Terrorist Attacks The Politics of Claiming Responsibility

Author(s): Nodirbek Soliev and Mohammed Sinan Siyech

Source: Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses, Vol. 8, No. 8 (August 2016), pp. 17-21
Published by: International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research
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 Terrorist Attacks: The Politics of Claiming Responsibility - Nodirbek Soliev & Mohammed Sinan Siyech

Terrorist Attacks:
The Politics of Claiming
Responsibility
Nodirbek Soliev & Mohammed Sinan Siyech

While the so-called Islamic State (IS) has rushed to claim credit for terrorist
attacks across the world, especially in Western countries, it has been rather
cautious in claiming responsibility for those conducted in Turkey and Saudi
Arabia. This variation in respect of claiming credit is largely influenced by the
strategic goal pursued by IS towards a particular country or region.

Introduction

Since June 2016, there has been a surge in terrorist operations attributed to
IS around the world. IS’ militants and supporters were responsible for dozens
of attacks in several countries including the U.S., Jordan, Yemen, Lebanon,
Turkey, Iraq, Bangladesh, Saudi Arabia, France and most recently in
Germany, Pakistan and Afghanistan, killing and injuring several hundred
people.

Although IS has claimed credit for most of these attacks, it has been reluctant
to accept responsibility for the attacks in Turkey and Saudi Arabia. Given the
strategic value of a successful terrorist attack, especially amidst significant
military setbacks, it is worthwhile to explore IS’ selective approach towards
claiming responsibility as it will provide some insights into IS’ strategic
thinking, calculations and objectives.

Attacks in Turkey and Saudi Arabia

The suicide attacks at the Istanbul Airport on 28 June 2016 and three attacks
in Saudi Arabia on 4 July 2016 bore all the hallmarks of those carried out by
IS in Belgium and France (Reuters 2016). While IS was quick to claim
responsibility for the attacks in Belgium and France, it has not done so for
Turkey or Saudi Arabia. The nature of the attacks, the tactics used, target
selection, scale, timing, and post-attack investigations and arrests indicate

