategic Partner after the following conditions are
met:
a. Execution of the necessary contracts with GSIS/MHC not
later than October 23, 1995 (reset to November 3, 1995);
and

b. Requisite approvals from the GSIS/MHC and COP
(Committee on Privatization)/ OGCC (Office of the
Government Corporate Counsel) are obtained.[3]
Pending the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning
bidder/strategic partner and the execution of the
necessary contracts, petitioner in a letter to respondent
GSIS dated 28 September 1995 matched the bid price of
P44.00 per share tendered by Renong Berhad.[4] In a
subsequent letter dated 10 October 1995 petitioner sent a
managers check issued by Philtrust Bank for Thirty-three
Million Pesos (P33,000,000.00) as Bid Security to match
the bid of the Malaysian Group, Messrs. Renong Berhad x x
x x[5] which respondent GSIS refused to accept.
On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that
respondent GSIS has disregarded the tender of the
matching bid and that the sale of 51% of the MHC may be
hastened by respondent GSIS and consummated with
Renong Berhad, petitioner came to this Court on
prohibition and mandamus. On 18 October 1995 the Court
issued a temporary restraining order enjoining
respondents from perfecting and consummating the sale
to the Malaysian firm.
On 10 September 1996 the instant case was accepted by
the Court En Banc after it was referred to it by the First
Division. The case was then set for oral arguments with
former Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando and Fr. Joaquin
G. Bernas, S.J., as amici curiae.
In the main, petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art.
XII, of the 1987 Constitution and submits that the Manila
Hotel has been identified with the Filipino nation and has
practically become a historical monument which reflects
the vibrancy of Philippine heritage and culture. It is a proud
legacy of an earlier generation of Filipinos who believed in
the nobility and sacredness of independence and its power
and capacity to release the full potential of the Filipino
people. To all intents and purposes, it has become a part of
the national patrimony.[6] Petitioner also argues that since
51% of the shares of the MHC carries with it the ownership
of the business of the hotel which is owned by respondent
GSIS, a government-owned and controlled corporation, the
hotel business of respondent GSIS being a part of the
tourism industry is unquestionably a part of the national
economy. Thus, any transaction involving 51% of the
shares of stock of the MHC is clearly covered by the term
national economy, to which Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII,
1987 Constitution, applies.[7]
It is also the thesis of petitioner that since Manila Hotel is
part of the national patrimony and its business also
unquestionably part of the national economy petitioner
should be preferred after it has matched the bid offer of
the Malaysian firm. For the bidding rules mandate that if
for any reason, the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the
Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to the other Qualified
Bidders that have validly submitted bids provided that
these Qualified Bidders are willing to match the highest bid
in terms of price per share.[8]
Respondents except. They maintain that: First, Sec. 10,
second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is merely a
statement of principle and policy since it is not a self-
executing provision and requires implementing
legislation(s) x x x x Thus, for the said provision to operate,
there must be existing laws to lay down conditions under
which business may be done.[9]
Second, granting that this provision is self-executing,
Manila Hotel does not fall under the term national
patrimony which only refers to lands of the public domain,
waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral oils,
all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber,
wildlife, flora and fauna and all marine wealth in its
territorial sea, and exclusive marine zone as cited in the
first and second paragraphs of Sec. 2, Art. XII, 1987
Constitution. According to respondents, while petitioner
speaks of the guests who have slept in the hotel and the
events that have transpired therein which make the hotel
historic, these alone do not make the hotel fall under the
patrimony of the nation. What is more, the mandate of the
Constitution is addressed to the State, not to respondent
GSIS which possesses a personality of its own separate and
distinct from the Philippines as a State.
Third, granting that the Manila Hotel forms part of the
national patrimony, the constitutional provision invoked is
still inapplicable since what is being sold is only 51% of the
outstanding shares of the corporation, not the hotel
building nor the land upon which the building stands.
Certainly, 51% of the equity of the MHC cannot be
considered part of the national patrimony. Moreover, if the
disposition of the shares of the MHC is really contrary to
the Constitution, petitioner should have questioned it right
from the beginning and not after it had lost in the bidding.
Fourth, the reliance by petitioner on par. V., subpar. J. 1., of
the bidding rules which provides that if for any reason, the
Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares,
GSIS may offer this to the other Qualified Bidders that have
validly submitted bids provided that these Qualified
Bidders are willing to match the highest bid in terms of
price per share, is misplaced. Respondents postulate that
the privilege of submitting a matching bid has not yet
arisen since it only takes place if for any reason, the
Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares.
Thus the submission by petitioner of a matching bid is
premature since Renong Berhad could still very well be
awarded the block of shares and the condition giving rise
to the exercise of the privilege to submit a matching bid
had not yet taken place.
Finally, the prayer for prohibition grounded on grave abuse
of discretion should fail since respondent GSIS did not
exercise its discretion in a capricious, whimsical manner,
and if ever it did abuse its discretion it was not so patent
and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or
a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law.
Similarly, the petition for mandamus should fail as
petitioner has no clear legal right to what it demands and
respondents do not have an imperative duty to perform
the act required of them by petitioner.
We now resolve. A constitution is a system of fundamental
laws for the governance and administration of a nation. It
is supreme, imperious, absolute and unalterable except by
the authority from which it emanates. It has been defined
as the fundamental and paramount law of the nation.[10]
It prescribes the permanent framework of a system of
government, assigns to the different departments their
respective powers and duties, and establishes certain fixed
principles on which government is founded. The
fundamental conception in other words is that it is a
supreme law to which all other laws must conform and in
accordance with which all private rights must be
determined and all public authority administered.[11]
Under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, if a law or
contract violates any norm of the constitution that law or
contract whether promulgated by the legislative or by the
executive branch or entered into by private persons for
private purposes is null and void and without any force and
effect. Thus, since the Constitution is the fundamental,
paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed
written in every statute and contract.
Admittedly, some constitutions are merely declarations of
policies and principles. Their provisions command the
legislature to enact laws and carry out the purposes of the
framers who merely establish an outline of government
providing for the different departments of the
governmental machinery and securing certain fundamental
and inalienable rights of citizens.[12] A provision which lays
down a general principle, such as those found in Art. II of
the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a
provision which is complete in itself and becomes
operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling
legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means
of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is
self-executing. Thus a constitutional provision is self-
executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred
and the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself,
so that they can be determined by an examination and
construction of its terms, and there is no language
indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature for
action.[13]
As against constitutions of the past, modern constitutions
have been generally drafted upon a different principle and
have often become in effect extensive codes of laws
intended to operate directly upon the people in a manner
similar to that of statutory enactments, and the function of
constitutional conventions has evolved into one more like
that of a legislative body. Hence, unless it is expressly
provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a
constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all
provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the
constitutional provisions are treated as requiring
legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would
have the power to ignore and practically nullify the
mandate of the fundamental law.[14] This can be
cataclysmic. That is why the prevailing view is, as it has
always been, that -
x x x x in case of doubt, the Constitution should be
considered self-executing rather than non-self-executing x
x x x Unless the contrary is clearly intended, the provisions
of the Constitution should be considered self-executing, as
a contrary rule would give the legislature discretion to
determine when, or whether, they shall be effective. These
provisions would be subordinated to the will of the
lawmaking body, which could make them entirely
meaningless by simply refusing to pass the needed
implementing statute.[15]
Respondents argue that Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the
1987 Constitution is clearly not self-executing, as they
quote from discussions on the floor of the 1986
Constitutional Commission -
MR. RODRIGO. Madam President, I am asking this question
as the Chairman of the Committee on Style. If the wording
of PREFERENCE is given to QUALIFIED FILIPINOS, can it be
understood as a preference to qualified Filipinos vis-a-vis
Filipinos who are not qualified. So, why do we not make it
clear? To qualified Filipinos as against aliens?
THE PRESIDENT. What is the question of Commissioner
Rodrigo? Is it to remove the word QUALIFIED?
MR. RODRIGO. No, no, but say definitely TO QUALIFIED
FILIPINOS as against whom? As against aliens or over aliens
?
MR. NOLLEDO. Madam President, I think that is
understood. We use the word QUALIFIED because the
existing laws or prospective laws will always lay down
conditions under which business may be done. For
example, qualifications on capital, qualifications on the
setting up of other financial structures, et cetera
(underscoring supplied by respondents).
MR. RODRIGO. It is just a matter of style.
MR. NOLLEDO. Yes.[16]
Quite apparently, Sec. 10, second par., of Art XII is couched
in such a way as not to make it appear that it is non-self-
executing but simply for purposes of style. But, certainly,
the legislature is not precluded from enacting further laws
to enforce the constitutional provision so long as the
contemplated statute squares with the Constitution. Minor
details may be left to the legislature without impairing the
self-executing nature of constitutional provisions.
In self-executing constitutional provisions, the legislature
may still enact legislation to facilitate the exercise of
powers directly granted by the constitution, further the
operation of such a provision, prescribe a practice to be
used for its enforcement, provide a convenient remedy for
the protection of the rights secured or the determination
thereof, or place reasonable safeguards around the
exercise of the right. The mere fact that legislation may
supplement and add to or prescribe a penalty for the
violation of a self-executing constitutional provision does
not render such a provision ineffective in the absence of
such legislation. The omission from a constitution of any
express provision for a remedy for enforcing a right or
liability is not necessarily an indication that it was not
intended to be self-executing. The rule is that a self-
executing provision of the constitution does not
necessarily exhaust legislative power on the subject, but
any legislation must be in harmony with the constitution,
further the exercise of constitutional right and make it
more available.[17] Subsequent legislation however does
not necessarily mean that the subject constitutional
provision is not, by itself, fully enforceable.
Respondents also argue that the non-self-executing nature
of Sec. 10, second par., of Art. XII is implied from the tenor
of the first and third paragraphs of the same section which
undoubtedly are not self-executing.[18] The argument is
flawed. If the first and third paragraphs are not self-
executing because Congress is still to enact measures to
encourage the formation and operation of enterprises fully
owned by Filipinos, as in the first paragraph, and the State
still needs legislation to regulate and exercise authority
over foreign investments within its national jurisdiction, as
in the third paragraph, then a fortiori, by the same logic,
the second paragraph can only be self-executing as it does
not by its language require any legislation in order to give
preference to qualified Filipinos in the grant of rights,
privileges and concessions covering the national economy
and patrimony. A constitutional provision may be self-
executing in one part and non-self-executing in another.
[19]
Even the cases cited by respondents holding that certain
constitutional provisions are merely statements of
principles and policies, which are basically not self-
executing and only placed in the Constitution as moral
incentives to legislation, not as judicially enforceable rights
- are simply not in point. Basco v. Philippine Amusements
and Gaming Corporation[20] speaks of constitutional
provisions on personal dignity,[21] the sanctity of family
life,[22] the vital role of the youth in nation-building,[23]
the promotion of social justice,[24] and the values of
education.[25] Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance[26] refers
to constitutional provisions on social justice and human
rights[27] and on education.[28] Lastly, Kilosbayan, Inc. v.
Morato[29] cites provisions on the promotion of general
welfare,[30] the sanctity of family life,[31] the vital role of
the youth in nation-building[32] and the promotion of total
human liberation and development.[33] A reading of these
provisions indeed clearly shows that they are not judicially
enforceable constitutional rights but merely guidelines for
legislation. The very terms of the provisions manifest that
they are only principles upon which legislations must be
based. Res ipsa loquitur.
On the other hand, Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the
1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which
is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines
or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its
very words the provision does not require any legislation
to put it in operation. It is per se judicially enforceable.
When our Constitution mandates that [i]n the grant of
rights, privileges, and concessions covering national
economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to
qualified Filipinos, it means just that - qualified Filipinos
shall be preferred. And when our Constitution declares
that a right exists in certain specified circumstances an
action may be maintained to enforce such right
notwithstanding the absence of any legislation on the
subject; consequently, if there is no statute especially
enacted to enforce such constitutional right, such right
enforces itself by its own inherent potency and puissance,
and from which all legislations must take their bearings.
Where there is a right there is a remedy. Ubi jus ibi
remedium.
As regards our national patrimony, a member of the 1986
Constitutional Commission[34] explains -
The patrimony of the Nation that should be conserved and
developed refers not only to our rich natural resources but
also to the cultural heritage of our race. It also refers to our
intelligence in arts, sciences and letters. Therefore, we
should develop not only our lands, forests, mines and
other natural resources but also the mental ability or
faculty of our people.
We agree. In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term
patrimony pertains to heritage.[35] When the Constitution
speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only to the
natural resources of the Philippines, as the Constitution
could have very well used the term natural resources, but
also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos.
Manila Hotel has become a landmark - a living testimonial
of Philippine heritage. While it was restrictively an
American hotel when it first opened in 1912, it
immediately evolved to be truly Filipino. Formerly a
concourse for the elite, it has since then become the venue
of various significant events which have shaped Philippine
history. It was called the Cultural Center of the 1930s. It
was the site of the festivities during the inauguration of the
Philippine Commonwealth. Dubbed as the Official Guest
House of the Philippine Government it plays host to
dignitaries and official visitors who are accorded the
traditional Philippine hospitality.[36]
The history of the hotel has been chronicled in the book
The Manila Hotel: The Heart and Memory of a City.[37]
During World War II the hotel was converted by the
Japanese Military Administration into a military
headquarters. When the American forces returned to
recapture Manila the hotel was selected by the Japanese
together with Intramuros as the two (2) places for their
final stand. Thereafter, in the 1950s and 1960s, the hotel
became the center of political activities, playing host to
almost every political convention. In 1970 the hotel
reopened after a renovation and reaped numerous
international recognitions, an acknowledgment of the
Filipino talent and ingenuity. In 1986 the hotel was the site
of a failed coup d etat where an aspirant for vice-president
was proclaimed President of the Philippine Republic.
For more than eight (8) decades Manila Hotel has bore
mute witness to the triumphs and failures, loves and
frustrations of the Filipinos; its existence is impressed with
public interest; its own historicity associated with our
struggle for sovereignty, independence and nationhood.
Verily, Manila Hotel has become part of our national
economy and patrimony. For sure, 51% of the equity of the
MHC comes within the purview of the constitutional
shelter for it comprises the majority and controlling stock,
so that anyone who acquires or owns the 51% will have
actual control and management of the hotel. In this
instance, 51% of the MHC cannot be disassociated from
the hotel and the land on which the hotel edifice stands.
Consequently, we cannot sustain respondents claim that
the Filipino First Policy provision is not applicable since
what is being sold is only 51% of the outstanding shares of
the corporation, not the Hotel building nor the land upon
which the building stands.[38]
The argument is pure sophistry. The term qualified
Filipinos as used in our Constitution also includes
corporations at least 60% of which is owned by Filipinos.
This is very clear from the proceedings of the 1986
Constitutional Commission -
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Davide is recognized.
MR. DAVIDE. I would like to introduce an amendment to
the Nolledo amendment. And the amendment would
consist in substituting the words QUALIFIED FILIPINOS with
the following: CITIZENS OF THE PHILIPPINES OR
CORPORATIONS OR ASSOCIATIONS WHOSE CAPITAL OR
CONTROLLING STOCK IS WHOLLY OWNED BY SUCH
CITIZENS.
xxxx
MR. MONSOD. Madam President, apparently the
proponent is agreeable, but we have to raise a question.
Suppose it is a corporation that is 80-percent Filipino, do
we not give it preference?
MR. DAVIDE. The Nolledo amendment would refer to an
individual Filipino. What about a corporation wholly
owned by Filipino citizens?
MR. MONSOD. At least 60 percent, Madam President.
MR. DAVIDE. Is that the intention?
MR. MONSOD. Yes, because, in fact, we would be limiting
it if we say that the preference should only be 100-percent
Filipino.
MR. DAVIDE. I want to get that meaning clear because
QUALIFIED FILIPINOS may refer only to individuals and not
to juridical personalities or entities.
MR. MONSOD. We agree, Madam President.[39]
xxxx
MR. RODRIGO. Before we vote, may I request that the
amendment be read again.
MR. NOLLEDO. The amendment will read: IN THE GRANT
OF RIGHTS, PRIVILEGES AND CONCESSIONS COVERING THE
NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY, THE STATE SHALL
GIVE PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS. And the word
Filipinos here, as intended by the proponents, will include
not only individual Filipinos but also Filipino-controlled
entities or entities fully-controlled by Filipinos.[40]
The phrase preference to qualified Filipinos was explained
thus -
MR. FOZ. Madam President, I would like to request
Commissioner Nolledo to please restate his amendment so
that I can ask a question.
MR. NOLLEDO. IN THE GRANT OF RIGHTS, PRIVILEGES AND
CONCESSIONS COVERING THE NATIONAL ECONOMY AND
PATRIMONY, THE STATE SHALL GIVE PREFERENCE TO
QUALIFIED FILIPINOS.
MR. FOZ. In connection with that amendment, if a foreign
enterprise is qualified and a Filipino enterprise is also
qualified, will the Filipino enterprise still be given a
preference?
MR. NOLLEDO. Obviously.
MR. FOZ. If the foreigner is more qualified in some aspects
than the Filipino enterprise, will the Filipino still be
preferred?
MR. NOLLEDO. The answer is yes.
MR. FOZ. Thank you.[41]
Expounding further on the Filipino First Policy provision
Commissioner Nolledo continues
MR. NOLLEDO. Yes, Madam President. Instead of MUST, it
will be SHALL - THE STATE SHALL GIVE PREFERENCE TO
QUALIFIED FILIPINOS. This embodies the so-called Filipino
First policy. That means that Filipinos should be given
preference in the grant of concessions, privileges and
rights covering the national patrimony.[42]
The exchange of views in the sessions of the Constitutional
Commission regarding the subject provision was still
further clarified by Commissioner Nolledo[43] -
Paragraph 2 of Section 10 explicitly mandates the Pro-
Filipino bias in all economic concerns. It is better known as
the FILIPINO FIRST Policy x x x x This provision was never
found in previous Constitutions x x x x
The term qualified Filipinos simply means that preference
shall be given to those citizens who can make a viable
contribution to the common good, because of credible
competence and efficiency. It certainly does NOT mandate
the pampering and preferential treatment to Filipino
citizens or organizations that are incompetent or
inefficient, since such an indiscriminate preference would
be counterproductive and inimical to the common good.
In the granting of economic rights, privileges, and
concessions, when a choice has to be made between a
qualified foreigner and a qualified Filipino, the latter shall
be chosen over the former.
Lastly, the word qualified is also determinable. Petitioner
was so considered by respondent GSIS and selected as one
of the qualified bidders. It was pre-qualified by respondent
GSIS in accordance with its own guidelines so that the sole
inference here is that petitioner has been found to be
possessed of proven management expertise in the hotel
industry, or it has significant equity ownership in another
hotel company, or it has an overall management and
marketing proficiency to successfully operate the Manila
Hotel.[44]
The penchant to try to whittle away the mandate of the
Constitution by arguing that the subject provision is not
self-executory and requires implementing legislation is
quite disturbing. The attempt to violate a clear
constitutional provision - by the government itself - is only
too distressing. To adopt such a line of reasoning is to
renounce the duty to ensure faithfulness to the
Constitution. For, even some of the provisions of the
Constitution which evidently need implementing
legislation have juridical life of their own and can be the
source of a judicial remedy. We cannot simply afford the
government a defense that arises out of the failure to
enact further enabling, implementing or guiding
legislation. In fine, the discourse of Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas,
S.J., on constitutional government is apt -
The executive department has a constitutional duty to
implement laws, including the Constitution, even before
Congress acts - provided that there are discoverable legal
standards for executive action. When the executive acts, it
must be guided by its own understanding of the
constitutional command and of applicable laws. The
responsibility for reading and understanding the
Constitution and the laws is not the sole prerogative of
Congress. If it were, the executive would have to ask
Congress, or perhaps the Court, for an interpretation every
time the executive is confronted by a constitutional
command. That is not how constitutional government
operates.[45]
Respondents further argue that the constitutional
provision is addressed to the State, not to respondent GSIS
which by itself possesses a separate and distinct
personality. This argument again is at best specious. It is
undisputed that the sale of 51% of the MHC could only be
carried out with the prior approval of the State acting
through respondent Committee on Privatization. As
correctly pointed out by Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., this fact
alone makes the sale of the assets of respondents GSIS and
MHC a state action. In constitutional jurisprudence, the
acts of persons distinct from the government are
considered state action covered by the Constitution (1)
when the activity it engages in is a public function; (2)
when the government is so significantly involved with the
private actor as to make the government responsible for
his action; and, (3) when the government has approved or
authorized the action. It is evident that the act of
respondent GSIS in selling 51% of its share in respondent
MHC comes under the second and third categories of state
action. Without doubt therefore the transaction, although
entered into by respondent GSIS, is in fact a transaction of
the State and therefore subject to the constitutional
command.[46]
When the Constitution addresses the State it refers not
only to the people but also to the government as elements
of the State. After all, government is composed of three (3)
divisions of power - legislative, executive and judicial.
Accordingly, a constitutional mandate directed to the State
is correspondingly directed to the three (3) branches of
government. It is undeniable that in this case the subject
constitutional injunction is addressed among others to the
Executive Department and respondent GSIS, a government
instrumentality deriving its authority from the State.

