ALCONERA v PALLANAN
As a Court Employee, he
Petitioner/s: Atty. Virgilio Alconera
Respondent/s: Alfredo Pallanan
Doctrine:
Facts:
(1) [Antecent Facts] Atty. Alconera is the counsel for Morito Rafols, the defendant in an
unlawful detainer case (Cua Beng v Morita Rafols et al). The MTCC Gen San therein ruled
against Rafols and his co-defendants, ordered them to vacate the subject lots and
deliver possession to Cua Beng and pay back rentals of P5,000 per month until he
vacates the premises.
(2) Rafols, through Atty. Alconera, appealed the case to the RTC. Pending appeal, the court
issued an Order granting Cua Beng’s motion for execution in the unlawful detainer case.
Alconera filed an MR but it was denied.
(3) Few days later, Evelyn Rafols, the daughter-in-law, called up Alconera (who was in
Manila) to report that the sheriff, respondent Pallanan, was about to implement the
adverted writ of execution. Rafols informed Alconera that Pallanan arrived with 30 other
men to enforce the writ and demanded payment of P720k to settle Rafols’ obligation, to
which Rafols objected as he has been paying monthly rentals in court.
(4) After which, she passed the phone to Pallanan, causing an argument between Alconera
and Pallanan to ensue over the phone.
a. Alconera: There is a pending MR on the issuance of the writ of execution.
b. Pallanan: MR has already been denied and since there is no TRO enjoining the
implementation, he is legally mandated to perform his ministerial duty of enforcing
the writ.
c. Alconera: He did not receive a copy of the denial of the MR, rendering the
execution premature and preventing him from securing a TRO from the SC.
Despite the conversation over the phone, Pallanan still pushed through with the
execution of the judgment.
(5) When Alconera returned to his law office in Gen San, he found a copy of the Order
denying his MR, which was served only that day. Angry, he went to the RTC and
confronted Pallanan. The face-off escalated into a heated argument, which was caught
on video by Alconera’s daughter, who was coincidentally the office clerk. She filmed and
transcribed the altercation which contained an exchange of insults between the two.
(6) Thus, Alconera filed a Complaint-Affidavit against Pallanan for grave misconduct, which
was referred to the OCA.
a. Pallanan filed a comment: Duty of a court sheriff in enforcing a writ of execution is
ministerial and a sheriff is duty bound to implement it, unless there is a TRO
enjoining the execution. He also alleged that Alconera berated him at his office and
threatened to sue and kill him.
(7) Investigating Judge: Recommended Pallanan be admonished.
must exercise utmost patience and humility in the performance of his duties despite
pressures and personal attacks, as he carries the image of the entire judiciary with him.
Issue: W/N Pallanan can be held administratively liable for grave misconduct and false
testimony.
Held:
Grave Misconduct
a. Misconduct: Transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more
particularly unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer.
b. Grave misconduct: If it involves any of the additional elements of corruption, willful
intent to violate the law, or to disregard established rules, all of which must be
established by substantial evidence, and must necessarily be manifest in a charge of
grave misconduct.
c. Alconera imputes grave misconduct on Pallanan on the ff:
- Enforcing the writ despite Alconera has yet to receive a copy of the Order denying
MR on the writ of execution
- Allegedly leaking to opposite counsel issuance of Order
- Allegedly demanding P720k form Rafols
- Allegedly being arrogant and disrespectful
d. Alconera admits that no TRO was issued nor allegations that a MTW has been filed.
SC:
(1) The case herein spurred from an unlawful retainer case against Rafols.
- ROC Sec. 19, Rule 70: [GENERAL RULE] If judgment is rendered against defendant,
execution shall issue immediately upon motion,
- [EXCEPTIONS] Unless (1) an appeal is perfected, (2) supersedeas bond is filed
(within the appeal period), and (3) periodic rent deposits or reasonable
compensation are made during pendency of the appeal.
- [EXCEPTION TO EXCEPTION] Non-compliance due to fraud, accident, mistake, or
excusable negligence, which prevented def. from posting bond or monthly deposit
or supervening event making execution inequitable.
- Reason: To avoid further injustice to a lawful possessor
(2) Case herein: Although Alconera lost his client’s case and appealed to the RTC, and
deposited rental with the court, the bond filed did not meet the legal reqs because it
was posted as a property bond, not cash nor surety, and he did not even own the
property bond. Because of non-compliance with the conditions, the execution of the
judgment was not stayed.
(3) Thus, there was no legal impediment preventing Pallanan to enforce the writ both as to
restoration of possession and payment of accrued rentals or compensation. A sheriff’s
duty in execution of a writ is purely ministerial. He has no discretion w/n to execute the
judgment. Absent a TRO or Order of quashal or compliance with Sec. 19, Rule 70,
Pallanan has no alternative but to enforce the writ.
(4) HOWEVER, the sheriff must comply the ROC in executing the writ. Any act deviating
from the procedure (under Sec. 10, Rule 39) is misconduct and warrants disciplinary
action.
 - Sec. 10, Rule 39: Requirement of Notice of writ and demand from defendant to
vacate property within 3 days.
- Although the MR was allegedly served on the same day when the writ was
executed, Alconera failed to prove such allegation.
Discourtesy in Performance of Official Duty
SC: Nevertheless, Court recommends that Pallanan be penalized for discourtesy in the
performance of his official duties.
(1) As a public officer and trustee for the public, it is his responsibility to demonstrate
courtesy and civility in his official actuations with the public.
- Employees of the judiciary are expected to accord respect to the person and the
rights of another. Their every act and word should be characterized by prudence,
restraint, courtesy and dignity.
- Government service is people-oriented; high-strung and belligerent behavior has
no place therein.
- Rude hostile behavior often translates to personal conflict and pollutant of
peaceful work environment, affecting the quality of service that the office renders
to the public.
(2) Case herein: Based on the transcript of the altercation, it is readily apparent that
Pallanan has indeed been remised in this duty of observing courtesy in serving the
public. He should have exercised restraint in dealing with Alconera, instead of allowing
the quarrel to escalate into a hostile encounter. His demeanour tarnished the image not
only of his office, but that of the judiciary as a whole, exposing him to disciplinary
measure.
Making Untruthful Statements
SC: The charge must fail.
(1) Statements mentioned in Alconera’s complaint-affidavit is not conclusive evidence as
only a part of the argument was recorded. Thus, there is a probability that there is more
to the argument than what was caught on video.
FALLO: Pallanan is ADMONISHED and WARNED to be always be courteous in dealing with the
public in the performance of his official duties.
RABE V FLORES
FACTS
 An administrative complaint was filed by petitioner Narita Rave against respondent
Delsa Flores, Interpreter III of the RTC of Panabo, Davao for “conduct unbecoming
a government employee, acts prejudicial to the interest of the service and abuse of
authority.”
 It was alleged that Flores took advantage of her position as a court employee by
claiming a stall at the public market when she is not among those awarded the
market’s stalls by the court in a civil case.
 Also, she is said to have destroyed petitioner’s stall and brought the materials to
the police station of the municipality.
 The court in a resolution absolved her of the charge.
 However, she was made to explain the following:
o why she had a certification that she started working as an interpreter on
May 16, 1991, and another declaring that she was Assessment Clerk I
under the office of the Municipal Assessor from February 1, 1990 to June
3, 1991;
o why she did not report said business interest (market stall) in her sworn
statement of assets, liabilities and net worth, disclosure of
business interests and financial connections, and identification of
relatives in the government service for the years 1991-1994;
o why she has not divested herself of her interest in said business within 60
days from assumption of office, and;
o why she has claimed that she reported for work in certain 21 working
days when her contract of lease with the municipal government required
her to personally conduct her business and be present at the stall.
 Upon referral to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), the latter found
respondent guilty for dishonesty and failure to report her business interest, and
recommended a dismissal.
ISSUE
Whether respondent is guilty of the above charges, and should be dismissed from service.
HELD
YES. Indeed!
 She has failed to satisfactorily explain why she still collected her salary from the
municipality when the glaring fact was she was already employed at the RTC.
 She knew that she was no longer entitled to the same, but she took it nonetheless.
 What according to her is an overriding need for money aggravated by the alleged
delay in the processing of her salary from the court in no way justifies receipt of
salary not due her.
 Also, that she is the sole breadwinner of the family is not an acceptable excuse for
her misconduct.
 If she was really in merely in need of money, then she should have returned the
salary to the municipal government as soon as she obtained her salary from the
court. But she didn’t do this. Instead, she only refunded after receipt of the court’s
resolution, on the pretext of forgetting about it.
 Forgetfulness is, again, never a rational or acceptable explanation.
 Pursuant to the Administrative Code of 1987 and other Civil Service Law as, the
penalty for dishonesty is dismissal, even for the first offense. A public office is a
public trust. Although every office in the government service is a public trust, no
position demands greater moral righteousness and uprightness from an
individual than in the judiciary.
 Flores should also be held liable for failure to perform her legal obligation to
disclose her business interests. Her market stall is undoubtedly a business interest.
 The OCA even found that she had been receiving rental payments from one
Rodolfo Luay for the use of the stall. Her contention that her contract of lease of
market stall was never implemented because it became the subject of a civil case
also fails to convince. The case she was referring to was filed in 1995; earlier than
this, she was already collecting rentals as early as 1991.
 Therefore, she should have declared said business interest for the years 1991-
1995. RA No. 6713 provides that it is the “obligation” of an employee to submit a
sworn statement of his assets, liabilities, net worth and financial and business
interest, because the public has a right to know. Violation of this also constitutes
sufficient cause for removal or dismissal.
Santos v. Court of Appeals
Fact:
Santos, an appointed judge of the MeTC of Quezon City, retired in 1992 and acquired his
retirement gratuity under RA 910. In 1993, he was appointed Director III of the Traffic
Operation Center of the MMA. In 1995, the MMA was reorganized and renamed as MMDA.
Santos, in 1996, was voluntarily separated from the service and was entitled to separation
benefits equivalent to 1 ¼ monthly salary for every year of service as provided under Sec. 11
of the MMDA Law.”
Issue:
w/n Santiago is entitled to a separation benefit computed from the years of service as Metc
judge to Director III because the retirement gratuity he received under RA 910 is not
considered as double compensation?
Held:
The retirement benefits which Santiago had received or has been receiving, under RA 910, do
not constitute double compensation. But, to credit his years of service in the Judiciary in the
computation of his separation pay under RA 7924 would be to countenance double
compensation for exactly the same services.
DIMAGIBA V ESPARTERO
FACTS
 Petitioners Hilarion Dimagiba (Dimagiba), Irma Mendoza (Mendoza), and Ellen
Rasco (Rasco) were employees of The Livelihood Corporation (LIVECOR), a
government-owned and controlled corporation created under Executive Order No.
866. Petitioner Dimagiba was the Group Manager, Petitioners Hilarion Dimagiba
(Dimagiba), Irma Mendoza (Mendoza), and Ellen Rasco (Rasco) were employees of
The Livelihood Corporation (LIVECOR), a government-owned and controlled
corporation created under Executive Order No. 866. Petitioner Dimagiba was the
Group Manager, LIVECOR and the Human Settlement Development Corporation
(HSDC), now known as Strategic Investment and Development Corporation
(SIDCOR), also a government-owned and controlled corporation, created under
Presidential Decree (P.D.) 1396, entered into a Trust Agreement3 whereby the
former would undertake the task of managing, administering, disposing and
liquidating the corporate assets, projects and accounts of HSDC. In HSDC Board
Resolution No. 3- 26-A4 dated March 26, 1990, it was provided that in order to
carry out the trust agreement, LIVECOR personnel must be designated concurrently
to operate certain basic HSDC/SIDCOR functions, thus, LIVECOR personnel, namely,
petitioners Dimagiba and Mendoza were designated as Assistant General Manager
for Operations and Head, Inter-Agency Committee on Assets Disposal and as
Treasurer and Controller, respectively. The same resolution provided for the
designees' monthly honoraria and commutable reimbursable representation
allowances (CRRA).
 In a letter6 dated November 14, 1997, the Department of Budget and Management
informed LIVECOR of the approval of its organization/staffing pattern modifications
which resulted in the abolition of petitioners' positions. As a result, petitioners
were separated from the service which entitled them to separation pay which
includes granting gratuity pay
 In a Memorandum dated July 17, 1998 issued by LIVECOR Administrator Manuel
Portes (Portes), it was stated that any payment of gratuities by the HSDC/SIDCOR
to LIVECOR officers concurrently performing HSDC functions shall not be processed
without prior clearance from him as the same shall be first cleared with the COA
and OGCC to avoid any legal problem. Portes then sought the opinion of LIVECOR’s
Resident COA Auditor, Alejandro Fumar, regarding petitioners' claim for additional
gratuity, who opined that such gratuity payment would amount to double
compensation.
