G.R. No.

171247 July 22, 2015

ALFREDO L. VILLAMAR, JR., vs. HON. AMELIA C. MANALASTAS, PRESIDING JUDGE,
RTC-PASIG CITY, BRANCH 268, and LEONARDO S. UMALE [deceased] substituted by
his spouse, CLARISSA VICTORIA UMALE

Facts: Petitioner Alfredo Villamar filed Motions for Inhibition (Motion for Inhibition,
Supplemental Motion for Inhibition, Second Supplemental Motion) to disqualify Judge
Manalastas on the following grounds: a) Judge Manalastas has stood together with
Leonardo Umale (Complainant against Villamar for damages and payment of rentals suit)
as godparents to a child of a common friend; and b) that the law firm of Judge Manalastas’
husband, as counsel of one of their clients, wrote Villamor on a purported claim appearing
to be the very same claims asserted by Umale himself.

Judge Manalastas denied the Motions for Inhibition since the allegations of
Villamar fall short of the proof required to overcome the presumption that the judge will
undertake her noble role to dispense justice according to Ignorance law and evidence
without fear and favor. Villamar filed for certiorari and pending the same, filed an
administrative case against Judge Manalastas with the OCA for Gross of the Law or
Procedure and for Bias or Partiality and a Motion for Inhibition on Account of
Administrative case before the RTC. Ca dismissed the petition, finding that the certiorari
filed with the CA and the pending motions in the RTC prayed for the same relief which is
forum shopping.

Issue: Whether or not Jude Manalastas’ decision to continue hearing the civil case
is proper.

Ruling: Yes. First, Judge Manalastas' inhibition from the civil case is discretionary.
The grounds relied upon by the petitioner do not fall under the first paragraph of Section
1, Rule 13 7 of the Rules of Court which enumerates the grounds for compulsory
inhibition. The issue of voluntary inhibition is primarily a matter of conscience and sound
discretion on the part of the judge based on his or her rational and logical assessment of
the case. Second, bare allegation of bias and prejudice are not enough, in the absence
of clear and convincing evidence, to overcome the presumption that a judge will
undertake his noble role to dispense justice according to law and evidence without fear
or favor. No evidence of bias and prejudice was submitted.

The allegations of Villamar that Judge Manalastas’ impartiality was

compromised do not suffice to overthrow the presumption that Judge Manalastas will
dispense justice accordingly. Since this act is discretionary, Judge Manalastas is in the
best position to determine whether or not there was a need to inhibit from the case and
her decision to hear the case, in the highest interest of justice, equity, and public interest,
should be respected.

While a party has the right to seek the inhibition or disqualification of a

judge who does not appear to be wholly free, disinterested, impartial, and independent
in handling the case, this right must be weighed with her duty to decide cases without
fear or pressure.