It should be stressed that while the Malaysian firm offered
the higher bid it is not yet the winning bidder. The bidding
rules expressly provide that the highest bidder shall only
be declared the winning bidder after it has negotiated and
executed the necessary contracts, and secured the
requisite approvals. Since the Filipino First Policy provision
of the Constitution bestows preference on qualified
Filipinos the mere tending of the highest bid is not an
assurance that the highest bidder will be declared the
winning bidder. Resultantly, respondents are not bound to
make the award yet, nor are they under obligation to enter
into one with the highest bidder. For in choosing the
awardee respondents are mandated to abide by the
dictates of the 1987 Constitution the provisions of which
are presumed to be known to all the bidders and other
interested parties.
Adhering to the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, the
subject constitutional provision is, as it should be,
impliedly written in the bidding rules issued by respondent
GSIS, lest the bidding rules be nullified for being violative
of the Constitution. It is a basic principle in constitutional
law that all laws and contracts must conform with the
fundamental law of the land. Those which violate the
Constitution lose their reason for being.
Paragraph V. J. 1 of the bidding rules provides that [i]f for
any reason the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the
Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to other Qualified
Bidders that have validly submitted bids provided that
these Qualified Bidders are willing to match the highest bid
in terms of price per share.[47] Certainly, the constitutional
mandate itself is reason enough not to award the block of
shares immediately to the foreign bidder notwithstanding
its submission of a higher, or even the highest, bid. In fact,
we cannot conceive of a stronger reason than the
constitutional injunction itself.
In the instant case, where a foreign firm submits the
highest bid in a public bidding concerning the grant of
rights, privileges and concessions covering the national
economy and patrimony, thereby exceeding the bid of a
Filipino, there is no question that the Filipino will have to
be allowed to match the bid of the foreign entity. And if
the Filipino matches the bid of a foreign firm the award
should go to the Filipino. It must be so if we are to give life
and meaning to the Filipino First Policy provision of the
1987 Constitution. For, while this may neither be expressly
stated nor contemplated in the bidding rules, the
constitutional fiat is omnipresent to be simply disregarded.
To ignore it would be to sanction a perilous skirting of the
basic law.
This Court does not discount the apprehension that this
policy may discourage foreign investors. But the
Constitution and laws of the Philippines are understood to
be always open to public scrutiny. These are given factors
which investors must consider when venturing into
business in a foreign jurisdiction. Any person therefore
desiring to do business in the Philippines or with any of its
agencies or instrumentalities is presumed to know his
rights and obligations under the Constitution and the laws
of the forum.
The argument of respondents that petitioner is now
estopped from questioning the sale to Renong Berhad
since petitioner was well aware from the beginning that a
foreigner could participate in the bidding is meritless.
Undoubtedly, Filipinos and foreigners alike were invited to
the bidding. But foreigners may be awarded the sale only if
no Filipino qualifies, or if the qualified Filipino fails to
match the highest bid tendered by the foreign entity. In the
case before us, while petitioner was already preferred at
the inception of the bidding because of the constitutional
mandate, petitioner had not yet matched the bid offered
by Renong Berhad. Thus it did not have the right or
personality then to compel respondent GSIS to accept its
earlier bid. Rightly, only after it had matched the bid of the
foreign firm and the apparent disregard by respondent
GSIS of petitioners matching bid did the latter have a cause
of action.
Besides, there is no time frame for invoking the
constitutional safeguard unless perhaps the award has
been finally made. To insist on selling the Manila Hotel to
foreigners when there is a Filipino group willing to match
the bid of the foreign group is to insist that government be
treated as any other ordinary market player, and bound by
its mistakes or gross errors of judgment, regardless of the
consequences to the Filipino people. The
miscomprehension of the Constitution is regrettable. Thus
we would rather remedy the indiscretion while there is still
an opportunity to do so than let the government develop
the habit of forgetting that the Constitution lays down the
basic conditions and parameters for its actions.
Since petitioner has already matched the bid price
tendered by Renong Berhad pursuant to the bidding rules,
respondent GSIS is left with no alternative but to award to
petitioner the block of shares of MHC and to execute the
necessary agreements and documents to effect the sale in
accordance not only with the bidding guidelines and
procedures but with the Constitution as well. The refusal of
respondent GSIS to execute the corresponding documents
with petitioner as provided in the bidding rules after the
latter has matched the bid of the Malaysian firm clearly
constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
The Filipino First Policy is a product of Philippine
nationalism. It is embodied in the 1987 Constitution not
merely to be used as a guideline for future legislation but
primarily to be enforced; so must it be enforced. This Court
as the ultimate guardian of the Constitution will never
shun, under any reasonable circumstance, the duty of
upholding the majesty of the Constitution which it is
tasked to defend. It is worth emphasizing that it is not the
intention of this Court to impede and diminish, much less
undermine, the influx of foreign investments. Far from it,
the Court encourages and welcomes more business
opportunities but avowedly sanctions the preference for
Filipinos whenever such preference is ordained by the
Constitution. The position of the Court on this matter could
have not been more appropriately articulated by Chief
Justice Narvasa -
As scrupulously as it has tried to observe that it is not its
function to substitute its judgment for that of the
legislature or the executive about the wisdom and
feasibility of legislation economic in nature, the Supreme
Court has not been spared criticism for decisions perceived
as obstacles to economic progress and development x x x x
in connection with a temporary injunction issued by the
Courts First Division against the sale of the Manila Hotel to
a Malaysian Firm and its partner, certain statements were
published in a major daily to the effect that that injunction
again demonstrates that the Philippine legal system can be
a major obstacle to doing business here.
Let it be stated for the record once again that while it is no
business of the Court to intervene in contracts of the kind
referred to or set itself up as the judge of whether they are
viable or attainable, it is its bounden duty to make sure
that they do not violate the Constitution or the laws, or are
not adopted or implemented with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. It will
never shirk that duty, no matter how buffeted by winds of
unfair and ill-informed criticism.[48]
Privatization of a business asset for purposes of enhancing
its business viability and preventing further losses,
regardless of the character of the asset, should not take
precedence over non-material values. A commercial, nay
even a budgetary, objective should not be pursued at the
expense of national pride and dignity. For the Constitution
enshrines higher and nobler non-material values. Indeed,
the Court will always defer to the Constitution in the
proper governance of a free society; after all, there is
nothing so sacrosanct in any economic policy as to draw
itself beyond judicial review when the Constitution is
involved.[49]
Nationalism is inherent in the very concept of the
Philippines being a democratic and republican state, with
sovereignty residing in the Filipino people and from whom
all government authority emanates. In nationalism, the
happiness and welfare of the people must be the goal. The
nation-state can have no higher purpose. Any
interpretation of any constitutional provision must adhere
to such basic concept. Protection of foreign investments,
while laudible, is merely a policy. It cannot override the
demands of nationalism.[50]
The Manila Hotel or, for that matter, 51% of the MHC, is
not just any commodity to be sold to the highest bidder
solely for the sake of privatization. We are not talking
about an ordinary piece of property in a commercial
district. We are talking about a historic relic that has
hosted many of the most important events in the short
history of the Philippines as a nation. We are talking about
a hotel where heads of states would prefer to be housed as
a strong manifestation of their desire to cloak the dignity
of the highest state function to their official visits to the
Philippines. Thus the Manila Hotel has played and
continues to play a significant role as an authentic
repository of twentieth century Philippine history and
culture. In this sense, it has become truly a reflection of
the Filipino soul - a place with a history of grandeur; a most
historical setting that has played a part in the shaping of a
country.[51]
This Court cannot extract rhyme nor reason from the
determined efforts of respondents to sell the historical
landmark - this Grand Old Dame of hotels in Asia - to a
total stranger. For, indeed, the conveyance of this epic
exponent of the Filipino psyche to alien hands cannot be
less than mephistophelian for it is, in whatever manner
viewed, a veritable alienation of a nations soul for some
pieces of foreign silver. And so we ask: What advantage,
which cannot be equally drawn from a qualified Filipino,
can be gained by the Filipinos if Manila Hotel - and all that
it stands for - is sold to a non-Filipino? How much of
national pride will vanish if the nations cultural heritage is
entrusted to a foreign entity? On the other hand, how
much dignity will be preserved and realized if the national
patrimony is safekept in the hands of a qualified, zealous
and well-meaning Filipino? This is the plain and simple
meaning of the Filipino First Policy provision of the
Philippine Constitution. And this Court, heeding the clarion
call of the Constitution and accepting the duty of being the
elderly watchman of the nation, will continue to respect
and protect the sanctity of the Constitution.
WHEREFORE, respondents GOVERNMENT SERVICE
INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION,
COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE
GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL are directed to
CEASE and DESIST from selling 51% of the shares of the
Manila Hotel Corporation to RENONG BERHAD, and to
ACCEPT the matching bid of petitioner MANILA PRINCE
HOTEL CORPORATION to purchase the subject 51% of the
shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation at P44.00 per share
and thereafter to execute the necessary agreements and
documents to effect the sale, to issue the necessary
clearances and to do such other acts and deeds as may be
necessary for the purpose.
SO ORDERED.
 TINGA, J.:

Petitioner Rev. Elly Velez Pamatong filed his Certificate of

Candidacy for President on December 17, 2003.
Respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) refused
to give due course to petitioner’s Certificate of Candidacy
in its Resolution No. 6558 dated January 17, 2004. The
decision, however, was not unanimous since
Commissioners Luzviminda G. Tancangco and Mehol K.
Sadain voted to include petitioner as they believed he had
parties or movements to back up his candidacy.

On January 15, 2004, petitioner moved for reconsideration

of Resolution No. 6558. Petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration was docketed as SPP (MP) No. 04-001. The
COMELEC, acting on petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration and on similar motions filed by other
aspirants for national elective positions, denied the same
under the aegis of Omnibus Resolution No. 6604 dated
February 11, 2004. The COMELEC declared petitioner and
thirty-five (35) others nuisance candidates who could not
wage a nationwide campaign and/or are not nominated by
a political party or are not supported by a registered
political party with a national constituency. Commissioner
Sadain maintained his vote for petitioner. By then,
Commissioner Tancangco had retired.

In this Petition For Writ of Certiorari, petitioner seeks to

reverse the resolutions which were allegedly rendered in
violation of his right to "equal access to opportunities for
public service" under Section 26, Article II of the 1987

Constitution,1 by limiting the number of qualified

candidates only to those who can afford to wage a
nationwide campaign and/or are nominated by political
parties. In so doing, petitioner argues that the COMELEC
indirectly amended the constitutional provisions on the
electoral process and limited the power of the sovereign
people to choose their leaders. The COMELEC supposedly
erred in disqualifying him since he is the most qualified
among all the presidential candidates, i.e., he possesses all
the constitutional and legal qualifications for the office of
the president, he is capable of waging a national campaign
since he has numerous national organizations under his
leadership, he also has the capacity to wage an
international campaign since he has practiced law in other
countries, and he has a platform of government. Petitioner
likewise attacks the validity of the form for the Certificate
of Candidacy prepared by the COMELEC. Petitioner claims
that the form does not provide clear and reasonable
guidelines for determining the qualifications of candidates
G.R. No. 161872 April 13, 2004 since it does not ask for the candidate’s bio-data and his
REV. ELLY CHAVEZ PAMATONG, ESQUIRE, petitioner, program of government.
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent. First, the constitutional and legal dimensions involved.

RESOLUTION Implicit in the petitioner’s invocation of the constitutional

provision ensuring "equal access to opportunities for
public office" is the claim that there is a constitutional right
to run for or hold public office and, particularly in his case,
to seek the presidency. There is none. What is recognized
is merely a privilege subject to limitations imposed by law.
Section 26, Article II of the Constitution neither bestows
such a right nor elevates the privilege to the level of an
enforceable right. There is nothing in the plain language of
the provision which suggests such a thrust or justifies an
interpretation of the sort.
The "equal access" provision is a subsumed part of Article
II of the Constitution, entitled "Declaration of Principles
and State Policies." The provisions under the Article are
generally considered not self-executing,2 and there is no
plausible reason for according a different treatment to the
"equal access" provision. Like the rest of the policies
enumerated in Article II, the provision does not contain any
judicially enforceable constitutional right but merely
specifies a guideline for legislative or executive action.3
The disregard of the provision does not give rise to any
cause of action before the courts.4
An inquiry into the intent of the framers5 produces the
same determination that the provision is not self-
executory. The original wording of the present Section 26,
Article II had read, "The State shall broaden opportunities
to public office and prohibit public dynasties."6
Commissioner (now Chief Justice) Hilario Davide, Jr.
successfully brought forth an amendment that changed
the word "broaden" to the phrase "ensure equal access,"
and the substitution of the word "office" to "service." He
explained his proposal in this wise:
I changed the word "broaden" to "ENSURE EQUAL ACCESS
TO" because what is important would be equal access to
the opportunity. If you broaden, it would necessarily mean
that the government would be mandated to create as
many offices as are possible to accommodate as many
people as are also possible. That is the meaning of
broadening opportunities to public service. So, in order
that we should not mandate the State to make the
government the number one employer and to limit offices
only to what may be necessary and expedient yet offering
equal opportunities to access to it, I change the word
"broaden."7 (emphasis supplied)
Obviously, the provision is not intended to compel the
State to enact positive measures that would accommodate
as many people as possible into public office. The approval
of the "Davide amendment" indicates the design of the
framers to cast the provision as simply enunciatory of a
desired policy objective and not reflective of the
imposition of a clear State burden.
Moreover, the provision as written leaves much to be
desired if it is to be regarded as the source of positive
rights. It is difficult to interpret the clause as operative in
the absence of legislation since its effective means and
reach are not properly defined. Broadly written, the myriad
of claims that can be subsumed under this rubric appear to
be entirely open-ended.8 Words and phrases such as
"equal access," "opportunities," and "public service" are
susceptible to countless interpretations owing to their
inherent impreciseness. Certainly, it was not the intention
of the framers to inflict on the people an operative but
amorphous foundation from which innately unenforceable
rights may be sourced.
As earlier noted, the privilege of equal access to
opportunities to public office may be subjected to
limitations. Some valid limitations specifically on the
privilege to seek elective office are found in the
provisions9 of the Omnibus Election Code on "Nuisance
Candidates" and COMELEC Resolution No. 645210 dated
December 10, 2002 outlining the instances wherein the
COMELEC may motu proprio refuse to give due course to
or cancel a Certificate of Candidacy.
As long as the limitations apply to everybody equally
without discrimination, however, the equal access clause is
not violated. Equality is not sacrificed as long as the
burdens engendered by the limitations are meant to be
borne by any one who is minded to file a certificate of
candidacy. In the case at bar, there is no showing that any
person is exempt from the limitations or the burdens
which they create.
Significantly, petitioner does not challenge the
constitutionality or validity of Section 69 of the Omnibus
Election Code and COMELEC Resolution No. 6452 dated 10
December 2003. Thus, their presumed validity stands and
has to be accorded due weight.
Clearly, therefore, petitioner’s reliance on the equal access
clause in Section 26, Article II of the Constitution is
misplaced.
The rationale behind the prohibition against nuisance
candidates and the disqualification of candidates who have
not evinced a bona fide intention to run for office is easy to
divine. The State has a compelling interest to ensure that
its electoral exercises are rational, objective, and orderly.
Towards this end, the State takes into account the practical
considerations in conducting elections. Inevitably, the
greater the number of candidates, the greater the
opportunities for logistical confusion, not to mention the
increased allocation of time and resources in preparation
for the election. These practical difficulties should, of
course, never exempt the State from the conduct of a
mandated electoral exercise. At the same time, remedial
actions should be available to alleviate these logistical
hardships, whenever necessary and proper. Ultimately, a
disorderly election is not merely a textbook example of
inefficiency, but a rot that erodes faith in our democratic
institutions. As the United States Supreme Court held:
[T]here is surely an important state interest in requiring
some preliminary showing of a significant modicum of
support before printing the name of a political organization
and its candidates on the ballot – the interest, if no other,
in avoiding confusion, deception and even frustration of
the democratic [process].11
The COMELEC itself recognized these practical
considerations when it promulgated Resolution No. 6558
on 17 January 2004, adopting the study Memorandum of
its Law Department dated 11 January 2004. As observed in
the COMELEC’s Comment:
There is a need to limit the number of candidates
especially in the case of candidates for national positions
because the election process becomes a mockery even if
those who cannot clearly wage a national campaign are
allowed to run. Their names would have to be printed in
the Certified List of Candidates, Voters Information Sheet
and the Official Ballots. These would entail additional costs
to the government. For the official ballots in automated
counting and canvassing of votes, an additional page would
amount to more or less FOUR HUNDRED FIFTY MILLION
PESOS (₱450,000,000.00).
xxx[I]t serves no practical purpose to allow those
candidates to continue if they cannot wage a decent
campaign enough to project the prospect of winning, no
matter how slim.12
The preparation of ballots is but one aspect that would be
affected by allowance of "nuisance candidates" to run in
the elections. Our election laws provide various
entitlements for candidates for public office, such as
watchers in every polling place,13 watchers in the board of
canvassers,14 or even the receipt of electoral
contributions.15 Moreover, there are election rules and
regulations the formulations of which are dependent on
the number of candidates in a given election.
Given these considerations, the ignominious nature of a
nuisance candidacy becomes even more galling. The
organization of an election with bona fide candidates
standing is onerous enough. To add into the mix candidates
with no serious intentions or capabilities to run a viable
campaign would actually impair the electoral process. This
is not to mention the candidacies which are palpably
ridiculous so as to constitute a one-note joke. The poll
body would be bogged by irrelevant minutiae covering
every step of the electoral process, most probably posed at
the instance of these nuisance candidates. It would be a
senseless sacrifice on the part of the State.
Owing to the superior interest in ensuring a credible and
orderly election, the State could exclude nuisance
candidates and need not indulge in, as the song goes,
"their trips to the moon on gossamer wings."
The Omnibus Election Code and COMELEC Resolution No.
6452 are cognizant of the compelling State interest to
ensure orderly and credible elections by excising
impediments thereto, such as nuisance candidacies that
distract and detract from the larger purpose. The COMELEC
is mandated by the Constitution with the administration of
elections16 and endowed with considerable latitude in
adopting means and methods that will ensure the
promotion of free, orderly and honest elections.17
Moreover, the Constitution guarantees that only bona fide
candidates for public office shall be free from any form of
harassment and discrimination.18 The determination of
bona fide candidates is governed by the statutes, and the
concept, to our mind is, satisfactorily defined in the
Omnibus Election Code.
Now, the needed factual premises.
However valid the law and the COMELEC issuance involved
are, their proper application in the case of the petitioner
cannot be tested and reviewed by this Court on the basis
of what is now before it. The assailed resolutions of the
COMELEC do not direct the Court to the evidence which it
considered in determining that petitioner was a nuisance
candidate. This precludes the Court from reviewing at this
instance whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion in disqualifying petitioner, since such a review
would necessarily take into account the matters which the
COMELEC considered in arriving at its decisions.
Petitioner has submitted to this Court mere photocopies of
various documents purportedly evincing his credentials as
an eligible candidate for the presidency. Yet this Court, not
being a trier of facts, can not properly pass upon the
reproductions as evidence at this level. Neither the
COMELEC nor the Solicitor General appended any
document to their respective Comments.
The question of whether a candidate is a nuisance
candidate or not is both legal and factual. The basis of the
factual determination is not before this Court. Thus, the
remand of this case for the reception of further evidence is
in order.
A word of caution is in order. What is at stake is petitioner’s
aspiration and offer to serve in the government. It
deserves not a cursory treatment but a hearing which
conforms to the requirements of due process.
As to petitioner’s attacks on the validity of the form for the
certificate of candidacy, suffice it to say that the form
strictly complies with Section 74 of the Omnibus Election
Code. This provision specifically enumerates what a
certificate of candidacy should contain, with the required
information tending to show that the candidate possesses
the minimum qualifications for the position aspired for as
established by the Constitution and other election laws.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, COMELEC Case No. SPP (MP)
No. 04-001 is hereby remanded to the COMELEC for the
reception of further evidence, to determine the question
on whether petitioner Elly Velez Lao Pamatong is a
nuisance candidate as contemplated in Section 69 of the
Omnibus Election Code.
The COMELEC is directed to hold and complete the
reception of evidence and report its findings to this Court
with deliberate dispatch.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 143855 September 21, 2010
REPRESENTATIVES GERARDO S. ESPINA, ORLANDO FUA,
JR., PROSPERO AMATONG, ROBERT ACE S. BARBERS,
RAUL M. GONZALES, PROSPERO PICHAY, JUAN MIGUEL
ZUBIRI and FRANKLIN BAUTISTA, Petitioners
- versus -
HON. RONALDO ZAMORA, JR. (Executive Secretary), HON.
MAR ROXAS (Secretary of Trade and Industry), HON.
FELIPE MEDALLA (Secretary of National Economic and
Development Authority), GOV. RAFAEL BUENAVENTURA
(Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas) and HON. LILIA BAUTISTA
(Chairman, Securities and Exchange Commission),
Respondents.
ABAD, J.:
This case calls upon the Court to exercise its power of
judicial review and determine the constitutionality of the
Retail Trade Liberalization Act of 2000, which has been
assailed as in breach of the constitutional mandate for the
development of a self-reliant and independent national
economy effectively controlled by Filipinos.
The Facts and the Case
On March 7, 2000 President Joseph E. Estrada signed into
law Republic Act (R.A.) 8762, also known as the Retail
Trade Liberalization Act of 2000. It expressly repealed R.A.
1180, which absolutely prohibited foreign nationals from
engaging in the retail trade business. R.A. 8762 now allows
them to do so under four categories:
R.A. 8762 also allows natural-born Filipino citizens, who
had lost their citizenship and now reside in the Philippines,
to engage in the retail trade business with the same rights
as Filipino citizens.
On October 11, 2000 petitioners Magtanggol T. Gunigundo
I, Michael T. Defensor, Gerardo S. Espina, Benjamin S. Lim,
Orlando Fua, Jr., Prospero Amatong, Sergio Apostol, Robert
Ace S. Barbers, Enrique Garcia, Jr., Raul M. Gonzales, Jaime
Jacob, Apolinario Lozada, Jr., Leonardo Montemayor, Ma.
Elena Palma-Gil, Prospero Pichay, Juan Miguel Zubiri and
Franklin Bautista, all members of the House of
Representatives, filed the present petition, assailing the
constitutionality of R.A. 8762 on the following grounds:

First, the law runs afoul of Sections 9, 19, and 20 of Article
II of the Constitution which enjoins the State to place the
national economy under the control of Filipinos to achieve
equal distribution of opportunities, promote
industrialization and full employment, and protect Filipino
enterprise against unfair competition and trade policies.
Second, the implementation of R.A. 8762 would lead to
alien control of the retail trade, which taken together with
alien dominance of other areas of business, would result in
the loss of effective Filipino control of the economy.
Third, foreign retailers like Walmart and K-Mart would
crush Filipino retailers and sari-sari store vendors, destroy
self-employment, and bring about more unemployment.
Fourth, the World Bank-International Monetary Fund had
improperly imposed the passage of R.A. 8762 on the
government as a condition for the release of certain loans.
Fifth, there is a clear and present danger that the law
would promote monopolies or combinations in restraint of
trade.
Respondents Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora, Jr.,
Trade and Industry Secretary Mar Roxas, National
Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) Secretary
Felipe Medalla, Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas Gov. Rafael
Buenaventura, and Securities and Exchange Commission
Chairman Lilia Bautista countered that:
First, petitioners have no legal standing to file the petition.
They cannot invoke the fact that they are taxpayers since
R.A. 8762 does not involve the disbursement of public
funds. Nor can they invoke the fact that they are members
of Congress since they made no claim that the law
infringes on their right as legislators.
Second, the petition does not involve any justiciable
controversy. Petitioners of course claim that, as members
of Congress, they represent the small retail vendors in their
respective districts but the petition does not allege that
the subject law violates the rights of those vendors.
Third, petitioners have failed to overcome the presumption
of constitutionality of R.A. 8762. Indeed, they could not
specify how the new law violates the constitutional
provisions they cite. Sections 9, 19, and 20 of Article II of
the Constitution are not self-executing provisions that are
judicially demandable.
Fourth, the Constitution mandates the regulation but not
the prohibition of foreign investments. It directs Congress
to reserve to Filipino citizens certain areas of investments
upon the recommendation of the NEDA and when the
national interest so dictates. But the Constitution leaves to
the discretion of the Congress whether or not to make
such reservation. It does not prohibit Congress from
enacting laws allowing the entry of foreigners into certain
industries not reserved by the Constitution to Filipino
citizens.
The Issues Presented.
Simplified, the case presents two issues:
1. Whether or not petitioner lawmakers have the legal
standing to challenge the constitutionality of R.A. 8762;
and
2. Whether or not R.A. 8762 is unconstitutional.
The Courts Ruling
One. The long settled rule is that he who challenges the
validity of a law must have a standing to do so.[1] Legal
standing or locus standi refers to the right of a party to
come to a court of justice and make such a challenge.
More particularly, standing refers to his personal and
substantial interest in that he has suffered or will suffer
direct injury as a result of the passage of that law.[2] To put
it another way, he must show that he has been or is about
to be denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully
entitled or that he is about to be subjected to some
burdens or penalties by reason of the law he complains of.
[3]
Here, there is no clear showing that the implementation of
the Retail Trade Liberalization Act prejudices petitioners or
inflicts damages on them, either as taxpayers[4] or as
legislators.[5] Still the Court will resolve the question they
raise since the rule on standing can be relaxed for
nontraditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers,
and legislators when as in this case the public interest so
requires or the matter is of transcendental importance, of
overarching significance to society, or of paramount public
interest.[6]
Two. Petitioners mainly argue that R.A. 8762 violates the
mandate of the 1987 Constitution for the State to develop
a self-reliant and independent national economy
effectively controlled by Filipinos. They invoke the
provisions of the Declaration of Principles and State
Policies under Article II of the 1987 Constitution, which
read as follows:
Section 9. The State shall promote a just and dynamic
social order that will ensure the prosperity and
independence of the nation and free the people from
poverty through policies that provide adequate social
services, promote full employment, a rising standard of
living, and an improved quality of life for all.
xxxx
Section 19. The State shall develop a self-reliant and
independent national economy effectively controlled by
Filipinos.
Section 20. The State recognizes the indispensable role of
the private sector, encourages private enterprise, and
provides incentives to needed investments.
Petitioners also invoke the provisions of the National
Economy and Patrimony under Article XII of the 1987
Constitution, which reads:
Section 10. The Congress shall, upon recommendation of
the economic and planning agency, when the national
interest dictates, reserve to citizens of the Philippines or to
corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of
whose capital is owned by such citizens, or such higher
percentage as Congress may prescribe, certain areas of
investments. The Congress shall enact measures that will
encourage the formation and operation of enterprises
whose capital is wholly owned by Filipinos.
In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering
the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give
preference to qualified Filipinos.
The State shall regulate and exercise authority over foreign
investments within its national jurisdiction and in
accordance with its national goals and priorities.
xxxx
Section 12. The State shall promote the preferential use of
Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally produced
goods, and adopt measures that help make them
competitive.
Section 13. The State shall pursue a trade policy that serves
the general welfare and utilizes all forms and arrangements
of exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity.
But, as the Court explained in Taada v. Angara,[7] the
provisions of Article II of the 1987 Constitution, the
declarations of principles and state policies, are not self-
executing. Legislative failure to pursue such policies cannot
give rise to a cause of action in the courts.
The Court further explained in Taada that Article XII of the
1987 Constitution lays down the ideals of economic
nationalism: (1) by expressing preference in favor of
qualified Filipinos in the grant of rights, privileges and
concessions covering the national economy and patrimony
and in the use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and
locally-produced goods; (2) by mandating the State to
adopt measures that help make them competitive; and (3)
by requiring the State to develop a self-reliant and
independent national economy effectively controlled by
Filipinos.[8]
In other words, while Section 19, Article II of the 1987
Constitution requires the development of a self-reliant and
independent national economy effectively controlled by
Filipino entrepreneurs, it does not impose a policy of
Filipino monopoly of the economic environment. The
objective is simply to prohibit foreign powers or interests
from maneuvering our economic policies and ensure that
Filipinos are given preference in all areas of development.
Indeed, the 1987 Constitution takes into account the
realities of the outside world as it requires the pursuit of a
trade policy that serves the general welfare and utilizes all
forms and arrangements of exchange on the basis of
equality and reciprocity; and speaks of industries which are
competitive in both domestic and foreign markets as well
as of the protection of Filipino enterprises against unfair
foreign competition and trade practices. Thus, while the
Constitution mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods,
services, labor and enterprises, it also recognizes the need
for business exchange with the rest of the world on the
bases of equality and reciprocity and limits protection of
Filipino enterprises only against foreign competition and
trade practices that are unfair.[9]
In other words, the 1987 Constitution does not rule out
the entry of foreign investments, goods, and services.
While it does not encourage their unlimited entry into the
country, it does not prohibit them either. In fact, it allows
an exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity,
frowning only on foreign competition that is unfair.[10] The
key, as in all economies in the world, is to strike a balance
between protecting local businesses and allowing the entry
of foreign investments and services.
More importantly, Section 10, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution gives Congress the discretion to reserve to
Filipinos certain areas of investments upon the
recommendation of the NEDA and when the national
interest requires. Thus, Congress can determine what
policy to pass and when to pass it depending on the
economic exigencies. It can enact laws allowing the entry
of foreigners into certain industries not reserved by the
Constitution to Filipino citizens. In this case, Congress has
decided to open certain areas of the retail trade business
to foreign investments instead of reserving them
exclusively to Filipino citizens. The NEDA has not opposed
such policy.
The control and regulation of trade in the interest of the
public welfare is of course an exercise of the police power
of the State. A persons right to property, whether he is a
Filipino citizen or foreign national, cannot be taken from
him without due process of law. In 1954, Congress enacted
the Retail Trade Nationalization Act or R.A. 1180 that
restricts the retail business to Filipino citizens. In denying
the petition assailing the validity of such Act for violation
of the foreigners right to substantive due process of law,
the Supreme Court held that the law constituted a valid
exercise of police power.[11] The State had an interest in
preventing alien control of the retail trade and R.A. 1180
was reasonably related to that purpose. That law is not
arbitrary.
Here, to the extent that R.A. 8762, the Retail Trade
Liberalization Act, lessens the restraint on the foreigners
right to property or to engage in an ordinarily lawful
business, it cannot be said that the law amounts to a
denial of the Filipinos right to property and to due process
of law. Filipinos continue to have the right to engage in the
kinds of retail business to which the law in question has
permitted the entry of foreign investors.
Certainly, it is not within the province of the Court to
inquire into the wisdom of R.A. 8762 save when it blatantly
violates the Constitution. But as the Court has said, there is
no showing that the law has contravened any
constitutional mandate. The Court is not convinced that
the implementation of R.A. 8762 would eventually lead to
alien control of the retail trade business. Petitioners have
not mustered any concrete and strong argument to
support its thesis. The law itself has provided strict
safeguards on foreign participation in that business. Thus
First, aliens can only engage in retail trade business subject
to the categories above-enumerated; Second, only
nationals from, or juridical entities formed or incorporated
in countries which allow the entry of Filipino retailers shall
be allowed to engage in retail trade business; and Third,
qualified foreign retailers shall not be allowed to engage in
certain retailing activities outside their accredited stores
through the use of mobile or rolling stores or carts, the use
of sales representatives, door-to-door selling, restaurants
and sari-sari stores and such other similar retailing
activities.
In sum, petitioners have not shown how the retail trade
liberalization has prejudiced and can prejudice the local
small and medium enterprises since its implementation
about a decade ago.
WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the petition for lack of
merit. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 101083 July 30, 1993
JUAN ANTONIO, ANNA ROSARIO and JOSE ALFONSO, all
surnamed OPOSA, minors, and represented by their
parents ANTONIO and RIZALINA OPOSA, ROBERTA
NICOLE SADIUA, minor, represented by her parents
CALVIN and ROBERTA SADIUA, CARLO, AMANDA SALUD
and PATRISHA, all surnamed FLORES, minors and
represented by their parents ENRICO and NIDA FLORES,
GIANINA DITA R. FORTUN, minor, represented by her
parents SIGRID and DOLORES FORTUN, GEORGE II and
MA. CONCEPCION, all surnamed MISA, minors and
represented by their parents GEORGE and MYRA MISA,
BENJAMIN ALAN V. PESIGAN, minor, represented by his
parents ANTONIO and ALICE PESIGAN, JOVIE MARIE
ALFARO, minor, represented by her parents JOSE and
MARIA VIOLETA ALFARO, MARIA CONCEPCION T. CASTRO,
minor, represented by her parents FREDENIL and JANE
CASTRO, JOHANNA DESAMPARADO,
minor, represented by her parents JOSE and ANGELA
DESAMPRADO, CARLO JOAQUIN T. NARVASA, minor,
represented by his parents GREGORIO II and CRISTINE
CHARITY NARVASA, MA. MARGARITA, JESUS IGNACIO,
MA. ANGELA and MARIE GABRIELLE, all surnamed SAENZ,
minors, represented by their parents ROBERTO and
AURORA SAENZ, KRISTINE, MARY ELLEN, MAY, GOLDA
MARTHE and DAVID IAN, all surnamed KING, minors,
represented by their parents MARIO and HAYDEE KING,
DAVID, FRANCISCO and THERESE VICTORIA, all surnamed
ENDRIGA, minors, represented by their parents BALTAZAR
and TERESITA ENDRIGA, JOSE MA. and REGINA MA., all
surnamed ABAYA, minors, represented by their parents
ANTONIO and MARICA ABAYA, MARILIN, MARIO, JR. and
MARIETTE, all surnamed CARDAMA, minors, represented
by their parents MARIO and LINA CARDAMA, CLARISSA,
ANN MARIE, NAGEL, and IMEE LYN, all surnamed OPOSA,
minors and represented by their parents RICARDO and
MARISSA OPOSA, PHILIP JOSEPH, STEPHEN JOHN and
ISAIAH JAMES, all surnamed QUIPIT, minors, represented
by their parents JOSE MAX and VILMI QUIPIT, BUGHAW
CIELO, CRISANTO, ANNA, DANIEL and FRANCISCO, all
surnamed BIBAL, minors, represented by their parents
FRANCISCO, JR. and MILAGROS BIBAL, and THE
PHILIPPINE ECOLOGICAL NETWORK, INC., petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., in his
capacity as the Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources, and THE
HONORABLE ERIBERTO U. ROSARIO, Presiding Judge of
the RTC, Makati, Branch 66, respondents.
Oposa Law Office for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:

In a broader sense, this petition bears upon the right of
Filipinos to a balanced and healthful ecology which the
petitioners dramatically associate with the twin concepts
of "inter-generational responsibility" and "inter-
generational justice." Specifically, it touches on the issue of
whether the said petitioners have a cause of action to
"prevent the misappropriation or impairment" of
Philippine rainforests and "arrest the unabated
hemorrhage of the country's vital life support systems and
continued rape of Mother Earth."
The controversy has its genesis in Civil Case No. 90-77
which was filed before Branch 66 (Makati, Metro Manila)
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), National Capital Judicial
Region. The principal plaintiffs therein, now the principal
petitioners, are all minors duly represented and joined by
their respective parents. Impleaded as an additional
plaintiff is the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), a
domestic, non-stock and non-profit corporation organized
for the purpose of, inter alia, engaging in concerted action
geared for the protection of our environment and natural
resources. The original defendant was the Honorable
Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR). His substitution in this petition by the new
Secretary, the Honorable Angel C. Alcala, was subsequently
ordered upon proper motion by the petitioners.1 The
complaint2 was instituted as a taxpayers' class suit3 and
alleges that the plaintiffs "are all citizens of the Republic of
the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit,
use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is
the country's virgin tropical forests." The same was filed for
themselves and others who are equally concerned about
the preservation of said resource but are "so numerous
that it is impracticable to bring them all before the Court."
The minors further asseverate that they "represent their
generation as well as generations yet unborn."4
Consequently, it is prayed for that judgment be rendered:
. . . ordering defendant, his agents, representatives and
other persons acting in his behalf to —
(1) Cancel all existing timber license agreements in
the country;
(2) Cease and desist from receiving, accepting,
processing, renewing or approving new timber license
agreements.
and granting the plaintiffs ". . . such other reliefs just and
equitable under the premises."5
The complaint starts off with the general averments that
the Philippine archipelago of 7,100 islands has a land area
of thirty million (30,000,000) hectares and is endowed with
rich, lush and verdant rainforests in which varied, rare and
unique species of flora and fauna may be found; these
rainforests contain a genetic, biological and chemical pool
which is irreplaceable; they are also the habitat of
indigenous Philippine cultures which have existed, endured
and flourished since time immemorial; scientific evidence
reveals that in order to maintain a balanced and healthful
ecology, the country's land area should be utilized on the
basis of a ratio of fifty-four per cent (54%) for forest cover
and forty-six per cent (46%) for agricultural, residential,
industrial, commercial and other uses; the distortion and
disturbance of this balance as a consequence of
deforestation have resulted in a host of environmental
tragedies, such as (a) water shortages resulting from drying
up of the water table, otherwise known as the "aquifer," as
well as of rivers, brooks and streams, (b) salinization of the
water table as a result of the intrusion therein of salt
water, incontrovertible examples of which may be found in
the island of Cebu and the Municipality of Bacoor, Cavite,
(c) massive erosion and the consequential loss of soil
fertility and agricultural productivity, with the volume of
soil eroded estimated at one billion (1,000,000,000) cubic
meters per annum — approximately the size of the entire
island of Catanduanes, (d) the endangering and extinction
of the country's unique, rare and varied flora and fauna, (e)
the disturbance and dislocation of cultural communities,
including the disappearance of the Filipino's indigenous
cultures, (f) the siltation of rivers and seabeds and
consequential destruction of corals and other aquatic life
leading to a critical reduction in marine resource
productivity, (g) recurrent spells of drought as is presently
experienced by the entire country, (h) increasing velocity of
typhoon winds which result from the absence of
windbreakers, (i) the floodings of lowlands and agricultural
plains arising from the absence of the absorbent
mechanism of forests, (j) the siltation and shortening of
the lifespan of multi-billion peso dams constructed and
operated for the purpose of supplying water for domestic
uses, irrigation and the generation of electric power, and
(k) the reduction of the earth's capacity to process carbon
dioxide gases which has led to perplexing and catastrophic
climatic changes such as the phenomenon of global
warming, otherwise known as the "greenhouse effect."
Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental
consequences of continued and deforestation are so
capable of unquestionable demonstration that the same
may be submitted as a matter of judicial notice. This
notwithstanding, they expressed their intention to present
expert witnesses as well as documentary, photographic
and film evidence in the course of the trial.
As their cause of action, they specifically allege that:
CAUSE OF ACTION
7. Plaintiffs replead by reference the foregoing
allegations.
8. Twenty-five (25) years ago, the Philippines had
some sixteen (16) million hectares of rainforests
constituting roughly 53% of the country's land mass.
9. Satellite images taken in 1987 reveal that there
remained no more than 1.2 million hectares of said
rainforests or four per cent (4.0%) of the country's land
area.
10. More recent surveys reveal that a mere 850,000
hectares of virgin old-growth rainforests are left, barely
2.8% of the entire land mass of the Philippine archipelago
and about 3.0 million hectares of immature and
uneconomical secondary growth forests.
11. Public records reveal that the defendant's,
predecessors have granted timber license agreements
('TLA's') to various corporations to cut the aggregate area
of 3.89 million hectares for commercial logging purposes.
A copy of the TLA holders and the corresponding areas
covered is hereto attached as Annex "A".
12. At the present rate of deforestation, i.e. about
200,000 hectares per annum or 25 hectares per hour —
nighttime, Saturdays, Sundays and holidays included — the
Philippines will be bereft of forest resources after the end
of this ensuing decade, if not earlier.
13. The adverse effects, disastrous consequences,
serious injury and irreparable damage of this continued
trend of deforestation to the plaintiff minor's generation
and to generations yet unborn are evident and
incontrovertible. As a matter of fact, the environmental
damages enumerated in paragraph 6 hereof are already
being felt, experienced and suffered by the generation of
plaintiff adults.
14. The continued allowance by defendant of TLA
holders to cut and deforest the remaining forest stands will
work great damage and irreparable injury to plaintiffs —
especially plaintiff minors and their successors — who may
never see, use, benefit from and enjoy this rare and unique
natural resource treasure.
This act of defendant constitutes a misappropriation
and/or impairment of the natural resource property he
holds in trust for the benefit of plaintiff minors and
succeeding generations.
15. Plaintiffs have a clear and constitutional right to a
balanced and healthful ecology and are entitled to
protection by the State in its capacity as the parens
patriae.
16. Plaintiff have exhausted all administrative
remedies with the defendant's office. On March 2, 1990,
plaintiffs served upon defendant a final demand to cancel
all logging permits in the country.
A copy of the plaintiffs' letter dated March 1, 1990 is
hereto attached as Annex "B".
17. Defendant, however, fails and refuses to cancel
the existing TLA's to the continuing serious damage and
extreme prejudice of plaintiffs.
18. The continued failure and refusal by defendant
to cancel the TLA's is an act violative of the rights of
plaintiffs, especially plaintiff minors who may be left with a
country that is desertified (sic), bare, barren and devoid of
the wonderful flora, fauna and indigenous cultures which
the Philippines had been abundantly blessed with.
19. Defendant's refusal to cancel the
aforementioned TLA's is manifestly contrary to the public
policy enunciated in the Philippine Environmental Policy
which, in pertinent part, states that it is the policy of the
State —
(a) to create, develop, maintain and improve
conditions under which man and nature can thrive in
productive and enjoyable harmony with each other;
(b) to fulfill the social, economic and other
requirements of present and future generations of Filipinos
and;
(c) to ensure the attainment of an environmental
quality that is conductive to a life of dignity and well-being.
(P.D. 1151, 6 June 1977)
20. Furthermore, defendant's continued refusal to
cancel the aforementioned TLA's is contradictory to the
Constitutional policy of the State to —
a. effect "a more equitable distribution of
opportunities, income and wealth" and "make full and
efficient use of natural resources (sic)." (Section 1, Article
XII of the Constitution);
b. "protect the nation's marine wealth." (Section 2,
ibid);
c. "conserve and promote the nation's cultural
heritage and resources (sic)" (Section 14, Article XIV, id.);
d. "protect and advance the right of the people to a
balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm
and harmony of nature." (Section 16, Article II, id.)
21. Finally, defendant's act is contrary to the highest
law of humankind — the natural law — and violative of
plaintiffs' right to self-preservation and perpetuation.
22. There is no other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in law other than the instant action to arrest the
unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life support
systems and continued rape of Mother Earth. 6
On 22 June 1990, the original defendant, Secretary
Factoran, Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint based
on two (2) grounds, namely: (1) the plaintiffs have no
cause of action against him and (2) the issue raised by the
plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to
the legislative or executive branches of Government. In
their 12 July 1990 Opposition to the Motion, the
petitioners maintain that (1) the complaint shows a clear
and unmistakable cause of action, (2) the motion is dilatory
and (3) the action presents a justiciable question as it
involves the defendant's abuse of discretion.
On 18 July 1991, respondent Judge issued an order
granting the aforementioned motion to dismiss.7 In the
said order, not only was the defendant's claim — that the
complaint states no cause of action against him and that it
raises a political question — sustained, the respondent
Judge further ruled that the granting of the relief prayed
for would result in the impairment of contracts which is
prohibited by the fundamental law of the land.
Plaintiffs thus filed the instant special civil action for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court and
ask this Court to rescind and set aside the dismissal order
on the ground that the respondent Judge gravely abused
his discretion in dismissing the action. Again, the parents of
the plaintiffs-minors not only represent their children, but
have also joined the latter in this case.8
On 14 May 1992, We resolved to give due course to the
petition and required the parties to submit their respective
Memoranda after the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
filed a Comment in behalf of the respondents and the
petitioners filed a reply thereto.
Petitioners contend that the complaint clearly and
unmistakably states a cause of action as it contains
sufficient allegations concerning their right to a sound
environment based on Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil
Code (Human Relations), Section 4 of Executive Order
(E.O.) No. 192 creating the DENR, Section 3 of Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy),
Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution recognizing
the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology,
the concept of generational genocide in Criminal Law and
the concept of man's inalienable right to self-preservation
and self-perpetuation embodied in natural law. Petitioners
likewise rely on the respondent's correlative obligation per
Section 4 of E.O. No. 192, to safeguard the people's right to
a healthful environment.
It is further claimed that the issue of the respondent
Secretary's alleged grave abuse of discretion in granting
Timber License Agreements (TLAs) to cover more areas for
logging than what is available involves a judicial question.
Anent the invocation by the respondent Judge of the
Constitution's non-impairment clause, petitioners maintain
that the same does not apply in this case because TLAs are
not contracts. They likewise submit that even if TLAs may
be considered protected by the said clause, it is well
settled that they may still be revoked by the State when
the public interest so requires.
On the other hand, the respondents aver that the
petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a specific
legal right violated by the respondent Secretary for which
any relief is provided by law. They see nothing in the
complaint but vague and nebulous allegations concerning
an "environmental right" which supposedly entitles the
petitioners to the "protection by the state in its capacity as
parens patriae." Such allegations, according to them, do
not reveal a valid cause of action. They then reiterate the
theory that the question of whether logging should be
permitted in the country is a political question which
should be properly addressed to the executive or
legislative branches of Government. They therefore assert
that the petitioners' resources is not to file an action to
court, but to lobby before Congress for the passage of a bill
that would ban logging totally.
As to the matter of the cancellation of the TLAs,
respondents submit that the same cannot be done by the
State without due process of law. Once issued, a TLA
remains effective for a certain period of time — usually for
twenty-five (25) years. During its effectivity, the same can
neither be revised nor cancelled unless the holder has
been found, after due notice and hearing, to have violated
the terms of the agreement or other forestry laws and
regulations. Petitioners' proposition to have all the TLAs
indiscriminately cancelled without the requisite hearing
would be violative of the requirements of due process.
Before going any further, We must first focus on some
procedural matters. Petitioners instituted Civil Case No. 90-
777 as a class suit. The original defendant and the present
respondents did not take issue with this matter.
Nevertheless, We hereby rule that the said civil case is
indeed a class suit. The subject matter of the complaint is
of common and general interest not just to several, but to
all citizens of the Philippines. Consequently, since the
parties are so numerous, it, becomes impracticable, if not
totally impossible, to bring all of them before the court.
We likewise declare that the plaintiffs therein are
numerous and representative enough to ensure the full
protection of all concerned interests. Hence, all the
requisites for the filing of a valid class suit under Section
12, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court are present both in
the said civil case and in the instant petition, the latter
being but an incident to the former.
This case, however, has a special and novel element.
Petitioners minors assert that they represent their
generation as well as generations yet unborn. We find no
difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, for others
of their generation and for the succeeding generations, file
a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the
succeeding generations can only be based on the concept
of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right,
as hereinafter expounded, considers
the "rhythm and harmony of nature." Nature means the
created world in its entirety.9 Such rhythm and harmony
indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition,
utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the
country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife,
off-shore areas and other natural resources to the end that
their exploration, development and utilization be equitably
accessible to the present as well as future generations. 10
Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to
the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full
enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little
differently, the minors' assertion of their right to a sound
environment constitutes, at the same time, the
performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of
that right for the generations to come.
The locus standi of the petitioners having thus been
addressed, We shall now proceed to the merits of the
petition.
After a careful perusal of the complaint in question and a
meticulous consideration and evaluation of the issues
raised and arguments adduced by the parties, We do not
hesitate to find for the petitioners and rule against the
respondent Judge's challenged order for having been
issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction. The pertinent portions of the said order reads
as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
After a careful and circumspect evaluation of the
Complaint, the Court cannot help but agree with the
defendant. For although we believe that plaintiffs have but
the noblest of all intentions, it (sic) fell short of alleging,
with sufficient definiteness, a specific legal right they are
seeking to enforce and protect, or a specific legal wrong
they are seeking to prevent and redress (Sec. 1, Rule 2,
RRC). Furthermore, the Court notes that the Complaint is
replete with vague assumptions and vague conclusions
based on unverified data. In fine, plaintiffs fail to state a
cause of action in its Complaint against the herein
defendant.
Furthermore, the Court firmly believes that the matter
before it, being impressed with political color and involving
a matter of public policy, may not be taken cognizance of
by this Court without doing violence to the sacred principle
of "Separation of Powers" of the three (3) co-equal
branches of the Government.
The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no
matter how we stretch our jurisdiction, grant the reliefs
prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing timber
license agreements in the country and to cease and desist
from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or
approving new timber license agreements. For to do
otherwise would amount to "impairment of contracts"
abhored (sic) by the fundamental law. 11
We do not agree with the trial court's conclusions that the
plaintiffs failed to allege with sufficient definiteness a
specific legal right involved or a specific legal wrong
committed, and that the complaint is replete with vague
assumptions and conclusions based on unverified data. A
reading of the complaint itself belies these conclusions.
The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal
right — the right to a balanced and healthful ecology
which, for the first time in our nation's constitutional
history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law.
Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution explicitly
provides:
Sec. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of
the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord
with the rhythm and harmony of nature.
This right unites with the right to health which is provided
for in the preceding section of the same article:
Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to
health of the people and instill health consciousness
among them.
While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be
found under the Declaration of Principles and State Policies
and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is
less important than any of the civil and political rights
enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different
category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less
than self-preservation and self-perpetuation — aptly and
fittingly stressed by the petitioners — the advancement of
which may even be said to predate all governments and
constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights need
not even be written in the Constitution for they are
assumed to exist from the inception of humankind. If they
are now explicitly mentioned in the fundamental charter, it
is because of the well-founded fear of its framers that
unless the rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and
to health are mandated as state policies by the
Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their continuing
importance and imposing upon the state a solemn
obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance
the second, the day would not be too far when all else
would be lost not only for the present generation, but also
for those to come — generations which stand to inherit
nothing but parched earth incapable of sustaining life.
The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with
it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the
environment. During the debates on this right in one of the
plenary sessions of the 1986 Constitutional Commission,
the following exchange transpired between Commissioner
Wilfrido Villacorta and Commissioner Adolfo Azcuna who
sponsored the section in question:
MR. VILLACORTA:
Does this section mandate the State to provide sanctions
against all forms of pollution — air, water and noise
pollution?
MR. AZCUNA:
Yes, Madam President. The right to healthful (sic)
environment necessarily carries with it the correlative duty
of not impairing the same and, therefore, sanctions may be
provided for impairment of environmental balance. 12
The said right implies, among many other things, the
judicious management and conservation of the country's
forests.
Without such forests, the ecological or environmental
balance would be irreversiby disrupted.
Conformably with the enunciated right to a balanced and
healthful ecology and the right to health, as well as the
other related provisions of the Constitution concerning the
conservation, development and utilization of the country's
natural resources, 13 then President Corazon C. Aquino
promulgated on 10 June 1987 E.O. No. 192, 14 Section 4 of
which expressly mandates that the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources "shall be the primary
government agency responsible for the conservation,
management, development and proper use of the
country's environment and natural resources, specifically
forest and grazing lands, mineral, resources, including
those in reservation and watershed areas, and lands of the
public domain, as well as the licensing and regulation of all
natural resources as may be provided for by law in order to
ensure equitable sharing of the benefits derived therefrom
for the welfare of the present and future generations of
Filipinos." Section 3 thereof makes the following statement
of policy:
Sec. 3. Declaration of Policy. — It is hereby declared the
policy of the State to ensure the sustainable use,
development, management, renewal, and conservation of
the country's forest, mineral, land, off-shore areas and
other natural resources, including the protection and
enhancement of the quality of the environment, and
equitable access of the different segments of the
population to the development and the use of the
country's natural resources, not only for the present
generation but for future generations as well. It is also the
policy of the state to recognize and apply a true value
system including social and environmental cost
implications relative to their utilization, development and
conservation of our natural resources.
This policy declaration is substantially re-stated it Title XIV,
Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987,15 specifically
in Section 1 thereof which reads:
Sec. 1. Declaration of Policy. — (1) The State shall ensure,
for the benefit of the Filipino people, the full exploration
and development as well as the judicious disposition,
utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the
country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife,
off-shore areas and other natural resources, consistent
with the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological
balance and protecting and enhancing the quality of the
environment and the objective of making the exploration,
development and utilization of such natural resources
equitably accessible to the different segments of the
present as well as future generations.
(2) The State shall likewise recognize and apply a
true value system that takes into account social and
environmental cost implications relative to the utilization,
development and conservation of our natural resources.
The above provision stresses "the necessity of maintaining
a sound ecological balance and protecting and enhancing
the quality of the environment." Section 2 of the same
Title, on the other hand, specifically speaks of the mandate
of the DENR; however, it makes particular reference to the
fact of the agency's being subject to law and higher
authority. Said section provides:
Sec. 2. Mandate. — (1) The Department of Environment
and Natural Resources shall be primarily responsible for
the implementation of the foregoing policy.
(2) It shall, subject to law and higher authority, be in
charge of carrying out the State's constitutional mandate
to control and supervise the exploration, development,
utilization, and conservation of the country's natural
resources.
Both E.O. NO. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987
have set the objectives which will serve as the bases for
policy formulation, and have defined the powers and
functions of the DENR.
It may, however, be recalled that even before the
ratification of the 1987 Constitution, specific statutes
already paid special attention to the "environmental right"
of the present and future generations. On 6 June 1977, P.D.
No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy) and P.D. No.
1152 (Philippine Environment Code) were issued. The
former "declared a continuing policy of the State (a) to
create, develop, maintain and improve conditions under
which man and nature can thrive in productive and
enjoyable harmony with each other, (b) to fulfill the social,
economic and other requirements of present and future
generations of Filipinos, and (c) to insure the attainment of
an environmental quality that is conducive to a life of
dignity and well-being." 16 As its goal, it speaks of the
"responsibilities of each generation as trustee and
guardian of the environment for succeeding generations."
17 The latter statute, on the other hand, gave flesh to the
said policy.
Thus, the right of the petitioners (and all those they
represent) to a balanced and healthful ecology is as clear
as the DENR's duty — under its mandate and by virtue of
its powers and functions under E.O. No. 192 and the
Administrative Code of 1987 — to protect and advance the
said right.
A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the
corelative duty or obligation to respect or protect the same
gives rise to a cause of action. Petitioners maintain that the
granting of the TLAs, which they claim was done with grave
abuse of discretion, violated their right to a balanced and
healthful ecology; hence, the full protection thereof
requires that no further TLAs should be renewed or
granted.
A cause of action is defined as:
. . . an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal
right or rights of the other; and its essential elements are
legal right of the plaintiff, correlative obligation of the
defendant, and act or omission of the defendant in
violation of said legal right. 18
It is settled in this jurisdiction that in a motion to dismiss
based on the ground that the complaint fails to state a
cause of action, 19 the question submitted to the court for
resolution involves the sufficiency of the facts alleged in
the complaint itself. No other matter should be considered;
furthermore, the truth of falsity of the said allegations is
beside the point for the truth thereof is deemed
hypothetically admitted. The only issue to be resolved in
such a case is: admitting such alleged facts to be true, may
the court render a valid judgment in accordance with the
prayer in the complaint? 20 In Militante vs. Edrosolano, 21
this Court laid down the rule that the judiciary should
"exercise the utmost care and circumspection in passing
upon a motion to dismiss on the ground of the absence
thereof [cause of action] lest, by its failure to manifest a
correct appreciation of the facts alleged and deemed
hypothetically admitted, what the law grants or recognizes
is effectively nullified. If that happens, there is a blot on
the legal order. The law itself stands in disrepute."
After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, We
find the statements under the introductory affirmative
allegations, as well as the specific averments under the
sub-heading CAUSE OF ACTION, to be adequate enough to
show, prima facie, the claimed violation of their rights. On
the basis thereof, they may thus be granted, wholly or
partly, the reliefs prayed for. It bears stressing, however,
that insofar as the cancellation of the TLAs is concerned,
there is the need to implead, as party defendants, the
grantees thereof for they are indispensable parties.
The foregoing considered, Civil Case No. 90-777 be said to
raise a political question. Policy formulation or
determination by the executive or legislative branches of
Government is not squarely put in issue. What is
principally involved is the enforcement of a right vis-a-vis
policies already formulated and expressed in legislation. It
must, nonetheless, be emphasized that the political
question doctrine is no longer, the insurmountable
obstacle to the exercise of judicial power or the
impenetrable shield that protects executive and legislative
actions from judicial inquiry or review. The second
paragraph of section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution
states that:
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether
or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
Commenting on this provision in his book, Philippine
Political Law, 22 Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz, a distinguished
member of this Court, says:
The first part of the authority represents the traditional
concept of judicial power, involving the settlement of
conflicting rights as conferred as law. The second part of
the authority represents a broadening of judicial power to
enable the courts of justice to review what was before
forbidden territory, to wit, the discretion of the political
departments of the government.
As worded, the new provision vests in the judiciary, and
particularly the Supreme Court, the power to rule upon
even the wisdom of the decisions of the executive and the
legislature and to declare their acts invalid for lack or
excess of jurisdiction because tainted with grave abuse of
discretion. The catch, of course, is the meaning of "grave
abuse of discretion," which is a very elastic phrase that can
expand or contract according to the disposition of the
judiciary.
In Daza vs. Singson, 23 Mr. Justice Cruz, now speaking for
this Court, noted:
In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection
becomes even less tenable and decisive. The reason is
that, even if we were to assume that the issue presented
before us was political in nature, we would still not be
precluded from revolving it under the expanded
jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers, in proper
cases, even the political question. Article VII, Section 1, of
the Constitution clearly provides: . . .
The last ground invoked by the trial court in dismissing the
complaint is the non-impairment of contracts clause found
in the Constitution. The court a quo declared that:
The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no
matter how we stretch our jurisdiction, grant the reliefs
prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing timber
license agreements in the country and to cease and desist
from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or
approving new timber license agreements. For to do
otherwise would amount to "impairment of contracts"
abhored (sic) by the fundamental law. 24
We are not persuaded at all; on the contrary, We are
amazed, if not shocked, by such a sweeping
pronouncement. In the first place, the respondent
Secretary did not, for obvious reasons, even invoke in his
motion to dismiss the non-impairment clause. If he had
done so, he would have acted with utmost infidelity to the
Government by providing undue and unwarranted benefits
and advantages to the timber license holders because he
would have forever bound the Government to strictly
respect the said licenses according to their terms and
conditions regardless of changes in policy and the
demands of public interest and welfare. He was aware that
as correctly pointed out by the petitioners, into every
timber license must be read Section 20 of the Forestry
Reform Code (P.D. No. 705) which provides:
. . . Provided, That when the national interest so requires,
the President may amend, modify, replace or rescind any
contract, concession, permit, licenses or any other form of
privilege granted herein . . .
Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or
rescinded by executive action. It is not a contract, property
or a property right protested by the due process clause of
the Constitution. In Tan vs. Director of Forestry, 25 this
Court held:
. . . A timber license is an instrument by which the State
regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources
to the end that public welfare is promoted. A timber
license is not a contract within the purview of the due
process clause; it is only a license or privilege, which can be
validly withdrawn whenever dictated by public interest or
public welfare as in this case.
A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what
otherwise would be unlawful, and is not a contract
between the authority, federal, state, or municipal,
granting it and the person to whom it is granted; neither is
it property or a property right, nor does it create a vested
right; nor is it taxation (37 C.J. 168). Thus, this Court held
that the granting of license does not create irrevocable
rights, neither is it property or property rights (People vs.
Ong Tin, 54 O.G. 7576).
We reiterated this pronouncement in Felipe Ysmael, Jr. &
Co., Inc. vs. Deputy Executive Secretary: 26
. . . Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are
the principal instruments by which the State regulates the
utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end
that public welfare is promoted. And it can hardly be
gainsaid that they merely evidence a privilege granted by
the State to qualified entities, and do not vest in the latter
a permanent or irrevocable right to the particular
concession area and the forest products therein. They may
be validly amended, modified, replaced or rescinded by
the Chief Executive when national interests so require.
Thus, they are not deemed contracts within the purview of
the due process of law clause [See Sections 3(ee) and 20 of
Pres. Decree No. 705, as amended. Also, Tan v. Director of
Forestry, G.R. No. L-24548, October 27, 1983, 125 SCRA
302].
Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-
impairment clause, which reads:
Sec. 10. No law impairing, the obligation of contracts
shall be passed. 27
cannot be invoked.
In the second place, even if it is to be assumed that the
same are contracts, the instant case does not involve a law
or even an executive issuance declaring the cancellation or
modification of existing timber licenses. Hence, the non-
impairment clause cannot as yet be invoked. Nevertheless,
granting further that a law has actually been passed
mandating cancellations or modifications, the same cannot
still be stigmatized as a violation of the non-impairment
clause. This is because by its very nature and purpose, such
as law could have only been passed in the exercise of the
police power of the state for the purpose of advancing the
right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology,
promoting their health and enhancing the general welfare.
In Abe vs. Foster Wheeler
Corp. 28 this Court stated:
The freedom of contract, under our system of government,
is not meant to be absolute. The same is understood to be
subject to reasonable legislative regulation aimed at the
promotion of public health, moral, safety and welfare. In
other words, the constitutional guaranty of non-
impairment of obligations of contract is limited by the
exercise of the police power of the State, in the interest of
public health, safety, moral and general welfare.
The reason for this is emphatically set forth in Nebia vs.
New York, 29 quoted in Philippine American Life Insurance
Co. vs. Auditor General,30 to wit:
Under our form of government the use of property and the
making of contracts are normally matters of private and
not of public concern. The general rule is that both shall be
free of governmental interference. But neither property
rights nor contract rights are absolute; for government
cannot exist if the citizen may at will use his property to
the detriment of his fellows, or exercise his freedom of
contract to work them harm. Equally fundamental with the
private right is that of the public to regulate it in the
common interest.
In short, the non-impairment clause must yield to the
police power of the state. 31
Finally, it is difficult to imagine, as the trial court did, how
the non-impairment clause could apply with respect to the
prayer to enjoin the respondent Secretary from receiving,
accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber
licenses for, save in cases of renewal, no contract would
have as of yet existed in the other instances. Moreover,
with respect to renewal, the holder is not entitled to it as a
matter of right.
WHEREFORE, being impressed with merit, the instant
Petition is hereby GRANTED, and the challenged Order of
respondent Judge of 18 July 1991 dismissing Civil Case No.
90-777 is hereby set aside. The petitioners may therefore
amend their complaint to implead as defendants the
holders or grantees of the questioned timber license
agreements.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-72119 May 29, 1987
VALENTIN L. LEGASPI, petitioner,
vs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, respondent.
CORTES, J.:
The fundamental right of the people to information on
matters of public concern is invoked in this special civil
action for mandamus instituted by petitioner Valentin L.
Legaspi against the Civil Service Commission. The
respondent had earlier denied Legaspi's request for
information on the civil service eligibilities of certain
persons employed as sanitarians in the Health Department
of Cebu City. These government employees, Julian
Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas, had allegedly represented
themselves as civil service eligibles who passed the civil
service examinations for sanitarians.
Claiming that his right to be informed of the eligibilities of
Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas, is guaranteed by
the Constitution, and that he has no other plain, speedy
and adequate remedy to acquire the information,
petitioner prays for the issuance of the extraordinary writ
of mandamus to compel the respondent Commission to
disclose said information.
This is not the first tune that the writ of mandamus is
sought to enforce the fundamental right to information.
The same remedy was resorted to in the case of Tanada et.
al. vs. Tuvera et. al., (G.R. No. L-63915, April 24,1985,136
SCRA 27) wherein the people's right to be informed under
the 1973 Constitution (Article IV, Section 6) was invoked in
order to compel the publication in the Official Gazette of
various presidential decrees, letters of instructions and
other presidential issuances. Prior to the recognition of the
right in said Constitution the statutory right to information
provided for in the Land Registration Act (Section 56, Act
496, as amended) was claimed by a newspaper editor in
another mandamus proceeding, this time to demand
access to the records of the Register of Deeds for the
purpose of gathering data on real estate transactions
involving aliens (Subido vs. Ozaeta, 80 Phil. 383 [1948]).
The constitutional right to information on matters of public
concern first gained recognition in the Bill of Rights, Article
IV, of the 1973 Constitution, which states:
Sec. 6. The right of the people to information on matters of
public concern shall be recognized. Access to official
records, and to documents and papers pertaining to official
acts, transactions, or decisions, shall be afforded the
citizen subject to such limitations as may be provided by
law.
The foregoing provision has been retained and the right
therein provided amplified in Article III, Sec. 7 of the 1987
Constitution with the addition of the phrase, "as well as to
government research data used as basis for policy
development." The new provision reads:
The right of the people to information on matters of public
concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and
to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts,
transactions, or decisions, as well as to government
research data used as basis. for policy development, shall
be afforded the citizen, subject to such stations as may be
provided by law.
These constitutional provisions are self-executing. They
supply the rules by means of which the right to
information may be enjoyed (Cooley, A Treatise on the
Constitutional Limitations 167 [1927]) by guaranteeing the
right and mandating the duty to afford access to sources of
information. Hence, the fundamental right therein
recognized may be asserted by the people upon the
ratification of the constitution without need for any
ancillary act of the Legislature. (Id. at, p. 165) What may be
provided for by the Legislature are reasonable conditions
and limitations upon the access to be afforded which must,
of necessity, be consistent with the declared State policy of
full public disclosure of all transactions involving public
interest (Constitution, Art. 11, Sec. 28). However, it cannot
be overemphasized that whatever limitation may be
prescribed by the Legislature, the right and the duty under
Art. III Sec. 7 have become operative and enforceable by
virtue of the adoption of the New Charter. Therefore, the
right may be properly invoked in a mandamus proceeding
such as this one.
The Solicitor General interposes procedural objections to
Our giving due course to this Petition. He challenges the
petitioner's standing to sue upon the ground that the latter
does not possess any clear legal right to be informed of the
civil service eligibilities of the government employees
concerned. He calls attention to the alleged failure of the
petitioner to show his actual interest in securing this
particular information. He further argues that there is no
ministerial duty on the part of the Commission to furnish
the petitioner with the information he seeks.
1. To be given due course, a Petition for mandamus
must have been instituted by a party aggrieved by the
alleged inaction of any tribunal, corporation, board or
person which unlawfully excludes said party from the
enjoyment of a legal right. (Ant;-Chinese League of the
Philippines vs. Felix, 77 Phil. 1012 [1947]). The petitioner in
every case must therefore be an "aggrieved party" in the
sense that he possesses a clear legal right to be enforced
and a direct interest in the duty or act to be performed.
In the case before Us, the respondent takes issue on the
personality of the petitioner to bring this suit. It is asserted
that, the instant Petition is bereft of any allegation of
Legaspi's actual interest in the civil service eligibilities of
Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas, At most there is a
vague reference to an unnamed client in whose behalf he
had allegedly acted when he made inquiries on the subject
(Petition, Rollo, p. 3).
But what is clear upon the face of the Petition is that the
petitioner has firmly anchored his case upon the right of
the people to information on matters of public concern,
which, by its very nature, is a public right. It has been held
that:
* * * when the question is one of public right and the
object of the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of
a public duty, the people are regarded as the real party in
interest and the relator at whose instigation the
proceedings are instituted need not show that he has any
legal or special interest in the result, it being sufficient to
show that he is a citizen and as such interested in the
execution of the laws * * * (Tanada et. al. vs. Tuvera, et. al.,
G.R. No. L- 63915, April 24, 1985, 136 SCRA 27, 36).
From the foregoing, it becomes apparent that when a
mandamus proceeding involves the assertion of a public
right, the requirement of personal interest is satisfied by
the mere fact that the petitioner is a citizen, and therefore,
part of the general "public" which possesses the right.
The Court had opportunity to define the word "public" in
the Subido case, supra, when it held that even those who
have no direct or tangible interest in any real estate
transaction are part of the "public" to whom "(a)ll records
relating to registered lands in the Office of the Register of
Deeds shall be open * * *" (Sec. 56, Act No. 496, as
amended). In the words of the Court:
* * * "Public" is a comprehensive, all-inclusive term.
Properly construed, it embraces every person. To say that
only those who have a present and existing interest of a
pecuniary character in the particular information sought
are given the right of inspection is to make an unwarranted
distinction. *** (Subido vs. Ozaeta, supra at p. 387).
The petitioner, being a citizen who, as such is clothed with
personality to seek redress for the alleged obstruction of
the exercise of the public right. We find no cogent reason
to deny his standing to bring the present suit.
2. For every right of the people recognized as
fundamental, there lies a corresponding duty on the part
of those who govern, to respect and protect that right.
That is the very essence of the Bill of Rights in a
constitutional regime. Only governments operating under
fundamental rules defining the limits of their power so as
to shield individual rights against its arbitrary exercise can
properly claim to be constitutional (Cooley, supra, at p. 5).
Without a government's acceptance of the limitations
imposed upon it by the Constitution in order to uphold
individual liberties, without an acknowledgment on its part
of those duties exacted by the rights pertaining to the
citizens, the Bill of Rights becomes a sophistry, and liberty,
the ultimate illusion.
In recognizing the people's right to be informed, both the
1973 Constitution and the New Charter expressly mandate
the duty of the State and its agents to afford access to
official records, documents, papers and in addition,
government research data used as basis for policy
development, subject to such limitations as may be
provided by law. The guarantee has been further enhanced
in the New Constitution with the adoption of a policy of
full public disclosure, this time "subject to reasonable
conditions prescribed by law," in Article 11, Section 28
thereof, to wit:
Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the
State adopts and implements a policy of full public
disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.
(Art. 11, Sec. 28).
In the Tanada case, supra, the constitutional guarantee was
bolstered by what this Court declared as an imperative
duty of the government officials concerned to publish all
important legislative acts and resolutions of a public nature
as well as all executive orders and proclamations of general
applicability. We granted mandamus in said case, and in
the process, We found occasion to expound briefly on the
nature of said duty:
* * * That duty must be enforced if the Constitutional right
of the people to be informed on matters of public concern
is to be given substance and reality. The law itself makes a
list of what should be published in the Official Gazette.
Such listing, to our mind, leaves respondents with no
discretion whatsoever as to what must be in included or
excluded from such publication. (Tanada v. Tuvera, supra,
at 39). (Emphasis supplied).
The absence of discretion on the part of government
agencia es in allowing the examination of public records,
specifically, the records in the Office of the Register of
Deeds, is emphasized in Subido vs. Ozaeta, supra:
Except, perhaps when it is clear that the purpose of the
examination is unlawful, or sheer, idle curiosity, we do not
believe it is the duty under the law of registration officers
to concern themselves with the motives, reasons, and
objects of the person seeking access to the records. It is
not their prerogative to see that the information which the
records contain is not flaunted before public gaze, or that
scandal is not made of it. If it be wrong to publish the
contents of the records, it is the legislature and not the
officials having custody thereof which is called upon to
devise a remedy. *** (Subido v. Ozaeta, supra at 388).
(Emphasis supplied).
It is clear from the foregoing pronouncements of this Court
that government agencies are without discretion in
refusing disclosure of, or access to, information of public
concern. This is not to lose sight of the reasonable
regulations which may be imposed by said agencies in
custody of public records on the manner in which the right
to information may be exercised by the public. In the
Subido case, We recognized the authority of the Register of
Deeds to regulate the manner in which persons desiring to
do so, may inspect, examine or copy records relating to
registered lands. However, the regulations which the
Register of Deeds may promulgate are confined to:
* * * prescribing the manner and hours of examination to
the end that damage to or loss of, the records may be
avoided, that undue interference with the duties of the
custodian of the books and documents and other
employees may be prevented, that the right of other
persons entitled to make inspection may be insured * * *
(Subido vs. Ozaeta, 80 Phil. 383, 387)
Applying the Subido ruling by analogy, We recognized a
similar authority in a municipal judge, to regulate the
manner of inspection by the public of criminal docket
records in the case of Baldoza vs. Dimaano (Adm. Matter
No. 1120-MJ, May 5, 1976, 71 SCRA 14). Said
administrative case was filed against the respondent judge
for his alleged refusal to allow examination of the criminal
docket records in his sala. Upon a finding by the
Investigating Judge that the respondent had allowed the
complainant to open and view the subject records, We
absolved the respondent. In effect, We have also held that
the rules and conditions imposed by him upon the manner
of examining the public records were reasonable.
In both the Subido and the Baldoza cases, We were
emphatic in Our statement that the authority to regulate
the manner of examining public records does not carry
with it the power to prohibit. A distinction has to be made
between the discretion to refuse outright the disclosure of
or access to a particular information and the authority to
regulate the manner in which the access is to be afforded.
The first is a limitation upon the availability of access to the
information sought, which only the Legislature may impose
(Art. III, Sec. 6, 1987 Constitution). The second pertains to
the government agency charged with the custody of public
records. Its authority to regulate access is to be exercised
solely to the end that damage to, or loss of, public records
may be avoided, undue interference with the duties of said
agencies may be prevented, and more importantly, that
the exercise of the same constitutional right by other
persons shall be assured (Subido vs. Ozaetal supra).
Thus, while the manner of examining public records may
be subject to reasonable regulation by the government
agency in custody thereof, the duty to disclose the
information of public concern, and to afford access to
public records cannot be discretionary on the part of said
agencies. Certainly, its performance cannot be made
contingent upon the discretion of such agencies.
Otherwise, the enjoyment of the constitutional right may
be rendered nugatory by any whimsical exercise of agency
discretion. The constitutional duty, not being discretionary,
its performance may be compelled by a writ of mandamus
in a proper case.
But what is a proper case for Mandamus to issue? In the
case before Us, the public right to be enforced and the
concomitant duty of the State are unequivocably set forth
in the Constitution. The decisive question on the propriety
of the issuance of the writ of mandamus in this case is,
whether the information sought by the petitioner is within
the ambit of the constitutional guarantee.
3. The incorporation in the Constitution of a
guarantee of access to information of public concern is a
recognition of the essentiality of the free flow of ideas and
information in a democracy (Baldoza v. Dimaano, Adm.
Matter No. 1120-MJ, May 5, 1976, 17 SCRA 14). In the
same way that free discussion enables members of society
to cope with the exigencies of their time (Thornhill vs.
Alabama, 310 U.S. 88,102 [1939]), access to information of
general interest aids the people in democratic decision-
making (87 Harvard Law Review 1505 [1974]) by giving
them a better perspective of the vital issues confronting
the nation.
But the constitutional guarantee to information on matters
of public concern is not absolute. It does not open every
door to any and all information. Under the Constitution,
access to official records, papers, etc., are "subject to
limitations as may be provided by law" (Art. III, Sec. 7,
second sentence). The law may therefore exempt certain
types of information from public scrutiny, such as those
affecting national security (Journal No. 90, September 23,
1986, p. 10; and Journal No. 91, September 24, 1986, p.
32, 1986 Constitutional Commission). It follows that, in
every case, the availability of access to a particular public
record must be circumscribed by the nature of the
information sought, i.e., (a) being of public concern or one
that involves public interest, and, (b) not being exempted
by law from the operation of the constitutional guarantee.
The threshold question is, therefore, whether or not the
information sought is of public interest or public concern.
a. This question is first addressed to the
government agency having custody of the desired
information. However, as already discussed, this does not
give the agency concerned any discretion to grant or deny
access. In case of denial of access, the government agency
has the burden of showing that the information requested
is not of public concern, or, if it is of public concern, that
the same has been exempted by law from the operation of
the guarantee. To hold otherwise will serve to dilute the
constitutional right. As aptly observed, ". . . the
government is in an advantageous position to marshall and
interpret arguments against release . . ." (87 Harvard Law
Review 1511 [1974]). To safeguard the constitutional right,
every denial of access by the government agency
concerned is subject to review by the courts, and in the
proper case, access may be compelled by a writ of
Mandamus.
In determining whether or not a particular information is
of public concern there is no rigid test which can be
applied. "Public concern" like "public interest" is a term
that eludes exact definition. Both terms embrace a broad
spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know,
either because these directly affect their lives, or simply
because such matters naturally arouse the interest of an
ordinary citizen. In the final analysis, it is for the courts to
determine in a case by case basis whether the matter at
issue is of interest or importance, as it relates to or affects
the public.
The public concern invoked in the case of Tanada v. Tuvera,
supra, was the need for adequate notice to the public of
the various laws which are to regulate the actions and
conduct of citizens. In Subido vs. Ozaeta, supra, the public
concern deemed covered by the statutory right was the
knowledge of those real estate transactions which some
believed to have been registered in violation of the
Constitution.
The information sought by the petitioner in this case is the
truth of the claim of certain government employees that
they are civil service eligibles for the positions to which
they were appointed. The Constitution expressly declares
as a State policy that:
Appointments in the civil service shall be made only
according to merit and fitness to be determined, as far as
practicable, and except as to positions which are policy
determining, primarily confidential or highly technical, by
competitive examination. (Art. IX, B, Sec. 2.[2]).
Public office being a public trust, [Const. Art. XI, Sec. 1] it is
the legitimate concern of citizens to ensure that
government positions requiring civil service eligibility are
occupied only by persons who are eligibles. Public officers
are at all times accountable to the people even as to their
eligibilities for their respective positions.