ISSUE
 W/N the gratuities granted to petitioners dimagiba, mendoza and rasco by hsdc
constitute double compensation prohibited under article ix (b), section 8 of the
1987 constitution
RULING
 YES The additional grant of gratuity pay to petitioners amounted to additional
compensation prohibited by the Constitution. Clearly, the only exception for an
employee to receive additional, double and indirect compensation is where the law
allows him to receive extra compensation for services rendered in another position
which is an extension or is connected with his basic work. The prohibition against
additional or double compensation, except when specifically authorized by law, is
considered a “constitutional curb” on the spending power of the government.
 In Peralta v. Mathay, we stated the purpose of the prohibition, to wit: x x x This is
to manifest a commitment to the fundamental principle that a public office is a
public trust. It is expected of a government official or employee that he keeps
uppermost in mind the demands of public welfare. He is there to render public
service. He is of course entitled to be rewarded for the performance of the
functions entrusted to him, but that should not be the overriding consideration.
The intrusion of the thought of private gain should be unwelcome. The temptation
to further personal ends, public employment as a means for the acquisition of
wealth, is to be resisted. That at least is the ideal. There is then to be awareness on
the part of an officer or employee of the government that he is to receive only such
compensation as may be fixed by law. With such a realization, he is expected not to
 avail himself of devious or circuitous means to increase the remuneration attached
to his position.42 x x x
 The gratuity pay being given to petitioners by the HSDC Board was by reason of the
satisfactory performance of their work under the trust agreement. It is considered
a bonus and by its very nature, a bonus partakes of an additional remuneration or
compensation. It bears stressing that when petitioners were separated from
LIVECOR, they were given separation pay which also included gratuity pay for all
the years they worked thereat and concurrently in HSDC/SIDCOR. Granting them
another gratuity pay for the works done in HSDC under the trust agreement would
be indirectly giving them additional compensation for services rendered in another
position which is an extension or is connected with his basic work which is
prohibited. This can only be allowed if there is a law which specifically authorizes
them to receive an additional payment of gratuity. The HSDC Board Resolution No.
05-19-A granting petitioners’ gratuity pay is not a law which would exempt them
from the Constitutional proscription against additional, double or indirect
compensation. Neither does the HSDC law under P.D. 1396 contain a provision
allowing the grant of such gratuity pay to petitioners.
 The second paragraph of Section 8, Article IX specifically adds that "pensions and
gratuities shall not be considered as additional, double or indirect compensation."
This has reference to compensation already earned, for instance by a retiree. A
retiree receiving pensions or gratuities after retirement can continue to receive
such pension or gratuity even if he accepts another government position to which
another compensation is attached. The grant to designees Dimagiba et al. of
another gratuity from HSDC would not fall under the exception in the second
paragraph as the same had not been primarily earned, but rather being granted for
service simultaneously rendered to LIVECOR and HSDC. Hence, to allow the release
of the second gratuity from HSDC would run afoul over the wellsettled rule that "in
the absence of an express legal exception, pension or gratuity laws should be
construed as to preclude any person from receiving double compensation.
Debulgado vs CSC
Facts:
 Petitioner Mayor Rogelio Debulgado is the incumbent Mayor of the City of San Carlos,
Negros Occidental.
 He promoted his wife, petitioner Victoria Debulgado, as General Services Officer, that is,
as head of the Office of General Services of the City Government of San Carlos.
 Before her promotion, petitioner Victoria had been in the service of the City
Government for about thirty-two (32) years and she rose from the ranks by successively
occupying different government offices.
 Public respondent CSC received a letter from Congressman Tranquilino Carmona of the
First District of Negros Occidental, calling attention to the promotional appointment
issued by petitioner Mayor in favor of his wife.
 After investigation, the CSC disapproved the promotion of petitioner Victoria to the
position upon the ground that that promotion violated the statutory prohibition against
nepotic appointments.
 Petitioners moved for reconsideration, contending that
 The statutory prohibition against nepotism was not applicable to the
appointment of Victoria as General Services Officer since the prohibition applies
only to original appointments and not to promotional appointments
o Petitioners believe that because petitioner Victoria was already in the
service of the City Government before she married petitioner Mayor, the
reason behind the prohibition no longer applied to her promotional
appointment.
o Petitioners also affirm that petitioner Victoria deserves to be promoted
to General Services Officer, considering her long and faithful service to
the City Government.
 The CSC had deprived petitioner Victoria of her right to due process by
unilaterally revoking her appointment. Petitioners assert that Victoria can no
longer be removed from the position of General Services Officer without giving
her an opportunity to be heard and to answer the charged of nepotism.
Petitioner Mayor denies that he had been motivated by personal reasons when he appointed
his wife to the new post.
 He states that his wife was the most qualified among the candidates for
appointment to that position, she having worked for the City Government for
thirty-two (32) years and being highly recommended by the OIC-Treasurer of San
Carlos City.
 It is also claimed by petitioner Mayor that his choice of his wife for the position was
concurred in by the Sangguniang Panglungsod.
 He further avers that he had consulted the Field and Regional Officers of the CSC in
Bacolod City, and raised the question of applicability of the prohibition against
nepotism to the then proposed promotion of his wife in one of the seminars
conducted by the Commission's Regional Office held in San Carlos City. According
to petitioner Mayor, one Gregorio C. Agdon, a supervising personnel specialist in
the Commission's Bacolod Office, informed him that the promotional appointment
was not covered by the prohibition.
Issue:
Does the prohibition against nepotism apply to promotional appointments as well? YES.
Held:
FIRST ISSUE
The prohibition against nepotism applies to BOTH original and promotional appointments.
Both an original appointment and a promotion are particular species of personnel action,
which must comply with the prohibition against nepotism.
 The original appointment of a civil service employee and all subsequent personnel
actions undertaken by or in respect of that employee such as promotion, transfer,
reinstatement, reemployment, etc., must comply with the Implementing Rules
including, of course, the prohibition against nepotism
  The purpose is to ensure that all appointments and other personnel
actions in the civil service should be based on merit and fitness and
should never depend on how close or intimate an appointee is to the
appointing power.
 The prohibitory norm against nepotism in the public service is set out in Section 59,
Book V of the Revised Administrative Code of 1987 (also known as EO 292) under
Section 59:
 All appointments in the national, provincial, city and municipal
governments or in any branch or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations, made in favor of a
relative of the appointing or recommending authority, or of the chief of
the bureau or office, or of the persons exercising immediate supervision
over him, are hereby prohibited.
 As used in this Section the word "relative" and members of the family
referred to are those related within the third degree either of
consanguinity or of affinity.”
 The following are exempted from the operation of the rules on nepotism:
(a) persons employed in a confidential capacity, (b) teachers, (c)
physicians, and (d) members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines:
Provided, however, That in each particular instance full report of such
appointment shall be made to the Commission.
 The restriction mentioned in subsection (1) shall not be applicable to the
case of a member of any family who, after his or her appointment to any
position in an office or bureau, contracts marriage with someone in the
same office or bureau, in which event the employment or retention
therein of both husband and wife may be allowed.
 In order to give immediate effect to these provisions, cases of previous
appointment which are in contravention hereof shall be corrected by
transfer and pending such transfer, no promotion or salary increase shall
be allowed in favor of the relative or relatives who were appointed in
violation of these provisions.
 The prohibition was cast in comprehensive and unqualified terms.
 Firstly, it explicitly covers "all appointments," without seeking to make
any distinction between differing kinds or types of appointments.
 Secondly, Section 59 covers all appointments to the national, provincial,
city and municipal government, as well as any branch or instrumentality
thereof and all government owned or controlled corporations.
 Thirdly, there is a list of exceptions set out in Section 59 itself, but it is a
short exclusive list: (a) persons employed in a confidential capacity; (b)
teachers; (c) physicians; and (d) members of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines.
The subsequent marriage of one to the other of petitioners did not retroactively convert the
original appointment of petitioner Victoria into a prohibited nepotic one.
 It is the promotional appointment issued by petitioner Mayor to petitioner Victoria
in 1 October 1982 that is at stake.
It is essential to stress, however, that the prohibition applies quite without regard to the
actual merits of the proposed appointee and to the good intentions of the appointing or
recommending authority, and that the prohibition against nepotism in appointments
whether original or promotional, is not intended by the legislative authority to penalize
faithful service.
 The purpose of Section 59 is precisely to take out of the discretion of the
appointing and recommending authority the matter of appointing or
recommending for appointment a relative.
 In other words, Section 59 insures the objectivity of the appointing or
recommending official by preventing that objectivity from being in fact tested.
 The importance of this statutory objective is difficult to overstress in the culture in
which we live and work in the Philippines, where family bonds remain, in general,
compelling and cohesive.
SECOND ISSUE
The promotional appointment of petitioner Victoria as formerly approved by the CSC did not
vest in her a right to that position, therefore, she was not deprived of due process when she
was terminated.
 Victoria was not deprived due process as there were no administrative charges in
respect of which she would have been entitled to notice and hearing.
 The CSC, in approving or disapproving an appointment, only examines the
conformity of the appointment with applicable provisions of law and whether the
appointee possesses all the minimum qualifications and none of the
disqualifications.
 At all events, as the Solicitor General has noted, petitioner Victoria was afforded an
opportunity to be heard when she filed an MR with the CSC and there challenged
the disapproval by the Commission.
Since the promotional appointment in favor of petitioner Victoria was a violation of Section
59, it was null and void from the beginning. A void appointment cannot give rise to security
of tenure on the part of the holder of such appointment.
 The CSC is empowered to take appropriate action on all appointments and other
personnel actions, e.g., promotions.
 Such power includes the authority to recall an appointment initially approved in
disregard of applicable provisions of Civil Service law and regulations.
 Section 20 of Rule VI of the Omnibus Implementing Rules makes this
clear:
 Sec. 20. Notwithstanding the initial approval of an appointment, the
same may be recalled on any of the following grounds:
(a) Non-compliance with the procedures/criteria provided in the
agency's Merit Promotion Plan;
(b) Failure to pass through the agency's Selection/Promotion
Board;
(c) Violation of the existing collective agreement between
management and employees relative to promotion; or
 (d) Violation of other existing civil service law, rules and
regulations.
 The recall or withdrawal by the CSC of the approval which had been issued by one
of its Field Officers, Director Escobia, was accordingly lawful and appropriate, the
promotional appointment of petitioner Victoria being void "from the beginning."
 The approval issued by Director Escobia did not, as it could not, cure the intrinsic
vice of that appointment.
CSC VS CORTES
FACTS:
 The Commission En Banc of the CHR issued Reso A 2008-19 approving the
appointment to the position of Information Officer V (IO V) of respondent Cortes.
 Commissioner Mallari, father of respondent Cortes, abstained from voting and
requested the CHR to render an opinion on the legality of the respondent’s
appointment.
 In a Memorandum dated March 31, 2008, CHR Legal Division Chief Atty. Lamorena
rendered an opinion that respondent Cortes’ appointment is not covered by the
rule on nepotism because the appointing authority, the Commission En Banc, has
a personality distinct and separate from its members.
 CHR Chairperson Quisumbing, however, sent respondent a letter on the same day
instructing her not to assume her position because her appointment is not yet
complete.
 The Civil Service Commission-NCR (CSC-NCR) Field Office informed Chairperson
Quisumbing that it will conduct an investigation on the appointment of respondent
Cortes.
 Cornelio, Director II of the CSC-NCR Field Office informed Chairperson Quisumbing
that the appointment of respondent Cortes is not valid because it is covered by the
rule on nepotism under Section 9 of the Revised Omnibus Rules on Appointments
and Other Personnel Actions.
 According to the CSC-NCR, Commissioner Mallari is considered an appointing
authority with respect to respondent Cortes despite being a mere member of the
Commission En Banc.
 Respondent Cortes appealed the ruling of Director Cornelio but the same was
denied on September 30, 2008. Consequently, respondent Cortes filed a petition
for review on November 24, 2008 before the CSC. On March 2, 2010 the CSC issued
Resolution 10-0370 where it denied the petition and affirmed the nepotic character
of respondent Cortes’ appointment. Respondent Cortes filed a Motion for
Reconsideration but the same was denied in Resolution 10-1396 dated July 12,
2010.
( overpayments.
CSC VS DACOYCOY
FACTS:
Pedro Dacoycoy, respondent, is the vocational school administrator of Balicuatro College of
Arts and Trades in Northern Samar. After formal investigation by the CSC, he was found guilty
of nepotism on two counts. CSC imposed on him the penalty of dismissal from the service.
Respondent filed motion for reconsideration, anchoring on the the argument that he was not
the appointing or the recommending authority. CA reversed CSC's resolution ruling that the
respondent did not appoint his 2 sons, therefore he is not guilty of nepotism.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent is guilty of nepotism.
DECISION:
Yes. The law (Sec 59 Nepotism, (1) ) defines nepotism as all appointments to the national,
provincial, city and municipal governments or in any branch or instrumentality thereof,
including government owned or controlled corporations, made in favor of a relative of the
1. appointing or
2. recommending authority, or of the
3. chief of the bureau or office, or of
4. the persons exercising immediate supervision over him.