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 Terrorist Attacks: The Politics of Claiming Responsibility - Nodirbek Soliev & Mohammed Sinan Siyech
both attacks in Turkey and Saudi Arabia to be
the work of IS.
The Istanbul Airport attack was a coordinated
suicide operation against civilians and security
personnel that killed at least 44 people and
wounded 238 others. The Turkish government
has pointed the finger at IS. The attackers were
reported to be members of a “special unit” sent
directly from Raqqa, IS’ stronghold in Syria, and
part of a semi-autonomous clandestine IS cell
operating in Turkey. According to the Turkish
government, it was a seven-person cell under
the command of Akhmed Chataev, a Russian
citizen of Chechen origin, who is believed to be
one of IS key Chechen commanders and leader
of its cell in Istanbul. The suicide attackers were
reported to be nationals of Russia (Osman
Vadinov, from Russia’s Dagestan Republic),
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and/or Uzbekistan (IS
claims to have “covert units” in a number of
countries including Turkey and Saudi Arabia).
The timing of the attack is also revealing as it
coincided with the second anniversary of IS’
announcement of its so-called caliphate on 29
June 2014.
Most recently, on 21 August 2016, another
suicide bombing in the Turkish city of Gaziantep
killed more than 51 people, mainly Kurdish
civilians attending a wedding, and injured nearly
70 others. This attack also points quite strongly
to IS involvement even though there has been no
claim of responsibility. The Turkish government
and the Kurdish political parties have named IS
as the perpetrator of this attack. The Kurdish
armed groups, which are also conducting attacks
on the Turkish government, has been cleared of
responsibility as the civilians killed in this attack
were supporters of the pro-Kurdish Peoples’
Democratic party (HDP) (Yeginsu 2016). IS is
known to have an extensive network in
Gaziantep, which is 29 miles (46km) north of the
Syrian border. The attack can also be interpreted
as IS’ way of taking revenge against the Kurdish
offensives in Syria, where Kurdish militias have
been gaining victories against IS. It may also
indicate IS’ aims of exploiting ethnic fault lines
between Kurdish and Turkish people (Letsch
2016).
In Saudi Arabia, three attacks took place towards
the end of Ramadan, shortly before the Eid
celebrations. The first was at a mosque in the
Qatif area which is largely Shia, the second at a
US consulate in Jeddah and the third at security
guards stationed next to the mosque of the
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“ The targets, nature
and timings of the
attacks all point to IS’
involvement, a
hypothesis supported by
various security
officials. ”
Prophet Mohammed – the second holiest site in
Islam, after Makkah (David 2016). This is not the
first time that Saudi Arabia has been attacked by
the group. There have been many attacks that
took place over the last two years targeted
mainly at Shia mosques and worshippers or the
security forces of the country (Saab 2015). Other
targets include security agents, foreign workers
and diplomatic buildings (Khayat 2016).
The targets, nature and timings of the attacks all
point to IS’ involvement, a hypothesis supported
by various security officials (Reuters 2016). The
attack on the mosque in Qatif area also rules out
the possibility of Al Qaeda’s involvement due to
its refusal to attack innocent Shias (Byman
2015). However, like in Turkey, none of these
three blasts have been claimed by IS.
Other Prominent Attacks
The two other prominent attacks that have been
claimed by IS are the mass shootout in a gay
night club in Orlando on 12 June 2016 and the
attack carried out in Nice, France on 14 July
2016. The Orlando attack which killed more than
50 people was carried out by a man of Afghan
descent who was believed to have no direct links
to IS. Many reports have claimed that he was
mentally unstable, a closet homosexual and a
racist. His final act was to call the authorities and
pledge allegiance to IS, Jabhat al-Nusra and
Hezbolla – all enemies of one another.
The attack in Nice was carried out by a Tunisian
who drove a 19-tonne truck into a large crowd
celebrating the Bastile Day holiday, killing 84
people. Here too, the perpetrator is said to be
mentally unstable and a drug addict. The
Volume 8, Issue 8 | August 2016
 Terrorist Attacks: The Politics of Claiming Responsibility - Nodirbek Soliev & Mohammed Sinan Siyech
attacker was also not connected in any way to IS
which makes this an IS-inspired attack at best.
This was enough however for IS to claim credit
for this major attack soon after (O Toole 2016).
Although these two attacks were carried out by
people ‘inspired’ by IS ideology but with no direct
operational links to the group, IS’ eagerness to
claim responsibility raises questions about its
motives in doing so. It is reasonable to assume
that IS’ claim of responsibility for the attacks in
the Western countries came as part of its
strategy to strike terror and work towards
deepening the divides between Muslims and non
-Muslims in the US and Europe.
By quickly publicising its “involvement” in such
attacks, IS seeks to inspire other vulnerable
individuals within diaspora communities in the
West to initiate similar attacks. This strategy
appears to have worked. For instance, IS’ claim
of responsibility for the Orlando shootings
seemed to have set off a chain of similar acts of
violence in Nice, and most recently in Germany,
when a 17-year-old Afghan refugee carried out
an axe-and-knife assault on a train on 18 July
2016.
‘Benefits’ of Claiming Credit
IS’ selectiveness in claiming credit for attacks
could be multiple and context-based. There are