b. But then, it is not enough that the information

sought is of public interest. For mandamus to lie in a given
case, the information must not be among the species
exempted by law from the operation of the constitutional
guarantee.

In the instant, case while refusing to confirm or deny the

claims of eligibility, the respondent has failed to cite any
provision in the Civil Service Law which would limit the
petitioner's right to know who are, and who are not, civil
service eligibles. We take judicial notice of the fact that the
names of those who pass the civil service examinations, as
in bar examinations and licensure examinations for various
professions, are released to the public. Hence, there is
nothing secret about one's civil service eligibility, if actually
possessed. Petitioner's request is, therefore, neither
unusual nor unreasonable. And when, as in this case, the
government employees concerned claim to be civil service G.R. No. L-32432 September 11, 1970
eligibles, the public, through any citizen, has a right to
verify their professed eligibilities from the Civil Service MANUEL B. IMBONG, petitioner,
Commission. vs.
JAIME FERRER, as Chairman of the Comelec, LINO M.
The civil service eligibility of a sanitarian being of public PATAJO and CESAR MILAFLOR, as members thereof,
concern, and in the absence of express limitations under respondents.
the law upon access to the register of civil service eligibles
for said position, the duty of the respondent Commission G.R. No. L-32443 September 11, 1970
to confirm or deny the civil service eligibility of any person
occupying the position becomes imperative. Mandamus, IN THE MATTER OF A PETITION FOR DECLARATORY
therefore lies. JUDGMENT REGARDING THE VALIDITY OF R.A. No. 6132,
OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE CONSTITUTIONAL
WHEREFORE, the Civil Service Commission is ordered to CONVENTION ACT OF 1970. RAUL M. GONZALES,
open its register of eligibles for the position of sanitarian, petitioner,
and to confirm or deny, the civil service eligibility of Julian vs.
Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas, for said position in the COMELEC, respondent.
Health Department of Cebu City, as requested by the
petitioner Valentin L. Legaspi. Manuel B. Imbong in his own behalf.

Raul M. Gonzales in his own behalf.

Office of the Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio, Acting

Assistant Solicitor General Ricardo L. Pronove, Jr., and
Solicitors Raul I. Goco, Bernardo P. Pardo, Rosalio A. de
Leon, Vicente A. Torres and Guillermo C. Nakar for
respondents.

Lorenzo Tañada, Arturo Tolentino, Jovito Salonga and

Emmanuel Pelaez as amici curiae.

MAKASIAR, J.:

These two separate but related petitions for declaratory

relief were filed pursuant to Sec. 19 of R.A. No. 6132 by
petitioners Manuel B. Imbong and Raul M. Gonzales, both
members of the Bar, taxpayers and interested in running as
candidates for delegates to the Constitutional Convention.
Both impugn the constitutionality of R.A. No. 6132,
claiming during the oral argument that it prejudices their
rights as such candidates. After the Solicitor General had
filed answers in behalf the respondents, hearings were
held at which the petitioners and the amici curiae, namely
Senator Lorenzo Tañada, Senator Arturo Tolentino, Senator
Jovito Salonga, and Senator Emmanuel Pelaez argued
orally.
It will be recalled that on March 16, 1967, Congress, acting
as a Constituent Assembly pursuant to Art. XV of the
Constitution, passed Resolution No. 2 which among others
called for a Constitutional Convention to propose
constitutional amendments to be composed of two
delegates from each representative district who shall have
the same qualifications as those of Congressmen, to be
elected on the second Tuesday of November, 1970 in
accordance with the Revised Election Code.
After the adoption of said Res. No. 2 in 1967 but before the
November elections of that year, Congress, acting as a
legislative body, enacted Republic Act No. 4914
implementing the aforesaid Resolution No. 2 and
practically restating in toto the provisions of said
Resolution No. 2.
On June 17, 1969, Congress, also acting as a Constituent
Assembly, passed Resolution No. 4 amending the aforesaid
Resolution No. 2 of March 16, 1967 by providing that the
convention "shall be composed of 320 delegates
apportioned among the existing representative districts
according to the number of their respective inhabitants:
Provided, that a representative district shall be entitled to
at least two delegates, who shall have the same
qualifications as those required of members of the House
of Representatives,"1 "and that any other details relating
to the specific apportionment of delegates, election of
delegates to, and the holding of, the Constitutional
Convention shall be embodied in an implementing
legislation: Provided, that it shall not be inconsistent with
the provisions of this Resolution."2
On August 24, 1970, Congress, acting as a legislative body,
enacted Republic Act No. 6132, implementing Resolutions
Nos. 2 and 4, and expressly repealing R.A. No.
4914.3
Petitioner Raul M. Gonzales assails the validity of the entire
law as well as the particular provisions embodied in
Sections 2, 4, 5, and par. 1 of 8(a). Petitioner Manuel B.
Imbong impugns the constitutionality of only par. I of Sec.
8(a) of said R.A. No. 6132 practically on the same grounds
advanced by petitioner Gonzales.
I necessary implication withdrawn or removed by the
The validity of Sec. 4 of R.A. No. 6132, which considers, all
public officers and employees, whether elective or
appointive, including members of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, as well as officers and employees of
corporations or enterprises of the government, as resigned
from the date of the filing of their certificates of candidacy,
was recently sustained by this Court, on the grounds, inter
alia, that the same is merely an application of and in
consonance with the prohibition in Sec. 2 of Art. XII of the
Constitution and that it does not constitute a denial of due
process or of the equal protection of the law. Likewise, the
constitutionality of paragraph 2 of Sec. 8(a) of R.A. No.
6132 was upheld.4
II
Without first considering the validity of its specific
provisions, we sustain the constitutionality of the
enactment of R.A. No. 6132 by Congress acting as a
legislative body in the exercise of its broad law-making
authority, and not as a Constituent Assembly, because —
1. Congress, when acting as a Constituent Assembly
pursuant to Art. XV of the Constitution, has full and
plenary authority to propose Constitutional amendments
or to call a convention for the purpose, by a three-fourths
vote of each House in joint session assembled but voting
separately. Resolutions Nos. 2 and 4 calling for a
constitutional convention were passed by the required
three-fourths vote.
2. The grant to Congress as a Constituent Assembly
of such plenary authority to call a constitutional
convention includes, by virtue of the doctrine of necessary
implication, all other powers essential to the effective
exercise of the principal power granted, such as the power
to fix the qualifications, number, apportionment, and
compensation of the delegates as well as appropriation of
funds to meet the expenses for the election of delegates
and for the operation of the Constitutional Convention
itself, as well as all other implementing details
indispensable to a fruitful convention. Resolutions Nos. 2
and 4 already embody the above-mentioned details,
except the appropriation of funds.
3. While the authority to call a constitutional
convention is vested by the present Constitution solely and
exclusively in Congress acting as a Constituent Assembly,
the power to enact the implementing details, which are
now contained in Resolutions Nos. 2 and 4 as well as in
R.A. No. 6132, does not exclusively pertain to Congress
acting as a Constituent Assembly. Such implementing
details are matters within the competence of Congress in
the exercise of its comprehensive legislative power, which
power encompasses all matters not expressly or by
Constitution from the ambit of legislative action. And as
lone as such statutory details do not clash with any specific
provision of the constitution, they are valid.
4. Consequently, when Congress, acting as a
Constituent Assembly, omits to provide for such
implementing details after calling a constitutional
convention, Congress, acting as a legislative body, can
enact the necessary implementing legislation to fill in the
gaps, which authority is expressly recognized in Sec. 8 of
Res No. 2 as amended by Res. No. 4.
5. The fact that a bill providing for such
implementing details may be vetoed by the President is no
argument against conceding such power in Congress as a
legislative body nor present any difficulty; for it is not
irremediable as Congress can override the Presidential
veto or Congress can reconvene as a Constituent Assembly
and adopt a resolution prescribing the required
implementing details.
III
Petitioner Raul M. Gonzales asserts that Sec. 2 on the
apportionment of delegates is not in accordance with
proportional representation and therefore violates the
Constitution and the intent of the law itself, without
pinpointing any specific provision of the Constitution with
which it collides.
Unlike in the apportionment of representative districts, the
Constitution does not expressly or impliedly require such
apportionment of delegates to the convention on the basis
of population in each congressional district. Congress,
sitting as a Constituent Assembly, may constitutionally
allocate one delegate for, each congressional district or for
each province, for reasons of economy and to avoid having
an unwieldy convention. If the framers of the present
Constitution wanted the apportionment of delegates to
the convention to be based on the number of inhabitants
in each representative district, they would have done so in
so many words as they did in relation to the
apportionment of the representative districts.5
The apportionment provided for in Sec. 2 of R.A. No. 6132
cannot possibly conflict with its own intent expressed
therein; for it merely obeyed and implemented the intent
of Congress acting as a Constituent Assembly expressed in
Sec. 1 of Res. No. 4, which provides that the 320 delegates
should be apportioned among the existing representative
districts according to the number of their respective
inhabitants, but fixing a minimum of at least two delegates
for a representative district. The presumption is that the
factual predicate, the latest available official population
census, for such apportionment was presented to
Congress, which, accordingly employed a formula for the
necessary computation to effect the desired proportional
representation.
The records of the proceedings on Senate Bill No. 77
sponsored by Senator Pelaez which is now R.A. No. 6132,
submitted to this Tribunal by the amici curiae, show that it
based its apportionment of the delegates on the 1970
official preliminary population census taken by the Bureau
of Census and Statistics from May 6 to June 30, 1976; and
that Congress adopted the formula to effect a reasonable
apportionment of delegates. The Director of the Bureau of
Census and Statistics himself, in a letter to Senator Pelaez
dated July 30, 1970, stated that "on the basis of the
preliminary count of the population, we have computed
the distribution of delegates to the Constitutional
Convention based on Senate Bill 77 (p. 2 lines 5 to 32 and
p. 3 line 12) which is a fair and an equitable method of
distributing the delegates pursuant to the provisions of the
joint Resolution of both Houses No. 2, as amended. Upon
your request at the session of the Senate-House
Conference Committee meeting last night, we are
submitting herewith the results of the computation on the
basis of the above-stated method."
Even if such latest census were a preliminary census, the
same could still be a valid basis for such apportionment.6
The fact that the lone and small congressional district of
Batanes, may be over-represented, because it is allotted
two delegates by R.A. No. 6132 despite the fact that it has
a population very much less than several other
congressional districts, each of which is also allotted only
two delegates, and therefore under-represented, vis-a-vis
Batanes alone, does not vitiate the apportionment as not
effecting proportional representation. Absolute
proportional apportionment is not required and is not
possible when based on the number of inhabitants, for the
population census cannot be accurate nor complete,
dependent as it is on the diligence of the census takers,
aggravated by the constant movement of population, as
well as daily death and birth. It is enough that the basis
employed is reasonable and the resulting apportionment is
substantially proportional. Resolution No. 4 fixed a
minimum of two delegates for a congressional district.
While there may be other formulas for a reasonable
apportionment considering the evidence submitted to
Congress by the Bureau of Census and Statistics, we are
not prepared to rule that the computation formula
adopted by, Congress for proportional representation as,
directed in Res. No. 4 is unreasonable and that the
apportionment provided in R.A. No. 6132 does not
constitute a substantially proportional representation.
In the Macias case, relied on by petitioner Gonzales, the
apportionment law, which was nullified as
unconstitutional, granted more representatives to a
province with less population than the provinces with
more inhabitants. Such is not the case here, where under
Sec. 2 of R.A. No. 6132 Batanes is allotted only two
delegates, which number is equal to the number of
delegates accorded other provinces with more population.
The present petitions therefore do not present facts which
fit the mould of the doctrine in the case of Macias et al. vs.
Comelec, supra.
The impossibility of absolute proportional representation is
recognized by the Constitution itself when it directs that
the apportionment of congressional districts among the
various provinces shall be "as nearly as may be according
to their respective inhabitants, but each province shall
have at least one member" (Sec. 5, Art. VI, Phil. Const.,
emphasis supplied). The employment of the phrase "as
nearly as may be according to their respective inhabitants"
emphasizes the fact that the human mind can only
approximate a reasonable apportionment but cannot
effect an absolutely proportional representation with
mathematical precision or exactitude.
IV
Sec. 5 of R.A. 6132 is attacked on the ground that it is an
undue deprivation of liberty without due process of law
and denies the equal protection of the laws. Said Sec. 5
disqualifies any elected delegate from running "for any
public office in any election" or from assuming "any
appointive office or position in any branch of the
government government until after the final adjournment
of the Constitutional Convention."
That the citizen does not have any inherent nor natural
right to a public office, is axiomatic under our
constitutional system. The State through its Constitution or
legislative body, can create an office and define the
qualifications and disqualifications therefor as well as
impose inhibitions on a public officer. Consequently, only
those with qualifications and who do not fall under any
constitutional or statutory inhibition can be validly elected
or appointed to a public office. The obvious reason for the
questioned inhibition, is to immunize the delegates from
the perverting influence of self-interest, party interest or
vested interest and to insure that he dedicates all his time
to performing solely in the interest of the nation his high
and well nigh sacred function of formulating the supreme
law of the land, which may endure for generations and
which cannot easily be changed like an ordinary statute.
With the disqualification embodied in Sec. 5, the delegate
will not utilize his position as a bargaining leverage for
concessions in the form of an elective or appointive office
as long as the convention has not finally adjourned. The
appointing authority may, by his appointing power, entice
votes for his own proposals. Not love for self, but love for
country must always motivate his actuations as delegate;
otherwise the several provisions of the new Constitution
may only satisfy individual or special interests, subversive
of the welfare of the general citizenry. It should be stressed
that the disqualification is not permanent but only
temporary only to continue until the final adjournment of
the convention which may not extend beyond one year.
The convention that framed the present Constitution
finished its task in approximately seven months — from
July 30, 1934 to February 8, 1935.
As admitted by petitioner Gonzales, this inhibition finds
analogy in the constitutional provision prohibiting a
member of Congress, during the time for which he was
elected, from being appointed to any civil office which may
have been created or the emolument whereof shall have
been increased while he was a member of the Congress.
(Sec. 16, Art. VI, Phil. Constitution.)
As observed by the Solicitor General in his Answer, the
overriding objective of the challenged disqualification,
temporary in nature, is to compel the elected delegates to
serve in full their term as such and to devote all their time
to the convention, pursuant to their representation and
commitment to the people; otherwise, his seat in the
convention will be vacant and his constituents will be
deprived of a voice in the convention. The inhibition is
likewise "designed to prevent popular political figures from
controlling elections or positions. Also it is a brake on the
appointing power, to curtail the latter's desire to 'raid' the
convention of "talents" or attempt to control the
convention." (p. 10, Answer in L-32443.)
Thus the challenged disqualification prescribed in Sec. 5 of
R.A. No. 6132 is a valid limitation on the right to public
office pursuant to state police power as it is reasonable
and not arbitrary.
The discrimination under Sec. 5 against delegates to the
Constitutional Convention is likewise constitutional; for it is
based on a substantial distinction which makes for real
differences, is germane to the purposes of the law, and
applies to all members of the same class.7 The function of
a delegate is more far-reaching and its effect more
enduring than that of any ordinary legislator or any other
public officer. A delegate shapes the fundamental law of
the land which delineates the essential nature of the
government, its basic organization and powers, defines the
liberties of the people, and controls all other laws. Unlike
ordinary statutes, constitutional amendments cannot be
changed in one or two years. No other public officer
possesses such a power, not even the members of
Congress unless they themselves, propose constitutional
amendments when acting as a Constituent Assembly
pursuant to Art. XV of the Constitution. The classification,
therefore, is neither whimsical nor repugnant to the sense
of justice of the community.
As heretofore intimated, the inhibition is relevant to the
object of the law, which is to insure that the proposed
amendments are meaningful to the masses of our people
and not designed for the enhancement of selfishness,
greed, corruption, or injustice.
Lastly, the disqualification applies to all the delegates to
the convention who will be elected on the second Tuesday
of November, 1970.
V may belong or which may be in sympathy with his cause or
Paragraph 1, Sec. 8(a) of R.A. No. 6132 is impugned by
both petitioners as violative of the constitutional
guarantees of due process, equal protection of the laws,
freedom of expressions, freedom of assembly and freedom
of association.
This Court ruled last year that the guarantees of due
process, equal protection of the laws, peaceful assembly,
free expression, and the right of association are neither
absolute nor illimitable rights; they are always subject to
the pervasive and dormant police power of the State and
may be lawfully abridged to serve appropriate and
important public interests.8
In said Gonzalez vs. Comelec case the Court applied the
clear and present danger test to determine whether a
statute which trenches upon the aforesaid Constitutional
guarantees, is a legitimate exercise of police power.9
Paragraph 1 of Sec. 8(a), R.A. No. 6132 prohibits:
1. any candidate for delegate to the convention
(a) from representing, or
(b) allowing himself to be represented as being a
candidate of any political party or any other organization;
and
2. any political party, political group, political
committee, civic, religious, professional or other
organizations or organized group of whatever nature from
(a) intervening in the nomination of any such
candidate or in the filing of his certificate, or
(b) from giving aid or support directly or indirectly,
material or otherwise, favorable to or against his campaign
for election.
The ban against all political parties or organized groups of
whatever nature contained in par. 1 of Sec. 8(a), is confined
to party or organization support or assistance, whether
material, moral, emotional or otherwise. The very Sec. 8(a)
in its provisos permits the candidate to utilize in his
campaign the help of the members of his family within the
fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity, and a
campaign staff composed of not more than one for every
ten precincts in his district. It allows the full exercise of his
freedom of expression and his right to peaceful assembly,
because he cannot be denied any permit to hold a public
meeting on the pretext that the provision of said section
may or will be violated. The right of a member of any
political party or association to support him or oppose his
opponent is preserved as long as such member acts
individually. The very party or organization to which he
program of reforms, is guaranteed the right to disseminate
information about, or to arouse public interest in, or to
advocate for constitutional reforms, programs, policies or
constitutional proposals for amendments.
It is therefore patent that the restriction contained in Sec.
8(a) is so narrow that the basic constitutional rights
themselves remain substantially intact and inviolate. And it
is therefore a valid infringement of the aforesaid
constitutional guarantees invoked by petitioners.
In the aforesaid case of Gonzales vs. Comelec, supra, this
Court unanimously sustained the validity of the limitation
on the period for nomination of candidates in Sec. 50-A of
R.A. No. 4880, thus:
The prohibition of too early nomination of candidates
presents a question that is not too formidable in character.
According to the act: "It shall be unlawful for any political
party, political committee, or political group to nominate
candidates for any elective public office voted for at large
earlier than one hundred and fifty days immediately
preceding an election, and for any other elective public
office earlier than ninety days immediately preceding an
election.
The right of association is affected. Political parties have
less freedom as to the time during which they may
nominate candidates; the curtailment is not such, however,
as to render meaningless such a basic right. Their scope of
legitimate activities, save this one, is not unduly narrowed.
Neither is there infringement of their freedom to
assemble. They can do so, but not for such a purpose. We
sustain its validity. We do so unanimously. 10
In said Gonzales vs. Comelec case, this Court likewise held
that the period for the conduct of an election campaign or
partisan political activity may be limited without offending
the aforementioned constitutional guarantees as the same
is designed also to prevent a "clear and present danger of a
substantive evil, the debasement of the electoral process."
11
Even if the partisan activity consists of (a) forming
organizations, associations, clubs, committees or other
group of persons for the purpose of soliciting votes and/or
undertaking any campaign or propaganda for or against a
party or candidate; (b) holding political conventions,
caucuses, conferences, meetings, rallies, parades or other
similar assemblies for the purpose of soliciting votes
and/or undertaking any campaign or propaganda for or
against any candidate or party; and (c) giving, soliciting, or
receiving contributions for election campaign either
directly or indirectly, (Sec. 50-B, pars. (a), (b), and (c), R.A.
4880), the abridgment was still affirmed as constitutional
by six members of this Court, which could not "ignore ...
the legislative declaration that its enactment was in
response to a serious substantive evil affecting the
electoral process, not merely in danger of happening, but
actually in existence, and likely to continue unless curbed
or remedied. To assert otherwise would be to close one's
eyes to the reality of the situation." 12;
Likewise, because four members dissented, this Court in
said case of Gonzales vs. Comelec, supra, failed to muster
the required eight votes to declare as unconstitutional the
limitation on the period for (a) making speeches,
announcements or commentaries or holding interviews for
or against the election of any party or candidate for public
office; (b) publishing or distributing campaign literature or
materials; and (e) directly or indirectly soliciting votes
and/or undertaking any campaign or propaganda for or
against any candidate or party specified in Sec. 50-B, pars.
(c), (d) & (e) of R.A. 4880. 13
The debasement of the electoral process as a substantive
evil exists today and is one of the major compelling
interests that moved Congress into prescribing the total
ban contained in par. 1 of Sec. 8(a) of R.A. No. 6132, to
justify such ban. In the said Gonzales vs. Comelec case, this
Court gave "due recognition to the legislative concern to
cleanse, and if possible, render spotless, the electoral
process," 14 impressed as it was by the explanation made
by the author of R.A. No. 4880, Sen. Lorenzo Tañada, who
appeared as amicus curiae, "that such provisions were
deemed by the legislative body to be part and parcel of the
necessary and appropriate response not merely to a clear
and present danger but to the actual existence of a grave
and substantive evil of excessive partisanship, dishonesty
and corruption as well as violence that of late has marred
election campaigns and partisan political activities in this
country. He did invite our attention likewise to the well-
settled doctrine that in the choice of remedies for an
admitted malady requiring governmental action, on the
legislature primarily rests the responsibility. Nor should the
cure prescribed by it, unless clearly repugnant to
fundamental rights, be ignored or disregarded." 15
But aside from the clear and imminent danger of the
debasement of the electoral process, as conceded by
Senator Pelaez, the basic motivation, according to Senate
Majority Floor Leader Senator Arturo Tolentino, the
sponsor of the Puyat-Tolentino amendment embodied in
par. 1 of Sec. 8(a) of R.A. No. 6132, is to assure the
candidates equal protection of the laws by according them
equality of chances. 16 The primary purpose of the
prohibition then is also to avert the clear and present
danger of another substantive evil, the denial of the equal
protection of the laws. The candidates must depend on
their individual merits and not on the support of political
parties or organizations. Senator Tolentino and Senator
Salonga emphasized that under this provision, the poor
candidate has an even chance as against the rich
candidate. We are not prepared to disagree with them,
because such a conclusion, predicated as it is on empirical
logic, finds support in our recent political history and
experience. Both Senators stressed that the independent
candidate who wins in the election against a candidate of
the major political parties, is a rare phenomenon in this
country and the victory of an independent candidate
mainly rests on his ability to match the resources, financial
and otherwise, of the political parties or organizations
supporting his opponent. This position is further
strengthened by the principle that the guarantee of social
justice under Sec. V, Art. II of the Constitution, includes the
guarantee of equal opportunity, equality of political rights,
and equality before the law enunciated by Mr. Justice
Tuazon in the case Guido vs. Rural Progress Administration.
17
While it may be true that a party's support of a candidate
is not wrong per se it is equally true that Congress in the
exercise of its broad law-making authority can declare
certain acts as mala prohibita when justified by the
exigencies of the times. One such act is the party or
organization support proscribed in Sec. 8(a),which ban is a
valid limitation on the freedom of association as well as
expression, for the reasons aforestated.
Senator Tolentino emphasized that "equality of chances
may be better attained by banning all organization
support." 18
The questioned par. 1 of Sec. 8 (a) likewise can easily pass
the balancing-of-interest test. 19
In the apt words of the Solicitor General:
It is to be noted that right now the nation is on the
threshold of rewriting its Constitution in a hopeful
endeavor to find a solution to the grave economic, social
and political problems besetting the country. Instead of
directly proposing the amendments Congress has chosen
to call a Constitutional Convention which shall have the
task of fashioning a document that shall embody the
aspirations and ideals of the people. Because what is to be
amended is the fundamental law of the land, it is
indispensable that the Constitutional Convention be
composed of delegates truly representative of the people's
will. Public welfare demands that the delegates should
speak for the entire nation, and their voices be not those
of a particular segment of the citizenry, or of a particular
class or group of people, be they religious, political, civic or
professional in character. Senator Pelaez, Chairman of the
Senate Committee on Codes and Constitutional
Amendments, eloquently stated that "the function of a
constitution is not to represent anyone in interest or set of
interests, not to favor one group at the expense or
disadvantage of the candidates — but to encompass all the
interests that exist within our society and to blend them
into one harmonious and balanced whole. For the
constitutional system means, not the predominance of
interests, but the harmonious balancing thereof."
So that the purpose for calling the Constitutional
Convention will not be deflated or frustrated, it is
necessary that the delegatee thereto be independent,
beholden to no one but to God, country and conscience.
xxx xxx xxx
The evil therefore, which the law seeks to prevent lies in
the election of delegates who, because they have been
chosen with the aid and resources of organizations, cannot
be expected to be sufficiently representative of the people.
Such delegates could very well be the spokesmen of
narrow political, religious or economic interest and not of
the great majority of the people. 20
We likewise concur with the Solicitor General that the
equal protection of the laws is not unduly subverted in par.
I of Sec. 8(a); because it does not create any hostile
discrimination against any party or group nor does it confer
undue favor or privilege on an individual as heretofore
stated. The discrimination applies to all organizations,
whether political parties or social, civic, religious, or
professional associations. The ban is germane to the
objectives of the law, which are to avert the debasement
of the electoral process, and to attain real equality of
chances among individual candidates and thereby make
real the guarantee of equal protection of the laws.
The political parties and the other organized groups have
built-in advantages because of their machinery and other
facilities, which, the individual candidate who is without
any organization support, does not have. The fact that the
other civic of religious organizations cannot have a
campaign machinery as efficient as that of a political party,
does not vary the situation; because it still has that much
built-in advantage as against the individual candidate
without similar support. Moreover, these civic religious
and professional organization may band together to
support common candidates, who advocates the reforms
that these organizations champion and believe are
imperative. This is admitted by petitioner Gonzales thru
the letter of Senator Ganzon dated August 17, 1970
attached to his petition as Annex "D", wherein the Senator
stated that his own "Timawa" group had agreed with the
Liberal Party in Iloilo to support petitioner Gonzales and
two others as their candidates for the convention, which
organized support is nullified by the questioned ban,
Senator Ganzon stressed that "without the group moving
and working in joint collective effort" they cannot "exercise
effective control and supervision over our
leaders — the Women's League, the area commanders,
etc."; but with their joining with the LP's they "could have
presented a solid front with very bright chances of
capturing all seats."
The civic associations other than political parties cannot
with reason insist that they should be exempted from the
ban; because then by such exemption they would be free
to utilize the facilities of the campaign machineries which
they are denying to the political parties. Whenever all
organization engages in a political activity, as in this
campaign for election of delegates to the Constitutional
Convention, to that extent it partakes of the nature of a
political organization. This, despite the fact that the
Constitution and by laws of such civic, religious, or
professional associations usually prohibit the association
from engaging in partisan political activity or supporting
any candidate for an elective office. Hence, they must
likewise respect the ban.
The freedom of association also implies the liberty not to
associate or join with others or join any existing
organization. A person may run independently on his own
merits without need of catering to a political party or any
other association for support. And he, as much as the
candidate whose candidacy does not evoke sympathy from
any political party or organized group, must be afforded
equal chances. As emphasized by Senators Tolentino and
Salonga, this ban is to assure equal chances to a candidate
with talent and imbued with patriotism as well as nobility
of purpose, so that the country can utilize their services if
elected.
Impressed as We are by the eloquent and masterly
exposition of Senator Tañada for the invalidation of par. 1
of Sec. 8(a) of R.A. No. 6132, demonstrating once again his
deep concern for the preservation of our civil liberties
enshrined in the Bill of Rights, We are not persuaded to
entertain the belief that the challenged ban transcends the
limits of constitutional invasion of such cherished
immunities.
WHEREFORE, the prayers in both petitions are hereby
denied and R.A. No. 6132 including Secs. 2, 4, 5, and 8(a),
paragraph 1, thereof, cannot be declared unconstitutional.
Without costs.
G.R. No. L-34150 October 16, 1971

ARTURO M. TOLENTINO, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and THE CHIEF
ACCOUNTANT, THE AUDITOR, and THE DISBURSING
OFFICER OF THE 1971 CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION,
respondents, RAUL S. MANGLAPUS, JESUS G. BARRERA,
PABLO S. TRILLANA III, VICTOR DE LA SERNA, MARCELO B.
FERNAN, JOSE Y. FERIA, LEONARDO SIGUION REYNA,
VICTOR F. ORTEGA, and JUAN V. BORRA, Intervenors.

Arturo M. Tolentino in his own behalf.

Ramon A. Gonzales for respondents Chief Accountant and

Auditor of the 1971 Constitutional Convention.

Emmanuel Pelaez, Jorge M. Juco and Tomas L. Echivarre

for respondent Disbursing Officer of the 1971
Constitutional Convention.

Intervenors in their own behalf.

BARREDO, J.:

Petition for prohibition principally to restrain the

respondent Commission on Elections "from undertaking to
hold a plebiscite on November 8, 1971," at which the
proposed constitutional amendment "reducing the voting
age" in Section 1 of Article V of the Constitution of the
Philippines to eighteen years "shall be, submitted" for
ratification by the people pursuant to Organic Resolution
No. 1 of the Constitutional Convention of 1971, and the
subsequent implementing resolutions, by declaring said
resolutions to be without the force and effect of law in so
far as they direct the holding of such plebiscite and by also
declaring the acts of the respondent Commission
(COMELEC) performed and to be done by it in obedience
to the aforesaid Convention resolutions to be null and void,
for being violative of the Constitution of the Philippines.
As a preliminary step, since the petition named as
respondent only the COMELEC, the Count required that
copies thereof be served on the Solicitor General and the
Constitutional Convention, through its President, for such
action as they may deem proper to take. In due time,
respondent COMELEC filed its answer joining issues with
petitioner. To further put things in proper order, and
considering that the fiscal officers of the Convention are
indispensable parties in a proceeding of this nature, since
the acts sought to be enjoined involve the expenditure of
funds appropriated by law for the Convention, the Court
also ordered that the Disbursing Officer, Chief Accountant
and Auditor of the Convention be made respondents. After
the petition was so amended, the first appeared thru
Senator Emmanuel Pelaez and the last two thru Delegate
Ramon Gonzales. All said respondents, thru counsel, resist
petitioner's action.
For reasons of orderliness and to avoid unnecessary
duplication of arguments and even possible confusion, and
considering that with the principal parties being duly
represented by able counsel, their interests would be
adequately protected already, the Court had to limit the
number of intervenors from the ranks of the delegates to
the Convention who, more or less, have legal interest in
the success of the respondents, and so, only Delegates
Raul S. Manglapus, Jesus G. Barrera, Pablo S. Trillana III,
Victor de la Serna, Marcelo B. Fernan, Jose Y. Feria,
Leonardo Siguion Reyna, Victor Ortega and Juan B. Borra,
all distinguished lawyers in their own right, have been
allowed to intervene jointly. The Court feels that with such
an array of brilliant and dedicated counsel, all interests
involved should be duly and amply represented and
protected. At any rate, notwithstanding that their
corresponding motions for leave to intervene or to appear
as amicus curiae 1 have been denied, the pleadings filed by
the other delegates and some private parties, the latter in
representation of their minor children allegedly to be
affected by the result of this case with the records and the
Court acknowledges that they have not been without value
as materials in the extensive study that has been
undertaken in this case.
The background facts are beyond dispute. The
Constitutional Convention of 1971 came into being by
virtue of two resolutions of the Congress of the Philippines
approved in its capacity as a constituent assembly
convened for the purpose of calling a convention to
propose amendments to the Constitution namely,
Resolutions 2 and 4 of the joint sessions of Congress held
on March 16, 1967 and June 17, 1969 respectively. The
delegates to the said Convention were all elected under
and by virtue of said resolutions and the implementing
legislation thereof, Republic Act 6132. The pertinent
portions of Resolution No 2 read as follows:
SECTION 1. There is hereby called a convention to propose
amendments to the Constitution of the Philippines, to be
composed of two elective Delegates from each
representative district who shall have the same
qualifications as those required of Members of the House
of Representatives.
xxx xxx xxx
SECTION 7. The amendments proposed by the Convention
shall be valid and considered part of the Constitution when
approved by a majority of the votes cast in an election at
which they are submitted to the people for their
ratification pursuant to Article XV of the Constitution.
Resolution No. 4 merely modified the number of delegates
to represent the different cities and provinces fixed
originally in Resolution No 2.
After the election of the delegates held on November 10,
1970, the Convention held its inaugural session on June 1,
1971. Its preliminary labors of election of officers,
organization of committees and other preparatory works
over, as its first formal proposal to amend the Constitution,
its session which began on September 27, 1971, or more
accurately, at about 3:30 in the morning of September 28,
1971, the Convention approved Organic Resolution No. 1
reading thus: .
CC ORGANIC RESOLUTION NO. 1
A RESOLUTION AMENDING SECTION ONE OF ARTICLE V OF
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES SO AS TO LOWER
THE VOTING AGE TO 18
BE IT RESOLVED as it is hereby resolved by the 1971
Constitutional Convention:
Section 1. Section One of Article V of the Constitution of
the Philippines is amended to as follows:
Section 1. Suffrage may be exercised by (male) citizens of
the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law, who are
(twenty-one) EIGHTEEN years or over and are able to read
and write, and who shall have resided in the Philippines for
one year and in the municipality wherein they propose to
vote for at least six months preceding the election.
Section 2. This amendment shall be valid as part of the
Constitution of the Philippines when approved by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite to coincide with
the local elections in November 1971.
Section 3. This partial amendment, which refers only to the
age qualification for the exercise of suffrage shall be
without prejudice to other amendments that will be
proposed in the future by the 1971 Constitutional
Convention on other portions of the amended Section or
on other portions of the entire Constitution.
Section 4. The Convention hereby authorizes the use of the
sum of P75,000.00 from its savings or from its unexpended
funds for the expense of the advanced plebiscite; provided,
however that should there be no savings or unexpended
sums, the Delegates waive P250.00 each or the equivalent
of 2-1/2 days per diem.
By a letter dated September 28, 1971, President Diosdado
Macapagal, called upon respondent Comelec "to help the
Convention implement (the above) resolution." The said
letter reads:
September 28, 1971
The Commission on Elections Manila
Thru the Chairman
Gentlemen:
Last night the Constitutional Convention passed Resolution
No. 1 quoted as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
(see above)
Pursuant to the provision of Section 14, Republic Act No.
6132 otherwise known as the Constitutional Convention
Act of 1971, may we call upon you to help the Convention
implement this resolution:
Sincerely,
(Sgd.) DIOSDADO P. MACAPAGAL
DIOSDADO P. MACAPAGAL
President
On September 30, 1971, COMELEC "RESOLVED to inform
the Constitutional Convention that it will hold the
plebiscite on condition that:
(a) The Constitutional Convention will undertake the
printing of separate official ballots, election returns and
tally sheets for the use of said plebiscite at its expense;
(b) The Constitutional Convention will adopt its own
security measures for the printing and shipment of said
ballots and election forms; and
(c) Said official ballots and election forms will be
delivered to the Commission in time so that they could be
distributed at the same time that the Commission will
distribute its official and sample ballots to be used in the
elections on November 8, 1971.
What happened afterwards may best be stated by quoting
from intervenors' Governors' statement of the genesis of
the above proposal:
The President of the Convention also issued an order
forming an Ad Hoc Committee to implement the
Resolution.
This Committee issued implementing guidelines which
were approved by the President who then transmitted
them to the Commission on Elections.
The Committee on Plebiscite and Ratification filed a report
on the progress of the implementation of the plebiscite in
the afternoon of October 7,1971, enclosing copies of the
order, resolution and letters of transmittal above referred
to (Copy of the report is hereto attached as Annex 8-
Memorandum).
RECESS RESOLUTION
In its plenary session in the evening of October 7, 1971,
the Convention approved a resolution authored by
Delegate Antonio Olmedo of Davao Oriental, calling for a
recess of the Convention from November 1, 1971 to
November 9, 1971 to permit the delegates to campaign for
the ratification of Organic Resolution No. 1. (Copies of the
resolution and the transcript of debate thereon are hereto
attached as Annexes 9 and 9-A Memorandum,
respectively).
RESOLUTION CONFIRMING IMPLEMENTATION
On October 12, 1971, the Convention passed Resolution
No. 24 submitted by Delegate Jose Ozamiz confirming the
authority of the President of the Convention to implement
Organic Resolution No. 1, including the creation of the Ad
Hoc Committee ratifying all acts performed in connection
with said implementation.
Upon these facts, the main thrust of the petition is that
Organic Resolution No. 1 and the other implementing
resolutions thereof subsequently approved by the
Convention have no force and effect as laws in so far as
they provide for the holding of a plebiscite co-incident with
the elections of eight senators and all city, provincial and
municipal officials to be held on November 8, 1971, hence
all of Comelec's acts in obedience thereof and tending to
carry out the holding of the plebiscite directed by said
resolutions are null and void, on the ground that the calling
and holding of such a plebiscite is, by the Constitution, a
power lodged exclusively in Congress, as a legislative body,
and may not be exercised by the Convention, and that,
under Section 1, Article XV of the Constitution, the
proposed amendment in question cannot be presented to
the people for ratification separately from each and all of
the other amendments to be drafted and proposed by the
Convention. On the other hand, respondents and
intervenors posit that the power to provide for, fix the date
and lay down the details of the plebiscite for the
ratification of any amendment the Convention may deem
proper to propose is within the authority of the
Convention as a necessary consequence and part of its
power to propose amendments and that this power
includes that of submitting such amendments either
individually or jointly at such time and manner as the
Convention may direct in discretion. The Court's delicate
task now is to decide which of these two poses is really in
accord with the letter and spirit of the Constitution.
As a preliminary and prejudicial matter, the intervenors
raise the question of jurisdiction. They contend that the
issue before Us is a political question and that the
Convention being legislative body of the highest order is
sovereign, and as such, its acts impugned by petitioner are
beyond the control of the Congress and the courts. In this
connection, it is to be noted that none of the respondent
has joined intervenors in this posture. In fact, respondents
Chief Accountant and Auditor of the convention expressly
concede the jurisdiction of this Court in their answer
acknowledging that the issue herein is a justifiable one.
Strangely, intervenors cite in support of this contention
portions of the decision of this Court in the case of
Gonzales v. Comelec, 21 SCRA 774, wherein the members
of the Court, despite their being divided in their opinions
as to the other matters therein involved, were precisely
unanimous in upholding its jurisdiction. Obviously,
distinguished counsel have either failed to grasp the full
impact of the portions of Our decision they have quoted or
would misapply them by taking them out of context.
There should be no more doubt as to the position of this
Court regarding its jurisdiction vis-a-vis the
constitutionality of the acts of the Congress, acting as a
constituent assembly, and, for that matter, those of a
constitutional convention called for the purpose of
proposing amendments to the Constitution, which
concededly is at par with the former. A simple reading of
Our ruling in that very case of Gonzales relied upon by
intervenors should dispel any lingering misgivings as
regards that point. Succinctly but comprehensively, Chief
Justice Concepcion held for the Court thus: .
As early as Angara vs. Electoral Commission (63 Phil. 139,
157), this Court — speaking through one of the leading
members of the Constitutional Convention and a respected
professor of Constitutional Law, Dr. Jose P. Laurel —
declared that "the judicial department is the only
constitutional organ which can be called upon to
determine the proper allocation of powers between the
several departments and among the integral or constituent
units thereof."
It is true that in Mabanag v. Lopez Vito (supra), this Court
characterizing the issue submitted thereto as a political
one declined to pass upon the question whether or not a
given number of votes cast in Congress in favor of a
proposed amendment to the Constitution — which was
being submitted to the people for ratification — satisfied
the three-fourths vote requirement of the fundamental
law. The force of this precedent has been weakened,
however, by Suanes v. Chief Accountant of the Senate (81
Phil. 818), Avelino v. Cuenco, (L-2851, March 4 & 14, 1949),
Tañada v. Cuenco, (L-10520, Feb. 28, 1957) and Macias v.
Commission on Elections, (L-18684, Sept. 14, 1961). In the
first we held that the officers and employees of the Senate
Electoral Tribunal are under its supervision and control, not
of that of the Senate President, as claimed by the latter; in
the second, this Court proceeded to determine the
number of Senators necessary for quorum in the Senate; in
the third, we nullified the election, by Senators belonging
to the party having the largest number of votes in said
chamber, purporting to act, on behalf of the party having
the second largest number of votes therein of two (2)
Senators belonging to the first party, as members, for the
second party, of the Senate Electoral Tribunal; and in the
fourth, we declared unconstitutional an act of Congress
purporting to apportion the representatives districts for
the House of Representatives, upon the ground that the
apportionment had not been made as may be possible
according to the number of inhabitants of each province.
Thus we rejected the theory, advanced in these four (4)
cases that the issues therein raised were political questions
the determination of which is beyond judicial review.
Indeed, the power to amend the Constitution or to
propose amendments thereto is not included in the
general grant of legislative powers to Congress (Section 1,
Art. VI, Constitution of the Philippines). It is part of the
inherent powers of the people — as the repository
sovereignty in a republican state, such as ours (Section 1,
Art. 11, Constitution of the Philippines) — to make, and,
hence, to amend their own Fundamental Law. Congress
may propose amendments to the Constitution merely
because the same explicitly grants such power. (Section 1,
Art. XV, Constitution of the Philippines) Hence, when
exercising the same, it is said that Senators and members
of the House of Representatives act, not as members of
Congress, but as component elements of a constituent
assembly. When acting as such, the members of Congress
derive their authority from the Constitution, unlike the
people, when performing the same function, (Of amending
the Constitution) for their authority does not emanate
from the Constitution — they are the very source of all
powers of government including the Constitution itself.
Since, when proposing, as a constituent assembly,
amendments to the Constitution, the members of
Congress derive their authority from the Fundamental Law,
it follows, necessarily, that they do not have the final say
on whether or not their acts are within or beyond
constitutional limits. Otherwise, they could brush aside
and set the same at naught, contrary to the basic tenet
that ours is a government of laws, not of men, and to the
rigid nature of our Constitution. Such rigidity is stressed by
the fact that the Constitution expressly confers upon the
Supreme Court, (And, inferentially, to lower courts.) the
power to declare a treaty unconstitutional. (Sec. 2(1), Art.
VIII of the Constitution), despite the eminently political
character of treaty-making power.
In short, the issue whether or not a Resolution of Congress
— acting as a constituent assembly — violates the
Constitution is essentially justiciable not political, and,
hence, subject to judicial review, and, to the extent that
this view may be inconsistent with the stand taken in
Mabanag v. Lopez Vito, (supra) the latter should be
deemed modified accordingly. The Members of the Court
are unanimous on this point.
No one can rightly claim that within the domain of its
legitimate authority, the Convention is not supreme.
Nowhere in his petition and in his oral argument and
memoranda does petitioner point otherwise. Actually,
what respondents and intervenors are seemingly reluctant
to admit is that the Constitutional Convention of 1971, as
any other convention of the same nature, owes its
existence and derives all its authority and power from the
existing Constitution of the Philippines. This Convention
has not been called by the people directly as in the case of
a revolutionary convention which drafts the first
Constitution of an entirely new government born of either
a war of liberation from a mother country or of a
revolution against an existing government or of a bloodless
seizure of power a la coup d'etat. As to such kind of
conventions, it is absolutely true that the convention is
completely without restrain and omnipotent all wise, and
it is as to such conventions that the remarks of Delegate
Manuel Roxas of the Constitutional Convention of 1934
quoted by Senator Pelaez refer. No amount of
rationalization can belie the fact that the current
convention came into being only because it was called by a
resolution of a joint session of Congress acting as a
constituent assembly by authority of Section 1, Article XV
of the present Constitution which provides:
ARTICLE XV — AMENDMENTS
SECTION 1. The Congress in joint session assembled, by a
vote of three-fourths of all the Members of the Senate and
of the House of Representatives voting separately, may
propose amendments to this Constitution or call a
convention for the purpose. Such amendments shall be
valid as part of this Constitution when approved by a
majority of the votes cast at an election at which the
amendments are submitted to the people for their
ratification.
True it is that once convened, this Convention became
endowed with extra ordinary powers generally beyond the
control of any department of the existing government, but
the compass of such powers can be co-extensive only with
the purpose for which the convention was called and as it
may propose cannot have any effect as part of the
Constitution until the same are duly ratified by the people,
it necessarily follows that the acts of convention, its
officers and members are not immune from attack on
constitutional grounds. The present Constitution is in full
force and effect in its entirety and in everyone of its parts
the existence of the Convention notwithstanding, and
operates even within the walls of that assembly. While it is
indubitable that in its internal operation and the
performance of its task to propose amendments to the
Constitution it is not subject to any degree of restraint or
control by any other authority than itself, it is equally
beyond cavil that neither the Convention nor any of its
officers or members can rightfully deprive any person of
life, liberty or property without due process of law, deny to
anyone in this country the equal protection of the laws or
the freedom of speech and of the press in disregard of the
Bill of Rights of the existing Constitution. Nor, for that
matter, can such Convention validly pass any resolution
providing for the taking of private property without just
compensation or for the imposition or exacting of any tax,
impost or assessment, or declare war or call the Congress
to a special session, suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus, pardon a convict or render judgment in a
controversy between private individuals or between such
individuals and the state, in violation of the distribution of
powers in the Constitution.
It being manifest that there are powers which the
Convention may not and cannot validly assert, much less
exercise, in the light of the existing Constitution, the simple
question arises, should an act of the Convention be
assailed by a citizen as being among those not granted to
or inherent in it, according to the existing Constitution,
who can decide whether such a contention is correct or
not? It is of the very essence of the rule of law that
somehow somewhere the Power and duty to resolve such
a grave constitutional question must be lodged on some
authority, or we would have to confess that the integrated
system of government established by our founding fathers
contains a wide vacuum no intelligent man could ignore,
which is naturally unworthy of their learning, experience
and craftsmanship in constitution-making.
We need not go far in search for the answer to the query
We have posed. The very decision of Chief Justice
Concepcion in Gonzales, so much invoked by intervenors,
reiterates and reinforces the irrefutable logic and wealth of
principle in the opinion written for a unanimous Court by
Justice Laurel in Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil.,
134, reading:
... (I)n the main, the Constitution has blocked out with deft
strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to the
executive, the legislative and the judicial departments of
the government. The overlapping and interlacing of
functions and duties between the several departments,
however, sometimes makes it hard to say where the one
leaves off and the other begins. In times of social
disquietude or political excitement, the great landmark of
the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not
entirely obliterated. In cases of conflict, the judicial
department is the only constitutional organ which can be
called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers
between the several departments and among the integral
or constituent units thereof.
As any human production our Constitution is of course
lacking perfection and perfectibility, but as much as it was
within the power of our people, acting through their
delegates to so provide, that instrument which is the
expression of their sovereignty however limited, has
established a republican government intended to operate
and function as a harmonious whole, under a system of
check and balances and subject to specific limitations and
restrictions provided in the said instrument. The
Constitution sets forth in no uncertain language the
restrictions and limitations upon governmental powers and
agencies. If these restrictions and limitations are
transcended it would be inconceivable if the Constitution
had not provided for a mechanism by which to direct the
course of government along constitutional channels, for
then the distribution of powers would be mere verbiage,
the bill of rights mere expressions of sentiment and the
principles of good government mere political apothegms.
Certainly the limitations and restrictions embodied in our
Constitution are real as they should be in any living
Constitution. In the United States where no express
constitutional grant is found in their constitution, the
possession of this moderating power of the courts, not to
speak of its historical origin and development there, has
been set at rest by popular acquiescence for a period of
more than one and half centuries. In our case, this
moderating power is granted, if not expressly, by clear
implication from section 2 of Article VIII of our
Constitution.
The Constitution is a definition of the powers or
government. Who is to determine the nature, scope and
extent of such powers? The Constitution itself has provided
for the instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational way.
And when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional
boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the
other departments; it does not in reality nullify or
invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the
solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the
Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority
under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in
an actual controversy the rights which that instrument
secures and guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is
involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which
properly is the power of judicial review under the
Constitution. Even then, this power of judicial review is
limited to actual cases and controversies to be exercised
after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and
limited further to the constitutional question raised or the
very lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could
only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to
strike conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its
functions is in this manner the judiciary does not pass
upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of
legislation. More than that, courts accord the presumption
of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only
because the legislature is presumed to abide by the
Constitution but also because the judiciary in the
determination of actual cases and controversies must
reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed
through their representatives in the executive and
legislative departments of the government.
But much as we might postulate on the internal checks of
power provided in our Constitution, it ought not the less to
be remembered that, in the language of James Madison,
the system itself is not "the chief palladium of
constitutional liberty ... the people who are authors of this
blessing must also be its guardians ... their eyes must be
ever ready to mark, their voices to pronounce ...
aggression on the authority of their Constitution." In the
last and ultimate analysis then, must the success of our
government in the unfolding years to come be tested in
the crucible of Filipino minds and hearts than in
consultation rooms and court chambers.
In the case at bar, the National Assembly has by resolution
(No. 8) of December 3, 1935, confirmed the election of the
herein petitioner to the said body. On the other hand, the
Electoral Commission has by resolution adopted on
December 9, 1935, fixed said date as the last day for the
filing of protests against the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly;
notwithstanding the previous confirmations made by the
National Assembly as aforesaid. If, as contended by the
petitioner, the resolution of the National Assembly has the
effect of cutting off the power of the Electoral Commission
to entertain protests against the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly,
submitted after December 3, 1935 then the resolution of
the Electoral Commission of December 9, 1935, is mere
surplusage and had no effect. But, if, as contended by the
respondents, the Electoral Commission has the sole power
of regulating its proceedings to the exclusion of the
National Assembly, then the resolution of December 9,
1935, by which the Electoral Commission fixed said date as
the last day for filing protests against the election, returns
and qualifications of members of the National Assembly,
should be upheld.
Here is then presented an actual controversy involving as it
does a conflict of a grave constitutional nature between
the National Assembly on the one hand and the Electoral
Commission on the other. From the very nature of the
republican government established in our country in the
light of American experience and of our own, upon the
judicial department is thrown the solemn and inescapable
obligation of interpreting the Constitution and defining
constitutional boundaries. The Electoral Commission as we
shall have occasion to refer hereafter, is a constitutional
organ, created for a specific purpose, namely, to determine
all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the members of the National Assembly.
Although the Electoral Commission may not be interfered
with, when and while acting within the limits of its
authority, it does not follow that it is beyond the reach of
the constitutional mechanism adopted by the people and
that it is not subject to constitutional restriction. The
Electoral Commission is not a separate department of the
government, and even if it were, conflicting claims of
authority under the fundamental law between
departmental powers and agencies of the government are
necessarily determined by the judiciary in justiciable and
appropriate cases. Discarding the English type and other
European types of constitutional government, the framers
of our Constitution adopted the American type where the
written constitution is interpreted and given effect by the
judicial department. In some countries which have
declined to follow the American example, provisions have
been inserted in their constitutions prohibiting the courts
from exercising the power to interpret the fundamental
law. This is taken as a recognition of what otherwise would
be the rule that in the absence of direct prohibition, courts
are bound to assume what is logically their function. For
instance, the Constitution of Poland of 1921 expressly
provides that courts shall have no power to examine the
validity of statutes (art. 81, Chap. IV). The former Austrian
Constitution contained a similar declaration. In countries
whose constitution are silent in this respect, courts have
assumed this power. This is true in Norway, Greece,
Australia and South Africa. Whereas, in Czechoslovakia
(arts. 2 and 3, Preliminary Law to Constitutional Charter of
the Czechoslavak, Republic, February 29, 1920) and Spain
(arts. 121-123, Title IX, Constitution of the Republic of
1931) especial constitutional courts are established to pass
upon the validity of ordinary laws. In our case, the nature
of the present controversy shows the necessity of a final
constitutional arbiter to determine the conflict of authority
between two agencies created by the Constitution. Were
we to decline to take cognizance of the controversy, who
will determine the conflict? And if the conflict were left
undecided and undetermined, would not a void be thus
created in our constitutional system which may in the long
run prove destructive of the entire framework? To ask
these questions is to answer them. Natura vacuum
abhorret, so must we avoid exhaustion in our
constitutional system. Upon principle, reason, and
authority, we are clearly of the opinion that upon the
admitted facts of the present case, this court has
jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject
matter of the present controversy for the purpose of
determining the character, scope and extent of the
constitutional grant to the Electoral Commission as "the
sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns
and qualifications of the members of the National
Assembly." .
As the Chief Justice has made it clear in Gonzales, like
Justice Laurel did in Angara, these postulates just quoted
do not apply only to conflicts of authority between the
three existing regular departments of the government but
to all such conflicts between and among these
departments, or, between any of them, on the one hand,
and any other constitutionally created independent body,
like the electoral tribunals in Congress, the Comelec and
the Constituent assemblies constituted by the House of
Congress, on the other. We see no reason of logic or
principle whatsoever, and none has been convincingly
shown to Us by any of the respondents and intervenors,
why the same ruling should not apply to the present
Convention, even if it is an assembly of delegate elected
directly by the people, since at best, as already
demonstrated, it has been convened by authority of and
under the terms of the present Constitution..
Accordingly, We are left with no alternative but to uphold
the jurisdiction of the Court over the present case. It goes
without saying that We do this not because the Court is
superior to the Convention or that the Convention is
subject to the control of the Court, but simply because
both the Convention and the Court are subject to the
Constitution and the rule of law, and "upon principle,
reason and authority," per Justice Laurel, supra, it is within
the power as it is the solemn duty of the Court, under the
existing Constitution to resolve the issues in which
petitioner, respondents and intervenors have joined in this
case.
II
The issue of jurisdiction thus resolved, We come to the
crux of the petition. Is it within the powers of the
Constitutional Convention of 1971 to order, on its own fiat,
the holding of a plebiscite for the ratification of the
proposed amendment reducing to eighteen years the age
for the exercise of suffrage under Section 1 of Article V of
the Constitution proposed in the Convention's Organic
Resolution No. 1 in the manner and form provided for in
said resolution and the subsequent implementing acts and
resolution of the Convention?
At the threshold, the environmental circumstances of this
case demand the most accurate and unequivocal
statement of the real issue which the Court is called upon
to resolve. Petitioner has very clearly stated that he is not
against the constitutional extension of the right of suffrage
to the eighteen-year-olds, as a matter of fact, he has
advocated or sponsored in Congress such a proposal, and
that, in truth, the herein petition is not intended by him to
prevent that the proposed amendment here involved be
submitted to the people for ratification, his only purpose in
filing the petition being to comply with his sworn duty to
prevent, Whenever he can, any violation of the
Constitution of the Philippines even if it is committed in
the course of or in connection with the most laudable
undertaking. Indeed, as the Court sees it, the specific
question raised in this case is limited solely and only to the
point of whether or not it is within the power of the
Convention to call for a plebiscite for the ratification by the
people of the constitutional amendment proposed in the
abovequoted Organic Resolution No. 1, in the manner and
form provided in said resolution as well as in the subject
question implementing actions and resolution of the
Convention and its officers, at this juncture of its
proceedings, when as it is a matter of common knowledge
and judicial notice, it is not set to adjourn sine die, and is,
in fact, still in the preliminary stages of considering other
reforms or amendments affecting other parts of the
existing Constitution; and, indeed, Organic Resolution No.
1 itself expressly provides, that the amendment therein
proposed "shall be without prejudice to other
amendments that will be proposed in the future by the
1971 Constitutional Convention on other portions of the
amended section or on other portions of the entire
Constitution." In other words, nothing that the Court may
say or do, in this case should be understood as reflecting,
in any degree or means the individual or collective stand of
the members of the Court on the fundamental issue of
whether or not the eighteen-year-olds should be allowed
to vote, simply because that issue is not before Us now.
There should be no doubt in the mind of anyone that, once
the Court finds it constitutionally permissible, it will not
hesitate to do its part so that the said proposed
amendment may be presented to the people for their
approval or rejection.
Withal, the Court rests securely in the conviction that the
fire and enthusiasm of the youth have not blinded them to
the absolute necessity, under the fundamental principles
of democracy to which the Filipino people is committed, of
adhering always to the rule of law. Surely, their idealism,
sincerity and purity of purpose cannot permit any other
line of conduct or approach in respect of the problem
before Us. The Constitutional Convention of 1971 itself was
born, in a great measure, because of the pressure brought
to bear upon the Congress of the Philippines by various
elements of the people, the youth in particular, in their
incessant search for a peaceful and orderly means of
bringing about meaningful changes in the structure and
bases of the existing social and governmental institutions,
including the provisions of the fundamental law related to
the well-being and economic security of the
underprivileged classes of our people as well as those
concerning the preservation and protection of our natural
resources and the national patrimony, as an alternative to
violent and chaotic ways of achieving such lofty ideals. In
brief, leaving aside the excesses of enthusiasm which at
times have justifiably or unjustifiably marred the
demonstrations in the streets, plazas and campuses, the
youth of the Philippines, in general, like the rest of the
people, do not want confusion and disorder, anarchy and
violence; what they really want are law and order, peace
and orderliness, even in the pursuit of what they strongly
and urgently feel must be done to change the present
order of things in this Republic of ours. It would be tragic
and contrary to the plain compulsion of these
perspectives, if the Court were to allow itself in deciding
this case to be carried astray by considerations other than
the imperatives of the rule of law and of the applicable
provisions of the Constitution. Needless to say, in a larger
measure than when it binds other departments of the
government or any other official or entity, the Constitution
imposes upon the Court the sacred duty to give meaning
and vigor to the Constitution, by interpreting and
construing its provisions in appropriate cases with the
proper parties, and by striking down any act violative
thereof. Here, as in all other cases, We are resolved to
discharge that duty.
During these twice when most anyone feels very strongly
the urgent need for constitutional reforms, to the point of
being convinced that meaningful change is the only
alternative to a violent revolution, this Court would be the
last to put any obstruction or impediment to the work of
the Constitutional Convention. If there are respectable
sectors opining that it has not been called to supplant the
existing Constitution in its entirety, since its enabling
provision, Article XV, from which the Convention itself
draws life expressly speaks only of amendments which
shall form part of it, which opinion is not without
persuasive force both in principle and in logic, the
seemingly prevailing view is that only the collective
judgment of its members as to what is warranted by the
present condition of things, as they see it, can limit the
extent of the constitutional innovations the Convention
may propose, hence the complete substitution of the
existing constitution is not beyond the ambit of the
Convention's authority. Desirable as it may be to resolve,
this grave divergence of views, the Court does not consider
this case to be properly the one in which it should
discharge its constitutional duty in such premises. The
issues raised by petitioner, even those among them in
which respondents and intervenors have joined in an
apparent wish to have them squarely passed upon by the
Court do not necessarily impose upon Us the imperative
obligation to express Our views thereon. The Court
considers it to be of the utmost importance that the
Convention should be untrammelled and unrestrained in
the performance of its constitutionally as signed mission in
the manner and form it may conceive best, and so the
Court may step in to clear up doubts as to the boundaries
set down by the Constitution only when and to the specific
extent only that it would be necessary to do so to avoid a
constitutional crisis or a clearly demonstrable violation of
the existing Charter. Withal, it is a very familiar principle of
constitutional law that constitutional questions are to be
resolved by the Supreme Court only when there is no
alternative but to do it, and this rule is founded precisely
on the principle of respect that the Court must accord to
the acts of the other coordinate departments of the
government, and certainly, the Constitutional Convention
stands almost in a unique footing in that regard.
In our discussion of the issue of jurisdiction, We have
already made it clear that the Convention came into being
by a call of a joint session of Congress pursuant to Section I
of Article XV of the Constitution, already quoted earlier in
this opinion. We reiterate also that as to matters not
related to its internal operation and the performance of its
assigned mission to propose amendments to the
Constitution, the Convention and its officers and members
are all subject to all the provisions of the existing
Constitution. Now We hold that even as to its latter task of
proposing amendments to the Constitution, it is subject to
the provisions of Section I of Article XV. This must be so,
because it is plain to Us that the framers of the
Constitution took care that the process of amending the
same should not be undertaken with the same ease and
facility in changing an ordinary legislation. Constitution
making is the most valued power, second to none, of the
people in a constitutional democracy such as the one our
founding fathers have chosen for this nation, and which we
of the succeeding generations generally cherish. And
because the Constitution affects the lives, fortunes, future
and every other conceivable aspect of the lives of all the
people within the country and those subject to its
sovereignty, every degree of care is taken in preparing and
drafting it. A constitution worthy of the people for which it
is intended must not be prepared in haste without
adequate deliberation and study. It is obvious that
correspondingly, any amendment of the Constitution is of
no less importance than the whole Constitution itself, and
perforce must be conceived and prepared with as much
care and deliberation. From the very nature of things, the
drafters of an original constitution, as already observed
earlier, operate without any limitations, restraints or
inhibitions save those that they may impose upon
themselves. This is not necessarily true of subsequent
conventions called to amend the original constitution.
Generally, the framers of the latter see to it that their
handiwork is not lightly treated and as easily mutilated or
changed, not only for reasons purely personal but more
importantly, because written constitutions are supposed to
be designed so as to last for some time, if not for ages, or
for, at least, as long as they can be adopted to the needs
and exigencies of the people, hence, they must be
insulated against precipitate and hasty actions motivated
by more or less passing political moods or fancies. Thus, as
a rule, the original constitutions carry with them
limitations and conditions, more or less stringent, made so
by the people themselves, in regard to the process of their
amendment. And when such limitations or conditions are
so incorporated in the original constitution, it does not lie
in the delegates of any subsequent convention to claim
that they may ignore and disregard such conditions
because they are as powerful and omnipotent as their
original counterparts.
Nothing of what is here said is to be understood as
curtailing in any degree the number and nature and the
scope and extent of the amendments the Convention may
deem proper to propose. Nor does the Court propose to
pass on the issue extensively and brilliantly discussed by
the parties as to whether or not the power or duty to call a
plebiscite for the ratification of the amendments to be
proposed by the Convention is exclusively legislative and as
such may be exercised only by the Congress or whether
the said power can be exercised concurrently by the
Convention with the Congress. In the view the Court takes
of present case, it does not perceive absolute necessity to
resolve that question, grave and important as it may be.
Truth to tell, the lack of unanimity or even of a consensus
among the members of the Court in respect to this issue
creates the need for more study and deliberation, and as
time is of the essence in this case, for obvious reasons,
November 8, 1971, the date set by the Convention for the
plebiscite it is calling, being nigh, We will refrain from
making any pronouncement or expressing Our views on
this question until a more appropriate case comes to Us.
After all, the basis of this decision is as important and
decisive as any can be.
The ultimate question, therefore boils down to this: Is
there any limitation or condition in Section 1 of Article XV
of the Constitution which is violated by the act of the
Convention of calling for a plebiscite on the sole
amendment contained in Organic Resolution No. 1? The
Court holds that there is, and it is the condition and
limitation that all the amendments to be proposed by the
same Convention must be submitted to the people in a
single "election" or plebiscite. It being indisputable that
the amendment now proposed to be submitted to a
plebiscite is only the first amendment the Convention
propose We hold that the plebiscite being called for the
purpose of submitting the same for ratification of the
people on November 8, 1971 is not authorized by Section 1
of Article XV of the Constitution, hence all acts of the
Convention and the respondent Comelec in that direction
are null and void.
We have arrived at this conclusion for the following
reasons:
1. The language of the constitutional provision
aforequoted is sufficiently clear. lt says distinctly that either
Congress sitting as a constituent assembly or a convention
called for the purpose "may propose amendments to this
Constitution," thus placing no limit as to the number of
amendments that Congress or the Convention may
propose. The same provision also as definitely provides
that "such amendments shall be valid as part of this
Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast
at an election at which the amendments are submitted to
the people for their ratification," thus leaving no room for
doubt as to how many "elections" or plebiscites may be
held to ratify any amendment or amendments proposed by
the same constituent assembly of Congress or convention,
and the provision unequivocably says "an election" which
means only one.
(2) Very little reflection is needed for anyone to
realize the wisdom and appropriateness of this provision.
As already stated, amending the Constitution is as serious
and important an undertaking as constitution making itself.
Indeed, any amendment of the Constitution is as
important as the whole of it if only because the
Constitution has to be an integrated and harmonious
instrument, if it is to be viable as the framework of the
government it establishes, on the one hand, and
adequately formidable and reliable as the succinct but
comprehensive articulation of the rights, liberties,
ideology, social ideals, and national and nationalistic
policies and aspirations of the people, on the other. lt is
inconceivable how a constitution worthy of any country or
people can have any part which is out of tune with its
other parts..
A constitution is the work of the people thru its drafters
assembled by them for the purpose. Once the original
constitution is approved, the part that the people play in
its amendment becomes harder, for when a whole
constitution is submitted to them, more or less they can
assumed its harmony as an integrated whole, and they can
either accept or reject it in its entirety. At the very least,
they can examine it before casting their vote and
determine for themselves from a study of the whole
document the merits and demerits of all or any of its parts
and of the document as a whole. And so also, when an
amendment is submitted to them that is to form part of
the existing constitution, in like fashion they can study with
deliberation the proposed amendment in relation to the
whole existing constitution and or any of its parts and
thereby arrive at an intelligent judgment as to its
acceptability.
This cannot happen in the case of the amendment in
question. Prescinding already from the fact that under
Section 3 of the questioned resolution, it is evident that no
fixed frame of reference is provided the voter, as to what
finally will be concomitant qualifications that will be
required by the final draft of the constitution to be
formulated by the Convention of a voter to be able to
enjoy the right of suffrage, there are other considerations
which make it impossible to vote intelligently on the
proposed amendment, although it may already be
observed that under Section 3, if a voter would favor the
reduction of the voting age to eighteen under conditions
he feels are needed under the circumstances, and he does
not see those conditions in the ballot nor is there any
possible indication whether they will ever be or not,
because Congress has reserved those for future action,
what kind of judgment can he render on the proposal?
But the situation actually before Us is even worse. No one
knows what changes in the fundamental principles of the
constitution the Convention will be minded to approve. To
be more specific, we do not have any means of foreseeing
whether the right to vote would be of any significant value
at all. Who can say whether or not later on the Convention
may decide to provide for varying types of voters for each
level of the political units it may divide the country into.
The root of the difficulty in other words, lies in that the
Convention is precisely on the verge of introducing
substantial changes, if not radical ones, in almost every
part and aspect of the existing social and political order
enshrined in the present Constitution. How can a voter in
the proposed plebiscite intelligently determine the effect
of the reduction of the voting age upon the different
institutions which the Convention may establish and of
which presently he is not given any idea?
We are certain no one can deny that in order that a
plebiscite for the ratification of an amendment to the
Constitution may be validly held, it must provide the voter
not only sufficient time but ample basis for an intelligent
appraisal of the nature of the amendment per se as well as
its relation to the other parts of the Constitution with
which it has to form a harmonious whole. In the context of
the present state of things, where the Convention has
hardly started considering the merits of hundreds, if not
thousands, of proposals to amend the existing
Constitution, to present to the people any single proposal
or a few of them cannot comply with this requirement. We
are of the opinion that the present Constitution does not
contemplate in Section 1 of Article XV a plebiscite or
"election" wherein the people are in the dark as to frame
of reference they can base their judgment on. We reject
the rationalization that the present Constitution is a
possible frame of reference, for the simple reason that
intervenors themselves are stating that the sole purpose of
the proposed amendment is to enable the eighteen year
olds to take part in the election for the ratification of the
Constitution to be drafted by the Convention. In brief,
under the proposed plebiscite, there can be, in the
language of Justice Sanchez, speaking for the six members
of the Court in Gonzales, supra, "no proper submission".
III
The Court has no desire at all to hamper and hamstring the
noble work of the Constitutional Convention. Much less
does the Court want to pass judgment on the merits of the
proposal to allow these eighteen years old to vote. But like
the Convention, the Court has its own duties to the people
under the Constitution which is to decide in appropriate
cases with appropriate parties Whether or not the
mandates of the fundamental law are being complied with.
In the best light God has given Us, we are of the conviction
that in providing for the questioned plebiscite before it has
finished, and separately from, the whole draft of the
constitution it has been called to formulate, the
Convention's Organic Resolution No. 1 and all subsequent
acts of the Convention implementing the same violate the
condition in Section 1, Article XV that there should only be
one "election" or plebiscite for the ratification of all the
amendments the Convention may propose. We are not
denying any right of the people to vote on the proposed
amendment; We are only holding that under Section 1,
Article XV of the Constitution, the same should be
submitted to them not separately from but together with
all the other amendments to be proposed by this present
Convention.