The word "relative" and members of the family referred to are those related within the third
degree either of consanguinity or of affinity.
CSC found respondent guilty of nepotism as a result of the appointment of his 2 sons Rito, a
driver and Ped, a utility worker, as their are under his immediate supervision and control as
the school administrator.
BLAQUERA V ALACALA
FACTS
 Petitioners are officials and employees of several government departments and
agencies who were paid incentive benefits for the year 1992, pursuant to EO 292,
otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987, and the Omnibus Rules
Implementing Book V of EO 292. On January 19, 1993, then President Ramos issued
AO 29 authorizing the grant of productivity incentive benefits for the year 1992 in
the maximum amount of P1,000.00 and reiterating the prohibition under Section of
AO 268, enjoining the grant of productivity incentive benefits without prior
approval of the President.
 Section 4 of AO 29 directed all departments, offices and agencies which authorized
payment of CY 1992 Productivity Incentive Bonus in excess of the amount
authorized under Section 1 hereof [are hereby directed] to immediately cause the
return/refund of the excess within a period of six months to commence fifteen (15)
days after the issuance of this Order.
 In compliance therewith, the heads of the departments or agencies of the
government concerned, who are the herein respondents, caused the deduction
from petitioners salaries or allowances of the amounts needed to cover the alleged
 To prevent the respondents from making further deductions from their salaries or
allowances, the petitioners have come before this Court to seek relief.
ISSUE
Constitutionality of AOs
RULING
The President issued subject Administrative Orders to regulate the grant of productivity
incentive benefits and to prevent discontentment, dissatisfaction and demoralization among
government personnel by committing limited resources of government for the equal
payment of incentives and awards. The President was only exercising his power of control by
modifying the acts of the respondents who granted incentive benefits to their employees
without appropriate clearance from the Office of the President, thereby resulting in the
uneven distribution of government resources. In the view of the President, respondents did a
mistake which had to be corrected. In so acting, the President exercised a constitutionally-
protected prerogative --
The Presidents duty to execute the law is of constitutional origin. So, too, is his control of all
executive departments. Thus it is, that department heads are men of his confidence. His is the
power to appoint them; his, too, is the privilege to dismiss them at pleasure. Naturally, he
controls and directs their acts. Implicit then is his authority to go over, confirm, modify or
reverse the action taken by his department secretaries. In this context, it may not be said that
the President cannot rule on the correctness of a decision of a department secretary. (Lacson-
Magallanes Co., Inc. v. Pao, 21 SCRA 898)
Neither can it be said that the President encroached upon the authority of the Commission
on Civil Service to grant benefits to government personnel. AO 29 and AO 268 did not revoke
the privilege of employees to receive incentive benefits. The same merely regulated the
grant and amount thereof.
Sound management and effective utilization of financial resources of government are
basically executive functions,[34] not the Commissions. Implicit is this recognition in EO
292, which states:
Sec. 35. Employee Suggestions and Incentive Award System. - There shall be established a
government-wide employee suggestions and incentive awards system which shall be
administered under such rules, regulations, and standards as maybe promulgated by the
Commission.
In accordance with rules, regulations, and standards promulgated by the Commission, the
President or the head of each department or agency is authorized to incur whatever
necessary expenses involved in the honorary recognition of subordinate officers and
employees of the government who by their suggestions, inventions, superior accomplishment,
and other personal efforts contribute to the efficiency, economy, or other improvement of
government operations, or who perform such other extraordinary acts or services in the
public interest in connection with, or in relation to, their official employment.(Chapter 5,
Subtitle A, Book V) (underscoring ours)
Conformably, it is the President or the head of each department or agency who is authorized
to incur the necessary expenses involved in the honorary recognition of subordinate officers
and employees of the government. It is not the duty of the Commission to fix the amount of
the incentives. Such function belongs to the President or his duly empowered alter ego.
Anent petitioners contention that the forcible refund of incentive benefits is an
unconstitutional impairment of a contractual obligation, suffice it to state that [n]ot all
contracts entered into by the government will operate as a waiver of its non-suability;
distinction must be made between its sovereign and proprietary acts (United States of
America v. Ruiz, 136 SCRA 487).[35] The acts involved in this case are governmental. Besides,
the Court is in agreement with the Solicitor General that the incentive pay or benefit is in the
nature of a bonus which is not a demandable or enforceable obligation.
It is understood that the Judiciary, Civil Service Commission, Commission on Audit,
Commission on Elections, and Office of the Ombudsman, which enjoy fiscal autonomy, are
not covered by the amount fixed by the President. As explained in Bengzon vs. Drilon (208
SCRA 133):
As envisioned in the Constitution, the fiscal autonomy enjoyed by the Judiciary, the Civil
Service Commission, the Commission on Audit, the Commission on Elections, and the Office
of the Ombudsman contemplates a guarantee of full flexibility to allocate and utilize their
resources with the wisdom and dispatch that their needs require. It recognizes the power
and authority to levy, assess and collect fees, fix rates of compensation not exceeding the
highest rates authorized by law for compensation and pay plans of the government and
allocate and disburse such sums as may be provided by law or prescribed by them in the
course of the discharge of their functions.
Fiscal autonomy means freedom from outside control. If the Supreme Court says it needs 100
typewriters but DBM rules we need only 10 typewriters and sends its recommendations to
Congress without even informing us, the autonomy given by the Constitution becomes an
empty and illusory platitude.
The Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman must have the
independence and flexibility needed in the discharge of their constitutional duties. The
imposition of restrictions and constraints on the manner the independent constitutional
offices allocate and utilize the funds appropriated for their operations is anathema to fiscal
autonomy and violative not only of the express mandate of the Constitution but especially as
regards the Supreme Court, of the independence and separation of powers upon which the
entire fabric of our constitutional system is based. In the interest of comity and cooperation,
the Supreme Court, Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman have so far limited
their objections to constant reminders. We now agree with the petitioners that this grant of
autonomy should cease to be a meaningless provision.
Untenable is petitioners contention that the herein respondents be held personally liable for
the refund in question. Absent a showing of bad faith or malice, public officers are not
personally liable for damages resulting from the performance of official duties.[36]
Every public official is entitled to the presumption of good faith in the discharge of official
duties.[37] Absent any showing of bad faith or malice, there is likewise a presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duties.[38]
In upholding the constitutionality of AO 268 and AO 29, the Court reiterates the well-
entrenched doctrine that in interpreting statutes, that which will avoid a finding of
unconstitutionality is to be preferred.[39]
Considering, however, that all the parties here acted in good faith, we cannot countenance
the refund of subject incentive benefits for the year 1992, which amounts the petitioners
have already received.Indeed, no indicia of bad faith can be detected under the attendant
facts and circumstances. The officials and chiefs of offices concerned disbursed such
incentive benefits in the honest belief that the amounts given were due to the recipients and
the latter accepted the same with gratitude, confident that they richly deserve such benefits.
WHEREFORE, the Petitions in G.R. Nos. 109406, 110642, 111494, and 112056
are hereby DISMISSED, and as above ratiocinated, further deductions from the salaries and
allowances of petitioners are hereby ENJOINED.

Fajardo vs. Ombudsman Digest
G.R. No. 173268 : August 23, 2012
DOCTRINE: Under the "threefold liability rule," any act or omission of any public official or
employee can result in criminal, civil, or administrative liability, each of which is
independent of the other.
FACTS:
 Petitioner Ernesto A. Fajardo (Fajardo) was designated by the Bureau of Customs
(BOC) as a Special Collecting Officer at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport
(NAIA) Customs House, Collection Division. In its audit, the COA discovered that
Fajardo has an unremitted collection amounting to P53,214,258.00. Thus, Fajardo
was charged with misappropriation of public funds before the Ombudsman.
 The Ombudsman found Fajardo guilty of dishonesty and grave misconduct and
ordered Fajardo’s dismissal from the service. On appeal, the CA affirmed the
findings of the Ombudsman.
 Hence, this petition. Fajardo claims that the Ombudsman has no power to order his
dismissal from service.
COJUANGCO VS CA
Doctrine: To hold public officers personally liable for moral and exemplary damages and for
attorney’s fees for acts done in the performance of official functions, the plaintiff must prove
that these officers exhibited acts characterized by evident bad faith, malice, or gross
negligence. But even if their acts had not been so tainted, public officers may still be held
liable for nominal damages if they had violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.
Facts:
Petitioner Eduardo Cojuangco Jr. filed a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the ROC seeking
to set aside CA’s decision, after it reversed a favorable decision of the RTC that ordered the
private respondents to pay him moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and costs of
the suit, and denied his Motion for Reconsideration.
Cojuangco, a known businessman-sportsman owned several racehorses which he entered in
sweepstakes races. Several of his horses won the races on various dates, and won prizes
together with the 30% due for trainer/grooms. He sent letters of demand for the collection of
the prizes due him but private respondents PCSO and its then chairman Fernando Carrascoso
Jr. consistently replied that the demanded prizes are being withheld on advice of PCGG.
Consequently, Cojuangco filed this case before the Manila RTC but before the receipt
summons, PCGG advised private respondents that “it poses no more objection to its
remittance of the prized winnings”. This was immediately communicated to petitioner’s
counsel Estelito Mendoza by Carrascoso but the former refused to accept the prizes at this
point, reasoning that the matter had already been brought to court.
Issue:
W/N the award for moral and exemplary damages against respondent Carrascoso is
warranted by evidence the law
Held:
NO. Petitioner is only entitled to nominal damages.
Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or simple negligence. It imports a dishonest
purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of a known duty
due to some motive or interest of ill will that partakes of the nature of fraud. There is
sufficient evidence on record to support Respondent Court’s conclusion that Carrascoso did
not act in bad faith. His letters to PCGG indicated his uncertainties as to the extent of the
sequestration against the properties of the plaintiff. There is also denying that plaintiff is a
very close political and business associate of the former President Marcos. Sequestration was
also a novel remedy. Under these equivocalities, Carrascoso could not be faulted in asking
further instructions from the PCGG, on what to do and more so, to obey the instructions
given. Besides, EO2 has just been issued by President Aquino, “freezing all assets and
properties in the Philippines (of) former President Marcos and/or his wife…their close
friends, subordinates, business associates…”
The extant rule is that public officers shall not be liable by way of moral and exemplary
damages for acts done in the performance of official duties, unless there is a clear showing of
bad faith, malice or gross negligence. Attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation cannot be
imposed either, in the absence of clear showing of any of the grounds provided therefor
under the Civil Code. The trial court’s award of these kinds of damages must perforce be
deleted.
Nevertheless, this Court agrees with the petitioner and the trial that Respondent Carrascoso
may still be held liable under Article 32 of the Civil Code, which provides:
Art. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly
obstruct, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights
and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages:
xxx xxx xxx
(6) The rights against deprivation of property without due process of law;
Under the aforecited article, it is not necessary that the public officer acted with malice or
bad faith. To be liable, it is enough that there was a violation of the constitutional rights of
petitioner, even on the pretext of justifiable motives or good faith in the performance of
one’s duties.
We hold that petitioner’s right to the use of his property was unduly impeded. While
Respondent Carrascoso may have relied upon the PCGG’s instructions, he could have further
sought the specific legal basis therefor. A little exercise of prudence would have disclosed
that there was no writ issued specifically for the sequestration of the racehorse winnings of
petitioner. There was apparently no record of any such writ covering his racehorses either.
The issuance of a sequestration order requires the showing of a prima facie case and due
regard for the requirements of due process. The withholding of the prize winnings of
petitioner without a properly issued sequestration order clearly spoke of a violation of his
property rights without due process of law.
Art. 2221 of the Civil Code authorizes the award of nominal damages to a plaintiff whose
right has been violated or invaded by the defendant, for the purpose of vindicating or
recognizing that right, not for indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered.
OCA V ENRIQUEZ
FACTS
In a letter dated 19 January 1987, one Eliodoro C. Cruz of Compania Maritima, Inc. informed
this Court that the company's lawyer filed with the Tanodbayan on 12 December 1986 a
complaint for falsification of a public document, use of falsified documents, robbery and the
violation of R.A. No. 3019 against herein respondent Ramon G. Enriquez, Deputy Sheriff of
Branch XXXI of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila and others. The said company lawyer
requested that an investigation be conducted on the administrative aspect of the case.
In his 20 January 1987 letter to Mr. Cruz, then Court Administrator Leo D. Medialdea, who
later became a member of this Court, informed the latter that as a matter of policy, the
administrative aspect of the case "will be undertaken by this Office upon the filing of a
corresponding information by the Tanodbayan before the Sandiganbayan."
Consequently, an Information for falsification of a public document was filed against the
respondent with the Sandiganbayan on 6 October 1988. The case was docketed as Criminal
Case No. 12987 and was assigned to the Second Division. A copy of the Information was
furnished the Office of the Court Administrator on 17 October 1988.