costs as well as benefits in claiming
responsibility (Lynn Rorie 2008) which is typically
issued after the successful accomplishment of a
terrorist operation and publicised by the group
and its affiliates. It adds significance to terrorist
attacks, which is often described by scholars as
a “strategic and communicative act” (Eric Min
2013). For the perpetrator, it is one of the easiest
and most reliable ways to differentiate himself
from other potential perpetrators operating in a
particular arena (Hoffman 2010). By
acknowledging its responsibility publicly, the
group sends a political message to the targeted
audience about its motives and identities.
In democratic countries like the U.S. and France,
taking credit gives IS added advantages. The
free press in these countries could be counted
upon to play up the threat of Islamist terrorism
and in the process, arouse distrust and anger
towards Muslim communities and refugees. This
is evident from the significant rise in
Islamophobic attacks in countries like the U.S.,
UK, France and elsewhere in the wake of the
Paris attacks in November 2015 (Jenkins 2016)
and now, after Orlando, Nice and Germany. In
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“ By quickly publicising
its “involvement” in
such attacks, IS seeks to
inspire other vulnerable
individuals within
diaspora communities
in the West to initiate
similar attacks. ”
addition, the increased official scrutiny of
diaspora communities as a result of the terrorist
attacks would in turn arouse disenchantment
among Muslims. The backlash against Muslims
increases the risk of radicalisation and plays
directly into IS’ game plan of fomenting
communal discord and recruiting Muslims
disillusioned with Western governments and
societies for future attacks.
Absence of Claims: A Strategic Move
For IS, the above ‘benefits’ would not apply to
Muslim majority countries like Turkey and Saudi
Arabia. Additionally, IS would not want to incur
bad publicity by claiming an attack on the second
holiest site of the very same religion they purport
to fight for; the strong condemnations made by
Muslims around the world show that IS was
shrewd enough to stay silent on the attack
(Hume 2016). This holds true for Turkey too, a
country considered as a secure bastion of Islam
in a tumultuous region. The high number of
casualties in the Istanbul Airport attack also drew
strong criticisms from Turks as well as Muslims
worldwide.
Another reason IS did not claim responsibility
could be that it did not want to alienate
sympathisers and potential recruits who might be
turned off by the killing of fellow Muslims (The
New York Times 2016). Another possible
rationale could be that it is afraid of decisive
retaliatory strikes by Turkish and Saudi
governments. An increased involvement of the
two key regional powers in active fighting against
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 Terrorist Attacks: The Politics of Claiming Responsibility - Nodirbek Soliev & Mohammed Sinan Siyech
IS in Syria and Iraq might threaten its core
terrain.
By being less accountable, IS also hopes to
avoid heavy retaliation against IS cells in these
countries which would be less restrained than
Western countries in terms of arrests,
incarcerations, elimination of cells and disruption
of operations. IS would want to avoid such an
eventuality in Turkey where it has many human
networks that help to smuggle people and goods
in and out of Syria (Gingeras 2016). A large
number of arrests would eliminate their cells and
disrupt their operations. This is especially
relevant to Saudi Arabia where previously more
than 400 arrests were made on a government
clampdown in July 2015 (Gander 2016).
Claiming responsibility for terrorist attacks
selectively is a strategic move by IS leadership to
further its agenda in the specific countries. Given
its reasons for staying silent, it would be
worthwhile for authorities in these countries to
fully expose IS’ duplicity and hold it responsible
for the attacks so that it would attract the full
opprobrium of the Muslim world. More than that,
Turkey and Saudi Arabia should take strong and
decisive police action against IS cells and rings
of supporters within their borders before they
cause more harm to life and property and
undermine social and political stability in the
country.
Nodirbek Soliev is a Senior Analyst at the
International Centre for Political Violence and
Terrorism Research (ICPVTR), a constituent unit
of the S. Rajaratnam School of International
Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological
University, Singapore.
Mohammed Sinan Siyech is a Research
Analyst with the International Centre for Political
Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR), a
constituent unit of the S. Rajaratnam School of
International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang
Technological University, Singapore.
References:
Andrew Buncombe, 2016. Omar Mateen’s ‘gay
lover’ says Orlando attack was about revenge –
not IS. The Independent, Accessed July 25,
2016.
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“ Another reason IS did
not claim responsibility
could be that it did not
want to alienate
sympathisers and
potential recruits who
might be turned off by
the killing of fellow
Muslims. ”
Bilal Y. Saab. 2015. Can the House of Saud
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2016.
Daniel L.Byman, Jennifer R Winters. 2016. IS vs.
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war. Brookings, Accessed July 27, 2016.
Eric Min, 2013. Taking Responsibility: When and
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Khayat. M. 2016. IS Campaign Targets Saudi Arabia, Calls For Attacks

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