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition herein is

granted. Organic Resolution No. 1 of the Constitutional
Convention of 1971 and the implementing acts and
resolutions of the Convention, insofar as they provide for
the holding of a plebiscite on November 8, 1971, as well as
the resolution of the respondent Comelec complying
therewith (RR Resolution No. 695) are hereby declared null
and void. The respondents Comelec, Disbursing Officer,
Chief Accountant and Auditor of the Constitutional
Convention are hereby enjoined from taking any action in
compliance with the said organic resolution. In view of the
peculiar circumstances of this case, the Court declares this
decision immediately executory. No costs.
G.R. No. 76180 October 24, 1986

IN RE: SATURNINO V. BERMUDEZ, petitioner.

R E S O L U T IO N

PER CURIAM:

In a petition for declaratory relief impleading no

respondents, petitioner, as a lawyer, quotes the first
paragraph of Section 5 (not Section 7 as erroneously
stated) of Article XVIII of the proposed 1986 Constitution,
which provides in full as follows:

Sec. 5. The six-year term of the incumbent President and

Vice-President elected in the February 7, 1986 election is,
for purposes of synchronization of elections, hereby
extended to noon of June 30, 1992.
The first regular elections for the President and Vice- the Republic under her government. (Joint Resolution of
President under this Constitution shall be held on the May 22, 1986 in G.R. No. 73748 [Lawyers League for a
second Monday of May, 1992. Better Philippines, etc. vs. President Corazon C. Aquino, et
al.]; G.R. No. 73972 [People's Crusade for Supremacy of
Claiming that the said provision "is not clear" as to whom it the Constitution. etc. vs. Mrs. Cory Aquino, et al.]; and G.R.
refers, he then asks the Court "to declare and answer the No. 73990 [Councilor Clifton U. Ganay vs. Corazon C.
question of the construction and definiteness as to who, Aquino, et al.])
among the present incumbent President Corazon Aquino
and Vice-President Salvador Laurel and the elected For the above-quoted reason, which are fully applicable to
President Ferdinand E. Marcos and Vice-President Arturo the petition at bar, mutatis mutandis, there can be no
M. Tolentino being referred to under the said Section 7 question that President Corazon C. Aquino and Vice-
(sic) of ARTICLE XVIII of the TRANSITORY PROVISIONS of President Salvador H. Laurel are the incumbent and
the proposed 1986 Constitution refers to, . ... legitimate President and Vice-President of the Republic of
the Philippines. For the above-quoted reasons, which are
The petition is dismissed outright for lack of jurisdiction fully applicable to the petition at bar,
and for lack for cause of action.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby dismissed.
Presiding from petitioner's lack of personality to sue or to
bring this action, (Tan vs. Macapagal, 43 SCRA 677), it is
elementary that this Court assumes no jurisdiction over
petitions for declaratory relief. More importantly, the
petition amounts in effect to a suit against the incumbent
President of the Republic, President Corazon C. Aquino,
and it is equally elementary that incumbent Presidents are
immune from suit or from being brought to court during
the period of their incumbency and tenure.

The petition furthermore states no cause of action.

Petitioner's allegation of ambiguity or vagueness of the
aforequoted provision is manifestly gratuitous, it being a
matter of public record and common public knowledge
that the Constitutional Commission refers therein to
incumbent President Corazon C. Aquino and Vice-President
Salvador H. Laurel, and to no other persons, and provides
for the extension of their term to noon of June 30, 1992 for
purposes of synchronization of elections. Hence, the
second paragraph of the cited section provides for the
holding on the second Monday of May, 1992 of the first
regular elections for the President and Vice-President
under said 1986 Constitution. In previous cases, the G.R. No. 78059 August 31, 1987
legitimacy of the government of President Corazon C.
Aquino was likewise sought to be questioned with the ALFREDO M. DE LEON, ANGEL S. SALAMAT, MARIO C. STA.
claim that it was not established pursuant to the 1973 ANA, JOSE C. TOLENTINO, ROGELIO J. DE LA ROSA and
Constitution. The said cases were dismissed outright by JOSE M. RESURRECCION, petitioners,
this court which held that: vs.
HON. BENJAMIN B. ESGUERRA, in his capacity as OIC
Petitioners have no personality to sue and their petitions Governor of the Province of Rizal, HON. ROMEO C. DE
state no cause of action. For the legitimacy of the Aquino LEON, in his capacity as OIC Mayor of the Municipality of
government is not a justiciable matter. It belongs to the Taytay, Rizal, FLORENTINO G. MAGNO, REMIGIO M.
realm of politics where only the people of the Philippines TIGAS, RICARDO Z. LACANIENTA, TEODORO V. MEDINA,
are the judge. And the people have made the judgment; ROSENDO S. PAZ, and TERESITA L. TOLENTINO,
they have accepted the government of President Corazon respondents.
C. Aquino which is in effective control of the entire country
so that it is not merely a de facto government but in fact
and law a de jure government. Moreover, the community MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the present
government. All the eleven members of this Court, as An original action for Prohibition instituted by petitioners
reorganized, have sworn to uphold the fundamental law of seeking to enjoin respondents from replacing them from
their respective positions as Barangay Captain and
Barangay Councilmen of Barangay Dolores, Municipality of
Taytay, Province of Rizal.
As required by the Court, respondents submitted their
Comment on the Petition, and petitioner's their Reply to
respondents' Comment.
In the Barangay elections held on May 17, 1982, petitioner
Alfredo M. De Leon was elected Barangay Captain and the
other petitioners Angel S. Salamat, Mario C. Sta. Ana, Jose
C. Tolentino, Rogelio J. de la Rosa and Jose M.
Resurreccion, as Barangay Councilmen of Barangay
Dolores, Taytay, Rizal under Batas Pambansa Blg. 222,
otherwise known as the Barangay Election Act of 1982.
On February 9, 1987, petitioner Alfredo M, de Leon
received a Memorandum antedated December 1, 1986 but
signed by respondent OIC Governor Benjamin Esguerra on
February 8, 1987 designating respondent Florentino G.
Magno as Barangay Captain of Barangay Dolores, Taytay,
Rizal. The designation made by the OIC Governor was "by
authority of the Minister of Local Government."
Also on February 8, 1987, respondent OIC Governor signed
a Memorandum, antedated December 1, 1986 designating
respondents Remigio M. Tigas, Ricardo Z. Lacanienta
Teodoro V. Medina, Roberto S. Paz and Teresita L. Tolentino
as members of the Barangay Council of the same Barangay
and Municipality.
That the Memoranda had been antedated is evidenced by
the Affidavit of respondent OIC Governor, the pertinent
portions of which read:
xxx xxx xxx
That I am the OIC Governor of Rizal having been appointed
as such on March 20, 1986;
That as being OIC Governor of the Province of Rizal and in
the performance of my duties thereof, I among others,
have signed as I did sign the unnumbered memorandum
ordering the replacement of all the barangay officials of all
the barangay(s) in the Municipality of Taytay, Rizal;
That the above cited memorandum dated December 1,
1986 was signed by me personally on February 8,1987;
That said memorandum was further deciminated (sic) to all
concerned the following day, February 9. 1987.
FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NONE.
Pasig, Metro Manila, March 23, 1987.
Before us now, petitioners pray that the subject
Memoranda of February 8, 1987 be declared null and void
and that respondents be prohibited from taking over their
positions of Barangay Captain and Barangay Councilmen,
respectively. Petitioners maintain that pursuant to Section
3 of the Barangay Election Act of 1982 (BP Blg. 222), their
terms of office "shall be six (6) years which shall
commence on June 7, 1982 and shall continue until their
successors shall have elected and shall have qualified," or
up to June 7, 1988. It is also their position that with the
ratification of the 1987 Constitution, respondent OIC
Governor no longer has the authority to replace them and
to designate their successors.
On the other hand, respondents rely on Section 2, Article
III of the Provisional Constitution, promulgated on March
25, 1986, which provided:
SECTION 2. All elective and appointive officials and
employees under the 1973 Constitution shall continue in
office until otherwise provided by proclamation or
executive order or upon the designation or appointment
and qualification of their successors, if such appointment is
made within a period of one year from February 25,1986.
By reason of the foregoing provision, respondents contend
that the terms of office of elective and appointive officials
were abolished and that petitioners continued in office by
virtue of the aforequoted provision and not because their
term of six years had not yet expired; and that the
provision in the Barangay Election Act fixing the term of
office of Barangay officials to six (6) years must be deemed
to have been repealed for being inconsistent with the
aforequoted provision of the Provisional Constitution.
Examining the said provision, there should be no question
that petitioners, as elective officials under the 1973
Constitution, may continue in office but should vacate their
positions upon the occurrence of any of the events
mentioned. 1
Since the promulgation of the Provisional Constitution,
there has been no proclamation or executive order
terminating the term of elective Barangay officials. Thus,
the issue for resolution is whether or not the designation
of respondents to replace petitioners was validly made
during the one-year period which ended on February 25,
1987.
Considering the candid Affidavit of respondent OIC
Governor, we hold that February 8, 1977, should be
considered as the effective date of replacement and not
December 1,1986 to which it was antedated, in keeping
with the dictates of justice.
But while February 8, 1987 is ostensibly still within the
one-year deadline, the aforequoted provision in the
Provisional Constitution must be deemed to have been
overtaken by Section 27, Article XVIII of the 1987
Constitution reading.
SECTION 27. This Constitution shall take effect immediately
upon its ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite held for the purpose and shall supersede all
previous Constitutions.

The 1987 Constitution was ratified in a plebiscite on

February 2, 1987. By that date, therefore, the Provisional
Constitution must be deemed to have been superseded.
Having become inoperative, respondent OIC Governor
could no longer rely on Section 2, Article III, thereof to
designate respondents to the elective positions occupied
by petitioners.

Petitioners must now be held to have acquired security of

tenure specially considering that the Barangay Election Act
of 1982 declares it "a policy of the State to guarantee and
promote the autonomy of the barangays to ensure their
fullest development as self-reliant communities.2 Similarly,
the 1987 Constitution ensures the autonomy of local
governments and of political subdivisions of which the
barangays form a part, 3 and limits the President's power
to "general supervision" over local governments. 4
Relevantly, Section 8, Article X of the same 1987
Constitution further provides in part:

Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except

barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall
be three years ...

Until the term of office of barangay officials has been

determined by law, therefore, the term of office of six (6)
years provided for in the Barangay Election Act of 1982 5
should still govern.

Contrary to the stand of respondents, we find nothing

inconsistent between the term of six (6) years for elective
Barangay officials and the 1987 Constitution, and the same
should, therefore, be considered as still operative,
pursuant to Section 3, Article XVIII of the 1987
Constitution, reading:

Sec. 3. All existing laws, decrees, executive orders,

proclamations letters of instructions, and other executive
issuances not inconsistent, with this Constitution shall
remain operative until amended, repealed or revoked.

WHEREFORE, (1) The Memoranda issued by respondent

OIC Governor on February 8, 1987 designating
respondents as the Barangay Captain and Barangay
Councilmen, respectively, of Barangay Dolores, Taytay,
Rizal, are both declared to be of no legal force and effect;
and (2) the Writ of Prohibition is granted enjoining
respondents perpetually from proceeding with the
ouster/take-over of petitioners' positions subject of this
Petition. Without costs.

SO ORDERED.