On 1 February 1989, then Court Administrator Meynardo A. Tiro, pursuant to this Court's en
banc resolution of 12 March 1981 and on the basis of the Information filed with the
Sandiganbayan, administratively charged the herein respondent with the crime of
falsification of a public document and with conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service committed in the manner alleged in the said Information
Instead of filing the answer/explanation as ordered, the respondent forwarded to the Court
Administrator a letter on 20 February 1989 informing the latter that Criminal Case No. 12987
was still pending resolution before the Sandiganbayan and that therefore, he (respondent)
should not be held administratively liable.
On 15 May 1989, the Sandiganbayan, acting on a demurrer to evidence, promulgated a
Resolution granting the same and dismissing the case against the respondent "for
insufficiency of evidence."
On 10 April 1991, respondent filed a Manifestation informing this Court of the promulgation
of the above resolution and praying that "by virtue of the dismissal of the Criminal Case filed
against the respondent before the Sandiganbayan, the Administrative Case . . . be likewise
dismissed."
ISSUE
W/N dismissal of criminal action forecloses institution of administrative action
RULING
Be that as it may, its dismissal of the criminal case on the ground of insufficiency of evidence
was never meant, as respondent doggedly believed and arrogantly asserted, to foreclose
administrative action against him or to give him a clean bill of health in all respects. The
Sandiganbayan, in dismissing the same, was simply saying that the prosecution was unable to
prove the guilt of the respondent beyond reasonable doubt, a condition sine qua non for
conviction 2 because of the presumption of innocence which the Constitution guarantee an
accused. 3 Lack or absence of proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean an absence of
any evidence whatsoever for there is another class of evidence which, though insufficient to
establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt, is adequate in civil cases; this is preponderance of
evidence. 4 Then too, there is the "substantial evidence" rule in administrative proceedings
which merely requires in these cases such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion. 5
Going back to Our findings, there is no doubt in Our minds that the respondent (a) falsified
the Minutes of Sale and the Sheriff's Certificate of Sale; (b) violated Sections 22 and 25, Rule
39 of the Rules of Court by not conducting another bidding — assuming one was held on 12
May 1986 — after the alleged highest bidder, Patriarca, failed to pay the bid price, by
executing in the latter's favor a certificate of Sheriff's Sale and by delivering the auctioned
vessels despite the failure to pay: (c) illegally sold the vessels to Cailian on 23 May 1986
without a public bidding; and (d) maliciously connived and conspired with Patriarca, Cailian
and others to cover up such illegal acts by making it appear, by means of an antedated deed
of sale, that Patriarca sold the vessels to Cailian.
Respondent is therefore guilty of gross dishonesty, grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial
to the best interest of the service. He not only deliberately violated the integrity of official
acts of an employee of the court, but also undermined the faith and trust of the public in the
Judiciary. He has transgressed the constitutional command that as a public office is a public
trust, all public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve
them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act with patriotism and
justice and lead modest lives. 6 In Jereos vs. Reblando, 7 We laid down the rule that the
conduct and behavior of every one connected with an office charged with the dispensation of
justice, such as the court of which the herein respondent is the assigned sheriff, should be
circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility. His conduct, at all times, must not
only be characterized with propriety and decorum, but above all else must be beyond
suspicion.
While it is but proper that the respondent should not be kept a minute longer in the
Judiciary, his dismissal from the service should not end this case. In the light of the above
findings of conspiracy with other parties, including a certain Judge Luz who prepared the
alleged deed of sale in favor of Cailian, there is a need to dig deeper, in a manner of speaking,
in this case. This could open the door to the secret chambers of a rumored syndicate which is
in the business of fixing attachments and execution sales.
WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to DISMISS from the service, effective immediately,
respondent RAMON G. ENRIQUEZ, for gross dishonesty, grave misconduct and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service, with forfeiture of all benefits, except the
monetary value of his leave credits, if any, and with prejudice to his re-employment in any
branch or service of the government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations.
JOROLAN V ACUZAR
FACTS
On May 2, 2000, respondent Aproniano Jorolan filed Administrative Case No. 2000-
01[4] against petitioner before the PLEB charging the latter of Grave Misconduct for allegedly
having an illicit relationship with respondents minor daughter.
On May 11, 2000, respondent also instituted a criminal case against petitioner before the
Municipal Trial Court of New Corella, docketed as Criminal Case No. 1712, for Violation of
Section 5 (b), Article III of Republic Act No. 7610, otherwise known as the Child Abuse Act.
On May 15, 2000, petitioner filed his Counter-Affidavit[5] before the PLEB vehemently
denying all the accusations leveled against him. In support thereof, petitioner attached the
affidavit of complainants daughter, Rigma A. Jorolan, who denied having any relationship
with the petitioner or having kissed him despite knowing him to be a married person.
On July 24, 2000, petitioner filed a motion to suspend the proceedings before the PLEB
pending resolution of the criminal case filed before the regular court. The PLEB denied his
motion for lack of merit and a hearing of the case was conducted.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Board finds the respondent, SPO1 Leonito Acuzar,
PNP New Corella, Davao del Norte Police Station GUILTY of GRAVE MISCONDUCT (Child
Abuse) which is punishable by DISMISSAL effective immediately.
ISSUE
W/N PLEB had no jurisdiction to hear the administrative case until petitioner is convicted
before the regular court
RULING
A careful perusal of respondents affidavit-complaint against petitioner would show that
petitioner was charged with grave misconduct for engaging in an illicit affair with
respondents minor daughter, he being a married man, and not for violation of law, as
petitioner would like to convince this Court. Misconduct generally means wrongful, improper
or unlawful conduct, motivated by premeditated, obstinate or intentional purpose.[10] It
usually refers to transgression of some established and definite rule of action, where no
discretion is left except what necessity may demand; it does not necessarily imply corruption
or criminal intention but implies wrongful intention and not to mere error of judgment.[11] On
the other hand, violation of law presupposes final conviction in court of any crime or offense
penalized under the Revised Penal Code or any special law or ordinance. [12] The settled rule is
that criminal and administrative cases are separate and distinct from each other. [13] In
criminal cases, proof beyond reasonable doubt is needed whereas in administrative
proceedings, only substantial evidence is required. Verily, administrative cases may proceed
independently of criminal proceedings.[14] The PLEB, being the administrative disciplinary
body tasked to hear complaints against erring members of the PNP, has jurisdiction over the
case.
It is apparent from the foregoing provision that the remedy of appeal from the decision of
the PLEB to the Regional Appellate Board was available to petitioner. Since appeal was
available, filing a petition for certiorari was inapt. The existence and availability of the right of
appeal are antithetical to the availment of the special civil action of certiorari. [16] Corollarily,
the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies requires that before a party is allowed
to seek the intervention of the court, it is a precondition that he should have availed of the
means of administrative processes afforded to him. If a remedy is available within the
administrative machinery of the administrative agency, then this alternative should first be
utilized before resort can be made to the courts. This is to enable such body to review and
correct any mistakes without the intervention of the court.
TECSON V SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS
Petitioner was, at the time of the commission of the offense charged in the Information, the
Municipal Mayor of Prosperidad, Agusan del Sur.
Private complainant before the Sandiganbayan, Mrs. Salvacion Luzana, is a resident of
Poblacion, Prosperidad, Agusan del Sur. She is a neighbor of the petitioner.
Upon the offer of Tecson, he and Mrs. Luzana agreed to engage in an investment
business. They would sell tickets at P100.00 each which after 30 days would earn P200.00 or
more. She would buy appliances and cosmetics at a discount, with the use of the proceeds of
the sales of tickets, and resell them. No other details were disclosed on how the business
would operate, and Tecson does not appear to have contributed any monetary consideration
to the capital. On September 27, 1989, they began selling tickets.
Tecson also acted as agent selling tickets. He got on that day early in the morning two
booklets of tickets, for which he signed the covers of the booklets to acknowledge
receipt. Before noon of the same day he returned after having already sold 40 tickets in the
amount of P4,000.00, bringing with him a Mayors Permit in the name of Mrs. Luzana for their
business called LD Assurance Privileges. He asked for a cash advance of P4,000.00 which he
would use during the fiesta on September 29, 1989, and he would not release the Mayors
Permit unless the cash advance was given him. Mrs. Luzana reluctantly acceded, saying that it
was not the due date yet, so he was getting the cash advances on his share. Tecson signed for
the cash advance.
On October 3, 1989, Mrs. Luzana secured a Business Permit in accordance with the
instructions of Tecson. The permit was in her name but the same was for the operation of
Prosperidad Investment and Sub-Dealership, the new name of the business. In the session of
the Sangguniang Bayan of Prosperidad, Agusan del Sur on October 17, 1989 presided over by
Tecson, Resolution No. 100 was passed revoking the business permit at the instance of the
Provincial Director of the Department of Trade and Industry.[3]
With the revocation of her business permit, private complainant below filed an
administrative case against petitioner, for violation of Section 3 [c], R.A. No. 3019 and Section
60 of B.P. Blg. 337 (then Local Government Code) with the Department of Interior and Local
Government (DILG). The complaint was docketed as Adm. Case No. SP-90-01 and referred to
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Agusan del Sur for appropriate action.
Not content with having instituted administrative proceedings, private complainant below
also filed a civil case against petitioner for damages with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 6,
of Prosperidad, Agusan del Sur. This action was docketed as Civil Case No. 716.
A complaint was likewise filed with the Ombudsman for violation of R.A. No. 3019, otherwise
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. This complaint was docketed as OMB Case
No. 3-8-02919. It was subsequently referred to the Sandiganbayan, which took jurisdiction.
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Agusan del Sur dismissed the administrative case.
Sandiganbayan, First Division rendered the assailed decision convicting appellant of violating
R.A. No. 3019.
ISSUE
Whether or not the decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan exonerating the accused
serves as a bar by prior judgment to the decision of the Sandiganbayan;
RULING
NO First, it must be pointed out that res judicata is a doctrine of civil law.[7] It thus has no
bearing in the criminal proceedings before the Sandiganbayan. Second, it is a basic principle
of the law on public officers that a public official or employee is under a three-fold
responsibility for violation of duty or for a wrongful act or omission. This simply means that a
public officer may be held civilly, criminally, and administratively liable for a wrongful
doing. Thus, if such violation or wrongful act results in damages to an individual, the public
officer may be held civilly liable to reimburse the injured party. If the law violated attaches a
penal sanction, the erring officer may be punished criminally. Finally, such violation may also
lead to suspension, removal from office, or otheradministrative sanctions. This administrative
liability is separate and distinct from the penal and civil liabilities. Thus, the dismissal of an
administrative case does not necessarily bar the filing of a criminal prosecution for the same
or similar acts, which were the subject of the administrative complaint.[8] We conclude,
therefore, that the decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Agusan del Sur exonerating
petitioner in Administrative Case No. SP 90-01 is no bar to the criminal prosecution before
the Sandiganbayan.
As to the amicable settlement in Civil Case No. 716 with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 6, of
Prosperidad, Agusan del Sur, it is settled that a complaint for misconduct, malfeasance or
misfeasance against a public officer or employee cannot just be withdrawn at any time by the
complainant. This is because there is a need to maintain the faith and confidence of the
people in the government and its agencies and instrumentalities.[9] The inescapable
conclusion, therefore, is that the order of the trial court dismissing Civil Case No. 716 did not
bar the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan.
OCAMPO V OMBUDSMAN
FACTS
Jesus Ocampo is the Training Coordinator of NIACONSULT, a subsidiary of the National
Irrigation Administration.
The Agricultural Development Bank of Nepal (ADBN) requested NIACONSULT for training of
small-scale community irrigation development, and Ocampo attended to the request.
NIACONSULT demanded Ocampo to turn-over the total training fee paid by ADBN which
Ocampo personally received, but failed to remit the amount.
This prompted NIACONSULT to file an administrative case before the OMBUDSMAN.
While the case is pending, a criminal complaint for estafa and falsification was filed against
Ocampo based on the same facts or incidents. The Regional Trial Court DISMISSED the case.
OCAMPO’S CONTENTION: RTC’s dismissal of the criminal case serves as a bar to the
administrative case that can no longer stand on its own and therefore should be dismissed.
ISSUE
Whether or not the dismissal of the criminal case affect the validity of the administrative
case’s resolution?
RULING
NO. The dismissal of the criminal case will not foreclose administrative action filed against
petitioner or give him a clean bill of health in all respects. The Regional Trial Court, in
dismissing the criminal complaint, was simply saying that the prosecution was unable to
prove the guilt of petitioner beyond reasonable doubt, a condition sine qua non for
conviction. The lack or absence of proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean an absence
of any evidence whatsoever for there is another class of evidence which, though insufficient
to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt, is adequate in civil cases; this is preponderance
of evidence. Then too, there is the "substantial evidence" rule in administrative proceedings
which merely requires such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.
Thus, considering the difference in the quantum of evidence, as well as the procedure
followed and the sanctions imposed in criminal and administrative proceedings, the findings
and conclusions in one should not necessarily be binding on the other.
OCA V MACUSI
FACTS
Criselda M. Paligan (Paligan) was the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 429-06, entitled Ms. Criselda
M. Paligan v. Spouses Cornelio and Lermila Tabanganay, an action for collection of sum of
money with damages, before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Tabuk City,
Kalinga. In A letter dated July 23, 2009,1 addressed to the Presiding Judge, MTCC,2 Tahuk City,
Kalinga, Paligan inquired as to the status of the writ of execution issued on September 10,
2008 by the MTCC in Civil Case No. 4'29-06, since she had not received any report or
information whether the said writ had already been served. Paligan also furnished the Sheriff
of the Regional Trial Court
Judge Dalanao pointed out before the OCA that the Sheriff7 was inconsistent: making reports
in some cases, although some of said reports were late, and making no reports at all in other
cases. Judge Dalanao further noted that five years has already lapsed without execution in
several cases. He has also yet to receive the Sheriff’s estimate of expenses for approval.
Judge Dalanao lastly averred that after receiving complaints from parties, he already verbally
brought up the matter with the Executive Judge, and even personally talked to the Sheriff
several times to remind the Sheriff of his duties and responsibilities.
The OCA, finding that Macusi violated Rule 39, Section 14 and Rule141, Section 9 of the Rules
of Court, sent the latter a letter dated December 2, 200911 directing him to show cause why
no disciplinary action should betaken against him.
In a Resolution dated February 6, 2013,18 the Court re-docketed the administrative complaint
against Macusi as a regular administrative matter and required Macusi to manifest within 10
days from notice if he was willing to submit the matter for decision/resolution based on the
records/pleadings filed.
Macusi19 submitted his Manifestation and Motion dated May 30,2013, informing the Court
that he was deemed resigned from government service by operation of law when he filed his
Certificate of Candidacy for the position of City Councilor in Tabuk City, Kalinga for the 2010
Local Elections. He prayed that the Court dismiss the administrative case against him for
being moot and academic.
ISSUE
W/N Resignation of respondent will relieve him from administrative liability
RULING
The raison d’ etre behind the requirement of periodic reports under Rule 39, Section 14 of
the Rules of Court is to update the court on the status of the execution and to take necessary
steps to ensure the speedy execution of decisions.20 Macusi did not deny that he failed to file
periodic reports on the Writ of Execution dated September 10, 2008 in Civil Case No. 429-
06,as well as on the writs of execution in the other cases in Judge Dalanao’s inventory. In his
defense, however, he asserted that the prevailing party in the cases, including Paligan, failed
to coordinate or refused to cooperate with him in the implementation of their respective
writs of execution; and that the writs of execution were not properly turned over to him
when he was appointed Sheriff in April 2005. Macusi’s excuses cannot exonerate him.
In Mariñas v. Florendo,21 the Court stressed that:
Sheriffs play an important role in the administration of justice and as agents of the law, high
standards are expected of them. They are duty- bound to know and to comply with the very
basic rules relative to the implementation of writs of execution.
Macusi’s prayer for dismissal of the present case for being moot is baseless. Macusi’s
constructive resignation from service through filing of his Certificate of Candidacy for the
2010 Local Elections does not render the case against him moot. Resignation is not a way out
to evade administrative liability when a court employee is facing administrative sanction.27 As
the Court held in Baquerfo v. Sanchez28:
Cessation from office of respondent by resignation or retirement neither warrants the
dismissal of the administrative complaint filed against him while he was still in the service nor
does it render said administrative case moot and academic. The jurisdiction that was this
Court’s at the time of the filing of the administrative complaint was not lost by the mere fact
that the respondent public official had ceased in office during the pendency of his case.
Respondent’s resignation does not preclude the finding of any administrative liability to
which he shall still be answerable.(Citations omitted.)
Considering the grave responsibilities imposed on him, Macusi had been careless and
imprudent in discharging his duties. Neither neglect nor delay should be allowed to stall the
expeditious disposition of cases. As such, he is indeed guilty of simple neglect of duty, which
is the failure of an employee to give proper attention to a required task. Simple neglect of
duty signifies "disregard of a duty resulting from carelessness or indifference."29
Under Section 23, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regulations, (simple)
neglect of duty is punishable by suspension of one month and one day to six months for the
first offense. However, under Sec.19, Rule XIV of the same Rules, the penalty of fine (instead
of suspension) may also be imposed in the alternative. 30Following the Court’s ruling in
several cases involving (simple) neglect of duty, this Court finds the penalty of a fine in the
amount of P4,000.00, as recommended by Judge Wacas and the OCA, just and reasonable.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds Desiderio W. Macusi, Jr., former Sheriff IV, Regional Trial Court, action against him, because in such a case, there is no basis nor justifiable reason to maintain
Branch 25, Tabuk City, Kalinga, GUILTY of Simple Neglect of Duty and imposes upon him the the administrative suit.
penalty of a FINE in the amount ofP4,000.00. Considering Macusi's resignation, the Court
directs the Office of Administrative Services to compute Macusi's terminal leave credits and
the Fiscal Management Office to compute the monetary equivalent thereof, from which his
fine of P-4,000.00 shall be deducted.

LARIN V EXEC SEC

FACTS
On September 18, 1992, [1] a decision was rendered by the Sandiganbayan convicting herein
petitioner Aquilino T. Larin, Revenue Specific Tax Officer, then Assistant Commisioner of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue and his co-accused (except Justino E. Galban, Jr.) of the crimes of
violation of Section 268 (4) of the National Internal Revenue Code and Section 3 (e) of R.A.
3019 in Criminal Cases Nos. 14208-14209, entitled People of the Philippines,
Plaintiff vs. Aquilino T. Larin, Teodoro T. Pareno, Justino E. Galban, Jr. and Potenciana N.
Evangelista, Accused
The fact of petitioners conviction was reported to the President of the Philippines by the then
Acting Finance Secretary Leong through a memorandum.
After a memo for investigation was implemented, the president, in the assailed
Administrative Order No. 101 dated December 2, 1993, found petitioner guilty of grave
misconduct in the administrative charge and imposed upon him the penalty of dismissal with
forfeiture of his leave credits and retirement benefits including disqualification for
reappointment in the government service.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed directly with this Court the instant petition on December 13, 1993
to question basically his alleged unlawful removal from office.
On April 17, 1996 and while the instant petition is pending, this Court set aside the conviction
of the petitioner in Criminal Case Nos. 14208 and 14209.
ISSUE
W/N pet is removed from service due to a valid cause
RULING
Although the proceedings taken complied with the requirements of procedural due process,
this Court, however, considers that petitioner was not dismissed for a valid cause.
It should be noted that what precipitated the creation of the investigative committee to look
into the administrative charge against petitioner is his conviction by the Sandiganbayan in
criminal Case Nos. 14208 and 14209. As admitted by the respondents, the administrative
case against petitioner is based on the Sandiganbayan Decision of September 18, 1992.
However, it must be stressed at this juncture that the conviction of petitioner by the
Sandiganbayan was set aside by this court in our decision promulgated on April 17, 1996 in
G.R. Nos. 108037-38 and 107119-20
We are not unaware of the rule that since administrative cases are independent from
criminal actions for the same act or omission, the dismissal or acquittal of the criminal charge
does not foreclose the institution of administrative action nor carry with it the relief from
administrative liability.[6] However, the circumstantial setting of the instant case sets it miles
apart from the foregoing rule and placed it well within the exception. Corollarily, where the
very basis of the administrative case against petitioner is his conviction in the criminal action
which was later on set aside by this court upon a categorical and clear findings that the acts
for which he was administratively held liable are not unlawful and irregular, the acquittal of
the petitioner in the criminal case necessarily entails the dismissal of the administrative
RUBRICO V MACAPAGAL ARROYO
FACTS
Rubrico, in her petition, said she was abducted on April 3, 2007 by armed men belonging to
the 301st Air Intelligence and Security Squadron, based at the Philippine Air Force Field
Station at Fernando Air Base in Lipa City, Batangas. During her detention, the petitioner
added, her daughters Mary Joy Rubrico Carbonel and Jean Rubrico Apruebo were harassed
by Senior Insp. Arsenio Gomez and that there were also armed men following them. The
petitioners prayed that a writ of amparo be issued, ordering the individual respondents to
desist from performing any threatening act against the security of the petitioners and for the
Office of the Ombudsman (OMB) to immediately file an information for kidnapping qualified
with the aggravating circumstance of gender of the offended party. It also prayed for
damages and for respondents to produce documents submitted to any of them on the case
of Lourdes.
The respondents then filed a joint return on the writ specifically denying the material
inculpatory averments against them. Respondents interposed the defense that the President
may not be sued during her incumbency.
ISSUE
W/N dismissal of the petition with respect to Gen. Esperon, P/Dir. Gen. Razon, P/Supt.
Roquero, P/Insp. Gomez, and the OMB is correct
RULING
As explained by the CA, Gen. Esperon and P/Dir. Gen. Razon were included in the case on the
theory that they, as commanders, were responsible for the unlawful acts allegedly
committed by their subordinates against petitioners. To the appellate court, the privilege of
the writ of amparo must be denied as against Gen. Esperon and P/Dir. Gen. Razon for the
simple reason that petitioners have not presented evidence showing that those who
allegedly abducted and illegally detained Lourdes and later threatened her and her family
were, in fact, members of the military or the police force. The two generals, the CAs holding
broadly hinted, would have been accountable for the abduction and threats if the actual
malefactors were members of the AFP or PNP.
As regards the three other answering respondents, they were impleaded because they
allegedly had not exerted the required extraordinary diligence in investigating and
satisfactorily resolving Lourdes disappearance or bringing to justice the actual perpetrators of
what amounted to a criminal act, albeit there were allegations against P/Insp. Gomez of acts
constituting threats against Mary Joy.
While in a qualified sense tenable, the dismissal by the CA of the case as against Gen.
Esperon and P/Dir. Gen. Razon is incorrect if viewed against the backdrop of the stated
rationale underpinning the assailed decision vis--vis the two generals, i.e., command
responsibility. The Court assumes the latter stance owing to the fact that command
responsibility, as a concept defined, developed, and applied under international law, has
little, if at all, bearing in amparo proceedings.
The evolution of the command responsibility doctrine finds its context in the development of
laws of war and armed combats. According to Fr. Bernas, command responsibility, in its
simplest terms, means the responsibility of commanders for crimes committed by
subordinate members of the armed forces or other persons subject to their control in
international wars or domestic conflict.[14] In this sense, command responsibility is properly a
form of criminal complicity. The Hague Conventions of 1907 adopted the doctrine of
command responsibility,[15] foreshadowing the present-day precept of holding a superior
accountable for the atrocities committed by his subordinates should he be remiss in his duty
of control over them. As then formulated, command responsibility is an omission mode of
individual criminal liability, whereby the superior is made responsible forcrimes
committed by his subordinates for failing to prevent or punish the perpetrators[16] (as
opposed to crimes he ordered).
The doctrine has recently been codified in the Rome Statute[17] of the International Criminal
Court (ICC) to which the Philippines is signatory. Sec. 28 of the Statute imposes individual
responsibility on military commanders for crimes committed by forces under their
control. The country is, however, not yet formally bound by the terms and provisions
embodied in this treaty-statute, since the Senate has yet to extend concurrence in its
ratification.[18]
While there are several pending bills on command responsibility,[19] there is still no Philippine
law that provides for criminal liability under that doctrine.[20]
It may plausibly be contended that command responsibility, as legal basis to hold
military/police commanders liable for extra-legal killings, enforced disappearances, or
threats, may be made applicable to this jurisdiction on the theory that the command
responsibility doctrine now constitutes a principle of international law or customary
international law in accordance with the incorporation clause of the Constitution. [21] Still, it
would be inappropriate to apply to these proceedings the doctrine of command
responsibility, as the CA seemed to have done, as a form of criminal complicity through
omission, for individual respondents criminal liability, if there be any, is beyond the reach
of amparo. In other words, the Court does not rule in such proceedings on any issue of
criminal culpability, even if incidentally a crime or an infraction of an administrative rule may
have been committed. As the Court stressed in Secretary of National Defense v.
Manalo (Manalo),[22] the writ of amparo was conceived to provide expeditious and effective
procedural relief against violations or threats of violation of the basic rights to life, liberty,
and security of persons; the corresponding amparo suit, however, is not an action to
determine criminal guilt requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt x x x or administrative
liability requiring substantial evidence that will require full and exhaustive proceedings. [23] Of
the same tenor, and by way of expounding on the nature and role of amparo, is what the
Court said in Razon v. Tagitis:
It does not determine guilt nor pinpoint criminal culpability for the disappearance [threats
thereof or extra-judicial killings]; it determines responsibility, or at least accountability, for
the enforced disappearance [threats thereof or extra-judicial killings] for purposes of
imposing the appropriate remedies to address the disappearance [or extra-judicial killings].
xxxx
As the law now stands, extra-judicial killings and enforced disappearances in this jurisdiction
are not crimes penalized separately from the component criminal acts undertaken to carry
out these killings and enforced disappearances and are now penalized under the Revised
Penal Code and special laws. The simple reason is that the Legislature has not spoken on the
matter; the determination of what acts are criminal x x x are matters of substantive law that
only the Legislature has the power to enact.[24] x x x
If command responsibility were to be invoked and applied to these proceedings, it should, at
most, be only to determine the author who, at the first instance, is accountable for, and has
the duty to address, the disappearance and harassments complained of, so as to enable the
Court to devise remedial measures that may be appropriate under the premises to protect
rights covered by the writ of amparo. As intimated earlier, however, the determination
should not be pursued to fix criminal liability on respondents preparatory to criminal
prosecution, or as a prelude to administrative disciplinary proceedings under existing
administrative issuances, if there be any.
RODRIGEZ V MACAPAGAL ARROYO
Rodriguez claims that the military tagged KMP as an enemy of the State under the Oplan
Bantay Laya, making its members targets of extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances.[2] He is a member of Alyansa Dagiti Mannalon Iti Cagayan (Kagimungan), a
peasant organization affiliated with Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP).
In September 2009, an affiliate of the Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP) was abducted
by the military. Dressed in civilian clothing, the military forced him into a car where he was
held at gun point and beaten. He was brought to a remote area where they held him captive
in a camp that belonged to the 17th Infantry Battalion of the Philippine Army. Here, he was
continously interrogated and tortured for twelve (12) days to obtain a confession that he was
a member of the New People’s Army (NPA). Torture included being beaten, starved, and
electrocuted. He was also threatened to be killed if he did not give the location of the NPA
camp.
Despite all this, he remained silent. During the latter part of his detention, he was forced to
sign different documents declaring that he had surrendered to the military in an encounter,
that he was never maltreated or tortured, and that he was a military asset giving information
about different individuals who belonged to NPA and the different NPA locations.
On the day of his release, he was given a shower, a new set of clothes, and food which he ate
alongside military officials. Throughout the day’s activities, the military took pictures of him
being well-treated. He was repeatedly reminded not to disclose to the media his experience
in the camp and to say that he had surrendered. His family picked him up that afternoon.
Two (2) months after his release, however, he noticed that he was constantly being followed
so he applied for writs of amparo and habeas data against the government to protect him
from the violation of his right to life, liberty and security. Among the respondents was
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (PGMA), based on the doctrine of command
responsibility. The Court of Appeals granted the writs but found the doctrine of command
responsibility inapplicable to amparo and habeas data cases.
ARTHUR BALAO v. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, GR No. 186050, 2011-12-13
Facts:
James M. Balao is a Psychology and Economics graduate of the University of the Philippines-
Baguio (UP-Baguio). In 1984, he was among those who founded the Cordillera Peoples
Alliance (CPA), a coalition of non-government organizations (NGOs) working for the cause of
indigenous... peoples in the Cordillera Region.
In 1988, while working for the CPA, he was arrested on the charge of violation of the Anti-
Subversion Law but the case was eventually dismissed for lack of evidence.
in May 2008, James reported surveillances on his person to his family, particularly to his
sister Nonette Balao (Nonette), and to CPA Chairperson Beverly Longid (Beverly).
He also claimed to have received calls and messages through his mobile phone informing him
that he was under surveillance by the PNP Regional Office and the AFP-ISU.
Contending that there is no plain, speedy or adequate remedy for them to protect James's
life, liberty and security, petitioners prayed for the issuance of a writ of amparo ordering the
respondents to disclose where James is detained or confined, to release James, and to...
cease and desist from further inflicting harm upon his person. They likewise prayed for (1) an
inspection order for the inspection of at least 11 military and police facilities which have been
previously reported as detention centers for activists abducted by military and police...
operatives; (2) a production order for all documents that contain evidence relevant to the
petition, particularly the Order of Battle List and any record or dossier respondents have on
James; and (3) a witness protection order.
Petitioners simultaneously filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion[5] for the immediate issuance of
a writ of amparo pursuant to Section 6 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.
On October 9, 2008, the Writ of Amparo[6] was issued directing respondents to file their
verified return together with their supporting affidavit within five days from receipt of the
writ.
GR 185215 July 22, 2010
Virginia BAUTISTA v CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and DBP
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
FACTS
Petitioner began her career in DBP on June 1, 1978 when she was appointed as Chief of
Division. On December 1, 1982, she was promoted to the position of Technical Assistant. On December
3, 1986, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive Order No. 81 which authorized, among
others, the reorganization of Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) pursuant to Sections 32 and 33
thereof. As part of DBPs reorganization, petitioner was temporarily appointed in January 1987 as
Account Officer with an annual salary of P62,640.00 which is equivalent to the 14th step of Salary Grade
(SG)-20. In November 1988, this appointment was made permanent subject to the result of the ongoing
reorganization of DBP and the approval of the CSC.
Republic Act No. 6758 (RA 6758), or The Compensation and Classification Act of 1989, took
effect on July 1, 1989. To implement the aforesaid law, the Department of Budget and Management
(DBM) promulgated the Government Financial Institutions (GFIs) Index of Occupational Services which
mandated GFIs, like the DBP, to adopt a uniform set of position titles in their plantilla. On October 2,
1989, the DBM issued Corporate Compensation Circular No. 10 (DBM-CCC No. 10) which authorized the
GFIs to match their current set of position titles to those prescribed by the GFIs Index of Occupational
Services. As a consequence, on February 15, 1991, petitioner was appointed on a permanent status as
BEO II with an annual salary of P131,250.00 or the 8th step of SG-24 which was made to retroact to July 1,
1989 (the date of effectivity of RA 6758). Prior to her appointment thereto, petitioner occupied the
position of Account Officer with SG-20 (24th step) with an annual salary of P102,000.00
Petitioner protested her appointment as BEO II before the Head of the Personnel
Administration Department of the DBP because it allegedly amounted to a demotion. According to
petitioner, prior to the reorganization of DBP, she occupied the position of Account Officer which, under
the GFIs Index of Occupational Services, was assigned a salary grade of 25 while that of BEO II has a
salary grade of 24.
Petitioners complaint was referred to the DBM, which found the same to be lacking in
merit. It held that the position of Account Officer in DBP is not in the rank of Assistant Department
Manager II. Therefore, to allocate [the] subject positions to Account Officer, SG-25 [under the GFIs Index
of Occupational Services] will be highly illogical and totally out of context of the accepted organizational
set-up for GOCCs/ GFIs
Undaunted, petitioner appealed to the CSC through several letters but the latter failed to act
on the same. On October 8, 2001, while applying for early retirement, she again wrote a letter-complaint
to the CSC. This time the CSC required DBP to comment.
DBP asserted that when the bank started to reorganize in 1987, petitioner was appointed to
the position of Account Officer with SG-20 on a temporary status. Pursuant to DBM-CCC No. 10
implementing RA 6758, the position of Account Officer with SG-20 was matched with BEO II with SG-24
(8th step). Contrary to petitioners claim, there was, thus, no demotion because her salary grade was even
increased from 20 to 24.
On April 16, 2007, the CSC rendered a decision dismissing petitioners complaint for lack of
merit. The CSC ruled that the appointment of petitioner to the position of BEO II was done pursuant to a
valid reorganization. Moreover, petitioner only raised her claim to the contested position on September
26, 1996 or more than seven years from the time of her appointment. She is, thus, deemed to have slept
on her rights under the equitable doctrine of laches.
On the issue of laches, the CA disagreed with the CSC. It found that petitioner timely protested her
alleged demotion through several letter-complaints and appeals; first with the DBP a month after her
appointment as BEO II, and, later on, through several letter-appeals with the CSC.
On the issue of demotion, the CA upheld the findings of the CSC that the appointment of petitioner to
BEO II did not constitute a demotion because this was done in good faith and pursuant to a valid
reorganization. Petitioners duties and responsibilities as Account Officer with SG-20 and as BEO II with
SG-24 are practically the same as shown by her BC-CSC Form 1 (Position Description Form). Rather than
lowering her rank and salary, petitioners appointment as BEO II had, in fact, resulted to an increase
thereof from SG-20 to SG-24, thus, negating petitioners claim of demotion.
ISSUE
WON appointment of petitioner to BEO II constitute a demotion (no)
Petitioner argues that her appointment as BEO II with SG-24 constitutes a demotion because prior to the
reorganization of DBP, she was an incumbent Account Officer with SG-25. The position of Account
Officer with SG-25 was not abolished after the reorganization. Thus, there was a decrease in her rank
and salary from SG-25 to SG-24.
DBP counters that the appointment of petitioner to BEO II was done in good faith and pursuant to a valid
reorganization. It claims that petitioner failed to prove that she held the position of Account Officer with
SG-25 under the GFIs Index of Occupational Services prior to the reorganization of the bank. Rather, the
evidence duly established that petitioner occupied the position of Account Officer with SG-20. The
position of Account Officer with SG-20 is not the same as Account Officer with SG-25 under the GFIs
Index of Occupational Services. When RA 6758 was passed by Congress, the DBM approved the GFIs
Index of Occupational Services which mandated the GFIs, including DBP, to adopt the position titles
therein. As a result, DBP fixed the positions of its employees to appropriate positions to conform to the
GFIs Index of Occupational Services based on the nature of their functions, hierarchy of jobs, and existing
salary range. Thus, the position of Account Officer with SG-20 was matched to the position of BEO II with
SG-24. Petitioners duties and responsibilities as Account Officer and as BEO II remained essentially the
same. Taken together, there can be no demotion because petitioners salary grade was even increased
from 20 to 24. It emphasizes that petitioner failed to prove that there was a reduction in her duties,
responsibilities, status or rank as a result of her appointment to the position of BEO II.
RULING
There was no demotion when petitioner was appointed as BEO II.
In this jurisdiction, a reorganization is valid provided that it is done in good faith. As a general rule, the
test of good faith lies in whether the purpose of the reorganization is for economy or to make the
bureaucracy more efficient. Removal from office as a result of reorganization must, thus, pass the test of
good faith. A demotion in office, i.e., the movement from one position to another involving the issuance
of an appointment with diminution in duties, responsibilities, status or rank which may or may not
involve a reduction in salary, is tantamount to removal, if no cause is shown for it. Consequently, before
a demotion may be effected pursuant to a reorganization, the observance of the rules on bona
fide abolition of public office is essential.
petitioner failed to prove that the position of Account Officer with SG-20 in the plantilla of DBP prior to
its reorganization and the position of Account Officer with SG-25 under the GFIs Index of Occupational
Services are the same. Upon the passage of RA 6758, the DBM promulgated the GFIs Index of
Occupational Services which mandated the adoption of a uniform system of position titles in GFIs,
including DBP. The DBM then issued DBM-CCC No. 10 which authorized DBP to match its current set of
position titles to those prescribed under the GFIs Index of Occupational Services based on the nature of
duties and responsibilities, qualification requirements for the position, hierarchy of jobs, and existing
salary range. Consequently, petitioners position of Account Officer with SG-20 was matched to the
position of BEO II with SG-24 because she exercised supervisory functions over certain bank personnel.
petitioner never assailed the reduction in the scope of her duties and responsibilities arising from her
appointment as BEO II in the proceedings below. Instead, she limited her claim of demotion on the
alleged decrease of her salary grade from 25 to 24 which, as stated earlier, has no legal and factual bases
to stand on. Well-settled is the rule that points of law, theories, issues and arguments not adequately
brought to the attention of the lower tribunal will not be ordinarily considered by a reviewing court as
they cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.
petitioner has failed to prove that DBP acted in bad faith when it appointed her as BEO II. None of the
circumstances under Section 2 of RA 6656 (An Act to Protect the Security of Tenure of Civil Service
Officers and Employees in the Implementation of Government Reorganization) which would
be indicia of bad faith in the process of reorganization is present here. Quite the contrary, the
reorganization worked in petitioners favor as her salary grade was increased from 20 to 24.
BUKLOD NG KAWANING EIIB VS EXEC SEC
FACTS:
During the time of President Corazon Aquino, she created the Economic Intelligence and
Investigation Bureau (EIIB) to primarily conduct anti-smuggling operations in areas outside
the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs. In the year 2000, President Estrada issued an order
deactivating the EIIB. He subsequently ordered the employees of EIIB to be separated from
the service. Thereafter, he created the Presidential Anti-Smuggling Task Force “Aduana”,
which EIIB employees claim to be essentially the same as EIIB. The employees of EIIB,
through the Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB, invoked the Supreme Court’s power of judicial review
in questioning the said orders. EIIB employees maintained that the president has no power to
abolish a public office, as that is a power solely lodged in the legislature; and that the
abolition violates their constitutional right to security of tenure.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition has merit.
HELD: No. It is a general rule that the power to abolish a public office is lodged with the
legislature. The exception is when it comes to agencies, bureaus, and other offices under the
executive department, the president may deactivate them pursuant to control power over
such offices, unless such office is created by the Constitution. This is also germane to the
president’s power to reorganize the Office of the President. Basis of such power also has its
roots in two laws i.e., PD 1772 and PD 1416. These decrees expressly grant the President of
the Philippines the continuing authority to reorganize the national government, which
includes the power to group, consolidate bureaus and agencies, to abolish offices, to transfer
functions, to create and classify functions, services and activities and to standardize salaries
and materials.
Also, it cannot be said that there is bad faith in the abolition of EIIB. EIIB allocations has
always exceeded P100 million per year. To save the government some money, it needed to
abolish it and replace it with TF Aduana which has for its allocation just P50 million. Further,
TYF Aduana is invested more power that EIIB never had, i.e., search and seizure and arrest.
Lastly, EEIB employees’ right to security of tenure is not violated. Since there is no bad faith
in the abolition of EIIB, such abolition is not infirm. Valid abolition of offices is neither
removal nor separation of the incumbents. If the public office ceases to exist, there is no
separation or dismissal to speak of. Indeed, there is no such thing as an absolute right to hold
office. Except constitutional offices which provide for special immunity as regards salary and
tenure, no one can be said to have any vested right in an office or its salary.
. Astraquillo vs. Manglapus (terminated ambassadors)
214 SCRA 567
FACTS: Isabelo J. Astraquillo was appointed by the President as Ambassador to United
Arab Emirates. After occupying the post for 2 years, his wife and cousin-in-law was accused
of improper interference with his functions. Thus the Secretary of Foreign Affairs
recommended to the President AstraquilloS’ termination as Ambassador, it is approved by
the authority of the President.
Alunan Glang was appointed by President Aquino as Ambassador to Kuwait. Two years
afterwards he received telex message from Sec. of Foreign Affairs informing him that his
services as ambassador is terminated and directing him to vacate his post.
Alejandro Melchor Jr. was also appointed by the President Aquino as Ambassador. And just
the same the secretary of FA recommended to the president the termination of the services
of Melchor, which was approved.
Summary: It is a consolidated and jointly considered cases because they all turn upon a
common legal issue. The consolidated petition is questioning the validity of the termination
of petitioners appointment as political or non-career members of the country’s Foreign
Service by authority of the President of the Philippines who approved the recommendation
for termination issued by the Sec. of Foreign affairs.
ISSUE: Whether or not there services as Philippine Diplomats were under the circumstances,
at the pleasure of the President, terminable without cause or need of investigation?
HELD: YES, since under the “non-career” service in accordance to Section 6 of P.D. 807 all
three petitioners: Astroquillo, GLang and Melchor Jr. whose appointments to the Foreign
Service were made on “bases other than those of the usual test of merit and fitness utilized
for the career service.” This being so, their tenure was co-terminus with that of the
appointing authority subject to his pleasures.
Wherefore, the petitions in the cases embraced in this opinion are all denied, with costs
against the petitioners.
ACHOCOSO VS MACARAIG
FACTS: Tomas D. Achacoso was appointed Administrator of the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration
In compliance with a request addressed by the President of the Philippines to “all
Department Heads, Undersecretaries, Assistant Secretaries, Bureau Heads,” and other
government officials, he filed a courtesy resignation.
This was accepted by the President, “with deep regrets.”
The Secretary of Labor requested him to turn over his office to the Deputy Administrator as
officer-in-charge.
he protested his replacement and declared he was not surrendering his office because his
resignation was not voluntary but filed only in obedience to the President’s directive.
On the same date, respondent Jose N. Sarmiento was appointed Administrator of the POEA,
vice the petitioner.
Achacoso was informed thereof the following day and was again asked to vacate his office.
He filed a motion for reconsideration but this was denied. He then came to this Court for
relief.
The petitioner invokes security of tenure against his claimed removal without legal cause.
Achacoso contends that he is a member of the Career Service of the Civil Service and so
enjoys security of tenure, which is one of the characteristics of the Career Service as
distinguished from the Non-Career Service. 1 Claiming to have the rank of undersecretary, he
says he comes under Article IV, Section 5 of P.D. 807, otherwise known as the Civil Service
Decree, which includes in the Career Service:
3.Positions in the Career Executive Service; namely, Undersecretary, Assistant Secretary,
Bureau Director, Assistant Bureau Director, Regional Director, Assistant Regional Director,
Chief of Department Service and other officers of equivalent rank as may be identified by the
Career Executive Service Board, all of whom are appointed by the President.
His argument is that in view of the security of tenure enjoyed by the above-named officials, it
was “beyond the prerogatives of the President” to require them to submit courtesy
resignations. Such courtesy resignations, even if filed, should be disregarded for having been
submitted “under duress,” as otherwise the President would have the power to remove
career officials at pleasure, even for capricious reasons
The respondents assert he is not entitled to the guaranty because he is not a career official
(the petitioner did not possess the necessary qualifications when he was appointed
Administrator of the POEA in 1987).
ISSUE: WON Achacoso is protected by the security of tenure clause
HELD: NO. The Court finds for the respondent.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; SECURITY OF TENURE; PERMANENT APPOINTMENT
ISSUED ONLY TO PERSONS QUALIFIED. — A permanent appointment can be issued only “to a
person who meets all the requirements for the position to which he is being appointed,
including the appropriate eligibility prescribed.”
The mere fact that a position belongs to the Career Service does not automatically confer
security of tenure on its occupant even if he does not possess the required qualifications.
PERSONS APPOINTED WITHOUT THE REQUISITE QUALIFICATION DEEMED IN ACTING
CAPACITY. — The mere fact that a position belongs to the Career Service does not
automatically confer security of tenure on its occupant even if he does not possess the
required qualifications. Such right will have to depend on the nature of his appointment,
which in turn depends on his eligibility or lack of it. A person who does not have the requisite
qualifications for the position cannot be appointed to it in the first place or, only as an
exception to the rule, may be appointed to it merely in an acting capacity in the absence of
appropriate eligibles.
TEMPORARY APPOINTMENT; PURPOSE. — The purpose of an acting or temporary
appointment is to prevent a hiatus in the discharge of official functions by authorizing a
person to discharge the same pending the selection of a permanent or another appointee.
4.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CONDITION IMPOSED ON APPOINTEE. — The person named in an acting
capacity accepts the position under the condition that he shall surrender the office once he is
called upon to do so by the appointing authority.
EXPIRATION OF TERM; METHOD OF TERMINATING TEMPORARY EMPLOYMENT. — In these
circumstances, the acting appointee is separated by a method of terminating official relations
known in the law of public officers as expiration of the term. His term is understood at the
outset as without any fixity and enduring at the pleasure of the appointing authority. When
required to relinquish his office, he cannot complain that he is being removed in violation of
his security of tenure because removal imports the separation of the incumbent before the
expiration of his term. This is allowed by the Constitution only when it is for cause as
provided by law. The acting appointee is separated precisely because his term has expired.
Expiration of the term is not covered by the constitutional provision on security of tenure.
LUEGO CASE (143 SCRA 327) NOT APPLICABLE TO CASE AT BAR. — The case of Luego v. Civil
Service Commission is not applicable because the facts of that case are different. The
petitioner in Luego was qualified and was extended a permanent appointment that could not
be withdrawn on the ground that it was merely temporary. In the case at bar, the petitioner
was not eligible and therefore could be appointed at best only in a temporary capacity. The
other cases he cites, viz. Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila v. Intermediate Appellate Court,
Palma-Fernandez v. De la Paz, and Dario v. Mison, are also not pertinent because they also Petitioner's separation from government service as a result of the reorganization
involved permanent appointees who could not be removed because of their security of ordained by the then nascent Aquino government may not be considered a resignation
tenure. within the contemplation of the law. Resignation is defined as the act of giving up or the act
of an officer by which he declines his office and renounces the further right to use it. To
constitute a complete and operative act of resignation, the officer or employee must show a
clear intention to relinquish or surrender his position accompanied by the act of
SKIP RETIREMENT KASI WALA AKONG MAHANAP AT ANTOK NA AKO
relinquishment. Resignation implies an expression of the incumbent in some form, express or
RESIGNATION TOPIC NA TO implied, of the intention to surrender, renounce and relinquish the office, and its acceptance
by competent and lawful authority.
From the foregoing it is evident that petitioner's "resignation" lacks the element of
clear intention to surrender his position. We cannot presume such intention from his
MARIO D. ORTIZ vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and COMMISSION ON AUDIT
statement in his letter of March 5, 1986 that he was placing his position at the disposal of the
G.R. No. 78957. June 28, 1988
President. He did not categorically state therein that he was unconditionally giving up his
Facts:
position. It should be remembered that said letter was actually a response to Proclamation
Petitioner was appointed Commissioner of the Commission on Elections
No. 1 which President Aquino issued on February 25, 1986 when she called on all appointive
(COMELEC) by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos "for a term expiring May 17, 1992." On
public officials to tender their "courtesy resignation" as a "first step to restore confidence in
March 5, 1986, petitioner sent President Corazon C. Aquino a letter which reads that he
public administration.
hereby places his position at President Aquino’s disposal. On March 25, 1986, the Freedom
Verily, a "courtesy resignation" can lot properly be interpreted as resignation in the
Constitution was promulgated, Article III thereof provides: xxx SEC. 3. Any public officer or
legal sense for it is not necessarily a reflection of a public official's intention to surrender his
employee separated from the service as a result of the reorganization effected under this
position. Rather, it manifests his submission to the will of the political authority and the
Proclamation shall, if entitled under the laws then in force, receive the retirement and other
appointing power. A stringent interpretation of courtesy resignations must therefore be
benefits accruing thereunder.
observed, particularly in cases involving constitutional officials like the petitioner whose
On July 21, 1986, the Deputy Executive Secretary conveyed the information to
removal from office entails an impeachment proceeding.
Commissioners Marquinez, Ortiz, Agpalo and Layosa that the President had "accepted, with
The curtailment of his term, not being attributable to any voluntary act on the part
regrets, their respective resignations, effective immediately." After the presidential
of the petitioner, equity and justice demand that he should be deemed to have completed
acceptance of said "resignations," new Commissioners composed the COMELEC, to which
his term albeit much ahead of the date stated in his appointment paper. Petitioner's case
Commissioners Agpalo, Ortiz and Marquinez submitted on July 30, 1986 their respective
should be placed in the same category as that of an official holding a primarily confidential
applications for retirement.
position whose tenure ends upon his superior's loss of confidence in him. His cessation from
To justify their petitions for retirement and their requests for payment of
the service entails no removal but an expiration of his term. As he is deemed to have
retirement benefits, former COMELEC Commissioners invoked Section 1 of Republic Act No.
completed his term of office, petitioner should be considered retired from the service.
l568 which provides that: when the Auditor General or the Chairman or any Member of the
Commission on Elections retires from the service for having completed his term of office xxx
Provided, That in case of resignation, he has rendered not less than twenty years of service in
the government, he shall receive an annuity payable monthly during the residue of his
natural life equivalent to the amount of monthly salary he was receiving on the date of
retirement, incapacity or resignation. INSKIPAN KO UNG COLLANTES AT JOSON
The COMELEC denied the applications for retirement of the Commissioners on the
ground that they were "not entitled to retirement benefits under Republic Act No. 1568, as ELISA O. GAMBOA, et al. vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, et al.
amended.” Petitioner Ortiz moved for the reconsideration of said resolution; but the same G.R. No. L-38068 September 30, 1981
was denied by the COMELEC. Petitioner appealed to the Chairman of the COA, who referred GUERRERO, J.:
the same to COMELEC. The same, however, was not acted upon. Hence, this petition. The
respondents posit the view that petitioner's "voluntary resignation" prevented the Facts:
completion of his term of office, and, therefore, having rendered only sixteen years of service
to the government, he is not entitled to retirement benefits. Petitioners are the defendants in a civil case filed by herein private respondents with the CFI
Issue: of Rizal, for damages. Judgment was rendered by the trial court (then presided over by Judge
Whether or not a constitutional official whose "courtesy resignation" was accepted Vivencio Ruiz) in favor of the private respondents. The judgment having become final, a writ
by the President of the Philippines during the effectivity of the Freedom Constitution may be of execution was issued and accordingly, a public auction sale was conducted by the Sheriff
entitled to retirement benefits under Republic Act No. 1568, as amended. who issued a Sheriff's Certificate of Sale of a Toyota Corolla taxi, model '69, and of a
Held: certificate of Public Convenience to operate 60 units of taxicabs, in favor of private
respondents, represented by Atty. Jesus Suntay, their counsel of record. Thereafter, herein
petitioners filed an "Urgent Motion to Set Aside Sale on Execution" on the grounds that the
execution sale was attended by fraud, mistake and/or irregularity "so serious as to have
worked a grave injustice to defendants herein." The then presiding Judge Ruiz denied said
motion. Herein petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration which Judge Ruiz granted,
setting aside the execution sale on the grounds that it is defective and irregular.
Later, Judge Vivencio Ruiz tendered his resignation pursuant to and in compliance with Letter
of Instruction No. 11 issued by the President of the Philippines. The aforesaid order of Judge
Ruiz was then, setting aside the execution sale, promulgated and filed with the Clerk of
Court. Subsequent thereto, Judge Ruiz received the letter of acceptance by the President.
Respondent Judge Arsenio Alcantara was appointed in his stead.
Private respondents filed their "Motion to Annul and/or Set Aside Order, dated September
18, 1972". Respondent Judge Alcantara granted private respondents' motion, and declared as
null and void the order of the former Judge Ruiz, thereby restoring the validity and efficacy of
the execution sale in favor of private respondents. The reasons stated in the questioned
order were: (1) that Judge Ruiz ceased to be a member of the Judiciary on the date of his
resignation that was October 4, 1972, or, on the date of acceptance thereof by the President
in his letter of October 6, 1972; (2) that the order of September 18, 1972 was filed with the
Clerk of Court only on October 18, 1972 — to be valid and binding, a judgment or order must
be duly signed and promulgated during the incumbency of the Judge whose signature
appears thereon; (3) that Judge Ruiz cannot even be considered a de facto officer after
October 4 or 6, 1972 because — (a) the filing of the resignation of a public officer in the
proper office, without any objection constitutes a sufficient acceptance and notice of
acceptance is not necessary; (b) good faith on the part of Judge Ruiz did not exist when the
order of September 18, 1972 was filed and promulgated with the Clerk of Court on October
18, 1972, "on account of the fact that all orders except litigated order of September 18, 1972
filed with the Clerk of Court on October 18, 1972 bore October dates as attested by the
certification of the Clerk of Court, and if it were true that the contested order was made on
September 18, 1972, why was it not released earlier than October 18, 1972 when several
orders or decisions bearing all October dates were released ahead of the order in question".
Petitioners filed their Motion for Reconsideration; however, respondent Judge denied
petitioner's motion. Petitioners likewise filed a "Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to
Adduce Evidence in Support of Motion" but it was denied for lack of sufficient merits.
Issue:
Whether or not Judge Vivencio M. Ruiz ceased to be judge de jure or de facto upon
acceptance of his resignation by the President of the Philippines.
Ruling:
No. One of the ways of terminating official relations is by resignation. To constitute a
complete and operative resignation of public office, there must be an intention to relinquish
a part of the term, accompanied by the act of relinquishment 6 and a resignation implies an
expression of the incumbent in some form, express or implied, of the intention to surrender,
renounce, and relinquish the office and the acceptance by competent and lawful authority. 7
In Our jurisprudence, acceptance is necessary for resignation of a public officer to be
operative and effective, otherwise the officer is subject to the penal provisions of Article 238
of the Revised Penal Code on Abandonment of office or position. Clearly, a public officer
cannot abandon his office or position before his resignation is accepted but the incumbent
official would not be in a position to determine the acceptance of his resignation unless he
has been duly notified therefor.
It must be noted that respondent Court of Appeals underscored the undeniable fact that
while the President's letter of acceptance was dated October 6, 1972, it was completely
processed only on October 20, 1972 and officially received by Judge Ruiz on October 21,
1972. Thus, respondent Court's holding that even if there were a strict interpretation as to
when Judge Ruiz ceased to be a member of the Judiciary although petitioners maintain that
the date of his cessation from office is October 6, 1972, still, his acts before the official
notification of the acceptance of his resignation are those of a de facto officer, and therefore,
valid, is correct. Respondent Court of Appeals has also pointed out correctly that the
underlying principle of de facto acts is the protection of third parties and the public. It is for
this reason of public interest that the Secretary (now Minister) of Justice issued Circular No.
70 dated October 13, 1972, directing all categories of judges and fiscals to stay in their official
stations and not to depart therefrom without previous permission from the Office (referring
to Ministry of Justice) and to continue discharging their functions until notified of the action
taken on their letters of resignation.
QUINTO vs COMELEC
G.R. No. 189698 February 22, 2010
ELEAZAR P. QUINTO and GERINO A. TOLENTINO, JR., Petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
PUNO, C.J.:
 ETO DIGEST NG CASE PRIOR TO THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION.
RESOLUTION YUNG ASSIGNED CASE SA ATIN
Facts:
Pursuant to its constitutional mandate to enforce and administer election laws, COMELEC
issued Resolution No. 8678, the Guidelines on the Filing of Certificates of Candidacy (CoC)
and Nomination of Official Candidates of Registered Political Parties in Connection with the
May 10, 2010 National and Local Elections. Sections 4 and 5 of Resolution No. 8678 provide:
SEC. 4. Effects of Filing Certificates of Candidacy.—a) Any person holding a public appointive
office or position including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and other
officers and employees in government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be
considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.
b) Any person holding an elective office or position shall not be considered resigned upon
the filing of his certificate of candidacy for the same or any other elective office or position.
Alarmed that they will be deemed ipso facto resigned from their offices the moment they file
their CoCs, petitioners Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr., who hold appointive
positions in the government and who intend to run in the coming elections, filed the instant
petition for prohibition and certiorari, seeking the declaration of the afore-quoted Section
4(a) of Resolution No. 8678 as null and void. Petitioners also contend that Section 13 of R.A.
No. 9369, the basis of the assailed COMELEC resolution, contains two conflicting provisions.
These must be harmonized or reconciled to give effect to both and to arrive at a declaration
that they are not ipso facto resigned from their positions upon the filing of their CoCs.
Issue: whether the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369 and
Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 are violative of the equal protection clause
Held: Yes.
In considering persons holding appointive positions as ipso facto resigned from their posts
upon the filing of their CoCs, but not considering as resigned all other civil servants,
specifically the elective ones, the law unduly discriminates against the first class. The fact
alone that there is substantial distinction between those who hold appointive positions and
those occupying elective posts, does not justify such differential treatment.
In order that there can be valid classification so that a discriminatory governmental act may
pass the constitutional norm of equal protection, it is necessary that the four (4) requisites of
valid classification be complied with, namely:
(1) It must be based upon substantial distinctions;
(2) It must be germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) It must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) It must apply equally to all members of the class.
The first requirement means that there must be real and substantial differences between the
classes treated differently. As illustrated in the fairly recent Mirasol v. Department of Public
Works and Highways, a real and substantial distinction exists between a motorcycle and
other motor vehicles sufficient to justify its classification among those prohibited from plying
the toll ways. Not all motorized vehicles are created equal—a two-wheeled vehicle is less
stable and more easily overturned than a four-wheel vehicle.
Nevertheless, the classification would still be invalid if it does not comply with the second
requirement—if it is not germane to the purpose of the law.
The third requirement means that the classification must be enforced not only for the
present but as long as the problem sought to be corrected continues to exist. And, under the
last requirement, the classification would be regarded as invalid if all the members of the
class are not treated similarly, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed.
Applying the four requisites to the instant case, the Court finds that the differential
treatment of persons holding appointive offices as opposed to those holding elective ones is
not germane to the purposes of the law.
The obvious reason for the challenged provision is to prevent the use of a governmental
position to promote one’s candidacy, or even to wield a dangerous or coercive influence on
the electorate. The measure is further aimed at promoting the efficiency, integrity, and
discipline of the public service by eliminating the danger that the discharge of official duty
would be motivated by political considerations rather than the welfare of the public. The
restriction is also justified by the proposition that the entry of civil servants to the electoral
arena, while still in office, could result in neglect or inefficiency in the performance of duty
because they would be attending to their campaign rather than to their office work.
If we accept these as the underlying objectives of the law, then the assailed provision cannot
be constitutionally rescued on the ground of valid classification. Glaringly absent is the
requisite that the classification must be germane to the purposes of the law. Indeed, whether
one holds an appointive office or an elective one, the evils sought to be prevented by the
measure remain. For example, the Executive Secretary, or any Member of the Cabinet for
that matter, could wield the same influence as the Vice-President who at the same time is
appointed to a Cabinet post (in the recent past, elected Vice-Presidents were appointed to
take charge of national housing, social welfare development, interior and local government,
and foreign affairs). With the fact that they both head executive offices, there is no valid
justification to treat them differently when both file their CoCs for the elections. Under the
present state of our law, the Vice-President, in the example, running this time, let us say, for
President, retains his position during the entire election period and can still use the resources
of his office to support his campaign.
As to the danger of neglect, inefficiency or partisanship in the discharge of the functions of
his appointive office, the inverse could be just as true and compelling. The public officer who
files his certificate of candidacy would be driven by a greater impetus for excellent
performance to show his fitness for the position aspired for.
There is thus no valid justification to treat appointive officials differently from the elective
ones. The classification simply fails to meet the test that it should be germane to the
purposes of the law. The measure encapsulated in the second proviso of the third paragraph
of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369 and in Section 66 of the OEC violates the equal protection
clause.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The second proviso in the third
paragraph of Section 13 of Republic Act No. 9369, Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code
and Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 are declared as UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
Facts:
This is a motion for reconsideration filed by the Commission on Elections. The latter moved
to question an earlier decision of the Supreme Court declaring the second proviso in the third
paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369, the basis of the COMELEC resolution, and Section
4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 unconstitutional. The resolution provides that, “Any
person holding a public appointive office or position including active members of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, and other officers and employees in government-owned
or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the
filing of his certificate of candidacy.” RA 9369 provides that
“For this purpose, the Commission shall set the deadline for the filing of certificate of
candidacy/petition of registration/manifestation to participate in the election. Any person
who files his certificate of candidacy within this period shall only be considered as a
candidate at the start of the campaign period for which he filed his certificate of candidacy:
Provided, That, unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall take effect only
upon the start of the aforesaid campaign period: Provided, finally, That any person holding a
public appointive office or position, including active members of the armed forces, and
officers and employees in government-owned or -controlled corporations, shall be
considered ipso facto resigned from his/her office and must vacate the same at the start of
the day of the filing of his/her certificate of candidacy.
Issue: Issue: whether the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369
and Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 are violative of the equal protection clause
and therefore unconstitutional
Held: No challenge raised against Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code and the pertinent proviso
To start with, the equal protection clause does not require the universal application of the in Section 13 of RA 9369 must also fail.
laws to all persons or things without distinction. What it simply requires is equality among
equals as determined according to a valid classification. The test developed by jurisprudence
here and yonder is that of reasonableness, which has four requisites:
(1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; SKIP KO DIN UNG ESTRADA VS ARROYO
(2) It is germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.
Our assailed Decision readily acknowledged that these deemed-resigned provisions satisfy
the first, third and fourth requisites of reasonableness. It, however, proffers the dubious
conclusion that the differential treatment of appointive officials vis-à-vis elected officials is
not germane to the purpose of the law, because "whether one holds an appointive office or
an elective one, the evils sought to be prevented by the measure remain."
In the instant case, is there a rational justification for excluding elected officials from the
operation of the deemed resigned provisions? There is.
An election is the embodiment of the popular will, perhaps the purest expression of the
sovereign power of the people. It involves the choice or selection of candidates to public
office by popular vote. Considering that elected officials are put in office by their constituents
for a definite term, it may justifiably be said that they were excluded from the ambit of the
deemed resigned provisions in utmost respect for the mandate of the sovereign will. In other
words, complete deference is accorded to the will of the electorate that they be served by
such officials until the end of the term for which they were elected. In contrast, there is no
such expectation insofar as appointed officials are concerned.
The dichotomized treatment of appointive and elective officials is therefore germane to the
purposes of the law. For the law was made not merely to preserve the integrity, efficiency,
and discipline of the public service; the Legislature, whose wisdom is outside the rubric of
judicial scrutiny, also thought it wise to balance this with the competing, yet equally
compelling, interest of deferring to the sovereign will.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court RESOLVES to GRANT the respondent’s and the intervenors’
Motions for Reconsideration; REVERSE and SET ASIDE this Court’s December 1, 2009
Decision; DISMISS the Petition; and ISSUE this Resolution declaring as not
UNCONSTITUTIONAL (1) Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678, (2) the second
proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of Republic Act No. 9369, and (3) Section 66 of
the Omnibus Election Code.
==============
Note: Not applicable sa barangay office: Any elective or appointive municipal, city, provincial
or national official or employee, or those in the civil or military service, including those in
government-owned or-controlled corporations, shall be considered automatically resigned
upon the filing of certificate of candidacy for a barangay office.
Since barangay elections are governed by a separate deemed resignation rule, under the
present state of law, there would be no occasion to apply the restriction on candidacy found
in Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, and later reiterated in the proviso of Section 13
of RA 9369, to any election other than a partisan one. For this reason, the overbreadth